Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, October 6, 2026, are:

Re:                 Leyva, Silvia vs. Allstate Insurance Company

Case No.:   VCU328626

Date:           October 6, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Defendant’s Motions to Compel Initial Discovery

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with these motions to compel initial discovery and/or deed admissions admitted. The Court, therefore, takes these hearings off calendar. The Court notes motions to compel further responses filed by Defendant set for December 8, 2026 and December 15, 2026.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 First National Bank of Omaha vs. Underwood, Serena Renee

Case No.:   VCL328857

Date:           October 6, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and enter judgment as requested

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendant for breach of contract.

On April 21, 2026, Defendant filed an answer that checks the box “Defendant admits that all of the statements of the complaint or cross-complaint are true EXCEPT:” and states nothing that denies the allegations of the complaint.

Defendant’s answer further states they sought payment arrangements, a payment plan, have utilized a debt relief service and pleads affirmative defenses for impossibility or impracticability and that Defendant was prevented from performing under the contract.

On July 31, 2026, Defendant filed this motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense and instead admits the material allegations of the complaint.

No opposition appears filed.

Authority and Analysis

Meet and Confer

Plaintiff states that counsel attempted to contact Defendant regarding this Motion in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 439(a). “Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a).)

MJOP

A motion for judgment on the pleadings (MJOP) is used to challenge a pleading in the same manner as a general demurrer, i.e., the challenged pleading (1) establishes that the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction or (2) does not allege facts sufficient to support a cause of action or defense.(Code Civ. Proc. § 438(c)(1); International Assn. of Firefighters v. City of San Jose (2011) 195 Cal.App.4^th 1179,1196.) Like a demurrer, the grounds for the motion must appear on the face of the pleading or be based on facts capable of judicial notice, including court records.  (Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. Superior Court (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 978, 986, and fn. 6.)

A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be based upon “matters properly the subject to judicial notice.” Saltarelli & Steponovich v. Douglas (1995) 50 Cal.App.4th 1, 5. Judicial notice may be taken “of a party’s admissions or concessions, but only in cases where the admissions “cannot reasonably be controverted,’ such as in answer to interrogatories or request for admissions, or in affidavits and declaration filed on the party’s behalf.” (Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 485.) Here, the answer filed by Defendant sufficiently provides the basis to grant this motion, as Defendant fails to deny the allegations of the complaint. 

The Court, therefore, grants the motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court will sign the proposed order granting judgment on the pleadings and the proposed judgment inclusive of the costs reflected on the memorandum of costs filed with this Court. While the Court notes the memorandum of cost seeks $60 in the “other category” this amount appears to reflect the filing fee for this motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Engle, Al vs. Cantrell, Steven

Case No.:   VCU325651

Date:           October 6, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff alleges “negligence/malpractice” against Defendant Steven Cantrell, a medical doctor.

Defendant filed a summary judgment motion set for July 14, 2026.

On July 9, 2026, Defendant filed an ex parte motion to continue the trial date on the basis that the summary judgment motion would be heard within 30 days thereof. The Court exercised its jurisdiction to hear the motion within 30 days of the current trial date and declined to continue trial in this matter. The proof of service indicated service of the ex parte motion by mail.

The motion for summary judgment was heard July 14, 2026. No opposition was filed. No appearance on the motion was made by either party. The Court granted unopposed summary judgment motion in favor of Defendant.

On July 23, 2026, Defendant provided notice of entry of the Court’s ruling on the summary judgment motion.

On July 24, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion for reconsideration. The motion states “Plaintiff was not notified of July 13, 2026 court date, and was told that July 14, 2026 date was cancelled.

The Court notes no proof of service as to this motion.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, states:

"(a) When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown."

Section 1008 requires new or different facts, circumstances or law. New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal. App. 4th 206, 212, states, "Section 1008, subdivision (a) requires that a motion for reconsideration be based on new or different facts, circumstances, or law. A party seeking reconsideration also must provide satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce the evidence at an earlier time. [Citation.]"  Further, the New York Times Co. court noted "The burden under section 1008 is comparable to that of a party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence: the information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it at the trial. [Citation.] Case law after the 1992 amendments to Section 1008 as relaxed the definition of 'new or different facts,' but it is still necessary that the party seeking that relief offer some fact or circumstance not previously considered by the court. [Citations.]" (Id. at 212-213.)

Here, the summary judgment hearing date was always set for July 14, 2026, and the impact of the ex parte was to find the motion timely despite being heard within 30 days of trial. There is insufficient information presented to the Court that Plaintiff “was told that July 14, 2026 date was cancelled.” No speaker was identified, no method of communication was identified, and this motion had been set for approximately 3 months prior for the July 14, 2026. The court’s notes indicate that Plaintiff appeared at the settlement conference on July 9, 2026, and when the matter did not settle, was again given all future dates by the court, including the MSJ date. Plaintiff filed no timely opposition to the motion, which was due 20 days prior to the hearing date. The Court finds no basis to grant the motion for reconsideration of its ruling on summary judgment.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Estes, Jeremy Lee vs. Cheema Transport, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU289306

Date:           October 6, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Defendant’s Counsel’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel  

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; the order will be deemed effective upon the filing with the court of proof of personal service of the order as indicated herein.

On June 26, 2026 Counsel Micah K. Nilsson and Justin L. Thomas of Zimmer & Melton, LLP, filed a motion to be relieved as counsel as to Defendant Cheema Transport, Inc. Counsel filed the following with respect to withdrawing:

(1) MC-051 - Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as Counsel;

(2) MC-052 – Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel; and

(3) MC-053 - Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel

On August 28, 2026, Counsel filed a supplemental declaration.

Additionally, Counsel has filed proofs of service of these documents by electronic service.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 284 provides that “[t]he attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at any time before or after judgment of final determination, as follows: 1. Upon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes; [or] 2. Upon the order of the court, upon the application of either client or attorney, after notice from one to the other.”

California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) requires that the “notice of motion and motion to be relieved as counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) must be directed to the client and must be made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-051).”

As noted above, Counsel has complied with California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) by submitting the notice and motion on MC-051 and by directing the notice and motion to all parties. 

California Rule of Court 3.1362 (c) further mandates that: “The motion to be relieved as counsel must be accompanied by a declaration on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel--Civil (form MC-052).

The declaration must state in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1). Specifically, the declaration that Rule 3.1362(c) requires must state that the moving attorney attempted to secure a “Substitution of Attorney” from the client as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1) and that the client refused to so stipulate.

Here, the declaration is properly made on form MC-052 and uses general terms without compromising confidentiality. Further, the supplemental declaration indicates that a substitution of counsel was sought on July 15, 2026.

Next, service under Rule 3.1362(d) requires personal service, electronic service, or mail and counsel’s declaration must note the service made. Here, service was by mail at the last known address with return receipt requested and via email at addresses consistently used by the Defendant.

Finally, Rule 3.1362(e) requires the proposed order be lodged with the Court on MC-053 with the moving papers, specifying all hearing dates scheduled, including date of trial. Counsel has complied with this requirement.

Therefore, the Court grants Defendant’s Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw as to Defendant. If no one requests oral argument, the Court is prepared to sign the order entitled “Order Granting Attorney’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel - Civil” that the moving party lodged with the Court.  This order will be deemed effective upon the filing with the court of a proof of personal service of the “Order Granting Attorney’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – Civil” as to Defendant.

The Court further directs counsel to attach to the Order an additional notice of the date, time, and Department of this court for any future hearing dates for this case as calendared.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Renteria, Perlita vs. Perez, Jaclyn

Case No.:   VCU334035

Date:           October 6, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Demurrer

Tentative Ruling: To sustain the demurrer with leave to amend; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint.

Facts

The complaint in this matter defines Plaintiff as “Perlita Renteria obo William Renteria, a minor: and Defendant as “Jaclyn Perez obo Joseph Perez, a minor.”

Plaintiff alleges the following:

“On May 13, 2024, Plaintiff, William Renteria ("Plaintiff"), was present in an unsupervised boys' locker room at Farmersville Junior High School, located at 650 N. Virginia Avenue, Farmersville, California 93223, The Incident occurred between approximately 11:00 a.m. and 11:45 a.m.

While Plaintiff was in the locker room, Defendant, Joseph Perez ("Defendant"), also a student, approached Plaintiff and, without consent, placed him in a chokehold…”

Defendant demurrers to the complaint on the basis that it fails to allege Plaintiff’s standing and is uncertain as to the intended defendant. Defendant argues the complaint does not allege Plaintiff’s legal capacity to sue, as no guardian ad litem has been appointed by the Court. Further, that the complaint names Jaclyn Perez as a Defendant, but alleges no facts as to Jacyln’s liability.

In opposition, Plaintiff notes the pending guardian ad litem application and seeks leave to amend the complaint.

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Standing

A special demurrer lies on the ground that “[t]he person who filed the pleading does not have the legal capacity to sue.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(b).)

"A minor may enforce the minor's rights by civil action or other legal proceedings in the same manner as an adult, except that a guardian must conduct the action or proceedings." (Fam. Code, § 6601.) Code of Civil Procedure Section 372 provides in relevant part: "When a minor... is a party, that person shall appear either by a guardian or conservator of the estate or by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court in which the action or proceeding is pending, or by a judge thereof, in each case." (Code Civ. Proa, § 372(a)(1).) The statute provides that two types of individuals may appear on behalf of minors: (1) "a guardian or conservator of the estate";[1] or (2) "a guardian ad litem appointed by the court."

Here, Plaintiff has attempted to file a guardian ad litem application, but the application is incomplete and the Court cannot sign the proposed order. The complaint, in any event, fails to allege the capacity by which Perlita Renteria purports to bring this action.

Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer with leave to amend as to this issue.

Uncertainty

A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.  (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to respond to. (Williams v Beechmint Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2).

Here, the Court agrees that the manner of pleading as to the defendant in this case renders the complaint uncertain. No facts are alleged as against Jaclyn Perez and there is no allegation as Jaclyn Perez’s relationship to Joseph Perez.

Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer with leave to amend as to this issue.

Leave to Amend

Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Rouch Investment Company vs. Farrell, Brendan J.

Case No.:   VCU334667 

Date:           October 6, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Demurrer

Tentative Ruling: To sustain the demurrer, with leave to amend, as to the first three and fifth causes of action, and, otherwise, to overrule it.  Plaintiffs shall have 10 days from notice of this ruling to file an amended complaint. 

Defendant American Pacific Mortgage Corporation (American) demurrers to all causes of action asserted against it in the complaint of plaintiffs Rouch Investment Company and Pinball Properties, Inc.

Plaintiff’s complaint

This case arises from a generally described series of loan transactions, “at least thirty-five (35),” whereby plaintiffs allegedly gave money to defendants, pursuant to oral agreements with them “through [individual defendant Brendan J.] Farrell,” wherein “Farrell and defendants” were to loan the money to third parties, secured by real property. 

Plaintiffs allege money was loaned to third parties but “numerous” counter-parties’ real property was “never secured” and Farrell “redirected [loan] payments” that were supposed to go to plaintiffs to defendants “as well as other third parties.”

Plaintiffs’ complaint is not specific about the role of any of the five named defendants except the sole named individual defendant, Farrell. 

About Farrell, the plaintiffs allege, by way of example, that they entered “oral agreements” with defendants “through Farrell”; that Farrell, “on behalf of defendants,” misrepresented things about “promissory notes and/or deeds of trust for the above-referenced transactions”; that Farrell ultimately admitted to “redirect[ing] payments that were supposed to go to plaintiffs” and to not “properly record[ing] deeds of trust”; and that Farrell executed, on July 1, 2025, an “Acknowledgement of Debt Agreement” wherein he “formally acknowledge[d],” per its terms, “[his] debt to [plaintiffs] in the amount of $3,200,000.00.”

About American, plaintiffs allege (“under information and belief”) that it “hired, retained, and/or supervised Farrell during some or all times relevant to the allegations herein.” American is also swept in the complaints’ chief claim-framing allegations by way of reference to actions of the collective “defendants.”  Additionally, the complaint includes boilerplate multiparty allegations, such as that “all defendants … were the agents … of each other”; that “defendants … were members of … a joint venture”; and that all defendants “ratified each … act or omission complained of,” etc.

American’s demurrer is part attack on the specificity of plaintiffs’ allegations, and part attack on the timeliness of their claims.

American’s specificity challenge is informed by American’s relationship (or former relationship) to Farrell as his employer, as the complaint alleges.  American states Farrell was its employee, a loan officer.  American maintains it is “not in the business of raising investment money to lend to third parties” and, rather, “originates conventional mortgage loans.”  American faults plaintiffs for purporting to implicate it in “Farrell’s side hustle” without specifically alleging what actionable things American, itself, did. 

First Three Causes of Action - Fraud Claims

Plaintiffs assert, as their first three causes of action, three varieties of fraud claims: intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and negligent misrepresentation. 

Giving “the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 [216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58]), its would appear plaintiffs’ fraud claims, in essence, are that Farrell, “on behalf of defendants,” fraudulently misrepresented, intentionally or negligently, that he had taken appropriate steps to ensure loans made pursuant to the parties’ “oral agreements” were secured against real property of the loan counterparties, and that payments on said loans would be made to plaintiffs. 

Additionally, it seems clear plaintiffs mean to assert all of the defendants, collectively, concealed that Farrell had not taken appropriate steps to ensure the loans were secured by real property of the counterparties, and that he had directed loan payments to defendants “and other third parties” instead of plaintiffs.

As explained below, these claims are subject to a particularity requirement, and the court agrees with American that plaintiffs’ allegations fail to meet that standard.   

“In California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice. [Citations.] ‘Thus “ ‘the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings . . . will not ordinarily be invoked to sustain a pleading defective in any material respect.’ ” [Citation.] [P] This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which “show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” ’ [Citation, italics in original.] A plaintiff's burden in asserting a fraud claim against a corporate employer is even greater. In such a case, the plaintiff must ‘allege the names of the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written.’ [Citation.]” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 909 P.2d 981] (Lazar).)

“The specificity requirement serves two purposes. The first is notice to the defendant, to ‘furnish the defendant with certain definite charges which can be intelligently met.’ [Citations.] The pleading of fraud, however, is also the last remaining habitat of the common law notion that a complaint should be sufficiently specific that the court can weed out nonmeritorious actions on the basis of the pleadings. Thus the pleading should be sufficient ‘ “to enable the court to determine whether, on the facts pleaded, there is any foundation, prima facie at least, for the charge of fraud.” ’ [Citation.]”  (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216-217 [197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660] (Committee on Children’s Television).)  “ ‘The idea seems to be that allegations of fraud involve a serious attack on character, and fairness to the defendant demands that he should receive the fullest possible details of the charge in order to prepare his defense.’ ” (Id., at p. 216.)

There is “some conflict in the case law discussing the precise degree of particularity required in the pleading of a claim for negligent misrepresentation” (National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Cambridge Integrated Services Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 35, 50 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 473]), but the court finds no difficulty in concluding that the particularity requirement also applies to plaintiffs’ negligent misrepresentation claim as asserted here, as plaintiffs’ negligent misrepresentation claim involves no less a serious attack on the character of the defendants than their misrepresentation and concealment claims.  Indeed, while, as a general rule, “negligent misrepresentation does not require scienter or intent to defraud,” “i.e., to induce reliance” (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 173 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 490, 65 P.3d 1255]), plaintiffs allege in their negligent misrepresentation claim that defendants “intended that plaintiffs rely on their representation[s]” and, further, that defendants conduct “was intended … to cause injury … and/or was despicable conduct carried on … with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights of plaintiffs and/or subjected [them] to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of [their] rights as to constitute malice, oppression, or fraud … .”  Accordingly, the court finds the ordinary particularity requirement applicable to fraud claims applies to plaintiffs’ negligent misrepresentation claim. 

Plaintiffs argue their allegations are sufficiently specific, according to the fraud pleading standard, in that they identify Farrell as “the fraudulent speaker”; the “substance of [his] misrepresentations”; that Farrell’s misrepresentations “were made during the parties’ ongoing relationship from 2012 through the present”; and “the resulting scheme,” and thus “the who, what, where, when, why, and how of the alleged fraud.” 

The “when,” however, is the problem.  (Lazar, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 645.)

As a threshold matter, plaintiffs do not, as they maintain in their opposition, allege that Farrell’s misrepresentations “were made during the parties’ ongoing relationship from 2012 through the present.”  They allege, instead, only that “[d]uring the period of time beginning in 2012 through the current date, Farrell, a licensed mortgage broker, provided services for defendants.”  No specific date is alleged when Farrell made any material misrepresentation, or even when any specific transaction occurred. 

Further, even if plaintiffs had alleged Farrell’s misrepresentations “were made during the parties’ ongoing relationship from 2012 through the present,” that would only effectively be an allegation that Farrell made misrepresentations concerning (some or all of) an undifferentiated collection of “at least thirty-five (35) real estate transactions” “referenced” in the complaint at unspecified points during a period of roughly 14 years.  What’s more, plaintiffs only allege, despite the entirely conclusory allegation that the collective defendants each “ratified each and every omission complained of herein,” that American “under information and belief, hired, retained, and/or supervised Farrell during some or all times relevant to the allegations herein.”

Plaintiffs allegations, in effect, are that Farrell, on “information and belief” was possibly “hired, retained, and/or supervised” by American at some point during a roughly 14 year period when Farrell was a licensed mortgage broker “provid[ing] services for [one or more of the collective] defendants,” and, at unspecified “times relevant to the allegations,” Farrell made misrepresentations that plaintiffs conclusorily allege were “ratified” by one or more of the collective defendants, and that with respect to one or more of the “at least thirty-five (35) real estate transactions,” one or more of the collective defendants fraudulently concealed that “promissory notes and/or deeds of trust were not secured for the benefit of Plaintiffs.”

The court acknowledges “[l]ess specificity is required when ‘it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy,’ [citation]” (Committee on Children's Television, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 217) but that relaxed standard cannot be applied to save the fraud claims here.  Counterbalancing this exception is the consideration “that a complaint should be sufficiently specific that the court can weed out nonmeritorious actions on the basis of the pleadings” and “[t]hus the pleading should be sufficient ‘ “to enable the court to determine whether, on the facts pleaded, there is any foundation, prima facie at least, for the charge of fraud.” ’ [Citation.]”  (Id., at pp. 216-217.)

Here, plaintiffs are notably vague about details that should be particularly within their knowledge in a manner that calls into question whether they can truly plead a meritorious action based on fraud against American.  Indeed, the details omitted here tellingly bear directly on the question of whether there was any employment relationship between American and Farrell at the time he made fraudulent misrepresentations to plaintiffs (assuming, arguendo, plaintiffs had alleged, in non-conclusory terms, a sufficient nexus between the acts of Farrell and American, by virtue of that relationship, such that American could be held liable for fraud); and, further still, that bear directly on whether plaintiffs fraud claims are timely. 

Accordingly, the court finds the demurrer must be sustained as to the first three causes of action.  The demurrer is, however, sustained with leave to amend.  At this point, the court is not prepared to conclude there is no reasonable possibility of cure by amendment.  (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [134 Cal.Rptr. 375, 556 P.2d 737].)

The court does not reach the statute of limitations issue on the fraud claims at this point.  It does note, however, “ ‘[i]n  order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint’ ” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315-1316 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d 9] (E-Fab)), and because the complaint does not disclose when any purportedly actionable representation was made or when any purportedly actionable concealment occurred, demurrer on this basis would not be properly sustained as to the fraud claims as currently presented. 

If plaintiffs amend and meet the requisite specificity requirement for their fraud claims, though, there may be occasion to consider a statute of limitations defense disclosed on the face of the pleadings, and the court does note, for future reference—given some indications in the complaint that plaintiffs may intend to invoke the discovery rule—that while accrual may be delayed according to applicability of that rule (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807 [27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 661, 110 P.3d 914], quoting Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397 [87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 981 P.2d 79]), “ ‘[a] plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence,” and “[t]he burden is on the plaintiff to show diligence, and conclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer.’ [Citation.]” (E-Fab, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1319.)

Fourth Cause of Action - Breach of Contract

Plaintiffs allege they “entered into an oral agreement with defendants wherein plaintiffs employed Farrell, a licensed mortgage broker, to perform services including but not limited to securing real estate transactions by promissory notes and/or deeds of trust payable to plaintiffs,” and that “defendants breached the agreement by failing to secure the real estate transactions by properly recording the promissory notes and/or deeds of trust … [and] … further breached the agreement by … directing the funds intended for plaintiffs to defendants … , as well as other third parties.”

American challenges this cause of action solely on statute of limitations grounds. 

American contends the defense is raised on the face of the complaint because plaintiff alleges that it retained the services of defendants in 2012, which “clearly indicates that the 35+ separate transactions that plaintiffs contend make up their damages occurred outside of the limitations period.”

The court finds no such clear indication, however, in the complaint.  Plaintiffs actual allegations are (a) that “[d]uring the period of time beginning in 2012 through the current date, Farrell, a licensed mortgage broker, provided services for defendants”; (b) that “[o]n or about March 2025, plaintiffs became aware that numerous properties related to the transactions set forth above were never secured as promised by Farrell”; (c) that “[o]n information and belief, further investigation also revealed and Farrell admitted that [he] redirected payments that were supposed to go to plaintiffs as required by the terms of the various promissory notes and deeds of trust to defendants, and each of them, as well as other third parties”; and (d) “[o]n July 1, 2025, Farrell was confronted by a representative of plaintiffs regarding the outstanding debt owed to plaintiffs by Farrell,” and he “admitted that he did not properly record deeds of trust” and “also admitted that he did not ensure funds were returned to the appropriate parties.”

The court does not, based on these allegations, find a statute of limitations defense to the breach of contract cause of action clearly disclosed on the face of the complaint.  (E-Fab, 153 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1315-1316.) 

There being no other ground for demurrer presented to the breach of contract cause of action, the demurrer to that claim is overruled. 

Fifth Cause of Action – Conversion

Plaintiffs allege defendants “substantially interfered with plaintiffs’ money by knowingly or intentionally redirecting the repayment of said money to defendants … as well as other third parties without Plaintiffs’ knowledge or consent”; and that they “took possession of plaintiffs’ money” and “prevented plaintiffs from having access to [it].”

American contends plaintiffs’ fail to state a claim for conversion because their allegations do not identify a specific sum involved.  The court agrees.

“ ‘Money cannot be the subject of a cause of action for conversion unless there is a specific, identifiable sum involved … . [Citation.]’ [Citations.]”  (PCO, Inc. v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 384, 395 [58 Cal.Rptr.3d 516].)  “[A]ctions for the conversion of money have not been permitted when the amount of money involved is not a definite sum. [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 396.)

Plaintiffs allege “Farrell redirected payments” in unidentified amounts “to defendants … as well as other third parties,” which were received by “defendants and other third parties”; that Farrell admitted to owing “approximately $3,200,000, not including monies owed related to other transactions Farrell could not account for … ”; and that Farrell “redirected money … to defendants … and third parties on at least thirty-five (35) real estate transactions.”

Such allegations are insufficient to support a cause of action for conversion of money against American (or any defendant) and the demurrer is sustained as to that cause of action.  At this time, the court sustains the demurrer with leave to amend. 

The court notes American also contends plaintiffs’ conversion claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.  The court does not reach this issue but does note the allegations, again, do not disclose a statute of limitations defense in the complaint as currently pled. 

Sixth Cause of Action – Negligent Hiring, Supervision or Retention of Employee

Plaintiffs allege “[u]pon information and belief, and on such information and belief [Plaintiffs] allege[] that [they] are likely to have evidentiary support, after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery, that at least as early as 2019 Farrell was employed by defendants while at the same time acting as a private loan agent with the funds lent to him by Plaintiffs.”

Plaintiffs allege, further, that “defendants knew, or should have known, that Farrell was making prohibited private money loans while under their supervision and employ” and that defendants “are responsible for [harm to the plaintiffs resulting from the alleged prohibited private money loans] because defendants negligently hired, supervised and retained Farrell, knowing that he was making unethical private money loans while employed by [them].”

American contends, again, that the complaint discloses a statute of limitations defense, “[s]ince the alleged acts that caused plaintiffs' damages occurred as far back as 2012.”  The court, as indicated already above, disagrees.  It is, again, incorrect that plaintiffs alleged wrongdoing going back to 2012—they allege only that “[d]uring the period of time beginning in 2012 through the current date, Farrell, a licensed mortgage broker, provided services for defendants.”

The complaint does not otherwise disclose a statute of limitations defense, and there being no other ground for demurrer presented, the demurrer is overruled as to the sixth cause of action. 

A word on these allegations, however.  The court notes plaintiffs’ allegations fall short of a representation that plaintiffs are informed and believe the specific fact that Farrell was employed by defendants at the same time he was “acting as a private loan agent with the funds lent to him by Plaintiffs.”   Instead, plaintiffs represent only a belief, based on information, that such facts “are likely to have evidentiary support, after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” 

In other words, plaintiffs effectively concede they are unable, including on information and belief, to allege Farrell was actually an employee of any defendant, let alone American, at times relevant to the subject loan transactions. 

Plaintiffs allegations reveal that they are purporting to implicate American (and other defendants) in the asserted negligence claim despite lacking knowledge or informed belief of facts necessary to establish a duty of care on the part of American (or the other defendants) owed to them, i.e., based on Farrell’s having been “employed by defendants while at the same time acting as a private loan agent with the funds lent to him by Plaintiffs” (assuming such facts would establish such a duty).  

Notably, the allegations are patterned on identical language in Code of Civil section 128.7, subdivision (b)(3), which describes a minimum standard for allegations in a pleading to avoid potential sanctions under subdivision (c) of section 128.7.  Section 128.7(b)(3), the court highlights, though, does not state a standard for the sufficient statement of a cause of action. 

In any event, such allegations are not challenged in the demurrer presented here and the court does not address them here further. 

On an additional final note concerning the court’s repeated determination that a statute of limitations defense is not disclosed in the complaint as to multiple of plaintiffs’ claims, the court acknowledges that just as it is possible that curative allegations to the fraud claims could end up raising a potential statute of limitations defense to plaintiffs’ fraud claims, so too is it possible that those same allegations could end up raising a statute of limitations defense to plaintiffs’ other claims.  And, again, the court highlights its statements above, given the indications in the complaint that plaintiffs may intend to invoke the discovery rule, regarding allegations this court would deem necessary to support invocation of that rule. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                JPED Construction & Restoration, LLC vs. Pine, Darcy

Case No.:   VCU337575

Date:           October 6, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:      Demurrer

Tentative Ruling: To sustain the demurrer with leave to amend as to the first cause of action; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint as to this cause of action; To overrule the demurrer to the second cause of action.

Facts

Plaintiff sues for breach of contract and for foreclosure of mechanic’s lien based on the following allegations.

Plaintiff alleges that on or about July 15, 2024, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a written contract whereby Plaintiff agreed to perform fire restoration work on the Property owned by Defendant (hereinafter the "Contract") (Complaint ¶9 – Ex. A.) Plaintiff further states this fire restoration work included repairs and restoration services, that Defendant agreed under the Contract to pay Plaintiff for the repair and restoration work and that Plaintiff performed under the Contract. (Complaint ¶¶10, 11, 12.)

Further, that during the course of the restoration, “a supplement was drawn to authorize additional work beyond the scope of the original Contract (hereinafter the “Supplement”)” including additional repairs and restoration services required to complete the restoration. (Complaint ¶¶13, 14.) Further, that Plaintiff “completed all work under the Supplement with agreed-upon terms.” (Complaint ¶15.)

The total amount due and owing to Plaintiff for all work performed, materials supplied, and services rendered is $335,844.26 (the “Contract Amount”) (Complaint ¶17.)

Further, the complaint alleges the work performed by Plaintiff was to be paid for by insurance proceeds from Defendant’s carrier, but that Defendant would remain responsible for amounts not covered by insurance. (Complaint ¶18.)

Plaintiff alleged receipt of payment of $227,254.43 and that the balance remaining and due to Plaintiff is $108,589.83. (Complaint ¶19.)

Further, that Plaintiff, on April 23, 2026, timely recorded a mechanic’s lien in the amount of $108,589.83 and that the mechanic’s lien remains unsatisfied. (Complaint ¶¶21, 22, 23, 24, 25.)

As to breach of contract, the complaint incorporates the prior alleges and further alleges “Defendant materially breached the Contract by failing and refusing to pay Plaintiff the entire Contract Amount and Defendant still owes $108,589.83 the Amount Owed for work performed, materials supplied, and services rendered.” (Complaint ¶31.)

Defendant demurrers to both causes of action on the basis of uncertainty and as to the mechanic’s lien cause of action because Plaintiff was a direct contractor and did not record a lien within 90 days of completion of the work of improvement.

No opposition appears filed.

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

As such, the Court disregards the declaration of Defendant in support of the demurrer.

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

As to uncertainty, a demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.  (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

First Cause of Action – Breach of Contract

"To prevail on a cause of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must prove (1) the contract, (2) the plaintiff's performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damage to the plaintiff." (Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.)

A written contract must be pled verbatim in the body of the complaint, be attached to the complaint and incorporated by reference, or be pled according to its legal effect in order to survive demurrer. (Bowden v. Robinson (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 705, 718.)

Here, the Contract is attached and therefore satisfies this requirement.

However, as to the Supplement, the Court notes there is no attachment to the complaint and it is not pled verbatim in the complaint. Further, the Court does not find the generalized description as to “identified additional repairs and restoration services required to complete the fire restoration of the Property” sufficiently pleads the legal effect thereof.

Additionally, while the cause of action for breach of contract incorporates the prior allegations, including those as to the Supplement, Plaintiff pleads that “Defendant materially breached the Contract…” without discussion of the Supplement.

As such, the Court will sustain the demurer with leave to amend as to the first cause of action. Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to amend the complaint as to this cause of action.

Second Cause of Action – Mechanic’s Lien

As noted above, the Court cannot consider matters outside the four corners of the complaint or those for which the Court can take judicial notice thereof. No request for judicial notice is made here.

As such, the Court cannot sustain the demurrer on the various grounds argued that it was recorded untimely, or that insufficient documentation supporting the lien amount was pled.

"A complaint to foreclose a mechanic's lien must show a substantial compliance with the statute as to the contents and filing of the notice of lien . . . either by direct allegation or by an attached copy of the notice of lien." (Clements v. T.R. Bechtel Co. (1954) 43 Cal.2d 227, 238.)

Here, while the complaint does not identify the date the work was alleged completed, Defendant has presented no legal authority that the allegations that pleading “The Mechanic's Lien was timely recorded in compliance with the requirements of California Civil Code sections 8400 through 8424, including but not limited to section 8412” and “Plaintiff timely served all required preliminary notices, including a preliminary notice pursuant to California Civil Code section 8200, and complied with all statutory prerequisites for recording and enforcing a mechanic's lien” are insufficient allegations to support this cause of action.

As such, the Court overrules the demurrer to the second cause of action.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding - Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared October 5, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054276	In the Matter of Cutbirth, Jerry Edward	Letters of Administration	Recommended for Approval
VPR054274	In the Matter of Garza, Irene Marie	Letters of Administration	Recommended for Approval
VPR054271	In the Matter of Gonzalez, Celestina M.	Letters of Administration	Approval Conditional	Revised proposed order to be submitted for review
VPR054318	In the Matter of West, Cheryl Annette	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	1. Petition Item 7 omitted: if proceedings for the administration of decedent have commenced. 2. Petition Item 9a, (1) or (2); (3) or (4); (7) or (8), and 9b omitted: any surviving spouse, registered domestic partner, issue of a predeceased child or stepchild. 3. Petition Item 11(2),(3) omitted: Decedent’s interest in real property and facts showing that the real property was decedent’s primary residence in California, Prob C § 13152(a). 4. Petition Item 13: Petitioners’ claim in interest to the property is not based on intestate succession under Probate Code § 6402(a); 5. Petition not signed by all successors; Prob C §13006, 13151. 6. Notice of Hearing not served on all parties 15 days prior, Prob C § 13153. 7. DE-300 not attached as required by Probate Code § 13152(e)
VPR054280	In the Matter of Tinney, Sandra Gale	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	Petition Item 9a(2), (a) or (b) omitted: spouse deceased or decedent divorced/never married
VPR054273	In the Matter of Ramirez, Isaac Pablo	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054272	In the Matter of Vasquez, Elizabeth Clara	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	Need Clarification: Party who is named in caption, “Attorney for”, is not a named petitioner nor signed the petition; however, Party signed the Inventory and Appraisal
VPR054282	In the Matter of Prins, Johannes	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	Petition Item 2d omitted: bond amount or waiver
VPR054282	In the Matter of Prins, Johannes	Spousal Property Hearing	Appearance Required	Petition Attachment 7: the facts upon which the petitioner bases the allegation that the property is property passing to the surviving spouse necessary to establish the community property or quasi-community property claim omitted, Prob C § 13651(a)(3),(4)
VPR054275	In the Matter of Woolley, Kent Alan	Spousal Property Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054119	In the Matter of Ramirez, Rosenda	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Revised proposed order to be submitted, appointing general conservatorship of the person

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

GUARDIANSHIP CASES

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared AS STATED BELOW that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
10/5/2026 8:30	Department 09	VPR054359	In the Matter of E.J.W.	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service to be in accordance with Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3). Service on Father Mr. Addison & Mother Mrs. Wiliams are required Temporary Order and Temporary Letters need to be lodged prior to hearing
10/6/2026 14:00	Department 09	VPR054113	In the Matter of Madera, Shanylle	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511 on all grandparents
10/6/2026 8:30	Department 02	VPR054358	In the Matter of Johnson, River Lynn	TEMP- NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service to be in accordance with Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3), parents to be personally served 5 court day’s notice prior to hearing
10/6/2026 8:30	Department 01	VPR052277	In the Matter of Bennett, Zoey Lynn	NEED Notice of Hearing GC-020 form to be filed indicating parties to this case were served with a copy of the Notice of Hearing pursuant to Prob Code §1460, service to be given 15 calendar days before hearing
10/14/2026 8:30	Department 01	VPR053711	In the Matter of Allende, Jorge Jr	No issues to address
10/14/2026 8:30	Department 01	VPR047286	In the Matter of Clevenger, Brea Marie	Guardianship Status Review Report needs to be filed for 2026 NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating the relatives named in the Petition for Termination were served with 15 calendar days notice, as required by PROB Code §1460,1511, with a copy of the Notice of Hearing and Petition for Termination. The children may be of Native American ancestry, notice of termination proceedings must be given to the children’s tribe per ICWA NOT LODGED- Order Terminating Guardianship
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054192	In the Matter of Venegas, Analise Rose et al	No issues to address
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054155	In the Matter of Hernandez, Julian Carlos et al	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511, SERVICE to be completed on paternal grandfather DOJ Background record check appears to be outstanding for proposed guardian and household member
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR050803	In the Matter of Aviles, Irie A	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating the relatives named in the Petition for Termination were served with 15 calendar days notice, as required by PROB Code §1460, 1511, with a copy of the Notice of Hearing and Petition for Termination. Guardianship Status Review Report needs to be filed for 2026 NOT LODGED- Order Terminating Guardianship
10/15/2026 10:00	Department 09	VPR053787	In the Matter of Mendoza, Nolberto	Temporary guardianship for N.M. has terminated by operation of law as ward has reached the age of 18. NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511, notice required by maternal grandparents DOJ Background record check appears to be outstanding
10/15/2026 10:00	Department 09	VPR053770	In the Matter of Mendoza, Paulette	household member is required to complete the DOJ background record check NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511, by mail on the maternal grandparents and siblings 15 days prior to hearing
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054321	In the Matter of Pena, Rose Marie	Declaration of Due Diligence has not been filed for father Temporary Order and Temporary Letters need to be lodged prior to hearing
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054320	In the Matter of Rosales, Amelia Jade	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service to be in accordance with Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3). MOTHER to be personally served 5 court days prior to hearing Temporary Order and Temporary Letters need to be lodged prior to hearing
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054004	In the Matter of Leon, Ezra Invicto	No issues to address – notice to mother to be discussed at hearing