Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, March 6, 2025, are:

Re:                Citibank N.A. vs. Solis, Ramon

Case No.:  VCL311320

Date:           March 6, 2025

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 5 admitted.

Facts

On or about October 21, 2024, Plaintiff served by mail Requests for Admissions, Set One on Defendant. The discovery was mailed to the address on Defendant’s answer. As of the date of the filing of this motion, no response has been received by Plaintiff. Plaintiff now seeks to deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 5 admitted.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. Here, Defendant has failed to serve a timely response and Plaintiff has moved for an order to deem the admissions admitted.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion. The facts and allegations alleged in Requests for Admissions Nos. 1 through 5 of Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Admission shall be deemed admitted.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 Pitigliano, Amy vs. Garcia, Dolores Ledesma

Case No.:   VCU308450

Date:           March 6, 2025

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion with leave to amend; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint. CMC and OSC continued to May 21, 2025; 8:30 am; D1. 

Facts

In this complaint, Plaintiff Pitigliano alleges that Defendant Garcia committed an intentional tort based on the following:

“Defendant Dolores Ledesma Garcia, a married woman Plaintiff's husband used to date prior to July 2023, showed him and others still pictures she had taken in 2023 with hidden video cameras in the home she and Plaintiffs husband previously shared while living together as boyfriend and girlfriend.” (Complaint Page 4.)

Plaintiff alleges these photographs and videos are “explicit and personal in nature…” and that “Defendant has, in the recent past, sent pictures from these videos that she has kept, watched, and used repeatedly in attempts to illicit money from Plaintiffs husband and attempts to illicit sympathy from acquaintances as Defendant is currently failing in an attempt to request a Restraining Order.” (Complaint Page 4.)

Plaintiff further alleges “Defendant is currently using these intimately personal pictures of Plaintiffs husband in an attempt to cause such intentional emotional distress as to cause Plaintiffs husband to react in a way which gives her the only proof she can get in her failing attempt at obtaining a Restraining Order.” (Complaint Page 4.)

Plaintiff indicates she suffers from headaches, insomnia, tearfulness and extreme anxiety as a result of this conduct and Defendant’s alleged statements about Plaintiff’s husband that he is “1) a drug user, 2) a loser, 3) an abuser of women, 4) treated her terribly, and more.” (Complaint Page 4.)

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

On January 27, 2025, Defendant filed this motion for judgment on the pleadings. Defendant notes two causes of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress and argues that the complaint fails to state sufficient facts to allege these causes of action.

The Court notes, however, there does not appear to be a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress and the Court will not adjudicate this cause of action that does not appear to have been pled.

No opposition appears to have been filed.

Meet and Confer

“Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a).) However, “[a] determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to grant or deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a)(4).)

Here, the Declaration of Defendant’s former counsel indicates a sufficient meet and confer process has occurred.

Authorities and Analysis

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is used to challenge a pleading in the same manner as a general demurrer, i.e., the challenged pleading (1) establishes that the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction or (2) does not allege facts sufficient to support a cause of action or defense. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438(c)(1), see International Assn. of Firefighters v. City of San Jose (2011) 195 Cal.App.4^th 1179,1196; Bufil v. Dollar Financial Group (2008) 162 Cal.App.4^th 1193, 1202.)  Like a demurrer, the grounds for this motion must appear on the face of the pleading or be based on facts capable of judicial notice, including court records.  (See Bufil, at 1202; Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. Superior Court (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 978, 986, and fn. 6.)

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The elements of IIED are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by defendant; (2) made with intent to cause, or with reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (3) severe emotional suffering; and (4) actual and proximate causation. (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1259; Bogard v. Employers Casualty Company (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 602, 616.)

To start, the Court considers the allegations of disseminating explicit photographs of a person without their consent to be sufficiently extreme and outrageous conduct made with the intent to cause or with reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress. "Normally the test of extreme and outrageous conduct is an objective one — would the conduct involved outrage the 'average member of the community?" (Katsaris v. Cook (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 256, 267.)

However, “It is not enough that the conduct be intentional and outrageous. It must be conduct directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware.” (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903.) Here, the conduct appears to be the dissemination of private, explicit photographs of Plaintiff’s husband to others outside the presence of Plaintiff.

This, to the Court, appears directed at Plaintiff’s husband and the allegations do not demonstrate that the Plaintiff herself was present or that the dissemination occurred in the presence of Plaintiff. “The law limits claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress to egregious conduct toward plaintiff proximately caused by defendant.”  (Miller v. National Broadcasting Co.) (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1463, 1489) 

However, the Supreme Court in Christensen further noted that “The only exception to this rule is that recognized when the defendant is aware, but acts with reckless disregard, of the plaintiff and the probability that his or her conduct will cause severe emotional distress to that plaintiff…” (Christensen, supra, 54 Cal. 3d at 906.)

Despite this alternative theory, the Christensen opinion’s examples of its application do not appear to match with the facts alleged in this case.

The Christensen opinion notes that in State Rubbish etc. Assn. v. Siliznoff (1952) 38 Cal.2d 330, 337, “we observed that theretofore California had allowed recovery when ‘physical injury resulted from intentionally subjecting the plaintiff to serious mental distress.’ There, of course, agents of the defendant had intentionally caused the plaintiff to suffer extreme fright for the purpose of gaining a business advantage of the particular plaintiff.” (Christensen, supra, 54 Cal. 3d at 904.)

The Supreme Court continued, noting: “Similarly, in Cervantez v. J. C. Penney Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 579, in which reckless disregard was a theory, the misconduct was the arrest of the plaintiff with knowledge that he had not committed an offense or disregard of whether he had.” (Christensen, supra, 54 Cal. 3d at 904.)

“In Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932 and Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, racial epithets were directed at the plaintiff.” (Christensen, supra, 54 Cal. 3d at 904.)

“In Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, in which a wrongful death action was predicated on a theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress, defendant's conduct was directed specifically at the plaintiff's decedent during his lifetime.” (Christensen, supra, 54 Cal. 3d at 904.)

Finally, “In Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148 defendants continually harassed the plaintiff.” (Christensen, supra, 54 Cal. 3d at 904.)

As noted by these applications of the reckless disregard rule, conduct was still directed at the Plaintiff, as opposed to at Plaintiff’s husband for the purpose of gaining an advantage in the restraining order matter.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion, with leave to amend. A motion for judgment on the pleadings, like demurrer, cannot be granted without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Alba Bustamente, Estefani Carolina vs. Kaweah Delta Health Care, Inc

Case No.:   VCU316413

Date:           March 6, 2025

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Defendant Kaweah’s (1) Demurrer and (2) Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling: (1) To overrule the demurrer to the second cause of action; to sustain the demurrer to the third, fifth and eighth causes of action without leave to amend; (2) To grant the motion without leave to amend; to order Kaweah to file an answer no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

Facts Common to (1) and (2)

Plaintiffs are Estefani Carolina Alba Bustamente, individually, and as the Successor-in-Interest to The Estate Of Martin Sebastian Jr. Medina, and Martin Medina Carillo, individually, and as the Successor-in-Interest to The Estate Of Martin Sebastian Jr. Medina and The Estate Of Martin Sebastian Jr. Medina.

The complaint alleges that on September 05, 2024, Plaintiff Estefani Carolina Alba Bustamante was approximately thirty-nine (39) weeks pregnant with her baby, Martin Sebastian Jr. Medina. (Complaint ¶19.) It is further alleged that Plaintiff Ms. Bustamante had a medically known and high risk of becoming pre-eclamptic. (Complaint ¶21.)

At approximately 3:00 am on September 6, 2024, Plaintiff Ms. Bustamante experienced contractions, pain and was bleeding heavily. (Complaint ¶25.) Plaintiffs Ms. Bustamonte and Mr. Carillo arrived at Kaweah at approximately 4:23 am where an ultrasound was performed, the pain and bleeding had not subsided and Plaintiff Ms. Bustamante was given fentanyl. (Complaint ¶26.)

It is alleged that neither Plaintiff spoke English and at no time was a competent, certified medical translator present and no competent, certified medical translation of the medical services being prescribed or performed was provided. (Complaint ¶27.)

It is further alleged that at no point was Ms. Bustamante told an emergency cesarean operation was a possible or likely outcome, nor were the potential risks and benefits of an induction of labor as opposed to a cesarean operation discussed. (Complaint ¶28.) Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Bustamante did not give consent to a medical induction of labor. (Complaint ¶29.)

An epidural was administered and Ms. Bustamante began pushing. (Complaint ¶36.) It was determined that the baby’s heart rate had decelerated and that Ms. Bustamante should undergo an emergency cesarean section operation. (Complaint ¶37.)

Ms. Bustamante was taken into surgery and the baby was delivered via emergency cesarean section. (Complaint ¶38.) However, the baby was born with severe brain injury due to prolonged oxygen deprivation. (Complaint ¶38.)

Ms. Bustamante had sustained a complete rupture of the uterus. (Complaint ¶39.)

The baby passed away on September 10, 2024 with the cause of death listed as Severe Hypoxic Ischemic Encephalopathy and Respiratory Failure. (Complaint ¶43.)

Based on these facts, Plaintiffs allege medical malpractice, medical battery, negligent infliction of emotional distress, survival, failure to provide medical translation under Health and Safety Code section 1259, vicarious liability, negligent hiring, supervision and retention, violation of patient’s rights under CC. Regs. Tit. 22 §70707 and wrongful death. Plaintiffs seek punitive damages against Kaweah.

Plaintiffs indicate Kaweah is a hospital district and that the government claim presented to Kaweah was rejected. (Complaint ¶¶ 5, 14.)

Defendant Kaweah demurrers to the second cause of action for medical battery, third cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, fifth cause of action for failure to provide medical translation and eighth cause of action for violation of patient’s rights.

Kaweah also seeks to strike the claims for punitive damages.

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue an insufficient meet and confer process has occurred, that they have pled sufficient facts for each cause of action and punitive damages.

(1) Authority and Analysis - Demurrer

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Meet and Confer

While Plaintiffs raise the sufficiency of the meet and confer process here, the Court notes that pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41(a)(4) “A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer.” Plaintiffs have otherwise opposed the demurrer and the Court will rule on the demurrer.

Second Cause of Action - Medical Battery

As to this cause of action, Defendant Kaweah argues that insufficient facts as to medical battery have been alleged against it, noting that the complaint pleads “[Defendant ] ABRAHAM BETRE, D.O.’s and various DOE Defendants' conduct in performing medical procedures, including induction of labor, without consent from ESTEFANI BUSTAMANTE and/or MARTIN SEBASTIAN JR. MEDINA was a substantial factor in causing ESTEFANI BUSTAMANTE and MARTIN SEBASTIAN JR. MEDINA'S harm…" (Complaint ¶11.)

However, the complaint pleads that “Ms. Bustamante and Mr. Medina Carrillo reasonably believed that ABRAHAM BETRE, D.O., was an employee of KAWEAH and/or Kaweah Health Medical Center.” (Complaint ¶34.)

This appears sufficient, at least at the pleading stage, to hold Kaweah liable for the acts of its alleged employee.

The Court, therefore, overrules the demurrer to the second cause of action.

Third Cause of Action – NIED

There is no independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 984.)

The Court observes a cause of action for medical malpractice has been pled. “'Professional negligence' means a negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death, provided that such services are within the scope of services for which the provider is licensed and which are not within any restriction imposed by the licensing agency or licensed hospital." (Code Civ. Proc. § 340.5(2).) The test of whether an act or omission is considered ordinary negligence or professional negligence, is "not whether the situation calls for a high or low level of skill, or whether a high or low level of skill was actually employed, but rather the test is whether the negligent act occurred in the rendering of services for which the health care provider is licensed." (Murillo v. Good Samaritan Hospital (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 50, 57.)

A "merely duplicative pleading which adds nothing to the complaint by way of fact or theory" is not sufficient to survive demurrer. (Award Metals, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1135.)

Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer without leave to amend as to the third cause of action.

Fifth Cause of Action – Medical Translation

“A private party can sue for violation of a statute only where the statute in question allows it. (Lu v. Hawaiian Gardens Casino, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 592, 596.) We first examine the statutory text to see if it contains “‘clear, understandable, unmistakable terms,’ which strongly and directly” indicate a private right of action is allowed. (Id. at p. 597.) The statute may, for instance, refer to obtaining a remedy or enforcing its provisions “by way of an action.” (Ibid.) Where the text does not contain an unmistakable directive, the legislative history may indicate whether the Legislature intended to create a private  cause of action. (Id. at p. 598.)” (Mayron v. Google LLC (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 566, 571.)

The Court observes that Health and Safety Code section 1259(d) indicates noncompliance with this section shall be reportable to licensing authorities but does not appear to create a private right of action for violations thereof.

The Court, therefore, sustains the demurrer without leave to amend as to this cause of action.

Eighth Cause of Action – Patient’s Rights

Likewise, the Court’s review of 22 CCR 70707 reveals no legislative intent to create a private right of action,

The Court, therefore, sustains the demurrer without leave to amend as to this cause of action.

(2) Authority and Analysis – Motion to Strike

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435(b)(1).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436; Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.) 

Meet and Confer

While Plaintiffs raise the sufficiency of the meet and confer process here, the Court notes that pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5(a)(4) “A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to grant or deny the motion to strike.” Plaintiffs have substantively opposed the motion and the Court will rule on the motion.

Punitive Damages Against Public Entity

Based upon paragraph 5 of the complaint and the presentation of a government claim, it appears undisputed that Kaweah is a public entity under Government Code section 811.2.

Government Code section 818 states: "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, a public entity is not liable for damages awarded under Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other damages imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way of punishing defendant." 

Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against Kaweah is barred  and Court will grant the motion to strike the references to punitive damages as to Kaweah without leave to amend.

Attorneys’ Fees

Although the motion to strike seeks to strike attorneys’ fees, the Court notes that the memorandum of points and authorities presents no argument as to the striking of the attorneys’ fees request.

Lacking any argument, the Court denies the motion to strike the reference to attorneys’ fees.

Conclusion

Therefore, the Court orders Defendant Kaweah to answer the complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing, based on the rulings on demurrer and this motion to strike.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:               Velasquez, Tomas vs. Timmerman, Andrew James

Case No.:  PCL316894

Date:          March 6, 2025

Time:          9:30 A.M. 

Dept.          23-The Honorable Glade F. Roper

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion for Relief from Default Judgment or Stay of Execution of Writ of Possession

Tentative Ruling: To order Defendant to testify as to the dates of the hernia requiring emergency surgery as to the motion for relief from default; to stay execution of the writ upon prepayment of per diem rent for the length of the stay

Facts

This unlawful detainer matter filed January 13, 2025 involves property located at 341 S. Kessing Street, Porterville, CA, 93257 (“Subject Property”) (Complaint ¶3.)

The Court notes this action is based on a sixty day notice to quit.

Pursuant to this Court’s order, Defendant Timmerman was served via posting and mailing on January 27, 2025.

On February 25, 2025, default and default judgment were entered for possession only.

On February 27, 2025, the writ of possession was issued.

On March 5, 2025, Defendant filed this ex parte motion for relief from default judgment or to stay execution of the writ. In support of the motion for relief, Defendant provides no factual basis for relief, checking the boxes for mistake and inadvertence without more. However, Defendant does, later in the declaration, state “I was unable to come to court because of the following medical emergency: hernia Requiring [sic] emergency surgery / pnemonea [sic]”

As to the stay request, Defendant indicates he would be on the streets and homeless and has health issues.

Defendant indicates notice of this ex parte motion provided to Plaintiff’s counsel by voicemail.

Authority and Analysis

As to the motion for relief from default judgment, it must be made within a reasonable time, not to exceed six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order or proceeding was taken.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 473(b).)  There is no issue as to timing of the filing of this motion.

The court has broad discretion to set aside the entry of default, default judgment, or a dismissal, but that discretion can be exercised only if the defendant establishes a proper ground for relief, by the proper procedure and within the set time limits.  “Section 473 is often applied liberally where the party in default moves promptly to seek relief, and the party opposing the motion will not suffer prejudice if relief is granted.  [Citations.]  In such situations ‘very slight evidence will be required to justify a court in setting aside the default.’  [Citation.]”  (Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 233.) The Court may relieve a party or counsel from a judgment, dismissal, order or other proceeding taken against the party resulting from mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).)  

“A ‘mistake’ exists when a person, under some erroneous conviction of law or fact, does, or omits to do, some act which, but for the erroneous conviction, he would not have done, or omitted. It may arise either from unconsciousness, ignorance, forgetfulness, imposition, or misplaced confidence.” (Salazar v. Steelman (1937) 22 Cal.App.2d 402, 405, 410.) “Surprise” is defined as “some condition or situation in which a party to a cause is unexpectedly placed to his injury, without any default or negligence of his own, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.” (Miller v. Lee (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 10, 16.) Further, “excusable neglect” has been defined as “neglect that might have been the act or omission of a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.” (Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.App.3d 427, 435.)

Here, the Court intends to obtain testimony from Defendant as to the basis for the stated mistake or inadvertence in relation to the emergency hernia surgery. Therefore, the Court reserves its ruling as to the motion for relief from default.

The Court notes, however, Defendant has lodged a proposed answer in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b)

Defendant also seeks to stay execution of the judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 918. While section 918 contains no express grounds to issue a discretionary stay, equitable or hardship issues may be considered. Defendant states he will be homeless and suffers from health concerns.

If the judgment would be stayed on appeal only by posting an undertaking…the maximum §918 stay on execution…[is] thus, ordinarily a maximum 40-day stay on enforcement of limited civil case UD judgments…” California Practice Guide, Landlord-Tenant, Paragraph 9:427 (Rutter Group 2021).) Thus, the Court may enter a stay of only 40 days in this matter.

Any stay is typically conditioned on payment of per diem rent during the period of the stay (California Practice Guide, Landlord-Tenant, Paragraph 9:426 (Rutter Group 2021).) The Court notes the complaint alleges $10 in rent per day.

The Court is inclined to grant the stay, therefore, upon prepayment of per diem rent for the length of the stay, limited to 40 days.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Examiner Notes for Probate Matters Calendared

• Visalia Division 
• South County Justice Center Division