Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, June 16, 2026, are:

Re:                Lopez, Lorena Espitia vs. Olvera, James

Case No.:   VCU318866

Date:           June 16, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Defendant Olvera’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To find the motion moot by the voluntary dismissal of Defendant Olvera.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Jimenez, Jose v. Department of Motor Vehicles

Case No.:   VCU329571

Date:           June 16, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-Honorable Bret Hillman

Motion:     Ruling on Petition for Writ of Mandate

Tentative Ruling: Petition for Writ of Mandate is denied.

Facts

On December 9, 2024, the petitioner was driving a Freightliner truck on State Route 198, east of the State Route 99 over-crossing. The petitioner was traveling at a speed of 55 MPH in the number one lane, next to a Nissan vehicle in the number two lane. The Nissan’s speed is unknown. It is also unknown if the Nissan was right next to the petitioner’s vehicle or right behind it.

Based on the written description made by CHP Officer Hughes of a dashcam video provided by the petitioner’s employer, the petitioner was having a conversation on his Bluetooth device, glanced at his right-side mirror twice, and started to change lanes from lane number one to lane number two, where the Nissan was. It is unknown if the petitioner initiated his blinker prior to initiating the lane change.

The Nissan then veered onto the right shoulder, lost control, veered back into traffic and collided with the petitioner’s vehicle. The Nissan became entangled with the right front of the petitioner’s vehicle. The petitioner then veered to the left onto the north asphalt shoulder. The right-side tire of the Nissan gripped the asphalt as the petitioner’s vehicle pushed it causing the Nissan to turn over. The Nissan came to a rest on its roof as the petitioner’s vehicle came to rest on top of it.   

Procedural History

Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) Administrative Hearing Procedure

On August 27, 2025, the DMV conducted an administrative hearing regarding the suspension of the petitioner’s driver’s license. (Administrative Record (AR), page 29.) This was after the hearing was continued three or four times due to the CHP Officer Hughes nonappearance.

At the hearing, the hearing officer asked to admit the traffic crash report, CHP 555, the order of suspension letter, and a DMV record print-out. (Id. at 33.)

The hearing officer asked, “Mr. Caine, do you have any objection to me submitting documents 1-3 into evidence?” In response, the petitioner’s trial counsel stated, “None at all.” (Id. at 34.)

On September 2, 2025, the hearing officer issued findings and a decision to uphold the petitioner’s driver’s license suspension.

On September 15, 2025, the petitioner requested a department review of the DMV’s findings and determination.

On October 22, 2025, the DMV determined that the decision to suspend the petitioner’s driver’s license was proper and required. Petitioner’s driving privileges was suspended effective May 15, 2025.

Standard of Review

Cal. Veh. Code § 13559 establishes this Court’s jurisdiction to review the DMV’s hearing that led to the Petitioner’s driver’s license being suspended. Cal. Veh. Code § 13559 subd. (a) states,

The review shall be on the record of the hearing and the court shall not consider other evidence. If the court finds that the department exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority, made an erroneous interpretation of the law, acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, or made a determination which is not supported by the evidence in the record, the court may order the department to rescind the order of suspension or revocation and return, or reissue a new license to, the person.

If the Court finds that the department exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority, made an erroneous interpretation of the law, acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, or made a decision which is not supported by the evidence in the record, then the Court can order the return of the Petitioner’s driver’s license or order a new hearing. Cal. Veh. Code § 13559 subd. (a), Hall v. Superior Court (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 792, 807, and Cal. Civ. Proc. § 1094.5.

Authority and Analysis

1. The Evidentiary Challenges Made in This Petition Were Waived in the Underlying Administrative Proceedings

Government Code § 11513, subd. (d) states, “Hearsay evidence may be used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence but over timely objection shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection in civil actions. An objection is timely if made before submission of the case or on reconsideration.”

In Jackson v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1994) 22 Cal. App. 4th 730, 733, Jackson challenged the suspension of his driver’s license. There, the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) admitted the arrest/investigation report. (Id. at 734.) The DMV suspended Jackson’s license. (Id.) After an agency review and the trial court denied a writ of mandate, Jackson appealed to the Court of Appeals arguing in part that the officer’s police report was hearsay. (Id. at 735.) The Court affirmed the judgment reasoning in part, “If Jackson had made a foundational objection, the DMV could have subpoenaed Reyes to testify. Hence, as noted by the DMV, Jackson has waived any foundational objection to the arrest report.” (Id. at 738.)

Here, the petitioner, through trial counsel, stated he had no objection to the admission of the police report. As reasoned in Jackson, if he had, the respondent could have further continued the hearing to allow for the officer to be present.

When presented with this option by the hearing officer, the petitioner objected to any further continuance. (AR 34-36.)

2. The Petitioner’s Due Process Rights Were Not Violated Because He Was Offered a Continuance to Assure the Officer’s Appearance and Objected to it

Gov. Code § 11513, subd. (b) states, “Each party shall have these rights: to call and examine witnesses, to introduce exhibits; to cross-examine opposing witnesses on any matter relevant to the issues even though that matter was not covered in the direct examination; to impeach any witness regardless of which party first called him or her to testify; and to rebut the evidence against him or her. If respondent does not testify in his or her own behalf he or she may be called and examined as if under cross-examination.”

Here, Officer Hughes did not respond to the multiple subpoenas issued by the DMV. The hearing officer asked the petitioner, “So, you’re objecting to give him a few more minutes then to appear for the hearing?” The petitioner’s counsel responded, “I’m afraid so.” (AR 35.)

Then the hearing officer asked, “I assume that you’d be holding the same objection not continuing the hearing altogether then?” The petitioner’s counsel responded, “I would.” (AR 35-36.)

The petitioner cannot now claim his due process rights, as codified in Gov. Code § 11513, subd. (b), were violated when the hearing proceeded without Officer Hughes testimony. Further, without his appearance there was nothing to cross-examine. To the extent the code allows the petitioner to subpoena witnesses, he did not do so. He cannot complain now that he did not have the opportunity to cross-examine a witness who did not testify, he did not object to the officer’s report being admitted and did not subpoena the officer himself.

Consequently, the petitioner’s due process rights were not violated.

3. Exercising It’s Independent Judgment, the Court Finds That the DMV Did Not Abuse it’s Discretion and It’s Findings and Conclusions Are Supported By the Unobjected to Evidence

Both parties acknowledge that the Court is supposed to review the administrative record using its independent judgment.

Independent judgment review “does not mean that the preliminary work performed by the administrative board in sifting the evidence and in making its findings is wasted effort…[I]n weighing the evidence the courts can and should be assisted by the findings of the board. The findings of the board come before the court with a strong presumption of their correctness, and the burden rests on the complaining party to convince the court that the board’s decision is contrary to the weight of the evidence.” (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 805, 812.)

Vehicle Code § 13359 states, “The department may suspend or revoke the privilege of any person to operate a motor vehicle upon any of the grounds which authorize the refusal to issue a license.”

Vehicle Code § 12809, subd. (e) states, “The department may refuse to issue or renew a driver’s license to any person: (e) If the department determines that the applicant is a negligent or incompetent operator of a motor vehicle.”

a. Negligence

The elements of negligence are duty, breach, cause and damages. There does not appear to be any question that the petitioner held a duty to act with due care while driving a freightliner truck. Rather the question is whether he breached that duty causing the death of the other driver.

In the “Order of Suspension/Revocation” the specific allegation of negligence is that the petitioner, “caused, or contributed to, a fatal accident.” However, the fact there was an automobile accident that was fatal does not automatically mean there was negligence.

The hearing officer found the following facts in her Findings and decision:

“Due to…[petitioner’s] inattention while being on his hands-free cellphone, respondent began merging into the #2 lane without first ensuring the lane change could be conducted safely, directly into the path of V-2. V-2 was forced onto the right asphalt shoulder, where P-2 lost control of V-2.” (AR 003.)

Petitioner “is a negligent operator of a motor vehicle because he caused a fatal injury traffic collision by being in violation of section 21658, subd. (a) of the CVC in that: A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from the lane until such movement can be made with reasonable safety.” (AR 004.)

“The petitioner herein killed a pedestrian and was convicted of reckless driving in a criminal proceeding. To hold that such recklessness, coupled with his record of many previous convictions for speeding is not amenable to disciplinary action by the department of Motor Vehicles because section 12810 provides for a violation point count determinative of a presumption, prima facie, of negligence, would thwart the very purpose of such sections, namely, the effective elimination of hazard on the public highways.” (Kriesel v. McCarthy (1963) 214 Cal. App. 2d 69, 73.)

Here, as in Kriesel, the petitioner’s driving record is not clean. The petitioner has suffered a conviction for violating Vehicle Code section 23153, subd. (b) – (DUI Causing Injury) and Vehicle Code section 22406, subd. (b) – (Speeding in a passenger vehicle or bus drawing any other vehicle).

Further, it has been demonstrated by the evidence in the admitted and unobjected to police report that the petitioner changed lanes in this case which caused the victim to have to swerve onto the right asphalt shoulder. It is alleged based on this conduct that the petitioner violated Vehicle Code section 21658, subd. (a). Based on this finding, it can be concluded that the petitioner breached his duty causing the death of the other passenger.

The petitioner’s driving record, in conjunction with the determination that he was at fault in the accident at issue in this case, is enough to establish that he was a negligent or incompetent operator of a motor vehicle.

Conclusion

The Petition for a Writ of Mandate is denied.  

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Eckert, Russell et al vs. Hyundai Motor America, a California Corporation et al

Case No.:   VCU330831

Date:           June 16, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and delegate issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator. To set a CMC regarding the status of the arbitration on December 18, 2026 at 8:30 AM in Dept. 2.

Background Facts

In this Song Beverly Act case, Defendant seeks to compel arbitration of claims for breach of express and implied warranty.

Facts – Agreement to Arbitrate and Delegation Clause

Defendant notes that the vehicle at issue was accompanied by a warranty provided by Hyundai, located in the Owner’s Handbook & Warranty Information (“Warranty”), which included a binding arbitration provision. Defendant’s counsel provides a copy of the warranty in support of the motion.

Additionally, Defendant notes a Bluelink Connected Services Agreement that also contains an arbitration provision.

Plaintiff objects to the attachment of the Warranty Handbook and the Services Agreement.

Neither party appears to discuss the presence of the delegation clauses.

The Court notes Warranty Handbook contains the following provision:

BINDING ARBITRATION FOR CALIFORNIA VEHICLES ONLY:

PLEASE READ THIS SECTION IN ITS ENTIRETY AS IT AFFECTS YOUR RIGHTS THIS SECTION DOES NOT PRECLUDE YOU FROM FIRST PURSUING ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION THROUGH BBB AUTO LINE AS DESCRIBED IN THE “ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION” PROVISION IN SECTION 3 OF THIS HANDBOOK.

If you purchased or leased your Hyundai vehicle in the State of California, you and we, Hyundai Motor America, each agree that any claim or disputes between us (including between you and any of our affiliated companies) related to or arising out of your vehicle purchase, advertising for the vehicle, use of your vehicle, the performance of the vehicle, any service relating to the vehicle, the vehicle warranty, representations in the warranty, or the duties contemplated under the warranty, including without limitation claims related to false or misleading advertising, unfair competition, breach of contract or warranty, the failure to conform a vehicle to warranty, failure to repurchase or replace your vehicle, or claims for a refund or partial refund of your vehicle's purchase price (excluding personal injury claims), but excluding claims brought under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, shall be resolved by binding arbitration at either your or our election, even if the claim is initially filed in a court of law. If either you or we elect to resolve our dispute via arbitration (as opposed to in a court of law), such binding arbitration shall be administered by and through the American Arbitration Association (AAA) under its Consumer Arbitration Rules.

…

This agreement to arbitrate is intended to be broadly interpreted and to make all disputes and claims between us (including our affiliated companies) relating to or arising out of your vehicle purchase, use or performance of your vehicle, or the vehicle warranty subject to arbitration to the maximum extent permitted by law. The arbitrator (and not a court) shall decide all issues of interpretation, scope, and application of this agreement.

…

This agreement evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. Judgment upon any award in arbitration may be entered in any court having jurisdiction.” (emphasis added.)

The Bluelink Agreement likewise contains the following delegation clause:

“All issues are for the arbitrator to decide, including the scope and enforceability of this arbitration provision as well as the Agreement´s other terms and conditions, and the arbitrator shall have exclusive authority to resolve any such dispute relating to the scope and enforceability of this arbitration provision or any other term of this Agreement including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part of this arbitration provision or Agreement is void or voidable.”

Authority and Analysis - Delegation Clause

Malone v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1551 summarizes the applicable analysis with respect to delegation clauses:

“A delegation clause requires issues of interpretation and enforceability of an arbitration agreement to be resolved by the arbitrator. Delegation clauses have the potential to create problems of circularity. For example, suppose an arbitration agreement delegates the issue of enforceability to the arbitrator. If the arbitrator concludes that the arbitration agreement is, in fact, not enforceable, this would mean that the entire agreement, including the delegation clause, is unenforceable-a finding that would undermine the arbitrator's jurisdiction to make that finding in the first place. For this reason, courts have treated the delegation clause as a separate agreement to arbitrate solely the issues of enforceability…

“For this reason, when a party is claiming that an arbitration agreement is unenforceable, it is important to determine whether the party is making a specific challenge to the enforceability of the delegation clause or is simply arguing that the agreement as a whole is unenforceable. If the party's challenge is directed to the agreement as a whole--even if it applies equally to the delegation clause--the delegation clause is severed out and enforced; thus, the arbitrator, not the court, will determine whether the agreement is enforceable. In contrast, if the party is making a specific challenge to the delegation clause, the court must determine whether the delegation clause itself may be enforced (and can only delegate the general issue of enforceability to the arbitrator if it first determines the delegation clause is enforceable). (Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 70)”

Here, the delegation clause in the Warranty clearly and unmistakably, with consistent and unambiguous reservation of all issues, delegates the authority as to an agreement to enforce, including defenses to enforcement, to the arbitrator by stating:  

“The arbitrator (and not a court) shall decide all issues of interpretation, scope, and application of this agreement.”

The same clear and unmistakable language is found in the Bluelink Agreement:

“All issues are for the arbitrator to decide, including the scope and enforceability of this arbitration provision…”

Challenge to Agreement in its Entirety as Unenforceable

Here, Plaintiff has challenged the Warranty Handbook and Services Agreement, noted above, are unenforceable in their entirety on a number of grounds.

The Court, therefore, interprets this challenge, under Rent-A-Center and Malone, above, a challenge “…directed to the agreement as a whole--even if it applies equally to the delegation clause--the delegation clause is severed out and enforced; thus, the arbitrator, not the court, will determine whether the agreement is enforceable.”

Therefore, the Court will sever out the delegation clause and enforce it.

As such, the Court grants the motion and compels issues of interpretation, applicability, enforceability, and formation to the arbitrator pursuant to Warranty  Handbook noted above as well as the Bluelink Agreement.

The Court further stays this matter pending the arbitrator’s rulings on these issues. The Court sets a CMC regarding the status of the arbitration on December 18, 2026 at 8:30 AM in Dept. 2.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Ibarra, Leticia Lopez vs. FCA US, LLC

Case No.:  VCU330782

Date:           June 16, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Defendant’s (1) Demurrer and (2) Motion to Strike  

Tentative Ruling: (1) To sustain the demurrer with leave to amend as to the fifth cause of action for negligent repair; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint; To overrule the demurrer as to the sixth cause of action for concealment; (2) To grant the motion to strike with leave to amend; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint. The Case Management Conference is continued to August 18, 2026 at 8:30 AM.

Facts Common to (1) and (2)

Relevant here, Plaintiff sues Defendant Porterville Chrysler Jeep Dodge Ram for negligent repair and Defendant FCA for fraudulent inducement – concealment.

Plaintiff alleges on or about April 29, 2019, Plaintiff entered into a warranty contract with FCA as to a 2019 Dodge Journey (“Subject Vehicle”) manufactured or distributed by FCA. (Complaint ¶7.)

Plaintiff alleges they are a reasonable consumer who interacted with sales representatives, considered FCA's advertisement, and/or other marketing materials concerning the FCA Vehicles prior to purchasing the Subject Vehicle. (Complaint ¶21)

Since purchase of the Subject Vehicle, Plaintiff alleges issues with engine defects, transmission defects, electrical defects; among other defects and non-conformities and that Plaintiff purchased the Subject Vehicle as manufactured with FCA's defective engine. (Complaint ¶12, 15.) Further, that these issues substantially impair the use, value, or safety of the Subject Vehicle. (Complaint ¶13, 17)

Plaintiff further alleges that FCA knew, prior to Plaintiff purchasing the Subject Vehicle, that the 2019 Dodge Journey vehicles equipped with the 2.4L engine have one or more defects that can result loss of power, stalling, engine running rough, engine misfires, failure or replacement of the engine (the "Engine Defect"). (Complaint ¶16, 18.)

Further, that FCA failed to disclose the known defect prior to sale and acquired knowledge as to the defect via internal sources as to customer complaints, testing, warranty data and repair as to the network of dealers. (Complaint ¶19, 20, 22-27.)

Plaintiff generally alleges that the statute of limitations is tolled by equitable tolling, the discovery rule, the fraudulent concealment rules, equitable estoppel, the repair rule, and/or class action tolling. (Complain ¶37.)

As to the fifth cause of action against Defendant Porterville, Plaintiff alleges Plaintiff delivered the Subject Vehicle to Defendant Porterville for substantial repair on at least one occasion, that Defendant Porterville had a duty to use ordinary care to repair the Subject Vehicle, that Defendant Porterville breached its duty and that the breach proximately caused damages to Plaintiff.  (Complaint ¶60-63.)

As to the sixth cause of action against Defendant FCA for concealment, the amended complaint incorporates the prior allegations and reasserts them as to Defendant FCA’s acquisition of knowledge as to the Engine Defect, failure to disclose and Plaintiff’s lack of knowledge thereof. (Complaint ¶¶64-71.)

Defendants demurrer to the fifth and sixth causes of action and Defendant FCA seeks to strike the punitive damages allegations.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the facts alleged are sufficient regarding concealment under the analysis set forth in Dhital v. Nissan N. Am., Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828 and that the economic loss rule does not bar the negligent repair claim.

Authority and Analysis

(1) Demurrer

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

Fifth Cause of Action – Negligent Repair

The necessary elements for negligence claim are: (1) the existence of a legal duty of care that the defendant owed to the plaintiff; (2) breach; (3) causation; and (4) damages. (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318.)

As to the arguments that the economic loss doctrine bars the damages alleged here, the Court notes economic loss generally consists of “…damage for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective product or consequent loss of profits-without any claim of personal injury or damages to other property." (Food Safety Net Services v. Eco Safe Systems USA, Inc. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 118, 1130.)

The economic loss doctrine, in some cases, bars a tort action in the absence of personal injury or physical damage to property. (Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 984.) "The economic loss rule requires a purchaser to recover in contract for purely economic loss due to disappointed expectations, unless he can recover harm above and beyond a broken contractual promise." (Id. at 988.)

However, an exception appears recognized in Jimenez v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 473, 476, where the plaintiff homeowners brought an action against manufacturers of windows installed in mass-produced homes on claims of negligence. The court noted: "California decisional law has long recognized that the economic loss rule does not necessarily bar recovery in tort for damage that a defective product (e.g., a window) causes to other portions of a larger product (e.g., a house) into which the former has been incorporated." (Id. at 483.)

Here, where Plaintiff pleads the Subject Vehicle’s engine defect substantially impaired the safety and value of the Subject Vehicle, the Court will apply the exception in Jimenez at the pleading stage and overrule the demurrer regarding the economic loss doctrine.

Defendant Porterville argues additionally that the amended complaint lacks specificity as to the allegations of repair. The Court notes the operative complaint alleges no specific repair attempts. The complaint generally alleges a single repair presentation as to Defendant Porterville. (Complaint ¶60.) The Court finds the allegations in paragraphs 60-63 too conclusory.

Therefore, the Court will sustain the demurrer as to the fifth cause of action for negligent repair with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint.

Sixth Cause of Action – Concealment

“As with all fraud claims, the necessary elements of a concealment/suppression claim consist of ‘“(1) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (scienter); (3) intent to defraud (i.e., to induce reliance); (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage.”’” [citation omitted]”  (Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 843.)  “Suppression of a material fact is actionable when there is a duty of disclosure, which may arise from a relationship between the parties, such as a buyer-seller relationship.  [citation omitted]” (Id.)

Unlike most causes of action where the “the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings,” fraud requires particularity, that is, “pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) Every element of a fraud cause of action must be alleged both factually and specifically. (Cooper v. Equity General Insurance (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1252, 1262.) 

Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 844 is instructive on the issue of specificity at the pleading stage, providing in relevant part:

“Plaintiffs alleged the above elements of fraud in the SAC. As we have discussed, plaintiffs alleged the CVT installed in numerous Nissan vehicles (including the one plaintiffs purchased) were defective; Nissan knew of the defects and the hazards they posed; Nissan had exclusive knowledge of the defects but intentionally concealed and failed to disclose that information; Nissan intended to deceive plaintiffs by concealing known transmission problems; plaintiffs would not have purchased the car if they had known of the defects; and plaintiffs suffered damages in the form of money paid to purchase the car….

Nissan also contends plaintiffs did not provide specifics about what Nissan should have disclosed. But plaintiffs alleged the CVT were defective in that they caused such problems as hesitation, shaking, jerking, and failure to function. The SAC also alleged Nissan was aware of the defects as a result of premarket testing and consumer complaints that were made both to National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and to Nissan and its dealers. It is not clear what additional information Nissan believes should have been included. We decline to hold (again in the absence of a more developed argument on this point) that plaintiffs were required to include in the SAC more detailed allegations about the alleged defects in the CVT. We conclude plaintiffs' fraud claim was adequately pleaded.” (Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 844.)

Further, the Court notes less specificity is required if it appears from the nature of allegations that defendant must necessarily possess full information, or if the facts lie more in the knowledge of opposing parties.  (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384-1385.

Here, Plaintiff pleads that the defect regarding the engine was at issue in numerous similar vehicles, that Defendant FCA knew or should have known of the defect, that Defendant FCA had exclusive knowledge thereof as a result of internal sources or data, including customer complaints, that Defendant FCA failed to disclose the defect, that Plaintiff would not have purchased the Subject Vehicle had the defect as to the engine been disclosed and that Plaintiff suffered damages. These allegations extend beyond the issues or defects that are presupposed by the warranty. As to any requirement that Plaintiff specifically identify the persons who made the alleged omissions, based on the nature of the concealment claim, the Court finds less specificity is required and that the allegations here are sufficient against FCA as a corporation. As such, the Court overrules the demurrer as to the sufficiency of the allegations arguments.

There are “‘four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts.’”  (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336.)  However, unless the parties were in a fiduciary relationship, the other three circumstances “presupposes the existence of some other relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in which a duty to disclose can arise.”  (Id. at p. 337.)  “Thus, a duty to disclose may arise from the relationship between seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual agreement.” (Id.)

On this issue, the court in Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 844 noted:

“In its short argument on this point in its appellate brief, Nissan argues plaintiffs did not adequately plead the existence of a buyer-seller relationship between the parties, because plaintiffs bought the car from a Nissan dealership (not from Nissan itself). At the pleading stage (and in the absence of a more developed argument by Nissan on this point), we conclude plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient. Plaintiffs alleged that they bought the car from a Nissan dealership, that Nissan backed the car with an express warranty, and that Nissan's authorized dealerships are its agents for purposes of the sale of Nissan vehicles to consumers. In light of these allegations, we decline to hold plaintiffs' claim is barred on the ground there was no relationship requiring Nissan to disclose known defects.” (Id.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts of a transactional relationship establishing a duty to disclose at the pleading stage with respect to purchase from an authorized retail dealership, presentation to authorized retail dealerships for repair, prior exclusive knowledge of the alleged defective engine based on internal sources and that Plaintiff would not have purchased the Subject Vehicle had the engine issue been disclosed.

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer to the sixth cause of action as to this argument.

As to the economic loss doctrine, "economic loss consists of damage for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective product or consequent loss of profits-without any claim of personal injury or damages to other property." (Food Safety Net Services v. Eco Safe Systems USA, Inc. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 118, 1130.) As noted above, the economic loss doctrine, in some cases, bars a tort action in the absence of personal injury or physical damage to property. (Robinson, supra, 34 Cal.4th 979, 984.) "The economic loss rule requires a purchaser to recover in contract for purely economic loss due to disappointed expectations, unless he can recover harm above and beyond a broken contractual promise." (Id. at 988.) The holding of Robinson, permitting both recover under fraud and contract, “is narrow in scope and limited to a defendant's affirmative misrepresentations on which a plaintiff relies and which expose a plaintiff to liability for personal damages independent of the plaintiff's economic loss." (Id. at 993.) The economic loss rule, therefore, does not bar recovery as to a claim for fraudulent inducement. (Id. at 990; see also Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 838.)

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer to the sixth cause of action as to this argument.

(2) Motion to Strike

Defendant FCA seek to strike the section of the prayer seeking punitive damages.

Any party may file a timely notice of a motion to strike the whole or any part of a pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b).) The motion may seek to strike any “irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading” or any part of the pleading “not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) Irrelevant allegations include allegations that are not essential to the statement of a claim, allegations that are not pertinent to or supported by the claim and demands for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b), (c).)

Based on the Court's review of the operative complaint and as is detailed above regarding concealment, the Court has found a sufficient pleading as to concealment and therefore punitive damages as a remedy for this cause of action is properly pled.

However, as FCA is a corporation.

Civil Code section 3294(b), provides: "An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director or managing agent of the corporation."

Plaintiff has not properly alleged authorization or ratification:

"When the defendant is a corporation, '[a]n award of punitive damages against a corporation . . . must rest on the malice of the corporation's employees. [¶] But the law does not impute every employee's malice to the corporation.' [Citation.] Instead, the oppression, fraud, or malice must be perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. [Citation.] '"[M]anaging agent" . . . include[s] only those corporate employees who exercise substantial independent authority and judgment in their corporate decisionmaking so that their decisions ultimately determine corporate policy.' [Citation.]" (Wilson v. Southern California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123, 164.)

While the Court will not require the exact name of the employees on a concealment claim, some allegation connecting the concealment to the FCA as a corporation must be pled in the complaint.

Therefore,  the Court grants the motion to strike with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Felix, Jose vs. D.R. Klassen Packing, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU318452

Date:           June 16, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion for Preliminary Approval

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. The Court, therefore, takes the hearing off calendar. A Notice of Settlement was filed in this case on January 22, 2026. It indicated a dismissal would be filed no later than Match 28, 2026. Nothing of substance has been filed since. In the absence of any filings the Court sets an OSC re: dismissal on August 4, 2026, at 8:30 AM in Dept. 2.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Knox, Sean vs. Visalia Unified School District

Case No.:   VCU327313

Date:           June 16, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint

Tentative Ruling: To sustain the demurrer without leave to amend; to order Defendant VUSD to answer the operative second amended complaint.

Facts

In the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges causes of action for racial discrimination and for intentional infliction of emotional distress against public entity Defendant VUSD. (FAC ¶2)

The amended complaint alleges Plaintiff, an African American male, began his employment with Defendant on October 17, 2023, as a Campus Supervisor assigned to supervise and monitor student behavior under the supervision of the Site Administrator. (FAC ¶7.) Further, Plaintiff alleges the following sequence of events:

“10. During the course of his employment, PLAINTIFF made repeated and well documented requests for training related to physical intervention, verbal de-escalation, conflict resolution, and crisis management. In fact, PLAINTIFF was the only campus supervisor that did not receive this training.

11. On September 16, 2024, PLAINTIFF intervened to break up a fight between several students, acting in accordance with the training and responsibilities expected of him as an educator. During the incident in question, PLAINTIFF swiftly intervened to de-escalate a violent school brawl, demonstrating his clear intention to protect the safety of both students and staff. Upon noticing the aggression of the subject student, PLAINTIFF used a technique to safely break the subject student’s vertical plane and neutralize the immediate threat.

12. The entire altercation was captured via video surveillance. As depicted therein, PLAINTIFF effectively displaced the subject student's balance, bringing her to the ground to prevent further harm to herself or others, and quickly secured her to ensure she could not continue to engage in violent behavior. PLAINTIFF ensured he was not applying pressure to the subject student’s torso, maintaining her ability to breathe. PLAINTIFF’s actions were deliberate and focused on minimizing harm. His primary goal was to ensure the subject student’s safety  while addressing the immediate threat she posed in the chaotic situation.

13. Statements made by PLAINTIFF, "you can move" and "you can breathe," are not captured in the video, yet in fact were made, as confirmed by PLAINTIFF’s verbal interaction with the student. Despite the subject student’s assertions that she could not move or breathe, PLAINTIFF calmly reassured her, indicating an active awareness of her physical condition and emotional state, while continuing to assess whether she posed a further risk to the school environment.

14. PLAINTIFF’s conduct was part of a broader effort to maintain order during a violent school brawl. Aware of the larger threat posed by the ongoing brawl, PLAINTIFF requested additional assistance from staff, demonstrating the urgency of the situation.” (FAC ¶¶12-14.)

Further that “Notwithstanding, DEFENDANT VUSD’s subsequent October 21, 2024 decision to terminate PLAINTIFF was based on a racially prejudicial rush to judgment, and a both flawed and incompetently conducted investigation. By way of example, PLAINTIFF’s repeated requests for training related to physical intervention, verbal de-escalation, conflict resolution, and crisis management prior to this incident were well documented. In fact, PLAINTIFF was the only campus supervisor that did not receive this training. When confronted with these facts during the course of the investigation, administrators Luis Jaramillo, Paul Preheim and Frank Escobar admitted that PLAINTIFF’s requests had gone ignored. However, instead of being supportive of his efforts to maintain a safe environment, PLAINTIFF faced immediate, severe disciplinary action, culminating in his termination.” (FAC ¶16.)

Additionally, that “During the investigation and disciplinary process, PLAINTIFF informed DEFENDANTS that he had previously requested training in physical intervention and de escalation and had not received such training. Despite this, DEFENDANTS failed to meaningfully consider those facts in evaluating the incident” and “PLAINTIFF’s claims are further corroborated by the disparate treatment he was subjected to in comparison to his non-African American, similarly situated colleagues. Specifically, campus supervisors Manuel Vasquez and Patrick Buyayo were involved in similar incidents in which they intervened in student altercations, but faced minimal or no disciplinary action.” (FAC ¶17, 18.)

Specifically, as to the IIED cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that “DOES 1 through 50 were supervisory employees, administrators, investigators, and decision-makers employed by DEFENDANT VUSD, including individuals involved in reviewing the September 16, 2024 incident, evaluating PLAINTIFF’s prior training requests, conducting the ensuing investigation, recommending discipline, and approving PLAINTIFF’s termination.” (FAC ¶39.) Further that “…the acts and omissions of said DOE DEFENDANTS were committed within the course and scope of their employment with DEFENDANT VUSD. Pursuant to Government Code section 815.2, DEFENDANT VUSD is vicariously liable for injuries proximately caused by the wrongful acts and omissions of its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment.” (FAC ¶40.)

Additionally, that:

“41. Following the September 16, 2024 student altercation, DOE DEFENDANTS engaged in a course of conduct that was extreme and outrageous, including, but not limited to, ignoring or deliberately disregarding PLAINTIFF’s repeated and documented pre-incident requests for training in physical intervention, verbal de-escalation, conflict resolution, and crisis management, despite later acknowledging during the investigation that such requests had gone ignored and that PLAINTIFF had not been provided the same training afforded to other campus supervisors.

42. PLAINTIFF is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that DOE DEFENDANTS further engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct by conducting and ratifying a one-sided, predetermined, and fundamentally unfair investigation of the September 16, 2024 incident, including mischaracterizing PLAINTIFF’s conduct during the incident, disregarding the surrounding circumstances of the ongoing school brawl, failing to fairly consider that PLAINTIFF was acting in an effort to protect student and staff safety, and using the incident as a pretext to impose severe discipline and terminate PLAINTIFF’s employment.

43. PLAINTIFF is further informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that DOE DEFENDANTS treated similarly situated non-African American employees, including campus supervisors Manuel Vasquez and Patrick Buyayo, more favorably in connection with comparable student-discipline incidents, while subjecting PLAINTIFF to harsher scrutiny, a rushed disciplinary process, and termination. DOE DEFENDANTS knew of these disparities, yet approved and ratified the unequal treatment.

44. The above-described conduct was undertaken by DOE DEFENDANTS intentionally, or with reckless disregard of the probability of causing PLAINTIFF severe emotional distress. DOE DEFENDANTS knew, or reasonably should have known, that depriving PLAINTIFF of his livelihood through a knowingly unfair and discriminatory process, while ignoring Defendant’s own failure to provide requested training, would cause PLAINTIFF profound humiliation, anguish, and emotional harm.

45. The conduct of DOE DEFENDANTS exceeded all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. Said DOE DEFENDANTS abused their supervisory and administrative authority by failing to provide requested training, and thereafter relying on the consequences of that lack of training in imposing severe discipline against PLAINTIFF.” (FAC ¶¶42-45.)

Defendant VUSD demurrers to the second cause of action for IIED for failure to state facts sufficient to allege a cause of action.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the conduct described above is sufficient as to the elements of IIED in context of the discrimination claim.

Demurrer

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

IIED against Public Entities

Lawson v. Superior Court (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1389 suggests that IIED claims are viable against public entities on the basis of vicarious liability: “Accordingly, as long as the Complaint adequately pleads the elements of negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress against [State employee defendants], it also adequately pleads the vicarious liability of the State for those causes of action.”

"The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct." (Miller v. Fortune Commercial Corporation (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 214, 228-29.) "Whether a defendant's conduct can reasonably be found to be outrageous is a question of law that must initially be determined by the court; if reasonable persons may differ, it is for the jury to determine whether the conduct was, in fact, outrageous." (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 534.)

The court in Light v. Dept. of Parks & Recreation (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 75, 97-101 concluded that claims for IIED arising from employment may be asserted in a civil suit where the actionable conduct also forms the basis for a FEHA violation. There, such sufficient allegations included that the allegations that a defendant supervisor “…ostracized Light in the workplace, encouraged Light to lie to investigators, pursued Light at home and in the office to determine whether Light did so, and verbally and physically attacked Light after Light disobeyed. The trier of fact could conclude this conduct was extreme and outrageous (especially in light of Seals's supervisory position), taken for purposes of retaliation prohibited by FEHA, and intended to cause Light emotional distress.” (Id. at 102.)

Here, the amended allegations in support of the IIED claim fail under the standard set forth in Light. Plaintiff alleges an unfair investigation biased on the basis of Plaintiff’s race and a lack of training and ignoring of Plaintiff’s training requests. This does not arise to ostracizing Plaintiff in the workplace, encouraging Plaintiff to lie, pursuing Plaintiff at home, and physically attacking Plaintiff. Rather, these claims sound in discrimination, pled in the first cause of action by Plaintiff.

The Court, therefore, sustains the demurrer to the second cause of action.

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Here, neither the amended complaint nor the opposition reveal a basis for permitting amendment here. Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer to the second cause of action without leave to amend. Defendant is ordered to answer the complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared June 15, 2026 and June 17, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR050740	In the Matter of Flores, Rachel	Confirm Sale Real Property	Appearance Required	Appearance required pursuant to CRC, rule 7.452
VPR053647	In the Matter of Maria Mjia	Petition for Small Estate Set-Aside	Recommended for Approval
VPR052840	In the Matter of Racca, Christine Kent	Final Distribution Hearing	Recommended for Approval	Supplement document in order
VPR052773	In the Matter of Perez, Eusebio Elizarraraz	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053443	In the Matter of Lewis, Orville Dale	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR050199	In the Matter of Boykin, Thelma	OSC Hearing	Appearance Required	Continued hearing for missing accounting: The filed document does not comply with CRC, rule 7.575 for Accounting and Objection filed
VPR054101	In the Matter of Gundy, Gregory Dale	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Recommended for Approval
VPR045184	In the Matter of Chole Davis Special Needs Trust	Accounting Hearing	Recommended for Approval
VPR052768	In the Matter of Denham, Elsie	Status Conference	Appearance Required	Status of related case
VPR053673	In the Matter of Monty, Devon Robert	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Citation not filed. Petitioner’s Screening Form, Item 16 omitted.
VPR053900	In the Matter of Flowers, Karlen M.	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Capacity Declaration, Notice of Hearing and Citation not filed. Attachment Requesting Special Orders Regarding a Major Neurocognitive Disorder (form GC-313) not attached to petition.
VPR044298	In the Matter of Mesa, Alexander	Hearing: Transfer of Jurisdiction	Appearance Required	Review transfer of venue to Fresno County
VPR047970	In the Matter of Pineda, Francisco Javier Amaya	OSC Hearing	Appearance Required	Missing Accounting and Notice of Death

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                           There is no probate calendar for June 11, 2026 and June 18, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430.
 

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments

South County Justice Center & Visalia-County Civic Center

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared  June 15 – 18, 2026 that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date	Dept	Case	Comments
6/15/26	Dept 9	VPR049175; IMO R.V.	Appears in order
6/15/26	Dept 9	VPR048099; IMO A.M.	Service at issue
6/16/26	Dept 9	VPR054126; IMO A.F.C.	Service at issue
6/17/26	Dept 9	VPR053708; IMO R.N.
6/17/26, 1:30 PM	Dept 15	PPR054155; IMO J.C.H.	MATTER APPEARS TO BE IN ORDER
6/18/26	Dept 2	VPR053780; IMO C.G.	Proof of attendance of guardianship orientation needs to be filed.
6/18/26	Dept 9	VPR050092; IMO N.J.Z.K.