Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, September 10, 2026, are:

Re:                Scott, Fred Jr. vs. Vallarta Food Enterprises, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU319016

Date:           September 10, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Defendant’s (1) Motion for Summary Judgment, or Adjudication; (2) Motion for Protective Order re: Deposition

Tentative Ruling: (1) To deny the motion; (2) To grant the motion.

(1) Motion for Summary Judgment, or Adjudication

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendant Vallarta for negligence and premises liability.

Defendant moves for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of the following issues:

(a) That Defendant is entitled to judgment on Plaintiff’s first cause of action for negligence because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate Defendant breached any duty owed to Plaintiff; and

(b) That Defendant is entitled to judgment on the second cause of action for premises liability because Defendant did not have actual or constructive notice of any dangerous condition prior to Plaintiff’s fall.

In support, Defendant provides the following facts that are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.

Plaintiff fell at Vallarta in the men’s restroom on January 13, 2025, at approximately 8:31 a.m. (UMF Nos. 1 and 2.)

The men’s restroom was inspected by Angelica Sanchez at 8:02 a.m. on January 13, 2025, and there was nothing on the floor. (UMF No. 3.) Plaintiff disputes this, noting that Sanchez’s inspection of the bathroom was insufficient because the door never closed, she did not walk inside to the sinks to see if liquid pooled on the floor and did not walk to the urinal to confirm there was no liquid by the urinal. (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 3; AUMF No. 13, 14.)

Sanchez’s inspection of the men’s restroom is confirmed by the January 13, 2025 inspection log maintained by Defendant. (UMF No. 4) Plaintiff disputes this fact under the same facts and evidence as the dispute to No. 3. (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 4; AUMF No. 13, 14)

Plaintiff admitted he never saw anything on the ground prior to his fall. (UMF No. 5.) Plaintiff does not know who caused the substance to be on the floor. (UMF No. 6.) Plaintiff does not know where the substance came from. (UMF No. 7.) Plaintiff does not know how long the substance had been on the floor before he fell. (UMF No. 8.)

Further, that Plaintiff does not know if Defendant had actual notice of the substance prior to the fall. (UMF No. 9.) Plaintiff disputes this fact, stating that Plaintiff did not know if anyone at Defendant Vallarta knew the liquid was on the ground before his fall. (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 9)

Nobody from Vallarta ever told Plaintiff that Vallarta knew about the substance prior to his fall. (UMF No. 10.)

Plaintiff is unaware of anything that Vallarta did that caused his fall. (UMF No. 11.) Plaintiff disputes this, stating that Sanchez’s inspection of the bathroom was insufficient because the door never closed, she did not walk inside to the sinks to see if liquid pooled on the floor and did not walk to the urinal to confirm there was no liquid by the urinal. (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 11; AUMF No. 13, 14.)

Plaintiff provides additional material facts including that the inspection took approximately 9 seconds (AUMF No. 28.)

Authority and Analysis

A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(a).) “The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(f)(1).) If a party seeks summary adjudication as an alternative to a request for summary judgment, the request must be clearly made in the notice of the motion. (Gonzales v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1544.)  “[A] party may move for summary adjudication of a legal issue or a claim for damages other than punitive damages that does not completely dispose of a cause of action, affirmative defense, or issue of duty pursuant to” subdivision (t). (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(t).) 

To prevail, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c).) The motion cannot succeed unless the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts; the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other evidence. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of material fact, “[a]ll doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment…” (Gold v. Weissman (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-99.) “In other words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true.” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 179.) However, if adjudication is otherwise proper the motion “may not be denied on grounds of credibility,” except when a material fact is the witness’s state of mind and “that fact is sought to be established solely by the [witness’s] affirmation thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(e).) 

Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) “[T]here is no obligation on the opposing party... to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element... necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor.” (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) 

Objections

Defendant objects to the declaration of Plaintiff’s expert. The Court does not deem these objections material to disposition of the motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473c(q).

Negligence and Premises Liability

The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) a duty on the part of defendant toward plaintiff; (2) defendant’s breach of that duty; and (3) harm to the plaintiff caused by that breach. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142.)  

The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages.  (McIntyre v. The Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)  

The court in Girvetz v. Boys' Market (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 827, 829 states:

“The defendant market owner was not an insurer of the safety of his patrons, but owed them the duty to exercise reasonable care in keeping the premises safe for his invitees. To impose liability for injuries suffered by an invitee due to the defective condition of the premises, the owner or occupier must have either actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition or have been able by the exercise of ordinary care to discover the condition, which if known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to invitees on his premises. His negligence in such cases is founded upon his failure to exercise ordinary care in remedying the defect after he has discovered it.  Whether, under all the circumstances, the defective condition had existed long enough so that a reasonable man exercising reasonable care would have discovered it, is ordinarily a question of fact to be decided by the jury. The fact alone that a dangerous condition existed at the time the accident occurred will not warrant an inference that the defendant was negligent. There must be some evidence, direct or circumstantial, to support the conclusion that the condition had existed long enough for the proprietor, in the exercise of reasonable care, to have discovered and remedied it.”

To establish a breach of duty therefore, “…the owner's actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition is a key to establishing its liability. Although the owner's lack of knowledge is not a defense, to impose liability for injuries suffered by an invitee due to a defective condition of the premises, the owner or occupier must have either actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition or have been able by the exercise of ordinary care to discover the condition, which if known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to invitees on his premises…” (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205.)

As such, the Court views the two issues presented for summary adjudication, that is breach of duty and lack of actual or constructive knowledge” as one in the same.

Here, the Court agrees that Defendant lacked actual knowledge of the condition of the bathroom.

However, the lack of actual knowledge is based upon the approximately nine second inspection by Sanchez that did not include letting the door close behind her, checking for liquid near the sinks or urinal. The Court cannot say, as a matter of law, that Sanchez sufficiently checked the bathroom for liquid on the ground in the approximately nine seconds of inspection and whether an inspection lasting longer than nine seconds would have yielded knowledge of whether there was liquid on the ground to a degree where additional steps were necessary. This is question of fact for the jury. As such, the length of time between Sanchez’s inspection and Plaintiff’s injury is not dispositive on the issue of constructive knowledge.

"We conclude that plaintiffs still have the burden of producing evidence that the dangerous condition existed for at least a sufficient time to support a finding that the defendant had constructive notice of the hazardous condition. We also conclude, however, that plaintiffs may demonstrate the storekeeper had constructive notice of the dangerous condition if they can show that the site had not been inspected within a reasonable period of time so that a person exercising due care would have discovered and corrected the hazard. In other words, if the plaintiffs can show an inspection was not made within a particular period of time prior to an accident, they may raise an inference the condition did exist long enough for the owner to have discovered it. It remains a question of fact for the jury whether, under all the circumstances, the defective condition existed long enough so that it would have been discovered and remedied by an owner in the exercise of reasonable care." (Ortega v. Kmart (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1212-1213.)

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

(2) Motion for Protective Order re: Deposition of David Alonzo

In this matter, Plaintiff has taken the depositions of Defendant's Person Most Knowledgeable on July 28, 2025, and three Vallarta employees: Jose Moreno on February 5, 2026, Maria Suarez on February 6, 2026, and Angelica Sanchez on February 6, 2026.

Defendant’s counsel indicates these four witnesses have knowledge of the restroom, the alleged incident and Defendant’s maintenance and inspection practices. (Declaration of Benton ¶3.)

On July 9, 2026, Plaintiff served a Notice of Deposition of David Alonzo, Vallarta's Risk-Management and General-Liability Manager for July 31, 2026.

On July 24, 2026, Defendant’s counsel served a timely objection to the deposition notice on the grounds that counsel was “…engaged in trial in Fresno County through July 31, 2026.” (Declaration of Benton ¶5.)

On August 7, 2026, Plaintiff served a Notice of Deposition of David Alonzo for August 24, 2026.

On August 11, 2026, Defendant moved for this protective order that the deposition of Alonzo not be taken at all or limiting the deposition “…to matters, if any, as to which Plaintiff makes the showing the law requires.” Defendant further moves for sanctions in the amount of $2,047.50.

In support, Defendant’s counsel states “Mr. Alonzo did not witness the alleged incident, was not present at the store, and has no personal knowledge of the facts underlying Plaintiff's claim. His role is limited to risk management and general-liability administration. His only involvement in this matter is that, as a corporate agent, he signed the verifications to Vallarta's responses to Plaintiff's written discovery.” (Declaration of Benton ¶9.) As such, Defendant argues this deposition is barred by the “apex doctrine” as Alonzo is a management-level corporate official who lacks unique or superior personal knowledge of the relevant facts

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Alonzo received a report pertaining to inspection of the bathroom after the incident and that, as the risk manager, knows Defendant’s policies as to bathroom inspections.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.420(a) provides that:

“Before, during, or after a deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected person or organization may promptly move for a protective order. The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.”

The Court, for good cause shown, can make any order as justice requires from finding that the deposition should not proceed, to the deposition being taken subject to conditions, or that some other method other than a deposition be utilized. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.420(b).)

Apex Doctrine

As to depositions of “apex” witnesses or high-level corporate officers, Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1282, 1287-1289 states:

“…[w]hen a plaintiff seeks to depose a corporate president or other official at the highest level of corporate management, and that official moves for a protective order ... the trial court should first determine whether the plaintiff has shown good cause that the official has unique or superior personal knowledge of discoverable information. If not…the trial court should issue the protective order and first require the plaintiff to obtain the necessary discovery through less-intrusive methods. These would include interrogatories directed to the high-level official to explore the state of his or her knowledge of involvement in plaintiffs case; the deposition of lower level employees with appropriate knowledge and involvement in the subject matter of the litigation; and the organizational deposition of the corporation itself, which will require the corporation to produce for deposition the most qualified officer or employee to testify on its behalf as to the specified matters to be raised at the deposition.”

Here, while Plaintiff has deposed lower level employee with personal knowledge of the issues and facts in this case, as well as a person most qualified, Plaintiff has not directed interrogatories at Alonzo “… to explore the state of his or her knowledge of involvement in plaintiffs case.”

Plaintiff has not demonstrated through such interrogatories that Alonzo possesses knowledge as to the bathroom floor surface.

As such, the Court finds application of Liberty Mutual here and will issue the protective order.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Capital One, N.A. vs. Perez, Vanessa

Case No.:   VCL334106

Date:            September 10, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Motion for Entry of Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; CMC is continued to December 22, 2026; 8:30 am; D1 for status of Judgment.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff, on July 8, 2026 filed a stipulation in which Plaintiff and Defendant agree that Defendant is indebted to Plaintiff in the amount of $10,407.42. Further, that Defendant agrees to pay Plaintiff $8,357.16 to resolve the above titled action for 23 monthly payments of $348.21 and a final payment of $348.33.

In the event of default, the stipulation indicates that Plaintiff is entitled to entry of judgment for the $10,407.42 noted above, less any credits. The agreement indicates that the Court shall retain jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

This matter does not appear to have been dismissed.

On July 30, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion to enter judgment pursuant to the stipulation, indicating that Defendant has made no payments.

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states: 

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1360.)

As indicated above, the Court retains jurisdiction over the parties and this matter and therefore is prepared to “enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”

Defendant appears to have breached the settlement, based upon the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel and, the Court, having no opposition, grants the motion and enters judgment in the amount requested of $10,933.83 consisting of the $10,407.42 principal amount, less $0 in payments made plus $526.41 in court costs.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Rideout, Jazzmin vs. First Pitch Entertainment, LLC et al

Case No.:   VCU329435

Date:           September 10, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     (1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses as to Special Interrogatories, Set One as to Defendant First Pitch

(2) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses as to Requests for Production of Documents Nos. 1-2, 11-14, 21, 51, 55-56, and 59, Set One as to Defendant First Pitch

(3) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Compliance as to Requests for Production Nos. 4-6, 8, 10, 15, 24-34, 38, 43-45, 52-53, 60, 62-63 as to Defendant First Pitch

(4) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Initial Responses as to Special Interrogatories, Set Two as to Defendant First Pitch

Tentative Ruling: (1) through (4): There are no tentative rulings on the merits for these motions. The parties are directed to meaningfully meet and confer before the hearing of these motions to resolve the discovery disputes identified in the moving and opposition papers for these discovery motions. If unable to resolve, counsel are directed to personally appear for the hearing on these discovery motions. No CourtCall or Zoom appearances will be permitted if the parties are unable to resolve this matter prior to the scheduled hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                City of Exeter vs. Clark, Josie Bell Young

Case No.:   VCU292152

Date:           September 10, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Motion to Approve Rehabilitation Plan

Tentative Ruling: To approve the plan; status conference is continued to January 13, 2027; 8:30 am; D1.

Facts

This matter concerns 333 East Palm Street, Exeter, California (“the Property”) which is subject to a stipulated receivership order to rehabilitate the Property.

The Receiver indicates Property is subject to the following liens and secured claims:

1. Defaulted and secured property taxes for the 2019 through 2024 tax years in the current amount of $28,637.35;

2. Property taxes for the 2024-2025 tax year in the amount of $483.18;

3. The Receiver’s fees and costs pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 17980.7;

4. A lien in the amount of $11,764.02 recorded in 2020 by the City securing payment of expenses incurred to abate nuisances at the Property;

5. The City’s secured claim for reimbursement of its administrative, enforcement and inspection expenses, attorney fees and costs pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 17980.7 and the Appointment Order.

The Receiver indicates, and the stipulation reflected, the Property is a public nuisance with the following hazards:

1. The exterior of the residence is dilapidated and not weatherproof;

2. There is no permanent foundation under the residence;

3. The windows and entry doors are dilapidated and inoperable;

4. There is no functional kitchen or bathroom in the residence;

5. There is no functioning water heater;

6. The electrical system is in poor condition and a fire and electrocution hazard;

7. The floors, walls and ceilings in the residence are dilapidated and heavily soiled;

8. The detached garage is dilapidated;

9. The shed roof extension over the driveway is dilapidated and failing;

10. The residence and garage were littered with trash and abandoned personal property; and

11. The yards were filled with overgrown vegetation.

The Receiver indicates the following has been performed with respect to the Property:

A. Took possession of the Property and arranged for a locksmith to replace the locks on the residence, garage and rear yard gate;

B. Performed multiple inspections of the Property;

C. Oversaw the removal of overgrown vegetation and trash from the yards and boarding of the residence windows by Pablo Cruz Landscaping.

D. Oversaw the removal and disposal of trash and abandoned personal property in the residence and garage by Next Level Debris Removal.

E. Secured liability insurance for the Property and the Receivership Estate;

F. Obtained and reviewed building permit records for the Property;

G. Obtained and reviewed a Preliminary Title Report for the Property in order to verify the liens and secured claims which encumber it;

H. Retained environmental consultant YES Environmental, Inc. (“YEI”) to perform a survey of the residence and garage for the presence of asbestos as required by the San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District.

I. Met and conferred with representatives of the City and its counsel concerning the appropriate course and scope of rehabilitation of the Property;

J. Solicited bids for remediation of the asbestos-containing materials in the residence identified in the YEI asbestos survey (water heater vent pipe and roof penetration adhesive) from qualified abatement contractors.

K. Selected low bidder J & R Abatement Contractors to perform remediation of the asbestos containing materials in the residence, subject to Court approval.”;

L. Met and conferred with representatives of the Tulare County Building Department (“Building Department”) in order to verify the plans and other documentation which must be submitted in support of a demolition permit application;

M. Retained Artoo Design S2dio, Inc. (“Artoo”), to prepare site plan of the Property required by the Building Department as a condition of issuing a demolition permit.

N. Solicited bids for the demolition and removal of the residence, garage and flatwork (driveway and sidewalk) from demolition contractors Aftermath Demolition and Hauling, Central Valley Environmental and Bryan Company Demolition, Inc. (“Bryan Company”);

O. Selected low bidder Bryan Company to complete the demolition of the residence, garage and flatwork at the Property, subject to Court approval.

P. Obtained a market valuation of the Property as a vacant lot from Veronica Torres-Luna, a real estate agent employed by Re/Max Gold of Clovis in order to confirm the feasibility of the Rehabilitation Plan.

 Q. Undertook abandonment of the utilities servicing the Property as required by the Building Department as a condition of issuance of a demolition permit;

R. Submitted a demolition permit application to the Building Department (Permit Number OPA-26-0868); and

S. Prepared a comprehensive budget for the operation of the Receivership Estate through the completion of the work described in the Rehabilitation Plan.

As to the proposed rehabilitation plan, the Receiver seeks to accomplish:

A. Removal of overgrown vegetation and trash from yards and boarding of residence by Pablo Cruz Landscaping (completed);

B. Removal and disposal of trash and abandoned personal property in residence and garage by Next Level Debris Removal(completed);

C. Asbestos survey by YEI (completed);

D. Asbestos abatement by J & R Abatement Contractors pursuant to its proposal;

E. Preparation of demolition plot plan by Artoo; and

F. Demolition and removal of residence, garage and flatwork by Bryan Company pursuant to its proposal.

The Receiver estimates $32,549 in estimated costs to accomplish A through F above.

Authority and Analysis

Health and Safety Code Section 17980.7 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

Any receiver appointed pursuant to this section shall have all of the following powers and duties in the order of priority listed in this paragraph, unless the court otherwise permits:

(A) To take full and complete control of the substandard property.

(B) To manage the substandard building and pay expenses of the operation of the substandard building and real property upon which the building is located. . . .

(C) To secure a cost estimate and construction plan from a licensed contractor for the repairs necessary to correct the conditions cited in the notice of violation.

(D) To enter into contracts and employ a licensed contractor as necessary to correct the conditions cited in the notice of violation.

Further, section 17980.7 authorizes a receiver to perform any action which the Court deems appropriate in its discretion. (City of Santa Monica v. Gonzales (2008) 43 Cal. 4th 905.)

The Court, therefore, approves the plan.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Aspire General Insurance Company vs. Rico, Joey Garcia

Case No.:   VCL204982

Date:           September 10, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Motion to Enforce Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and enter judgment in the amount of $2,464.

Facts

In this subrogation matter, the complaint alleges Plaintiff has paid its insured the sum of $24,382.01 and seeks to recover this sum from Defendant.

The parties filed a settlement agreement on January 3, 2024 indicating judgment may be entered forthwith in favor of Plaintiff and against said Defendant for damages in the principal sum of $24,382.07 plus interest from December 16, 2022 (date of the filing of this complaint) and court costs, pursuant to the following:

(a) The sum of $10,000.00 shall be paid by General Insurance Company on or before November 30, 2023;

(b) The sum of $400.00 shall be paid 30 days of receipt of the settlement agreement;

(c) The sum of $150.00 shall be paid on or before the 30th of each month from December 30, 2023 to November 30, 2025.

The Agreement notes these payments total $14,000.

Further, that “The amount being paid under this agreement is a negotiated amount, and does not reflect the amount actually owed by DEFENDANT, but is merely a negotiated settlement entered into for financial reasons only. DEFENDANT acknowledges that the amount set forth in paragraph 1, including interest and costs is the actual amount due and owing.”

On January 25, 2024, the Court dismissed the matter pursuant to the settlement agreement and expressly retained jurisdiction pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

Plaintiff indicates Defendant has made payments totaling $2,050.00 and that Defendant’s “unpaid installment balance” is $1,950.

Plaintiff seeks entry of judgment in the amount of $21,523.41 consisting of the amount of $24,382.07, plus interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum from December 16, 2022 through July 7, 2026, in the amount of $8,677.34 (and continuing to accrue thereafter at the rate of $6.68 per day until paid), less a credit of $12,050.00 for all payments received prior to default, together with court costs of $514.00.

Section 664.6 (a) states: 

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1360.)

As indicated above, the Court has retained jurisdiction over the parties and this matter and therefore is prepared to “enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”

Greentree

The initial issue for the Court is whether the judgment amount sought of $24,382.07 is an unenforceable penalty in light of the settlement with this Defendant for what is effectively $4,000 and where Defendant has paid $2,050 of that amount.

The Court noted above a term of the stipulation purporting to “voluntarily disclaim and waive any rights or benefits under the holding in Greentree Financial Group, Inc., v. Execute Sports, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 495, and any other similar law, which states in essence that an acceleration clause seeking a judgment amount that exceeds the damages arising strictly from a breach of the minimum payment stream called for herein may be deemed an unenforceable penalty.”

However, Civil Code section 1671 renders contractual penalties or forfeitures illegal and unenforceable as against public policy if they bear no reasonable relationship to the actual damages caused by the breach that triggered them. (Ridgley v. Topa Thrift & Loan Assn. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 970, 976-977); Purcell v. Schweitzer (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 969, 974-975.) In the Court’s view, the public policy expressed in that code section may not be waived or circumvented by language in the settlement agreement, as even an express waiver of the right to appeal or the right to contest a stipulated judgment on any ground will not prevent a party from challenging a penalty or forfeiture included in the stipulated judgment. (Purcell, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at 972, 975; see Sybron Corp. v. Clark Hosp. Supply Corp. (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 896, 902, fn. 3.) The law cannot prevent a party from challenging an illegal term in a contract simply because the party agreed to the illegal term.

In Greentree, the plaintiff sued defendant for breach of contract for failure to pay $45,000 due under the contract. (Id. at 498.) The parties resolved this dispute via stipulation for entry of judgment providing that defendant would pay $20,000 in two installments of $15,000 and $5,000. (Id.) Further, if the defendant defaulted on either installment, the plaintiff would be entitled to have judgment entered for the amount prayed for in the complaint, plus interest, attorney fees and costs, less any amounts already paid. (Id. at 498.) The defendant defaulted on the first payment, and the plaintiff sought entry of judgment pursuant to the stipulation. (Id.) The trial court entered judgment in the amount of $61,232.50, consisting of the $45,000 prayed for in the complaint, plus $13,912.50 in prejudgment interest, $2,000 in attorney fees, and $320 in costs. (Id.) The defendant argued at the appellate level that the judgment of $61,232.50 for failure to make a $15,000 payment constitutes enforcement of an illegal penalty. (Id. at 498-499.)

The appellate court, agreeing with the defendant, interpreted the stipulation as an unenforceable liquidated damages clause that effectively imposed $61,232.50 in liquidated damages for breach of the defendant's obligation to pay $15,000 as follows:

“Greentree and ESI did not attempt to anticipate the damages that might flow from a breach of the stipulation. Rather, they simply selected the amount Greentree had claimed as damages in the underlying lawsuit, plus prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs. But the appellate record contains nothing showing Greentree's chances of complete success on the merits of its case—the record contains only the complaint, the answer, and the stipulation. In the stipulation, ‘[e]ach party disclaims any admission of wrongdoing, fault, liability, or violation of law.’ The lack of a guarantee of success at trial may explain, at least in part, why Greentree was willing to accept in settlement less than half the amount demanded in the complaint.

Also, the $ 61,232.50 amount in the judgment bears no reasonable relationship to the range of actual damages the parties could have anticipated from a breach of the stipulation to settle the dispute for $20,000. ‘[D]amages for the withholding of money are easily determinable—i.e., interest at prevailing rates…’ [citation omitted.] The amount of the judgment, however, was more than triple the amount for which the parties agreed to settle the case.” (Id. at 499-500.)

The court in Greentree noted that the validity of a liquidated damages provision is governed by section 1671, subdivision (b) and that “‘A liquidated damages clause will generally be considered unreasonable, and hence unenforceable under section 1671[, subdivision] (b), if it bears no reasonable relationship to the range of actual damages that the parties could have anticipated would flow from a breach.’” (Id. at 499.) Damages for failing to pay money are “‘easily determinable’” and are limited to “‘interest at [the] prevailing rate[]’” and (perhaps) “reasonable costs [incurred] in pursuing the payment.” (Id. at 500.)

Last, the court in Greentree concluded that:

“The stipulation does not contain any provision for an award of attorney fees or prejudgment interest, although the judgment included $ 2,000 in attorney fees and $ 13,912.50 in prejudgment interest. The $20,000 settlement sum in the stipulation is unallocated, and may or may not have included Greentree's claimed attorney fees and prejudgment interest. We find no basis for awarding Greentree its attorney fees and prejudgment interest in addition to the stipulated settlement sum. Greentree is entitled to recover its costs in the trial court (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032), and postjudgment interest.” (Id. at 502.)

Vitatech International, Inc. v Sporn (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 796 is also instructional here. In that case, the parties settled before trial for payment of $75,000 although plaintiff was seeking $166,000 in its complaint. Like this case, there was an agreement to “forbear” collection if Defendant paid the lesser sum. Defendant defaulted, and Plaintiff sought and obtained a judgment of over $300,000, including compensatory damages, prejudgment interest, attorney’s fees and costs.

In that case, plaintiff also argued that it sought damages that were no more than it could have recovered at trial and that all parties expressly accepted the amount that would be paid on default. The appellate court focused on the damages that could have flowed from the breach of the stipulation, not the amount claimed in the complaint:

“We reversed because "[the parties] did not attempt to anticipate the damages that might flow from a breach of the stipulation. Rather, they simply selected the amount [the plaintiff] had claimed as damages in the underlying lawsuit, plus prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs. But the appellate record contains nothing showing [the plaintiff's] chances of complete success on the merits of its case .... [¶] Also, the ……. amount in the judgment bears no reasonable relationship to the range of actual damages the parties could have anticipated from a breach of the stipulation to settle the dispute…” (Id. at 809)

Here, the Court does not find the principal amount of $24,382.07. claimed by Plaintiff were damages that might flow from breach of the stipulation, but rather the amount Plaintiff claimed in the underlying lawsuit, plus interest and costs. Plaintiff urges the court to order the full amount claimed to be due as it is not in dispute, and was agreed to in the stipulations of the parties. The Court, however, sees the essential question from the cases noted above as to what the relationship is between the stipulated amount and the damages that flow from the breach. The total amount sought is five times the amount Defendant owed under the settlement agreement.

The Court, therefore, sets the principal amount at $4,000.

As to the prejudgment interest, as in Greentree, the $4,000 settlement sum as to Defendant is unallocated and does not appear to contain prejudgment interest.

As to the costs, the Court will award the $514 requested.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and will enter judgment in the amount of $2,464, consisting of the $4,000 in principal, less the $2,050 in credits, plus $514 in costs.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Asman, Bruce E. et al vs. Ponce, Cipriano et al

Case No.:   VCU313509

Date:           September 10, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     (1) Plaintiffs’ Continued Motion to Consolidate; (2) Plaintiffs’ Continued Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint

Tentative Ruling:

(1) To continue the motion to September 24, 2026; 8:30 am; D1 and order the notice of related case filed in VCU332655, the notice of this motion filed in VCU332655 and the proposed order filed in both VCU313509 and  VCU332655;

(2) To grant the motion and deem the proposed amended complaint filed as of the date of this hearing

(1) Plaintiffs’ Continued Motion to Consolidate

Facts and Analysis

Via this continued motion, Plaintiffs seek to consolidate this matter VCU313509 with VCU332655.

VCU313509, as it stands, involves causes of action for quiet title and easements involving 13930 Idaho Ave Orosi, CA 93647 (“Subject Property”). The Court notes a pending motion to amend the complaint to add causes of action for negligence, fraud and failure to disclose involving the Subject Property. Defendants Ciprano Ponce and Sylvia Ponce are alleged to claim that the garage in dispute belongs to another parcel owned by Defendants.

VCU332655 involves causes of action for negligence and misrepresentation against Defendants Bloom Group, Inc. and Alma Rosa Jimenez (alleged to have represented Plaintiffs regarding the purchase of the Subject Property) and Defendants Melson Realty, Inc. and Maxim Leo Lisitsyn (alleged to have represented the sellers of the Subject Property.)

Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1048, subd. (a), “[w]hen actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court…it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.”

“A consolidation of actions does not affect the rights of the parties. The purpose of consolidation is merely to promote trial convenience and economy by avoiding duplication of procedure, particularly in the proof of issues common to both actions.” (Wouldridge v. Burns (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 82, 86.) “Under the statute and the case law, there are thus two types of consolidation: a consolidation for purposes of trial only, where the two actions remain otherwise separate; and a complete consolidation or consolidation for all purposes, where the two actions are merged into a single proceeding under one case number and result in only one verdict or set of findings and one judgment.” (Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147.)  “Consolidation under Code of Civil Procedure section 1048 is permissive, and it is for the trial court to determine whether the consolidation is for all purposes or for trial only.” (Id. at 1149.) Consolidation “is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial [court].”  Fellner v. Steinbaum (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 509, 511.)

Here, the substantive elements of section 1048(a) appear to be met given the common issues between the matters.

However, the Court will require compliance with the procedural aspects of consolidation prior to ordering consolidation.

Under California Rule of Court 3.300, a notice of related case must be filed in both VCU313509 and VCU332655. This requirement has been satisfied as to VCU313509. No notice of related case appears filed in VCU332655

Under California Rules of Court Rule 3.350(a), the notice of motion to consolidate must be filed in each case sought to be designated.

While the notice was filed in VCU313509, no notice of this motion was filed in VCU332655. The Court orders Plaintiffs to file the notice of motion in VCU332655.

Finally, California Rule of Court, Rule 3.350(c) requires a proposed order to be filed in each case sought to be consolidated. No proposed order has been filed in either VCU313509 or VCU332655. The Court orders Plaintiffs to a proposed order in both VCU313509 and VCU332655.

Upon compliance with the procedural requirements, the Court intends to grant consolidation of these matters for all purposes.

The Court, therefore, continues this matter to September 24 2026; 8:30 am; D1 and orders Plaintiffs to file:

• the notice of related case in VCU332655;
• the notice of this motion in VCU332655; and
• the proposed order in both VCU313509 and VCU332655.

(2) Plaintiffs’ Continued Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint

Facts

On July 2, 2026, Plaintiffs filed this motion for leave to file a first amended complaint.

Plaintiffs stated “THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS ARISE FROM THE SAME REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTION, INVOLVE THE SAME PARTIES, AND CONCERN THE SAME UNDERLYING DISPUTE THAT HAS BEEN BEFORE THE COURT SINCE THIS ACTION WAS FILED. PLAINTIFF DOES NOT SEEK TO INTRODUCE AN UNRELATED CONTROVERSY, BUT INSTEAD SEEKS TO CLARIFY THE FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND LEGAL THEORIES SO THAT THE ISSUES MAY BE RESOLVED ON THEIR MERITS.”

Further that “PLAINTIFF ACTED PROMPTLY AFTER REVIEWING THE FILE TO PREPARE THE PROPOSED FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT. THE REQUESTED AMENDMENT IS NOT MADE FOR PURPOSES OF DELAY, BUT TO PERMIT THE COURT TO DECIDE THE CONTROVERSY BASED UPON A COMPLETE PRESENTATION OF THE FACTS AND APPLICABLE LEGAL THEORIES.”

Additionally, the motion states “THE PROPOSED FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT CLARIFIES THE FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND ASSERTS ADDITIONAL LEGAL THEORIES RELATING TO THE PROPERTY DISPUTE, INCLUDING ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING THE DETATCHED GARAGE, THE PURCHASE TRANSACTION, AND THE CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED.”

The declaration in support states:      

“4. THE PROPOSED FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT ADDS AND CLARIFIES ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING, AMONG OTHER THINGS:

A.FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION;

B.FAILURE DISCLOSE MATERIAL FACTS

C.PROPERTY BOUNDARY AND OWNERSHIP ISSUES CONCERNING THE DETATCHED GARAGE;

D.EASEMENTS AND PROPERTY USE RIGHTS;

E.NEGLIGENCE AND BREACH OF DUTY BY THE REAL ESTATE PROFESSIONALS INVOLVED IN THE TRANSACTION.”

Further, that “6.THE REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND WAS NOT MADE EARLIER BECAUSE I WAS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR MUCH OF THIS CASE. MY FIRST ATTORNEY WAS RELIEVED FROM THIS CASE, I RETAINED BRIAN FOLLAND, WHO REPRESENTED ME FOR APPROXIMATELY SIX MONTHS BEFORE HE WAS ALSO RELIEVED FROM THE CASE.”

Additionally, that “AFTER BOTH ATTORNEYS WERE NO LONGER REPRESENTING ME, I OBTAINED AND REVIEWED MY CASE FILE. DURING MY REVIEW, I DETERMINED THAT THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT DID NOT FULLY INCLUDE ALL THE FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND LEGAL THEORIES THATI BELIEVED WERE: SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND THE EVIDENCE IN MY POSSESSION. I ALSO IDENTIFIED INFORMATION I BELIEVE SHOULD BE INCLUDED TO ACCURATELY PRESENTS MY CLAIMS.”

Further, Plaintiffs provide a summary of the proposed amendments contained in the first amended complaint.

The first amended complaint appears to have been lodged on May 28, 2026.

Plaintiffs have filed supplemental documents in support of the motion that confirms to the Court that the proposed amendments seek to clarify and correct factual allegations stated in prior versions of the complaint, but that the same property, garage and parties are at issue. Plaintiffs have provided citations to the proposed amended complaint that identify the proposed changes. Plaintiffs further indicate which causes of action have been removed and which causes of action have been added, including the reasons for each modification. Further, Plaintiffs indicate discovery of additional encumbrances on the property in November 2025 and July 2026 which, in part, appears to have necessitated the proposed amendments.  

In opposition, Defendants maintain their argument argue that the declarations and motion provide no facts supporting why Plaintiffs were unaware of the facts not contained in the original complaint, which was verified by Plaintiffs.

Authority and Analysis

 The Court may, in the furtherance of justice, and upon any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 473, 576.)  In general, California courts liberally exercise discretion to permit amendment of pleadings in light of a strong policy favoring resolution of all disputes between parties in the same action.  (Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939; Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 296 [“[T]here is a strong policy in favor of liberal allowance of amendments.”].)  Pursuant to this policy, requests for leave to amend generally will be granted unless the party seeking to amend has been dilatory in bringing the proposed amendment before the Court, and the delay in seeking leave to amend will cause prejudice to the opposing party if leave to amend is granted.  (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490; Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565.)  The decision on a motion for leave is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 

However, the Court finds a lack of compliance with California Rule of Court, Rule 3.1324. It is within the court’s discretion to require compliance with Rule 3.1324 before granting leave to amend. (Hataishi v. First American Home Buyers Protection Corp. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1469.)

Rule 3.1324 regulates the content of the motion and supporting declaration as follows:

“(a) Contents of motion

A motion to amend a pleading before trial must:

(1)  Include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments;

(2)  State what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and

(3)  State what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located.

(b) Supporting declaration

A separate declaration must accompany the motion and must specify:

(1)  The effect of the amendment;

(2)  Why the amendment is necessary and proper;

(3)  When the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and

(4)  The reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier.”

Here, subsection (a) is satisfied via the supplemental declaration provided which identifies the changes by page, paragraph and line number.

As to (b), the Court finds sufficient compliance with the requirements. The Court notes some delay between the discovery and inquiry into the facts and legal theories proposed and the filing of this motion initially. However, the Court finds a sufficient showing as to why the amendments were not made earlier including the replacement of counsel and Plaintiffs’ further review of the operative complaint and various documents associated with the property.

The Court should not deny the motion unless the opposing party can show prejudice. (Kittredge Sports Company v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal. App. 3d 1045, 1048.)

Prejudice exists where amendment would: (1) cause a delay of trial; (2) increase preparation costs; (3) change the focus of the complaint; or (4) increase discovery burdens. (Magpali, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488.) Additional discovery costs may support a claim for prejudice. (Miles v. City of Los Angeles (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 728, 739 [“Prejudice exists where the proposed amendment would require delaying the trial, resulting in added costs of preparation and increased discovery burdens.”].) Additionally, whether facts or legal theories are being changed and whether the opposing party will suffer prejudice “represent[ ] a different side of the same coin: If new facts are being alleged, prejudice may easily result because of the inability of the other party to investigate the validity of the factual allegations while engaged in trial or to call rebuttal witnesses. If the same set of facts supports merely a different theory—for example, an easement as opposed to a fee—no prejudice can result.” (City of Stanton v. Cox (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1557, 1563.)

Here, no delay of the trial will occur. Defendants have not demonstrated increased preparation costs or significant discovery burdens. The Court does not find the focus of the proposed amended complaint will result in prejudice where the same property, garage and related issues are presented under different legal theories.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and will deem the proposed amended complaint lodged May 28, 2026 deem filed as of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable David C. Mathias Presiding - Department 1

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared September 10, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR052371	In the Matter of Suzuki, Roy Yoshio	Final Distribution	Appearance Required	Settlement to be approved by all heirs entitled to distribution

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         Probate calendar for September 10, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR054259	In the Matter of Ashden, Laura Carol	Spousal Property Hearing	Appearance Required	Matter appears to be in order
PPR054247	In the Matter of Puente, Marian	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Capacity Declaration incomplete
PPR053587	In the Matter of Hamilton, Linda	Petition Hearing	Appearance Required	Proposed order to be submitted. Possible issue with Proof of Posting by Clerk, Prob Code §§ 10308, 1230

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

GUARDIANSHIP CASES

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared September 10, 2026  that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
9/10/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR054310	In the Matter of C.C.R.U.	Amended Questionnaire needs to be filed to give information about household members. The Notice of Hearing must state the complete title of the pleading to which notice relates (Cal Rules of Ct 7.50) (See #1 page 1 of Notice of Hearing)
9/10/26 8:30 AM	Department 01	VPR054307	In the Matter of H.A.B.B.	Notice appears to be in order. Proposed guardian to address with the court any other adult household members.
9/10/26 8:30 AM	Department 19	PPR054281	In the Matter of B.I.	Notice of Hearing needs to be filed indicating  MOTHER was personally served with a copy of the Notice of Hearing and SUCCESSOR TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT PETITION, 5 court days notice required according to Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3). THIS PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT, ORDERS, and & LETTERS NEEDS TO INDICATE THIS IS A SUCCESSOR APPOINTMENT
9/10/26 10:00 AM	Department 09	VPR054126	In the Matter of A.F.C.	Notice of Hearing needs to be filed indicating FATHER,  Mario Chavez, was PERSONALLY served (15 calendar days notice, as required by PROB Code §1511). MATERNAL GRANDPARENTS & PATERNAL GRANDPARENTS need to be served by mail with a copy of the Petition for Appointment and Notice of Hearing  ProbC §1511(c).