Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, August 20, 2026, [modified at 3:27 pm as to Dept. 19 only] are:

Re:                Alba Bustamente, Estefani Carolina vs. Kaweah Delta Health Care, Inc

Case No.:   VCU316413

Date:           August 20, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts and Analysis

On December 26, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in Tulare Superior Court alleging (1) Medical Malpractice - Professional Negligence; (2) Medical Battery; (3) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; (4) Survival Action; (5) Failure to Provide Medical Translation; (6) Vicarious Liability; (7) Negligent Hiring Supervision Retention; (8) Violation of Patient's Bill of Rights; and (9) Wrongful Death.

On March 6, 2025, this Court sustained Defendant's Demurrer as to Plaintiffs Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, Failure to Provide Medical Translation, and Violation of Patient's Bill of Rights causes of action.

On April 16, 2026, the Court denied Kaweah’s motion for summary adjudication as to the vicarious liability theory of ostensible agency.

On June 5, 2026, Plaintiffs filed this summary adjudication motion “…of the first element of their cause of action for medical battery, asking the Court to determine that on September 6, 2024, Kaweah Delta Health Care District Inc.’s employees induced Estefani Carolina Alba Bustamante without her consent.”

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1); emphasis added.)

Here, summary adjudication of a single element of a cause of action is not available to Plaintiff. Establishing the first element of the cause of action would not “completely dispose of” the cause of action. No affirmative defense would be established. The Court does not consider the first element regarding consent to be “a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.”

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Briseno, Guadalupe vs. Perfection Pet Foods, LLC

Case No.:   VCU308266

Date:            August 20, 2026

Time:            8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Motion for Approval of PAGA Only Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to set a final compliance hearing as to distribution of the net settlement fund to the LWDA and Aggrieved Employees on March 18, 2027; D1; 8:30 am.  CMC is off calendar.

Background Facts

Plaintiffs Birseno and Delayo’s operative amended complaint brings a single cause of action under PAGA against Defendants Perfection Pet Foods, LLC, Post Brands Pet Care, LLC, Volt Information Sciences, Inc., and Volt Management and seeks approval of the settlement of this matter.

1. Sufficiency of Amount of Settlement (Proposed Net Distribution: $40,582.99)

The gross settlement amount is $300,000.

Plaintiffs estimates approximately 382 aggrieved employees, defined as all persons currently or formerly employed by Defendants either directly or through a staffing agency as hourly-paid, non-exempt employees who worked for a Perfection Pet Foods, LLC facility in California from August 30, 2022 to December 9, 2024.

Plaintiffs’ PAGA claims allege violations of (1) Failure to Keep Accurate Records (Cal. Labor Code § 1174); (2) Failure to Produce Records (Cal. Labor Code §§ 226(b)-(c), 432, and 1198.5); (3) Failure to Provide Meal Periods (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7, 512); (4) Failure to Authorize and Permit Rest Periods (Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7); (5) Failure to Provide Suitable Resting Facilities (IWC Wage Order § 13(B), Cal. Lab. Code § 1198); (6) Failure to Pay Minimum and Overtime Wages (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 218.5, 510, 511, 558, 558.1, 1194, 1197, 1198, and 1199); (7) Failure to Pay Statutory Wages (Cal. Lab. Code § 223); (8) Failure to Pay Wages Due (Cal. Labor Code § 216); (9) Failure to Reimburse Business Expenses (Cal. Lab. Code § 2800 and 2802); (10) Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements (Cal. Lab. Code § 226); (11) Unlawful Deductions (Cal. Labor Code §§ 221-222); (12) Failure to Pay for Reporting Time (IWC Wage Order § 5, Cal. Lab. Code § 1198); (13) Violation of California Day of Rest Law (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 551, 552); (14) Failure to Provide Suitable Seating (IWC Wage Order §§ 14(A-B), Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1198, 1199); (15) Sick Leave and Supplemental Sick Leave Violations (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 233, 234, and 245-248.6); (16) Failure to Pay Vested Vacation Time (Cal. Labor Code § 227.3); (17) Failure to Timely Pay Final Wages at Termination (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201-203); (18) Failure to Pay Final Wages at Place of Discharge (Cal. Lab. Code § 208); and (19) Unlawful Agreements/Unlawful Inquiries into Criminal History (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 432.5, 432.7).

In deciding whether to grant approval of the proposed PAGA settlement, the primary issues to be decided is whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. (Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 56, 77.) “Because many of the factors used to evaluate class action settlements bear on a settlement's fairness—including the strength of the plaintiff's case, the risk, the stage of the proceeding, the complexity and likely duration of further litigation, and the settlement amount—these factors can be useful in evaluating the fairness of a PAGA settlement.” (Id.) “Given PAGA's purpose to protect the public interest, we also agree with the LWDA and federal district courts that have found it appropriate to review a PAGA settlement to ascertain whether a settlement is fair in view of PAGA's purposes and policies.” (Id. citing O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2016) 201 F.Supp.3d 1110, 1133.)

Plaintiff’s counsel provides estimates of the maximum PAGA penalty liability of $10,486,200 (22,991 pay periods x $100 per violation x 4 claims at 100% violation rate + 22,991 pay periods x $100 per violation x 1 claim at 56% violation rate) (Declaration of Serb ¶17.)

The motion adequately sets forth the relative strength and value of the PAGA claim as well as the risks, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation.

As noted above, the parties reached gross settlement figure of $300,000 after mediation.

Plaintiffs’ deductions from the gross settlement of $300,000 are proposed as follows:

Proposed Attorney Fees (35%):	$105,000.00
Proposed Attorney Costs (incurred):	$11,668.06
Proposed Payment to Plaintiff Briseno	$10,000.00
Proposed Payment to Plaintiff Delayo	$5,000.00
Proposed Administrative Costs	$6,000.00
Proposed Net Settlement Fund	$162,331.94
Proposed LWDA Share (75% of Net Settlement Fund)	$121,748.95
Proposed Aggrieved Employee Share (25% of Net Settlement Fund):	$40,582.99

The Court finds the gross settlement amount fair, adequate, and reasonable under Moniz as noted above.

2.  Notice

There is no notice period. The proposed notice adequately informs the aggrieved employees of adequate details regarding the case and distribution of their portion of the net settlement fund.

3.  Enhancement Awards

An enhancement payment of $10,000 is proposed as to Plaintiff Briseno and $5,000 as to Plaintiff Delayo.

The court has, in past cases, approved enhancement awards of $5,000 routinely. While Plaintiff Briseno has provided a declaration detailing the involvement in this case from inception to settlement, the Court does not find that these efforts should result in an enhancement award greater than the typical amount awarded by this Court. The enhancement awards of $5,000 are approved.

4. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees of 35% of the gross settlement fund of $300,000 or $105,000 and costs of $11,668.06 are sought by counsel.

Counsel has utilized the percentage of common fund methodology as well as provided adequate lodestar information to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee request.

Here, Counsel indicates that the firm has spent 166.9 hours at rates ranging from $850 to $650 per hour, proving a base lodestar of $130,740. (Declaration of Serb – Ex. 6.)

Counsel has also provided the current costs expended in amounts of $11,668.06. (Declaration of Serb ¶48.)

5.  Claims Administrator

The claims administrator is designated as Simpluris Inc. who has submitted a bid for $6,000 to administer the settlement. The Court approves the claims administrator.

6. Unclaimed Settlement Proceeds

The Court approves the distribution of unclaimed settlement proceeds to the California Secretary of State’s Unclaimed Property Division in the name of the Aggrieved Employee, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

7. Release

The Court finds the proposed limited release of PAGA claims reasonable and within the law under a PAGA only settlement as to the aggrieved employees. (Arias v. Sup. Ct., (2009) 46 CA4th 969, 986-987.) Further, the Court notes that the “Plaintiffs’ Release” term is supported by adequate consideration in the form of the enhancement payments, which the Court has approved above as $5,000 each.

 8. LWDA Notice

The Court finds confirmation from the LWDA of receipt of proof of submission of the proposed settlement agreement. (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (l)(2).) (Declaration of Serb – Ex. 5.)

The Court, therefore, grants the motion and sets a final compliance hearing as to distribution of the net settlement fund to the LWDA and Aggrieved Employees on March 18, 2027; D1; 8:30 am.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Serrano, Rosa Maria vs. The Villa Park Orchards Association

Case No.:   VCU332558

Date:           August 20, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; CMC is continued to February 25, 2027: 8:30 am; D1.

Background Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendant Villa Park Orchards Association for discrimination, retaliation, failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in interactive process and wrongful termination.

Defendant moves to compel arbitration of these claims.

The Court previously continued this hearing as to obtaining a certified translation of the agreement at issue. On August 13, 2026, Defendant filed a supplemental declaration sufficiently setting forth the requisite translated documents in compliance with the Rules of Court.

Facts – Agreement to Arbitrate

In support, Defendant provides the declaration of its Human Resources Manager. The manager indicates that, in 2022, “I was the one that presented the VPOA Arbitration Agreement and explanation document to Plaintiff. I speak both English and Spanish and had both English and Spanish versions of the arbitration agreement available for Plaintiff to review.” (Declaration of Anguiano ¶5.) Further that, Plaintiff voluntarily executed the 2022 Arbitration Agreement (“Agreement”) on her own behalf. (Declaration of Anguiano ¶6.) Further, the manager indicates the completed Agreement was physically placed in Plaintiff’s employee file and that the signature on the Agreement matched other documents in Plaintiff’s personnel file. (Declaration of Anguiano ¶8.) Declarant attaches a true and correct copy of the Agreement signed by Plaintiff as Exhibit A. (Declaration of Anguiano ¶8 – Ex. A.)

As noted above, Defendants have provided an English translation of the Agreement as Exhibit C. (Declaration of Benson – Ex. B)

In opposition, Plaintiff states “I do not recall ever signing this document. I also don’t recognize the document.” (Declaration of Plaintiff ¶7.)

Authority and Analysis – Agreement to Arbitrate

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2(a), (b).) (emphasis added.)

Absent a challenge by the nonmoving party, this burden is met by simply providing a copy of the arbitration agreement.  (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC, 13 Cal. App. 5th 1152, 1160 (2017); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.)  “For purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001), 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218; Sprunk v. Prisma LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 785, 793.)  

However, when the opposing party disputes the agreement, then the opposing party must provide evidence to challenge its authenticity.  (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) 

Under California law, "[t]he burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence …." (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164-165.)“However, the burden of production may shift in a three-step process." (Id. at 165.)

“First, the moving party bears the burden of producing 'prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.' [Citation.]” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) “The moving party 'can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party's] signature.' [Citation.]” (Id..) “For this step, 'it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.’ [Citation.]” (Id.)

Here, Defendant’s initial burden is met through attachment of Exhibits A and C as to Plaintiff’s handwritten signature to the Agreement and English translation thereof.

“If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.) “The opposing party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may testify under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement.” (Id.)

In Gamboa, the Court of Appeal found that the plaintiff “met her burden on the second step by filing an opposing declaration, saying she did not recall the agreement and would not have signed it if she had been aware of it: ‘I do not remember these documents at all .... Had I been made aware of the existence of an arbitration agreement, and been explained its provisions, I would not have signed any such documents.’” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 167.)

Here, Plaintiff indicates, similar to the plaintiff in Gamboa, she does not recognize the document, does not recall signing the document and has never previously read the document. (Declaration of Plaintiff ¶7.)

Under Ramirez v. Golden Queen Mining Co., LLC (May 15, 2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 821, Plaintiff’s declaration is insufficient, as she fails to deny the signature is her own:

“There is a split of authority among the Courts of Appeal as to what constitutes sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute about the authenticity of a handwritten signature on a document agreeing to arbitration. (Compare Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 757–758, review den. Apr. 26, 2023, S278817 with Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164–165) We join Iyere in concluding that an individual is capable of recognizing his or her handwritten signature and if that individual does not deny a handwritten signature is his or her own, that person's failure to remember signing the document does not create a factual dispute about the signature's authenticity. (Iyere, supra, at p. 757.)” (Id. at 825.)

In Ramirez, the appellate court found that the employer had met the initial burden via a declaration that asserted the employee was employed, that the declarant was the custodian of records, that the personnel file containing employee documents was kept in the regular course and scope, that a personnel file was maintained for the employee, that the employee signed the agreement and that true and correct copies were attached to the declaration. (Id. at 831.) As noted above, and in line with Ramirez (as well as with Gamboa and other cases), the Court has found Defendant has carried its initial burden.

Further, under Ramirez and in a handwritten signature case like this one, Plaintiff’s failure to deny she signed the Agreement is fatal the challenge to the authenticity. The Ramirez court noted that “Ramirez's declaration stated (1) he did “not recall ever being presented with an arbitration agreement,” (2) he did “not recall ever signing an arbitration agreement,” (3) no one informed him about an arbitration agreement, informed him of a desire that he sign an arbitration agreement, or explained to him what an arbitration agreement was, and (4) if someone had explained to him what an arbitration agreement was, he would not sign it.” (Id. at 836.)

The court, therefore, found the declaration insufficient to challenge the authenticity, stating “His declaration does not assert the signature on that document is not his and, furthermore, does not even state that he cannot recall signing that particular document.  Consequently, we conclude Ramirez, like the plaintiffs in Iyere, has offered no admissible evidence creating a dispute as to the authenticity of the handwritten signature on the acknowledgement.” (Id. at 836-837.)

The Court here agrees that “the inability to recall signing a document does not ‘afford[] an independent basis to find that a contract was not formed’” and therefore, the burden has not shifted back to Defendant.

Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that she signed the Agreement or that the signature is her own.

Therefore, the Court finds an agreement to arbitrate exists.

Facts – Scope of Agreement

The Agreement expressly applies to “Any and all disputes, controversies, or claims not resolved in accordance with the foregoing procedures, and which arise out of or relate to this Employee Handbook, your employment, or the termination of your employment…” as well as “…any issue regarding the applicability of or any alleged breach of this Employee Handbook or any purported employment contract or agreement, and/or any dispute or claim arising out of the relationship (or the nature of the relationship), or the commencement or termination of the relationship—including, but not limited to, claims for violation of a state or federal statute, and/or for breach of contract, breach of an implied contract or covenant of good faith and fair dealing, wrongful termination, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, invasion of privacy, interference with advantageous or contractual relations, conspiracy, or other tort claims of any kind. Claims for discrimination, harassment, and/or retaliation arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.), the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (California Government Code §§ 12940–12950), the California Labor Code, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 U.S.C. § 623) are subject to the provisions of this Arbitration Agreement.”

Authority and Analysis – Scope of Agreement

Based on the claims pled in the complaint as to discrimination, retaliation and other FEHA claims, as well as wrongful termination, the Court finds the claims at issue here are within the scope of the Agreement.

Facts – FAA Application

Defendant’s manager further states “Plaintiff worked in a packing facility as a grader. Plaintiff worked with various types of citrus products. Plaintiff’s job was to ensure that the citrus products that VPOA packed met the VPOA standards to be packed as a final product. All of the citrus fruit that VPOA packs and which Plaintiff graded originates and is grown in California.” (Declaration of Anguiano ¶9.)

Further, that:

“VPOA affects interstate commerce in several ways. As a cooperative, VPOA supports several businesses that operate in interstate commerce, including farms that utilize items like fertilizers and machinery that come from all over the United States. VPOA also supports those businesses that operate in interstate commerce by sorting, grading, and packing the citrus products. The California agriculture market supports commerce across the United States and feeds Americans all over. The citrus products that VPOA packs are distributed to stores that also operate in interstate commerce and sell other products from across the Country. Some of the VPOA citrus products are later sold to other states by an intermediary marketing company. As a grader working in the packing warehouse, Plaintiff worked directly with the citrus products that are later consumed by Americans all over.” (Declaration of Anguiano ¶10.)

Finally, that “Although Plaintiff’s job duties undoubtedly affected interstate commerce, Plaintiff’s job duties did not involve any transportation of any goods. Plaintiff was not part of the shipping or receiving process, did not cross any state lines, and did not have any transportation duties. Rather, Plaintiff affected interstate commerce by supporting other business that operate in interstate commerce by grading the citrus products which later went to market and were later distributed to other customers across the United States. Plaintiff’s job duties were exclusively within the State of California.” (Declaration of Anguiano ¶11.)

In opposition, Plaintiff states “Up until 2006, I worked in VPOA’s facility in Orange, California. Around 2006, the company moved to Strathmore, and I worked exclusively at the facility in Strathmore, California. During my 42 years of employment with VPOA, I never had to travel outside of the State for my work. I did not transport any goods or services as part of my job for VPOA. My employment with VPOA related exclusively to local operations in Strathmore after 2006, and in Orange prior to that. I had no contact with anyone outside of the State in connection with my work functions.” (Declaration of Plaintiff ¶4.)

Authority and Analysis – FAA Application

“The FAA applies to contracts that involve interstate commerce (9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2)” (Davis v. Shiekh Shoes, LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 956, 963.) The party asserting the FAA applies to an agreement has “the burden to demonstrate FAA coverage by declarations and other evidence.” (Hoover v. American Income Life Ins.Co. (2012) 206Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207; see Shepard v. Edward Mackay Enterprises, Inc. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1101)

An arbitration clause is governed by the FAA if the agreement is a contract "evidencing a transaction involving commerce." (9 U.S.C. § 2.) "[E]videncing a transaction involving commerce" means that "the 'transaction' in fact 'involv[es]' interstate commerce, even if the parties did not contemplate an interstate commerce connection." (Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v. Dobson (1995) 513 U.S. 265, 281.) This phrase is "broadly construe[d]" because the FAA "embodies Congress' intent to provide for the enforcement of arbitration agreements within the full reach of the Commerce Clause." (Giuliano v. Inland Empire Pers., Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1286.)

There are three categories of conduct that Congress may regulate under its commerce power: “ (1) the channels of interstate commerce, (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce and persons or things in interstate commerce, and (3) those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.” (Shepard, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at 1098, citing United States v. Lopez (1995) 514 U.S. 549, 588-589.)

Therefore, the FAA applies where an employer sells and distributes products out of state and where the employee's work forms part of that process. (Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 232, 246.)

Here, Defendant’s declarant states: “The citrus products that VPOA packs are distributed to stores that also operate in interstate commerce and sell other products from across the Country. Some of the VPOA citrus products are later sold to other states by an intermediary marketing company. As a grader working in the packing warehouse, Plaintiff worked directly with the citrus products that are later consumed by Americans all over.” This is sufficient to affect interstate commerce under the standard above. Although Plaintiff’s memorandum in opposition argues that these statements are self serving, lack foundation and conclusory, no objection to the declaration has been made. The Court finds the declaration sufficiently specific, within the personal knowledge of the manager and that Defendant need not offer information more specific than what has been provided to the Court. Further, Plaintiff’s lack of travel outside the state or that she has not personally transported goods are irrelevant under the standards set forth above.

Therefore, the Court finds the FAA applies.

Facts - Defenses to Enforcement – Unconscionability

As to procedural unconscionability, Plaintiff notes the adhesive nature of the Agreement, no meaningful opportunity to review and that Plaintiff was surprised by the contents of the Agreement based on the presentation of the Agreement.

As to substantive unconscionability, Plaintiff argues the Agreement lacks mutuality, there is an unlawful cost-shifting and fee burden imposed on Plaintiff, contains an unlawful attorney fee shifting, waiver of PAGA claims, and fails to include arbitration provider procedures,

Authority and Analysis - Defenses to Enforcement – Unconscionability

The inquiry into unconscionability consists of two prongs: A contract will be revoked if it is both procedurally unconscionable and substantively unconscionable. (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Service, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 82, 102.) Procedural and substantive unconscionability need not be present to the same degree. “[T]he more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” (Id. at 114.)

Procedural Unconscionability

“‘Procedural unconscionability’ concerns the manner in which the contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties at that time.  It focuses on the factors of oppression and surprise. The oppression component arises from an inequality of bargaining power of the parties to the contract and an absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice on the part of the weaker party. The component of surprise arises when the challenged terms are ‘hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce them.’” (Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1281.)

The Court also considers whether circumstances of the contract’s formation created such oppression or surprise that closer scrutiny of its overall fairness is required. (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 126-127.) “The circumstances relevant to establishing oppression include, but are not limited to (1) the amount of time the party is given to consider the proposed contract; (2) the amount and type of pressure exerted on the party to sign the proposed contract; (3) the length of the proposed contract and the length and complexity of the challenged provision; (4) the education and experience of the party; and (5) whether the party's review of the proposed contract was aided by an attorney.” (Id.) As OTO recognizes, the pressure exerted on a standard employee to accept an adhesive arbitration agreement as a condition of employment is “particularly acute,” which indicates oppression.  (Id. at 127.)

“An adhesive contract is standardized, generally on a preprinted form, and offered by the party with superior bargaining power on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. (Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1245.) Arbitration contracts imposed as a condition of employment are typically adhesive. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 114-115; Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 695, 704.) But the fact that an agreement is adhesive is not, alone, sufficient to render it unconscionable. (Malone v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1561.) “[A] compulsory pre-dispute arbitration agreement is not rendered unenforceable just because it is required as a condition of employment or offered on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.” (Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1127.)

Here, the Agreement appears to be a compulsory pre-dispute agreement for which Plaintiff was provided little time to review or comprehend, with some pressure exerted by management to sign the Agreement. (Declaration of Plaintiff ¶¶6-12.)

The Court finds a medium degree of procedural unconscionability under these circumstances.

Substantive Unconscionability

“Substantive unconscionability occurs when a contract, particularly, contracts of adhesion, impose terms “that have been variously described as overly harsh, unduly oppressive, so one-sided as to shock the conscience, or unfairly one-sided. All of these formulations point to the central idea that the unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with a simple old-fashioned bad bargain, but with terms that are unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party. Unconscionable terms impair the integrity of the bargaining process or otherwise contravene the public interest or public policy or attempt to impermissibly alter fundamental legal duties.” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho, supra, 8 Cal. 5^th at 129–30, internal quotations and citations omitted.)

Armendariz sets forth elements of essential substantive fairness as follows:

(1) provide for a neutral arbitrator:

(2) provide for adequate discovery;

(3) require the arbitrator to issue a written decision that permits limited judicial review;

(4) provide for the same remedies that would otherwise be available to the employee in court;

(5) not require the employee to bear costs unique to arbitration; and

(6) provide a “modicum of bilaterality” between the employer and employee. (Armendariz, supra. 24 Cal 4^th at 102-113, 117-118.)

Mutuality

Here, the Agreement states “This provision shall apply to any and all such disputes, controversies, or claims, whether directed against the Company and/or against any employee, officer, executive, representative, alleged agent, director, or affiliate of the Company, with respect to any matter pending regarding your employment or the termination thereof.” This phrase is reasonably interpreted to apply to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant, but lacks terms which would apply to Defendant’s disputes with Plaintiff or other employees.

On balance, the Agreement states “Any and all disputes, controversies, or claims not resolved in accordance with the foregoing procedures, and which arise out of or relate to this Employee Handbook, your employment, or the termination of your employment, shall be resolved through binding arbitration” without limitation as to which party has the dispute or claim. Further, the Agreement carves out that either party may seek injunctive relief. Additionally, the Agreement states “The arbitration provisions of this Agreement shall constitute the sole and exclusive remedy, and each party (and all interested parties) waives any right it may otherwise have to seek redress in any other forum, including a jury trial” which indicates mutuality. The Agreement finally states “Any claim which either party has against the other party which could be submitted for resolution pursuant to this paragraph must be presented in writing by the claiming party to the other in accordance with applicable State or Federal statutes of limitation.”

As such, the Court does not find a lack of mutuality and finds no substantive unconscionability as to this term.

Cost Shifting

The Agreement states “The Company shall pay the costs of the impartial arbitrator and a transcript of the entire arbitration process. Each party shall bear the costs of its own witnesses.” Plaintiff argues that, if this matter remains in this Court, Plaintiff would bear only the minimal subpoena costs to call witnesses to testify and that this impermissibly requires Plaintiff to bear all expenses of witnesses beyond such subpoena costs.

The Court, however, does not find that these witness fees, including retaining of Plaintiff’s own experts, would be costs beyond those incurred in litigation before this Court.

Therefore, the Court does not find any substantive unconscionability regarding the bearing of Plaintiff’s own witness costs.

Attorneys’ Fees

Plaintiff argues that the term “Should any litigation be necessary to enforce the terms of this Arbitration Agreement or should any legal action—even if prohibited—arise with respect to this Arbitration Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and to any other relief to which it may be entitled” is substantively unconscionable because FEHA claims provide that a prevailing defendant may recover fees and costs if the action is "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so." (Gov. Code § 12965, subd. (c)(6))

The Court finds this term substantively unconscionable given the requirement under FEHA for a defendant to recover such fees only where “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so."

PAGA Waiver

Here, the Agreement states “Employees are expressly prohibited from filing or participating in any joint, class, representative, or collective claim regarding their wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment against the employer in any forum, whether arbitral or judicial. This voluntary waiver includes claims under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), to the extent permitted by law.”

To start, the Court notes “[t]here is no individual component to a PAGA action because '"every PAGA action . . . is a representative action on behalf of the state."' [Citation.]" (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 87.) The term "individual" refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by the plaintiff. (See Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 639, 648 [referring to these claims as "Type A" claims].) The term “non-individual” refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by employees other than the plaintiff. (Galarsa, at 649 [referring to these claims as "Type O" claims].)

As such, the Court will utilize this terminology for clarity.

In Viking River, the United States Supreme Court held that, under an agreement permitting such, a PAGA cause of action may be divided into individual, Type A and representative or non-individual Type O claims and that the individual claims may be ordered to arbitration: 

"PAGA authorizes any 'aggrieved employee' to initiate an action against a former employer 'on behalf of himself or herself and other current and former employees' to obtain civil penalties that previously could have been recovered only by the State in an [Labor Workforce and Development Agency] enforcement action." (Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 645.)

The "individual PAGA claim" (Type A) is the claim for the violations suffered by the aggrieved employee and the "representative PAGA claim" (Type O) is the PAGA claim arising out of events involving other employees. (Id. at 648.)

The Viking River decision “left undisturbed” and “intact” both of the rules from Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348 that (1) prohibited categorical waivers of the right to bring a PAGA action in any forum and (2) prohibited waivers of PAGA claims on behalf of other employees, i.e., non-individual or representative claims. (Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104,1117-1118.)

However, the United States Supreme Court held that the third rule, which prohibited the "'division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate'" was preempted by the FAA. (Id. at 1118.) Specifically, the Viking River Court stated:

"The agreement between Viking and Moriana purported to waive 'representative PAGA claims. Under Iskanian, this provision was invalid if construed as a wholesale waiver of PAGA claims. And under our holding, that aspect of Iskanian is not preempted by the FAA, so the agreement remains invalid insofar as it is interpreted in that manner. But the severability clause in the agreement provides that if the waiver provision is invalid in some respect, any portion that remains valid must still be 'enforced in arbitration.' Based on this clause, Viking was entitled to enforce the agreement insofar as it mandated arbitration of Moriana's individual PAGA claim." (Id. at 1924-1925.)

As summarized by the California Supreme Court in Adolph, an agreement that is covered by the FAA may require arbitration of "alleged Labor Code violations personally sustained by a PAGA plaintiff — so-called 'individual' claims." (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1114, 1119.) "'[W]hen an appropriate arbitration agreement exists'" and "a plaintiff has filed a PAGA action comprised of individual and non-individual claims," the trial court must "'bifurcate and order [the] individual PAGA claim[] to arbitration.'" (Id. at 1126, 1123.) In this circumstance, the "order compelling arbitration of [the] individual claim[] does not strip the plaintiff of standing to litigate non-individual claims [i.e., claims on behalf of other employees] in court." (Id. at 1123) Instead, "'the individual PAGA claim[] in arbitration remain[s] part of the same lawsuit as the representative claims remaining in court.'" (Id. at 1126.) The plaintiff would thus be "'pursuing a single PAGA action "on behalf of [himself or herself] and other current or former employees," albeit across two fora.' [Citation.]" (Id.)

Further, it is irrelevant that Plaintiff here does not assert any claims under PAGA, as the Agreement is reviewed of substantive unconscionability at the time it was entered into and is not dependent upon the claims asserted. (Najarro v. Superior Court (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 871, 882.)

The Agreement makes no attempt to evidence an intent to split PAGA claims into Type A “individual” claims and Type O “representative” claims. Rather, the term attempts to impermissibly waive all PAGA claims in any forum.

In Mondragon, the carve out provision excluded claims brought “as a representative of the state of California as a private attorney general under the Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA; Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.)” and the trial court denied the motion to compel Plaintiff’s causes of action under PAGA to arbitration. (Id. at 599-601.)

Therefore, the Court finds the PAGA waiver substantively unconscionable.

Rules of Arbitration

The Agreement states “The arbitration will be conducted in accordance with the rules of the arbitration association or service with which the arbitrator is selected (American Arbitration Association, JAMS, ARS, or the rest).” Plaintiff further notes references to an employee handbook within the Agreement itself.  

The California Supreme Court in Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1246 noted that a failure  to attach a copy of the arbitration rules becomes an issue only where the plaintiff challenges the rules themselves. There appears to be no challenge the AAA, JAMS or other arbitration rules. The Court does not find that the failure to link or otherwise include the rules demonstrate substantive unconscionability. Further, the various stray references to a handbook within the Agreement do not demonstrate substantive unconscionability.

Severability

Courts have discretion to sever unconscionable clauses and enforce the remainder of the contract. (Civ. Code, § 1670.5, subd. (a); Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1244.)

There is a strong preference for courts to sever unconscionable provisions unless unconscionability permeates the entire agreement. (De Leon v. Pinnacle Property Management Services, LLC (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 476, 492.) However, if "the central purpose of the contract is tainted with illegality, then the contract as a whole cannot be enforced." (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 124.) But if "the illegality is collateral to the main purpose of the contract, and the illegal provision can be extirpated from the contract by means of severance or restriction, then such severance and restriction are appropriate." (Id.)

Here, the Agreement states “In the event that one or more of the provisions contained herein are deemed unlawful or unenforceable, such unlawfulness or unenforceability shall not affect any other provision; rather, the terms set forth herein shall be interpreted as if the unlawful provision had never existed in this document.”

Therefore, the Court will strike both the attorney fee clause and impermissible PAGA waiver noted above.

Having struck those terms, the Court finds a lack of substantive unconscionability.

Labor Code section 432.6

Labor Code section 432.6 does not invalidate an arbitration agreement otherwise enforceable under the FAA. Labor Code section 432.6 states, in part: "[n]othing in this section is intended to invalidate a written arbitration agreement that is otherwise enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act…" (Labor Code §432.6(f)). Further, after rehearing, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "the FAA preempts AB 51 as whole to the extent it applies to arbitration agreements." (Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Bonta (9th Cir. 2023) 62 F.4th 473, 490.)

Discovery / Evidentiary Hearing

The requests for additional discovery and/or an evidentiary hearing on this matter are denied. The issues here are not similarly situated to those in, for example, Hotels Nevada v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 754 as to fraud in the execution.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and compels arbitration of these claims.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Sams Gas & Food, Inc. vs. Ahmed, Shaibi

Case No.:   VCU313083

Date:           August 20, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw as Counsel

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion without prejudice; CMC is continued to November 5, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

Facts

On July 7, 2026, Plaintiff’s Counsel Brian N. Folland, filed a motion to be relieved as counsel as to Plaintiff Ghassan Ahmed. Plaintiff’s Counsel filed the following with respect to withdrawing:

(1) MC-051 - Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as Counsel;

(2) MC-052 – Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel; and

(3) MC-053 - Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel

Additionally, Plaintiff’s Counsel has filed proofs of service of these documents by mail.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 284 provides that “[t]he attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at any time before or after judgment of final determination, as follows: 1. Upon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes; [or] 2. Upon the order of the court, upon the application of either client or attorney, after notice from one to the other.”

California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) requires that the “notice of motion and motion to be relieved as counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) must be directed to the client and must be made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-051).”

As noted above, counsel has complied with California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) by submitting the notice and motion on MC-051 and by directing the notice and motion to Plaintiff.

California Rule of Court 3.1362 (c) further mandates that: “The motion to be relieved as counsel must be accompanied by a declaration on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel--Civil (form MC-052). The declaration must state in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1). Specifically, the declaration that Rule 3.1362(c) requires must state that the moving attorney attempted to secure a “Substitution of Attorney” from the client as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1) and that the client refused to so stipulate.

Here, the declaration is properly made on form MC-052 and uses general terms without compromising confidentiality, but does not indicate that counsel attempted to obtain a substitution by consent prior to making this motion. The Court interprets the phrase “In a good faith attempts to resolve the matter, The Folland Law Group has reached out to the client multiple times” as related to the “breakdown of the working relationship with the client and non-payment for services and costs rendered” as opposed to a refusal to substitute present counsel. Absent this information, the Court cannot grant the motion.

Next, service under Rule 3.1362(d) requires personal service, electronic service, or mail and counsel’s declaration must note the service made. Here, service was by mail on July 9, 2026. The declaration of counsel indicates that Plaintiff’s address was confirmed as current via telephone and conversation.

Finally, Rule 3.1362(e) requires the proposed order be lodged with the Court on MC-053 with the moving papers, specifying all hearing dates scheduled, including date of trial. Counsel has complied with this requirement.

The Court denies, without prejudice, Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw as to Plaintiff based upon the lack of compliance with California Rule of Court 3.1362(c) with respect to attempting to obtain a “Substitution of Attorney” prior to moving to withdraw and reflecting such efforts in the declaration. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Amezola, Carlos vs. Kawneer Company, Inc.

Case No.:  VCU313248

Date:           August 20, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To continue CMC and this motion for preliminary approval to September 17, 2026; 8:30 am; D1; to order supplemental declarations addressing the lodestar, presently incurred costs, proposed cy pres recipient, LWDA notice of settlement, and notice period filed no later than five (5) court days prior to the hearing.

1. Sufficiency of Amount of Settlement (Net Estimated: $321,666.67)

The gross settlement amount is $565,000.00.

Plaintiff estimates approximately 209 proposed Class Members, providing an estimated average payout of $1,539.07 per member.

The Class Members consist of current and former non-exempt employees of Defendant who were employed in California during the period between September 20, 2020 through the date of entry of Preliminary Approval Order and who were not subject to a collective bargaining agreement.

Plaintiff for Defendant’s alleged failure to pay all wages owed upon termination, failure to timely pay earned wages, failure to provide itemized wage statements, failure to provide rest and meal periods, failure to pay minimum wages and overtime/double-time wages, and failure to reimburse business expenses. Plaintiff also alleged a cause of action under the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq., arising from the alleged Labor Code violations.

Plaintiff provides estimates of the maximum recovery for each of the asserted wage and hour claims and penalties with information showing how the estimates were calculated including the damages models utilized.  (Declaration of Bacon ¶¶76-87.) Plaintiff has provided a discussion of the value of each claim, applied various discount rates regarding the chance of success as to each claim which corresponds to the final gross settlement amount. Counsel estimates a maximum recovery in the event of total, outright victory of $10,500,000. (Declaration of Bacon ¶83.)

After agreeing to participate in early mediation, Defendant informally produced time and pay records for Settlement Class members, key class data points, and other documents and information relevant to the claims alleged in advance of mediation. The parties reached the settlement after a full day mediation. 

The Court finds the information provided in support of the gross settlement amount sufficient for the Court to preliminarily approve the gross settlement amount, as the settlement amount appears to be within the recognized range of reasonableness given the claims and defenses asserted in this case.

Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $565,000 are proposed as follows:

Proposed Attorney Fees (33.3%):	$188,333.33
Proposed Attorney Costs (up to):	$20,000.00
Proposed Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff:	$10,000.00
Proposed Settlement Administrator Costs	$20,000.00
Proposed LWDA PAGA Payment	$10,000.00
Proposed Net Settlement Amount	$321,666.67

2.  Class Notice

The settlement agreement provides no claim form will be required of class members to participate in distributions.  Only those wishing to object or opt out must file notice with the settlement administrator.  Objections or opt out notices are to be made within 45 days.

The Court regularly approves notice periods of 60 days or longer.

The class notice period, therefore, is not approved.

With respect to the content of the Notice, the Court finds the Class Notice to be reasonable.  It clearly provides to the class member an estimate of the settlement share the employee is to receive and provides adequate instructions for any class member to opt out of the settlement or to submit an objection.

3.  Enhancement Awards to Class Representative

The Court preliminarily approves Plaintiff Amezola as Class Representative for settlement purposes. The proposed enhancement award to Plaintiff is $10,000.00.

The Court has, in past cases, approved enhancement awards of $5,000.00 routinely.

Enhancement payments “are fairly typical in class action cases.” (Cellphone Termination Fee Cases (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1393.) Enhancement payments “are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general.” (Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp. (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-959.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive awards to named plaintiffs is that he or she should be compensated for the expense or risk he has incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (Clark v. American Residential Services LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4^th 785, 806.)

Therefore, the Court will approve a $5,000 enhancement.

4. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees of 33 1/3% of the gross settlement fund of $565,000 or $188,333.33 and costs not to exceed $20,000 are sought by Plaintiff’s counsel.

Counsel has utilized the percentage of common fund methodology as well as provided adequate lodestar information to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee request.

Although the Court recognizes the utilization of the percentage of the common fund methodology to award attorneys’ fees, the Court requires a declaration from counsel that provides an estimate as to what the lodestar would be in this case. The ultimate goal of the Court is to award reasonable attorneys’ fees irrespective of the method of calculation. As such, the court needs to know the estimate of the approximate lodestar supported by declarations for preliminary approval. Counsel should submit information as to the time spent on this action and the hourly rates of all counsel working on the case. Without such information, the Court declines to preliminarily approve the fees.

The Court also cannot preliminarily approve costs up to $20,000.00 without a declaration which states the costs currently expended. 

The Court, however, finds that Plaintiff’s counsel are experienced class action attorneys through the declarations of counsel.

5.  Claims Administrator

The Court preliminary approves Rust Consulting, Inc. as the claims administrator for this class action based on the declaration of its Director of Business Development. The estimated cost is $11,602. The Court preliminarily approves administration costs not to exceed $20,000 as requested.

6. Unclaimed Settlement Proceeds

The Court cannot preliminarily approve the distribution of unclaimed settlement proceeds to Public Justice without additional information on this proposed cy pres recipient.

7. Release

The Court finds the proposed release of claims reasonable under the circumstances.

8. LWDA Notice

No declaration submitted indicates confirmation from the LWDA of receipt of proof of submission of the proposed settlement agreement. (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (l)(2).)

9. Class Certification

Code of Civil Procedure section 382 permits certification “when the question is of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 382.)  The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that class certification under section 382 is proper.  (See City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 460.)  To do so, “[t]he party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.”  (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.) 

Here, the Motion and accompanying declaration of Counsel sufficiently sets forth the basis for finding the class is numerous and ascertainable as 209 employees have been identified through Defendant’s employment records. Additionally, common questions of law and fact predominate within the individual causes of action based on class wide policies and procedures of Defendant. Further, the class representative, through their declaration, indicates they will adequately and fairly represent the Class Members and will not place their interests above any Class Member. The Class Representative was employed by Defendant during the relevant time period and thus worked under the same policies and procedures as the Class Members.

Therefore, the Court continues this motion for preliminary approval to September 17, 2026; 8:30 am; D1 and orders supplemental declarations addressing the lodestar, presently incurred costs, proposed cy pres recipient, LWDA notice of settlement and notice period filed no later than five (5) court days prior to the hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Stankewitz, Nancy vs. Stankewitz, Kelly

Case No.:   VCU326755

Date:           August 20, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     (1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Initial Responses to Requests for Production; (2) Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted; Sanctions

Tentative Ruling: (1) To grant the motion and order responses within thirty (30)  days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion; (2) To grant the motion and deem Admission Nos. 1-35 admitted; to issue sanctions in the amount of $495 due within thirty (30)  days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion; Plaintiff shall give notice.

Facts Common to (1) and (2)

In this quiet title, financial elder abuse and cancellation of written instrument action, Plaintiff served, on April 28, 2026, requests for production of documents, set one, and requests for admissions, set one, via mail.

As of the filing of these motions July 16, 2026, no responses have been received.

Plaintiff moves for compel initial responses to the production request and to deem admissions admitted. Plaintiff further seeks sanctions.

No opposition appears filed.

Authority and Analysis

(1) Requests for Production

Based on Defendant’s failure to respond to the first set requests for production of documents, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.300(a) that Defendant provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Plaintiff’s first set of requests for production of documents, within thirty (30)  days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Plaintiff shall give notice.

(2) Requests for Admissions

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. Here, Defendant has failed to serve a timely response and Plaintiff has moved for an order to deem the admission admitted.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion. The facts and allegations alleged in Requests for Admissions 1 through 35 of Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Admission shall be deemed admitted.

Sanctions

Under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2033.280(c) (Admissions) and 2031.300(c) (Requests for Production) Plaintiff seeks sanctions in the amount of $930 total, consisting of “2.0 hours at the rate of $375.00 per hour and my client incurred $180.00 in motion fees in connection with these three discovery motions…”

The Court notes two motions filed.

The Court notes there is no meet and confer requirement and all that is necessary to obtain the relief requested on this motion to compel initial responses is that the other party failed to respond within the designated time.

The Court will award one hour at the rate of $375, plus $120 in filing fees, for a total of $495. Sanctions are imposed against Defendant and are due within thirty (30)  days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Plaintiff shall give notice.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Cavalry SPV I LLC vs. Tafolla, Nayeli Acevedo

Case No.:   VCL328613

Date:           August 20, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts and Analysis

In this matter, Plaintiff sues for breach of contract as to Defendants Nayeli Acevedo Tafolla and Mauro Tovar.

On January 5, 2026, Defendant Tafolla filed an answer on a Judicial Council Form.

As to No. 3, which states “Check ONLY ONE of the next two boxes: a. [] Defendant generally denies each statement of the complaint ar cross-complaint. (Do not check this box if ~ the verified complaint or cross-complaint demands more than $1,000, ) b. [] Defendant admits that all of the statements of the complaint or crass-complaint are true EXCEPT: (1) Defendant claims the following statements are false (use paragraph numbers or explain),” Defendant Tafolla checked neither box.

The Court notes no answer by Defendant Tovar.

On July 7, 2026, Plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings as to both Defendants, arguing that the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the complaint.

Authority and Analysis

A motion for judgment on the pleadings (MJOP) is used to challenge a pleading in the same manner as a general demurrer, i.e., the challenged pleading (1) establishes that the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction or (2) does not allege facts sufficient to support a cause of action or defense.(Code Civ. Proc. § 438(c)(1); International Assn. of Firefighters v. City of San Jose (2011) 195 Cal.App.4^th 1179,1196.) Like a demurrer, the grounds for the motion must appear on the face of the pleading or be based on facts capable of judicial notice, including court records.  (Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. Superior Court (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 978, 986, and fn. 6.)

A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be based upon “matters properly the subject to judicial notice.” Saltarelli & Steponovich v. Douglas (1995) 50 Cal.App.4th 1, 5. Judicial notice may be taken “of a party’s admissions or concessions, but only in cases where the admissions “cannot reasonably be controverted,’ such as in answer to interrogatories or request for admissions, or in affidavits and declaration filed on the party’s behalf.” (Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 485.)

To start, Defendant Tovar has not responded to the complaint and therefore the Court cannot grant motion for judgment on the pleadings in favor of Plaintiff.

As to Defendant Tafolla’s answer, the failure to check either box renders the answer legally insufficient, but cannot be said to be an admission or response that cannot be reasonably controverted. Defendant Tafolla neither admits nor denies the allegations. As such, there is no basis to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                In Re the Joann Abila Palmer Revocable Trust u/t/d 11/13/2004 Daniel Recendez vs. Recendez, Adrian

Case No.:   PCU335981

Date:           August 20, 2026

Time:           11:00 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:      Respondent’s Ex Parte Motion to Quash Subpoena

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion in part and modify the scope of the subpoena as indicated herein; to order production by September 3, 2026 as to the modified scope.

Facts

In this matter, Petitioner seeks to compel production of the trust documents, for an accounting, for removal of the current trustee, for damages, and for fees and costs as against Respondent Adrian Recendez.

The petition alleges that Decedent passed away January 14, 2025, that the only significant known asset of the Trust at that time was the Decedent’s home located at 1191 East Thurman Ave., Porterville, CA 93257, that escrow closed on the sale of this property March 14, 2025 for $320,000, that only $8,000 has been distributed to Petitioner. (Petition ¶¶2-12.)

Specifically, Petitioner alleges that:

“Petitioner alleges that significant trust assets have been misappropriated since the close of escrow. Some misappropriations may have been well intentioned….

In the last year the Petitioner has witnessed the Respondent live outside of his financial means as neither the Respondent nor his wife have been steadily employed. Specifically, Respondent and his wife purchased a new car, purchased several thousand dollars worth of musical equipment and made significant improvements to their own home.” (Petitioner ¶¶13, 14.)

On August 18, 2026, Respondent filed this motion, set for August 20, 2026, to quash a business records subpoena served on Bank of Sierra purporting to request: “All statements and copies of canceled checks from 01/01/2024 through 09/03/2026 for bank accounts belonging to Adrian Recendez and Adrian Recendez, Trustee of the Joann Abila Palmer Revocable Trust u/t/d 11/13/2004, held either jointly or separately.”

Respondent argues this seeks unrestricted access to banking records as an “…exploratory search through confidential financial information in an effort to develop additional allegations or construct inferences beyond specifically identified transactions presently at issue.”

Production is set for September 3, 2026.

The motion indicates personal and mail service on Petitioner’s counsel and Bank of the Sierra.

Authority and Analysis

The Court “may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person." (Code Civ. Proc § 1987.1.)

The court, upon motion reasonably made by the party, may rule upon motions for quashing, modifying or compelling compliance with subpoenas. (Lee v. Swansboro County Property Owners Ass'n (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 575, 582-583.) There is no meet and confer requirement in bringing a motion to quash. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.1.)

“[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) “For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it ‘might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement …’ (citation).” These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery. (Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 790.)

Under section 1985.3, any consumer whose personal records, including those maintained by state or national bank, are sought by subpoena duces tecum and who is a party to the civil action in which the subpoena is served, may, prior to the date for production, bring a motion under Section 1987.1 to quash or modify the subpoena.

Here, the bank records sought are those of Respondent and those of the Trust.

The right of financial privacy is protected by Article I, section I of the California Constitution. (SCC Acquisitions, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 243 Cal. App. 4th 741, 754.) "A bank customer's expectation is that, absent compulsion by the legal process, the matters he reveals to the bank will be utilized by the bank only for internal banking purposes." (Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal. 4th 360, 368, citing Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 657.)

When the information sought to be discovered impacts a person’s constitutional right to privacy, limited protections come into play for that person. (Shaffer v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 993, 999.) The protections cover both a person’s personal and financial matters. (Id.) The court must balance competing rights — the right of a litigant to discover relevant facts and the right of an individual to maintain reasonable privacy — in determining whether the information is discoverable. (Id.)

The competing interest test is described in Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5^th 531, 552:

“The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. [Citation] The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations. [Citation]” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5^th 531, 552. 

The Court finds a sufficient countervailing interest here, where Petitioner alleges that the sale proceeds from the only known asset of the Trust have not been distributed and further that Respondent has utilized these trust funds for personal use. As such, the requested financial records are foundational to the disputes in the Petition.

The Court notes, however, that the sale closed March 14, 2025. As such, the Court finds the scope overbroad, as the subpoena seeks records from January 1, 2024. The Court, therefore modifies the subpoena to production starting March 14, 2025.

Additionally, the subpoena seeks documents up until the production date. This does not permit the responding Bank sufficient reasonable time to prepare the records for production where the production date and the end date for scope of the records are the same. As such, the Court will require production by September 3, 2026, but require records only through the date of this motion, August 20, 2026.

Additionally, the funds are alleged to have been deposited into a bank account in the name of the Trust. As such, at this time, the Court does not find a sufficient countervailing interest to produce statements and checks as to accounts held by Petitioner personally, either jointly or separately. Rather, the Court will permit production of the bank accounts belonging to the trust into which the escrow proceeds were deposited.

"All statements and copies of canceled checks from 03/14/25 through 08/20/26 for bank accounts belonging to the Joann Abila Palmer Revocable Trust u/t/d 11/13/2004.”

Therefore, the Court grants the motion, in part, as to the modified scope above. The proposed production date of September 3, 2026 appears reasonable.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared August 19, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054208	In the Matter of Derrick, Sadie Yakne	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	Petition Item 5a (3) or (4) omitted: re any surviving registered domestic partner. Petition Item 8: relationships of parties to decedent omitted. Notice of Petition to Administer not served on all parties 15 days prior, Prob C § 1220. Proof of Publication not filed, Prob C § 8120
VPR054097	In the Matter of Gonzalez, Raul A.	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	No supplemental documents filed. Previous issues remain
VPR053710	In the Matter of Ochoa, Martha	Accounting Hearing	Appearance Required	New accounting petition has not been field. Previous issues remain
VPR049933	In the Matter of Arteaga, Miguel	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing not filed
VPR054224	In the Matter of Fierro, Luz	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing not served on proposed conservatee and all relatives with the second degree
VPR054207	In the Matter of Tarvin, Diana	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Petition Attachment 1f: powers under Prob C § 2351-2358—specifying the orders requested are omitted
VPR053900	In the Matter of Flowers, Karlen M.	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing; Capacity Declaration; Citation not filed. Attachment Requesting Special Orders Regarding a Major Neurocognitive Disorder (form GC-313) not attached to Petition.
VPR053958	In the Matter of Lara, Emily Alejandra	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR051957	In the Matter of Ramirez, Fred	OSC Hearing - Conservatorship	Appearance Required	Continued hearing

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         Probate calendar for August 20, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR054182	In the Matter of Olvera Reyes, Jose Adalberto	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	The copy of the Will is not attached to the petition; the attachment appears to be a Trust. Petition concerning Trust administration/internal affairs has not been filed.
PPR054184	In the Matter of Arroyo-Rico, Gabriela	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Matter appears to be in order
PPR054054	In the Matter of Northam, Rita	Terminate Conservatorship Hearing	Appearance Required	Matter appears to be in order
PPR054054	In the Matter of Northam, Rita	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Termination petition filed. Appointment not necessary

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

GUARDIANSHIP CASES

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared August 20, 2026 that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
8/20/26 8:30 AM	Department 19	PPR047872	In the Matter of R.S.	Terminate Guardianship Hearing - MOTHER and adult SIBLING Edgar C. Saucedo, were not timely served with a copy of the Notice of Hearing. Required service is 15 calendar days PRIOR TO HEARING (PROB Code §1460). NOT LODGED- Order Terminating Guardianship
8/20/26 8:30 AM	Department 19	PPR054174	In the Matter of R.E.S.	Appoint Temporary Guardian- Petition for Appointment should indicate this is a successor appointment, all forms should to have “successor” added  NOT LODGED- Order Appointing Temporary Guardian & Letters of Temporary Guardianship
8/20/26 8:30 AM	Department 19	PPR053370	In the Matter of K.A.T.	Appoint Temporary Guardian review
8/20/26 8:30 AM	Department 01	VPR052294	In the Matter of R.A.C.	Review Hearing
8/20/2026 8:30	Department 01	VPR054220	In the Matter of F.D.M.C.	NEED Notice of Hearing to be filed indicating MOTHER was served by mail with a copy of the Notice of Hearing and copy of the Petition for Special Immigrant Juvenile Findings as required by Ca Rule of Ct. 7.1020(c).  If a parent wants to waive notice, they can attach a separate declaration that specifically addresses the SIJ findings. (only appointment was addressed)