Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, June 25, 2026 and Friday, June 26, 2026, are:

Re:                Salazar Gonzalez, Guadalupe vs. AEGIS GENERAL INSURANCE AGENCY

Case No.:   VCU325888

Date:           June 25, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Defendant’s Motion to Strike Punitive Damages

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion with leave to amend; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days from this hearing date to file an amended complaint as to allegations related to punitive damages.

Facts

In this amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges Plaintiff purchased a homeowner’s insurance policy from Defendants, Policy Number 0203424776 (“the Policy”), which insured the Property owned and occupied by Plaintiff on April 13, 2024 and in consideration for the premiums paid by Plaintiff to Defendants, Defendants issued Plaintiff the Policy and continued it in effect. (FAC ¶9.)

On April 13, 2024, Plaintiff’s home suffered strong winds which damaged Plaintiff’s property, including Plaintiff’s roof causing water intrusion and subsequent damage to the interior of the insured property. (FAC ¶10.)

Upon notice or discovery of the loss, Plaintiff timely reported it to Defendants and made a claim on the Policy (“Claim”). (FAC ¶11.) Defendants acknowledged receipt of the Claim and assigned claim number 1070000 with a April 13, 2024 date of loss. (FAC ¶11.) Defendants assigned an adjuster (or multiple adjusters) to handle the Claim and communicate with Plaintiff and their representatives concerning the Claim. (FAC ¶11.)

On January 24, 2025, Defendants informed Plaintiff in writing of Defendants’ coverage determination wherein Defendant denied the claim based on wear, tear, deterioration, inherent vice or latent defect as well as long-term water leakage, cracking, and faulty, inadequate or defective construction, workmanship, or maintenance. (FAC ¶13.)

Relevant here, Plaintiff’s second cause of action for tortious bad faith alleges the following:

26. There are no good faith disputes by Defendants concerning coverage for Plaintiff’s claim under the Policy or the nature and scope of the loss suffered and incurred by Plaintiff for which coverage is provided by the Policy. Defendants willfully acted in bad faith by making their coverage determination and later refusing to depart from it as requested by Plaintiff, and by rejecting Plaintiff’s demand for full payment of the total loss claimed. Defendants also failed or refused to negotiate with Plaintiff in a good faith effort to resolve the coverage dispute without litigation, despite Plaintiff’s efforts to do so.

27. Defendants willfully breached the duty of good faith and fair dealings by intentionally and unlawfully and unreasonably and unfairly failing and refusing to:

a. Conduct a full and complete and competent investigation of the Claim as required by the terms of the Policy and California law;

b. Conduct a full and complete and competent inspection of the Property in connection with the Claim as required by the terms of the Policy;

c. Provide full coverage for Plaintiff’ Claim of loss to the Property as required by the terms of the Policy;

d. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff any amount for repairs and mitigation despite the facts that plaintiff’s full amount of the loss to the Property is estimated to be a grand total of $ 125,019.79 (including the mitigation invoice $ 34,676.35 and the estimated costs of repairs $ 90,343.44).

e. Defendants failed to Restore the Property to its pre-existing condition prior to the date of loss on April 13, 2024, which has forced Plaintiff to continue living on the Property in its state of disrepair because they lack resources to pay for the repairs to the Property, as Defendants knew.

…

30. Plaintiff is also entitled to punitive damages against each of the Defendants pursuant to Civil Code § 3294, because each of the Defendants has acted willfully and in bad faith, and is, therefore, guilty of oppression, fraud, and malice based on their tortious conduct.

31. Specifically, Defendant’s claims investigators and adjusters intentionally delayed its investigation of the claim by failing to conclude its investigation within 40 days as required by California insurance regulations set forth Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 10, § 2695.7 - Standards for Prompt, Fair and Equitable Settlements. Likewise, Defendant and its adjusters and investigators further failed to provide anything more than pretextual reasons to continue its investigation. To that end, Defendant and its agents intentionally requested additional inspections of the insured’s wind damaged roof in which Defendant refused to pay for the cost to remove and reinstall the roof tarp on multiple occasions. Despite opening coverage for the claim, Defendant and its agents intentionally caused harm to plaintiff by purposely requested multiple inspections and intentionally delayed the claim in violation of California insurance regulations in order to force Plaintiff into incurring substantial additional unnecessary costs (removing/reinstalling roof tarps for multiple insurance inspections) and deterring the insured from pursuing a valid claim.” (FAC ¶¶26, 27, 30, 31.)

Defendants seek to strike the claims for punitive damages, arguing that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege facts in support of punitive damages for bad faith and that the amended complaint fails to identify a managing agent or ratifying individual as to the allegations in support of punitive damages.

No opposition appears to have been filed.

Authority and Analysis

Any party may file a timely notice of a motion to strike the whole or any part of a pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b).) The motion may seek to strike any “irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading” or any part of the pleading “not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)

California’s punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294, provides: “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”  (§3294, subd. (a).)

Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (c) defines the terms “malice,” “oppression,” and “fraud” for purposes of punitive damages liability: “(1) ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. [¶] (2) ‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights. [¶] (3) ‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.”

In order to support a prayer for exemplary damages, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant did more than act in bad faith.  “The conduct required to award punitive damages for the tortious breach of contract … is of a different dimension.” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1286.)  “Such damages are accessible only upon a showing that the defendant ‘act[ed] with the intent to vex, injure, or annoy.’ ” (Id., citing Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1978) 21 Cal.3d 910, 922.)

“Punitive damages for failure to pay or properly administer an insurance claim are ordinarily … based on ‘malice’ or ‘oppression,’ [which] are defined in Civil Code section 3294 as involving ‘despicable conduct’ … .”   (Id.)  In the case of malice, such conduct “ ‘is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others,’ and as to oppression is ‘conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.’”  (Id., at 1286-1287.)

“It is notable that punitive damages have been assessed against insurance companies most commonly where a showing has been made of a continuous policy of nonpayment of claims.”  (Id., citing Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 306, 329.) 

With respect to employers, Civil Code section 3294 provides that “[a]n employer shall not be liable for [punitive damages], based upon acts of an employee …, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.”

Here, the allegations that Defendants failed to conduct a complete investigation provide full coverage, pay Plaintiff for repair damages, and failure to restore the Subject Property, allegations of intentional delay beyond 40 days, the “fail[ure] to provide anything more than pretextual reasons to continue its investigation” and “intentionally requested additional inspections of the insured’s wind damaged roof in which Defendant refused to pay for the cost to remove and reinstall the roof tarp on multiple occasions” are insufficient as to the standards set forth above. Plaintiff has failed to allege anything more than the denial of a claim. Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the requirement under Civil Code section 3294.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion to strike with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint as to the allegations in support of punitive damages.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                County of Tulare vs. Haley, Jamison

Case No.:   VCU328781

Date:           June 25, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Plaintiff’s Motion for Order for Prejudgment Possession

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion as indicated herein.

Facts

In this eminent domain action, the County of Tulare seeks to acquire approximately 0.61 acres of road right-of-way and fee title, and approximately 3.17 acres of temporary construction easements contained within APNs 069-390-011 & 069-390-010 (the “Subject Property”) owned by Defendant Haley. (Declaration of Doré ¶9; Declaration of Miller ¶4.)

The Subject Property is located near the Mineral King Road Bridge over East Fork Kaweah River, is vacant, and is necessary as to the construction of a replacement bridge adjacent to the historic Oak Grove Bridge, which has been determined to be structurally deficient, while preserving the existing bridge in place as a historic resource. (Declaration of Schenke ¶¶4, 5, 8.)

Schenke, a professional engineer and director of the RMA further declares “The permanent right-of-way is needed for the new bridge as well as the related road realignment necessary to use the new bridge. The temporary construction easement is needed to provide the County’s contractor with sufficient work area to construct the proposed improvements, including parking, storage, and staging of materials during construction. The Project will not interfere with Haley’s access to his remaining parcel and other neighboring parcels.” (Declaration of Schenke ¶8.)

Additionally, Schenke states:

“The County has worked for over a decade to complete the design and obtain the materials, funding and permits necessary to implement the Project. Possession of the subject property is the only remaining impediment to putting the Project out to bid and beginning construction. If the County does not immediately obtain the subject property, then the safety and security of the public that travels this corridor will be put at risk, as the current bridge is structurally deficient and cannot allow all types of vehicles to pass, including some safety vehicles and equipment. By constructing this replacement bridge as part of the Project, the roadway will be brought to current standards thereby providing a public benefit. If possession is delayed, the County is unable to proceed with the proposed replacement bridge in a timely manner. Delays will cause an increase in both the administrative-related and construction-related costs as a result of additional staff time and inflationary pressures. Further, excessive delay may result in further deficiencies in the bridge thereby reducing the size of vehicles that may use this road even further.” (Declaration of Schenke ¶10.)

On August 5, 2025, a resolution of necessity (“RON”) was passed by the Board of Supervisors, finding that:

“a. The public interest and necessity require the proposed Project.

b. The proposed Project is planned or located in the manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.

c. Acquisition of the Subject Property is necessary for the proposed Project.

d. The County made a pre-condemnation offer of just compensation to acquire the Subject Property to the owners of record in accordance with California Government Code section 7267.2. Said offer included a summary of the basis for the amount established and offered as just compensation for the Subject Property.

e. The County has complied with all conditions and statutory requirements necessary to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire the Subject Property.

f. A portion of the Subject Property may be acquired for a more necessary public use pursuant to CCP section 1240.610. The Board further finds and determines that insofar as said parcel has heretofore been dedicated to a public use for telephone and/or electric utility purposes, the acquisition and use of said parcel by the County for the Project is for a more necessary public use than the use for which that portion of the Subject Property is currently being used.

g. The County plans that the date of use of the Subject Property for the proposed Project will be within three years from the date the complaint for eminent domain proceedings is filed.

h. The County has fully complied with all provisions of the California Environmental Quality Act and its implementing regulations for the Project.” (RON 2025-0673.)

On the issue of deposit, Code of Civil Procedure section 1255.010(d) provides that “the plaintiff may deposit with the State Treasury the probable amount of compensation, based on the appraisal, that will be awarded in the proceeding.” On or about August 20, 2025, Plaintiff deposited $14,200 with the State Treasurer which is an amount of probable compensation to be awarded to the Defendant for the Subject Property and is based on an appraisal prepared by a duly qualified appraiser, Lance Doré, as evidenced by the written statement of the basis for the appraisal under Code Civ. Proc section 1255.010(b). (Declaration of Miller ¶¶2, 3; Declaration of Doré ¶¶11, 12 – Ex. 1)

On April 13, 2026, based on the above, Plaintiff filed this motion for prejudgment possession seeking an order authorizing it to take possession of the Subject Property upon service of the court's order for possession.

In opposition, Plaintiff notes the RON indicates completion of the project in three years, but the complaint alleges five years to complete the property, causing uncertainty. Further, that Plaintiff has failed to offer relocation services for personal property located on the Subject Property. Additionally, Defendant objects to Paragraphs 8 and 11 of the declaration of Schenke, arguing that it misstates the evidence and assumes facts not in evidence. Defendant notes that the property is not vacant or unoccupied, as it contains personal property of Defendant. The Court overrules the objections, finding a reasonable interpretation of the declaration is that the Subject Property is not the residence of any persons, despite the presence of personal property thereon.

Authority and Analysis

Plaintiff’s motion for early possession may be granted if this court finds each of the following:

“(A) The plaintiff is entitled to take the property by eminent domain.

(B) The plaintiff has deposited pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) an amount that satisfies the requirements of that article.

(C) There is an overriding need for the plaintiff to possess the property prior to the issuance of final judgment in the case, and the plaintiff will suffer a substantial hardship if the application for possession is denied or limited.

(D) The hardship that the plaintiff will suffer if possession is denied or limited outweighs any hardship on the defendant or occupant that would be caused by the granting of the order of possession.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1255.410(d)(2).)

Entitled to Take

The Court finds that Plaintiff established the first element, its entitlement to take the property, by its the adoption of RON as the legislative body of a local public entity pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1245.201(a). Defendant does not challenge the right to take element.

Deposit

The Court finds that plaintiff has deposited pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Code Civ. Proc., § 1255.010) an amount that satisfies the requirements of that article as to probable compensation.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1255.410,(d)(2)(B).) Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1255.010, subdivision (a), “… the plaintiff may deposit with the State Treasury the probable amount of compensation, based on an appraisal, that will be awarded in the proceeding… .” 

Defendant remains free, as Defendant has been since the deposit was made and noticed, to file a separate motion seeking to increase the amount of the deposit under Code of Civil Procedure section 1255.030, to the extent permitted under that statute on the basis of any personal property relocation issues.

Plaintiff’s Overriding Need and Suffering of Substantial Hardship

As to overriding need and suffering of substantial hardship, Plaintiff states the need for early possession in order to proceed with bidding and construction in order to timely complete the Project. The current bridge is structurally defective and cannot allow all types of vehicles to pass. Additionally, delays will increase administrative and construction costs. Further, Plaintiff argues that the Property is unimproved and unoccupied as to persons.

As noted above, Defendant opposes the motion on grounds that there is an uncertain date of completion. However, this issue, as to date of completion, would be present should the County take possession by judgment after trial and are not increased by early possession.  (See Code Civ. Proc. §1255.410(d)(2)(D).)  

As to the relocation expenses and time to relocate personal property, the Court notes that this lawsuit was served February 17, 2026, over four months ago, providing sufficient time to relocate the property. Any such cost incurred thereon is an issue of just compensation, not hardship that would preclude immediate possession.

Order

The Court is not without the power to fashion an order granting prejudgment possession that permits a reasonable time to relocate the property. The Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff has satisfied the requirements to take prejudgment possession and therefore grants the motion. The Court directs the parties to circulate a proposed order that addresses the following issue:

• A notice period of at one week to relocate any such personal property located within the Subject Property impacted by immediate possession.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                SINITSA, STAN vs. CUSO FINANCIAL SERVICES, LP

Case No.:   VCU326251

Date:           June 25, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Continued Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion, as modified below; to set the motion for final approval for February 18, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

Background

The Court previously continued this motion and ordered a supplemental declaration to be filed as to the information to calculate the lodestar, the presently incurred costs of counsel, the administrative cost estimate and the length of the notice period.

On June 17, 2026, Plaintiff filed a supplemental declaration addressing these issues.

Class Notice

The settlement agreement provides no claim form will be required of class members to participate in distributions.  Only those wishing to object or opt out must file notice with the settlement administrator. 

Objections or opt out notices are now to be made within 60 days. The Court regularly approves notice periods of 60 days or longer.

The class notice period is therefore approved.

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees no greater than of 33.3% of the gross settlement fund of $1,750,000 or $583,333.33 are sought in this matter.

Counsel has utilized the percentage of common fund methodology as well as provided adequate lodestar information to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee request.

Here, counsel indicates that the firms, collectively, have spent 401.5 hours at rates ranging from $900 to $200 per hour, resulting in a base lodestar of $337,640. (Joint Declaration ¶4.)

To award the $583,333.33 sought in fees, the Court would need to apply a multiplier of 1.73.

The Court permits a maximum lodestar multiple of 1.5 in these cases. The Court has reviewed the declarations of counsel in support of what is now an additional .16 multiplier, but, in its discretion, rules that the additional .5 awarded adequately takes into account the quality of the representation, the novelty and complexity of the issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk presented. (See In re Vitamin Cases (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1052 quoting Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 833) Despite any agreement by the parties to the contrary, the Court has an independent responsibility to review the attorney fee provision of the settlement agreement and award an amount that it determines to be reasonable. (Garabedian v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 123, 128.)

Therefore, the Court will preliminarily approve $506,460 in fees, equal to 1.5 times the current lodestar.

The Court notes that it will permit a declaration providing actual expended additional hours between preliminary approval and final approval as to any increase in this approved fee amount.

As to presently incurred costs, counsel jointly indicates that $11,346.81 have been incurred. Therefore, the Court preliminarily approves costs not to exceed $20,000.

Claims Administrator

The Court preliminary approved Analytics LLC as the claims administrator for this class action and the supplemental joint declaration indicates a cost estimate of $73,826. The Court approves the cost associated with the administration of this claim.

Therefore, as modified above, the Court grants the motion for preliminary approval and Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $1,750,000 are preliminarily approved as follows:

Preliminarily Approved Attorneys’ Fees (1.5 Lodestar):	$506,460
Preliminarily Approved Costs (up to):	$20,000
Preliminarily Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff:	$5,000
Preliminarily Approved Settlement Administrator Costs	$73,826
Preliminarily Approved Net Settlement Amount	$1,144,714

Therefore, the Court sets the motion for final approval for February 18, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Cruz, Hilda vs. Monrovia Nursery Company

Case No.:   VCU304732

Date:           June 25, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Defendant’s Motion to Prohibit Contact with Potential Class

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion.

Facts

In this class action matter, filed initially by Plaintiffs Cruz and Korey, Defendant has settled with a number of class representatives resulting in the addition of new class representatives and multiple amended complaints, only to be followed by further rounds of settling with these newly named class representatives. As it stands, the current class representatives are Eliseo Ureno, Serapio Castellanos and Jaime Martinez.

On May 14, 2026, Defendant answered the operative second amended complaint.

On June 1, 2026, Defendant filed an ex parte application for a protective order regarding communications from Plaintiff’s counsel to employees and former employees of Defendant. The Court set this matter for hearing on June 25, 2026 and set a briefing schedule.

Defendant states that, since at least early 2025, Plaintiffs’ counsel established a website www.MonroviaNurseryInvestigation.com which states “you may be entitled to significant compensation” and

“*You may be owed significant back pay*

Were you, or are you currently, an hourly employee at Monrovia after September 2019?

Blackstone law has filed a lawsuit against Monrovia for unpaid wages, unpaid overtime, working off the clock, not getting meal / rest breaks on time (or at all), and wage theft.

As a previous or current hourly employee, you may be entitled to significant compensation* if your legal rights were violated. As a firm that specializes in this area of law.

As a firm that specializes in this area of law, we are seeking to represent current and former hourly employees at Monrovia, across California, who were paid hourly and were not paid overtime or provided with legally compliant meal and rest breaks.

We would like to speak with you about your experience and provide you with a free assessment of your case. All consultations are free and kept strictly confidential.

We understand you often work under tight deadlines and demanding conditions. However, California law requires proper compensation and break periods for all employees.

                   …

It’s also important to know that California labor laws prohibit employers from retaliating against employees who exercise their legal rights, including meeting with an attorney or bringing a lawsuit.” (Declaration of Frusetta ¶1 – Exs. 2 and 3.)

Further, that various social media advertisements name Defendant and state things such as ““Current or Former Monrovia Employee? You Could Be Owed THOUSANDS in Unpaid Wages!”” (Declaration of Frusetta ¶2 – Ex. 3.) Similar advertisements appear in the Spanish language. (Declaration of Frusetta ¶¶3,4 – Ex. 4, 5.)

Further, that Plaintiffs’ counsel has reached out, directly, to current or former employees of Defendant via email and text, despite that the employee had not contacted Plaintiff’s counsel. (Declaration of Frusetta ¶5 – Ex. 6; Declaration of Santana ¶1 – Ex. 6.)

Defendant seeks the following relief: 

1. Cessation of Misleading Content: That Plaintiffs’ counsel remove the website, social media and advertisements that contain “wage theft,” investigation” or that Plaintiffs’ counsel “specializes” in employment law.

2. Mandatory Disclosures in Future Communications: That Plaintiffs’ counsel shall include, in future communications that no class has been certified in this matter, that Monrovia denies all allegations, that recovery is contingent on class certification, finding of liability or settlement.

3. Production of Prior Communications: That Plaintiffs’ counsel produce copies of prior communications.

4. Identification of Unrepresented Employees Contacted: That Plaintiffs’ counsel produce the names and contact information of current and former employees with whom Plaintiffs’ counsel has communicated.

5. Disclosure of Source of Contact Information: That Plaintiffs’ counsel disclose how they obtained contact information, the total number of personally addressed solicitations and “Confirmation, under oath, that none of the contact information used for such solicitations was derived from this litigation, from documents Monrovia produced (whether subject to a protective order or otherwise), from information learned at any deposition, or from any prior or current named plaintiff.”

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant has unclean hands via the use of an agent to settle with the previous class representatives, that no verifiably false statements are contained in the advertisements or solicitations above and that the requested relief goes beyond a protective order via seeking to compel various documents.

Authority and Analysis

In Parris v. Superior Court (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 285, 291, the named plaintiffs moved “…in the trial court for an order permitting precertification notice to potential class members and for approval of the proposed notice and method of dissemination.”

The appellate court held that “Because no judicial approval was needed for the proposed precertification communication with potential class members, Parris and Lopez's motion for leave to engage in such communications was unnecessary and should have been dismissed by the trial court on that ground.” (Id. at 299.)

In that context, the appellate court stated “A trial court may rule on the propriety of precertification communications only if the  opposing party seeks an injunction, protective order or other relief” and that:

“If such a motion is brought, the trial court may impose restrictions on such communications only "by a showing of direct, immediate and irreparable harm." [citation omitted] Broad-based assertions that a proposed informational notice is "unfair," contains some inaccurate statements, or is presented in a misleading form are simply insufficient bases for imposition of judicial limitations on protected speech in the form of a prior restraint. Even then, any restrictions " 'must be narrowly drawn and cannot be upheld if reasonable alternatives are available having a lesser impact' " on the right to free speech. [citation omitted] Finally, "the restraint 'must have been accomplished with procedural safeguards that reduce the danger of suppressing constitutionally protected speech.' [Citation.]" [citation omitted]” (Id. at 299-300.)

In other words, "absent specific evidence of abuse, an order prohibiting or limiting precertification communication with potential class members by the parties to a putative class action is an invalid prior restraint" of speech. (Id. at 298.)

The Parris court further noted “The requirement of court approval for precertification communications is a classic example of a prior restraint on speech” and that although “‘[p]rior restraints are not unconstitutional per se’ prior restraints have long been held presumptively unconstitutional.” (Id. at 296.) “’[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights. [citation omitted] Prior restraints on speech are permissible only in certain narrow circumstances constituting ‘exceptional cases.’ [citation omitted] The party seeking to enjoin speech ‘thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.’[citation omitted]” (Id. at 296-297.)

Here, therefore, Defendant properly seeks a protective order regarding precertification communications with potential class members, though it bears the burden as to the relief requested involving future communications.

The Court further notes that in Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard (1981) 452 U.S. 89, 91, “Gulf began to send notices to the 643 employees eligible for backpay, stating the exact amount available to each person in return for execution within 30 days of a full release of all discrimination claims dating from the relevant time period.”

“Gulf filed a motion in the District Court seeking an order limiting communications by parties and their counsel with class members. An accompanying brief described the EEOC conciliation agreement, asserting that 452 of the 643 employees entitled to backpay under that agreement had signed releases and been paid by the time the class action was filed. Gulf stated that after it was served in the case, it ceased sending backpay offers and release forms to class members.” (Id. at 92.)

The district court “…entered a temporary order prohibiting all communications concerning the case from parties or their counsel to potential or actual class members…It was not based on any findings of fact.” (Id. at 93.) The order was later modified to include “…a complete  ban on all communications concerning the class action between parties or their counsel and any actual or potential class member who was not a formal party, without the prior approval of the court. It gave examples of communications, including any solicitation of legal representation of potential or actual class members, and any statements "which may tend to misrepresent the status, purposes and effects of the class action" or "create impressions tending without cause, to reflect adversely on any party, any counsel, this Court, or the administration of justice." (Id. at 94-95.)

When the appeal was heard en banc, “A majority opinion joined by 13 judges held that the order was an unconstitutional prior restraint on expression accorded First Amendment protection.” (Id. at 98.)

The Supreme Court reviewed the matter as to whether the order limiting communications was constitutionally permissible, concluding that it was not.

The Supreme Court noted, however:

“Class actions serve an important function in our system of civil justice. They present, however,  opportunities for abuse as well as problems for courts and counsel in the management of cases. Because of the potential for abuse, a district court has both the duty and the broad authority to exercise control over a class action and to enter appropriate orders governing the conduct of counsel and parties. But this discretion is not unlimited, and indeed is bounded by the relevant provisions of the Federal Rules. [citation omitted.]....” (Id. at 100-101.)

“Because of these potential problems, an order limiting communications between parties and potential class members should be based on a clear record and specific findings that reflect a weighing of the need for a limitation and the potential interference with the rights of the parties...  In addition, such a weighing -- identifying the potential abuses being addressed -- should result in a carefully drawn order that limits speech as little as possible, consistent with the rights of the parties under the circumstances.” (Id. at 101-102.)

“We recognize the possibility of abuses in class-action litigation, and agree with petitioners that such abuses may implicate communications with potential class members. But the mere possibility of abuses does not justify routine adoption of a communications ban that interferes with the formation of a class or the prosecution of a class action in accordance with the Rules” (Id. at 104.)

As such, the Court turns to the alleged abuses or misrepresentations identified as to “wage theft,” “investigation,” and that Plaintiffs’ counsel specializes in employment law.

In support of this motion, Defendant cites to Sheller v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1697 and Hernandez v. Vitamin Shoppe Industries Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1441.

Sheller examined the extent of the trial court’s power to sanction the conduct of an out of state attorney admitted pro hac vice where counsel, in June 2005, “…sent a written communication to some 350 Farmers policyholders, seeking additional class representatives. The letter was in the form of a flyer, boldly captioned, “Attention Farmers Insurance Group Policy Holders!!!” The flyer began, “A potential class action lawsuit has been filed  against [Farmers] in the State Court of Los Angeles County. We are concerned Farmers may have given you misleading information about this lawsuit. Our intention is to help policyholders and give them accurate information.”  The flyer went on to state, “If you have purchased such a policy, we may be able to help you. We are looking for other people who have purchased such Farmers policies. If you have, you may be accepted as a ‘class representative.’ If accepted, you are paid for your time in an amount set by the judge.” (Original boldface.)” (Sheller, supra, 158 Cal. App. 4^th at 1703.)

Farmers moved for a temporary restraining order based on this communication and “on two other communications which allegedly contained factual misrepresentations about the insurance policies at issue: a September 2003 letter and a telephone survey of 500 Farmers policyholders Attorney Sheller had commissioned” and which, in a September 2003 letter, “informed Farmers's policyholders that, if they purchased one of the challenged policies and “are paying less than the maximum premium, the chances are very high your policy will lapse.” Farmers took the position that, while lapse was conceivable, there was no basis to assert the chances of lapse were “very high.” The telephone survey contained some questions that were somewhat “loaded.” For example, it asked policyholders, “[A] phrase in the policy says, ‘the actual amount and frequency of your premium payments will affect the values and duration of your policy.’ Did you understand that this means, that even if you make regular payments of the planned premiums, you could lose your insurance before age 95?”” (Id. at 1703, FN6.)

The trial court held the September 2003 letter and telephone survey “appeared loaded” but did not rise to the level of “inappropriate” but that June 2005 flyer, containing the statement “If accepted, you are paid for your time in an amount set by the judge,” to be “inappropriate and simply untrue. Not only are class representatives not always entitled to recover, they may in fact be liable for court costs if the defendant prevails.” (Id. at 1704, FN 8.) The trial court thereafter “…restrained plaintiffs' counsel from any further precertification communications with potential classmembers without court preapproval.” (Id. at 1704.)

Relevant here, the appellate court concluded as follows:

“While we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sanctions ordered, this should in no way be interpreted as our approval of Attorney Sheller's conduct in this matter. Attorney Sheller mailed an advertising flyer to 350 of Farmers's policyholders, seeking additional class representatives and informing them, “If accepted, you are paid for your time in an amount set by the judge.” This statement is completely false; it indicates to the policyholders that they would be paid “for [their] time,” in other words, that they would be paid regardless of the outcome of the action.” (Id. at 1717.)

As to Hernandez, supra, 174 Cal.App.4^th at 1445 current and former employees brought three (3) class actions against the defendant. Preliminary approval as to one of the three matters had been granted by the trial court in addition to conditional certification for settlement purposes. (Id. at 1446-1447) However, counsel representing some of the plaintiffs in two of the actions that had not settled contacted class members whom he did not represent, but who were represented by other counsel, and urged those members to opt out of the settlement, retain him as counsel and join one of the other class actions as plaintiffs. (Id. at 1447)

The trial court found that the “…letters were misleading, violated the Rules of Professional Conduct regarding communications with represented parties, and had attempted to interfere with the proper procedures governing the proposed settlement of the case. It ordered that a corrective notice be sent, directed [counsel] to refrain from any further communications with class members that he did not represent, and granted the request for monetary sanctions, subject to further hearing on the amount.” (Id. at 1448)

The appellate court concluded that “…the [trial] court had the authority to protect class members from improper, unilateral communications after the conditional certification of the class and approval of class notice. Second, [counsel’s] letters to members of the conditionally certified class were communications in violation of rule 2-100.” (Id. at 1461.)

As to the present matter, the Court finds no application of either Hernandez or Sheller. To start, the facts of Hernandez are not aligned with the facts noted above, as there is no conditional certification, no communication with represented parties and no preliminary settlement.

As to Sheller, the court focused on the phrase “If accepted, you are paid for your time in an amount set by the judge.”

Here, the Court finds no equivalent “misrepresentation” as to either “wage theft” or “investigation.” The Court does not find that use of the term “wage theft” implies a criminal matter has been initiated especially in context with the remainder of the text that states “Blackstone law has filed a lawsuit against Monrovia for unpaid wages, unpaid overtime, working off the clock, not getting meal / rest breaks on time (or at all), and wage theft” as well as “PAID ATTORNEY ADVERTISEMENT” and “Past results do not guarantee future outcomes. Each case is unique and depends on specific circumstances. This communication does not create an attorney-client relationship. This is not an official investigation by any government agency.” Further, “investigations” are not within exclusive purview of government agencies, as the term “private investigator” is common. The same applies to the advertisement in the Spanish language.

Further, as to the term “specializes” the Court agrees that California Rule of Professional Conduct 7.4(b) expressly permits a communication that a lawyer “may also communicate that his or her practice specializes in, is limited to, or is concentrated in a particular field of law, subject to the requirements of rule 7.1” and that only a designation of “certified specialist” is prohibited under 7.4(a).

As to Rule 7.1, it states “A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services. A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the communication considered as a whole not materially misleading.” Again, the Court does not find that communication of specializing in employment law is not the equivalent of a statement containing the term “certified specialist.”

As such, the Court identifies no misleading statements or misrepresentations equivalent to Sheller or Hernandez.

Additionally, the Court notes that in Pirjada v. Superior Court (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1074, the court permitted plaintiffs’ counsel to use “informal means” (means that are beyond obtaining a court order following discovery as to class contact information) to identify a potential replacement class representative. (Id. at 1086.)

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Asman, Bruce E. et al vs. Ponce, Cipriano et al

Case No.:   VCU313509

Date:           June 25, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion without prejudice

Facts

On May 28, 2026, Plaintiffs filed this motion for leave to amend to “to correct serious defiencies [sic] caused by prior counsel and to properly present claims including, but limited to : *Fraud and misrepresentaion [sic] *Failure to disclose material facts *Property boundry [sic] and ownership disputes *Easement and use rights *Negligence and breach of duty”

The motion states that these amendments are necessary to “ensure a ir [sic] adjudiacation [sic] of the case”

Further that the prior complaint was prepared by a former attorney and that the former attorney “…failed to properly include key facts and legal claims related to my property purchase, including: *The garage that has always been used as part of my property *Lot line issues that were not disclosed prior to purchase *Water contamination issues affecting habitability *Representations made by the relator that were false or misleading.”

Plaintiffs indicate they only recently became aware of the deficiencies, that the request is made in good faith and not for the purpose of delay.

Plaintiffs appear to have provided a proposed amended complaint.

In opposition, Defendants argue that the motion fails as to the lack of a proper declaration in support thereof in compliance with the Rules of Court.

Authority and Analysis

 The Court may, in the furtherance of justice, and upon any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 473, 576.)  In general, California courts liberally exercise discretion to permit amendment of pleadings in light of a strong policy favoring resolution of all disputes between parties in the same action.  (Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939; Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 296 [“[T]here is a strong policy in favor of liberal allowance of amendments.”].)  Pursuant to this policy, requests for leave to amend generally will be granted unless the party seeking to amend has been dilatory in bringing the proposed amendment before the Court, and the delay in seeking leave to amend will cause prejudice to the opposing party if leave to amend is granted.  (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490; Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565.)  The decision on a motion for leave is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 

However, the Court finds a lack of compliance with California Rule of Court, Rule 3.1324. It is within the court’s discretion to require compliance with Rule 3.1324 before granting leave to amend. (Hataishi v. First American Home Buyers Protection Corp. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1469.)

Rule 3.1324 regulates the content of the motion and supporting declaration as follows:

“(a) Contents of motion

A motion to amend a pleading before trial must:

(1)  Include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments;

(2)  State what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and

(3)  State what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located.

(b) Supporting declaration

A separate declaration must accompany the motion and must specify:

(1)  The effect of the amendment;

(2)  Why the amendment is necessary and proper;

(3)  When the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and

(4)  The reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier.”

In this case, the motion fails to provide the information required by subsections (a)(2) and (3) and the Court cannot readily discern all of the amendments to evaluate whether granting leave is proper.

As to subsection (b), while the effect of the amendment appears to add allegations and causes of action, it is unclear to the Court when the facts giving rise to these amended allegations were discovered by Plaintiffs and why nearly ten months have passed between substitution of former counsel and this motion, as Plaintiffs seek leave to amend based on omissions by prior counsel.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion without prejudice. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Aion, Jesus Sanchez vs. Frank G. Borba, Jr. Family Partnership

Case No.:   VCU329734

Date:           June 25, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Demurrer, or in the Alternative, Motion to Stay

Tentative Ruling: To overrule the demurrer; to grant the motion to stay

Facts

In this matter (the “Aegis Action”), Plaintiff Aion brings causes of action against Defendants Frank G. Borba, Jr. Family Partnership and Borba Dairy (formerly Doe 1) for:

1. Failure to Pay Minimum Wages;

2. Failure to Pay Overtime Wages;

3. Failure to Provide Meal Periods;

4. Failure to Permit Rest Breaks;

5. Failure to Reimburse Business Expenses;

6. Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements;

7. Failure to Pay All Wages Due Upon Separation of Employment;

8. Violation of Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq.; and

9. Enforcement of Labor Code § 2698 et seq. (“PAGA”) (FAC ¶¶4, 5.)

Defendant Borba Dairy demurrers on the theory of abatement based on an earlier filed complaint in Case No. VCU333662 entitled Jesus Sanchez v. Borba Dairy filed by Bokhour Law Group (the “Bokhour Action”).

Defendant Borba Dairy notes the Bokhour Action names, after the second amended complaint, only Borba Dairy, and alleges the same first 8 causes of action as in the Aegis Action. The Bokhour Action, however, does not include the PAGA claim.

Alternatively, Defendant seeks to stay the Aegis Action pending the outcome of the Bokhour Action.

The Court notes that on June 11, 2026, Plaintiff filed a request for dismissal as to Defendant Frank G. Borba, Jr. Family Partnership.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues a lack of a proper meet and confer process, that the parties are not the same and that the causes of action are not the same.

Authority and Analysis

“A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or the facts alleged. . . . To the extent there are factual issues in dispute, however, this court must assume the truth not only of all facts properly pled, but also of those facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged in the complaint.[Citations.]” (City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 459.)

Defendant specially demurs on the ground of another pending action, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (c).  “A single cause of action cannot be the basis for more than one lawsuit.” (Pitts v. City of Sacramento (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 853, 856.) A plaintiff may not “split” a cause of action by filing multiple lawsuits based on the violation of the same primary right. (Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 681–682.)

In accordance with the language of section 430.10(c), the demurring party must show: (1) another action is "pending;" (2) the pending action involves "the same parties;" and (3) the pending action involves "the same cause of action." If these requirements are met, abatement of the second filed action is mandatory. (Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Superior Court (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 455, 460.) The statutory plea of abatement rests on “narrow grounds” as it requires “absolute identity of parties, causes of action or remedies sought in the initial and subsequent actions.” (Plant Insulation Co. v. Is Fibreboard Corp. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 781, 789 (Plant Insulation).)  “In determining whether the causes of action are the same for purposes of pleas in abatement, the rule is that such a plea may be maintained only where a judgment in the first action would be a complete bar to the second action." (Plant Insulation, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at pp. 787-788.) Whether a cause of action is identical is based on the harm suffered. (See Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers’ Mut. Ins. Co. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 854, 860, fn. 1.) To be the “same cause of action,” each complaint must allege invasion of the same “primary right.”  (Bush v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1374, 1384.)

Here, the Bokhour Action is pending, having been filed November 14, 2025, while this action, the Aegis Action, was filed December 30, 2025.

Additionally, after the dismissal of Defendant Frank G. Borba, Jr. Family Partnership, the parties appear to be the same on the face of the pleadings. However, as noted by the Defendant, the Aegis Action contains a PAGA claim. A PAGA claim "is fundamentally a law enforcement action designed to protect the public and not to benefit private parties." (Gavriiloglou v. Prime Healthcare Management, Inc. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 595, 603.) PAGA plaintiffs seek to recover penalties that would otherwise be sought by the state. (Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 993, 1003.) PAGA claims and class actions necessarily involve different sets of potential penalties and damages. As such, the Court does not find that the matters involve the same parties nor the same causes of action.

As such, the Court overrules the demurrer on the abatement theory.

Motion to Stay

Our Supreme Court has stated that the “first-filed rule in California means that when two courts of the same sovereignty have concurrent jurisdiction, the first to assume jurisdiction over a particular subject matter of a particular controversy takes it exclusively, and the second court should not thereafter assert control over that subject matter.” (Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 697, 707.)

The statutory plea in abatement rule is similar in effect to the “exclusive concurrent jurisdiction rule,” which requires courts to abate a later-filed suit in favor of an earlier suit in a different court. The exclusive concurrent jurisdiction rule is broader, however, than the statutory plea of abatement because it does not require absolute identity of parties, causes of action, or remedies sought in the initial and subsequent action. (Plant Insulation, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 789.)

In Plant Insulation, the Court of Appeal held that:

“[i]f the court exercising original jurisdiction has the power to bring before it all the necessary parties, the fact that the parties in the second action are not identical does not preclude application of the rule. Moreover, the remedies sought in the separate actions need not be precisely the same so long as the court exercising original jurisdiction has the power to litigate all the issues and grant all the relief to which any of the parties might be entitled under the pleadings.” (Id. at p. 788.)

Here, the two Actions involve the same underlying facts and Labor Code violations, are both brought against Defendant Borba Dairy and therefore satisfy the requirements of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction.

As such, the Court grants the motion to stay and stays the Bokhour Action pending the resolution of the Aegis Action.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Citibank, N.A. vs. Minguela, Victor

Case No.:   VCL330258

Date:           June 25, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Plaintiff’s Motion to Set Aside Default and Dismiss Without Prejudice

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to dismiss this matter without prejudice.

Facts and Analysis

While Plaintiff obtained default judgment in this matter on April 29, 2026, counsel for Plaintiff has subsequently discovered that Defendant filed for bankruptcy, and obtained an automatic stay, on April 29, 2026. Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the default and dismiss this matter without prejudice.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Conterra Agricultural Capital, LLC vs. Prosperity Farms, LLC et al

Case No.:   PCU325122 

Date:           June 25, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      TCWA Motion for Leave to Intervene

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion.

The Tri-County Water Authority (TCWA) seeks leave to intervene in this action to assert claims arising from an unpaid balance of groundwater extraction fees. 

TCWA’s proposed complaint includes common counts on an open book account and a quantum meruit theory, and a cause of action for declaratory relief.  The complaint identifies the following defendants: Michael and Cynthia Graham; Prosperity Farms, LLC (Prosperity); Ron Cook; CA Farms, LLC (CA Farms); Prosperity Ranch 20, LLC (Prosperity R20); and Corporate America Lending, Inc. (CAL). 

TCWA is, according to the instant motion, owed an outstanding balance for groundwater extraction fees incurred on an account for Prosperity R20 for an approximately 400-acre pistachio ranch referred to by the parties as “Tulare 20.” 

Background

The underlying action in this case is a receivership proceeding in which Focus Management Group (Focus) has been appointed receiver over certain real and personal property assets of Prosperity, including an approximately 1,800-acre pistachio ranch referred to by the parties as “Tulare 22.” 

The underlying complaint by Conterra Agricultural Capital, LLC arises in connection with an approximate $32 million debt secured by, inter alia, Tulare 22. 

The named defendants are Prosperity; Michael and Cynthia Graham; and nominally named defendants Compeer Financial, ACA; Compeer Financial, PCA; and Compeer Financial, FLCA, identified collectively in this litigation as “Compeer.”

About four months after the receivership proceedings commenced, the Grahams filed a 17-cause-of-action cross-complaint asserting various claims against, amongst others, Ron and Jennifer Cook; CAL; and CA Farms.  Additionally identified as cross-complainants are Prosperity; Prosperity R20; and Prosperity Development, LLC. 

The cross-complaint includes claims concerning Tulare 22, a host of other matters, and, as pertinent here, Tulare 20.  Specifically pertaining to that ranch, cross-complainants allege, amongst many other things, that Ron Cook transferred title to Tulare 20 from Prosperity to Prosperity R20 without disclosing the transfer to the Grahams (despite the Grahams owning 50% of Prosperity); that Mr. Cook, acting through CAL, then recorded a deed of trust against the property in connection with a purported $2.5 million loan, which “loan was pulled without the Grahams’ knowledge or consent”; and that the Grahams “subsequently discovered … that Mr. Cook assigned the beneficial interest in the loan to [an entity identified as ‘SA9 Properties, LLC’].”

Prior to commencement of the cross-complainants’ action in this case, the Grahams filed a complaint for declaratory relief in TCSC Case No. VCU324716, naming, as defendants, Ron Cook, CA Farms, and Prosperity R20.  The Grahams alleged that CA Farms and Mr. Cook were attempting to secure a loan or other financing against real property owned by Prosperity R20 without the Grahams’ knowledge.  The Grahams sought (and still seek) “a declaration that any encumbrance on the Property [in Prosperity R20] without [the Grahams’] consent is invalid and void.”  Notable here, the only real property identified as owned by Prosperity R20 by any party to this or any other relevant case is Tulare 20.

Incident to the close relationship of the claims in the declaratory relief action and the Grahams’ claims concerning Tulare 20 in their cross-complaint in this case, VCU324716 was recently consolidated with this case, with VCU324716 designated as the lead case, on unopposed motion by the Grahams. 

TCWA’s motion to intervene

TCWA states it has a groundwater account involving Prosperity R20, for groundwater used at Tulare 20, with an outstanding balance of $151,511.52 and that it is unclear when TCWA will be paid or by whom.  TCWA asserts it filed a lien against properties held by Prosperity R20 (i.e., against Tulare 20). 

TCWA asserts that “[a]s such, TCWA has an interest in the property of the Defendants and is entitled to intervene as a matter of right in the case at bar.”  “Alternatively,” TCWA asserts, “TCWA should be permitted to intervene in this lawsuit because it also meets the standard of having ‘an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either (or any) of the parties, or an interest against both.’ (CCP § 387 (d)(2)).”

The court briefly notes that TCWA references another account involving Prosperity, for groundwater used at Tulare 22, as well as, amongst other things, an associated lien against “properties held by Compeer.”  By “properties held by Compeer,” TCWA is referring to Tulare 22, which—according to a receivership report by Focus recently filed in this case—is, or soon should be, actually held by Prosperity.  The circumstances of that title matter are not pertinent here, but the court highlights TCWA’s reference to the Prosperity/Tulare 22 account for the purpose of making clear that that account is irrelevant to TCWA’s instant motion.   That is because, by TCWA’s own admission, the Prosperity/Tulare 22 account has been “paid in full and the lien [on Tulare 22] is being released.”

Accordingly, TCWA’s motion for leave to intervene stands or falls based solely on the relationship of its claims relating to the Tulare 20/Prosperity R20 account and the subjects at issue in this now consolidated action, specifically as to the matters raised in the cross-complaint in this case and the Grahams’ declaratory relief action concerning Tulare 20 and Prosperity R20. 

Opposition by CAL, CA Farms, and Ron and Jennifer Cook

TCWA’s motion is opposed solely by Ron and Jennifer Cook, CAL, and CA Farms.  They collectively assert the subject matter of this action (referencing both the underlying receivership action and the Grahams’ cross-complaint) have “no relation to TCWA and its claim for alleged unpaid water fees” and that TCWA fails “to show how the disposition in this action will impair or impede its interest in collecting alleged unpaid water fees.”

ANALYSIS

Code of Civil Procedure section 387 permits a nonparty to seek leave to file a complaint in an action “[d]emanding anything adverse to both a plaintiff and a defendant” (and/or adverse to both a “cross-complainant” and “cross-defendant”).  (Id., subds. (a)-(c).)

The nonparty is entitled, as a matter of right, to intervene if “[t]he person seeking  intervention claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and that person is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede that person’s ability to protect that interest, unless that person’s interest is adequately represented by one or more of the existing parties.”  (Id., subd (d)(1)(B).)

Alternatively, a nonparty may be permitted to intervene “if the person has an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both.”  (Id., subd. (d)(2).)

TWCA does not have a mandatory right to intervene

“In determining whether an unconditional right to intervene exists under section 387, subdivision (b), the threshold question is whether the person seeking intervention has ‘an interest relating to the property [or] transaction which is the subject of the action.’ [Citations.]” (Siena Court Homeowners Assn. v. Green Valley Corp. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1423 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 915].)

“In addition to demonstrating an interest in the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, a person seeking intervention must also show that he or she ‘is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede that person's ability to protect that interest.’ [Citations.]”  (Id., at p. 1424.)

Arguably, TWCA makes a showing that it has an interest relating to property that is amongst the subjects of the Grahams’ cross-complaint, as well as their declaratory relief action.  TCWA claims an interest relating to Tulare 20 and Prosperity R20 and the court notes that the Grahams’ cross-complaint includes claims for judicial dissolution of Property R20 (which owns Tulare 20); declaratory relief concerning the entitlement of various parties to crop proceeds from the 2025 harvest at Tulare 20; for money had and received, seeking recovery of the 2025 Tulare 20 crop proceeds; and a prayer for a constructive trust over the 2025 Tulare 20 crop proceeds.

TWCA, however, fails to show that disposition of the consolidated action in its absence will impair or impede its ability to protect its interest in the past due Prosperity R20/Tulare 20 account.  TWCA’s interest in the payment of its outstanding balance for the Prosperity R20/Tulare 20 account arises from its authority under the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) to assess fees and penalties against landowners within its jurisdictional area.  The obligations of the defendants identified in the proposed complaint to pay groundwater fees are independent of the various issues asserted in the Grahams’ cross-complaint and declaratory relief action.  TWCA fails to show how a judgment in the Grahams’ consolidated actions will affect TWCA’s ability to protect its interest in payment of groundwater fees it has assessed under SGMA.  TWCA has an interest, as a creditor, in the consolidated actions of the Grahams, by virtue of its interest in recovery of the account balance from any judgment for damages, but that interest does not give it the right to intervene in the action.  (See Olson v. Hopkins (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 638, 642 [75 Cal.Rptr. 33].)

TWCA contends “resolution of the case at bar may, as a practical matter, determine how or whether TCWA is able to recover the fees owed, particularly where payment sources or priorities may be adjudicated in TCWA’s absence.”  TWCA, though, fails to explain how resolution of any of the Grahams’ several claims in the consolidated action will determine any of the matters indicated.  While it may be true that these issues might somehow indirectly be affected by the resolution of this matter, there is no direct relationship.  “ ‘The right broadly granted by the code has, however, been strictly limited by the decisions defining “interest,” a word that is of crucial significance and that has a definite legal meaning in intervention proceedings. The interest referred to must be in the matter in litigation and of such a direct or immediate character that the intervener will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.’ [Citation.]” (Muller v. Robinson (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 511, 515 [345 P.2d 25].)

If TWCA has a claim based on SGMA as against Prosperity R20, or any other defendant identified in its proposed complaint, with respect to the alleged outstanding Prosperity R20/Tulare 20 account balance, it may bring a separate action for that claim, but such a claim, as a creditor, does not supply grounds for mandatory intervention in the consolidated action here.   

Discretionary intervention is not warranted

“Pursuant to section 387 the trial court has discretion to permit a nonparty to intervene where the following factors are met: (1) the proper procedures have been followed; (2) the nonparty has a direct and immediate interest in the action; (3) the intervention will not enlarge the issues in the litigation; and (4) the reasons for the intervention outweigh any opposition by the parties presently in the action. [Citation.]” (Reliance Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 383, 386 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 807].)

“ ‘The requirement of a direct and immediate interest means that the interest must be of such a direct and immediate nature that the moving party “ ‘will either gain or lose by the direct  legal operation and effect of the judgment.’ [Citation.]” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Siena Court Homeowners Assn., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1428.)

TWCA does not have a direct and immediate interest in the consolidated action incident to the outstanding balance on the Prosperity R20/Tulare 20 groundwater fee account.  TWCA will not gain or lose as a result of any judgment in the consolidated action because the judgment will not affect its entitlement to collect the claimed groundwater fees due.  TWCA, in any event, has failed to identify how any such judgment might affect its interests. 

What’s more, TWCA’s intervention, if permitted, would needlessly enlarge the issues in litigation to include matters concerning the person(s) or entity(ies) obligated to pay the outstanding debt to TWCA, and the enforceability of those obligations, which matters have nothing to do with the claims in the consolidated action. 

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, TWCA’s motion for leave to intervene is denied.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Bank of the Sierra vs. Sierra Forest Products

Case No.:   VCU335496 

Date:           June 26, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Motion for Appointment of Receiver

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion without prejudice. 

Bank of the Sierra (Bank) applied ex parte for appointment of a receiver and hearing on the application was continued to permit Sierra Forest Products (Sierra) additional time to file an opposition.  Sierra has filed an opposition to the Bank’s application.

A receiver may be appointed “where necessary to preserve the property or rights of” a party to a pending case, and “[i]n an action by a secured lender for specific performance of an assignment of rents provision in a deed of trust, mortgage, or separate assignment document.”  (Code Civ. Proc., 564, subds. (b)(9) & (11).)

The Bank is a secured lender of Sierra.  Sierra has a revolving line of credit with the Bank and has executed two security agreements granting the Bank a security interest in collateral described in the agreements.  The security agreements give the Bank the right to have a receiver appointed with power to protect and preserve the collateral and to hold it as security for Sierra’s indebtedness. 

Sierra has been in default since April 15, 2026.  Prior to that, in late February 2025, the Bank and Sierra entered a forbearance agreement, and, between April 2025 and   February 2026, entered four amendments to the forbearance agreement.  The Bank formally declared Sierra in default on May 1, 2026.  As of May 13, 2026, Sierra’s total outstanding balance with the Bank was approximately $2.5 million. 

The Bank contends Sierra has “failed and refused to pay the outstanding balance” due on its credit line; continues to use its collateral “for its own benefit” and has not turned it over to the Bank; that the collateral “is exclusively personal property that is easily transferred, secreted, moved, hidden, used, dissipated and/or otherwise made unavailable to collection or for levy”; and that unless a receiver is appointed, the Bank will be prevented “from enjoying its right to the rents, profits and proceeds” from the collateral. 

Sierra, in opposition, maintains the Bank seeks appointment of a receiver “based on a default alone.”  According to Sierra, it is “is continuing to operate its business in the ordinary course, preserving the collateral, paying its employees, maintaining its insurance, and continuing its efforts to secure financing that would repay [the Bank].” According to Sierra’s CEO, David Thomas, “[t]he collateral securing [the Bank’s] loan is not being and has not been transferred, moved, hidden, used, or otherwise made unavailable for collection or for levy.”

Thomas avers that, at present, he is “actively pursuing financing, capital investment, and transactions that would secure necessary capital to stabilize [Sierra’s] operations and to pay [the Bank’s] debt.”  Thomas specifically states he is “currently working with accountants (Baker Tilly/Moss Adams) and potential investors and equity partners (e.g., Ault Lending, LLC/Ault Capital Group, Inc. and Alpine Ridge Funding),” and, as of the date of his declaration, one of the “potential investors”/“equity partners,” “Ault,” “has access to [Sierra’s] data room and has been actively reviewing [its] financial and operational information as part of [Ault’s] due diligence process regarding a potential financing transaction.”

Thomas asserts “appointment of a receiver will disrupt ongoing financing efforts.”

ANALYSIS

“The appointment of a receiver is a drastic remedy, may involve unnecessary expense and hardship and courts carefully weigh the propriety of such appointment in exercising their discretion to appoint a receiver particularly if there is an alternative remedy.”  (Hoover v. Galbraith (1972) 7 Cal.3d 519, 528 [102 Cal.Rptr. 733, 498 P.2d 981].)

Whether to appoint a receiver is a matter “largely” committed to the “discretion of the court,” which discretion is to be exercised “according to the principles and usages of equity.” (Barclays Bank of California v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 593, 600 [137 Cal.Rptr. 743].)

And, notwithstanding whether the parties, by agreement, consent to appointment of a receiver, such agreement will not establish “jurisdiction upon the superior court to appoint such a receiver. [Citations.]”  (Ibid.)  Although an agreement to appointment of a receiver, however, “is not binding upon the courts,” such agreement “nevertheless has some evidentiary weight.” (Id., at p. 602.)  In this regard, “it presents a prima facie, but rebuttable, evidentiary showing of the beneficiary's entitlement to appointment of a receiver.”  (Ibid.)

The court finds Sierra makes a sufficient showing, at this stage, rebutting the Bank’s prima facie entitlement to appointment of a receiver based on the security agreements.  According to CEO Thomas, Sierra “remains operational and continues to conduct business on a daily basis,” and “has ninety-three (93) full-time employees in Terra Bella and is current on payroll and insurance payments.”  Thomas represents, further, Sierra’s “primary logging season is beginning, and [it] currently has approximately 34 million feet of logs under contract.”  Thomas avers that appointment of a receiver would “likely adversely affect [Sierra’s] logging contracts and supplier relationships and [its] ability to operate efficiently, including impairing [its] ability to obtain logs necessary to fulfill its contractual obligations.”

Further, the court is not persuaded, at this stage, that the Bank establishes that appointment of a receiver is necessary to preserve the property or rights of the Bank in the collateral.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 564, subd. (b)(9).)  For the Bank’s part, it only represents, based on the declaration of its senior vice president and credit administrator, Kelli Blackburn, that Sierra is using the collateral for “their exclusive and sole benefit” and that Sierra’s continued use of its collateral to conduct its daily business affairs somehow jeopardizes its rights in the collateral, which the Bank conclusorily asserts is “easily transferred, secreted, moved, hidden, used, dissipated and/or otherwise made unavailable for collection or for levy.”

The court finds appointment of a receiver on the Bank’s application, based on the showing it has made here, and Sierra’s rebuttal showing, appears premature, and, accordingly, the court denies Sierra’s motion, at this stage, without prejudice. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared June 15, 2026 and June 17, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR050740	In the Matter of Flores, Rachel	Confirm Sale Real Property	Appearance Required	Appearance required pursuant to CRC, rule 7.452
VPR053647	In the Matter of Maria Mjia	Petition for Small Estate Set-Aside	Recommended for Approval
VPR052840	In the Matter of Racca, Christine Kent	Final Distribution Hearing	Recommended for Approval	Supplement document in order
VPR052773	In the Matter of Perez, Eusebio Elizarraraz	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053443	In the Matter of Lewis, Orville Dale	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR050199	In the Matter of Boykin, Thelma	OSC Hearing	Appearance Required	Continued hearing for missing accounting: The filed document does not comply with CRC, rule 7.575 for Accounting and Objection filed
VPR054101	In the Matter of Gundy, Gregory Dale	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Recommended for Approval
VPR045184	In the Matter of Chole Davis Special Needs Trust	Accounting Hearing	Recommended for Approval
VPR052768	In the Matter of Denham, Elsie	Status Conference	Appearance Required	Status of related case
VPR053673	In the Matter of Monty, Devon Robert	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Citation not filed. Petitioner’s Screening Form, Item 16 omitted.
VPR053900	In the Matter of Flowers, Karlen M.	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Capacity Declaration, Notice of Hearing and Citation not filed. Attachment Requesting Special Orders Regarding a Major Neurocognitive Disorder (form GC-313) not attached to petition.
VPR044298	In the Matter of Mesa, Alexander	Hearing: Transfer of Jurisdiction	Appearance Required	Review transfer of venue to Fresno County
VPR047970	In the Matter of Pineda, Francisco Javier Amaya	OSC Hearing	Appearance Required	Missing Accounting and Notice of Death

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         Probate calendar for June 25, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR053470	In the Matter of Gonzalez, Rita Maria	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing not served on all relatives within the 2nd degree; ProbC§1822
PPR054049	In the Matter of Akin, Samie Jane	Petition to Determine Trust Asset	Recommended for Approval
PPR054064	In the Matter of Gasco, Gregory	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	Waiver of Bond not filed by all heirs: missing petitioner’s, Prob C §8481(a)(2) Petition Item at #3e omitted: regarding bond Order not lodged
PPR054087	In the Matter of Moraga, Rita	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	Not filed- Proof of Publication Waiver of Bond not filed by all heirs, Prob C §8481(a)(2) Not filed- Notice of Petition to Administer Estate (DE-121)
PPR053968	In the Matter of Perez, Rosita	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	1. Petition Item 5a(3) or (4) omitted: re any surviving registered domestic partner 2. Original will to be lodged with attached translated copy, CRC RULE 3.1110(g) 3. Publication not in accordance with Probate C § 8120:  Three publications in a newspaper published once a week or more often, with at least five days intervening between the first and last publication dates, not counting the publication dates, are sufficient.
PPR054109	In the Matter of Galbraith, Margie Fay	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance required	Issue re Petition Item 11(2): facts upon which the petitioner bases the allegation that the described real property was the decedent’s primary residence, Prob C § 13152(a)(2)
PPR054110	In the Matter of Hubble, Alvin C.	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance required	Petition to be signed by all successors/decedent’s children, Prob C § 13152(a)   (re email signature)

South County Justice Center & Visalia-County Civic Center

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared  June  23 - 29, 2026 that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date	Dept	Case	Comments
6/23/26	Dept 1	VPR054027; IMO J.J..A.M.	Required documents have been filed
6/23/26	Dept 9	VPR051156; IMO R.R.P.	NOT LODGED- Order Appointing Guardian & Letters of Guardianship
6/23/26	Dept 9	VPR053539; IMO I.W.	NOT LODGED- Order Appointing Guardian & Letters of Guardianship
6/25/26	Dept 9	VPR054114; IMO A.G.M.P.	NOT LODGED- Order Appointing Guardian & Letters of Guardianship
6/25/26	Dept 19	PPR053987 IMO A.R.P.	Notice of Hearing (GC-020) has not been filed indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511(c), re notice to grandparents Guardianship Orientation attendance declaration has not been filed DOJ Background record check appears to be outstanding
6/25/26	Dept 1	VPR053882; IMO U.S.V.	Notice of Hearing (GC-020) has not been filed indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511(c), re notice to grandparents
6/25/26	Dept 19	VPR046341; IMO L.J.M.	Notice of Hearing (GC-020) has not been filed indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511(c), re notice to grandparents & siblings ICWA-030 has not been filed pursuant to ProbC §1460.2
6/29/26	Dept 1	VPR047904 ; IMO A.J.S.	Notice of Hearing (GC-020) has not been filed indicating Notice of Hearing was served pursuant to Probate Code §1460