Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, March 5, 2026, are:

Re:                Anaya, Luis Alvarado vs. County of Tulare

Case No.:  VCU308194

Date:           March 5, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Yao and S.J. Distributors, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment

Tentative Ruling:  To grant the motion for summary judgment.

This is a multi-vehicle accident case involving multiple negligence and related indemnity claims by and against multiple parties.  The case commenced with a complaint by Luis Anaya against Yolanda Velasco, an involved driver, and her employer, the County of Tulare.  Anaya later added another driver involved, Cristina Payan, as a defendant to his complaint. 

Goushen Yao, another of the drivers involved in the accident, and S.J. Distributors, Inc., owner of the vehicle Yao was driving, were named cross-defendants, amongst others, in a cross-complaint by Payan.  Yao and S.J. Distributors filed their own cross-complaint against Payan and others.  In their respective cross-complaints, these parties seek indemnity and contribution.  They each respectively assert, by way of general conclusory allegations only, that any of plaintiff’s injuries determined to result from the accident were caused by the negligence of others. 

Yao and S.J. Distributors move for summary judgment, both against Payan on her cross-complaint, and in their favor on their cross-complaint, on the ground that Yao was not negligent.  

The court finds Yao and S.J. Distributors make a prima facie showing that Yao was not negligent and that Payan, the sole party opposing the motion, fails to present evidence showing the existence of a triable issue of fact on the matter of Yao’s negligence.  The court, therefore, finds Yao and S.J. Distributors are entitled to summary judgment in their favor. 

Noticed hearing date

As a threshold matter, Payan, the sole party opposing moving parties’ motion, contends the motion “should be denied because the date noticed for hearing of the motion was less than 30 days before the date set for trial in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(a)(3).”

Subdivision (a)(3) of section 437c provides that a motion for summary judgement “shall be heard no later than 30 days before the date of trial, unless the court for good cause orders otherwise.”

Moving parties filed and served the instant motion on October 24, 2025, and reserved and noticed an original hearing date of January 22, 2026, which was less than 30 days prior to the then scheduled trial date of February 9, 2026. 

Moving parties thereafter moved, on November 17, 2025, ex parte, to specially set the motion for summary judgment on January 9, 2026, or to continue the trial date so that the motion could be heard 30 days before trial.  The ex parte hearing was continued from November 19, 2025 to December 1, 2025, at which time the court vacated the February 9, 2026 trial date and continued the hearing on the motion for summary judgment to March 5, 2026. 

Payan maintains Green v. Bristol Myers Co. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 604 [253 Cal.Rptr. 745] (Green) supports that this court’s subsequent vacation of the February 9, 2026 trial date did not “cure the defect” of moving parties’ noticing an initial hearing date less than 30 days before the then scheduled February 9^th trial date.  Green does not support the existence of a “defect,” however, nor support that moving parties’ actions after filing and serving its motion and notice of motion were insufficient to “cure” it. 

Green involved a situation in which a moving party noticed a motion for summary judgment to be heard more than 30 days before a continued trial date.  (Id., at p. 606.)  The motion was filed after the initially scheduled trial date, and after the first of two continued trial dates. (Id., at pp. 606-607.)  The opposing party argued that subdivision (a) section 437c (of the statute as effective at the time of the case) required “summary judgment motions to be heard no later than 30 days prior to the initial trial date and any continuance of that date [would] not extend the time within which a motion [could] be heard” and the court in Green disagreed.  (Id., at p. 608.)  Green’s determination, that “the 30-day time limit on summary judgment hearings should be calculated based on the trial date in existence when the motion is noticed regardless of whether that date is the original trial date or not” (id., at p. 609), is inapplicable to the situation presented here. 

The moving parties filed and served their motion such that, at the time, it could have been properly heard with 75 days’ notice and more than 30 days prior to trial, on January 9, 2026, but moving parties were advised by the court clerk that the first available date was January 22, 2026.  Moving parties reserved the first available date that allowed them to provide the minimum required statutory notice, and then promptly moved either to advance the hearing date to January 9, 2026, or to continue trial to ensure the matter was heard more than 30 days before trial. 

The court’s ruling on the ex parte motion ensured, as is occurring here, that moving parties’ motion would not be heard less than 30 days prior to trial.  No authority cited by Payan supports that the motion must be denied for the reason cited. 

The court, therefore, turns to the merits of the motion.

Issues framed by the pleadings

The first step in summary judgment analysis is to determine the issues framed by the pleadings, and, after that, the court determines whether the moving party establishes facts that negate the opponent’s claim and justify a judgment in movant’s favor.  (Bashi v. Wodarz (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1318 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 635].)

Payan’s cross-complaint frames the issue of Yao’s negligence (and/or the negligence of the other named cross-defendants) only in general terms as follows:

First, Payan incorporates the allegations of Anaya’s complaint by reference (of course, though, “not for the purpose of admitting [those] allegations”).  As pertinent, Anaya, in his complaint, alleges he was driving on the US 101 freeway when Velasco struck him with her vehicle resulting in injuries to Anaya, and that Velasco was driving negligently, which negligence was the cause of Anaya’s injuries.  Yao and S.J. Distributors are not named, nor mentioned, in Anaya’s complaint. 

Later, in Payan’s first cause of action for indemnity, she alleges “[i]f [Anaya] sustained injuries, it was the direct result of the negligence of Cross-Defendants [i.e., those listed in her cross-complaint], and each of them,” and that “[i]n the event the Cross-Complainants are held liable to the Plaintiff in the principal action, … such liability arises only by reason of the active and primary negligence of Cross-Defendants, and each of them, and through no fault of Cross-Complainants whose fault, if any, is secondary and passive only.”

Under Payan’s second cause of action for contribution, she similarly alleges “[Anaya’s] damages, if any, were caused by the negligence and carelessness of the Cross-Defendants, and each of them … .”

These allegations, in effect, only frame a general contention of negligence on the part of parties other than Payan. 

As noted above, Yao and S.J. Distributors’ cross-complaint similarly frames a general contention of negligence on the part of parties other than Yao. 

Moving parties’ response to the issues framed

Summary judgment proceedings are “limited to the claims framed by the pleadings [citation],” and “[a] moving party seeking summary judgment or adjudication is not required to go beyond the allegations of the pleading, with respect to new theories that could have been pled, but for which no motion to amend or supplement the pleading was brought, prior to the hearing on the dispositive motion.”  (Howard v. Omni Hotels Management Corp. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 403, 421 [136 Cal.Rptr.3d 739].)

The court finds moving parties respond to the negligence issue as presented, in conclusory terms, in the respective cross-complaints at issue.

Moving parties’ undisputed evidence establishes that Officer Kyle Dodge responded to the multi-vehicle accident at issue and spoke with the drivers involved, and the only report regarding Yao’s driving came from Yao himself, who reported he was driving on US-101, at approximately 30-35 mph, when he was suddenly rear ended by a vehicle, determined to have been being driven by Anaya and that he didn’t see anything else happen. 

Further undisputed is that Anaya was driving northbound on US-101, that he observed Velasco change lanes into his lane, and that Velasco’s vehicle struck his vehicle and this caused Anaya’s vehicle “to begin spinning around and travel across the freeway and into the rear of [the truck Yao was driving].”

Based on this evidence, the court finds no reasonable jury could conclude that it was more probable than not that any driving conduct on the part of Yao was the cause of any of Anaya’s injuries. 

Notable here, although Yao’s testimony was that he was driving the box truck at a speed apparently significantly below the speed limit on US-101, none of the pleadings in this action frame that driving conduct as the cause of Anaya’s alleged injuries.  The evidence, rather establishes that Anaya, who was driving at an excessive speed, was struck by Velasco, and that Anaya’s vehicle, as a result, began spinning across the highway where it struck Yao from behind.

The court finds, based on this showing, that moving parties carry their initial burden on summary judgment, and, as a result, the burden shifts to opposing parties to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493].)

Opposing party’s showing

Payan presents no evidence in opposition to moving parties’ motion.  She, instead, asserts that moving parties’ own evidence “raises an initial presumption of negligence for violation of the California ‘basic minimum speed law’ for going 50% or more slower than surrounding traffic and forcing drivers to go around him.”

California’s basic speed law provides that “[n]o person shall drive a vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable or prudent having due regard for weather, visibility, the traffic on, and the surface and width of, the highway, and in no event at a speed which endangers the safety of persons or property.”

Payan contends:  “Moving Parties’ own evidence indisputably establishes that Yao was driving at 50% of the speed limit, 30 mph slower than Ms. Payan in traffic behind him, 35 mph slower than traffic in the lane to his left and apparently 50 mph slower than Mr. Anaya was going in the #2 lane. Moving Parties’ own evidence establishes that Ms. Payan’s normal and reasonable movement was blocked by Yao’s low speed and caused her to attempt a lane change which action was the initiating event of the chain reaction accident.”

Payan identifies the basis of the critical assertion that Yao’s slow speed caused a maneuver by Payan that set off the chain of events leading to plaintiff’s injury as being undisputed material facts 17, 29 and 30.  Taken together, however, these facts are solely that:

• Payan stated to Officer Dodge she was driving northbound on US-101 “at about the speed limit,” “signaled to change lanes and checked her side mirrors and sensors,” and “began to change lanes but saw Yolanda Velasco’s vehicle rapidly approaching … so [Payan] drove her vehicle back into the [lane she was driving in].” (Italics added.)

• Yao was determined, by Officer Dodge, to be the driver of the box truck.

• Yao “was driving [the box truck] northbound on US-101 in the far-right lane, at approximately 30-35 mph.”

None of this evidence supports the purported assertion of Payan that her “normal and reasonable movement was blocked by Yao’s low speed and caused her to attempt a lane change which action was the initiating event of the chain reaction accident.”

As neither Payan, nor any other party, present evidence showing the existence of a triable issue of material fact regarding whether Yao was negligent, the court finds the motion must be granted. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:               Jackson, Robert vs. State of California

Case No.:  VCU292972

Date:          March 5, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      (1) Defendant Westcoast Billboards, Stephanie Gregory, and Jeremy Gregory’s Motion to Compel Initial Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One (2)  Defendant Westcoast Billboards, Stephanie Gregory, and Jeremy Gregory’s Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted as to Requests for Admissions Sets Two and Three

Tentative Ruling: (1) To grant the motion upon payment of the remaining filing fee of $120 and order responses due no later than thirty days after payment of the additional $120 filing fee and service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Defendants shall give notice; (2) To grant the motions and deem admissions admitted upon payment of the remaining filing fee of $120 and service of the notice of this ruling for these motions. Defendants shall give notice.  Total filing fees owed are $240. Monetary sanctions are issued in the amount of $1060.

Facts Common to (1) and (2)

As an initial matter, the Court notes two motion fees have been submitted to this Court, but that three motions are made here. The Court will condition the order as to initial responses and admission admitted upon payment of the remaining filing fee of $60.

On October 7, 2025, Defendants served Requests for Admissions, Set Two, Requests 24, 25, and 26, on Plaintiff Robert Jackson by U.S. Mail and email.

On October 31, 2025, Defendants served Form Interrogatories, Set One and Requests for Admissions, Set Three on Plaintiff Robert Jackson by U.S. Mail and email.

As of the filing of these motions, no responses have been received.

Defendants seek to compel initial responses, deem admissions admitted and seek $1,245 in sanctions.

No opposition appears filed.

Authority and Analysis

(1) Interrogatories

Based on Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the first set of form interrogatories, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.290(a), that Plaintiff provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Defendants’ first set of form interrogatories, within thirty days after payment of the additional $120 filing fee and service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Defendants shall give notice.

(2) Requests for Admissions

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. Here, Plaintiff has failed to serve a timely response to two sets of requests and Defendants have moved for an order to deem the admission admitted.

Therefore, upon payment of the remaining $120 filing fee, the Court grants the motions and orders the requests set out in Set Two and Set Three deemed admitted.

Sanctions

Under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2033.280(c) (Admissions) and 2030.290(c) (Interrogatories), the Court will impose sanctions in total of $1060, consisting of $360 in filing fees and two hours at the rate of $350 per hour. The Court notes there is no meet and confer requirement and all that is necessary to obtain the relief requested on this motion to compel initial responses is that the other party failed to respond within the designated time. Sanctions are due within thirty days after payment of the additional $240 filing fee and service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Defendants shall give notice.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Stinson, Kalen vs. Visalia Rescue Mission, Inc.

Case No.:  VCU316195

Date:           March 5, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts and Analysis

On October 6, 2025, Plaintiff was served with Defendant Visalia Rescue Mission, Inc.’s, Requests for Admission to Plaintiff, Set One.

On November 11, 2025 Plaintiff served their Responses to Request for Admission, Set One.

Defendant contends that Nos. 10, 11, 12 and 17 did not contain “proper responses.”

The Court’s review of the responses to Nos. 10, 11, 12 and 17 indicate that Plaintiff objected to those requests.

Defendant moves to deem admissions admitted under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280. Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted.

Here, as noted in the opposition, Plaintiff objected to the responses and therefore the Court does not consider this a failure to serve a timely response, as an objection was stated to each request. Defendant’s dissatisfaction with the content of the response necessitates a motion to compel a further response under section 2033.290, which states:

(a) On receipt of a response to requests for admissions, the party requesting admissions may move for an order compelling a further response if that party deems that either or both of the following apply:

(1) An answer to a particular request is evasive or incomplete.

(2) An objection to a particular request is without merit or too general.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:               C.R. a Minor vs. Central Valley Christian School Society et al

Case No.:  VCU319118

Date:          March 5, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Defendant K.H.’s Demurrer to Complaint

Tentative Ruling: To overrule the demurrer to the first and second causes of action; to sustain the demurrer to the fourth cause of action with leave to amend; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint. CMC is continued to May 21, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

Facts

Plaintiff alleges that, in or around September 2024, while a student at Central Valley Christian Middle School, plaintiff was part of a text message group created by K.H. and 17 other sixth grade students from CVC.  K.H.’s father was “the former varsity football coach and Dean of Students for CVC’s High School.”

Plaintiff had “attempted to leave the group chat on multiple occasions; however, K.H. repeatedly readded him to the group chat,” and “[o]ther students had the same experience where they attempted to leave, but K.H. would add them back to the group.” 

At some point, “K.H. [had] stated to the group ‘Guys I’m gonna hijack a plane and crash into new [YORK],’” and, at another point, “[s]he … threatened another student stating: ‘… ur going to get shot in your frontal lobe if you do’ when [apparently another student] was attempting to leave the group chat.”

In text messages sent amongst the group, K.H. “falsely stated that Plaintiff told her he would be ‘shooting up the school,’” and had “stated to the group text and goaded Plaintiff - “[Plaintiff] please shoot up the school.” 

In response to K.H.’s group text to “please shoot up the school,” “Plaintiff texted a picture of an airsoft gun and replied, ‘I’m shooting it up with this’ and then wrote ‘I’m just joking.’”  “Another student commented ‘ITS AIRSOFT.’”

Despite K.H.’s role in having encouraged “Plaintiff to ‘shoot up the school,’ stating her own violent threats, knowing that the gun depicted in the photo was an airsoft gun, and having been assured it was a joke, K.H. texted ‘[I’m] calling the police now.’”

“On September 19, 2024, law enforcement arrived at Plaintiff’s home and told Plaintiff’s family that Plaintiff threatened the school”; “[l]aw enforcement showed Plaintiff’s family the text message of the airsoft gun”; and “Plaintiff’s room was searched, two airsoft guns were seized, and Plaintiff was handcuffed and taken to the police station.”

The evening of September 19, 2024, CVC’s Interim Superintendent Blake Hiemstra, advised plaintiff’s father that plaintiff was suspended from CVC (plaintiff is informed and believes “that K.H. has not been suspended, nor disciplined”).

Plaintiff further alleges “In these text messages, K.H. had sent messages to this group where she falsely stated that Plaintiff told her he would be ‘shooting up the school.’ She also stated to the group text and goaded Plaintiff – ‘[Plaintiff] please shoot up the school’ and ‘Despite encouraging Plaintiff to ‘shoot up the school,’ stating her own violent threats, knowing that the gun depicted in the photo was an airsoft gun, and having been assured it was a joke, K.H. texted ‘[I’m] calling the police now.’”

Relevant here, Plaintiff brings causes of action for defamation, slander per se, and declaratory relief against Defendant K.H. Plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief against K.H. is based on page 11, line 22 under the “Prayer” section which reads “For a judicial determination that Defendants defamed Plaintiff.”

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law. (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist.” (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1226.)

First Cause of Action – Defamation

"The elements of a defamation claim are (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage. The defamatory statement must specifically refer to, or be of and concerning, the plaintiff." (John Doe 2 v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1300, 1312 [quotation marks and citation omitted].) A  cause of action for defamation must plead special damages unless the statement is considered libel per se. (Civ. Code § 45a.)

"To state a defamation claim that survives a First Amendment challenge, plaintiff must present evidence of a statement of fact that is provably false." (Seelig v. Infinity Broadcasting Corp. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 798, 809.) To determine if a statement is provably false, courts apply the totality of the circumstances test, examining both the language of the statement and the context in which it was made. (Overhill Farms, Inc. v. Lopez (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1248, 1261.) "The dispositive question...is whether a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the published statements imply a provably false factual assertion." (Yelp Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1, 16.) Statements cannot form the basis of a defamation action if they cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual. (Reed v. Gallagher (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 841, 855.) California courts have held that "rhetorical hyperbole, vigorous epithets, lusty, and imaginative expressions of contempt and language used in a loose figurative sense will not support a defamation action." (Charney v. Standard General, L.P. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 149, 157.)

(1) Publication

Plaintiff presents the following statement as defamatory:

K.H. told the other students in the group chat that Plaintiff told her he would be “shooting up the school” and that K.H. texted the group that she was going to call the police. In fact the police did respond to the plaintiff’s home on September 19, 2024. Presumptively, the plaintiff does not have the exact statements that K.H. made to law enforcement or that she even called at all. The plaintiff presumably expects the Court to make an inference that this conversation happened because law enforcement responded to his home on September 19, 2024.

These statements were published to the group chat where other sixth grade students were members and could read the chat. Consequently, this element is met due to the initial text where K.H. told other students in the group chat that Plaintiff told her he would “shoot up the school.”

Regarding the presumptive statements to law enforcement, they support a claim of defamation per se because they necessarily would have had to accuse the plaintiff of a crime in order to get the police response on September 19, 2024. (See Civ. Code § 46.)

(2) That is False

"To state a defamation claim that survives a First Amendment challenge, plaintiff must present evidence of a statement of fact that is provably false." (Seelig v. Infinity Broadcasting Corp. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 798, 809.)

On demurrer, we accept the allegation in the complaint as true. Plaintiff’s assertion that the statement: “K.H. told the other students in the group chat that Plaintiff told her he would be ‘shooting up the school’” was false is a question for trial to be proven by evidence. On the face of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that it is false.

(3) Defamatory

“The question whether a statement is reasonably susceptible to a defamatory interpretation is a question of law for the trial court. Only once the court has determined that a statement is reasonably susceptible to such a defamatory interpretation does it become a question for the trier of fact whether or not it was so understood.” (Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal. App. 4th 637, 647.)

Here, the statements imputed to K.H. are reasonably susceptible to a defamatory interpretation because they accuse the plaintiff of a crime. Whether it was the alleged statement that K.H. told other students that the plaintiff told her that he “would be shooting up the school” or reporting the threat as a crime, this is defamation per se pursuant to Civ. Code § 46.

(5) Has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage

“’In general, … a written communication that is false, that is not protected by any privilege, and that exposes a person to contempt or ridicule or certain other reputational injuries, constitutes libel.’” (Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46 Cal. App. 5th 869, 888.)

Here, if the plaintiff can prove that the statements were made, that they are false, that they are not protected by any privilege, then it is evident that he was exposed to contempt or ridicule or certain other reputational injuries. He was expelled from school, law enforcement arrested him, and he has gained a bad reputation.

Consequently, the complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish a cause of action for defamation.

Second Cause of Action – Slander Per Se

Slander per se is defined by Civ. Code § 46, subd. (1)-(4) which states,

Slander is a false and unprivileged publication, orally uttered, and also communications by radio or any mechanical or other means which:

1. Charges any person with crime, or with having been indicted, convicted, or punished for crime;

2. Imputes in him the present existence of an infectious, contagious, or loathsome disease;

3. Tends directly to injure him in respect to his office, profession, trade or business, either by imputing to him general disqualification in those respects which the office or other occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with reference to his office, profession, trade, or business that has a natural tendency to lessen its profits;

4. Imputes to him impotence or a want of chastity; or

5. Which, by natural consequence, causes actual damage.

Charges any person with crime, or with having been indicted, convicted, or punished for crime

As discussed supra, the statements attributed to K.H. necessarily involve her accusing the plaintiff of a crime by their very nature. Not to mention that the statements made to law enforcement caused law enforcement to detain the defendant and investigate him.

False

"To state a defamation claim that survives a First Amendment challenge, plaintiff must present evidence of a statement of fact that is provably false." (Seelig v. Infinity Broadcasting Corp. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 798, 809.)

On demurrer, we accept the allegation in the complaint as true. Plaintiff’s assertion that the statement: “K.H. told the other students in the group chat that Plaintiff told her he would be ‘shooting up the school’” was false is a question for trial to be proven by evidence. On the face of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that it is false.

Unprivileged publication

Civ. Code § 47, subd. (b)(5) states,

This subdivision does not make privileged any communication between a person and a law enforcement agency in which the person makes a false report that another person has committed, or is in the act of committing, a criminal act or is engaged in an activity requiring law enforcement intervention, knowing that the report is false, or with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the report.

Here, the alleged communication by K.H. to law enforcement are not privileged according to Civ. Code § 47, subd. (b)(5).

Regarding, the statements made in the group chat, there is no assertion by K.H. that it was privileged.

Consequently, there are sufficient facts plead to support this cause of action and the Court overrules the demurrer to this cause of action.

Fourth Cause of Action –

Cal. Code Civ. Pro § 1060 states,

Any person interested under a written instrument, excluding a will or a trust, or under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another, or in respect to, in, over or upon property, or with respect to the location of the natural channel of a watercourse, may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action or cross-complaint in the superior court for a declaration of his or her rights and duties in the premises, including a determination of any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or contract. He or she may ask for a declaration of rights or duties, either alone or with other relief; and the court may make a binding declaration of these rights or duties, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed at the time. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and the declaration shall have the force of a final judgment. The declaration may be had before there has been any breach of the obligation in respect to which said declaration is sought.

Here, the plaintiff defends his request for declaratory relief is based on his prayer for relief which states “a judicial determination that defendants defamed plaintiff.”

The Court notes that this relies on a statement that applies to all defendants in the prayer, not the fourth cause of action. Second, this declaratory relief is redundant to the First and Second causes of action. If the plaintiff proves his claims in those two causes of action, he necessarily proves that K.H. defamed him.

Consequently, the demurrer is sustained as to this cause of action with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint as to the fourth cause of action only.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Carrillo, Nicholas vs. Nunez, Fatima

Case No.:  VCU321055

Date:           March 5, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Motion to Set Aside/Vacate

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion.

Facts and Analysis

On July 10, 2025, this Court held a hearing, swore in witnesses, noted the expiration of a temporary restraining order and set a hearing for July 24, 2025 as to “ensure that the camera in Petitioner’s backyard is no longer facing Respondent’s backyard.”

On July 24, 2025, the Court noted that the camera at issue had been removed and otherwise reimposed the other orders previously in effect.

On November 4, 2025, the Court noted no appearances by the parties, that no party submitted a declaration regarding a further incident, that the motion for reconsideration was taken off calendar, that the temporary restraining orders remain expired, and dismissed the case.

On December 19, 2025, Petitioner filed this motion to set aside or vacate the Court’s “prior order directing removal of a camera.”

No such order is identified by Petitioner and the Court’s review of the file indicates dismissal of this matter.

In response, Respondent seeks denial of the motion and indicates some additional issues appear to have arisen between the parties.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Conterra Agricultural Capital, LLC vs. Prosperity Farms, LLC et al

Case No.:  PCU325122

Date:           March 5, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Motion by Receiver to Hire Broker

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion.

Facts

Plaintiff Conterra Agricultural Capital, LLC filed this complaint for appointment of receiver, judicial foreclosure and entry of deficiency judgment against Defendants Prosperity Farms, LLC, formerly known as York Pistachio Ranch, LLC (“Prosperity Farms”), Michael S. Graham and Cynthia Graham (collectively, the “Grahams”) and series of nominal Defendants with respect to Compeer Financial.

The owners of Prosperity Farms are defendant Michael Graham (25%), defendant Cynthia Graham (25%) (collectively, the “Grahams”), and non-party CA Farms (50%) (principally owned by Ron Cook.)

Conterra is the lender to Prosperity and the loan, with a balance of $34,751,665.57, is secured by six parcels of land for growing of pistachios (“Real Property Collateral”)

Plaintiff notes further that the Real Property Collateral is adjacent to numerous parcels that together comprise the “Tulare 22 Parcels.” Bank of the Sierra, as Prosperity Farms’ crop lender, and along with Conterra, made protective advances as to the current crop harvest.

Bank of the Sierra then sought and received, without opposition, the appointment of a receiver to manage and complete the crop harvest on the Tulare 22 Parcels (the “Crop Receiver”), scheduled to finish in mid-October. Thereafter, the Crop Receiver will have completed the obligations under the appointment and cease maintenance of the trees, effectively abandoning the Tulare 22 Parcels.

Conterra sought the appointment of a receiver for the maintenance of the Real Property Collateral, valued at $10,600,000. On November 13, 2025, this Court appointed Receiver Focus.

On November 21, 2025, the Court entered the order on appointment.

On February 4, 2026, Focus filed this motion for authorization to hire a broker to market and sell the Subject Properties pursuant to Paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Order Appointing Receiver for All Purposes, etc., entered November 21, 2025 (the “Appointment Order”).

Paragraph 13 states:

“13. Receiver’s Agents. Receiver shall have the power to employ, hire, engage, and retain other attorneys, certified public accountants, investigators, consultants, and any other personnel or employees at commercially reasonable rates, which the Receiver deems-in its business judgment-necessary to assist Receiver in the discharge of its duties. Except as expressly set forth hereinabove, any employment of counsel for Receiver shall be done in compliance with California Rules of Court 3.1180.”

Paragraph 14 states:

“14. Sale. The Receiver shall have the authority to sell any or all of the Receivership Estate, including the Collateral, outside the ordinary course of business with Court approval. To that end, the Receiver may hire brokers as the Receiver deems appropriate to assist with listing and marketing the Property for sale. The Receiver is also authorized to negotiate with title insurance companies relating to lien removal for the Collateral, including mechanic’s liens and other liens not authorized by Prosperity Farms, and relating to obtaining endorsements or other title insurance which may be reasonably necessary for the Collateral. The Receiver, with Court approval, may sell any property free and clear of liens, claims, encumbrances, and interests. The Receiver, in consultation with Conterra and the Grahams, is authorized to determine the best offer for the sale of the Property. Upon selection of an offer or offers, the Receiver may file, or authorize Conterra to file, a motion to approve a sale. If no timely objection is filed then the motion shall be deemed granted and the Court shall approve the sale. Any sale by Receiver shall comply with the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 568.5.”

Subparagraph (h) of the Order states “h) Conterra has an interest, in the form of an unliquidated deficiency claim, in all assets and property, tangible and intangible, real and personal, of any kind, of Prosperity Farms, including the Collateral (collectively, the “Receivership Estate”)”

Focus proposes Person Realty to market and sell all properties that are or may become subject to the receivership (“Subject Properties”) under a listing agreement with an initial term of nine (9) months, which may be extended by agreement of the Receiver and Pearson Realty without further order of the Court, and to pay Pearson Realty a commission of 3.5%, to be split 50/50 between the buyer’s and seller’s agent(s).

Focus indicates it conducted in-person interviews and toured the Subject Properties with three leading agricultural real estate brokers who operate in Tulare County, then solicited and obtained bids from the candidates, and thereafter selected Pearson Realty based on its agents’ experience with sales of similar properties, the size of its team, a comprehensive plan for marketing the Subject Properties, and the competitive terms it has offered. (Declaration of Schwartzkopf ¶¶5-7.)

In opposition, Michael Graham declares that no real property is currently owned by Prosperity Farms because in or around July of 2025, Tulare 20, was transferred to Prosperity Farms Ranch 20, LLC and that since April of last year, Compeer has had title of Tulare 22, an issue subject to pending litigation in Case No. PCU323957. (Declaration of Graham ¶¶3, 4, 5.) Graham otherwise argues that Tulare 20 and Tulare 22 should be sold together, but that Pearson, during a conference call, acknowledged they had not evaluated a sale of both Tulare 20 and Tulare 22. (Declaration of Graham ¶14.)

In reply, Focus argues that the motion does not seek approval of a sale, merely to hire a broker pursuant to the Receivership Order.

Authority and Analysis

The Court finds that Paragraph 14 expressly authorizes the hiring of a broker to sell the “Receivership Estate” defined as “all assets and property, tangible and intangible, real and personal, of any kind, of Prosperity Farms, including the Collateral.”  The parties and the Court agree that Prosperity Farms does not appear to currently have title to either Tulare 20 or Tulare 22. However, this would not preclude the initial hiring of a broker, and marketing Receivership Estate, pursuant to the Receivership Order. The Court will entertain additional law & motion matters as appropriate to further define the receivership estate.

As to the selection of Pearson Realty, the Court finds a sufficient vetting process by Focus as to an adequate receiver.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Arceo, Celia vs. Malley Farms, Inc.

Case No.:  VCU317951

Date:           March 5, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Depositions of Daniel Veloria (“Veloria”), Cornelio Garcia (“Garcia”), Francisco Para (“Para”), Luigi Doe (“Luigi”), and Maria Soledad (“Soledad”)

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts

Plaintiff, on January 12, 2026, served deposition notices for Daniel Veloria, Cornelio Garcia, Francisco Para, Luigi Doe, and Maria Soledad, individuals who exercised supervisory control over Plaintiff during employment with Defendants. The depositions were set for January 27, 2026, January 28, 2026, January 29, 2026, and February 3, 2026.

On January 22, 2026, Defendants served objections to each deposition notice stating “counsel is not available on the unilaterally set date and Plaintiff made no effort to determine if Defendant represents the proposed deponent.”

Plaintiff does not appear to have conducted the depositions. Plaintiff sent a meet and confer letter January 23, 2026 prior to the deposition dates.

Authority and Analysis

If the proposed deponents were employees of Defendants, Defendants based on validly served deposition notices, were required to produce "those of its officers, directors, managing agents, employees, or agents who are most qualified to testify on its behalf as to those matters to the extent of any information known or reasonably available to the deponent." (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.230.)

But to obtain a court order for the deposition, Plaintiff must comply with the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450 states:

“(a) If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.”

“(b)(2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the documents, electronically stored information, or things described in the deposition notice, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance.” (emphasis added)

No motion to compel here lies where the deponent or counsel merely state they will not attend the deposition and where no notice of nonappearance is placed on the record via transcript or declaration. Serving an objection based on unavailability or unilateral setting does not impose a stay on a notice of deposition and is not a substitute for a protective order. (Snyder v. Superior Court (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 579, 586 [applying former Code Civ. Proc. § 2021]; Carl v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 73,76.)

Therefore, the Court cannot say 2025.450 has been complied with absent the failure to appear for the examination and a declaration stating Plaintiff has contacted Defendants to inquire as to the nonappearance or a meet and confer letter as to the same. Here, no deposition took place, no notice of nonappearance was recorded and therefore the Court denies the motion compel the depositions.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order

Examiner Notes for Probate Matters Calendared

• Visalia Division 
• South County Justice Center Division