Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Monday, February 9, 2026 [modified as to Dept. 1 at 11:41 am and as to Dept. 7 at 1:50 pm], are:

Re:                 Conterra Agricultural Capital, LLC vs. Prosperity Farms, LLC et al

Case No.:   PCU325122

Date:            February 9, 2026

Time:            8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Continued Hearing on Receiver’s Motion to Authorize Issuance of Receiver’s Certificates

Tentative Ruling:  The parties, and Bank of the Sierra, specifically, are directed to appear and report on the status of Conterra and Bank of the Sierra’s discussions regarding possible agreement to the granting of Conterra’s pending motion. 

In its prior tentative ruling, the court expressed concern regarding qualifications to representations by Conterra that Bank of the Sierra was willing to agree to its desired priority on the 2026 Crop, given Conterra’s other representations that the extent of funds Conterra would be willing to lend would be severely limited if it didn’t have that priority on the 2026 Crop.

Counsel for Bank of the Sierra appeared at the hearing and indicated Bank of the Sierra would stipulate to the granting of the Receiver’s motion.  The court directed Conterra to file a further declaration clarifying the facts of the situation. 

The court has reviewed Mr. Roemmich’s declaration.  Mr. Roemmich states “Conterra did not make [Bank of the Sierra’s agreement to] subordination a condition of funding the budget,” but also that, “Conterra has made a condition of fully funding the contemplated budget … , a security interest in the 2026 Crop,” against which there is a preexisting lien of Bank of the Sierra.

Roemmich indicates Conterra is “generally informed that Bank of the Sierra will be paid in full from the proceeds of the 2025 Crop” and he represents, therefore, “Bank of the Sierra’s lien will not interfere with Conterra being repaid for its advances on the 2026 harvest.”  Roemmich represents, though, that while “counsel for Bank of the Sierra was generally agreeable,” they would “need to resolve subordination through a stipulation or agreed order.”  Roemmich also indicates Bank of the Sierra represented it was not able to enter a stipulation until resolution of uncertainty regarding the timing of payment to it by the processor, Primex, though it remained generally agreeable once that uncertainty was resolved.  

The court is inclined to grant the Receiver’s motion provided there is a clear agreement as between Conterra and Bank of the Sierra with respect to Conterra’s security interest in the 2026 crop.  Because Roemmich’s declaration leaves some questions as to where that agreement stands, the parties are directed to appear and address the matter at the hearing.

Re:                 V., J. vs. County of Tulare

Case No.:   VCU311593

Date:           February 9, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling: To find the motion moot by the stipulation and order signed January 7, 2026 as to the filing of a fifth amended complaint.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Velazquez, Conception Ortiz vs. Adventist Health Tulare

Case No.:  VCU295353

Date:           February 9, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Defendant Abraham Betre M.D.’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion.

Facts

Plaintiffs’ Complaint asserts a sole cause of action for medical negligence. (UMF No. 1.)

Based on his knowledge, education, training, professional experience and review of the relevant materials in this case, Yair Blumenfeld, M.D. is qualified to render expert opinion as to the applicable standard of care in this case and whether ABRAHAM BETRE, M.D. complied with the standard of care in his treatment and care of Plaintiffs’ decedent. (UMF No. 2.) Plaintiff disputes that Dr. Blumenfeld is the “determinative expert.” (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 2.)

At all relevant times, ABRAHAM BETRE, M.D. complied with the standard of care in his treatment and care of Plaintiffs’ decedent. (UMF No. 3.) Plaintiff disputes that Dr. Blumenfeld is the “determinative expert.” (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 3.)

Based on his knowledge, education, training, professional experience and review of the relevant materials in this case, Yair Blumenfeld, M.D. is qualified to render expert opinion as to whether any action or inaction on the part of ABRAHAM BETRE, M.D. was a substantial factor in causing injury to Plaintiffs’ decedent. (UMF No. 4.) Plaintiff disputes that Dr. Blumenfeld is the “determinative expert.” (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 4.)

No action or inaction on the part of ABRAHAM BETRE, M.D. proximately caused or contributed to the injuries claimed by the Plaintiffs in this matter. (UMF No. 5.) Plaintiff disputes that Dr. Blumenfeld is the “determinative expert.” (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 5.)

In opposition, Plaintiff presents its own expert testimony, as examined in detail below.

Authority and Analysis

A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(a).) “The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(f)(1).) If a party seeks summary adjudication as an alternative to a request for summary judgment, the request must be clearly made in the notice of the motion. (Gonzales v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1544.)  “[A] party may move for summary adjudication of a legal issue or a claim for damages other than punitive damages that does not completely dispose of a cause of action, affirmative defense, or issue of duty pursuant to” subdivision (t). (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(t).) 

To prevail, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c).) The motion cannot succeed unless the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts; the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other evidence. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of material fact, “[a]ll doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment…” (Gold v. Weissman (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-99.) “In other words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true.” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 179.) However, if adjudication is otherwise proper the motion “may not be denied on grounds of credibility,” except when a material fact is the witness’s state of mind and “that fact is sought to be established solely by the [witness’s] affirmation thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(e).) 

Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) “[T]here is no obligation on the opposing party... to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element... necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor.” (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) 

“The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment motion. The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues and to frame the outer measure of materiality in a summary judgment proceeding.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493, quotations and citations omitted.) “Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff's theories of liability as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings.” (Id.) 

Medical Malpractice

In a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must establish the following elements: “(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional's negligence.  [citations.]”  (Galvez v. Frields (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1420.)

Applicable Standard of Care

A defendant moving for summary judgment in a medical malpractice action must “present evidence that would preclude a reasonable trier of fact from finding it was more likely than not that their treatment fell below the standard of care.”  (Johnson v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 297, 305.)  The standard of care against which the acts of health care providers are to be measured is a matter within the knowledge of experts.  (Elcome v. Chin (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 310, 317.)  Unless the conduct required by the particular circumstances is within the common knowledge of the layman, the standard of care in a malpractice action can only be proved by an expert’s testimony.  (Id.) 

Defendant’s Expert – Standard of Care

In support of the motion, Defendant submits the declaration of Yair Blumenfeld, M.D. The Court’s review of Dr. Blumenfeld’s declaration and CV indicate sufficient education and experience in the field Obstetrics & Gynecology, including Fetal Medicine & Obstetrics. (Declaration of Dr. Blumenfeld ¶¶1, 2, 6)

Dr. Blumenfeld indicates he has been retained by Defendant Dr. Betre’s counsel to provide expert opinion as to the standard of care applicable to the treatment and care provided by Dr. Betre, to Conception Ortiz Velazquez (mother) and Mariana Villareal Ortiz (fetus/newborn) during their labor and delivery admission at Adventist Health Tulare on January 29-30, 2022. (Declaration of Dr. Blumenfeld ¶¶4, 7.) Dr. Blumenfeld indicates familiarity with the degree of skill ordinarily possessed by OB-GYNs in the care and treatment of laboring patients such as Ms. Ortiz, awareness that the standard of care requires that medical health providers exercise that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of their profession under similar or like circumstances, and awareness that the failure to both have the requisite skill and knowledge or the failure to exercise that skill or knowledge is a violation of the standard of care. (Declaration of Dr. Blumenfeld ¶5.)

The Court finds Dr. Blumenfeld qualified to offer opinions on the standard of care in this matter.

Dr. Blumenfeld indicates review of a. Complaint filed on January 20, 2023; b. Concepcion Ortiz Velazquez’ medical records from Adventist Health Tulare; c. Mariana Villareal Ortiz’ medical records from Adventist Health Tulare; d. Concepcion Ortiz Velazquez’ medical records from Abraham Betre, M.D.; e. The deposition transcript of Concepcion Ortiz Velazquez w/ exhibits; f. The deposition transcript of Jaime Villareal; and g. Concepcion Ortiz Velazquez’ Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One, propounded by Dr. Betre. (Declaration of Dr. Blumenfeld ¶8.)

Dr. Blumenfeld thereafter provides a factual chronology of this matter and, thereafter, opines that Dr. Betre did not breach the standard of care with respect to (1) initiate measures to prolong Ms. Ortiz’ pregnancy; (2) immediately transfer Ms. Ortiz to a NICU Level III/IV facility; and (3) ensure that a pediatrician or neonatal specialist was present for the birth to attempt resuscitation measures. (Declaration of Dr. Blumenfeld ¶9, 10, 11, 13.)

The Court finds Defendant has carried the initial burden as to the standard of care and breach thereof.

Plaintiffs’ Expert – Standard of Care

“When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence.”  (Munro v. Regents of University of California (1989) 215 Cal.3d 977, 984-985.)

Here, Plaintiff provides the declaration of Dr. Vikas Sachar. The Court’s review of Dr. Sachar’s declaration and CV indicates sufficient experience and education in the field Obstetrics & Gynecology, including specialization in maternal fetal medicine. (Declaration of Dr. Sachar ¶¶1, 2, 3.)

Further, that Dr. Sachar is familiar with the standard of care by doctors, nurses, technicians and other hospital personnel in the care and treatment of patients such as Ortiz Velazquez (mother) and Mariana Villareal Ortiz (fetus/newborn) during their labor and delivery. (Declaration of Dr. Sachar ¶¶3, 4.) Further, that the standard of care requires Dr. Betre, as an OB/GYN, to exercise that degree of skill, knowledge and care, ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of their profession under similar circumstances and that negligence would occur if such a doctor failed to use the requisite skill, knowledge and care in diagnosis and treatment that a reasonably careful doctor would exercise in similar circumstances. (Declaration of Dr. Sachar ¶7.)

Dr. Sachar indicates he has been retained by Plaintiffs’ counsel as to the care and treatment provided by Defendant Dr. Betre during the treatment and hospitalization from January 29, 2022 to January 30, 2022. (Declaration of Dr. Sachar ¶5.) Further, Dr. Sachar indicates he has reviewed the complaint, complete medical records, records from Dr. Betre, deposition transcripts, responses to discovery  and the declarations of Defendant Dr. Betre’s experts.  (Declaration of Dr. Sachar ¶9.) Dr. Sachar provides a timeline of relevant events on which his opinion is based. (Declaration of Dr. Sachar ¶10.)

The Court finds Dr. Sachar qualified to offer opinions on the standard of care in this matter.

Dr. Sachar points to specific instances as to the breach of the standard of care, namely Dr. Betre’s failure to obtain an informed consent from Ms. Ortiz where peri-viable threatened preterm labor patient arrives at the hospital, and thereafter failure to implement the parents’ wishes falls below the standard of care. (Declaration of Dr. Sachar ¶11.a.) Further, that Dr. Betre failed to initiate measures to prolong the pregnancy, given the baby was at 22 5/7 weeks gestation. (Declaration of Dr Sachar ¶11.b.) Further, attempts to prolong the pregnancy via use of antibiotics and tocolysis would have held no risks and would have caused no harm. (Declaration of Dr. Sachar ¶11.b.) Further, that Dr. Betre failed to initiate a transfer to a NICU Level III/IV facility immediately or communicate with another NICU Level III/IV facility was below the standard of care. (Declaration of Dr. Sachar ¶11.c, d.)

Based on the opinions and declarations of Plaintiff’s qualified expert, the Court finds Plaintiff has met the burden in opposing summary judgment as to the issue of the standard of care because Plaintiff has come forward with conflicting expert evidence. (Munro, supra, 215 Cal.3d at 984-985.)

Causation

In order to establish that defendant's negligence was a “substantial factor” in causing injury, the plaintiff must prove the negligence was of itself sufficient to bring about that harm.  (Bromme v. Pavitt (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1498.)  “The law is well settled that in a personal injury action causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.  Mere possibility alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie case.  [Citations.]  That there is a distinction between a reasonable medical ‘probability’ and a medical 'possibility' needs little discussion.  There can be many possible ‘causes,’ indeed, an infinite number of circumstances which can produce an injury or disease. A possible cause only becomes ‘probable’ when, in the absence of other reasonable causal explanations, it becomes more likely than not that the injury was a result of its action.  This is the outer limit of inference upon which an issue may be submitted to the jury.”  (Id.; citing Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 402 403.)

Defendant’s Expert

As with the duty issue, “causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.” (Dumas v. Cooney (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1593, 1603.) Dr. Blumenfeld further indicates no act or omission on the part of Dr. Betre, in violation of the standard of care, caused or contributed to, or was a substantial factor in causing, injury to Baby Mariana and that these views are expressed with a reasonable degree of medical probability. (Declaration of Dr. Blumenfeld ¶12, 13)

The Court finds Defendant has met the burden on the issue of causation.

Plaintiff’s Expert

As noted above, Plaintiff must come forward with conflicting expert evidence to defeat summary judgment. (Munro, supra, at 984-985.) Further, Dr. Sachar is aware that the legal cause of an injury is a cause that, in a natural and continuing sequence, more likely than not caused the injury or harm and that such cause is a substantial medical factor in brining about the injury or harm. (Declaration of Dr. Sachar ¶8.)

Dr. Sachar further opines that the failure to take immediate steps to prolong the pregnancy, failure to transfer or communicate with a NICU Level III or IV hospital and failure to obtain informed consent, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, resulted in the death of the child. (Declaration of Dr. Sachar ¶11.)

The Court finds Plaintiff has met the burden in opposing this motion on the issue of causation.

As such, the Court denies summary judgment.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:              Progressive Preferred Insurance Company vs. Thompson, Jonathan G.

Case No.:    VCL318305

Date:           February 9, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:    Motion to Set Aside Default

Tentative Ruling: This motion was filed February 2, 2026, less than sixteen Court days required under Code of Civil Procedure section 1005(b). Additionally, the motion contains no proof of service. Therefore, the Court continues this matter to March 16, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 7 and orders Defendant to serve the motion, if not already served, and to file a proof of service.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                United Wholesale Mortgage, LLC vs. Winding, Braden Spencer et al

Case No.:  VCU319097

Date:          February 9, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Substitute Plaintiff

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion

Facts and Analysis

This matter was initially filed March 12, 2025 naming United Wholesale Mortgage, LLC as Plaintiff.

Counsel for United indicates that on June 25, 2025, an Assignment of Deed of Trust, Document No. 2025-0029909, was recorded assigned a beneficial interest to Planet Home Lending, LLC. (Declaration of Nguyen ¶2 – Ex A.)

Therefore, Plaintiff seeks to substitute United for Planet Home Lending, LLC, as Planet is now the holder of the note and deed of trust via the assignment.

Code of Civil Procedure § 368.5 provides: “In case of any transfer of interest, the action or proceeding may be continued in the name of the original party, or the court may allow the person to whom the transfer is made to be substituted in the action or proceeding.”

Here, the Court finds a transfer via the assignment and grants the motion to substitute Planet Home Lending, LLC for United Wholesale Mortgage, LLC.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:              Padilla, Hernan vs. Martin, Seth

Case No.: VCU315308

Date:          February 9, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:    Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Initial Responses to Form Interrogatories-General, Set One, to Defendant Martin AG, Inc.; Form Interrogatories-Employment, Set One to Defendant Martin AG, Inc.; Form Interrogatories-General, Set One to Defendant Seth Martin; and Requests For Production, Set One to Defendant Martin AG, Inc; and for sanctions

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motions upon the payment of the remaining filing fees of $180; to order responses due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of payment of the filing fee and notice to Defendants; to issue sanctions in the amount of $530 total, due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of payment of the filing fee and notice to Defendants; to order Plaintiff to give notice.

Facts

As an initial matter, the Court notes one motion fee has been submitted to this Court, but that four total motions are made here. The Court conditions the order as to initial responses upon payment of the remaining filing fees of $180.

On February 7, 2025, Plaintiff served the following discovery on the indicated Defendant:

• Form Interrogatories-General, Set One, to Defendant Martin AG, Inc.;
• Form Interrogatories-Employment, Set One to Defendant Martin AG, Inc.;
• Form Interrogatories-General, Set One to Defendant Seth Martin; and
• Requests For Production, Set One to Defendant Martin AG, Inc;

Discovery was served on Defendants’ then legal counsel.

Responses were due initially on March 11, 2025. After extensions and substitution of counsel by Defendants, on October 3, 2025, current defense counsel provided verified responses to the Requests for Admission, but no responses were provided as to the discovery noted above.

The parties appear to have agreed to a final date for responses of December 19, 2025. However, no responses were provided on that date and this motion followed.

Plaintiff seeks to compel initial responses and impose monetary sanctions of $1,300.

No opposition appears filed.

Authority and Analysis

Interrogatories – Martin Ag

Based on Defendant Martin Ag’s failure to respond to the first set of form interrogatories – general and form interrogatories - employment, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.290(a), that Martin Ag provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Plaintiff’s first set of form interrogatories – general and first set of form interrogatories - employment, within thirty days after payment of the additional $180 filing fee and service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Plaintiff shall give notice.

Interrogatories – Seth Martin

Based on Defendant Seth Martin’s failure to respond to the first set of form interrogatories – general, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.290(a), that Seth Martin provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Plaintiff’s first set of form interrogatories – general within thirty days after payment of the additional $180 filing fee and service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Plaintiff shall give notice.

Production – Martin Ag

Based on Defendant Martin Ag’s failure to respond to the first set of requests for production of documents, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.300(a) that Plaintiff provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Plaintiff’s first set of requests for production of documents, within thirty days after payment of the additional $180 filing fee and service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Plaintiff shall give notice.

Sanctions

Under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.290(c) (Interrogatories) and 2031.300(c) (Requests for Production), the Court imposes sanctions of $530 total, jointly and severally against Defendants Seth Martin, Martin Ag and counsel of record, consisting of one hour total for all motions at the local, community rate of $350 per hour, plus three filing fees of $60 each. The Court notes there is no meet and confer requirement and all that is necessary to obtain the relief requested on this motion to compel initial responses is that the other party failed to respond within the designated time. Sanctions are due within thirty days after payment of the additional $180 filing fees and service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Plaintiff shall give notice.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Young, Danielle vs. Ledezma, Masyn

Case No.:  VCL327082

Date:          February 9, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. Therefore, the Court takes the hearing off calendar.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:              Wodley, Frank A vs. Mendoza, Michaelpaul

Case No.:     VCU325744

Date:           February 9, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.  7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:       Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP)

Tentative Ruling:  To grant Michaelpaul Mendoza’s special motion to strike (anti-SLAPP).

In this action, Frank Wodley sues Michaelpaul Mendoza, a former board member of The Windmills homeowner’s association (HOA).  Mendoza specially moves to strike (anti-SLAPP) Wodley’s entire complaint.

Wodley’s disputes with Mendoza—which, in essence, are really disputes with the HOA—originate from a failed election bid by Wodley for an HOA board seat in or around July 2023.  According to the complaint, candidates for election were listed alphabetically on a ballot sent to voters; Wodley was listed last; and Wodley received the fewest votes.  Wodley thereafter, in September 2023, “served a formal Election Challenge citing ballot-order bias.”

Wodley alleges he “is an 82-year-old disabled homeowner in Tulare County,” with “decades of homeowner-rights advocacy experience.”  Mendoza is identified as having served on the HOA board from 2020 to 2025 and as having served as HOA president from July 2023 to July 2024.  Wodley alleges that Mendoza “approved the … biased election format:  alphabetical order, suppressed bios, and marginalization of reform candidates.”

Wodley alleges that, about a week after he submitted his “Election Challenge,” “Mendoza presided over the meeting denying the challenge,” during which he “barred recordings, kept skeletal minutes, ignored Plaintiff's evidence, and later admitted his ‘research’ was limited to the Davis-Stirling [Act] website.”  Wodley alleges he thereafter “submitted a 9-page Rebuttal documenting the defects facts, research, and consequences of the denial.”

Inferably, this process did not result in a satisfactory outcome to Wodley, either by way of a favorable HOA determination or an acceptable HOA procedure for adjudicating his election dispute. 

On November 7, 2023, Wodley alleges, Wodley sent an email, which was sent to Mendoza, that include the sentence:  “If you continue this charade, someone will get hurt.  That is not my goal.” 

According to Wodley, he sent subsequent emails clarifying that he meant “[h]urt meaning to their [the board members’] character, not bodily,” and that he “never said the board will be hurt,” he “said someone”; but despite these subsequent emails, Mendoza “canceled the IDR [apparently the ongoing HOA internal dispute resolution process regarding Wodley’s election challenge], and escalated matters.”  Wodley alleges “[h]ours after canceling IDR, the HOA’s attorney sent a Cease & Desist letter.”

Wodley alleges that despite his having ceased sending further emails or having any further direct contact with the board after November 7, 2023, “[b]etween December 1-7, 2023, Mendoza coordinated multiple nearly identical Civil Harassment Restraining Order (CHRO) petitions recycling the same mischaracterization of Plaintiff’s email [as being intended as a physical threat].”

The court here notes that, between late November and early December 2023, Wodley was the subject of six separate restraining order requests, including a workplace violence restraining order request by the HOA, and five civil harassment restraining order requests by individual petitioners, including Mendoza.  All six matters were consolidated and resolved, without issuance of a restraining order, with Wodley agreeing to participate in HOA meetings via Zoom, communicating with board members solely electronically via an HOA portal, and not otherwise contacting board members or their families.  Wodley includes allegations suggesting that Judge David Mathias, who presided over the restraining order matters, found the petitioners had all failed to identify “direct threats” by Wodley, and noted “many petitions were ‘cut and pasted.’ ”

Wodley alleges that, during “mediation in January 2024” (inferably in the course of the consolidated restraining order proceedings), “Defendants’ counsel [presumably referring to counsel for the petitioners in the various restraining order proceedings] threatened [Wodley] and his wife:  accept all terms or face a $10,000 bill,” and that “[Wodley’s] wife broke down crying, overwhelmed by fear and stress.” 

Wodley further alleges that, in March 2024, that “Mendoza authored a newsletter to 292 homes claiming the HOA was ‘forced to hire an attorney to protect the community from Plaintiff’ at a cost of $23,483.60,” which “was false and misleading, as the Court had already rejected the CHRO claims.”

Wodley also alleges that, during the entirety of Mendoza’s time as a board member and HOA president, he “presided over escalating expenses and refus[ed] financial transparency,” and Wodley describes various areas of alleged wasteful/excessive HOA spending. 

Wodley then alleges that, over a year later, in April 2025, Wodley “mailed certified Demand and Preservation of Evidence letters to all sitting board members, including Defendant Mendoza,” and “[w]hile others signed or responded, Mendoza expressly refused to accept service.”  Wodley alleges that, the following month, he “mailed follow-up letters,” which, presumably, Wodley infers Mendoza also “refused to accept” as he alleges, generally, that “Mendoza’s refusal to accept these preservation demands demonstrates a willful effort to obstruct accountability and transparency, consistent with his role in denying Plaintiff's 2023 election challenge, escalating the November 7, 2023 email, filing retaliatory CHROs, and authoring defamatory newsletters.”

Finally, Wodley alleges that “Mendoza acted in concert” with various identified individuals and “Evans Management” in the various conduct described above.    

Wodley asserts four causes of action: for breach of fiduciary duty; for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); for abuse of process; and for “Civil Conspiracy.”  The latter cause of action is an amalgam of the prior three—based on allegations that Mendoza acted in concert with others with respect to the conduct giving rise to the first three causes of action.

Each of Wodley’s causes of action are based on discrete claims. 

The first cause of action is based on claims that Mendoza breached fiduciary duties owed Wodley by:

1. “Predetermining and denying Plaintiff's election challenge”;
2. “Publishing false and damaging statements in the March 2024 newsletter”;
3. “Diverting HOA funds to retaliation [i.e., the restraining order proceedings] while core operations suffered”;
4. “Refusing preservation of evidence despite formal demands” (i.e., refusing “to accept service” of Wodley’s “Demand and Preservation of Evidence letters”); and
5. “Denying records access” (i.e., again, refusing Wodley’s “Demand and Preservation of Evidence letters”).

The second cause of action is based on claims that Mendoza engaged in “conduct” that “was outrageous and intended to cause harm, including:”

1. “Misusing CHROs”;
2. “Coercing Plaintiff and his crying wife at mediation with threats of a $10,000 bill;” (apparently Wodley attributes the alleged conduct of Mendoza’s counsel during the January 2024 mediation to Mendoza);
3. “Smearing Plaintiff publicly to his entire community”;
4. “Blocking Plaintiffs election rights and reform efforts”; and
5. “Refusing to preserve evidence” (i.e., again, refusing Wodley’s “Demand and Preservation of Evidence letters”).

The third cause of action is based on claims that Mendoza “misused legal process” by:

1. “[F]iling duplicative CHROs”; and
2. “[M]isuing mediation to intimidate Plaintiff into submission.”

By implication, Wodley’s fourth conspiracy cause of action is based on Mendoza’s conspiring with others in the commission of the alleged conduct giving rise to all 12 of the above-listed claims under the first three causes of action.  Wodley alleges “Defendant conspired with others to entrench control and retaliate against Plaintiff.”

Wodley asserts in his complaint that he “seeks vindication and truth, not financial gain,” but it is not accurate to suggest he does not seek damages and other financial renumeration.  In addition to “[d]eclaratory relief that Defendant breached fiduciary duties and retaliated against Plaintiff” and “[r]estoration of reputation and acknowledgement of wrongdoing,” Wodley also prays for general and special damages, punitive damages, and costs. 

ANALYSIS

1. Anti-SLAPP

The anti-SLAPP statute “provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity. Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16. [Citation.] If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.”  (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 [205 Cal.Rptr.3d 475, 376 P.3d 604] (Baral), italics omitted.)

The anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, at subdivision (b)(1), states that “[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike.”

“As our Supreme Court explained in Baral, the statute uses the term ‘cause of action’ in a particular way to target ‘claims that are based on the conduct protected by the statute.’ The term is not limited to a specific count as pleaded in a complaint. Thus, while an anti-SLAPP motion ‘does not reach claims based on unprotected activity,’ it ‘may challenge any claim for relief founded on allegations of protected activity.’ A claim targeted by an anti-SLAPP motion ‘must amount to a “cause of action” in the sense that it is alleged to justify a remedy.’ ” (Rudisill v. California Coastal Com. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1071 [247 Cal.Rptr.3d 840], citations omitted.)  Stated another way, “[t]he statute's definitional focus is not on the form of the plaintiff's cause of action but rather the defendant's activity giving rise to his or her asserted liability and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.”  (Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1232 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 57].) 

Accordingly, “[a]nalysis of an anti-SLAPP motion is not confined to evaluating whether an entire cause of action, as pleaded by the plaintiff, arises from protected activity or has merit. Instead, courts should analyze each claim for relief—each act or set of acts supplying a basis for relief, of which there may be several in a single pleaded cause of action—to determine whether the acts are protected and, if so, whether the claim they give rise to has the requisite degree of merit to survive the motion. [Citation.]”  (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1010 [281 Cal.Rptr.3d 678, 491 P.3d 1058].)

2. First Step

For purposes of the first step of anti-SLAPP analysis, protected activity includes “any act … in furtherance of the … right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) 

“ ‘[A]ct[s] in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue’ include[] (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”  (Id., subd. (e).)

Under the surface of Wodley’s sprawling, scatter-shot complaint there may, potentially, be lurking some kind of claim outside the “definitional focus” (Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1232 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 57]) of the anti-SLAPP statute by which Wodley means to target the fairness or validity of the procedures he was afforded by the HOA in the adjudication of his election, or, perhaps, the “[a]cts of governance” (San Ramon Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. Contra Costa County Employees' Retirement Assn. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 343, 354 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 724]) occurring in the course of those procedures, in the manner of a petition for writ of mandate or for writ of administrative mandate.

While, “in an appropriate case, a petition for mandamus may be subject to a special motion to strike just like any other form of action” (id., at p. 353), the collective action of the HOA in denying Wodley’s election challenge or the denial of statutorily provided, or otherwise fair, procedures, could appropriately be challenged by such a petition without running afoul of the anti-SLAPP statute because such a challenge would not arise from acts taken by the HOA board, or its individual members, in furtherance of their right of petition or free speech (see id, at pp. 353-356 [discussing relevant examples]).

Wodley comes closest to this in his claim under his first cause of action targeted at Mendoza’s alleged “[p]redetermining and denying Plaintiff's election challenge,” but even here, having stated the claim as the basis of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, Wodley directs the focus of his claim precisely at Mendoza’s petitioning activity because Mendoza’s expression of denial “in connection with an issue under consideration or review [in an] official proceeding authorized by law” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)) itself is alleged to be actionable conduct in breach of fiduciary duties allegedly owned by Mendoza to Wodley. 

This is all to say that Wodley, at least in the above instance, indicates a dispute that may not run afoul of the anti-SLAPP statute, but the manner of his assertion of his claims arising from that dispute, as pled, runs squarely into the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute.  Ultimately, Wodley seeks legal relief based on Mendoza’s involvement in HOA board activities, not based on the board’s actions or the process afforded Wodley in connection with the board actions. 

And, beyond this, the remainder of Wodley’s claims also run squarely into the definitional focus of the anti-SLAPP statute.  Wodley targets Mendoza’s involvement in protected litigation activity relating to restraining orders and mediation of the restraining order proceedings (see Thomas v. Quintero (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 635, 642 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 619]); his “refusal to accept service” of letters demanding preservation of evidence in anticipation of litigation, his participation in communications regarding litigation to HOA community members, and his participation, generally, in HOA dispute resolution proceedings (see Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 647 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 620]; Cabrera v. Alam (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1087-1090 [129 Cal.Rptr.3d 74], all of which target Mendoza’s protected petitioning activity. 

Accordingly, the court turns to the second step of anti-SLAPP analysis.

3. Second Step

Mendoza correctly contends, with one exception, that Wodley cannot establish a probability of prevailing with respect to any of his claims because his claims are barred by the litigation privilege under Civil Code 47.

“ ‘ “[T]he litigation ‘privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action. [Citations.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”  (Seltzer v. Barnes (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 953, 970 [106 Cal.Rptr.3d 290].)

These elements are met with respect to all Wodley’s claims, but the litigation privilege, however, does not extend to Wodley’s “abuse of process” claim based on “filing duplicative CHROs.” 

Though styled as an “abuse of process” cause of action, with respect to this particular claim, Wodley substantively asserts a malicious prosecution claim.  (See S.A. v. Maiden (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 27, 41-42 [176 Cal.Rptr.3d 567] [“Malicious prosecution and abuse of process are distinct. The former concerns a meritless lawsuit (and all the damage it inflicted). The latter concerns the misuse of the tools the law affords litigants once they are in a lawsuit (regardless of whether there was probable cause to commence that lawsuit in the first place)”] (Maiden).)  The litigation privilege does not apply to malicious prosecution claims.  (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 216 [266 Cal.Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365].)

This is not to say that the entirety of the abuse of process cause of action escapes the litigation privilege argument.  Wodley’s claim that Mendoza “misus[ed] mediation to intimidate Plaintiff into submission” is, indeed, an abuse of process claim directed at “misuse of the tools the law affords litigants once they are in a lawsuit.”  (Maiden, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 42.)

The court finds that this claim, along with the remainder of Wodley’s claims, squarely implicate the protections of the litigation privilege.

“The principal purpose of [the litigation privilege] is to afford litigants and witnesses [citation] the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions. [Citations.]” (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 213.)  “In order to achieve this purpose of curtailing derivative lawsuits, [the Supreme Court has] given the litigation privilege a broad interpretation. … Beginning with Albertson v. Raboff [(1956) 46 Cal.2d 375 [295 P.2d 405]], which involved an action for defamation of title, [the California Supreme Court] first extended the litigation privilege to apply to torts other than defamation. [Citation.] As [the Supreme Court] observed in Silberg, the litigation privilege has since ‘been held to immunize defendants from tort liability based on theories of abuse of process [citations], intentional infliction of emotional distress [citations], intentional inducement of breach of contract [citations], intentional interference with prospective economic advantage [citation], negligent misrepresentation [citation], invasion of privacy [citation], negligence [citation] and fraud [citations].’ [Citation.]”  (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 398, 163 P.3d 89].)

It cannot reasonably be disputed that these elements are met with respect to Wodley’s claims (aside from the noted exception of the substantive malicious prosecution claim based on Mendoza’s involvement in restraining order proceedings) targeting Mendoza’s communications and conduct in the court of HOA internal dispute resolution proceedings, in the course of litigation, and in the course of HOA proceedings generally. 

Accordingly, the court finds that Mendoza’s motion must be granted, based on its determination at the second step of anti-SLAPP analysis regarding the litigation privilege, to all Wodley’s claims save his substantive malicious prosecution claim based on Mendoza’s involvement in restraining order proceedings.

Regarding this excepted claim, the court notes Mendoza’s other argument (targeted also at all of Wodley’s claims) that Wodley cannot prevail because Wodley did not “sue in accordance with [the Davis-Stirling Act],” which “provides for default procedures related to Board elections” and “posits clear dispute resolution procedures where a dispute involves an association member’s rights, duties, or liabilities under the Act.”  It appears that Mendoza is arguing that Wodley’s claims fail because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies. 

The court does not agree, with respect to the claim at issue, that Wodley was required to exhaust administrative HOA procedures, however, with respect to a malicious prosecution claim based on Mendoza’s individual involvement in restraining order proceedings against him as such dispute neither pertains to “Board elections” or “an association member’s rights, duties, or liabilities under the [the Davis-Stirling] Act.” 

Beyond this, though, the court still must consider whether Wodley makes a “minimal merit” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 93 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d 703]) showing with respect to his malicious prosecution claim.  The court finds that Wodley fails to make the requisite showing.

“To establish a cause of action for the malicious prosecution of a civil proceeding, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the prior action (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal termination in his, plaintiff’s, favor; (2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was initiated with malice.” (Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13Cal.3d 43, 50 [118 Cal.Rptr. 184, 529 P.2d 608], internal citations omitted.)

Wodley concedes he agreed to a stay-away order and that himself alleges that he sent an email stating: “If you continue this charade, someone will get hurt.”  The court does not find any of the evidence presented by Wodley shows merit to the claim that such statement was not probable cause for the pursuit of restraining orders or that the proceedings were initiated with malice.  Wodley’s sole showing that he sent emails “stating that [he] meant no harm” do not establish that Mendoza lacked probable cause to believe that Wodley had engaged in conduct presenting a “credible threat of violence” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6).

What’s more, in order to secure cessation of the pending restraining order proceedings, Wodley agreed to participate in HOA meetings via Zoom, communicate with board members solely electronically via an HOA portal, and not otherwise contact board members or their families.  The court does not find that such agreement is indicative of a termination of the proceedings in Wodley’s favor. 

Accordingly, the court finds that Mendoza’s motion also must be granted with respect to Wodley’s malicious prosecution claim. 

Based on the foregoing, the anti-SLAPP motion is granted as to the entirety of Wodley’s complaint. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:              Wodley, Frank A vs. Redstone, Matt

Case No.:     VCU325739 

Date:           February 9, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:       Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP)

Tentative Ruling:  To grant Matt Redstone’s special motion to strike (anti-SLAPP).

In this action, Frank Wodley sues Matt Redstone, a former board member of The Windmills homeowner’s association (HOA).  Redstone specially moves to strike (anti-SLAPP) Wodley’s entire complaint.

Wodley’s disputes with Redstone—which, in essence, are really disputes with the HOA—originate from a failed election bid by Wodley for an HOA board seat in or around July 2023.  According to the complaint, candidates for election were listed alphabetically on a ballot sent to voters; Wodley was listed last; and Wodley received the fewest votes.  Wodley thereafter, in September 2023, “served a formal Election Challenge citing ballot-order bias.”

Wodley alleges he “is an 82-year-old disabled homeowner in Tulare County,” with “decades of homeowner-rights advocacy experience.”  Redstone is identified as having served on the HOA board from July 2023 to May 2025—inferably having been elected in the election disputed by Wodley—and as having served as HOA president from July 2024 to May 2025.

Wodley alleges that, about a week after he submitted his “Election Challenge,” “Redstone participated in the [HOA] Board’s denial without independent review or written reasons,” and Wodley thereafter “submitted a 9-page Rebuttal documenting the defects [in the electoral process vis-à-vis the alphabetical listing of candidates] and consequences [i.e., an election that Wodley felt was unfair].”

Inferably, this process did not result in a satisfactory outcome to Wodley, either by way of a favorable HOA determination or an acceptable HOA procedure for adjudicating his election dispute. 

On November 7, 2023, Wodley alleges, Wodley sent an email (to an individual board member; not Redstone) that include the sentence:  “If you continue this charade, someone will get hurt.  That is not my goal.” 

According to Wodley, he sent subsequent emails clarifying that he meant “[h]urt meaning to their [the board members’] character, not bodily,” and that he “never said the board will be hurt,” he “said someone”; but despite these subsequent emails, “the HOA canceled IDR [apparently the ongoing HOA internal dispute resolution process regarding Wodley’s election challenge] and labeled the email a ‘threat,’ ” and “the HOA’s attorney sent a Cease & Desist.”

Wodley alleges that despite his having ceased sending further emails or having any further direct contact with the board after November 7, 2023, “[b]etween December 1-7, 2023, Defendant Redstone joined and filed Civil Harassment Restraining Order (CHRO) petitions repeating the same mischaracterization [of Wodley’s email “as a physical threat despite the clarifications and Plaintiff’s outreach].”

The court here notes that, between late November and early December 2023, Wodley was the subject of six separate restraining order requests, including a workplace violence restraining order request by the HOA, and five civil harassment restraining order requests by individual petitioners, including Redstone.  All six matters were consolidated and resolved, without issuance of a restraining order, with Wodley agreeing to participate in HOA meetings via Zoom, communicating with board members solely electronically via an HOA portal, and not otherwise contacting board members or their families.  Wodley includes allegations suggesting that Judge David Mathias, who presided over the restraining order matters, found the petitioners had all failed to identify “direct threats” by Wodley, and noted “many petitions were ‘cut and pasted.’ ”

Wodley alleges that, during “mediation in January 2024” (inferably in the course of the consolidated restraining order proceedings), “defense counsel [presumably referring to counsel for the petitioners in the various restraining order proceedings] threatened [Wodley] and his wife with a $10,000 consequence if they did not accept terms; [and] [Wodley’s] wife broke down crying.” 

Wodley then alleges that, approximately six weeks later, in March 2024, “Redstone personally represented the Board” during dispute resolution proceedings in which he “acted with hostility, dismissing Plaintiff's evidence and proposals for a website, newsletter, homeowner committees, and surveys.” 

Wodley further alleges, also in March 2024, that “a Board newsletter”—with Redstone having “supported the Board that disseminated it”—“was distributed to 292 homes, claiming the HOA was ‘forced’ to hire counsel to protect the community from [Wodley]; [and] the piece was misleading and humiliating in light of Judge Mathias’s [alleged] comments [during the restraining order proceedings].”

Wodley also alleges that, during the entirety of Redstone’s time as a board member and HOA president, he “presided over escalating expenses and refused transparency,” and Wodley describes various areas of alleged wasteful/excessive HOA spending.  Woodley alleges “[h]omeowners complained about the lack of precise budget detail.”

Wodley then alleges that, over a year later, in April 2025, Wodley “mailed Demand and Preservation of Evidence letters via certified mail to all sitting board members, including Defendant Redstone”; “Redstone expressly refused to accept service”; and, the following month, Wodley “mailed follow-up letters,” which, presumably, Wodley infers Redstone also “refused to accept” as he alleges, generally, that “Redstone’s refusal demonstrates a willful effort to obstruct accountability and transparency, consistent with his roles in: denying the 2023 challenge, escalating the November 7 email, participating in retaliatory CHROs, rejecting reforms, and presiding over waste.”

Finally, Wodley alleges that “Redstone acted in concert” with various identified individuals and “Evans Management” “to commit the torts [earlier described in the complaint].”  None of the alleged co-conspirators, the court notes, are identified as defendants in the complaint (Redstone is the only named defendant). 

Wodley asserts four causes of action: for breach of fiduciary duty; for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); for abuse of process; and for “Civil Conspiracy.”  The latter cause of action is an amalgam of the prior three—based on allegations that Redstone acted in concert with others with respect to the conduct giving rise to the first three causes of action.

Each of Wodley’s causes of action are based on discrete claims. 

The first cause of action is based on claims that Redstone breached fiduciary duties owed Wodley by:

6. “Denying Plaintiff’s 2023 election challenge without independent review”;
7. “Refusing preservation of evidence despite formal demands” (i.e., refusing “to accept service” of Wodley’s “Demand and Preservation of Evidence letters”);
8. “Approving or participating in retaliatory legal spend (~$25,000) associated with CHROs”;
9. “Presiding over wasteful contracts and opaque finances while core functions suffered”; and
10. “Rejecting transparency reforms and records access” (Wodley includes an attachment of his notes from March 2024 board proceedings—during which Redstone allegedly “acted with hostility” toward Wodley—which indicate Redstone found the basis of Wodley’s election challenged lacked merit, was based merely on Wodley’s “opinion,” and that it was Wodley’s “fault that [he] lost”).

The second cause of action is based on claims that Redstone “engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct intended to cause (or in reckless disregard of causing) severe emotional distress” by:

6. “Participating in duplicative CHROs based on a mischaracterized email”;
7. “Coercive mediation tactics that caused Plaintiff’s wife to break down crying” (apparently Wodley attributes the alleged conduct of Redstone’s counsel during the January 2024 mediation to Redstone);
8. “Hostile conduct at IDR and rejection of reforms” (i.e., during the board proceedings in March 2024);
9. “Supporting publication of a smearing newsletter to the entire community”; and
10. “Refusing to preserve evidence” (i.e., refusing Wodley’s “Demand and Preservation of Evidence letters”).

The third cause of action is based on claims that Redstone “misused legal process” by:

3. “[F]iling and supporting CHRO petitions not for protection but to retaliate against and silence Plaintiff's protected participation in HOA affairs”; and
4. “[U]s[ing] mediation to intimidate and coerce compliance rather than to resolve a bona fide safety dispute.”

By implication, Wodley’s fourth conspiracy cause of action is based on Redstone’s conspiring with others in the commission of the alleged conduct giving rise to all 12 of the above-listed claims under the first three causes of action.  Wodley alleges “Defendant agreed and acted in concert with others … to commit the torts alleged above—abuse of process, ITED, and breaches of fiduciary duty—through coordinated actions … .”

Wodley asserts in his complaint that he “seeks vindication and truth, not financial gain,” but it is not accurate to suggest he does not seek damages and other financial renumeration.  In addition to “[d]eclaratory relief that Defendant breached fiduciary duties and retaliated against Plaintiff” and “[r]estoration of reputation and acknowledgement of wrongdoing,” Wodley also prays for general and special damages, punitive damages, and costs. 

ANALYSIS

1. Anti-SLAPP

The anti-SLAPP statute “provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity. Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16. [Citation.] If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.”  (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 [205 Cal.Rptr.3d 475, 376 P.3d 604] (Baral), italics omitted.)

The anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, at subdivision (b)(1), states that “[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike.”

“As our Supreme Court explained in Baral, the statute uses the term ‘cause of action’ in a particular way to target ‘claims that are based on the conduct protected by the statute.’ The term is not limited to a specific count as pleaded in a complaint. Thus, while an anti-SLAPP motion ‘does not reach claims based on unprotected activity,’ it ‘may challenge any claim for relief founded on allegations of protected activity.’ A claim targeted by an anti-SLAPP motion ‘must amount to a “cause of action” in the sense that it is alleged to justify a remedy.’ ” (Rudisill v. California Coastal Com. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1071 [247 Cal.Rptr.3d 840], citations omitted.)  Stated another way, “[t]he statute's definitional focus is not on the form of the plaintiff's cause of action but rather the defendant's activity giving rise to his or her asserted liability and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.”  (Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1232 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 57].) 

Accordingly, “[a]nalysis of an anti-SLAPP motion is not confined to evaluating whether an entire cause of action, as pleaded by the plaintiff, arises from protected activity or has merit. Instead, courts should analyze each claim for relief—each act or set of acts supplying a basis for relief, of which there may be several in a single pleaded cause of action—to determine whether the acts are protected and, if so, whether the claim they give rise to has the requisite degree of merit to survive the motion. [Citation.]”  (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1010 [281 Cal.Rptr.3d 678, 491 P.3d 1058].)

2. First Step

For purposes of the first step of anti-SLAPP analysis, protected activity includes “any act … in furtherance of the … right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) 

“ ‘[A]ct[s] in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue’ include[] (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”  (Id., subd. (e).)

Under the surface of Wodley’s sprawling, scatter-shot complaint there may, potentially, be lurking some kind of claim outside the “definitional focus” (Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1232 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 57]) of the anti-SLAPP statute by which Wodley means to target the fairness or validity of the procedures he was afforded by the HOA in the adjudication of his election, or, perhaps, the “[a]cts of governance” (San Ramon Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. Contra Costa County Employees' Retirement Assn. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 343, 354 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 724]) occurring in the course of those procedures, in the manner of a petition for writ of mandate or for writ of administrative mandate.

While, “in an appropriate case, a petition for mandamus may be subject to a special motion to strike just like any other form of action” (id., at p. 353), the collective action of the HOA in denying Wodley’s election challenge or the denial of statutorily provided, or otherwise fair, procedures, could appropriately be challenged by such a petition without running afoul of the anti-SLAPP statute because such a challenge would not arise from acts taken by the HOA board, or its individual members, in furtherance of their right of petition or free speech (see id, at pp. 353-356 [discussing relevant examples]).

Wodley comes closest to this in his claim under his first cause of action targeted at Redstone’s alleged denial of his “2023 election challenge without independent review,” but even here, having stated the claim as the basis of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, Wodley directs the focus of his claim precisely at Redstone’s petitioning activity because Redstone’s expression of denial “in connection with an issue under consideration or review [in an] official proceeding authorized by law” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)) itself is alleged to be actionable conduct in breach of fiduciary duties allegedly owned by Redstone to Wodley. 

Similarly, Wodley might have properly asserted a claim targeted at the board’s involvement in alleged “wasteful contracts and opaque finances” that did not run afoul of the anti-SLAPP statute, but Wodley, again, directs his focus, through framing as a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Redstone, at Redstone’s protected petitioning activity in participating, as an individual board member and/or HOA president, i.e., “[p]residing over,” HOA contracts and finances.  Even a breach of fiduciary duty claim directed at the HOA itself could presumably be construed as directed at wasteful spending and not protected petitioning activity (see e.g., Baharian-Mehr v. Smith (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 265, 273 [117 Cal.Rptr.3d 153]), but in the case of Wodley’s claim, he targets Redstone’s individual participation (i.e., his petitioning activity) in HOA contract and finance determinations in a claim inextricably intertwined with an implied dispute against the subject contract and finance determinations.

This is all to say that Wodley, in a couple instances, indicates disputes that may not run afoul of the anti-SLAPP statute, but the manner of his assertion of his claims arising from those disputes, as pled, runs squarely into the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute.  Ultimately, Wodley seeks legal relief based on Redstone’s involvement in HOA board activities, not based on the board’s actions or the process afforded Wodley in connection with the board actions. 

And, beyond this, the remainder of Wodley’s claims also run squarely into the definitional focus of the anti-SLAPP statute.  Wodley targets Redstone’s involvement in protected litigation activity relating to restraining orders and (indirect) involvement in “[c]oercive mediation tactics” in the course of restraining order proceedings (see Thomas v. Quintero (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 635, 642 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 619]); his “refusal to accept service” of letters demanding preservation of evidence in anticipation of litigation, his participation in communications regarding litigation to HOA community members (“publication of a smearing newsletter”), “[r]ejecting transparency reforms and records access” by way of determining against Wodley in HOA dispute resolution proceedings, and “[h]ostile conduct” during those HOA proceedings (see Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 647 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 620]; Cabrera v. Alam (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1087-1090 [129 Cal.Rptr.3d 74], all of which target Redstone’s protected petitioning activity. 

Accordingly, the court turns to the second step of anti-SLAPP analysis.

3. Second Step

Redstone correctly contends, with one exception, that Wodley cannot establish a probability of prevailing with respect to any of his claims because his claims are barred by the litigation privilege under Civil Code 47.

“ ‘ “[T]he litigation ‘privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action. [Citations.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”  (Seltzer v. Barnes (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 953, 970 [106 Cal.Rptr.3d 290].)

These elements are met with respect to all Wodley’s claims, but the litigation privilege, however, does not extend to Wodley’s “abuse of process” claim based on “filing and supporting CHRO petitions not for protection but to retaliate against and silence Plaintiff's protected participation in HOA affairs.” 

Though styled as an “abuse of process” cause of action, with respect to this particular claim, Wodley substantively asserts a malicious prosecution claim.  (See S.A. v. Maiden (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 27, 41-42 [176 Cal.Rptr.3d 567] [“Malicious prosecution and abuse of process are distinct. The former concerns a meritless lawsuit (and all the damage it inflicted). The latter concerns the misuse of the tools the law affords litigants once they are in a lawsuit (regardless of whether there was probable cause to commence that lawsuit in the first place)”] (Maiden).)  The litigation privilege does not apply to malicious prosecution claims.  (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 216 [266 Cal.Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365].)

This is not to say that the entirety of the abuse of process cause of action escapes the litigation privilege argument.  Wodley’s claim that Redstone “misused legal process” by “us[ing] mediation to intimidate and coerce compliance rather than to resolve a bona fide safety dispute” is, indeed, an abuse of process claim directed at “misuse of the tools the law affords litigants once they are in a lawsuit.”  (Maiden, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 42.)

The court finds that this claim, along with the remainder of Wodley’s claims, squarely implicate the protections of the litigation privilege.

“The principal purpose of [the litigation privilege] is to afford litigants and witnesses [citation] the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions. [Citations.]” (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 213.)  “In order to achieve this purpose of curtailing derivative lawsuits, [the Supreme Court has] given the litigation privilege a broad interpretation. … Beginning with Albertson v. Raboff [(1956) 46 Cal.2d 375 [295 P.2d 405]], which involved an action for defamation of title, [the California Supreme Court] first extended the litigation privilege to apply to torts other than defamation. [Citation.] As [the Supreme Court] observed in Silberg, the litigation privilege has since ‘been held to immunize defendants from tort liability based on theories of abuse of process [citations], intentional infliction of emotional distress [citations], intentional inducement of breach of contract [citations], intentional interference with prospective economic advantage [citation], negligent misrepresentation [citation], invasion of privacy [citation], negligence [citation] and fraud [citations].’ [Citation.]”  (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 398, 163 P.3d 89].)

It cannot reasonably be disputed that these elements are met with respect to Wodley’s claims (aside from the noted exception of the substantive malicious prosecution claim based on Redstone’s involvement in restraining order proceedings) targeting Redstone’s communications and conduct in the court of HOA internal dispute resolution proceedings, in the course of litigation, and in the course of HOA proceedings generally. 

Accordingly, the court finds that Redstone’s motion must be granted, based on its determination at the second step of anti-SLAPP analysis regarding the litigation privilege, to all Wodley’s claims save his substantive malicious prosecution claim based on Redstone’s involvement in restraining order proceedings.

Regarding this excepted claim, the court notes Redstone’s other argument (targeted also at all of Wodley’s claims) that Wodley cannot prevail because Wodley did not “sue in accordance with [the Davis-Stirling Act],” which “provides for default procedures related to Board elections” and “posits clear dispute resolution procedures where a dispute involves an association member’s rights, duties, or liabilities under the Act.”  It appears that Redstone is arguing that Wodley’s claims fail because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies. 

The court does not agree, with respect to the claim at issue, that Wodley was required to exhaust administrative HOA procedures, however, with respect to a malicious prosecution claim based on Redstone’s individual involvement in restraining order proceedings against him as such dispute neither pertains to “Board elections” or “an association member’s rights, duties, or liabilities under the [the Davis-Stirling] Act.” 

Beyond this, though, the court still must consider whether Wodley makes a “minimal merit” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 93 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d 703]) showing with respect to his malicious prosecution claim.  The court finds that Wodley fails to make the requisite showing.

“To establish a cause of action for the malicious prosecution of a civil proceeding, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the prior action (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal termination in his, plaintiff’s, favor; (2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was initiated with malice.” (Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13Cal.3d 43, 50 [118 Cal.Rptr. 184, 529 P.2d 608], internal citations omitted.)

Wodley concedes he agreed to a stay-away order and that himself alleges that he sent an email stating: “If you continue this charade, someone will get hurt.”  The court does not find any of the evidence presented by Wodley shows merit to the claim that such statement was not probable cause for the pursuit of restraining orders or that the proceedings were initiated with malice.  Wodley’s sole showing that he sent emails “reiterating that [he] did not intend physical harm” do not establish that Redstone lacked probable cause to believe that Wodley had engaged in conduct presenting a “credible threat of violence” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6).

What’s more, in order to secure cessation of the pending restraining order proceedings, Wodley agreed to participate in HOA meetings via Zoom, communicate with board members solely electronically via an HOA portal, and not otherwise contact board members or their families.  The court does not find that such agreement is indicative of a termination of the proceedings in Wodley’s favor. 

Accordingly, the court finds that Redstone’s motion also must be granted with respect to Wodley’s malicious prosecution claim. 

Based on the foregoing, the anti-SLAPP motion is granted as to the entirety of Wodley’s complaint. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Examiner Notes for Probate Matters Calendared

• Visalia Division 
• South County Justice Center Division