Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, January 20, 2026, are:

Re:              Leon, Jorge vs. J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc. et al

Case No.:     VCU313217

Date:           January 20, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:       (1) Defendant Express Services’ Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) Defendant J-M’s Motion to Bifurcate

Tentative Ruling: (1) To deny the motion; (2) To grant the motion

(1) Defendant Express Services’ Motion for Summary Judgment

Background Facts

In this discrimination, retaliation and wrongful termination action, Plaintiff sues Defendant Express Services, amongst others, alleging that Express was a staffing agency who assigned Plaintiff to work at Defendant J-M in or around September 7, 2020, as a mixer/blender at Defendant J-M’s pipe manufacturing facility.

Plaintiff alleges, generally, that he suffered an injury on or about October 3, 2020, and that after this injury, on or about October 7, 2020, Defendant Express called to inform him that Defendant J-M had terminated Plaintiff’s employment.

As against Express, Plaintiff alleges causes of action for disability discrimination under Government Code section 12940(a), failure to reasonably accommodate under Government Code section 12940(m), failure to engage in interactive process under Government Code section 12940(n), failure to maintain a workplace free from discrimination and retaliation under Government Code section 12940(k), retaliation in violation of FEHA and constructive wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

Defendant Express moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication as to the following issues:

1. Express is entitled to summary adjudication judgment as to the first cause of action for disability discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) because Plaintiff cannot establish prima facie case of disability discrimination because Plaintiff cannot establish that he suffered an adverse employment action.

2. Express is entitled to summary adjudication judgment as to the second cause of action for failure to reasonably accommodate in violation of the FEHA because: (1) no reasonable accommodation existed that would allow Plaintiff to perform a position’s essential job functions; and (2) Express reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s disability.

3. Express is entitled to summary adjudication judgment as to the third cause of action for failure to engage in the interactive process in violation of the FEHA because Defendant because: (2) Express engaged in good faith in the interactive process; (2) no reasonable accommodation existed that would allow Plaintiff to perform a position’s essential job

4. Express is entitled to summary adjudication judgment as to the fourth cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation, in violation of FEHA because this claim is derivative of Plaintiff’s claims for disability discrimination and retaliation and, because those claims fail for the reasons stated herein, the fourth cause of action fails as well.

5. Express is entitled to summary adjudication judgment as to the fifth cause of action for retaliation in violation of the FEHA because Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation because: (1) Express did not subject Plaintiff to an adverse employment action; and (2) the complained of retaliatory conduct did not occur

6. Express is entitled to summary adjudication judgment as to the sixth cause of action for wrongful constructive termination in violation of public policy because it is derivative of and based on Plaintiff’s statutory claims for disability discrimination and retaliation, and because those claims fail for the reasons stated herein, the seventh cause of action fails as well.

7. Express is entitled to summary adjudication judgment on the issue of punitive damages because Plaintiff cannot raise a triable issue of malice, oppression, or fraud on behalf of any officer, directly or managing agent of Express based on the clear and convincing evidence standard.

Material Facts

In support, Express provides the following material facts, in support of each issue.

Express is a staffing agency that matches job seekers with employers seeking the employee’s skill and experience. (UMF No. 1.)

In or around early September of 2020, Plaintiff submitted an application to Express in Visalia, California, seeking placement with a company as a general laborer. (UMF No. 2.) Express assisted Plaintiff in obtaining a position with co-defendant JM Eagle. (UMF No. 3.)

Plaintiff started his assignment with JM Eagle on or around September 7, 2020, as a “mixer.” (UMF No. 4.) In that role, Plaintiff was tasked with operating blending equipment as part of the process of manufacturing PVC pipes. (UMF No. 5.)

The position included significant physical demands, including: balancing to maintain body equilibrium to prevent falling when walking, standing or crouching, lifting 26-50 pounds and carrying the weight up to 30 feet, and occasionally lifting up to 70 pounds and part of Plaintiff’s role involving lifting heavy hoses (weighing approximately 90- 100 pounds) connected to a mixer machine and moving the hoses up to 20-to-30 feet. (UMF No. 6.) Plaintiff disputes this fact in part, noting that there was only one object, a hose, weighing greater than 15 pounds and it needed to be lifted once, or less, per shift. (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 6.)

On October 3, 2020, while working at JM Eagle, Plaintiff suffered an injury to his back while moving one of the 90-100 pound hoses. (UMF No. 7.) Plaintiff informed his JM Eagle supervisor, Gustavo Lopez, of his injury and Mr. Lopez drove Plaintiff to Kaweah Delta Medical Center for treatment that night where he was discharged the following day with a diagnosis of back pain. (UMF No. 8.)

On October 5, 2020, Plaintiff informed Express of the injury he sustained to his back at JM Eagle. (UMF No. 9.) Express provided Plaintiff with standard workers compensation documentation which Plaintiff filled out. (UMF No. 10.) Later the same day, Plaintiff was examined at Palm Occupational Medicine where he was placed on light duty with the following restrictions: no repetitive bending/stooping, no lifting/pushing/pulling over 5 to 10 pounds, and no prolonged standing over 1 hour. (UMF No. 10.)

Plaintiff agrees he could not perform the role of “mixer” with these restrictions. (UMF No. 11.) Plaintiff disputes this fact, arguing that the only activity he could not perform under such restrictions was limited to the lifting of the heavier hose a single time, or less, during the shift. (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 11.)

On October 6, 2020, Express communicated Plaintiff’s restrictions to JM Eagle. (UMF No. 12.)

The following day, JM Eagle notified Express that JM Eagle had decided to end Plaintiff’s assignment “due to business needs caused by a decline in production.” (UMF No. 13.) Plaintiff notes that the “business needs” reason was not communicated at the time of termination and, rather, was produced as a response to discovery in this matter. (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 13.)

On October 12, 2020, Plaintiff again visited Palm Occupational Medicine, where he was again placed on light duty with the same restrictions through October 19, 2020, the date of his next scheduled visit. (UMF No. 14.) Plaintiff next visited Palm Occupational Medicine on October 19, 2020, where he was released to full duty for a one-week “trial period.” (UMF No. 15.)

According to Plaintiff, he was still suffering significant pain in his back as of October 19, 2020, and could not have performed all the duties of his prior position at JM Eagle. (UMF No. 16.) Plaintiff disputes this fact, arguing that the only activity he could not perform under such restrictions was limited to the lifting of the heavier hose a single time, or less, during the shift. (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 16.)

On October 27, 2020, less than three weeks after Plaintiff’s injury, and just over a week after Plaintiff was released to work for a “trial period,” Express sent Plaintiff a text message inquiring if he was interested in a machine operator position in the Visalia area, and also inquiring whether Plaintiff was interested in other positions. (UMF No. 17.) However, Plaintiff denies receipt of this message and expressly opted out of receiving text messages from Express. (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 17.)

Plaintiff did not communicate interest the position about which Express texted Plaintiff on October 27, 2020. (UMF No. 18.)  Again, Plaintiff denies receipt of such messages and expressly opted out of receiving text messages from Express. (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 18.)

On November 18, 2020, Express sent Plaintiff a message regarding a position Express believed met his qualifications and experience, and asked Plaintiff to let Express know if he was still interested in other positions. (UMF No. 19.) Again, Plaintiff denies receipt of such messages and expressly opted out of receiving text messages from Express. (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 19.)

Plaintiff turned down this opportunity because, according to Plaintiff, he had already secured a position at another company earning approximately three dollars more per hour than he had been earning when he worked at JM Eagle. (UMF No. 20.) Again, Plaintiff denies receipt of such messages and expressly opted out of receiving text messages from Express. (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 20.)

Even though Plaintiff had notified Express he had accepted another job, Express continued to reach out to Plaintiff several more times over the course of the next year. Specifically, Express sent a message to Plaintiff on February 21, 2021, and two messages on October 21, 2021. (UMF No. 21.), Again, Plaintiff denies receipt of such messages and expressly opted out of receiving text messages from Express. (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 21.)

Plaintiff did not respond to either of these messages. (UMF No. 22.) Again, Plaintiff denies receipt of such messages and expressly opted out of receiving text messages from Express. (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 22.)

Plaintiff remained eligible for positions with Express for an entire year after JM Eagle ended his assignment. (UMF No. 23.)

Plaintiff never reached out to Express to inquire about any jobs or accommodations after he learned JM Eagle ended his assignment. (UMF No. 24.) Plaintiff disputes this fact, arguing it remained Express’s duty to reach out to offer accommodations.

Plaintiff is not aware of any positions or accommodations that Express could have provided but failed to do so. (UMF No. 25.) Plaintiff disputes this fact, arguing hat his forklift license would have permitted him to perform forklifting duties at JM Eagle. (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 25.)

Additionally, Plaintiff adds that Express served JM Eagle as its staffing agency from at least 2005 to present and JM Eagle is a current client of Express. (AUMF No. 1.)

Further, that Express controlled Plaintiff’s pay, maintained the ability to discipline Leon, and controlled workers’ compensation insurance covering Leon’s workplace injury claims and medical treatment while J-M controlled the day to day operations, work schedule and supervision. (AUMF No. 6.) 

That on October 5, 2020, JM Eagle informed Express of Plaintiff’s October 3, 2020 workplace injury. (AUMF No. 13.) On October 6, 2020, Diaz (Express) told Wheeler (JM Eagle) that Plaintiff had been placed on light duties as a result of his October 3 injury. (AUMF No. 15.)

On or about October 7, 2020, Wheeler told Express through Diaz to end Plaintiff’s assignment: “Spoke to Justine, ended assignment for Jorge Leon.” (AUMF No. 16.) On October 7, 2020, Express called Plaintiff and informed him of JM Eagle’s decision to terminate his assignment. (AUMF No. 16.)

Plaintiff adds that various accommodations were available at the time of termination. (AUMF No. 17.) On October 19, 2020, Plaintiff was released without work restrictions from Palm Occupational. (AUMF No. 19.)

Express’s policy dictates that when an associate like Plaintiff is placed on “light duties” which cannot be accommodated by its client like JM Eagle, Express works with Sedgwick, its worker’s compensation insurance provider, through a program called “Guardian,” to connect the injured associate with a third party that will accommodate physical work restrictions. (AUMF No. 34.) However, Plaintiff notes that Express has no record of contacting Sedgwick or Guardian to seek accommodations for Plaintiff. (AUMF No. 35.)

Authority and Analysis

A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(a).) “The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(f)(1).) If a party seeks summary adjudication as an alternative to a request for summary judgment, the request must be clearly made in the notice of the motion. (Gonzales v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1544.)  “[A] party may move for summary adjudication of a legal issue or a claim for damages other than punitive damages that does not completely dispose of a cause of action, affirmative defense, or issue of duty pursuant to” subdivision (t). (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(t).) 

To prevail, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c).) The motion cannot succeed unless the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts; the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other evidence. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of material fact, “[a]ll doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment…” (Gold v. Weissman (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-99.) “In other words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true.” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 179.) However, if adjudication is otherwise proper the motion “may not be denied on grounds of credibility,” except when a material fact is the witness’s state of mind and “that fact is sought to be established solely by the [witness’s] affirmation thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(e).) 

Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) “[T]here is no obligation on the opposing party... to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element... necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor.” (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) 

“The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment motion. The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues and to frame the outer measure of materiality in a summary judgment proceeding.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493, quotations and citations omitted.) “Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff's theories of liability as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings.” (Id.) 

Issue 1: Adverse Employment Action by Express as to First Cause of Action for Discrimination

To successfully assert a claim for discrimination, a plaintiff lacking direct evidence of discrimination, must satisfy the requirements of the three-step McDonnell Douglas test. (See Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354-355.)  Generally, a prima facie case requires showing that (1) plaintiff was a member of a protected class; (2) they were qualified for the position they sought or were performing competently in the position they held; (3) plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job; and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive. (Id. at 355.)

Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, there is a "rebuttable" but "legally mandatory" presumption of discrimination. (Id. at 355.) The burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption by producing admissible evidence that the defendant's "action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." (Id. at 355-356.)

Finally, if the defendant meets its burden, "the presumption of discrimination disappears." (Id. at 356.) The plaintiff must then show that the defendant's legitimate reason is merely pretext. (Id.) "Pretext may be inferred from the timing of the discharge decision, the identity of the decisionmaker, or by the discharged employee's job performance before termination." (Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 224.) "Pretext may [also] be demonstrated by showing that the proffered reason had no basis in fact, the proffered reason did not actually motivate the discharge, or, the proffered reason was insufficient to motivate discharge." (Id.)

However, on a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, the moving defendant initially must show that, under the undisputed material facts, (1) one or more elements of plaintiffs discrimination claim is without merit, or that (2) defendant's action was based on legitimate, non-discriminatory factors. (Arteaga v. Brink's, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 344.) In other words, the initial burden on summary adjudication remains with the moving party at all stages of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. (McGrory v. Applied Signal Tech., Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1523.)

Here, Defendant Express seeks to show there is no adverse employment action taken by it. Express cites to Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009)  47 Cal. 4th 686, 706-707: “In the case of an institutional or corporate employer, the institution or corporation itself must have taken some official action with respect to the employee, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, adverse job assignment, significant change in compensation or benefits, or official disciplinary action…” Here, Express argues that Defendant J-M ended the assignment and Express made multiple attempts to place Plaintiff at a different employer. (UMF Nos. 13, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23.)

California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 7286.5, subdivision (b)(5), states that an employee may be considered an employee of the contracting employer for “such terms, conditions and privileges of employment under the control of that employer” and that, likewise, the temporary service agency may be considered the employer “with regard to such terms, conditions and privileges of employment under the control of the temporary service agency.”

Further, where “both the employment agency and the client company had the right to exercise certain powers of control over the employee” the Court in Mathieu v. Norrell Corp. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1184 found “…no reason not to permit an employee injured by violations of FEHA laws to likewise look to both employers for redress.”

Here, Plaintiff argues that Express was a joint employer of Plaintiff, having maintained some control over Plaintiff as an employee and that Express, therefore, may be liable on a discrimination theory.

The Court notes a very short time between Plaintiff’s injury and the termination of Plaintiff’s employment with J-M. “‘[C]ases that accept mere temporal proximity ... as sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must be “very close.” ’ ... [T]o be persuasive evidence, temporal proximity must be very close[.]”  (Arteaga v. Brink 's Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 354.) Here, the injury occurred October 3, 2020, the restrictions were communicated October 6, 2020 and the following day, Plaintiff’s assignment ended.

In Mathieu, the court examined the knowledge of the staffing agency as to harassment, which informs the Court’s analysis here. (Mathieu, supra, 115 Cal.App.4^th at 1185.) Here, Express knew of the injury to Plaintiff and knew of the subsequent ending of the assignment a few days after the injury.  Further, Plaintiff argues that Express ratified the termination by informing Plaintiff itself.

The Court agrees that a dispute exists as to the degree of Express’s control over Plaintiff’s placement with J-M, the degree of involvement in the termination of Plaintiff’s assignment, and its ratification of the acts of J-M regarding ending the assignment close to the date of injury. Additionally, the extent of the relationship between J-M and Express creates a triable issue as to Express’s joint liability for J-M’s acts.  Therefore, the Court cannot say, as a matter of law, that Express committed no adverse employment action in this matter.

Therefore, the Court denies summary adjudication as to the first issue.

Issue 2 –Failure to Reasonably Accommodate by Express as to Second Cause of Action

Under FEHA, an employer must make reasonable accommodations for known physical or mental disabilities of an employee, unless it subjects the employer to an undue hardship. (Cal. Gov. Code, § 12940(m).) “The elements of a failure to accommodate claim are (1) the plaintiff has a disability under the FEHA, (2) the plaintiff is qualified to perform the essential functions of the position, and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff’s disability. [Citation.]” (Scotch v. Art Institute of Calif. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1009-1010.)

An employer's failure to make reasonable accommodation for the known physical or mental disability of an applicant or employee is an unlawful employment practice. (Swanson v. Morongo Unified School District (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 954, 968.)  A reasonable accommodation is any modification or adjustment to the workplace that enables the employee to perform the essential functions of the job held or desired. (Id. at 968-969.)  Reasonable accommodations include job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. (Id. at 969.) 

Courts have found that medical leaves consisting of several months may be a reasonable disability accommodation for purposes of FEHA. (Sanchez v. Swissport, Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1341 ["A finite leave of greater than four months may be a reasonable accommodation for a known disability under the FEHA."]; Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 227 ["Indubitably, the seven extra months of leave … constitutes a reasonable accommodation in this case."]) "Holding a job open for a disabled employee who needs time to recuperate or heal is in itself a form of reasonable accommodation and may be all that is required where it appears likely that the employee will be able to return to an existing position at some time in the foreseeable future." (Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1, 42.)

Here, the Court agrees that no reasonable accommodation occurred as to Express and Plaintiff where the assignment was simply ended, as opposed to held open or eliminating the heavy hose lifting requirement. Additionally, Plaintiff disputes receipt of various messages that indicate Express was, as part of the process, attempting to reassign Plaintiff as a reasonable accommodation.

Therefore, the Court denies summary adjudication as to this issue. 

Issue 3 - Failure Engage in the Good Faith Process by Express as to Third Cause of Action

FEHA requires an employer and a disabled employee to engage in a timely, good faith "interactive process" to identify or implement effective, reasonable accommodations that will enable the employee to perform their job effectively. (Gov't. Code § 12940(n); 2 Cal. Code Regs. § 11069(a); Scotch v. Art Institute of California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1013.) To prevail on a claim under Government Code Code section 12940(n), "…the employee must be able to identify an available accommodation the interactive process should have produced." (Id. at 1018-1019.) "An 'employer cannot be held liable for failing to engage in [the] interactive process when the employee was in fact offered a reasonable accommodation.'" (Miller v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 261, 282.)

Here, consistent with the ruling above, the Court finds Plaintiff’s assignment was ended without any good faith process.

Therefore, the Court denies summary adjudication as to this issue.

Issue 4 – Failure to Prevent Discrimination Derivative of Discrimination Claim

To state a claim under section 12940(k), a plaintiff must allege that (1) she was subjected to discrimination, harassment or retaliation; (2) defendant failed to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent the wrongful conduct; and (3) this failure was a substantial factor causing plaintiff to suffer damage or harm. (Cal. Civil Jury Instructions No. 2527.) “…[W]e examine the section 12940 claim and finding with regard to whether the usual elements of a tort, enforceable by private plaintiffs, have been established: Defendants’ legal duty of care toward plaintiffs, breach of duty (a negligent act or omission), legal causation, and damages to the plaintiff.” (Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 280, 286-287.)

As this claim is derivative of the above, the Court, likewise, denies summary adjudication as to this issue.

Issue 5 - Adverse Employment Acton by Express as to Retaliation

Here, the complaint alleges “EXPRESS retaliated against Plaintiff by failing to offer him a new position for a year after Plaintiff engaged in protected activities by placing defendants on notice of his disabilities and requests for reasonable accommodation.”

On this theory, Mathieu, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at 1186-1187 notes that after the assignment to the secondary employer ended, the staffing agency “continued to contact [the plaintiff] about potential placements for a short time. However, it is disputed whether [staffing agency] agreed to reassign her to a comparable position. [The plaintiff] testified she received only two or three more telephone calls from [staffing agency] after her termination from [secondary employer] and was not given the opportunity to work in a position similar to the one she had at [secondary employer]. As the trial court concluded in denying summary adjudication as to noticed issue 4, this evidence creates triable issues as to whether [staffing agency] engaged in retaliation of its own by failing to attempt to place [the plaintiff] in a comparable position elsewhere after her discharge by [secondary employer].”

Here, the Court agrees there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Express agreed to reassign Plaintiff to a comparable position, including whether Express’s text messages to Plaintiff constitute such attempts given Plaintiff’s opting out of receipt of text messages. For the same reason as in Matheiu, the Court denies summary adjudication of this issue.

Issue 6 – Wrongful Constructive Termination Derivative of Discrimination Claim

The Fifth District Court of Appeal summarized the constructive discharge doctrine as follows, citing to the California Supreme Court’s decision in
Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1244-1251 (internal citations omitted):

“ ‘Constructive discharge occurs when the employer's conduct effectively forces an employee to resign. Although the employee may say, “I quit,” the employment relationship is actually severed involuntarily by the employer's acts, against the employee's will. As a result, a constructive discharge is legally regarded as a firing rather than a resignation.’ ‘Under the cases, an employee cannot simply “quit and sue,” claiming he or she was constructively discharged. The conditions giving rise to the resignation must be sufficiently extraordinary and egregious to overcome the normal motivation of a competent, diligent, and reasonable employee to remain on the job to earn a livelihood and to serve his or her employer. The proper focus is on whether the resignation was coerced, not whether it was simply one rational option for the employee.’ ‘ “There appears to be no disagreement [in the cases] that one of the essential elements of any constructive discharge claim is that the adverse working conditions must be so intolerable that any reasonable employee would resign rather than endure such conditions.”’

‘The essence of the test is whether, under all the circumstances, the working conditions are so unusually adverse that a reasonable employee in plaintiff's position “‘“would have felt compelled to resign.”’” ([‘[T]he cases are in agreement that the standard by which a constructive discharge is determined is an objective one—the question is “whether a reasonable person faced with the allegedly intolerable employer actions or conditions of employment would have no reasonable alternative except to quit.”’].) Finally, ‘[a] constructive discharge is the practical and legal equivalent of a dismissal—the employee's resignation must be employer-coerced, not caused by the voluntary action of the employee or by conditions or matters beyond the employer's reasonable control.’ ([“a wrongful discharge claim may prevail only if an employee can show the employer, or those representing the employer, either created or knowingly permitted working conditions to remain intolerable”].)’

‘…In order to establish a constructive discharge, an employee must plead and prove, by the usual preponderance of the evidence standard, that the employer either intentionally created or knowingly permitted working  conditions that were so intolerable or aggravated at the time of the employee's resignation that a reasonable employer would realize that a reasonable person in the employee's position would be compelled to resign. [¶] For purposes of this standard, the requisite knowledge or intent must exist on the part of either the employer or those persons who effectively represent the employer, i.e., its officers, directors, managing agents, or supervisory employees.’…’Standing alone, constructive discharge is neither a tort nor a breach of contract, but a doctrine that transforms what is ostensibly a resignation into a firing. Even after establishing constructive discharge, an employee must independently prove a breach of contract or tort in connection with employment termination in order to obtain damages for wrongful discharge.’ (Atalla v. Rite Aid Corp. (2023) 89 Cal. App. 5th 294, 319-320).)”

Caselaw permits the trial court to find, on summary judgment, no constructive termination. (Id. at 320 [where the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding of constructive termination on summary judgment where the plaintiff resigned her position; See also St. Myers v. Dignity Health (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 301, 307 [where the appellate court also affirmed the trial court’s finding of constructive termination on summary judgment where the plaintiff resigned her position.])

Here, Plaintiff pleads that “…no reasonable or objective person in Plaintiff's position would have continued to be employed by EXPRESS for one year without any offers of employment or means of earning an income.” (Complaint ¶78)

The Court agrees that material factual disputes exist as to the sufficiency of Express’s efforts to reassign Plaintiff after the injury, given Plaintiff’s testimony that he never received the text messages and that Express otherwise did not contact him as to placement in a different assignment.

Issue 7 – Punitive Damages

“Punitive damages are imposed as punishment for the defendant’s serious misconduct.”  (5 Witkin Cal. Proc. (5th ed. 2019) Pleading, § 933.)  “Although the basic principle of damages is compensation, additional damages may be given in tort actions where the defendant's conduct has been outrageous, for the purpose of punishing and deterring him or her and others from outrageous conduct in the future. Citations.]”  (6 Witkin Sum. Cal. Law (11th ed. 2017) Torts, § 1727.)

Claims for punitive damages are governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 3294, which limits their availability to circumstances where “the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.”  Consequently, punitive damages “cannot be recovered without a pleading of malice, oppression, or fraud … .”  (5 Witkin Cal. Proc. (5th ed. 2019) Pleading, § 933, citing Hall v. Berkell (1955) 130 Cal. App. 2d 800, 804.)

Relevant here, “malice” as used in section 3294, means conduct “intended … to cause injury to the plaintiff” or “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”  Section 3294’s reference to “despicable conduct” represents a “substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.”  (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)  “Absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs' interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found. [Citations.]”  (Ibid.)

With respect to employers, section 3294 provides that “[a]n employer shall not be liable for [punitive damages], based upon acts of an employee …, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.”

Further, a corporation may be liable for punitive damages if the malicious acts were committed by an employee who belongs to the leadership group of officers, directors and managing agents. (Cruz v. Homebase (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 168; Civ. Code § 3294(b).) Managing agents are those employees who exercise substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy. (White v. Ultramar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 573.)

Causes of action under the FEHA and for wrongful termination may provide a basis for claim for punitive damages. (Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1147-1148; Monge v. Superior Court (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 503, 509; Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 211, 220-221; Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1101)

Here, the Court has denied summary adjudication as to the various causes of action under FEHA supporting punitive damages and finds a disputed material fact as to the knowledge or ratification of the alleged acts by Express’s managing agent Gagnon, head of HR, as to the interactive process and reasonable accommodation options available to Plaintiff days after the injury. (AUMF No. 23.) Therefore, the Court denies summary adjudication of this issue.

(2) Defendant J-M’s Motion to Bifurcate

Facts

In this discrimination, retaliation and wrongful termination action, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages.

On December 16, 2025, Defendant J-M filed this motion to bifurcate the punitive damages phase of trial from the liability phase pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 3295.

No opposition appears to have been filed.

Authority and Analysis

Civil Code section 3295, subdivision (d) states, in relevant part, that on application of any defendant, the Court "shall" bifurcate trial with respect to punitive damages. (Civ. Code, § 3295(d).)

Torres v. Auto. Club of So. California (1997) 16 Cal.4th 771, 777-778 states:

"[S]ection 3295(d) requires a court, upon application of any defendant, to bifurcate a trial so that the trier of fact is not presented with evidence of the defendant's wealth and profits until after the issues of liability, compensatory damages, and malice, oppression, or fraud have been resolved against the defendant”

Further, Holdgrafer v. Unocal. Corp. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 901, 919 states that "[w]hile the statute refers only to evidence of the defendant's financial condition, in practice bifurcation under this section means that all evidence relating to the amount of punitive damages is to be offered in the second phase, while the determination whether the plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages (i.e., whether the defendant is guilty of malice, fraud or oppression) is decided in the first phase along with compensatory damages."

Unlike motions for discretionary bifurcation under Code of Civil Procedure sections 598 and 1048(b), this motion as to punitive damages requires mandatory bifurcation. The Court, therefore, grants the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:              In the Matter of Rosario, Vicente

Case No.:     VCU326490

Date:           January 20, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:       Motion for Reconsideration re: Minor's Compromise 

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts

In this matter, on the Court approved the minor’s compromise and set recovery of attorneys’ fees at 25%.

Counsel indicates, in the motion, that notice of the order was received November 3, 2025.

The Court notes here that the declaration in support of the minor’s compromise, as to recovery of attorneys’ fees stated the following:

“2. Miracle Law, A Professional Corporation entered into a fee agreement with the minor, through her guardian Vicente Rosario, wherein it was agreed that Miracle Law, A Professional Corporation would retain 33.33% of the gross recovery for the incident, not including costs

3. Additionally, the fee agreement specifies that the minor will incur a flat processing fee of $300.00. This amount will be deducted to cover costs related to phone usage, postage, photocopying, and other reproduction expenses, such as internet data and access, regular mail services, as well as the initial investigation and processing of the claim.”

On November 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed this motion for reconsideration under Civil Procedure section 1008(a) seeking to increase the recovery to 33.3% as in the retainer agreement.

Although the motion states the following in support of reconsideration, the Court notes no declaration attesting to the following:

The 33.3% contingency fee agreement in this case is reasonable considering counsel's extensive efforts, which included:

a. Thorough investigation of the injury claims for both minors;

b. Conducting comprehensive background checks on the defendant and vehicle details;
c. Sending representation letters to the insurance company;

d. Resolving complex liability issues related to the collision with the insurance company;

e. Engaging in numerous correspondences with the insurance company regarding the claims;

f. Maintaining frequent correspondences and communications with the clients (including phone calls and text messages) to keep them regularly informed of case developments;

g. Conducting legal research, investigation, and background searches relevant to the case;

h. Retrieving and organizing medical records and billing from multiple providers for both minors;

i. Detailed review and analysis of all medical and billing records;

j. Facilitating and assisting with clients' medical treatment and appointments;

k. Engaging in numerous communications with medical providers to ensure proper treatment and documentation;

l. Preparing and sending comprehensive demand packages to the insurance company;

m. Skillful negotiations with the adjuster to secure the policy limits; and

n. Resolving all outstanding liens on the case”

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, states:

"(a) When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown."

To start, no written notice of the order appears to have been provided. As such, the Court will consider the motion timely.

However, section 1008 requires new or different facts, circumstances or law. New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal. App. 4th 206, 212, states, "Section 1008, subdivision (a) requires that a motion for reconsideration be based on new or different facts, circumstances, or law. A party seeking reconsideration also must provide satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce the evidence at an earlier time. [Citation.]"

Further, the New York Times Co. court noted "The burden under section 1008 is comparable to that of a party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence: the information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it at the trial. [Citation.] Case law after the 1992 amendments to Section 1008 as relaxed the definition of 'new or different facts,' but it is still necessary that the party seeking that relief offer some fact or circumstance not previously considered by the court. [Citations.]" (Id. at 212-213.)

Here, there is no evidence presented to the Court. There is no declaration supporting these facts. What is presented to the Court is simply argument of counsel. (See Fuller v. Tucker (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1173 [“Argument of counsel is not evidence”]; See also Ponte v. County of Calaveras (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 551, 556 [“the arguments of counsel in a motion are not a substitute for evidence...”)

Moreover, these additional facts were known to counsel at the time of the initial declaration and do not constitute new or different facts under the standard set forth above. There is no explanation provided for the failure to provide these facts in the initial declaration.

Additionally, California Rules of Court, rule 7.955, subdivision (a) states that, unless the Court approved the fee arrangement in advance, the Court must use a reasonable fee standard when approving and allowing the amount of attorney's fees payable from money or property paid or to be paid for the benefit of a minor. Here, no prior fee agreement was approved by this Court.

Therefore, the Court notes that while the agreement indicates 33.3% recovery, the Court, under California Rule of Court, rule 7.955, subdivision (c) requires the attorney submit a declaration that addresses the following non-exclusive factors, where applicable, enumerated in section 7.955, subdivision (b) to determine reasonableness of the fee:

1. The fact that a minor or person with a disability is involved and the circumstances of that minor or person with a disability.
2. The amount of the fee in proportion to the value of the services performed.
3. The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill required to perform the legal services properly.
4. The amount involved and the results obtained.
5. The time limitations or constraints imposed by the representative of the minor or person with a disability or by the circumstances.
6. The nature and length of the professional relationship between the attorney and the representative of the minor or person with a disability.
7. The experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney or attorneys performing the legal services.
8. The time and labor required.
9. The informed consent of the representative of the minor or person with a disability to the fee.
10. The relative sophistication of the attorney and the representative of the minor or person with a disability.
11. The likelihood, if apparent to the representative of the minor or person with a disability when the representation agreement was made, that the attorney's acceptance of the particular employment would preclude other employment.
12. Whether the fee is fixed, hourly, or contingent.
13. If the fee is contingent:
    1. The risk of loss borne by the attorney;
    2. The amount of costs advanced by the attorney; and
    3. The delay in payment of fees and reimbursement of costs paid by the attorney.
14. Statutory requirements for representation agreements applicable to particular cases or claims.

(See also Super. Ct. Tulare County, Local Rules, rules 706 and 707.)

“[T]he protective role the court generally assumes in cases involving minors, [is] a role to assure that whatever is done is in the minor’s best interests . . . .  [I]ts primary concern is whether the compromise is sufficient to provide for the minor’s injuries, care and treatment.”  (Goldberg v. Superior Court (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1382.) 

The declaration within the petition fails to address these factors. Even if the Court were to consider the statements made in the motion for reconsideration, the Court does not find the increase to 33.3% warranted under the factors above.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:              In the Matter of Rosario, Vicente

Case No.:     VCU326619

Date:           January 20, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:       Motion for Reconsideration re: Minor's Compromise 

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts

In this matter, on the Court approved the minor’s compromise and set recovery of attorneys’ fees at 25%.

Counsel indicates, in the motion, that notice of the order was received November 3, 2025.

The Court notes here that the declaration in support of the minor’s compromise, as to recovery of attorneys’ fees stated the following:

“2. Miracle Law, A Professional Corporation entered into a fee agreement with the minor, through her guardian Vicente Rosario, wherein it was agreed that Miracle Law, A Professional Corporation would retain 33.33% of the gross recovery for the incident, not including costs

3. Additionally, the fee agreement specifies that the minor will incur a flat processing fee of $300.00. This amount will be deducted to cover costs related to phone usage, postage, photocopying, and other reproduction expenses, such as internet data and access, regular mail services, as well as the initial investigation and processing of the claim.”

On November 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed this motion for reconsideration under Civil Procedure section 1008(a) seeking to increase the recovery to 33.3% as in the retainer agreement.

Although the motion states the following in support of reconsideration, the Court notes no declaration attesting to the following:

The 33.3% contingency fee agreement in this case is reasonable considering counsel's extensive efforts, which included:

a. Thorough investigation of the injury claims for both minors;

b. Conducting comprehensive background checks on the defendant and vehicle details;
c. Sending representation letters to the insurance company;

d. Resolving complex liability issues related to the collision with the insurance company;

e. Engaging in numerous correspondences with the insurance company regarding the claims;

f. Maintaining frequent correspondences and communications with the clients (including phone calls and text messages) to keep them regularly informed of case developments;

g. Conducting legal research, investigation, and background searches relevant to the case;

h. Retrieving and organizing medical records and billing from multiple providers for both minors;

i. Detailed review and analysis of all medical and billing records;

j. Facilitating and assisting with clients' medical treatment and appointments;

k. Engaging in numerous communications with medical providers to ensure proper treatment and documentation;

l. Preparing and sending comprehensive demand packages to the insurance company;

m. Skillful negotiations with the adjuster to secure the policy limits; and

n. Resolving all outstanding liens on the case”

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, states:

"(a) When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown."

To start, no written notice of the order appears to have been provided. As such, the Court will consider the motion timely.

However, section 1008 requires new or different facts, circumstances or law. New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal. App. 4th 206, 212, states, "Section 1008, subdivision (a) requires that a motion for reconsideration be based on new or different facts, circumstances, or law. A party seeking reconsideration also must provide satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce the evidence at an earlier time. [Citation.]"

Further, the New York Times Co. court noted "The burden under section 1008 is comparable to that of a party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence: the information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it at the trial. [Citation.] Case law after the 1992 amendments to Section 1008 as relaxed the definition of 'new or different facts,' but it is still necessary that the party seeking that relief offer some fact or circumstance not previously considered by the court. [Citations.]" (Id. at 212-213.)

Here, there is no evidence presented to the Court. There is no declaration supporting these facts. What is presented to the Court is simply argument of counsel. (See Fuller v. Tucker (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1173 [“Argument of counsel is not evidence”]; See also Ponte v. County of Calaveras (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 551, 556 [“the arguments of counsel in a motion are not a substitute for evidence...”)

Moreover, these additional facts were known to counsel at the time of the initial declaration and do not constitute new or different facts under the standard set forth above. There is no explanation provided for the failure to provide these facts in the initial declaration.

Additionally, California Rules of Court, rule 7.955, subdivision (a) states that, unless the Court approved the fee arrangement in advance, the Court must use a reasonable fee standard when approving and allowing the amount of attorney's fees payable from money or property paid or to be paid for the benefit of a minor. Here, no prior fee agreement was approved by this Court.

Therefore, the Court notes that while the agreement indicates 33.3% recovery, the Court, under California Rule of Court, rule 7.955, subdivision (c) requires the attorney submit a declaration that addresses the following non-exclusive factors, where applicable, enumerated in section 7.955, subdivision (b) to determine reasonableness of the fee:

1. The fact that a minor or person with a disability is involved and the circumstances of that minor or person with a disability.
2. The amount of the fee in proportion to the value of the services performed.
3. The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill required to perform the legal services properly.
4. The amount involved and the results obtained.
5. The time limitations or constraints imposed by the representative of the minor or person with a disability or by the circumstances.
6. The nature and length of the professional relationship between the attorney and the representative of the minor or person with a disability.
7. The experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney or attorneys performing the legal services.
8. The time and labor required.
9. The informed consent of the representative of the minor or person with a disability to the fee.
10. The relative sophistication of the attorney and the representative of the minor or person with a disability.
11. The likelihood, if apparent to the representative of the minor or person with a disability when the representation agreement was made, that the attorney's acceptance of the particular employment would preclude other employment.
12. Whether the fee is fixed, hourly, or contingent.
13. If the fee is contingent:
    1. The risk of loss borne by the attorney;
    2. The amount of costs advanced by the attorney; and
    3. The delay in payment of fees and reimbursement of costs paid by the attorney.
14. Statutory requirements for representation agreements applicable to particular cases or claims.

(See also Super. Ct. Tulare County, Local Rules, rules 706 and 707.)

“[T]he protective role the court generally assumes in cases involving minors, [is] a role to assure that whatever is done is in the minor’s best interests . . . .  [I]ts primary concern is whether the compromise is sufficient to provide for the minor’s injuries, care and treatment.”  (Goldberg v. Superior Court (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1382.) 

The declaration within the petition fails to address these factors. Even if the Court were to consider the statements made in the motion for reconsideration, the Court does not find the increase to 33.3% warranted under the factors above.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:              Hernandez, Sylvia vs. Visalia Police Dept.

Case No.:     VCU318115

Date:           January 20, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:       Defendants’ Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint

Tentative Ruling: The Court’s file reflects no filed demurrer by Defendants to the Second Amended Complaint. The Court intends to inquire as to the filing of the demurrer at this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:              Montelongo, Esteban vs. Venida Packing Company

Case No.:     VCU302568

Date:           January 20, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:       Continued Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion for preliminary approval; to set the motion for final approval for August 25, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 2.

Facts

At the prior hearing, the Court continued this motion and ordered supplemental declarations as to information to calculate the lodestar and the presently incurred costs.

On January 8, 2026, counsel filed a supplemental declaration addressing these issues as follows:

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees of 33.3% of the gross settlement fund of $300,000 or $100,000 and costs not to exceed $25,000 are sought by Plaintiff’s counsel.

Counsel has utilized the percentage of common fund methodology as well as provided adequate lodestar information to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee request.

Here, counsel indicates that the firm has spent 103.8 hours on this case, at rates ranging from $950 to $470 per hour, creating a total lodestar of $66,110. (Supplemental Declaration of Moon ¶3.) Therefore, to award the amount requested, the Court would need to apply a lodestar of 1.51.

The Court further notes counsel states “it is estimated that my office will need to expend at least another 50 to 100 hours to monitor the process leading up to the final approval and payments made to the Class.” (Supplemental Declaration of Moon ¶3.) The Court will examine the additional hours on final approval.

Counsel has also provided the current costs expended in amounts of $21,825.29. (Supplemental Declaration of Moon ¶4)The Court preliminarily approves costs not to exceed $25,000.00.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $300,000 are preliminarily approved as follows:

Preliminarily Approved Attorney Fees (33.3%):	$100,000
Preliminarily Approved Attorney Costs (up to):	$25,000
Preliminarily Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :	$5,000
Preliminarily Approved Settlement Administrator Costs	$7,850
Preliminarily Approved PAGA Payment	$25,000
Preliminarily Approved Net Settlement Amount	$137,150

Therefore, the Court grants the motion for preliminary approval. The Court sets the motion for final approval for August 25, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 2.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, January 20, 2026, are:

Re:              TD Bank, N.A. vs. McKnight, James

Case No.:     PCL312549

Date:           January 20, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          19-The Honorable Glade F. Roper

Motion:       Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings           

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion.

Facts

On September 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed this action for breach of contract seeking damages in the amount of $6,759.24.

Defendant answered the complaint on June 24, 2025, generally denying the allegations of the complaint.

On September 25, 2025, Plaintiff moved this Court to deem admitted requests for admissions, set one, numbers 1 through 8, and to deem documents genuine.

On November 4, 2025, the Court adopted its tentative ruling, deeming admitted the truth of each matter specified in requests for admissions numbers 1 through 8 and deeming documents genuine.

These requests, now admitted, are as follows:

“1. You entered into the CONTRACT attached as Exhibit "A".

2. That the CONTRACT was assigned to Plaintiff for valuable consideration.

3. On October 11, 2022, you breached this CONTRACT. by failing to make the required payments.

4. As a result of your breach, Plaintiff recovered the collateral.

5. Plaintiff has complied with applicable notice of intent to sell requirements.

6. Plaintiff re-sold the vehicle in a commercially reasonable manner.

7. As a result of your breach, Plaintiff has been damaged in the principal sum of $6,759.24.

8. According to the CONTRACT, Plaintiff is entitled to interest, costs, and attorney’s fees.”

Therefore, Plaintiff moves for judgment on the pleadings.

The Court notes that this motion was served on Defendant at the address identified in the answer.

Meet and Confer

Plaintiff states that counsel attempted to contact Defendant regarding this Motion in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 439(a).

“Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a).) However, “[a] determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to grant or deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a)(4).)

Authorities and Analysis

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is used to challenge a pleading in the same manner as a general demurrer, i.e., the challenged pleading (1) establishes that the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction or (2) does not allege facts sufficient to support a cause of action or defense. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438(c)(1), see International Assn. of Firefighters v. City of San Jose (2011) 195 Cal.App.4^th 1179,1196; Bufil v. Dollar Financial Group (2008) 162 Cal.App.4^th 1193, 1202.)  Like a demurrer, the grounds for this motion must appear on the face of the pleading or be based on facts capable of judicial notice, including court records.  (See Bufil, at 1202; Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. Superior Court (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 978, 986, and fn. 6.)

Here, Plaintiff seeks judgment on the basis of its requests for admissions, deemed admitted by the Court. A “deemed admitted order established, by judicial fiat, that a nonresponding party has responded to the requests by admitting the truth of all matters contained therein.” (Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 979.) Further, this motion may be based upon “matters properly the subject to judicial notice.” (Saltarelli & Steponovich v. Douglas (1995) 50 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.) Judicial notice may be taken “of a party’s admissions or concessions, but only in cases where the admissions “cannot reasonably be controverted,’ such as in answer to interrogatories or request for admissions, or in affidavits and declaration filed on the party’s behalf.” (Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 485.)

To establish a claim for breach of contract, Plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence of the contract, (2) Plaintiffs' performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendants' breach, and (4) the resulting damage to Plaintiff." (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)

Here, the first element is met by Nos. 1 and 2.

The second element is met by Nos. 5 and 6.

The third element is met by No. 3 and 4.

The fourth element is met by Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion.

Plaintiff has filed a declaration and memorandum of costs seeking $877.35 in costs, as well as $1,425.92 in fees based on Local Rule 8 and Appendix 8, as well as interest in the amount of $1,196.82 ($1.09/day calculated at 5.94%/year of $6,759.24 for 1098 days (from re-sale date of November 30, 2022 through the filing of this motion on December 2, 2025.)

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and will enter judgment as requested.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:              Jefferson Capital Systems LLC vs. Esparza, Jazmin R.

Case No.:     PCL323316

Date:           January 20, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          19-The Honorable Glade F. Roper

Motion:       Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and enter judgment in the amount of $1,909.37, as the Court lacks a declaration or memorandum of costs as to the costs sought.

Facts

On July 9, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this action for a single cause of action for an open book account for money due within the last four years, based on a writing for money lent by Plaintiff to Defendant at Defendant’s request and account stated. Plaintiff alleged damages in the amount of $1,909.37.

Defendant answered the complaint on July 22, 2025 admitting all statements in the complaint.

On December 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed this motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that Defendant’s answer did not deny that the money was owed to Plaintiff. Notice of this motion as mailed to the address indicated on Defendant’s answer.

The motion seeks entry of judgment in the amount of $1,909.37 plus costs of $376.18.

Meet and Confer

Plaintiff states that counsel contacted Defendant regarding this Motion in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 439(a). “Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a).)

Authorities and Analysis

A motion for judgment on the pleadings (MJOP) is used to challenge a pleading in the same manner as a general demurrer, i.e., the challenged pleading (1) establishes that the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction or (2) does not allege facts sufficient to support a cause of action or defense.(Code Civ. Proc. § 438(c)(1); International Assn. of Firefighters v. City of San Jose (2011) 195 Cal.App.4^th 1179,1196.) Like a demurrer, the grounds for the motion must appear on the face of the pleading or be based on facts capable of judicial notice, including court records.  (Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. Superior Court (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 978, 986, and fn. 6.)

A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be based upon “matters properly the subject to judicial notice.” Saltarelli & Steponovich v. Douglas (1995) 50 Cal.App.4th 1, 5. Judicial notice may be taken “of a party’s admissions or concessions, but only in cases where the admissions “cannot reasonably be controverted,’ such as in answer to interrogatories or request for admissions, or in affidavits and declaration filed on the party’s behalf.” (Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 485.) Here, the answer filed by Defendant sufficiently provides the basis to grant this motion, as Defendant unequivocally admits to owing the amount alleged in the complaint.

Plaintiff claims that there was an open book account in which financial transactions between the parties were recorded and that Defendant owes it  money on the account. Plaintiff therefore must establish the following:

1.That Plaintiff and Defendant had financial transactions with each other;

2.That Plaintiff, in the regular course of business, kept a written account of the debits and credits involved in the transactions;

3.That Defendant owes Plaintiff money on the account; and

4.The amount of money that Defendant owes Plaintiff. (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Zerin (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 445, 460; CACI 372)

Plaintiff also alleges account stated. “The essential elements of an account stated are: (1) previous transactions between the parties establishing the relationship of debtor and creditor; (2) an agreement between the parties, express or implied, on the amount due from the debtor to the creditor; (3) a promise by the debtor, express or implied, to pay the amount due.  [Citations.]  [Citation.]” (Leighton v. Forster (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 467, 491 (internal quotation marks omitted).)

As noted above, Defendant does not deny the allegations of the complaint.

The Court, therefore, grants the motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court will sign the proposed order granting judgment on the pleadings.

However, as to the judgment and amount, the Court lacks a memorandum of costs, or any other evidence submitted under penalty of perjury, as to the $376.18 in costs sought.

Based on what is before the Court, the Court is prepared to enter judgment in the amount of $1,909.37.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:              Perez, Guadalupe vs. Sierra Valley Rehab Center et al

Case No.:     PCU324200

Date:           January 20, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          19-The Honorable Glade F. Roper

Motion:        Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To enforce the delegation clause and compel the issue of enforcement of the Agreement to the arbitrator.

Facts – Delegation Clause

In this elder abuse, negligence and violation of patient’s bill of rights action, Defendants move to compel arbitration based upon an arbitration agreement signed by Plaintiff on March 9, 2022.

In support, Defendants provide the declaration of its medical records clerk who assisted with admissions and intake at Sierra Nevada SNF, LLC dba Sierra Valley Rehab Center (''the Facility")

Defendants indicate further that the Arbitration Agreement contains the following term as to delegation:

“1.6 The arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have the exclusive authority to resolve any Dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, or formation of this Agreement, including, but not limited to, any claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or voidable.” (Arbitration Agreement ¶1.6.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the “…agreement is voidable because Plaintiff lacked capacity. Further, it fails to comply with state and federal requirements and is also unconscionable.”

Authority and Analysis – Delegation Clause

Malone v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1551 summarizes the applicable analysis with respect to delegation clauses:

“A delegation clause requires issues of interpretation and enforceability of an arbitration agreement to be resolved by the arbitrator. Delegation clauses have the potential to create problems of circularity. For example, suppose an arbitration agreement delegates the issue of enforceability to the arbitrator. If the arbitrator concludes that the arbitration agreement is, in fact, not enforceable, this would mean that the entire agreement, including the delegation clause, is unenforceable-a finding that would undermine the arbitrator's jurisdiction to make that finding in the first place. For this reason, courts have treated the delegation clause as a separate agreement to arbitrate solely the issues of enforceability…

“For this reason, when a party is claiming that an arbitration agreement is unenforceable, it is important to determine whether the party is making a specific challenge to the enforceability of the delegation clause or is simply arguing that the agreement as a whole is unenforceable. If the party's challenge is directed to the agreement as a whole--even if it applies equally to the delegation clause--the delegation clause is severed out and enforced; thus, the arbitrator, not the court, will determine whether the agreement is enforceable. In contrast, if the party is making a specific challenge to the delegation clause, the court must determine whether the delegation clause itself may be enforced (and can only delegate the general issue of enforceability to the arbitrator if it first determines the delegation clause is enforceable). (Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 70)”

Here, Plaintiff does not make a specific challenge to the delegation clause, but instead argues the entire agreement is unenforceable on theories of capacity and unconscionability. The Court, therefore under Rent-A-Center and Malone, above, severs out the delegation clause and enforces it, leaving the determination of the defenses to the enforcement of the Agreement to an arbitrator. This determination includes the issue of the arbitrability of the cause of action under Health and Safety Code section 1430.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and compels issues of interpretation, applicability, enforceability, and formation to the arbitrator pursuant to the Agreement.

The Court further stays this matter pending the arbitrator’s rulings on these issues.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:              Cardona v. Woodside 06N, LP,

Case No.:     PCU327784

Date:           January 20, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          19-The Honorable Glade F. Roper

Motion:       Defendant Kimmel’s (1) Demurrer and (2) Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling: To continue these motions to February 3, 2025 to be heard with Defendant Woodside’s demurrer and motion to compel arbitration.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:              Sturgeon, Judy vs. Emerson, Tamara

Case No.:     PCL327928

Date:           January 20, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          19-The Honorable Glade F. Roper

Motion:        Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Judgment After Trial

Tentative Ruling:  To deny the motion

Facts

In this unlawful detainer matter, trial occurred on December 23, 2025, during which both Plaintiff and Defendant appeared. By agreement, the Court entered judgment for Plaintiff against Defendant for possession, with an agreed no lock out until January 10, 2026, after which Defendant was to vacate the premises. Further, that no further stay or extension would be granted.

On January 6, 2026, Defendant filed this motion to vacate the judgment, arguing mistake, inadvertence, surprise and/or excusable neglect under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b). In support, Defendant attests that she was unable to pay a daily rental amount for additional time to move out, and agreed to the judgment in lieu of trial based on a belief that she would obtain less time to move if she proceeded to trial.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), provides, in part: “The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”

Though section 473(b) typically applies to default, the Court notes that Rutter indicates “Procedures to set aside judgment at the trial court level are available to parties to a UD judgment as in civil actions generally.” (California Practice Guide, Landlord-Tenant, Paragraph 9:448 (Rutter Group 2022).

“A ‘mistake’ exists when a person, under some erroneous conviction of law or fact, does, or omits to do, some act which, but for the erroneous conviction, he would not have done, or omitted. It may arise either from unconsciousness, ignorance, forgetfulness, imposition, or misplaced confidence.” (Salazar v. Steelman (1937) 22 Cal.App.2d 402, 405, 410.) 

“Surprise” is defined as “some condition or situation in which a party to a cause is unexpectedly placed to his injury, without any default or negligence of his own, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.” (Miller v. Lee (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 10, 16.)

Further, “excusable neglect” has been defined as “neglect that might have been the act or omission of a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.” (Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.App.3d 427, 435.)

“Finally, as for inadvertence or neglect, ‘[t]o warrant relief under section 473 a litigant's neglect must have been such as might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances. The inadvertence contemplated by the statute does not mean mere inadvertence in the abstract. If it is wholly inexcusable it does not justify relief.’ ” (Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1206.)” (Henderson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 215, 230.)

Here, the Court finds no sufficient basis to grant the motion under section 473(b). Defendant agreed to additional time, without payment of per diem rent, to move out and appears to have failed to do so. The Court expressly stated at trial, as reflected in the minute order, that no further stay would be granted as to the lock out.

Additionally, the Court notes that any such stay would have been conditioned on payment of per diem rent during the period of the stay, which Defendant admits Defendant cannot pay. (California Practice Guide, Landlord-Tenant, Paragraph 9:426 (Rutter Group 2021).)

As such, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Examiner Notes for Probate Matters Calendared

• Visalia Division 
• South County Justice Center Division