Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Monday, March 9, 2026, are:

Re:                Valadez, Brenda et al vs. DLR Management Group, Inc.

Case No.:  VCU310362

Date:           March 9, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel (1) Deposition of Defendant Kamohai; (2) Further Responses by Defendant Kamohai to Form Interrogatories and (3) Further Responses by Defendant Kamohai to

Tentative Ruling: (1), (2) and (3): There are no tentative rulings on the merits for these motions. The parties are directed to meaningfully meet and confer before the hearing of these motions to resolve the discovery disputes identified in the moving and opposition papers for these discovery motions. If unable to resolve, counsel are directed to personally appear for the hearing on these discovery motions. No CourtCall or Zoom appearances will be permitted if the parties are unable to resolve this matter prior to the scheduled hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:               Mateo, Yesenia vs. Snowdrop Holdings, LLC

Case No.:  VCU316517

Date:          March 9, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion as modified below; to set the final compliance hearing as to distribution of the net settlement fund to the LWDA and Aggrieved Employees for October 26, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 7.

1. Sufficiency of Amount of Settlement (Proposed Net Distribution to Aggrieved Employees: $26,675.75)

The gross settlement amount is $169,999.

Plaintiff estimates approximately 345 aggrieved employees, consisting of all current and former hourly-paid or non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant within the State of California at any time during the period from October 23, 2023, through December 20, 2025.

Plaintiff brings claims under the PAGA statute for violations of Labor Code sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 210, 218.5, 221, 226(a), 226.3, 226.7, 246, 432.5, 510, 512(a), 551, 552, 558, 1174(d),1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 2800, and 2802. (Labor Code § 2699.)

In deciding whether to grant approval of the proposed PAGA settlement, the primary issues to be decided is whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. (Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 56, 77.) “Because many of the factors used to evaluate class action settlements bear on a settlement's fairness—including the strength of the plaintiff's case, the risk, the stage of the proceeding, the complexity and likely duration of further litigation, and the settlement amount—these factors can be useful in evaluating the fairness of a PAGA settlement.” (Id.) “Given PAGA's purpose to protect the public interest, we also agree with the LWDA and federal district courts that have found it appropriate to review a PAGA settlement to ascertain whether a settlement is fair in view of PAGA's purposes and policies.” (Id. citing O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2016) 201 F.Supp.3d 1110, 1133.)

Plaintiff’s counsel estimates $34,500 (345 employees x $100 penalty for initial violation) on the low end and $207,000 (345 employees x $100 penalty for initial violation x 6 theories of recovery.) The motion adequately sets forth the relative strength and value of the PAGA claim as well as the risks, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation.

Plaintiffs’ deductions from the gross settlement of $169,999 are proposed as follows:

Proposed Attorney Fees (35%):	$ 59,499.65
Proposed Attorney Costs (incurred):	$ 18,282.93
Proposed Enhancement Award to Plaintiff:	$ 10,000.00
Proposed Administrative Costs	$ 6,000.00
Proposed Net Settlement Fund	$ 76,216.42
Proposed LWDA Share (65% of Net Settlement Fund)	$49,540.67
Proposed Aggrieved Employee Share (35% of Net Settlement Fund):	$26,675.75

The Court finds the gross settlement amount fair, adequate, and reasonable under Moniz as noted above.

2.  Notice

There is no notice period. The proposed notice adequately informs the aggrieved employees of adequate details regarding the case and distribution of their portion of the net settlement fund.

3.  Enhancement Awards to Class Representative

An enhancement payment of $10,000 is proposed to as to Plaintiff.

The Court has, in past cases, approved enhancement awards of $5,000 routinely. While Plaintiff has provided a declaration detailing the involvement in this case from inception to settlement, the Court does not find that these efforts should result in an enhancement award greater than the typical amount awarded by this Court.

The enhancement award of $5,000 is approved.

4. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees of 35% of the gross settlement fund of $169,999 or $59,499.65 and approval of costs of $11,362.54 are sought by Plaintiff’s counsel.

Counsel has utilized the percentage of common fund methodology as well as provided adequate lodestar information to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee request.

Here, Counsel indicates that the firm has spent 195.2hours on this case  rates of $900 to $600 per hour, creating a base lodestar of $152,470. (Declaration of Han ¶¶31, 33.) The fees requested are therefore approved without a multiplier.

Counsel has also provided the current costs expended in amounts of $18.282.93. (Declaration of Han ¶35. )

5.  Claims Administrator

The claims administrator is designated as Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions, who has submitted a bid for $6,000 to administer the settlement. The Court approves the claims administrator.

6. Unclaimed Settlement Proceeds

The court approves the distribution of unclaimed settlement proceeds to the California Secretary of State’s Unclaimed Property Division in the name of the Aggrieved Employee, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

7. Release

The Court finds the proposed limited release of PAGA claims reasonable and within the law under a PAGA only settlement as to the aggrieved employees. (Arias v. Sup. Ct., (2009) 46 CA4th 969, 986-987.) Further, the Court notes that the “Plaintiff’s  Release” term is supported by adequate consideration in the form of the enhancement and release payment, which the Court has approved above as $5,000.

8. LWDA Notice

The Court finds confirmation from the LWDA of receipt of proof of submission of the proposed settlement agreement. (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (l)(2).) (Declaration of Hong ¶3– Ex. 1.)

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and approves the deduction from the gross settlement fund of $169,999 as follows:

Approved Attorney Fees (35%):	$ 59,499.65
Approved Attorney Costs (incurred):	$ 18,282.93
Approved Enhancement Award to Plaintiff:	$ 5,000.00
Approved Administrative Costs	$ 6,000.00
Approved Net Settlement Fund	$ 76,216.42
Approved LWDA Share (65% of Net Settlement Fund)	$ 52,790.67
Approved Aggrieved Employee Share (35% of Net Settlement Fund):	$ 28,425.75

The Court, therefore, grants the motion as modified, and sets a final compliance hearing as to distribution of the net settlement fund to the LWDA and Aggrieved Employees for October 26, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 7.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Wooden, Paul vs. Visalia Ventures, LLC.

Case No.:  VCU328645

Date:           March 9, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Background Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues on behalf of Decedent for Elder Abuse and Professional Negligence. Plaintiff also brings a wrongful death cause of action on an individual basis.

Plaintiff names Visalia Ventures, LLC., Integral Senior Living Management, LLC. and Integral Senior Living, LLC as Defendants.

Defendant Visalia Ventures, LLC moves to compel arbitration

Facts – Agreement to Arbitrate

In the moving papers, Defendant Visalia Ventures provides the declaration of counsel who asserts a true and correct copy of the arbitration agreement executed by the Decedent in handwriting.

In opposition, Plaintiff challenges this showing, arguing a lack of authentication, a lack of mutual assent and that the agreement at issue does not reference, expressly, Visalia Ventures and that the moving papers fail to demonstrate Visalia Ventures either is a signatory to the arbitration agreement or can enforce the agreement as a non-signatory.

On reply, Defendant Visalia Ventures provides the declaration of the “Executive Director of Prestige Assisted Living & Memory Care in Visalia” who provides supplemental testimony as to Decedent’s execution of the agreement.

Authority and Analysis – Agreement to Arbitrate

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2(a), (b).) (emphasis added.) The motion to compel arbitration requires the facts are to be proven by affidavit or declaration and documentary evidence with oral testimony taken only in the court’s discretion. (Code Civ. Proc., §1290.2; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413–414.) The motion must set forth the provisions of the written agreement and the arbitration clause verbatim, or such provisions must be attached and incorporated by reference. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330; see Condee v. Longwood Mgmt. Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218.)

Absent a challenge by the nonmoving party, this burden is met by simply providing a copy of the arbitration agreement.  (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2017) 13 Cal. App. 5th 1152, 1160; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.)  “For purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 218; Sprunk v. Prisma LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 785, 793.)  

However, when the opposing party disputes the agreement, then the opposing party must provide evidence to challenge its authenticity.  (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) 

Under California law, "[t]he burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence …." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 164-165.)

"However, the burden of production may shift in a three-step process." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at. 165.)

"First, the moving party bears the burden of producing 'prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.' [Citation.]" (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) "The moving party 'can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party's] signature.' [Citation.]" (Id.) "For this step, 'it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.' [Citation.]” (Id.)

Here, then, the Court finds counsel’s attachment of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the signature of the Decedent sufficient to meet this first step under Gamboa. (See also Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219: “as a preliminary matter the court is only required to make a finding of the agreement's existence, not an evidentiary determination of its validity.”)

"If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.) “The opposing party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may testify under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement.” (Id.)

In Gamboa, the Court of Appeal found that the plaintiff “met her burden on the second step by filing an opposing declaration, saying she did not recall the agreement and would not have signed it if she had been aware of it: ‘I do not remember these documents at all .... Had I been made aware of the existence of an arbitration agreement, and been explained its provisions, I would not have signed any such documents.’” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 167.)

However, under Ramirez v. Golden Queen Mining Co., LLC (May 15, 2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 821, the declaration in Gamboa would be insufficient on a handwritten signature issue where there is no denial as to the authenticity of the signature:

“There is a split of authority among the Courts of Appeal as to what constitutes sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute about the authenticity of a handwritten signature on a document agreeing to arbitration. (Compare Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 757–758, review den. Apr. 26, 2023, S278817 with Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164–165) We join Iyere in concluding that an individual is capable of recognizing his or her handwritten signature and if that individual does not deny a handwritten signature is his or her own, that person's failure to remember signing the document does not create a factual dispute about the signature's authenticity. (Iyere, supra, at p. 757.)” (Id. at 825.)

Here, although the signature is not Plaintiff’s signature, there is no evidence presented that the signature is not that of the Decedent. “Consequently, we conclude Ramirez, like the plaintiffs in Iyere, has offered no admissible evidence creating a dispute as to the authenticity of the handwritten signature on the acknowledgement.” (Id. at 836-837.)

As such, the Court finds Defendant has met its first step as to the existence of the agreement, that Plaintiff has not met the burden on the second step and therefore accepts the existence of the agreement to arbitrate.

Neither Toal v. Tardif (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1208 nor Kinder v. Capistrano Beach Care Center, LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 804 involve facts regarding authentication issues as to the first step on a motion to compel arbitration. Toal involved attorneys’ who signed arbitration agreements on behalf of clients without a showing of consent or ratification. (Toal, supra, 178 Cal. App. 4^th at 1213-1214.) Kinder involved issues as to the signatures of the adult children of the resident of a skilled nursing facility to bind the resident, not at issue here where the Decedent purportedly signed the agreement himself. (Kinder, supra, 91 Cal. App. 5^th at 809-810.)

As to the argument regarding mutual assent, Caballero v. Premier Care Simi Valley LLC (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 512, 518 notes:

“ ‘Mutual assent is determined under an objective standard applied to the outward manifestations or expressions of the parties, i.e., the reasonable meaning of their words and acts, and not their unexpressed intentions or understandings.’ [citation omitted] ‘A party's acceptance of an agreement to arbitrate may be express, as where a party signs the agreement.’ [citation omitted].) ‘[O]ne who accepts or signs an instrument, which on its face is a contract, is deemed to assent to all its terms, and cannot escape liability on the ground that he has not read it. If he cannot read, he should have it read or explained to him.’ [citation omitted]”

Again, having found no challenge to the authentication of the signature on the agreement before this Court, the Court does not find a lack of mutual assent under the above.

Authority and Analysis – Non-Signatory Visalia Ventures LLC

Plaintiff argues next that Defendant Visalia Ventures, LLC is not an expressly named “Facility” as defined in the agreement.

The agreement states that it is between the Decedent, as “Resident” and “Prestige Senior Living, LLC, doing business as Prestige Assisting Living & Memory Care in Visalia (‘Facility’)”

The agreement does contain language stating that the claims covered by the agreement include those against “…any parent, subsidiary or affiliate of the facility.”

When a petitioner seeks to compel arbitration as a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement, there are six theories which may support the petition: “‘(a) incorporation by reference; (b) assumption; (c) agency; (d) veil-piercing or alter ego; (e) estoppel; and (f) third-party beneficiary…[Citations.]” (Benaroya v. Willis (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 462, 469.) 

However, the moving papers do not contain evidence that establishes, or attempts to establish, a theory of enforcement by a non-signatory.

While Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group, 246 Cal. App. 4th 1047, 1060-1061 noted that the trial court abused its discretion in striking a supplemental reply of the party moving to compel arbitration, this appears strictly limited to issues of authentication, addressed above and resolved in the favor of the moving party.

Here, the declaration in reply does not  address the non-signatory issue in any capacity. While the Court finds a sufficient showing of an agreement to arbitrate between Decedent and “Prestige Senior Living, LLC, doing business as Prestige Assisting Living & Memory Care in Visalia (‘Facility’)” but that no showing as to an agreement between Decedent and Visalia Ventures, LLC, the non-signatory moving party.

As such, the Court denies the motion on this ground.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Nordsman Mobile Home Lodge, LLC vs. Marcell, Charles Jerome

Case No.:  VCL326616

Date:           March 9, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Petition for Judicial Declaration of Abandonment of Mobile Home

Tentative Ruling: To grant the petition and, based on the filings, award $10,121.50 in unpaid rent and storage costs.

Facts

In this matter, Petitioner, Nordsman Mobile Home Lodge, LLC, dba Nordsman Mobile Home Lodge., seeks a judicial declaration of abandonment of 1970 Buddy Mobilehome, Decal No. LAJ871, Serial No. BCS12131, located at 39850 Road 16, Space #30, Kingsburg, California 93631.

Petitioner identifies registered owners of the Subject Mobilehome as Charles Jerome Marcell, Sr., Carol Ann Marcell, and, Phillip Michael Marcell.

On April 10, 2025, Petitioner caused to be posted a Notice of Belief of Abandonment on the Subject Mobilehome and caused to be deposited a copy of the Notice in the United States mail, postage prepaid, certified, return receipt requested, to Charles Jerome Marcell, Sr., Carol Ann Marcel, Phillip Michael Marcell, and, All Persons Claiming An Interest in the Subject Mobilehome at their last known addresses, under Civil Code §798.61(b.)

Over thirty (30) days have elapsed since this Notice was posted and mailed, and none of the Respondents, nor any other person claiming an interest in said mobilehome has paid to Petitioner the amounts owed or arranged to reclaim the subject mobilehome.

As of August 31, 2025, there was due $5,927.50 for unpaid rent due on the Premises from February 1, 2025. Said amount accrued at the rate of $27.96 per day.

Storage charges of $27.96 per day are accruing from September 1, 2025 through entry of judgment and sale of the mobilehome.

Pursuant to Civil Code section 798.61(c), this petition was properly served via posting and mailed via certified mail after the requisite thirty day period following posting of the notice of belief of abandonment.

On February 4, 2026, Petitioner filed this motion for judicial declaration of abandonment. In support, Petitioner provides the declaration of its managing member who, in support of the belief that the Subject Mobilehome is abandoned, states that the Subject Mobilehome is not affixed permanently to the land, that Charles Jerome Marcell, Carol Ann Marcell, and, Phillip Michael Marcell are the registered owners of the mobile home, that these parties no longer lives at the Premises, that no one has occupied the Subject Mobilehome since before February 2025, that the Subject Mobilehome has occupied Space #30 and that no rent paid for more than twelve continuous months. (Declaration of Geddes ¶¶1-7.)

Therefore, Petitioner seeks a judicial declaration of abandonment, judgment for recovery, sale of contents, unpaid rent and accruing charges, to permit sale and for recovery of attorneys’ fees.

No opposition to the petition has been filed.

Authority and Analysis

Determination of "Abandoned Mobilehome"- Civ. Code § 798.61(a)(1)

Pursuant to Civil Code, section 798.61(a)(1), an " 'abandoned mobilehome' means a mobilehome about which all of the following are true:

“(A) It is located in a mobilehome park on a site for which no rent has been paid to the management for the preceding 60 days.

(B) It is unoccupied.

(C) A reasonable person would believe it to be abandoned.

(D) It is not permanently affixed to the land.” (Civ. Code § 798.61(a)(1).)

As noted above, Petitioner’s managing member declares the Subject Mobilehome is located at the Premises, that it has been unoccupied since at least February of 2025, that it is not permanently affixed to land and therefore has demonstrated a reasonable person would believe the Subject Mobilehome to be abaonded.

Notice of Belief of Abandonment - Civ. Code § 798.61(b)

Civil Code section 798.61(b) requires:

“After determining a mobilehome in a mobilehome park to be an abandoned mobilehome, the management shall post a notice of belief of abandonment on the mobilehome for not less than 30 days, and shall deposit copies of the notice in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the homeowner at the last known address and to any known registered owner, if different from the homeowner, and to any known holder of a security interest in the abandoned mobilehome. This notice shall be mailed by registered or certified mail with a return receipt requested.” (Civ. Code § 798.61, subd. (b).)

Here, Petitioner submits a copy of a Notice of Belief of Abandonment dated April 10, 2025 and served via certified mail and posting pursuant to Civil Code Section 798.64. (Declaration of Geddes ¶7 – Exs. 2, 3.) Additionally, the petition attaches a proof of service of this notice.

Respondents Charles Jerome Marcell, Carol Ann Marcell, and, Phillip Michael Marcell are the only registered owners of the Subject Mobilehome according to a copy of the registration card provided (Declaration of Geddes ¶4 – Ex. 1)

Therefore, the Court finds the requirements of Section 798.61(b) are satisfied.

Petition for Judicial Declaration - Civ. Code § 798.61(c)

Civil Code section 798.61(c)(1) states:

“Thirty or more days following posting pursuant to subdivision (b), the management may file a petition in the superior court in the county in which the mobilehome park is located, for a judicial declaration of abandonment of the mobilehome. A proceeding under this subdivision is a limited civil case. Copies of the petition shall be served upon the homeowner, any known registered owner, and any known person having a lien or security interest of record in the mobilehome by posting a copy on the mobilehome and mailing copies to those persons at their last known addresses by registered or certified mail with a return receipt requested in the United States mail, postage prepaid.” (Civ. Code § 798.61(c)(1).)

On February 11, 2026, Petitioner filed proof of service demonstrating Respondents were served with the Petition, Notice of Hearing and Assignment, and Orders on February 4, 2026, via certified mail with return receipt requested and by posting copies at the Subject Mobilehome.

Therefore, the Court finds the service requirements of Civil Code section 798.61(c)(1) are satisfied.

The Court, therefore, grants the petition to declare the Subject Mobilehome abandoned.

Charges, Attorney's Fees, and Costs

Civil Code section 798.61(d)(2) states:

"If, at the hearing, the petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the criteria for an abandoned mobilehome has been satisfied and no party establishes an interest therein at the hearing and tenders all past due rent and other charges, the court shall enter a judgment of abandonment, determine the amount of charges to which the petitioner is entitled, and award attorney's fees and costs to the petitioner."

Here, Petitioner seeks:

(a) $5,927.50 representing storage charges owing for the premises accrued through August 31, 2025;

(b) $4,194.00, representing storage charges at the daily rate of $27.96 per day accruing from September 1, 2025 through January 28, 20266, the date of the declaration of Geddes and for amounts that will continue to accrue at that rate through entry of judgment;

(c) Recovery through the date of sale of the Buddy Mobile home.

(d) Recovery regarding the sale of the Buddy Mobile home and its contents, including the reasonable costs of sale;

(e) Storage charges, at the daily rate of $27.96 per day accruing from the judgment entry date through the date of the sale;

(f)  Costs of suit of $673.67

(g) Attorney’s fees of $1,500.00 (Declaration of Geddes ¶10.)

The Court, at this time, will award $5,927.50 and $4,194.00, for a total of $10,121.50. Counsel may appear at the hearing as to proof of increased damages based on the daily accrual rates. However, the Court will not, absent authority, prospectively order damages as to the sale and future storage charges.

Additionally, no verified memorandum of costs has been presented and no attorney declaration as to the fees has been provided. The Court, therefore, defers these issues to a noticed motion for fees and costs.

The Court further notes no proposed order lodged as to the relief sought and authorized in this ruling.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Visalia Ceramic Tile, Inc., a California Corporation vs. De Anza Tile Co., Inc., a California Corporation et al

Case No.:   VCU327154 

Date:           March 9, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:      Demurrer

Tentative Ruling:  In this matter, the Court will clarify the procedural history and current status of the case.

To start, Defendant De Anza filed a demurrer to the initial complaint. However, Judge Burke recused himself from the case the day prior to the hearing. The Court transferred the matter to Judge Hillman, who reviewed the ruling to demurrer, approved it and the Court, thereafter, posted the tentative ruling with the statement:

“If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.”

No party appeared and the Court, thereafter, entered its tentative ruling as its final ruling.

However, within the permitted time to do so, Plaintiff filed a Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 challenge as to Judge Hillman, which was accepted.

Thereafter, the Court transferred this matter to Department 7, withdrew its ruling on demurrer (given the 170.6 acceptance) and reset the initial demurrer hearing for this date.

However, on February 5, 2026, Plaintiff, presumably in response to the ruling on demurrer permitting leave to amend, filed an amended complaint.

As such, this Court will accept the amended complaint as the operative complaint in this matter and permit responsive pleadings to be filed thereto.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Ogata, Angelina vs. Davidian III, Sarkis

Case No.:  VCL326121

Date:           March 9, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:      Motion to Set Aside Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts and Analysis

This unlawful detainer matter proceeded to trial November 12, 2025, entering judgment for possession in favor of Plaintiff and for costs of $687.45.

Judgment was entered November 21, 2025.

Defendant seeks to set aside the judgment under Code of Civil Procedure sections 663, 473(d) and seeks to coordinate this matter with a ongoing trust proceeding. Defendant has filed a proof of electronic service of this motion.

No opposition appears filed.

As to section 663, Defendant has not complied with section 663a as to filing and service of the intention to set aside and vacate the judgment, the grounds on which the motion will be made and specifying the particulars in which the legal basis for the decision is not consistent with or supported by the facts. As such, the Court denies the motion for failure to comply with section 663a.

As to section 473(d), it permits correcting of clerical mistakes or set aside a void judgment. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the unlawful detainer judgment against him is void. Defendant states the judgment rests on an erroneous legal basis and is not supported by the evidence. This does not demonstrate the judgment is void. Defendant raises post judgment acts which do not appear to affect the judgment.

Further, the Court’s position is that the relief sought by Defendant, under the sections cited herein, must be sought prior to the execution and return of the writ of possession.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order

Examiner Notes for Probate Matters Calendared

• Visalia Division 
• South County Justice Center Division