Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Monday, March 2, 2026, are:

Re:               Wilson, Tatyana et al vs. Sierra Minit Marts, Inc.

Case No.:  VCU308861

Date:           March 2, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To continue motion for preliminary approval to March 16, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 7; to orders a supplemental declaration as to the notice period and submission to the LWDA of the proposed settlement; to otherwise approve the deductions from the gross settlement fund as modified herein.

1. Sufficiency of Amount of Settlement (Net Estimated: $427,250.00)

The gross settlement amount is $750,000. Plaintiff estimates approximately 339 proposed Class Members, providing an estimated average payout of $1,289.82 per member.

The Class Members consist of:

“all current and former non-exempt employees who worked for Defendants Sierra Minit Marts, Inc. and Defendant Don Forrester and Defendant Forrest in California at any time between May 10, 2020, and September 7, 2025.

Plaintiff primarily alleged the following violations: : (1) Unfair Competition in Violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.; (2) Failure to Pay Minimum Wages in Violation Of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1194, 1197 & 1197.1; (3) Failure to Pay Overtime Wages in Violation Of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 510, et seq.; (4) Failure to Provide Required Meal Periods in Violation Of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7 & 512 and the Applicable IWC Wage Order; (5) Failure to Provide Required Rest Periods in Violation Of Cal. Lab Code §§ 226.7 & 512 and the Applicable IWC Wage Order; (6) Failure to Reimburse Employees for Required Expenses in Violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 2802; (7) Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Statements in Violation Of Cal. Lab. Code § 226; (8) Failure to Pay Wages When Due in Violation Of Cal. Labor Code §§ 201, 202 and 203; and (9) PAGA.

Plaintiff provides estimates of the maximum recovery for each of the asserted wage and hour claims and penalties with information showing how the estimates were calculated including the damages models utilized. (Declaration of Zackay ¶¶ 32 – 46.) The total, reasonable projected liability as to the class claims is $1,971,425 and as to the PAGA claims is $884,250.00 if successful at trial.

After agreeing to participate in early mediation, Defendants informally produced time and pay records for Settlement Class members, key class data points, and other documents and information relevant to the claims alleged in advance of mediation. The parties reached the settlement after a full day mediation. 

The Court finds the information provided in support of the gross settlement amount sufficient for the Court to preliminarily approve the gross settlement amount, as the settlement amount appears to be within the recognized range of reasonableness given the claims and defenses asserted in this case.

Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $750,000 are proposed as follows:

Proposed Court Approved Attorney Fees (33.3%):	$250,000
Proposed Attorney Costs (up to):	$25,000
Proposed Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :	$10,000
Proposed Settlement Administrator Costs	$7,750
Proposed PAGA Payment	$20,000
Proposed Net Settlement Amount	$427,250.00

2.  Class Notice

The settlement agreement provides no claim form will be required of class members to participate in distributions.  Only those wishing to object or opt out must file notice with the settlement administrator. 

Objections or opt out notices are to be made within 45 days. The Court regularly approves notice periods of 60 days or longer.

The class notice period is therefore not approved.

With respect to the content of the Notice, the Court finds the Class Notice to be reasonable.  It clearly provides to the class member an estimate of the settlement share the employee is to receive and provides adequate instructions for any class member to opt out of the settlement or to submit an objection.

3.  Enhancement Award to Class Representative

The court preliminarily approves Plaintiff Tatyana Wilson  as Class Representative for settlement purposes. The proposed enhancement award to Plaintiff is $10,000.

The Court has, in past cases, approved enhancement awards of $5,000.00 routinely.

Enhancement payments “are fairly typical in class action cases.” (Cellphone Termination Fee Cases (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1393.) Enhancement payments “are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general.” (Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp. (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-959.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive awards to named plaintiffs is that he or she should be compensated for the expense or risk he has incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (Clark v. American Residential Services LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4^th 785, 806.)

Therefore, the Court will approve a $5,000 enhancement.

4. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees of 33.3% of the gross settlement fund of $750,000 or $250,000 and costs not to exceed $25,000 are sought by Plaintiff’s counsel.

Counsel has utilized the percentage of common fund methodology as well as provided adequate lodestar information to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee request.

Here, Zakay Law Group, APLC indicates 104.8 hours on this case, at rates of $800 to $475 per hour, creating a base lodestar of $66,857.50 (Declaration of Zakay ¶8 – Ex. 5.) Additionally, JCL Law Firm, APC has incurred 103.4 hours at rates ranging from $850 to $250 per hour, creating a base lodestar of $86,800. (Declaration of Lapuyade ¶¶6, 9.)

Therefore, the combined lodestar is $153,657.50. This would require a multiplier of 1.63.

The Court permits a maximum lodestar multiple of 1.5 in these cases. The Court has reviewed the declarations of counsel in support of what is now an additional .13 multiplier, but, in its discretion, rules that the additional .5 awarded adequately takes into account the quality of the representation, the novelty and complexity of the issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk presented. (See In re Vitamin Cases (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1052 quoting Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 833) Despite any agreement by the parties to the contrary, the Court has an independent responsibility to review the attorney fee provision of the settlement agreement and award an amount that it determines to be reasonable. (Garabedian v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 123, 128.)

Therefore, the Court will preliminarily approve $230,486.20 in fees.

Counsel have also provided the current costs expended in amounts of  $20,424.63 (Declaration of Zakay ¶8; Declaration of Lapuyade ¶4.) The Court preliminarily approves costs not to exceed $25,000.

The Court further finds that Plaintiff’s counsel are experienced class action attorneys through the declarations of counsel.

5.  Claims Administrator

The Court preliminary approves Apex Class Action LLC as the claims administrator for this class action based on prior experience with this settlement administrator in other class actions litigated in this Court and declaration of Hartranft.  The Court preliminarily approves administration costs not to exceed $7,750.

6. Unclaimed Settlement Proceeds

The Court preliminarily approves the distribution of unclaimed settlement proceeds to California Controller’s Office Unclaimed Property Division, with an identification of the Participating Class Member to whom the funds belong, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

7. Release

The Court finds the proposed release of claims reasonable under the circumstances.

8. LWDA Notice

The Court does not find confirmation from the LWDA of receipt of proof of submission of the proposed settlement agreement in either declaration of counsel. (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (l)(2).)

Therefore, the Court will order a further declaration on this issue.

9. Class Certification

Code of Civil Procedure section 382 permits certification “when the question is of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 382.)  The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that class certification under section 382 is proper.  (See City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 460.)  To do so, “[t]he party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.”  (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.) 

Here, the Motion and accompanying declarations of counsel sufficiently set forth the basis for finding the class is numerous and ascertainable as 339 employees have been identified through Defendant’s employment records. Additionally, common questions of law and fact predominate within the individual causes of action based on class wide policies and procedures of Defendant. Further, that the class representative will adequately and fairly represent the Class Members and will not place their interests above any Class Member. The Class Representative was employed by Defendant during the relevant time period and thus worked under the same policies and procedures as the Class Members.

Therefore, the Court approves the following deductions from the gross settlement fund:

Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $750,000 are preliminarily approved as follows:

Preliminarily Approved Attorney Fees (1.5 multiplier):	$230,486.20
Preliminarily Approved Attorney Costs (up to):	$25,000.00
Preliminarily Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :	$5,000.00
Preliminarily Approved Settlement Administrator Costs	$7,750.00
Preliminarily Approved PAGA Payment	$20,000.00
Preliminarily Approved Net Settlement Amount	$461,763.80

However, the Court requires further information as to the notice period and submission of the settlement to the LWDA. Therefore, the Court continues this motion for preliminary approval to March 16, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 7 and orders a supplemental declaration as to the notice period and submission to the LWDA of the proposed settlement.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Plascencia, Miriam vs. Garden Estates Apartments

Case No.:   VCU311652

Date:           March 2, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions re: Spoilation of Evidence

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion as to terminating sanctions; to grant the motion as to issue, evidentiary and monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,110 as against Defendants Garden Estates and Buckingham due no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff alleges negligence, premises liability and negligent hiring, retention and supervision arising out of a September 4, 2022 slip and fall on a sidewalk outside of Plaintiff’s apartment which was owned, controlled and/or managed by Defendant Garden Estates.

Plaintiff indicates that on September 13, 2022, Plaintiff’s counsel served a formal Letter of Preservation to Defendant via certified United States Mail which “explicitly demanded the preservation of evidence and required at least thirty (30) day’ notice prior to any changes, repairs, or renovations to the incident area.” (Declaration of Farahi ¶3.)

The Letter states:

“Furthermore, this correspondence is intended to put you on notice to take all necessary steps to preserve any and . all evidence including, but not limited to: photographs, all closed-circuit television footage, surveillance tapes, and/or video footage of all cameras that captured the scene of the incident for the time period of 12:00 AM to 11:59 PM on 9/4/2022.

…

Failure to preserve all records may lead to the imposition of civil sanctions including, but not limited to, jury instructions stating that the jury may infer that the evidence was destroyed because it was unfavorable to the ( complex and/or its employees/owner of the premises).

To further ensure the preservation of all evidence, kindly notify us at least thirty (30) days prior to making any changes, improvements, repairs, or renovation in the area where the subject incident happened.” (emphasis in original)

Further, that Defendant acknowledged receipt on September 19, 2022, through its community manager, who thereafter emailed the corporate supervisors. (Declaration of Farahi ¶4.)

Plaintiff states that “…[On] September 20, 2022—less than 24 hours after acknowledging receipt of the preservation letter— Defendants dispatched maintenance personnel to the subject area” and that the work order associated with this issue indicated “Ed grinded.” (Declaration of Farahi ¶5.) Counsel further notes that “The grinding of the concrete surface permanently altered its physical condition, removing the surface texture and any biological growth present at the time of the incident” and that Plaintiff retained an expert to opine as to the ability to evaluate the walkway after alteration. (Declaration of Farahi ¶6, 7.)

Plaintiff notes the deposition of the community manager indicated that she did not go to the scene of the incident and did not take any photographs of the scene at the time of the incident. (Declaration of Farahi ¶10.) Plaintiff further notes a lack of protocol as to training, recording, reporting, tracking, inspecting or preserving the incident area or details thereabout.  (Declaration of Farahi ¶¶9-11.)

Further, Plaintiff took the deposition of Eduardo Figuero (previously noted as “Ed”) who indicated the work order stated “Sidewalk slippery. Grinded spot on sidewalk that tenant complained.” (Declaration of Farahi ¶11.)

Based on those facts, Plaintiff has filed this motion for spoilation of evidence, seeking terminating sanctions, or in the alternative, issue, evidentiary and/or monetary sanctions.

In opposition, Defendant argues that the act of grinding the sidewalk is a remedial measure by a landlord to secure the safety of the premises, there was no willful suppression of evidence, and that “Nothing changes the evidence in this case. Defendant is not going to claim that the sidewalk was not slippery.” Defendant argues that terminating sanctions are too severe and that sanctions should be imposed incrementally.

Authority and Analysis

Spoliation of evidence has been held as a misuse of the discovery process. (Cedars-Sinai Med. Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 12.) “Spoilation of evidence means the destruction or significant alteration of evidence or the failure to preserve evidence for another's use in pending or future litigation.” (Williams v. Russ (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1223.) 

“While there is no tort cause of action for the intentional destruction of evidence after litigation has commenced, it is a misuse of the discovery process that is subject to a broad range of punishment, including monetary, issue, evidentiary, and terminating sanctions. [Citations.] A terminating sanction is appropriate in the first instance without a violation of prior court orders in egregious cases of intentional spoilation of evidence. [Citation]" (Id.) "Discovery sanctions are intended to remedy discovery abuse, not to punish the offending party. Accordingly, sanctions should be tailored to serve that remedial purpose, should not put the moving party in a better position than he would otherwise have been had he obtained the requested discovery, and should be proportionate to the offending party's misconduct." (Id.) 

"[l]f it is sufficiently egregious, misconduct committed in connection with the failure to produce evidence in discovery may justify the imposition of nonmonetary sanctions even absent a prior order compelling discovery, or its equivalent. Furthermore, a prior order may not be necessary where it is reasonably clear that obtaining such an order would be futile." (New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403,1426.)

In Williams, the appellate court affirmed the terminating sanction based on spoilation under the following summary of the facts:

“Within weeks of obtaining the file from Russ, Williams's lawyer warned Slyngstad that he found evidence in the file to support new claims and soon after amended the complaint accordingly. During the next few months, Williams fell into a pattern of either late or partial payments on the rental space where he chose to store the file. Despite numerous and repeated warnings from the storage facility that the contents of his storage space would be sold, Williams did nothing to prevent their sale and concomitant destruction. We agree with the trial court that this is tantamount to intentionally destroying those files.  Then, instead of promptly informing Russ, Williams kept it secret and the truth was not revealed for more than three years until Russ demanded production of the entire file during discovery. This at least raises an inference that, after cherry-picking favorable new information from the file, Williams chose to stand by and allow the rest of the files to be destroyed. We also agree with the trial court that at least one reason for having done so would be to prevent Russ from obtaining other documents from the file that were unfavorable to Williams.” (Id. at 1224.)

"[A] party moving for discovery sanctions based on the spoliation of evidence must make an initial prima facie showing that the responding party in fact destroyed evidence that had a substantial probability of damaging the moving party's ability to establish an essential element of his claim or defense. [Citation.]" (Williams, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1227.) The burden then shifts to the other party to disprove prejudice. (Id.) Under these facts, the appellate court found the trial court properly shifted the burden to disprove prejudice on the party responsible for the spoilation having found the moving party made the requisite initial prima facie showing. (Id. at 1225-1226.)

Here, Plaintiff, as to the initial prima facie showing, notes that Defendant was made aware of the incident, including the slippery nature of the sidewalk at issue, was provided, and received, a preservation of evidence letter, and within 24 hours of receipt of the letter, grinded the subject area without taking photographs, videos or otherwise documenting the area, or permitting inspection by Plaintiff, counsel or an expert. Further, the work order associated with the grinding indicates the area was “slippery.” Although the Court notes a total lack of protocol to record or preserve the area lends itself to negligence, the series of events as to the fall, the reporting of the fall, the preservation letter, the receipt thereof, and the grinding of the area appears tantamount to intentional destruction.

Further, the inability to review the now modified area of the sidewalk has a substantial probability of damaging Plaintiff’s ability to establish the issue of notice as to the condition of the sidewalk. Plaintiff’s retained expert opines that the sidewalk is the primary physical evidence in this matter, that the destruction is irreversible, and that there is no way to determine the original slip resistance of the sidewalk.

The Court finds Plaintiff has met the prima facie showing and that the burden shifts to Defendant to disprove prejudice.

Defendants state that a landlord has a duty to remedy a dangerous condition once placed on notice. However, Defendants citation to Staats v. Vintner’s Golf Club, LLC (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 826, 833 reveals a second option, to “give adequate warning” as an alternative to remedying the condition. Moreover, there is no justification or discussion as to the failure to preserve evidence in light of the letter. Finally, as to the argument this is subsequent remedial measure in line with removal of roots in Wellsfry v. Ocean Colony Partners, LLC (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1075, that case does not discuss spoilation.

The Court distinguishes Wellsfry on the facts that the defendant in Wellsfry could not identify the roots at issue, but removed “in an abundance of caution” three roots that were the “best guess” as to the tree root stepped on. (Id. at 1090.) Here, there was a preservation letter sent as to the exact area of the sidewalk at issue. No evidence has been presented to the Court as to an inability to secure the area, allow an inspection by Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s counsel or expert, and thereafter perform a subsequent remedial measure. As such, the Court finds prejudice to Plaintiff as to the failure to inspect the area.

As to the potential remedies, Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at 11-12 notes the evidentiary inference that one party has destroyed or rendered unavailable was unfavorable to that party as set forth in Evidence Code section 413, jury instructions as to consideration of willful suppression, and discovery sanctions including “monetary sanctions, contempt sanctions, issue sanctions ordering that designated facts be taken as established or precluding the offending party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, evidence sanctions prohibiting the offending party from introducing designated matters into evidence, and terminating sanctions that include striking part or all of the pleadings, dismissing part or all of the action, or granting a default judgment against the offending party.”

Here, Plaintiff argues that the conduct here goes beyond the “passive loss” of evidence described in Williams, above, and therefore justifies terminating sanctions as to striking Defendants’ answers.

Further, issue sanctions are warranted as to establishing: “(1) Defendants had a duty to preserve the evidence; (2) Defendants breached that duty by destroying it; and (3) the condition of the walkway at the time of the incident was dangerous and was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s fall.”

Further, that evidentiary sanctions should be imposed that prohibit Defendants from introducing any evidence, photographs, or expert testimony regarding the “safety” or “slip resistance” of the walkway based on its post-grinding condition.

Finally, that monetary sanctions in the amount of $5,160 should be awarded.

The Court will not impose terminating sanctions by striking the answers of Defendants.

However, the Court will impose issue sanctions as to:

“(1) Defendants had a duty to preserve the evidence; (2) Defendants breached that duty by destroying it; and (3) the condition of the walkway at the time of the incident was dangerous and was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s fall.”

The Court will also impose evidentiary sanctions prohibiting Defendants from introducing any evidence, photographs, or expert testimony regarding the “safety” or “slip resistance” of the walkway based on its post-grinding condition.

Additionally, based on Defendant’s position in the opposition, that terminating sanctions are inappropriate and that “Defendants are not contending that the sidewalk was not slippery,” the issue and evidentiary sanctions ordered above appear appropriate. 

Finally, the Court will award monetary sanctions against Defendants Garden Estates and Buckingham in the amount of $1,110, consisting of 3 hours at the local, community rate of $350 plus the $60 filing fee. Sanctions are due no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Parker, Derrick vs. Krone America, LLC

Case No.:   VCU317703

Date:           March 2, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Continued Motion Preliminary Approval

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion, as modified herein; to set the motion for final approval for October 26, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 7.

Facts and Analysis

The Court ordered a supplemental declaration as to the lodestar, and presently incurred costs at the prior hearing. Additionally, the Court permitted a supplemental declaration as to the proposed enhancement award and permitted the notice period of 45 days. On January 30, 2026, Plaintiff’s counsel filed supplemental declarations addressing these issues.

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees of 35% of the gross settlement fund of $235,000 or $82,250 and costs not to exceed $20,000 are sought by Plaintiff’s counsel.

Counsel has utilized the percentage of common fund methodology as well as provided adequate lodestar information to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee request.

Here, Counsel indicates that the firm has spent 247.8 hours on this case, at rates between $900 and $500 per hour, resulting in a base lodestar of $185,620 (Supplemental Declaration of Han ¶7.) Therefore the Court approves the fee request.

Additionally, Counsel indicates presently incurred costs of $10,549.46 and therefore the Court preliminarily approves costs not to exceed $20,000. (Supplemental Declaration of Han ¶9.)

Enhancement Award to Class Representative

The Court preliminarily approved Plaintiff Derrick Parker  as Class Representative for settlement purposes. The proposed enhancement award to Plaintiff is $10,000.

The Court has, in past cases, approved enhancement awards of $5,000.00 routinely.

Enhancement payments “are fairly typical in class action cases.” (Cellphone Termination Fee Cases (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1393.) Enhancement payments “are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general.” (Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp. (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-959.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive awards to named plaintiffs is that he or she should be compensated for the expense or risk he has incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (Clark v. American Residential Services LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4^th 785, 806.)

The Court has reviewed the declaration Parker in support of the increased award and finds it provides justification for the $5,000 award, but no amount higher. The Court finds that Plaintiff engaged in typical participation in discovery and resolution of this matter amounting to approximately 30 hours and the award of $5,000 adequately compensates Plaintiff for this participation, including any reputational risk undertaken as to future employment.

Therefore, the Court will approve a $5,000 enhancement.

Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $235,000 are preliminarily approved as follows:

Preliminarily Approved Attorneys’ Fees (35%):	$82,250
Preliminarily Approved Attorney Costs (up to):	$20,000
Preliminarily Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :	$5,000
Preliminarily Approved Settlement Administrator Costs	$10,000
Preliminarily Approved PAGA payment to the LWDA	$15,000
Preliminarily Approved Net Settlement Amount	$107,750

Therefore, the Court grants the motion, as modified herein, and sets the motion for final approval for October 26, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 7.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                15999 AVENUE 327, L.P. vs. Guerra, Selina

Case No.:  VCL323734

Date:          March 2, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and amend the judgment as requested.

Facts and Analysis

In this unlawful detainer matter, the complaint alleges the address of the property at issue as “15975 Avenue, #327 D-59, Ivanhoe, CA 93235, County of Tulare.”

The Court entered Default Judgment on September 3, 2025. Plaintiff sought a writ of possession on October 23, 2025.

On November 5, 2025, the Tulare County Sheriff Department informed Plaintiff that the address formatting needed to be corrected.

The address on both the writ and the judgment states: “15975 Avenue, #327 D-59, Ivanhoe, CA 93235” whereas apparently the correct address is “15975 Avenue 327 D-59, Ivanhoe, CA 93235.”

Plaintiff notes the notice was sent to the “15975 Avenue 327 D-59, Ivanhoe, CA 93235” address, but that the “#327” was a clerical error appearing on the complaint, judgment and writ.

Plaintiff characterizes this as a “clerical error” and seeks amendment under Code of Civil Procedure sections 473(a) and 473(d).

Section 473(a) states:

The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code. (Code Civ. Proc. § 473(a)(l).)

Under section 473(d):

The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order. (Code Civ. Proc. § 473(d).)

Here, the Court will permit amendment under section 473 and grants the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Valencia Hernandez, Salvador vs. KIA Motors America, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU325740

Date:           March 2, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Defendant Kia’s (1) Demurrer and (2) Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling: (1) To sustain the demurrer with leave to amend as to delayed discovery theory; Plaintiffs shall have ten (10) days from the date of this hearing to file an amended complaint; To overrule the demurrer as to the remaining arguments; (2) To find the motion to strike moot based on the ruling on demurrer and granting of leave to amend.

Facts Common to (1) and (2)

Relevant here, Plaintiffs sues Defendant for, amongst other causes of action, fraudulent inducement – concealment, based on Plaintiffs’ purchase of 2021 Kia Seltos, vehicle identification number KNDEPCAA8M7177340 (hereafter "Vehicle") on or about January 10, 2021. (FAC ¶6.) Plaintiff alleges “Prior to purchase, Plaintiffs reviewed Defendant KA’s marketing and advertising materials, viewed KA’s vehicle-specific window sticker, and took the Vehicle for a test drive. But at no point prior to purchase were Plaintiffs advised the Vehicle and its 2.0-liter engine were defective.” (FAC ¶10.)

Further, that Plaintiffs experienced defects and non-conformities and thereafter presented the Vehicle to authorized repair facilities on numerous occasions as to the engine defects, steering defects, and electrical defects. (FAC ¶¶12, 13, 17.)

Plaintiff alleges “discovery rule tolling” stating that “Plaintiff did not become suspicious of Defendant’s concealment of the latent defects and its inability to repair it until shortly before the filing of the complaint, when the issue persisted following Defendant’s representations that the Vehicle was repaired and/or working as designed” and “Defendant was under a continuous duty to disclose to Plaintiff the true character, quality, and nature of the Defendant Vehicles suffering from the Defects, and the inevitable repairs, costs, time, and monetary damage resulting from the Defects. Due in part to Defendant’s failure to do so, Plaintiff was unable to discover Defendant’s wrongful conduct alleged herein until the issues persisted following Defendant’s attempts to conform the Vehicle to its warranties.” (FAC ¶¶32, 34.)

Further that the estoppel applies to toll the statute of limitations as to fraud, because Defendant “concealed the defects, minimized the scope, cause, and dangers of the defects with inadequate TSBs and/or Recalls, and refused to investigate, address, and remedy the defects as it pertains to all affected vehicles as set forth herein” and that the concealment was ongoing. (FAC ¶¶41-43.)

Specifically as to fraud, Plaintiff alleges Defendant concealed a known defect as to the 2.0L Engine and/or its related components installed in the Subject Vehicle suffer from one or more defects that can result in loss of power, stalling, engine running rough, engine misfire(s), failure or replacement of the engine (the “Engine Defect”), that the Engine Defect presents a safety hazard, that there was a failure to disclose to Plaintiffs at the time of purchase and thereafter. (FAC ¶¶66-69.)

Defendant demurrers to the fifth cause of action for fraud based on the statute of limitations, for failure to allege sufficient facts with specificity, that a fiduciary relationship is not alleged, and that the damages allegations are conclusory. Defendant seeks to strike the related prayer for relief for punitive damages.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues the complaint does not reveal a violation of the statute of limitations as to fraud, that Kia’s warranty is a contractual relationship requiring a duty to disclose, that the transactional relationship does not require privity, and that fraud is against public policy,

Authority and Analysis

(1) Demurrer

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

Statute of Limitations

Defendant contends that the parties entered into the warranty agreement concerning the Vehicle on or about January 10, 2021 and that the three-year statute of limitations for fraud therefore bars Plaintiffs' fraudulent inducement - concealment cause of action against Defendant, as the complaint was filed in December 22, 2025.

A three-year limitations period applies to fraud claims. (Code Civ. Proc. § 338, subd. (d).)

The repair rule states that, "where one who has breached a warranty claims that the defect can be repaired and attempts to make repairs," the statute of limitations is tolled. (Aved v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 573, 585.) Defendant is demurring to Plaintiffs' fraudulent inducement - concealment, claim, not to Plaintiffs' breach of warranty claims. Therefore, the repair rule is inapplicable.

Under the delayed discovery rule, a cause of action accrues at the time when the cause of action is complete with all its elements. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806-807.) The test for when the statute of limitations on a claim starts to run under the delayed discovery rule is "whether the plaintiff has information of circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry, or has the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to his or her investigation." (McGee v. Weinberg (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 798, 803.)

"In order to invoke this special defense to the statute of limitations, the plaintiff must specifically plead facts which show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence." (Saliter v. Pierce Brothers Mortuaries (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 292, 300.) "The burden is on the plaintiff to show diligence, and conclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer." (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1319 (E-Fab) (internal quotations omitted).

The Court does not believe the statute of limitations started until after purchase of the Vehicle and after presentation of the Vehicle to an authorized dealer based on some defect underlying this action. However, the amended complaint fails to allege sufficient specific dates that Plaintiff presented the Vehicle for repeated repairs as to the same defect and therefore the Court cannot apply either the discovery rule or determine the accrual date of the cause of action for concealment.

Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer on this ground, with leave to amend.

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint addressing the issue of discovery rule tolling.

Fraudulent Inducement - Specificity

“As with all fraud claims, the necessary elements of a concealment/suppression claim consist of ‘“(1) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (scienter); (3) intent to defraud (i.e., to induce reliance); (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage.”’” [citation omitted]”  (Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 843.)  “Suppression of a material fact is actionable when there is a duty of disclosure, which may arise from a relationship between the parties, such as a buyer-seller relationship.  [citation omitted]” (Id.)

Concealment must be pled with specificity.  (Id. at 843-844) General and conclusory allegations are not sufficient. (Nagy v. Nagy (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1262, 1268.) Unlike most causes of action where the “the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings,” fraud requires particularity, that is, “pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) Every element of a fraud cause of action must be alleged both factually and specifically. (Cooper v. Equity General Insurance (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1252, 1262.) Less specificity is required when "it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy," (Bradley v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. (1973) 30 Cal. App. 3d 818, 825.) "Even under the strict rules of common law pleading, one of the canons was that less particularity is required when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party ...." (Turner v. Milstein (1951) 103 Cal. App. 2d 651, 658.)

Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 844 is instructive on the issue of specificity at the pleading stage, providing in relevant part:

“Plaintiffs alleged the above elements of fraud in the SAC. As we have discussed, plaintiffs alleged the CVT installed in numerous Nissan vehicles (including the one plaintiffs purchased) were defective; Nissan knew of the defects and the hazards they posed; Nissan had exclusive knowledge of the defects but intentionally concealed and failed to disclose that information; Nissan intended to deceive plaintiffs by concealing known transmission problems; plaintiffs would not have purchased the car if they had known of the defects; and plaintiffs suffered damages in the form of money paid to purchase the car….

Nissan also contends plaintiffs did not provide specifics about what Nissan should have disclosed. But plaintiffs alleged the CVT were defective in that they caused such problems as hesitation, shaking, jerking, and failure to function. The SAC also alleged Nissan was aware of the defects as a result of premarket testing and consumer complaints that were made both to National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and to Nissan and its dealers. It is not clear what additional information Nissan believes should have been included. We decline to hold (again in the absence of a more developed argument on this point) that plaintiffs were required to include in the SAC more detailed allegations about the alleged defects in the CVT. We conclude plaintiffs' fraud claim was adequately pleaded.” (Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 844.)

Further, the Court notes less specificity is required if it appears from the nature of allegations that defendant must necessarily possess full information, or if the facts lie more in the knowledge of opposing parties.  (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384-1385.

Here, Plaintiff pleads the Engine Defect installed in numerous similar KIA vehicles with the same engine, that KIA knew or should have known of the Engine Defect , that KIA had exclusive knowledge thereof as a result of internal sources or data, that KIA failed to disclose the Engine Defect, that Plaintiffs would not have purchased the car if the Engine Defect had been disclosed and that Plaintiff suffered damages. Further, to the Court, this goes beyond the defects that are presupposed by the warranty and Plaintiffs have alleged the Engine Defect existed in vehicles of the same engine as the Subject Vehicle, in contrast to the holding in Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 344. (FAC ¶¶68-75.) The allegations in the FAC are sufficient to place Defendant on notice of the nature of the claim and are sufficient to raise an inference of fraud at the pleading stage, and precise evidentiary facts should be left for discovery. (Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 592, 608.)

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer on this basis.

Fraudulent Inducement - Fiduciary Relationship

As to the allegation of a fiduciary relationship, there are “‘four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts.’”  (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336.)  However, unless the parties were in a fiduciary relationship, the other three circumstances “presupposes the existence of some other relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in which a duty to disclose can arise.”  (Id. at p. 337.)  “Thus, a duty to disclose may arise from the relationship between seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual agreement.” (Ibid.)

On this issue, the court in Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 844 noted:

“In its short argument on this point in its appellate brief, Nissan argues plaintiffs did not adequately plead the existence of a buyer-seller relationship between the parties, because plaintiffs bought the car from a Nissan dealership (not from Nissan itself). At the pleading stage (and in the absence of a more developed argument by Nissan on this point), we conclude plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient. Plaintiffs alleged that they bought the car from a Nissan dealership, that Nissan backed the car with an express warranty, and that Nissan's authorized dealerships are its agents for purposes of the sale of Nissan vehicles to consumers. In light of these allegations, we decline to hold plaintiffs' claim is barred on the ground there was no relationship requiring Nissan to disclose known defects.” (Id.)

Here, the amended complaint alleges that Kia backs the car with an express warranty, and that the Subject Vehicle was purchased from an authorized KIA dealership and that such authorized dealerships are agents for the purpose of sale. (FAC ¶¶ 6, 7, 8, 9, 70.)

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer on this basis, finding the allegations are sufficient under Dhital as to the buyer-seller relationship.

(2) Motion to Strike

Plaintiff seeks to strike the claim for punitive damages related to the fifth cause of action. However, as the Court has granted leave to amend above, the Court finds the motion to strike moot and will take up the issues related to the sufficiency of punitive damages allegations upon amendment and further motion to strike, if any.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:               Zarate, Jose Luis Rosas et al vs. Rosas, Steven

Case No.:  VCU328111

Date:          March 2, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Ex Parte Motion to Sell Real Property, Select Realtor, Place Funds in Attorney Trust

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion. The Court finds no ex parte basis or emergency basis to sell the property, select a realtor and place the funds in an attorney trust. The motion and declaration of Plaintiff mention foreclosure and a failure to pay the deed of trust since 2024, but there is no indication of a pending foreclosure.

Additionally, the Court notes this is a partition action and it is the Court’s position that no interlocutory judgment may be entered (a necessary prerequisite to the sale or appointment of real estate agent to effectuate the sale) in a partition action except by stipulation, by default (Finney v. Gomez (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 527, 532), by summary judgment (LEG Investments v. Boxler (2010) 183 Cal. App. 4th 484) or trial (Code Civ. Proc. § 872.810.)

In opposition, Defendant notes he has consulted with counsel (who also provides a declaration) as to an agreement to sell the property, has requested a stipulation and both sides have proposed different real estate agents for the sale.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Examiner Notes for Probate Matters Calendared

• Visalia Division 
• South County Justice Center Division