Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, April 9, 2026, are:

Re:                Smithson, Roger vs. Kaweah Delta District Hospital et al

Case No.:   VCU313258

Date:           April 9, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Defendant Alexander Nguyen, M.D.’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts

Plaintiffs ROGER LEROY SMITHSON (“Mr. Smithson”) and JENNIFER SMITHSON (collectively “Plaintiffs”), sue Defendant ALEXANDER NGUYEN, M.D., for medical malpractice and loss of consortium resulting from Mr. Smithson’s stroke. (UMF No. 1.)

The Complaint alleges that Dr. Nguyen failed to diagnose and treat stroke, failed to properly interpret CT scans, and failed to transfer Mr. Smithson to a comprehensive stroke center. (UMF No. 17.) The Complaint also alleges a derivative loss-of-consortium claim on behalf of Plaintiff Jennifer Smithson. (UMF No. 18.)

On or about October 29, 2023, Plaintiff, Mr. Smithson, presented to KH Urgent Care with numbness and left-side facial droop where he was diagnosed with Bell’s Palsy and discharged with a prescription for oral prednisone. (UMF No. 2.)

Plaintiff continued to have left-sided numbness and facial weakness for approximately two days following his discharge from urgent care. (UMF No. 3.)

On October 31, 2023, Plaintiff presented to Kaweah Health Medical Center (KHMC) Emergency Department with worsening symptoms including slurred speech, left-sided facial droop, issues retaining liquids in his mouth, and dizziness. (UMF No. 4.)

KHMC Emergency Department evaluated the patient for a possible acute stroke. (UMF No. 5.)

On October 31, 2023, at 19:37, a CT and CTA of the Plaintiff’s head, neck and spine were performed revealing dense right MCA sign, moderate to large subacute right MCA infarct, no hemorrhagic conversion or acute bleed, no midline shift or hydrocephalus, and a complete occlusion of the Plaintiffs right Internal Carotid Artery (ICA). (UMF No. 6.)

On October 31, 2023, vascular surgery’s Alexander Nguyen, M.D. (“Dr. Nguyen”) was consulted by the Emergency Department. (UMF No. 7.)

On October 31, 2023, Dr. Nguyen gave a telephone consultation where Dr. Nguyen recommended no surgical or endovascular intervention based on the imaging demonstrating a large established stroke and complete ICA occlusion. (UMF No. 8.)

On October 31, 2023, Plaintiff was admitted to the ICU under neurology and taken over by a hospitalist; Dr. Nguyen was not the admitting, primary, or directing physician. (UMF No. 9.)

On November 1, 2023, Dr. Nguyen  personally evaluated Mr. Smithson and confirmed  a complete occlusion of the right ICA including its intracranial portion. (UMF No. 10.)

On November 1, 2023, Dr. Nguyen determined that the Plaintiff was not an appropriate candidate for mechanical thrombectomy or other revascularization procedures because: (1) the duration of neurological symptoms exceeded accepted therapeutic windows; (2) CT and CTA imaging demonstrated a large, already-established right MCA territorial infarct; and (3) the intracranial portion of the right internal carotid artery was completely occluded, indicating that viable downstream tissue could not be restored through intervention and that attempting revascularization carried a significant risk of hemorrhagic conversion and additional neurological injury. (UMF No. 11.)

Dr. Nguyen recommended aggressive medical management, including antiplatelets and statins. (UMF No. 12.)

An MRI performed on November 2, 2023 at 02:27 showed a massive right MCA infarct with 7–8 mm midline shift. (UMF No. 13.)

Dr. Nguyen did not perform or recommend any surgical or endovascular procedure on the Plaintiff. (UMF No. 14.)

Dr. Kokinos opines, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that Dr. Nguyen met the standard of care at all times. (UMF No. 15.) Dr. Kokinos further agrees that no act or omission by Dr. Nguyen was a substantial factor in causing Mr. Smithson’s stroke, deterioration, or injuries. (UMF No. 16.)

By the time Dr. Nguyen was consulted, the patient’s ischemic stroke process had already progressed to a completed or near-completed infarct within the right MCA territory. Clinical history reflected approximately 48 hours of evolving neurologic deficits prior to vascular surgery involvement, and CT/CTA imaging obtained on October 31, 2023, demonstrated a substantial established infarct core with a completely occluded intracranial right internal carotid artery. These findings indicated that the ischemic tissue was non-salvageable and that the therapeutic window for revascularization— whether through thrombolysis or mechanical thrombectomy—had long expired. Accordingly, no surgical or endovascular intervention available to Dr. Nguyen at the time of his consultation could have altered the natural progression of the infarction. (UMF No. 19.)

The neurosurgical hemicraniectomy performed on November 3, 2023, was not performed or recommended by Dr. Nguyen. (UMF No. 20.)

Dr. Nguyen’s involvement in Mr. Smithson’s care was limited in both scope and duration to a discrete vascular surgery consultation requested after the completion of diagnostic imaging. He did not serve as the patient’s admitting, attending, or primary treating physician; did not assume responsibility for stroke activation, neurological management, hospital admission, or transfer decisions; and did not direct or control the course of treatment provided by emergency medicine, neurology, or neurosurgery. His role was confined to providing a specialty opinion within the parameters of vascular surgery based on the clinical information and imaging available at the time of consultation. (UMF No. 21.)

In opposition, Plaintiff provides declarations from three experts who opine that Dr. Nguyen fell below the standard of care and caused the injuries alleged in the complaint.

In reply, Defendant argues the declarations are insufficient and objects to the reply brief itself. Defendant has also filed a reply to the separate statement.

As to the objections, the Court notes that objecting to the declarations of Plaintiff’s experts in the memorandum of the reply is not permitted under California Rule of Court, rule 3.1354(b) “All written objections to evidence must be served and filed separately from the other papers in support of or in opposition to the motion.” The failure to do so here renders the objections ineffective.

Additionally, no reply to a separate statement is permitted under Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252 ["[t]here is no provision" in the summary judgment statute for a Reply Separate Statement].)

Authority and Analysis

A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(a).) “The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(f)(1).) If a party seeks summary adjudication as an alternative to a request for summary judgment, the request must be clearly made in the notice of the motion. (Gonzales v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1544.)  “[A] party may move for summary adjudication of a legal issue or a claim for damages other than punitive damages that does not completely dispose of a cause of action, affirmative defense, or issue of duty pursuant to” subdivision (t). (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(t).) 

To prevail, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c).) The motion cannot succeed unless the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts; the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other evidence. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of material fact, “[a]ll doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment…” (Gold v. Weissman (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-99.) “In other words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true.” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 179.) However, if adjudication is otherwise proper the motion “may not be denied on grounds of credibility,” except when a material fact is the witness’s state of mind and “that fact is sought to be established solely by the [witness’s] affirmation thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(e).) 

Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) “[T]here is no obligation on the opposing party... to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element... necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor.” (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) 

“The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment motion. The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues and to frame the outer measure of materiality in a summary judgment proceeding.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493, quotations and citations omitted.) “Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff's theories of liability as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings.” (Id.) 

Medical Malpractice

In a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must establish the following elements: “(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional's negligence.  [citations.]”  (Galvez v. Frields (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1420.)

Applicable Standard of Care

A defendant moving for summary judgment in a medical malpractice action must “present evidence that would preclude a reasonable trier of fact from finding it was more likely than not that their treatment fell below the standard of care.”  (Johnson v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 297, 305.)  The standard of care against which the acts of health care providers are to be measured is a matter within the knowledge of experts.  (Elcome v. Chin (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 310, 317.)  Unless the conduct required by the particular circumstances is within the common knowledge of the layman, the standard of care in a malpractice action can only be proved by an expert’s testimony.  (Id.) 

Defendant’s Expert – Standard of Care

In support of the motion, Defendant submits the declaration of Dr. Kokinos, which indicates sufficient education and experience in the fields of General Surgery and Vascular Surgery. (Declaration of Dr. Kokinos ¶1, 2, 16 – Ex. A.)

Dr. Kokinos indicates retention Defendant Dr. Nguyen’s counsel to provide expert opinion as to the standard of care applicable to Plaintiff Roger Smithson as to vascular surgeons practicing in urgent care and emergency clinical settings when evaluating patients presenting with neurologic complaints, including facial droop, extremity weakness, and complaints potentially suggestive of stroke or stroke mimic. (Declaration of Dr. Kokinos ¶3.)

The Court finds Dr. Kokinos qualified to offer opinions on the standard of care in this matter.

Dr. Kokinos indicates review of the complaint and medical records at issue in this case and provides a timeline of events which informed his opinion. (Declaration of Dr. Kokinos ¶¶4-15.)

Dr. Kokinos opines that Dr. Nguyen met the standard of care at all times in this case because when Dr. Nguyen initially discussed the case and management with the emergency department, the patient had already experienced neurologic symptoms for approximately two days prior. This prolonged symptom duration is medically significant and placed the patient well outside any accepted therapeutic window for acute revascularization therapies, including mechanical thrombectomy. (Declaration of Dr. Kokinos ¶18.) Further that at the time of Dr. Nguyen’s consultation, diagnostic imaging had already been performed, including a CT scan and CTA of the head and neck on October 31, 2023, which demonstrated a moderate to large acute to subacute infarct within the right middle cerebral artery (MCA) territory and a complete occlusion of the intracranial carotid artery (ICA). Importantly, the imaging showed no hemorrhagic transformation, no acute intracranial hemorrhage, no midline shift, and no hydrocephalus at that time, indicating that the infarct was evolving but already established. (Declaration of Dr. Kokinos ¶19.) Further, that Dr. Nguyen appropriately evaluated the patient, considered reasonable differential diagnoses, and acted consistently with what a reasonably prudent physician would have done under similar circumstances. Nothing in the records suggests that Dr. Nguyen ignored or failed to act on objective findings mandating emergent transfer at the time of the encounter. (Declaration of Dr. Kokinos ¶20.)

Additionally, that Dr. Nguyen appropriately recognized that the total occlusion of the ICA significantly reduced the risk of future embolization from that vessel and that surgical intervention would not alter the patient’s neurological outcome. His decision not to pursue thrombectomy was medically sound, consistent with accepted standards of care, and reflected appropriate reliance on objective imaging findings, stroke physiology, and the timing of symptom onset. There is no reliable medical evidence that a different course of treatment by Dr. Nguyen would have altered the patient’s ultimate neurologic outcome. The suggestion that the stroke would have been prevented or materially mitigated is speculative and not supported by the objective medical record. (Declaration of Dr. Kokinos ¶22.)

Further, that Dr. Nguyen acted within the standard of care by recommending aggressive medical management, including dual antiplatelet therapy and statin therapy, which represent the accepted treatment for secondary stroke prevention in patients with established ischemic infarction. This approach was consistent with neurology’s decision to admit the patient for ischemic stroke with intensive care–level monitoring. Tissue plasminogen activator (tPA) was appropriately not administered because the patient presented well outside the window for effective thrombolytic therapy, a decision unrelated to and not attributable to Dr. Nguyen. (Declaration of Dr. Kokinos ¶23.)

Further, that the development of a massive right MCA infarct with midline shift identified on MRI on November 2, 2023, represents a known and anticipated evolution of a large MCA territory stroke, particularly in patients with delayed presentation and complete ICA occlusion and this progression does not indicate a failure of care by Dr. Nguyen and would not have been prevented by surgical intervention at the time he evaluated the patient. (Declaration of Dr. Kokinos ¶24.)

The Court finds Defendant has carried the initial burden as to the standard of care and breach thereof.

Plaintiffs’ Expert – Standard of Care

“When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence.”  (Munro v. Regents of University of California (1989) 215 Cal.3d 977, 984-985.)

Here, Plaintiff first provides the declaration of Dr. Christian Ochoa, a board certified vascular surgeon, a current clinical professor of surgery, and indicates sufficient experience and education as to patients with potential carotid occlusions which may or may not result in stroke-like symptoms. (Declaration of Dr. Ochoa ¶¶1-5.)

Further, that Dr. Ochoa is familiar with the standard of care by vascular surgeons in treating patients such as Plaintiff in emergent and non-emergent situations ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of their profession under similar circumstances. (Declaration of Dr. Ochoa ¶¶5, 6, 7.)

Dr. Ochoa indicates he has been retained by Plaintiff’s counsel as to the care and treatment provided by Defendant Dr. Nguyen during the treatment of Plaintiff. (Declaration of Dr. Ochoa ¶6.) Further, Dr. Ochoa indicates he has reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records from Kaweah, the declaration of Dr. Kokinos in support of this motion, the declarations of Drs. Marehbian and Konstas in opposition to this motion and the written stroke protocols of Kaweah. (Declaration of Dr. Ochoa ¶8.) Dr. Ochoa provides a timeline of relevant events on which his opinion is based. (Declaration of Dr. Ochoa ¶9.)

The Court finds Dr. Ochoa qualified to offer opinions on the standard of care in this matter.

Dr. Ochoa opines that a vascular surgeon such as Dr. Nguyen breached the standard of care by treating or evaluating Plaintiff as to a condition above the jawline, including any condition involving the middle portion of the carotid artery or the distal portion of the internal carotid, as such evaluations should have taken place by a neurologist and interventionalist. (Declaration of Dr. Ochoa ¶10.a.) Further, that Dr. Nguyen breached the standard of care by evaluating and rendering opinions regarding the viability of any endovascular treatment after areas of the brain demonstrate damage from a clot moving from the carotid to the brain, as a vascular surgeon lacks expertise to evaluate such a condition in a patient such as Plaintiff. (Declaration of Dr. Ochoa ¶10.b.) Dr. Ochoa further opines Dr. Nguyen, upon such events, should have removed himself from the care of Plaintiff and insisted on an interventionalist. (Declaration of Dr. Ochoa ¶10.b.) Further, that Dr. Nguyen erroneously stated the occlusion presented little risk of future embolization and that chronic carotid artery disease does not result in stroke. (Declaration of Dr. Ochoa ¶¶10.c., 10.d.)

Further, Plaintiff submits the declaration of Dr. Jonathan Marehbian, a board certified and practicing neurologist who routinely evaluates and treats stroke or suspected stroke patients, reviews and interprets imaging and consults with interventional neuroradiologists to determine whether clot retrieval is available and whether the risks of such a procedure outweigh the benefits thereof. (Declaration of Dr. Marehbian ¶¶1-5.)

Dr. Marehbian indicates familiarity with the relevant standard of care, has been retained by Plaintiff’s counsel and has reviewed the medical records of Plaintiff from Kaweah’s urgent care, Kaweah’s medical center, imaging as to Plaintiff, the depositions of Plaintiff and Jenifer Smithson, copies of text messages, the declarations in support of and in opposition to this motion for summary judgment, and written stroke and emergency protocols of Kaweah. (Declaration of Dr. Marehbian ¶¶6-7.)

The Court finds Dr. Marehbian qualified to offer opinions on the standard of care in this matter.

Dr. Marehbian provides a chronological summary of relevant events and opines that Dr. Nguyen breached the standard of care with respect to the opinion that “Carotid disease does not typically cause stroke…findings likely chronic” because that opinion is incorrect and directly contradicts the radiologists interpretation. (Declaration of Dr. Marehbian ¶¶7, 8, 9.g.) Further, that the standard of care was breached due to a failure to obtain a consultation with a neurointerventionalist. (Declaration of Dr. Marehbian ¶9.i.)

Additionally, Plaintiff provides the declaration of Dr. Angelos Konstas, a board certified and practicing interventional and diagnostic neuroradiologist who has experience evaluating and treating stroke or suspected stroke patients, reviewing and interpreting imaging, determining whether clot retrieval and carotid stenting is available and whether such procedures are too risky depending on the circumstances. (Declaration of Dr. Konstas ¶1-5, 8.)

Dr. Konstas indicates retention by Plaintiff’s counsel to render opinions  as to breach and causation by Dr. Nguyen.  Dr. Konstas will also provide opinions as to the imaging in this case as it relates to Dr. Nguyen. (Declaration of Dr. Konstas ¶¶6, 7.) The Court finds Dr. Konstas qualified to offer opinions on the standard of care in this matter.

Dr. Konstas indicates review of the medical records of Plaintiff from Kaweah’s urgent care, Kaweah’s medical center, imaging as to Plaintiff, the depositions of Plaintiff and Jenifer Smithson, copies of text messages, the declarations in support of and in opposition to this motion for summary judgment, and written stroke and emergency protocols of Kaweah. (Declaration of Dr. Konstas ¶¶9.) Further, Dr. Konstas provides a chronological summary of relevant events and opines that Dr. Nguyen should not have been consulted to render opinions related to clot retrieval and that a interventional neuroradiologist should have been consulted and failing to do so was a breach of the standard of care. (Declaration of Dr. Konstas ¶¶9, 10.i.)

Based on the opinions and declarations of Plaintiff’s qualified experts Dr. Ochoa, Dr. Marehbian and Dr. Konstas, the Court finds Plaintiff has met the burden in opposing summary judgment as to the issue of the standard of care because Plaintiff has come forward with conflicting expert evidence. (Munro, supra, 215 Cal.3d at 984-985.)

Causation

In order to establish that defendant's negligence was a “substantial factor” in causing injury, the plaintiff must prove the negligence was of itself sufficient to bring about that harm.  (Bromme v. Pavitt (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1498.)  “The law is well settled that in a personal injury action causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.  Mere possibility alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie case.  [Citations.]  That there is a distinction between a reasonable medical ‘probability’ and a medical 'possibility' needs little discussion.  There can be many possible ‘causes,’ indeed, an infinite number of circumstances which can produce an injury or disease. A possible cause only becomes ‘probable’ when, in the absence of other reasonable causal explanations, it becomes more likely than not that the injury was a result of its action.  This is the outer limit of inference upon which an issue may be submitted to the jury.”  (Id.; citing Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 402 403.)

Defendant’s Expert

As with the duty issue, “causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.” (Dumas v. Cooney (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1593, 1603.) Dr. Kokinos opines that to a reasonable degree of medical probability, nothing Dr. Nguyen did or did not do caused or contributed to the patient’s stroke or subsequent neurological deterioration, and by the time Dr. Nguyen became involved, the stroke process was already well underway, and earlier intervention was neither possible nor within his control. (Declaration of Dr. Kokinos ¶¶25, 26.) Further, that the subsequent progression of the patient’s condition, including the development of a massive right MCA infarct with midline shift identified on MRI on November 2, 2023, represents a known and expected evolution of a large territorial ischemic stroke, particularly in the setting of delayed presentation and complete carotid occlusion and this progression was not caused by the action or inaction of Dr. Nguyen. (Declaration of Kokinos ¶¶27-29.)

The Court finds Defendant has met the initial burden on the issue of causation.

Plaintiff’s Expert

As noted above, Plaintiff must come forward with conflicting expert evidence to defeat summary judgment. (Munro, supra, at 984-985.)

Here, Plaintiff provides the declaration of Dr. Marehbian states that the failure to obtain the consultation indicated above, as well as the medically incorrect statements of Dr. Nguyen as to carotid disease, caused the failure to preserve salvageable tissue. (Declaration of Dr. Marehbian ¶9.j.) Dr. Marehbian indicates these opinions are made with sufficient probability that any breach caused injury to Plaintiff. (Declaration of Dr. Marehbian ¶6.)

“‘[W]hen an expert's opinion is purely conclusory because unaccompanied by a reasoned explanation connecting the factual predicates to the ultimate conclusion, that opinion has no evidentiary value because an “expert opinion is worth no more than the reasons upon which it rests.’” (Sanchez v. Kern Emergency Medical Transportation Corp. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 146, 155.) However, “the rule [is] that … we liberally construe the declarations for the plaintiff's experts.” (Powell v. Kleinman (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 112, 125–126) Further, that “a reasoned explanation required in an expert declaration filed in opposition to a summary judgment motion need not be as detailed or extensive as that required in expert testimony presented in support of a summary judgment motion or at trial” (Garrett v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 173, 189.)

Therefore, under these principles, the Court finds Plaintiff has met the burden in opposing summary judgment as to the issue of the causation because Plaintiff has come forward with sufficient conflicting expert evidence. (Munro, supra, 215 Cal.3d at 984-985.)

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Conterra Agricultural Capital, LLC vs. Prosperity Farms, LLC et al

Case No.:   PCU325122

Date:           April 9, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Motion for Authorization to Settle

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion.

The appointed receiver in this case, Focus Management Group (Focus) moves for an order authorizing it to enter a stipulated judgment in settlement of Compeer Financial, ACA, et al. v. Prosperity Farms, LLC, Tulare Superior Court case number PCU323957.

In PCU323957, Compeer Financial, ACA; Compeer Financial, PCA; and Compeer Financial, FLCA—collectively, Compeer—sue Prosperity Farms, LLC (Prosperity), seeking to rescind a grant deed purporting to transfer certain of Prosperity’s real property to Compeer. 

Focus has been appointed, in this case, as receiver over a receivership estate consisting of, inter alia, real property of Prosperity. 

Focus requires court approval to settle the litigation with Compeer on behalf of Prosperity.  While the court’s order appointing Focus authorizes it “to negotiate, enter into, modify, or terminate any agreement, contract, or arrangement pertaining to the Receivership Estate,” it expressly states that “Court approval shall be required for any agreement entered into by Receiver to settle litigation to which the Receivership Estate is a party.”

Corporate America Lending, Inc. (CAL), which is not a party to the recission action in PCU323957, and does not have, and at no pertinent time has had, any discernable ownership interest in Prosperity or its real property, opposes Focus’s motion. 

Previously, CAL moved to intervene in both this action and PCU323957, and in both instances its motions were denied.  The background behind CAL’s prior attempts to intervene in this and the other Prosperity litigation was covered at length in the prior rulings on those motions and need not be recounted here.  What matters here is that, as previously determined on CAL’s intervention motions, CAL has no protectable interest in the real property described in the grant deed at issue in the recission action and no interest in Prosperity. 

CAL has, since the denial of its prior intervention motion, been made a party to this action—as one of several cross-defendants sued by Michal and Cynthia Graham (in various capacities, including on behalf of Prosperity) in a cross-complaint containing 17 causes of action—but this doesn’t make CAL’s position on whether Focus should be granted approval to enter a settlement of PCU323957 any more relevant than it was before it was sued in that cross-complaint.  

Which is to say, stating it more succinctly, CAL’s position on Focus’s motion is legally irrelevant. Accordingly, the court need not consider CAL’s arguments in opposition, or its additional requests that this court “dismiss” or alternatively “stay” PCU323957 (which requests are, in any event, non-cognizable in this action).

Separate and apart from CAL’s opposition, Focus convincingly establishes—unopposed by any party to this action or PCU323957 (other than CAL)—that it is in the best interests of the receivership estate to settle the recission action with Compeer, so as to avoid needless incursion of litigation costs in the defense of an action to which the receiver reasonably believes there are no valid defenses. 

Accordingly, the motion is granted.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                American Incorporated vs. Westgate Development, Inc

Case No.:  VCU317080

Date:           April 9, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Defendant Sabbah’s Motion Set Aside Default

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts

On January 13, 2025, Plaintiff filed this complaint for breach of contract, account stated, fraudulent transfer and for recovery on a contractor’s license bond against, amongst others, moving Defendant Sabbah.

On April 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed a proof of service purporting that substitute service occurred as to Defendant Sabbah on April 24, 2025, at 11:59 am, at 2348 West Whitendale Ave, Suite D, Visalia, CA 93277 (“Service Address”) on “Jane Doe, Occupant” and that this was a business address. The documents were thereafter mailed to the same address noted above. The process server is registered in California and provides a declaration of diligence indicating two unsuccessful attempts at service followed by the service indicated above on “JANE DOE, Age: 38; Ethnicity: Caucasian; Gender” Female; Weight: 260; Height: 5'6"; Hair: Brown; Eyes: Brown; Relationship: SECRETARY.”

On June 4, 2025, default was entered as to Defendant Sabbah.

On December 5, 2025, default judgment was entered in the amount of $67,622.39.

On February 28, 2026, Defendant Sabbah filed this motion for relief from default. Defendant states Defendant was not personally served, that Defendant did not receive the summons and complaint prior to March 14, 2025, that Defendant did not receive the summons and complaint on or around April 24, 2025, that Defendant did not receive any mailed copies of the documents, that Defendant did not have actual notice of the lawsuit prior to default, that Defendant does not reside at and did not reside at any relevant time at, the Service Address, that Defendant lives and works in Chino Hills, and that Defendant is unaware of the person identified as Jane Doe in the proof of service. (Declaration of Defendant ¶¶1-10.) Further that “I was not a party to the Agreement at issue in this action and did not execute that Agreement in my individual capacity.” (Declaration of Defendant ¶11.)

Defendant argues the default is void, that Plaintiff failed to timely serve Defendant Sabbah by March 14, 2025, and that substitute service did not result in actual notice.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues the Service Address is the business address of Defendant Sabbah via his status as President of “Westgate Construction & Development Inc” (a corporation which Plaintiff contends does not exist via the Secretary of State) as listed on a contract drafted by Defendant Sabbah executed in September 2022. (Declaration of Saucedo ¶¶3, 4.) Further, that Plaintiff invoiced Defendant Sabbah for work performed under this contract at the Service Address and that Defendant Sabbah received a mechanic’s lien at this address because Defendant Sabbah contacted Saucedo regarding the lien. (Declaration of Saucedo ¶¶6, 7.) Further, that Saucedo went to the Service address on March 24, 2026, entered the office, encountered two ladies, one of whom indicated Sabbah comes to the location periodically, that there were business cards indicating Sabbah was president of Westgate Construction & Development Inc” and that the description of Jane Doe matches one of the office managers present on that visit. (Declaration of Saucedo ¶¶9-11.)

Authority and Analysis

To start, the Court notes the argument from the motion lacks any legal citation:

“Plaintiff was required to complete service on Defendant by March 14, 2025. Plaintiff failed to do so. Plaintiff’s Proof of Service, Exhibit A, states that substituted service on Defendant occurred on April 24, 2025. Because service was not completed within the required time, it was ineffective to confer personal jurisdiction over Defendant and thus, this court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant.”

The motion for relief from default on the ground that Plaintiff failed to properly serve Defendant within 60 days is not a basis to find service was not properly made or to declare the judgment void. The failure to serve pleadings within 60 days as required by California Rules of Court rule 3.110(b) may result in the court issuing an Order to Show Cause why sanctions should not be imposed pursuant to rule 3.110(e), but is not a basis for finding that service made after 60 days is not effective or that the judgment is void.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 583.210(a), a Plaintiff has three years from filing of the complaint to serve a defendant.

As such, the Court denies the motion on this ground.

As to the claim that substitute service did not result in actual notice, again, no legal citation is set forth for the Court to evaluate.

The Court notes that under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5 where service of summons has not resulted in actual notice to a party and default has been entered, the party may file a notice of motion to set aside the default and for leave to defend the action. Under subsection (a), the motion must be made within a reasonable time, but “in no event exceeding the earlier of: (i) two years after entry of a default judgment against him or her; or (ii) 180 days after service on him or her of a written notice that the default or default judgment has been entered.”

Here, this motion is timely if under section 473.5.

Subsection (b) additionally requires the filing of “an affidavit showing under oath that the party’s lack of actual notice in time to defend the action was not caused by his or her avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect. The party shall serve and file with the notice a copy of the answer, motion, or other pleading proposed to be filed in the action.” The declaration filed by Defendant Sabbah is insufficient as to this requirement.

Therefore, the motion is denied under section 473.5, to the extent it is made thereunder.

Finally, as to section 473(d), "compliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction. [Citation.] Thus, a default judgment entered against a defendant who was not served with a summons in the manner prescribed by statute is void. [Citation.]' [Citation.] Under section 473, subdivision (d), the court may set aside a default judgment which is valid on its face, but void, as a matter of law, due to improper service." (Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 544.)

Such a motion under section 473(d), prior to the California Supreme Court’s decision in California Capital Ins. Co. v. Hoehn (2024) 17 Cal.5th 207, used to be subject to the two year statutory period provided by section 473.5 (See Trackman v. Kenney (2010) 187 Cal. App. 4th 175, 180, overruled by California Capital.)

However, under California Capital, supra, 17 Cal. 5^th at 225 “We hold that a section 473(d) motion to vacate a judgment that is void for lack of proper service is not subject to the judicially imposed two-year limitation”

Therefore, this motion is timely.

“A judgment ‘is considered void on its face only when the invalidity is apparent from an inspection of the judgment roll or court record without consideration of extrinsic evidence.’ [Citation.] When a default judgment has been taken, the judgment roll consists of ‘the summons, with the affidavit or proof of service; the complaint; the request for entry of default ..., and a copy of the judgment.’ (§ 670, subd. (a).) If the invalidity can be shown only through consideration of extrinsic evidence, such as declarations or testimony, the order/judgment is not void on its face.” [Citation.] (Kremerman v. White (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 358, 370.)

Here, the judgment does not appear void on its face.

Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20(b) provides for substitute service:

“If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served, as specified in Section 416.60, 416.70, 416.80, or 416.90, a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person’s dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, in the presence of a competent member of the household or a person apparently in charge of his or her office, place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left. Service of a summons in this manner is deemed complete on the 10th day after the mailing.”

“ ‘A judgment or order is said to be void on its face when the invalidity is apparent upon an inspection of the judgment-roll.’ [citation omitted] In a case in which the defendant does not answer the complaint, the judgment roll includes the proof of service. (§ 670, subd. (a).) Thus, in a motion under the sixth paragraph of section 473 [“The court…may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order” and now subsection (d)], the moving defendant need make no evidentiary showing whatsoever, so long as the jurisdictional defect is shown by the proof of service.” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1441.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 417.10 indicates that a statutorily-compliant proof of service “presumptively establishes the fact of proper service, but . . . may be impeached and the lack of proper service shown by contradictory evidence.” (Id.) Under Evidence Code section 647: “[t]he return of a process server registered pursuant to Chapter 16 (commencing with Section 22350) of Division 8 of the Business and Professions Code upon process or notice establishes a presumption, affecting the burden of producing evidence, of the facts stated in the return.”  (Evid. Code § 647.) Under Evidence Code section 604: “[t]he effect of a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence is to require the trier of fact to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence, in which case the trier of fact shall determine the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact from the evidence and without regard to the presumption.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the drawing of any inference that may be appropriate.”  (Evid. Code § 604.)

Therefore, the Court starts with the presumption of valid service given the execution of the proof by a registered process server and statement of due diligence.

Here, the face of the proof of service reveals apparent compliance with the statutory requirements. There appears to be reasonable due diligence as to the attempts at personal service, the proof indicates that the process server served the substitute person at the Service Address, as well providing a description thereof, over 18 years old, with whom the documents were left.

The Court finds the service, and therefore, the judgment facially valid.

However, Defendant seeks to have the judgment declared void based on extrinsic evidence. Bae v. T.D. Service Co. of Arizona (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 89.

“Apart from any statute, courts have the inherent authority to vacate a default and default judgment on equitable grounds such as extrinsic fraud or extrinsic mistake. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981.) ‘Extrinsic fraud usually arises when a party is denied a fair adversary hearing because he has been “deliberately kept in ignorance of the action or proceeding, or in some other way fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or defense.” ’ (Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467, 471; see 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, § 225, p. 832.) In contrast, the term ‘extrinsic mistake’ is ‘broadly applied when circumstances extrinsic to the litigation have unfairly cost a party a hearing on the merits. [Citations.] “Extrinsic mistake is found when [among other things] … a mistake led a court to do what it never intended … .” ’ (Rappleyea, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 981, quoting Kulchar, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 471–472.)” (Id. at 97-98)

“Because a motion for equitable relief is ‘direct,’ rather than ‘collateral,  extrinsic fraud or mistake may be demonstrated by evidence not included in the judgment roll or record relating to the judgment. (Munoz v. Lopez (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 178, 183–184.)” (Bae, supra, 245 Cal.App.4^th at 99.)

Here, the declaration of Defendant states “I do not reside at, and did not reside at any relevant time at, 2348 West Whitendale Avenue, Suite D, Visalia, California, the address identified in Plaintiff’s Proof of Service” and “I live and work in Chino Hills, California.” (Declaration of Defendant ¶¶8,9.)

The declaration, however, does not address the issue that the service address is not a residence, but a business, as identified on the proof of service. As noted by Plaintiff, substitute service at a business address during usual office hours is permitted under Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20. The declaration of Defendant is insufficient to rebut the statutory presumption discussed above. Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the description, that it does not match the description of the office manager or provide any other facts that would rebut the presumption.

The Court finds no evidence of fraud that would provide equitable relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(d) or Bae, as noted above.

As to extrinsic mistake, the Bae court restated the test from Rappleyea, supra, 8 Cal.4th at 982 as follows:

“[R]elief under the doctrine of extrinsic mistake is subject to a stringent three-part formula.  [T]o set aside a [default] judgment based upon extrinsic mistake one must satisfy three elements.  First, the defaulted party must demonstrate that it has a meritorious case. Second, the party seeking to set aside the default must articulate a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense to the original action. Last, the moving party must demonstrate diligence in seeking to set aside the default once discovered.”  (Bae, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at 100.)

Here, as noted above, there is no basis for mistake presented and therefore no satisfactory excuse for failing to defend the action.

Additionally, Plaintiff has presented competent evidence that the Service Address was and is used by Defendant Sabbah as a business address as a further basis for finding no fraud or mistake with respect to service.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Definitive Staffing Solutions, Inc vs. N.D.R. Companies, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU273756

Date:           April 9, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion.

Facts

On March 6, 2026, Plaintiff’s Counsel Don J. Pool filed a motion to be relieved as counsel as to Plaintiff Definitive Staffing Solutions. Plaintiff’s Counsel filed the following with respect to withdrawing:

(1) MC-051 - Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as Counsel;

(2) MC-052 – Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel; and

(3) MC-053 - Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel

Additionally, Plaintiff’s Counsel has filed proof of service of these documents by mail on Defendant care of James Pinedo 820 North Alta Avenue, Suite D Dinuba, CA 93618.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 284 provides that “[t]he attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at any time before or after judgment of final determination, as follows: 1. Upon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes; [or] 2. Upon the order of the court, upon the application of either client or attorney, after notice from one to the other.”

California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) requires that the “notice of motion and motion to be relieved as counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) must be directed to the client and must be made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-051).”

As noted above, Counsel has complied with California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) by submitting the notice and motion on MC-051 and by directing the notice and motion to all parties.

California Rule of Court 3.1362 (c) further mandates that: “The motion to be relieved as counsel must be accompanied by a declaration on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel--Civil (form MC-052). The declaration must state in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1). Specifically, the declaration that Rule 3.1362(c) requires must state that the moving attorney attempted to secure a “Substitution of Attorney” from the client as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1) and that the client refused to so stipulate.

Here, the declaration is properly made on form MC-052, as well as a supplemental declaration attached to the Notice, and uses general terms without compromising confidentiality and indicates that Counsel has attempted to obtain a substitution by stipulation, but that Plaintiff has refused.

Next, service under Rule 3.1362(d) requires personal service, electronic service, or mail and counsel’s declaration must note the service made. Here, service was by mail on March 6, 2026. The declaration of Counsel indicates that Plaintiff’s address was confirmed as current by email.

Finally, Rule 3.1362(e) requires the proposed order be lodged with the Court on MC-053 with the moving papers, specifying all hearing dates scheduled, including date of trial. Plaintiff’s Counsel has complied with this requirement.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion as to Plaintiff. If no one requests oral argument, the Court is prepared to sign the order entitled “Order Granting Attorney’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel - Civil” that the moving party lodged with the Court. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Carranza, Valentin Salas vs. Morales, Crystal Espino

Case No.:   VCU301263

Date:           April 9, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Defendant Dr. Jeffrey A Saladin Company, Inc.’s Motion to Bifurcate Trial as to Liability and Damages

Tentative Ruling:  To deny the motion

Facts

In this motor vehicle negligence case, it is alleged that Defendant Crystal Morales was the driver of a vehicle legally registered and owned by Defendant Jose Morales. (Complaint ¶¶5, 6.)

On April 14, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an amendment to the complaint, substituting Doe Defendant 1 for Defendant Dr. Jeffrey A. Saladin Company, Inc. (“Defendant Saladin”).

On August 29, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an amendment to the complaint, substituting Doe Defendant 2 for Defendant CC Amulet Management, LLC. (Defendant “CC Amulet”).

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Crystal was operating the motor vehicle at issue while in the course and scope of her employment with Defendant Saladin. 

Defendants Saladin and CC Amulet (“Defendants”) move to bifurcate the trial as to liability and damages phases. In support, counsel for Defendants states trial would be more economically and efficiently handled if bifurcated, as the liability portion is estimated to consist of no more than 2-3 days, while the injuries and damages portion is estimated to take 5-7 days, as there are “numerous retained and non-retained experts designed by Plaintiffs and moving Defendants solely on the issues that pertain exclusively to injuries and damages.” (Declaration of Rueger ¶¶5-8.) Additionally, Defendants state it would suffer prejudice as “evidence and testimony to be presented may cause jury confusion and unjustifiably undermine moving Defendants’ argument against liability due to the nature and extent of the injuries and damages claimed by both Plaintiffs.” (Declaration of Rueger ¶10.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue the evidence is not severable, that the showing is too generic, as it would apply to any case involving liability and damages, and that the showing further is speculative as to the efficiency of the trial.

Authority and Analysis

Whether to order bifurcation of issues for trial is typically discretionary (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 598, 1048(b); Grappo v. Coventry Financial Corp. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 496, 504).

The objective of bifurcation is to avoid wasting time and money on the trial of damages if the liability issue is resolved against plaintiff.  (Horton v. Jones (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 952, 954.) Granting or denying of a motion for bifurcation lies within the trial court’s sound discretion and is subject to reversal on appeal only for clear abuse.  (Grappo v. Coventry Financial Corp. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 496, 503-504.) 

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1048(b):

“The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action, including a cause of action asserted in a cross-complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues, preserving the right of trial by jury required by the Constitution or a statute of this state or of the United States.”  

Similarly, Code of Civil Procedure section 598 provides: 

“The court may, when the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted thereby, on motion of a party, after notice and hearing, make an order, no later than the close of pretrial conference in cases in which such pretrial conference is to be held, or, in other cases, no later than 30 days before the trial date, that the trial of any issue or any part thereof shall precede the trial of any other issue or any part thereof in the case, except for special defenses which may be tried first pursuant to Sections 597 and 597.5. The court, on its own motion, may make such an order at any time.”

Section 598 was expressly adopted as the result of Judicial Council recommendations and “Its objective is avoidance of waste of time and money caused by unnecessary trial of damage questions in cases where the liability issue is resolved against the plaintiff.”  (Trickey v. Superior Court (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 650, 653)

Finally, Evidence Code section 320 states that: “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, the court in its discretion shall regulate the order of proof.” “Under these provisions, trial courts have broad discretion to determine the order of proof in the interests of judicial economy.”  (Grappo v. Coventry Financial Corp. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 496, 504.)

California courts have recognized that bifurcation is proper where liability is a simple matter while damages require testimony from multiple witnesses, or where only a small fraction of the evidence would be repeated, and the trial court had determined the ends of justice would be served by bifurcation.  (See Trickey, supra, at 652-653 – one witness in addition to the parties; Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 737, 745-746 (superseded by statute on other grounds in Barnett v. American-Cal Medical Services (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 260 – “the trial court could properly conclude that while some evidence relating to damages would also be necessary on the issue of liability, only a small fraction of the evidence would be repeated so that the ends of justice were served by bifurcation.”)

Here, Defendants have failed to provide specific information as to the two proposed phases, including the number of witnesses to be called in the liability and damages phases, the length and difficulty of the anticipated testimony, including the identity of the parties’ experts and likely length of their testimony, and the amount of time saved if a defense verdict is entered on liability as compared to the additional time needed for an extra set of openings/closings and an extra round of jury deliberations if Plaintiff prevails.

The generalized arguments set forth by Defendants are concerns in every case that involves liability and damages.

Jurors will be instructed as to their own emotions, compassions and sympathies, thereby reducing any concern of bias or undue prejudice. This motor vehicle collision matter does not appear to have  facts that uniquely tend to evoke an emotional bias against a defendant without relevancy, as least within the standard set forth by Evidence Code section 352. (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1121.) The Court does not find the evidence indicated above unduly prejudicial to warrant bifurcation.

Finally, the Court will not weigh the evidence or likelihood of Defendants prevailing on the course and scope issue on the motion to bifurcate.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order

Examiner Notes for Probate Matters Calendared

• Visalia Division 
• South County Justice Center Division