Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, May 19, 2026, are:

Re:                Hernandez, John Jr. vs. General Motors, LLC

Case No.:   VCU314185

Date:           May 19, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion

Facts

In this matter,  Defendant moves for summary judgment as to both causes of action for violation of Magnusson Moss Warranty Act and breach of warranty under the California Commercial Code.

Defendant states the vehicle at issue is a model year 2020 GMC Sierra 1500 VIN 3GTU9BET0LG318951 (“Subject Vehicle” or “Sierra”), which Plaintiffs John Hernandez, Jr. and Tammy A. Uranday (“Plaintiffs”) bought on January 5, 2022. (UMF No. 1.)

Plaintiffs did not buy the Sierra new; Plaintiffs bought it used, with 32,183 miles on the odometer, from Visalia Kia (“Kia”) (UMF No. 2.)

GM was not a party to the transaction between Plaintiffs and Kia, and Kia is not a GM-authorized dealership. (UMF No. 3.) Plaintiffs were not the Sierra’s original owner(s). (UMF No. 4.)

Fresno Buick GMC delivered the Sierra to its original owner(s) on June 13, 2020, with 3 miles on its odometer. (UMF No. 5.)

In connection with that delivery to the Sierra’s original owner, GM issued a New Vehicle Limited Warranty with bumper-to-bumper coverage for the earlier of 3 years or 36,000 miles and powertrain coverage for the earlier of 5 years or 100,000 miles. (UMF No. 6.) Plaintiffs dispute that this fact establishes that the warranty’s time-and-mileage limits eliminate Plaintiffs’ claims as a matter of law. (Plaintiffs’ Dispute to UMF No. 6.)

The Warranty’s coverages began when Fresno Buick GMC originally delivered the Sierra on June 13, 2020. (UMF No. 7.) Plaintiffs dispute that this fact establishes that Plaintiffs’ repair presentations were outside all applicable warranty coverage or that GM complied with its warranty obligations. (Plaintiffs’ Dispute to UMF No. 7.)

GM did not issue or provide any new or additional warranty coverage to Plaintiffs or the Sierra when Plaintiffs bought the Sierra used in January 2022; Plaintiffs received only the balance of coverage under the Warranty that GM issued back in June 2020. (UMF No. 8.) Plaintiffs dispute that this fact establishes that receiving the balance of warranty coverage bars Plaintiffs from enforcing GM’s written warranty as subsequent owners. (Plaintiffs’ Dispute to UMF No. 8.)

No timely opposition appears filed. On May 7, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a late opposition and responses to separate statement, adding that “After purchasing the Subject Vehicle, Plaintiffs presented the Subject Vehicle to GM-authorized repair facilities on multiple occasions for diagnosis and repair” (AUMF No. 1.) Further, that despite multiple repair attempts, the Subject Vehicle continued to exhibit nonconformities. (AUMF No. 2.) Further, that despite multiple repair presentations, the Subject Vehicle continued to exhibit concerns requiring further diagnosis and repair. (AUMF No. 3.) Additionally, that Plaintiffs suffered diminution in value and loss of use as a result of GM’s failure to repair.

The Court notes that Plaintiff filed the second amended complaint in response to this Court’s ruling on January 27, 2026 as to requiring a commercial code claim to support a claim under Magnusson-Moss.

Authority and Analysis

A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(a).) “The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)

To prevail, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c).) The motion cannot succeed unless the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts; the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other evidence. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of material fact, “[a]ll doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment…” (Gold v. Weissman (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-99.) “In other words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true.” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 179.) However, if adjudication is otherwise proper the motion “may not be denied on grounds of credibility,” except when a material fact is the witness’s state of mind and “that fact is sought to be established solely by the [witness’s] affirmation thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(e).) 

Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) “[T]here is no obligation on the opposing party... to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element... necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor.” (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) 

Second Cause of Action – Breach of Warranty under California Commercial Code

Plaintiffs allege Defendant violated the California Commercial Code, which applies to both express and implied warranties under sections 2313 (express), 2314 (implied warranty of merchantability) and 2315 (implied warranty for fitness of purpose.)

However, Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal. App. 4th 1187, 1201 notes: “As a general rule, a cause of action for breach of implied (or express) warranty requires privity of contract; ‘there is no privity between the original seller and a subsequent purchaser who is in no way a party to the original sale.’” While the Jones court noted exceptions to the rule, none of which appear to be relevant here. (Id.)

Further Ballesteros v. Ford Motor Co. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1196, 1216 notes that “The California Uniform Commercial Code's express warranty provisions are limited to warranties given by the seller directly to the buyer” and “Similarly, implied warranties arise under the California Uniform Commercial Code only for a merchant or seller in privity with the buyer.” Ballesteros notes that claims under Song Beverly do not require privity, as Song Beverly governs manufacturers warranties. However, as noted above, there is no claim under Song Beverly here and, as such, the Court finds the privity requirement unmet via the purchase of a used vehicle from a nonauthorized retailer. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs purchased the Vehicle used and therefore is a “subsequent purchaser” who was not a party to the original sale. As such, Plaintiffs lack privity with Defendant GM and the Court finds Defendant has met its initial burden on summary judgment.

First Cause of Action - Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act

The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act "authorizes a civil suit by a consumer to enforce the terms of an implied or express warranty. Magnuson-Moss 'calls for the application of state written and implied warranty law, not the creation of additional federal law,' except in specific instances in which it expressly prescribes a regulating rule." (Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 832-833.) Further, the "…failure to state a warranty claim under state law necessarily constitutes a failure to state a claim under Magnuson-Moss." (Id. at 832.)

However, Ngo v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (9^th Cir. 2022) 23 F.4th 942, 945 notes that these claims “…stand or fall with [the] express and implied warranty claims under state law.”

The opposition notes that the Commercial Code warranty claim is the basis for the Magnusson Moss Act claim.

Having found no express or implied warranty claim above, the Court grants summary judgment as to the first cause of action.

Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                LVNV Funding LLC vs. Hernandez, Luis

Case No.:   VCL318352

Date:           May 19, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion re: Opposition to Claim of Exemption

Tentative Ruling: To continue this matter to June 2, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 2 as to a filing of the claim of exemption by the levying officer.

Facts

In this matter, judgment for Plaintiff in the amount of $2,913.23 was awarded May 23, 2025.

A writ of execution was issued on October 16, 2025 in the amount of $2,992.38.

On April 1, 2026, Plaintiff filed a notice of opposition to the claim of exemption stating:

“Judgment creditor opposes the claim of exemption because the debtor has not shown that all earnings are necessary for basic support as required under CCP §§ 703.115 and 706.051. The financial statement reflects income sufficient to allow a greater withholding amount than proposed, and several listed expenses appear discretionary or unsupported. Debtor has not established a financial hardship that warrants the exemption requested. Accordingly, creditor requests that the claim of exemption be denied.

 However, the Court’s file does not contain a filing from the levying officer as to the claim of exemption under Code of Civil Procedure section 706.105(b).

As such, the Court cannot adjudicate the claim of exemption, or opposition thereto, absent a filing by the levying officer containing the requisite information.

Therefore, the Court continues this matter to June 2, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 2.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Tilley, Jennifer M. vs. Fisher, June A.

Case No.:   VCU322372

Date:           May 19, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion to Continue Trial

Tentative Ruling: The Court does not issue tentative rulings on these motions. Counsel may appear in any manner.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                LVNV Funding LLC vs. Farias, Anthony

Case No.:   VCL318924

Date:           May 19, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:      Defendant’s Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion without prejudice.

Facts

On April 28, 2026, Counsel Alexandar Penley filed a motion to be relieved as counsel as to Defendant Anthony Farias. Counsel filed the following with respect to withdrawing:

(1) MC-051 - Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as Counsel;

(2) MC-052 – Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel; and

(3) MC-053 - Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel

Additionally, Counsel has filed an undated proof of service regarding service of these documents by mail.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 284 provides that “[t]he attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at any time before or after judgment of final determination, as follows: 1. Upon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes; [or] 2. Upon the order of the court, upon the application of either client or attorney, after notice from one to the other.”

California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) requires that the “notice of motion and motion to be relieved as counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) must be directed to the client and must be made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-051).”

As noted above, Counsel has complied with California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) by submitting the notice and motion on MC-051 and by directing the notice and motion to all parties. 

California Rule of Court 3.1362 (c) further mandates that: “The motion to be relieved as counsel must be accompanied by a declaration on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel--Civil (form MC-052).

The declaration must state in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1). Specifically, the declaration that Rule 3.1362(c) requires must state that the moving attorney attempted to secure a “Substitution of Attorney” from the client as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1) and that the client refused to so stipulate.

Here, the declaration is properly made on form MC-052 and uses general terms without compromising confidentiality. However, the declaration is silent as to an attempt to first secure a “Substitution of Attorney” and that the client refused to so stipulate. Absent this information, the Court cannot grant the motion.

Next, service under Rule 3.1362(d) requires personal service, electronic service, or mail and counsel’s declaration must note the service made. Here, service was by mail, but was made on an unknown date based on the lack of date on the proof of service. The declaration of Counsel indicates that Defendant’s address is the last known address.

Finally, Rule 3.1362(e) requires the proposed order be lodged with the Court on MC-053 with the moving papers, specifying all hearing dates scheduled, including date of trial. Counsel has complied with this requirement.

The Court denies, without prejudice, Defendant’s Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw as to Defendant based upon the lack of compliance with California Rule of Court 3.1362(c) with respect to attempting to obtain a “Substitution of Attorney” prior to moving to withdraw and reflecting such efforts in the declaration and absent a dated proof of service.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Hodges, Eastonn vs. State of California, Department of Transportation [Caltrans]

Case No.:   VCU328136

Date:           May 19, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion for Trial Preference

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to inquire at the hearing as to potential trial dates within the 120 day time period. The Court will set the matter for trial on September 14, 2026,  at 9:00 AM in the absence of any agreement to choose another date by counsel.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiffs allege that, on or about January 19, 2025:

“Emeshia Hodges was hit by a car being driven by Dominick Nunez while crossing the street at an uncontrolled crosswalk at the intersection of Hwy 63/Mooney Blvd and E. Cross Avenue. Ms. Hodges suffered catastrophic traumatic injuries, including an open skull fracture, brain avulsion and traumatic amputation of her right leg. She died several hours later at the hospital.”

Plaintiffs include:

• Issa Cummings, individually and as guardian ad litem for Easton Hodges, a minor;
• Reva Moseray, as guardian ad litem for Anthony Dabbs, Jr, Endiyah Dabbs and Amarion Dabbs
• Mckinley Womack, Jr, as guardian ad litem for Ayceonn Hodges.

No trial date has been set in this matter.

Plaintiffs move for an order granting trial preference and setting trial within 120 days of this hearing based on Code of Civil Procedure section 36(b). Plaintiff’s counsel declares all essential parties in this matter have been served with process and have appeared. (Declaration of Gouzoules ¶3.)

Further, Issa Cummings declares that Eastonn Hodges is currently seven years old, is a surviving heir of Emeshia Hodges and that this is an action for wrongful death. (Declaration of Cummings ¶2-4.)

Further, Reva Moseray declares that Amarion Dabbs is currently nine years old, Endiyah Dabbs is 11 years old, and Anthony Dabbs, Jr. is thirteen years old, and that each of these minors is a surviving heir of Emeshia Hodges and that this is an action for wrongful death. (Declaration of Moseray ¶¶2-6.)

Further, Mckinley Womack, Jr declares Ayceonn Hodges is currently five years old, is a surviving heir of Emeshia Hodges and that this is an action for wrongful death. (Declaration of Womack, Jr ¶¶2-4.)

In opposition, Caltrans argues that it has not been able to investigate whether the City of Tulare is an indispensable party and that the City has not been named in the lawsuit by Plaintiffs. Further, that Plaintiffs have further failed to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 389(c) by failing to name the City of Tulare in the complaint as a potential defendant. Further, that Plaintiffs have “disclosed no documentation showing their relationship to Emeshia Hodges.” Additionally, that Plaintiffs have not made a good faith effort to mitigate prejudice to Defendants. Finally, that Caltrans would be denied due process if this motion were granted.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 36(b) specifically provides:

“A civil action to recover damages for wrongful death or personal injury shall be entitled to preference upon the motion of any party to the action who is under 14 years of age unless the court finds that the party does not have a substantial interest in the case as a whole. A civil action subject to subdivision (a) shall be given preference over a case subject to this subdivision.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 36(b).)

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 36(c), a motion for trial preference by a party not older than 70 years of age must be accompanied by a declaration that all essential parties have been served with process or have appeared. (Code Civ. Proc. § 36(c)(1).)

Trial preference under section 36(b) is mandatory. (Peters v. Superior Court (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 218, 224:

“In contrast to the use of “shall” in section 36, subdivisions (a) and (b), the Legislature used the term “may” in subdivisions (d) and (e), in each latter reference linking the word “may” with the phrase “in its discretion.” Thus, the Legislature made unmistakably clear that motions for preference under subdivisions (d) and (e) were not mandatory. Equally clear, by the omission of the phrase “in its discretion” and by the use of “shall” instead of “may,” is that subdivisions (a) and (b) were intended to be mandatory.”

The Court does not find that Isaak v. Superior Court (2022) 73 Cal.App.5^th 792 aids Caltrans’ position here. In Isaak, the trial court denied the motion on the basis that it need not follow section 36 in a coordinated proceeding. (Id. at 796.) The appellate court affirmed, noting that section 36 does not supersede the coordination rules. (Id. at 795.) Here, there is no coordinated proceeding for which the Court may consider.

The trial court does not have discretion to deny trial preference to a party under 14 who has a substantial interest in the litigation" and who has "diligently engaged in preparation for trial or settlement." (Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 696-697.)  

If the Court finds that Plaintiff meets the requirements for mandatory trial preference under section 36, the court cannot balance the conflicting interests of opposing litigants. (See Fox v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 529, 535 [considering trial preference pursuant to subdivision (a) and holding that "preference must be granted" and "[n]o weighing of interests is involved"].

Here, each minor Plaintiff is under fourteen years old, each is a survivor heir of the decedent and therefore has a substantial interest in this wrongful death matter. Plaintiffs’ counsel indicates all essential parties have been served and have appeared in this matter. Neither the law, nor this Court, requires “documentation” proving this issue beyond the declarations submitted herein.

As to the naming of the City of Tulare as a defendant, the Court discerns no issue here. Caltrans could have, at the time it answered, named the City as a cross-defendant but, like Plaintiff, chose not to do so. The Court has no basis to determine the City is an indispensable party and finds all essential parties have been served.

The Court finds no basis that Plaintiffs need to engage in good faith efforts to mitigate prejudice under Peters, supra.

As to the due process argument and summary judgment filing, the Court may not weigh such interests under Fox v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 529, 535 ["[w]here a party meets the requisite standard for calendar preference under subdivision (a), preference must be granted. No weighing of interests is involved]; Swaithes v. Superior Court (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1082, 1085 ["[t]he trial court has no power to balance the differing interests of opposing litigants in applying the provision."

Under these authorities, the mandate of section 36(b), which like section (a) uses the word “shall,” prevails over countervailing considerations such as fairness, rights to discovery and any right to file a motion for summary judgment.

The Court notes that some courts have mentioned, without deciding, that a trial preference may implicate the due process rights of the opposing party. (Roe v. Superior Court (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 642, 643 n.2 [recognizing that "the due process implications of this approach have not yet been decided"]; Peters, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at 227 [noting but not deciding due process issue potentially raised by mandatory trial preference].)

The Court, however, finds it lacks discretion to weigh the interests raised by Caltrans where the statutory requirements of section 36(b) have otherwise been met.

Further, the Court notes that, while this case was filed November 11, 2025, the incident occurred January 29, 2025 and the tort claim presentation requirements require that Caltrans be given notice of the claim prior to the filing date. The Court finds this provided sufficient opportunity for Caltrans to investigate the claim, including any liability upon the City of Tulare.

The Court notes Caltrans may move for a protective order seeking discovery responses sooner than thirty (30) days and may seek to have any summary judgment motion heard less than thirty (30) days before trial as to balancing these issues. Further, at least one fifteen-day continuance is contemplated under section 36(f).

Therefore, the Court grants the motion. The Court intends to inquire at the hearing as to potential trial dates within the 120-day time period. According to the court’s calculation the final Monday from the hearing date within 120 days would be September 14, 2026. Absent agreement to another date by counsel, that will be the date the Court will set this matter for trial.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared Monday, May 18, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054013	In the Matter of Guerrero, Aurelio Acuna	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	1. Notice not given to the Personal Representative of Estate of Spouse, CRC rule 7.51 2. Bond Waiver not filed by the Personal Representative of Estate of Spouse, Prob C § 8481(a)(2) 3. Petition Item 3b: If a citizen of a foreign country dies without leaving a will, notice shall be given to a recognized diplomatic or consular official of the foreign country, Prob C § 8113 4. Proof of Publication not filed, Prob C § 8120
VPR054032	In the Matter of Heater, James	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	Petition Item 8c:  DE-300 not attached as required in Probate C § 13152(e)
VPR054019	In the Matter of Cunningham, Ted Landon	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Recommended for Approval
VPR054018	In the Matter of Call, Pamella Janette	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Recommended for Approval
VPR054035	In the Matter of Ortega, Pablo	Petition for Order to Set Aside Small Estate	Appearance Required	Documents in order The court to consider Prob C § 6609(b)
VPR054017	In the Matter of Jobe Family Trust Dated October 9, 2020	Petition to Confirm Trust Asset	Approval Conditional	Approval upon review of proposed order to be submitted
VPR053124	In the Matter of Palomino, Roberta	Final Distribution Hearing	Recommended for Approval
VPR053585	In the Matter of Drew, Kathleen Stroben	Final Distribution Hearing	Recommended for Approval
VPR053958	In the Matter of Lara, Emily Alejandra	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Live Scan, Orientation and Investigation not completed

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared Thursday, May 14, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR054028	In the Matter of Yraceburu, Richard Joseph	Letters of Administration	Recommended for Approval
PPR053310	In the Matter of Long, Beverly Jane	Final Distribution Hearing	Approval Conditional	Approval upon review of proposed order to be submitted