Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, January 29, 2026, are:

Re:                Covarrubias Gonzalez, Felisa vs. Case Vander Eyk Dairy, LLC et al

Case No.:   VCU293120

Date:           January 29, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Motion for Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to set a Final Compliance Hearing for September 24, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

Facts and Analysis

Plaintiff’s motion for final approval of class action and PAGA settlement, attorneys’ fees, costs, enhancement award, LWDA payment and class certification for settlement purposes came on for hearing on January 29, 2025.  The Court finds and rules as follows:

On January 6, 2026, the settlement administrator Phoenix, through its Case Manager, filed a declaration detailing the following events.

On August 8, 2025, the administrator  received a mailing list of 435 potential class members from Defendant’s counsel with names, contact information, social security numbers and relevant employment information. On August 9, 2025, after the administrator processed the names through the National Change of Address Database and updated the list with any updated addresses located, the administrator sent class notice by mail. Of the one hundred fifty-five (155) returned notices, fifty-seven (57) updated addresses were obtained. Therefore, ninety-eight (98) notice packets have been deemed undeliverable.

Class members had sixty (60) days, until October 28, 2025 to submit objections, disputes and/or requests for exclusions. Zero (0) request for exclusion and zero (0) valid objections have been received from class members. Therefore, 435 class members or 100% of the class will participate in the settlement.

The Court presumes the settlement is fair and reasonable given (a) that it was reached through arms-length bargaining at mediation, (b) that there was sufficient time for investigation and discovery since commencement of litigation on June 23, 2022 (c) class counsel have particularized experience with the claims at issue in the case, and (d) there appear to be zero disputes and zero objections.  (Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4^th 1794, 1802.) 

A net settlement amount of $514,439.19 is available to pay to the class members in accordance with the terms of settlement, with the highest Individual Settlement Share estimated to be paid is $5,882.16, the lowest Individual Settlement Share to be paid is $16.85, and the average Individual Settlement Share estimated to be paid is $1,171.12. The Court believes basic information about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise under the circumstances, in accordance with Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4^th 116, 133.  This case involved extensive informal discovery and investigation of disputed claims, including review and analysis by Plaintiff’s expert.  The settlement avoids significant risks and delay that would result from further litigation of the case, which would include, amongst other matters, certification proceedings, trial, and the possibility of further delay and cost resulting from appeals.

Class counsel has provided an updated declaration in support of the requested fees 33 1/3% of the gross settlement fund of $900,000 or $300,000 and costs incurred of $20,560.81.

Here, Counsel indicates that the firm has spent 421.5 hours on this case, at a rate of $800 per hour, providing a base lodestar of 337,200. (Decl. of Savoy ¶145)

Counsel has also provided the current costs expended in amounts of $20,560.81 (Decl. of Savoy ¶51.)

The Court believes the requested attorney fees and costs appear reasonable under the circumstances. Additionally, counsel has provided a sufficient declaration to demonstrate adequate previous experience with class actions to further support the reasonableness of the award.

The settlement administrator has provided, in the declaration describing the work it has performed on the case, a value of services totaling $10,000, which is amount that was estimated in the motion for preliminary approval.  The Court believes the amount requested as compensation for the administrator appears reasonable.

State of California Unclaimed Property Fund is designated as the cy pres recipient in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384 as to any unclaimed proceeds. (Code Civ. Proc. § 384.)

The Court previously approved representative payment of $5,000 and believes that the requested class representative payment is appropriate under the circumstances. Enhancement payments “are fairly typical in class action cases.” (Cellphone Termination Fee Cases (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1393.) Enhancement payments “are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general.” (Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp. (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-959.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive awards to named plaintiffs is that he or she should be compensated for the expense or risk he has incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (Clark v. American Residential Services LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4^th 785, 806.)

The Court’s review of the declaration of Plaintiff indicates justification for the $5,000 award, but no amount higher.

Finally, the Court confirms its conditional certification of the settlement class. The Court finds no significant events have occurred that would cause it to change its prior determination that the settlement class met all requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 382 for certification for settlement purposes at the time it granted Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval.

On review of the declarations and pleadings submitted, the Court finds, given the established presumption that the settlement is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of this case, and, particularly, given the absence of any objection or opposition following the class notice, that the settlement is fair and reasonable and that the motion for final approval should be, and is hereby, granted.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $900,000 are approved as follows:

Approved Attorney Fees (33.3%):	$300,000.00
Approved Attorney Costs (incurred):	$20,560.81
Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :	$5,000.00
Approved Settlement Administrator Costs	$10,000.00
Approved PAGA payment to the LWDA	$50,000.00
Approved Net Settlement Amount	$514,439.19

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and sets a Final Compliance Hearing for September 24, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 Bravo, Juan vs. Santana Rios Farm Labor

Case No.:   VCU285413

Date:            January 29, 2026

Time:            8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Motion for Final Approval

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to set a Final Compliance Hearing for September 24, 2026; 8:30 am; D1. CMC is vacated.

Facts and Analysis

Plaintiff’s motion for final approval of class action and PAGA settlement, attorneys’ fees, costs, enhancement award, LWDA payment and class certification for settlement purposes came on for hearing on January 29, 2025.  The Court finds and rules as follows:

On January 20, 2026, the settlement administrator Phoenix, through its Case Manager, filed a declaration detailing the following events.

On May 27, 2025, the administrator  received a mailing list of 4,004 potential class members from Defendant’s counsel with names, contact information, social security numbers and relevant employment information. On September 4, 2025, after the administrator processed the names through the National Change of Address Database and updated the list with any updated addresses located, the administrator sent class notice by mail. Zero (0) notices were returned as undeliverable.

Class members had sixty (60) days, until November 3, 2025 to submit objections, disputes and/or requests for exclusions. Zero (0) request for exclusion and zero (0) valid objections have been received from class members. Therefore, 4,004 class members or 100% of the class will participate in the settlement.

The Court presumes the settlement is fair and reasonable given (a) that it was reached through arms-length bargaining at mediation, (b) that there was sufficient time for investigation and discovery since commencement of litigation on June 23, 2022 (c) class counsel have particularized experience with the claims at issue in the case, and (d) there appear to be zero disputes and zero objections.  (Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4^th 1794, 1802.) 

A net settlement amount of $275,492.10 is available to pay to the class members in accordance with the terms of settlement, with the highest Individual Settlement Share estimated to be paid is $2,442.56, the lowest Individual Settlement Share to be paid is approximately $7.00, while the average Individual Settlement Share to be paid is approximately $67.06. The Court believes basic information about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise under the circumstances, in accordance with Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4^th 116, 133.  This case involved extensive informal discovery and investigation of disputed claims, including review and analysis by Plaintiff’s expert.  The settlement avoids significant risks and delay that would result from further litigation of the case, which would include, amongst other matters, certification proceedings, trial, and the possibility of further delay and cost resulting from appeals.

Class counsel has provided an updated declaration in support of the requested fees 33 1/3% of the gross settlement fund of $525,000 or $175,000 and costs in the amount of $18,007.90

Here, Counsel indicates that the firm has spent 269.7 hours at rates ranging from $950 to $450, resulting in a base lodestar of $190,477.50. (Declaration of Khaled ¶44.) Therefore, the Court approves the fee request with no multiplier.

Counsel has also provided the current costs expended in amounts of $18,007.90 (Declaration of Khaled ¶46.)

The Court believes the requested attorney fees and costs appear reasonable under the circumstances. Additionally, counsel has provided a sufficient declaration to demonstrate adequate previous experience with class actions to further support the reasonableness of the award.

The settlement administrator has provided, in the declaration describing the work it has performed on the case, a value of services totaling $31,500.

St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital is designated as the cy pres recipient in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384 as to any unclaimed proceeds. (Code Civ. Proc. § 384.)

The Court previously approved representative payment of $5,000 and believes that the requested class representative payment is appropriate under the circumstances. Enhancement payments “are fairly typical in class action cases.” (Cellphone Termination Fee Cases (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1393.) Enhancement payments “are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general.” (Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp. (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-959.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive awards to named plaintiffs is that he or she should be compensated for the expense or risk he has incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (Clark v. American Residential Services LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4^th 785, 806.)

The Court’s review of the declaration of Plaintiff indicates justification for the $5,000 award, but no amount higher.

Finally, the Court confirms its conditional certification of the settlement class. The Court finds no significant events have occurred that would cause it to change its prior determination that the settlement class met all requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 382 for certification for settlement purposes at the time it granted Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval.

On review of the declarations and pleadings submitted, the Court finds, given the established presumption that the settlement is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of this case, and, particularly, given the absence of any objection or opposition following the class notice, that the settlement is fair and reasonable and that the motion for final approval should be, and is hereby, granted.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $525,000 are approved as follows:

Approved Attorney Fees (33.3%):	$175,000.00
Approved Attorney Costs (incurred):	$18,007.90
Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :	$5,000.00
Approved Settlement Administrator Costs	$31,500.00
Approved PAGA payment to the LWDA	$20,000.00
Approved Net Settlement Amount	$275,492.10

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and sets a Final Compliance Hearing regarding distribution of the settlement for September 24, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 Jackson, Robert vs. State of California

Case No.:     VCU292972

Date:            January 29, 2026

Time:            8:30 A.M. 

Dept.            1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     (1) Defendants Westcoast Billboards, Stephanie Gregory, and Jeremy Gregory’s (Does 3, 4, and 5’s) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; (2) Defendant Visalia Landscape and Tree Company Inc. dba Shipman Tree Service (DOE 6)’s Motion for Relief from Default

Tentative Ruling: (1) To grant the motion with limited leave to amend; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint, limited to the scope indicated in the ruling below; (2) To grant the motion; to order Defendant Visalia Landscaping to file the proposed demurrer or proposed answer no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing. CMC is continued to April 7, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

(1) Defendants Westcoast Billboards, Stephanie Gregory, and Jeremy Gregory’s (Does 3, 4, and 5’s) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Facts

On August 17, 2022, Plaintiff filed this complaint as follows:

• Against Defendant State of California, Caltrans and Does 1-20 for Dangerous Condition of Public Property under Government Code section 835, defining Does 1-20 as "currently unknown governmental or quasi-governmental entities which owned, maintained, or otherwise controlled the premises."
• Against Does 21 – 40 for general negligence;
• Against Does 41-80 for general negligence; 
• Against Does 41-80 for premises liability;
• Against Does 21-40, 81-100 for negligent hiring, training and supervision;

Plaintiff alleges the incident occurred October 15, 2021.

On October 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed amendments to the Complaint, naming the Westcoast Billboards, Stephanie Gregory, and Jeremy Gregory as the true names of Does 3, 4, and 5.

On October 29, 2025, Westcoast Billboards, Stephanie Gregory, and Jeremy Gregory (“Moving Defendants”) filed this motion for judgment on the pleadings. Moving Defendants argue that because they were substituted for Does 3, 4 and 5, the only cause of action against them is for dangerous condition on public property under Government Code section 835 et seq. Further, that the operative complaint, therefore, fails to assert that a written claim was presented to the Moving Defendants before filing of the lawsuit.

The Court notes that it denied Plaintiff’s previous motion to amend the operative complaint to substitute these Moving Defendants for other Does or otherwise amend the complaint to allege a different cause of action against these Moving Defendants.

In opposition, Plaintiff appeared to assume that the then pending motion for leave to amend would obviate this issue. However, the Court denied that motion.

Authority and Analysis

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is used to challenge a pleading in the same manner as a general demurrer, i.e., the challenged pleading (1) establishes that the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction or (2) does not allege facts sufficient to support a cause of action or defense. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438(c)(1), see International Assn. of Firefighters v. City of San Jose (2011) 195 Cal.App.4^th 1179,1196; Bufil v. Dollar Financial Group (2008) 162 Cal.App.4^th 1193, 1202.)  Like a demurrer, the grounds for this motion must appear on the face of the pleading or be based on facts capable of judicial notice, including court records.  (See Bufil, at 1202; Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. Superior Court (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 978, 986, and fn. 6.)

The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should grant the motion if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-880.) To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the motion, as on demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A motion for judgment on the pleadings, like a demurrer, cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Government Tort Claim Presentation

California Government Code section 911.2 requires that such a claim be presented to the relevant public entity not more than six months after the accrual of the cause of action. Presentation of such a claim is a condition precedent to filing a suit against the public entity. (Cal. Govt. Code, § 945.4.) If the injured party fails to file a timely claim, “a written application may be made to the public entity for leave to present such claim.” (Cal. Govt. Code, § 911.4, subd. (a).) The deadline to apply to for leave to present a late claim is a reasonable time not to exceed one year. (Cal. Govt. Code, § 911.4, subd. (b).)

These claim presentation requirements apply to claims involving monetary damages.

“With certain exceptions (§ 905), the timely filing of a written government claim is an element that a plaintiff is required to prove in order to prevail on his or her cause of action.” (Willis v. City of Carlsbad (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1104, 1119.)

Additionally, compliance with the presentation requirement must be stated in the complaint. (Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School Dist. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 27, 31 [holding “In those circumstances in which a claim must be presented, the plaintiff must allege compliance or circumstances excusing compliance, or the complaint is subject to general demurrer.”].)

Timely claim presentation is a condition precedent to maintaining an action against the public entity and is, therefore, an element of a cause of action which the plaintiff must prove. (DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 990.) Failure to timely present a claim to the agency bars the plaintiff's lawsuit against the public entity. (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 738) Failure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim-presentation requirement subjects a complaint to demurrer for failure to state a cause of action (State of California v. Superior Court (Bodde) (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1237, 1243.)

Here, the complaint lacks an allegation that Plaintiff presented a claim to the Moving Defendants. The Court, therefore grants the motion.

The Court notes that, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, it cannot reach issues such as whether the Moving Defendants, pled as public entities under the first cause of action via the doe substitution, are actually public entities. As such, the Court will permit leave to amend here expressly limited to issue of pleading compliance, or excuse therefrom, of the tort claim presentation requirements as to these Moving Defendants. As such, with the limited scope noted herein, Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint as to the first cause of action as to tort claim presentation relative to the Moving Defendants.

(2) Defendant Visalia Landscape and Tree Company Inc. dba Shipman Tree Service (DOE 6)’s Motion for Relief from Default

Facts

On July 22, 2025, Plaintiff substituted Doe 6 for Defendant Visalia Landscape and Tree Company Inc. dba Shipman Tree Service.

On August 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed a proof of service indicating that the amendment to complaint and complaint were served on “MATTHEW D. STOLL, Agent for Service” at 6837 W Pershing Ave Visalia, CA 93291 via substitute service on August 20, 2025 at 12:28 pm on “Daniel Montolongo , General Manager, Gender: Male Age: 45 Height: 5'9 Weight: 220 Race: Caucasian Hair: Brown” and thereafter the documents were mailed.

On October 1, 2025, Plaintiff requested default of Defendant Visalia Landscape and default was entered.

On October 24, 2025, Defendant Visalia Landscape filed this motion for relief from default. In support, Defendant, via its CEO, states “On or about August 20, 2025, Defendant received by-mail a copy of a summons and complaint naming it as DOE 6 in this action” and “Upon receipt, I immediately began contacting local attorneys to retain counsel to defend the company. Between August 20, 2025, and October 1, 2025, I contacted at least three (3) different law offices. Each office declined representation for various reasons, including conflicts with existing clients and workload capacity.” (Declaration of Stoll ¶3.)

On or about October 17, 2025, after default had been entered, Defendant retained current counsel. (Declaration of Stoll ¶5.)

Counsel for Defendant attaches a “a proposed demurrer and motion for judgment on the pleadings” as well as a proposed answer” as Exhibits 2 and 3 to the declaration of counsel.

Defendant seeks relief under the discretionary portion of Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b)

In opposition, Plaintiff states “A motion to change the Doe from the first cause of action to the causes of action for general negligence and premises liability is set for January 22, 2026. and is anticipated to resolve the issue of a default. In the event that the moving party is added to the causes of action for general negligence and premises liability by a change in the Doe numbering or by the first amended complaint, the default would be dismissed.” As noted above, the Court has denied the motion for leave to amend.

Authority and Analysis

The court has broad discretion to set aside the entry of default, default judgment, or a dismissal, but that discretion can be exercised only if the defendant establishes a proper ground for relief, by the proper procedure and within the set time limits.  

Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b) provides, in relevant part: 

“The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.”

Here, the motion is timely.

“A ‘mistake’ exists when a person, under some erroneous conviction of law or fact, does, or omits to do, some act which, but for the erroneous conviction, he would not have done, or omitted. It may arise either from unconsciousness, ignorance, forgetfulness, imposition, or misplaced confidence.” (Salazar v. Steelman (1937) 22 Cal.App.2d 402, 405, 410.) 

“Surprise” is defined as “some condition or situation in which a party to a cause is unexpectedly placed to his injury, without any default or negligence of his own, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.” (Miller v. Lee (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 10, 16.)

Further, “excusable neglect” has been defined as “neglect that might have been the act or omission of a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.” (Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.App.3d 427, 435.)

“Finally, as for inadvertence or neglect, ‘[t]o warrant relief under section 473 a litigant's neglect must have been such as might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances. The inadvertence contemplated by the statute does not mean mere inadvertence in the abstract. If it is wholly inexcusable it does not justify relief.’ ” (Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1206.)” (Henderson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 215, 230.)

Here, Defendant has demonstrated excusable inadvertence or neglect as to the diligent attempts to retain counsel prior to default and the retention of counsel only after entry of default. “Section 473 is often applied liberally where the party in default moves promptly to seek relief, and the party opposing the motion will not suffer prejudice if relief is granted.  [Citations.]  In such situations ‘very slight evidence will be required to justify a court in setting aside the default.’  [Citation.]”  (Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 233.)

As such, the Court will grant the relief requested.

Next, subsection (b) additionally requires the filing of “a copy of the answer, motion, or other pleading proposed to be filed in the action.” Here, both a proposed demurrer and proposed answer have been lodged with this motion. Therefore, this requirement is met.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and orders Defendant Visalia Landscaping to file either the demurrer or answer lodged with this motion no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Carranza, Valentin Salas vs. Morales, Crystal Espino

Case No.:  VCU301263

Date:          January 29, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:       (1) Continued Motion to Compel Responses to Deposition Question re: Sandoval Deposition, as PMK, as to the Issue of Monetary and Evidentiary Sanctions; (2) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Deposition of PMK of Defendant Saladin

Tentative Ruling: (1) and (2): There are no tentative rulings on the merits for these motions. The parties are directed to meaningfully meet and confer before the hearing of these motions to resolve the discovery disputes identified in the moving and opposition papers for these discovery motions. If unable to resolve, counsel are directed to personally appear for the hearing on these discovery motions. No CourtCall or Zoom appearances will be permitted if the parties are unable to resolve this matter prior to the scheduled hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 In the Matter of State of California, Agricultural Labor Relations Board

Case No.:   VCU326221

Date:           January 29, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Petition Hearing

Tentative Ruling: To continue this matter as to service of the summons and amended petition on Respondent. The Court notes no proof of service in its file as of the date of this motion. The hearing, therefore, is continued to March 26, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:              Conterra Agricultural Capital, LLC vs. Prosperity Farms, LLC et al

Case No.:     PCU325122

Date:           January 29, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motions:     (1) Demurrer by Michael and Cynthia Graham;  (2) Receiver’s Motion to Authorize Issuance of Receiver’s Certificates

Tentative Rulings:  The Grahams’ demurrer is overruled.  The Receiver’s motion to authorize issuance of receiver’s certificates is denied without prejudice. 

In this action, Conterra Agricultural Capital, LLC (Conterra) seeks, inter alia, judicial foreclosure against real property owned by Prosperity Farms, LLC, formerly known as York Pistachio, LLC (Prosperity), and a deficiency judgment, as to Prosperity and Michael and Cynthia Graham. 

Conterra’s requests relate to a loan made to Prosperity that is secured by its real property and other of its assets. 

Prosperity maintains, as pertinent to one of the motions here, that Michael and Cynthia Graham are personally liable on the loan.  The Grahams dispute they are personally liable and demurrer to Conterra’s deficiency judgment cause of action on that basis. 

Separately, appointed receiver Focus Management Group (Receiver) moves for an order authorizing the Receiver to issue receiver’s certificates up to an amount of $6,931,050.  The Grahams oppose.

DEMURRER

The Grahams contend the Conterra loan documents do not identify them as borrowers.  The loan documents include a promissory note and a deed of trust.  The Grahams maintain “Borrower” is not defined in the note and that the deed of trust solely identifies York Pistachio Ranch, LLC (now Prosperity Farms, LLC) as a borrower. 

The note, attached as Exhibit E to Conterra’s complaint, uses the capitalized term “Borrower” but does not expressly identify to whom the term refers. 

But, in a section entitled “Obligations of Persons Under This Note,” on page five, the note reads: “If more than one person signs this Note, each person is fully and personally obligated to keep all of the promises made in the Note, including the promise to pay the full amount owed … Lender may enforce its rights under this Note against each person individually or against all of those persons together.  This means that any one of the persons signing this Note may be required to pay all of the amounts owed under this Note.” 

Then, at the end, the note is signed by Michael and Cynthia Graham, both (a) as “Managing Member[s]” of York Pistachio Ranch, LLC; and, separately, (b) as individuals. 

The deed of trust, attached as Exhibit F to the complaint, uses the term “Borrower” and defines it as follows:  “ ‘Borrower’ is York Pistachio Ranch, LLC … .”  The “Borrower” definition does not include the Grahams individually. 

Analysis

The court is not persuaded by the Grahams arguments on demurrer.

Nothing in the law cited supports that the court may disregard the provisions of the note concerning the obligations of the parties who signed it based on the deed of trust’s sole reference to York Pistachio Ranch, LLC, as the borrower. 

“ ‘ “While it is the rule that several contracts relating to the same matters are to be construed together, it does not follow that for all purposes they constitute one contract.” ’  The rule is simply a particular application of the more general principle that ‘[w]e construe [a] contract in light of the circumstances under which it was made … .’ ” (Fuentes v. TMCSF, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 541, 548 [237 Cal.Rptr.3d 256], citations omitted.)  “A note and a deed of trust are separate instruments and need not contain all of the terms of the agreement between the parties.”  (Kerivan v. Title Ins. & Trust Co. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 225, 230 [195 Cal.Rptr. 53].)

The note defines the obligor parties as the parties who sign it; the Grahams signed—both as managers of Prosperity and individually.  In one set of signatures, the form shows unambiguously that the signatures are made on behalf of York Pistachio Ranch, LLC; in another set of signatures there is no unambiguous indication that the signatures are made in a representative capacity.  (See Com. Code, § 3402, subd. (b).)

The demurrer is overruled.

AUTHORIZE RECEIVER CERTIFICATES

The Receiver requests an order authorizing issuance of receiver’s certificates up to an amount of $6,931,050 to protect and preserve approximately 1,509 acres of operating pistachio farms in the receivership estate.

The order appointing the Receiver states, regarding issuance of receiver certificates:

“9. Receiver’s Certificates. The Receiver may seek an order of the Court granting the Receiver authority to issue Receiver’s certificates for advances made within the scope of the receivership, and may request that such certificates constitute administrative super-priority claims against all assets of the Receivership Estate with priority over all other claims against the Receivership Estate. Any super-priority liens granted shall not, unless express written consent is granted, take priority over any preexisting and otherwise superior in priority lien to (i) the lien granted to Bank of the Sierra (“BotS”) as to certain personal property of Prosperity Farms, as set forth in Paragraph 23 of this Order; (2) any liens held by U.S. Bank National Association as Custodian/Trustee for Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (“Farmer Mac”), but shall take priority over all other liens. In no event shall the costs of the Receivership be charged to BotS or Farmer Mac without the consent of the respective lienholder. The Receiver shall have no duty to maintain, sell, or otherwise dispose of the collateral of BotS or Farmer Mac unless an agreement is made between Receiver and the respective lienholder regarding funding the costs of maintaining, selling, or otherwise disposing of the lienholder’s collateral. Nothing in this paragraph or order shall constitute a determination regarding the extent or validity of any lien of BotS or Farmer Mac, or waiver of any defense thereto.”

The Receiver states the receiver’s certificates would secure advances to be made by Conterra and, specifically, confirm any advances are secured by the lien of Conterra’s existing deed of trust against real property of Prosperity; and grant Conterra a lien on the 2026 crop produced from the receivership estate. 

The Receiver’s requests lien priority on the 2026 crop superior to that of an existing lien of Bank of the Sierra.  According to Conterra’s Chief Credit Officer, Timothy Roemmich, “[u]pon information and belief, Bank of Sierra [sic] has agreed in principle to subordinate its lien on the farm products and other personal property liens solely as to the 2026 Crop and … counsel for Conterra, Receiver, and Bank of the Sierra are in the process or preparing a stipulation to that effect … .”

The Receiver assembled a budget for necessary expenses for an 11-month period from December 1, 2025, through October 2026.  The $6,931,050 amount is represented to be an amount equal to the expenses in the budget, plus a 15% margin so the Receiver won’t have to incur further legal expenses requesting additional authorization for “relatively minor cost-overruns.”

Conterra estimates crop revenue of $3,545,999.60 from the 2026 crop.  While this is roughly $3.385 million less than the maximum receivership certificates amount requested, Conterra maintains pistachio crops follow “an ‘on year,’ ‘off year’ alternate bearing cadence,” and that, “[b]y farming and investing in the crop this year, it will maintain the farm for a higher yielding 2027 crop, the next on year, thus maintaining the value of Prosperity Farms in general.”  By way of example, Conterra represents the approved yield for 2025 was 4,282 lbs./acre, while the approved yield for 2026 is 1,222 lbs./acre. 

According to Roemmich, “[i]f Conterra does not receive a security interest in the 2026 Crop [presumably this would occur if Bank of the Sierra doesn’t agree to Conterra having that priority], Conterra may still advance some funds in order to preserve the collateral,” but “Conterra would likely drastically reduce the funds advanced to the bare minimum necessary, which could significantly impact the 2026 crop (and likely the 2027 crop), and thus could drastically lower the value of Prosperity Farms in general.”  Roemmich then also represents that “without a security interest in the 2026 crops, Conterra does not see how it could financially justify advancing funds for a crop for which it would not receive direct payment, even if doing so could potentially maintain the value of Prosperity Farms in general.”

The Grahams, in their opposition, state that they “oppose any effort to modify the existing Deed of Trust or increase their potential individual exposure” and “independently oppose the Motion because it fails for lack of critical terms regarding the proposed loan from Conterra.”

ANALYSIS

“Courts … have substantial discretion to authorize a receiver to borrow money to fund the preservation and management of property in the receivership estate … . … [T]he receiver may ask the court to authorize the issuance of a receiver's certificate to the lender as security for money loaned to the estate. Typically, such a receivership certificate will have priority over all other liens—even preexisting liens. … This too is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the court.”  (City of Sierra Madre v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 648, 657 [244 Cal.Rptr.3d 118], citations omitted.)

The Grahams’ First Point of Opposition – Scope of the Receivership and Appointment Order

The Grahams cite a case, Turner v. Superior Court (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 804 [140 Cal.Rptr. 475] (Turner), in which the Court of Appeal, amongst other things, held a trial court had no power to authorize a receiver to take possession of “rents, issues and profits and apply them to the debt” giving rise to the receivership proceedings where those “rents, issues and profits” were “not part of the [contractually assigned] security for the debt.”  (Id., at p. 812.)

The Grahams attempt to draw some kind of analogy to Turner whereby, by seeking authorization to issue receivership certificates in an amount that would exceed anticipated crop revenues for 2026 by “$3.4 million,” which deficiency “would be chargeable to the Grahams,” the Receiver’s request for authorization to issue receivership certificates is akin to the receiver in Turner seeking to take possession of “rents, issues and profits” that were not part of the contractually assigned security for the subject debt in Turner.

This analogy breaks down immediately in light of the fact that the deed of trust securing the subject loan in this case contractually provides both:

A. “If [] Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained in this Security Instrument … [or] Borrower has abandoned the Property, then Lender may do and pay for whatever is reasonable or appropriate to protect Lender's interest in the Property and rights under this Security Instrument…. Lender’s actions can include, but are not limited to … perform[ing] any farming operations related to the planting, growing, maintenance, and harvesting of crops located on the Property….”

And,

B. “Lender may make advances under this security instrument or other instrument providing security for the Note, to protect the Lender's interest in this security instrument or other instrument providing security for the Note from loss of value or damage. Any money so advanced (including reasonable costs of recovery and attorneys' fees) plus interest at the default rate indicated in the Note shall become an obligation due and owing under the terms of the Note immediately upon the date advanced by Lender and is an obligation of the Borrower secured by the security instrument or other instrument providing security for the Note.”

Given these provisions, nothing in the Receiver’s request involves authorization of the Receiver or Conterra, as lender, to take possession of any money or property outside the scope of what is already authorized under the deed of trust. 

The Grahams’ Second Point of Opposition – Lack of Detail Concerning the Terms of the Receivership Certificates

The Grahams contend the Receiver’s request is fatally silent on material terms of the receivership certificates that it seeks authorization to issue, including terms regarding “default interest, late fees, or other penalties”; conditions triggering default; and when advances would become due and payable. 

As the Receiver notes, however, its motion clearly specifies that “The Advances secured by the Receiver’s Certificates would be payable on the same terms and conditions, and accrue interest at the same rate, set forth in Conterra’s existing Deed of Trust.”  As the Receiver notes, this fact makes clear that, if the Receiver’s request is granted, for any issued receiver’s certificates, Conterra’s advances will accrue interest at the rate set forth in the Adjustable Rate Rider attached to the end of the deed of trust; the default triggers for the advances will be the same default triggers set forth in the deed of trust; and advances will become due and payable according to the terms of the deed of trust. 

Particularly notable, in addition, is that the deed of trust already, incident to the provisions noted above, authorizes Conterra to make advances for the types of expenses at issue in the Receiver’s request here, and the order appointing the Receiver already provides:

“Conterra, in its discretion and without further order of the Court, may fund any amounts deemed necessary for the operation of the Receivership Estate, including the payment of Receiver and its counsel’s fees. Any such advance will, to the extent authorized by the Note and Deed of Trust, and without the need for a receiver’s certificate, be added to the principal balance of Conterra’s loans and claims under the Note and secured by the Deed of Trust and accrue interest as provided in the Note and the Deed of Trust.”

This additionally addresses the Grahams other objection that the Receiver has failed to identify any alternative lenders contacted and its “precise efforts … to obtain financing on more favorable terms.”  Because Conterra is already authorized to advance funds to the receivership estate on the terms of the existing note and deed of trust, it is immaterial whether the Receiver has demonstrated to seek terms better than those terms.  Conterra is already authorized to loan the sums indicated, for the purposes indicated, without the issuances of receivership certificates.

As the Receiver states its reply to the Grahams’ opposition, the principal matter necessitating the filing of its motion is that “Conterra is also requesting a lien on the 2026 Crop, proceeds of the 2026 Crop, and any insurance proceeds related to the 2026 Crop, as well as priority over Bank of the Sierra’s existing lien on those assets.”  This is why the Receiver seeks authorization to issue receivership certificates.

On this issue though, the court harbors some concern.  At this point, the extent of confirmation that Bank of the Sierra “has agreed in principle to subordinate its lien on the farm products and other personal property liens … as to the 2026 Crop” is the slender reed of Roemmich’s “information and belief.”  Roemmich, further, indicates that a stipulation is in “process” or that counsel are “preparing” one, but, by that statement, Roemmich effectively concedes that there is no such stipulation at this point (at least as of the date of his declaration in support of the Receiver’s motion). 

The court is particularly concerned that, according to Roemmich, without the desired priority on the 2026 Crop, the extent of funds Conterra is willing to lend is severely limited, as is, relatedly, the possibility that such lending will accomplish much in the way of protecting and preserving the real property in the receivership estate.

Assuming there is sufficient certainty as to this significant issue, the court would be inclined to grant the Receiver’s request, which is to say that the court is not persuaded by the merits of the Grahams’ objections, but as certainty as to Bank of the Sierra’s position is entirely lacking at this point, the court does not believe the Receiver’s request can properly be granted at this time.

Accordingly, the Receiver’s request is denied without prejudice.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 Barron, Oscar vs. City of Tulare

Case No.:   VCU297068

Date:           January 29, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Defendant Diego Rodriguez’s Application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the application and determine the settlement was made in good faith

Facts

In this matter, on July 8, 2022, Officer Jonathan Carrillo, of the Tulare Police Department, was driving his patrol vehicle in pursuit of Diego Rodriguez who was driving a vehicle trying to escape Officer Carrillo.

At that time, Plaintiffs were attending the Viva Tulare Street Fair.

Defendant Rodriguez’s vehicle entered the fair area, despite being closed to vehicle traffic, and struck Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs sued the City of Tulare for dangerous condition of public property and Defendants City of Tulare and Officer Carillo for negligence and negligence per se in the operative first amended complaint. The Court granted summary adjudication as to the dangerous condition of public property cause of action against the City and denied the motion as to negligence and negligence per se.

Additionally, Plaintiffs sued Defendant Rodriguez for negligence.

Defendant Rodriguez has settled with Plaintiffs. On November 26, 2025, Defendant Rodriguez filed an application to determine that the settlement was made in good faith. In support, Defendant Rodriguez indicates that he has tendered the automobile liability insurance policy for the vehicle he was operating issued by Viking Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Policy Number 11407611608, with applicable liability limits of $15,000 per person and $30,000 per incident to Plaintiffs. As such, Plaintiffs are receiving from Defendant Rodriguez the maximum amount of the only applicable insurance policy. The Court notes here that Defendant Rodriguez was apparently not insured and this policy is his mother’s insurance policy.

On December 19, 2025, Defendant City of Tulare filed a motion to contest the determination of good faith as to the settlement of Defendant Rodgriguez. The City argues Rodriguez has the maximum proportional liability based on his state of intoxication, fleeing of police, ignoring barriers and warnings as to the street fair, and conviction of felony hit and run.

Although no amount is stated as to the damages sustained by Plaintiffs, the City notes that Plaintiff Oscar Barron suffers from the following injuries, which are continuing and costly: · memory loss · mild traumatic brain injury · left arm injury · lung damage · fracture of the left scapula · acute fracture of the left anterior 3rd -5th ribs · displaced fracture of the left femoral neck · acute fracture of the left anterior iliac bone · multiple left facial bone fractures · superior dislocation of the left hip joint · avulsion to left ear · chest pain · abdominal hematoma · closed intertrochanteric fracture of proximal phalanx of left great toe · left acetabular fracture · open fracture of distal end of fibula and tibia · fracture of metatarsal bone of left foot · left navicular fracture of foot · left open tibia/fibula fracture · knee injury · acute blood loss anemia · avulsion fracture of navicular bone of left foot.

Further, that future medical treatment will be necessary and that Plaintiff Oscar claims lost earnings. Additionally, that Plaintiff Virginia claims loss of consortium.

Additionally, the City argues that “Plaintiffs could easily have sought punitive damages against Rodriguez who was intoxicated and convicted of hit-and-run. Plaintiffs, however, did not” and that “Something definitely seems strange about plaintiffs’ seemingly lenient treatment of Rodriguez.”

The City argues that Rodriguez should be required to contribute more than the insurance policy limits.

Authority and Analysis

California Code of Civil Procedure section 877 states:

Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith before verdict or judgment to one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort, or to one or more other co-obligors mutually subject to contribution rights, it shall have the following effect:

(a) It shall not discharge any other such party from liability unless its terms so provide, but it shall reduce the claims against the others in the amount stipulated by the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater.

(b) It shall discharge the party to whom it is given from all liability for any contribution to any other parties.

(c) This section shall not apply to co-obligors who have expressly agreed in writing to an apportionment of liability for losses or claims among themselves.

(d) This section shall not apply to a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment given to a co-obligor on an alleged contract debt where the contract was made prior to January 1, 1988.

Section 877.6, subdivision (a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that, on noticed motion, “[a]ny party to an action in which it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (a)(1).) “[Code of Civil Procedure] Section 877.6 was enacted by the Legislature in 1980 to establish a statutory procedure for determining if a settlement by an alleged joint tortfeasor has been entered into in good faith and to provide a bar to claims of other alleged joint tortfeasors for equitable contribution or partial or comparative indemnity when good faith is shown.”  (IRM Corp. v. Carlson (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 94, 104.)

The evidentiary burden depends on whether the good faith of the settlement is being contested.

When a motion for determination of good faith settlement is contested, however, the settling party must make a more specific showing under the Tech-Bilt factors. (Id. at 1261-62.) Such a showing may be made either in the original moving papers or in counter-declarations filed after the nonsettling defendants have filed an opposition challenging good faith of the settlement. (Id. at 1262.) Where good faith is contested, the showing requires competent evidence in support of “good faith.” (Greshko v. County of Los Angeles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 822, 834.)

“Once there is a showing made by the settlor of the settlement, the burden of proof on the issue of good faith shifts to the non-settlor who asserts that the settlement was not made in good faith.” (City of Grand Terrace, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at 1262; Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (d).) The party challenging the good faith settlement “should be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute.  Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a ‘settlement made in good faith’ within the terms of section 877.6.”  (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at 499-500.)

 “Practical considerations require that [their] evaluation be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement.”  (Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 894, 909.)

Application of Tech-Bilt Factors

In Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499, the California Supreme Court identified the following nonexclusive factors courts are to consider in determining if a settlement is in good faith under section 877.6 including: (1) a rough approximation of plaintiffs' total recovery and the settlor's proportionate liability, (2) the amount paid in settlement, (3) the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, (4) a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial, (5) the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, and (6) the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of non-settling defendants.

The Court finds Schmid v. Superior Court (1988) 205 Cal. App. 3d 1244, 1245, the court applied the Tech-Bilt factors to a case where the defendants took the position they were judgment proof. In Schmid, the defendant offered a settlement of $55,000, representing the policy limit of her insurance coverage. (Id. at 1247.) However, the plaintiff’s claim was in excess of $500,000. (Id.) Schmid had a blood-alcohol level measuring approximately 0.17. (Id.)

The trial court applied the Tech-Bilt factors and denied the motion, even though the non-settling defendant county did not oppose the motion. (Id. at 1248.) The defendant filed a petition for a writ of mandate with the Court of Appeals challenging this determination. (Id. at 1246.) The appellate court issued the writ directing the trial court vacate its order denying Schmid’s motion and enter a new order granting the motion. (Id. at 1249.)

The appellate court reasoned, “[w]e can think of no earthly good that would come from requiring defendant Schmid to remain in the action. Good faith approval of the settlement would bar contribution or indemnity claims against Schmid by codefendant County…No evidence suggests that Schmid has any assets, or any prospect of acquiring assets, other than her insurance policy.” (Id. at 1248-49.)

The appellate court further reasoned, “disapproval of the good faith of the settlement would doubtless require Schmid to continue her, defense, possibly at the expense of her insurer, to avoid a judgment in excess of her policy limits that could require her to declare bankruptcy. We see no virtue in this. Schmid’s continued defense would simply increase her defense costs (possibly producing an unnecessary ultimate boost in insurance premiums) and needlessly add to the work of all personnel of the court.” (Id. at 1249.)

Schmid cited to Tech-Bilt, noting “…bad faith is not established merely by a showing that a settling defendant with limited ability to satisfy a judgment will pay less than his or her theoretical proportionate share: ‘Such a rule would unduly discourage settlements. “For the damages are often speculative, and the probability of legal liability therefor is often uncertain or remote. And even where the claimant's damages are obviously great, and the liability therefor certain, a disproportionately low settlement figure is often reasonable in the case of a relatively insolvent, and uninsured, or underinsured, joint tortfeasor.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at 1248, emphasis in the original.)

Similarly, in County of Los Angeles v. Guerrero (1989) 209 Cal. App. 3d 1149, 1155, the court applied the Tech-Bilt factors to a situation where the defendant was  also apparently judgment proof.

There, the defendant’s insurance policy paid policy limits of $15,000 to both plaintiffs for a total of $30,000. (Id. at 1152.) The plaintiffs sued the County of Los Angeles. (Id. at 1153.) The County filed a cross-complaint against defendant for indemnity and declaratory relief. (Id.) The defendant responded by filing a motion for determination of good faith settlement arguing that although his $30,000 settlement with the plaintiffs was below his probable proportional liability for their damages, that is all he had to contribute. (Id. at 1153.) The trial court granted Guerrero’s motion and dismissed the County’s cross-complaint with respect to Guerro. (Id. at 1154.) The County appealed and the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order. (Id. at 1160.)

The appellate court reasoned that, although the $30,000 settlement is not within the reasonable range of proportional share of comparative liability, the other Tech-Bilt factors “…the scale of the potential damages and Guerrero's modest ‘financial [condition] and insurance policy limits’…are necessarily controlling and effectively override the other Tech-Bilt factors.” (Id. at 1157.) “The perceived injustice in such a result is no different from any other case involving joint tortfeasors, where one defendant is insolvent, and a deep pocket defendant is left with full liability and without a meaningful action for comparative indemnity.” (Id. at 1158.) “Guerrero's judgment-proof status would cause the Russos to look solely to the County to satisfy any judgment. The perceived injustice in such a result is no different from any other case involving joint tortfeasors, where one defendant is insolvent, and a deep pocket defendant is left with full liability and without a meaningful action for comparative indemnity.” (Id.)

Here, as in Schmid, Defendant Rodgriguez carries a disproportionate amount of liability due to his driving under the influence, hitting and running from the scene of the accident. However, like in Schmid, this does not preclude the determination of good faith settlement.

The County argues the disproportionality between defendant Diego Rodgriguez’s culpability and the settlement amount requires a denial of the application for good faith settlement. However, Guerrero on this issue notes:

“[e]ven where the claimant’s damages are obviously great, and the liability therefor certain, a disproportionately low settlement figure is often reasonable in the case of a relatively insolvent, and uninsured, or underinsured, joint tortfeasor. Tech-Bilt thus addresses this very fact situation. Here, as in Schmid, the scale of the potential damages and Guerrero’s modest ‘financial condition and insurance policy limits’ are necessarily controlling and effectively override the other Tech-Bilt factors.” (Guerrero, supra, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1157-1158.)

The Court notes the amount paid is as in Guerrero, where two plaintiffs are being paid $15,000 each for a total of $30,000, the policy maximum.

The County further argues that Defendant Rodgriguez is not insolvent, uninsured, or underinsured because he is gainfully employed and can make payments on a potential judgment. However, this argument was address in Schmid where the court reasoned: “disapproval of the good faith of the settlement would doubtless require Schmid to continue her, defense, possibly at the expense of her insurer, to avoid a judgment in excess of her policy limits that could require her to declare bankruptcy.” (Schmid, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at 1248-1249.) Like in Schmid, Defendant  Rodriguez would not have to pay anything beyond his policy limits if he was able to successfully discharge any judgment above that amount in bankruptcy.

Therefore, the Court grants the application and determines the settlement between Plaintiffs and Defendant Rodriguez in good faith.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 Bermudez, Alejandro vs. Shannon Bros. Co.

Case No.:   VCU301866

Date:           January 29, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Continued Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to set the motion for final approval for September 24, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

Background Facts

The Court previously continued this matter and ordered supplemental declarations filed with respect to the notice period, lodestar and presently incurred costs. On November 18 and 19, 2025, counsel for Plaintiff filed supplemental declarations that addressed the lodestar and presently incurred costs issues, but did not address the 60 day notice issue. The Court again continued this matter to this hearing date.

On January 12, 2026, counsel filed a further supplemental declaration indicating that the parties had amended the settlement agreement to provide a 60 day notice period.  

Class Notice

The settlement agreement provides no claim form will be required of class members to participate in distributions.  Only those wishing to object or opt out must file notice with the settlement administrator. 

Objections or opt out notices are still to be made within 60 days. 

The Court regularly approves notice periods of 60 days or longer. The class notice period is approved.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $275,000 are preliminarily approved as follows:

Preliminarily Approved Attorney Fees (33.3%):	$90,750
Preliminarily Approved Attorney Costs (up to):	$15,000
Preliminarily Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff:	$5,000
Preliminarily Approved Settlement Administrator Costs:	$7,950
Preliminarily Approved PAGA Payment:	$20,000
Preliminarily Approved Net Settlement Amount	$136,300

The Court, therefore, grants the motion and sets the motion for final approval for September 24, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Examiner Notes for Probate Matters Calendared

• Visalia Division 
• South County Justice Center Division