Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, May 12, 2026, are:

Re:                 Darko, Joseph K vs. M1 Support Services

Case No.:   VCU321734

Date:           May 12, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion

Facts

M1 hired Plaintiff on August 1, 2024 as an Aircraft Mechanic I (Structures) supporting its Contract Field Teams (CFT) at the Naval Air Station in Lemoore, California. (UMF No. 1.)

On April 4, 2025, M1 terminated Plaintiff’s employment. (UMF No. 2.)

After his termination, Plaintiff argued that he was entitled to late payment penalties resulting from a purported failure to timely pay his final wages. (UMF No. 3.)

M1 disputed such payment; however, the parties agreed to enter into a written release agreement. (UMF No. 4.)

On May 9, 2025, M1 sent Plaintiff a release which provided that M1 would pay Plaintiff $8,035.44, minus applicable payroll taxes and standard deductions, in exchange for Plaintiff releasing any further claims related to alleged untimely payment of wages or late payment penalties under the California Labor Code (the “Release”).  (UMF No. 5.)

That same day, Plaintiff signed the Release. (UMF No. 6.)

Also on that same day, M1 paid Plaintiff in accordance with the Release in the amount of $6,670.38. (UMF No. 7.)

On May 15, 2025, Plaintiff emailed M1 claiming that it breached the Release by taking the taxes out of the agreed amount of $8,035.44. (UMF No. 8.)

In an effort to avoid litigation and make Plaintiff whole, M1 agreed to pay Plaintiff an additional $4,808.84 for a second release on May 20, 2025. (UMF No. 9.)

Plaintiff rejected M1’s offer. (UMF No. 10.)

Plaintiff then this matter, alleging a single cause of action for breach of contract for wage penalties. (UMF No. 11.)

On November 25, 2025, M1 demurred to the Complaint and moved to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages, noneconomic damages, special economic damages, and attorney’s fees. After hearing oral argument, on December 23, 2025, this Court overruled M1’s demurrer and granted its motion to strike with prejudice. Consequently, at the time of the Court’s ruling, the only remaining damages Plaintiff was arguably entitled to in connection with M1’s alleged breach of the Release were the withheld taxes in the amount of $1,365.08. (UMF No. 12.)

On January 6, 2026 at 4:24 p.m. PST, M1 delivered a check in the amount of $1,365.08 to Plaintiff. With the check was a letter from M1’s counsel titled “Re: Joseph Darko v. M1 Support Services Settlement Check,” which provided, “[e]nclosed please find M1 Support Services’ check number 57863, made payable to Joseph Darko in the amount of $1,365.08.” (UMF No. 13.)

That same day, Plaintiff cashed the check with his bank. (UMF No. 14.)

Subsequently, on January 8, 2026, Plaintiff filed a pleading with this Court entitled “Plaintiff’s Remedies Sought For Relief” in which he admitted the check in the amount of $1,365.08 had been paid. (UMF No. 17.)

Defendant filed a notice of non-opposition on April 24, 2026, noting that it had not received a timely opposition. A non-opposition and answer to this motion was filed by plaintiff on April 29, 2026, less than 20 days before the hearing. The non- opposition and answer filed by plaintiff does not address the issues in the summary judgment motion.

Authority and Analysis

A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(a).) “The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)

To prevail, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c).) The motion cannot succeed unless the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts; the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other evidence. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of material fact, “[a]ll doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment…” (Gold v. Weissman (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-99.) “In other words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true.” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 179.) However, if adjudication is otherwise proper the motion “may not be denied on grounds of credibility,” except when a material fact is the witness’s state of mind and “that fact is sought to be established solely by the [witness’s] affirmation thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(e).) 

Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) “[T]here is no obligation on the opposing party... to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element... necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor.” (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) 

“The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment motion. The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues and to frame the outer measure of materiality in a summary judgment proceeding.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493, quotations and citations omitted.) “Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff's theories of liability as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings.” (Id.)

The sole remaining cause of action in this matter, pursuant to the Court’s ruling on demurrer dated December 23, 2025, is a cause of action for breach of contract related to the settlement agreement entered into between plaintiff and defendant. 

Breach of Contract and Performance

"[T]he elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiffs performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff." (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)

Here, Defendant argues that payment of the amount at issue constitutes an extinguishment of the obligation under Civil Code section 1473, which states:

“Full performance of an obligation, by the party whose duty it is to perform it, or by any other person on his behalf, and with his assent, if accepted by the creditor, extinguishes it.”

“California Civil Code section 3300 provides for the general measure of damages for a breach of contract. It reads: "For the breach of an obligation arising from contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this code, is the amount which will compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, or which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to result therefrom." (Martin v. U-Haul Co. of Fresno (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 396, 408-409.) Further "Damages are awarded in an action for breach of contract to give the injured party the benefit of his bargain and insofar as possible to place him in the same position he would have been in had the promisor performed the contract. [Citations.] Damages must be reasonable, however, and the promisor is not required to compensate the injured party for injuries that he had no reason to foresee as the probable result of his breach when he made the contract. [Citations.]") (Id.) Here, defendant fully complied with their obligations under the release by tendering the amount due less the applicable payroll taxes and standard deductions clearly referenced in the release. When it became clear plaintiff would not accept this in full satisfaction, they tendered the balance of the funds without condition.

Here, the total obligation was $8,035.44, of which Defendant paid $6,670.38 initially, and after the filing of this lawsuit, paid the remaining amount of $1,365.08. As such, the most Plaintiff could recover in damages for breach of the agreement is the total of $8,035.44, which has now been paid in full and therefore extinguishes the obligation. Further, the Court finds that Defendant has met its burden on summary judgment that there is no material disputed fact as to the element of damages, which are now zero. Plaintiff has failed to meet Plaintiff’s corresponding burden.

Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Dowling, Nicole vs. Leyva, Marycruz

Case No.:  VCU331283

Date:          May 12, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:       Demurrer

Tentative Ruling: To sustain the demurrer to the first two causes of action with leave to amend; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days from the date of this hearing to file an amended complaint addressing the issues indicated herein; to sustain the demurrer to the third cause of action for injunctive relief without leave to amend.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendant for conversion, continuing conversion and injunctive relief.

Plaintiff alleges the following:

“6. At all times prior to November 14, 2025, Plaintiff was the sole owner and lawful possessor of the personal property described herein, including but not limited to: personal identification and documents, work-related materials, clothing, electronics, personal effects, and items necessary for daily living and employment (“Personal Property”).

7. Plaintiff lawfully stored her Personal Property within the residential premises located at 2421 Capitol Court, in Tulare County, California (“the Premises”), where Plaintiff resided immediately prior to her forcible removal.

8. On or about November 14, 2025, Defendant, acting individually and through agents, caused Plaintiff to be forcibly removed from the Premises pursuant to a wrongfully obtained writ of possession, while knowingly allowing Plaintiff’s Personal Property to remain inside the residence.

9. Following the lockout and forcible removal, Defendant knowingly retained possession and control over Plaintiff’s Personal Property.

10. Defendant exercised dominion and control over Plaintiff’s Personal Property by excluding Plaintiff from access, retaining possession, and refusing to allow retrieval, despite having no ownership interest or legal justification to do so.

11. On November 14, 2025, immediately after being forced to leave the Premises, Plaintiff contacted Defendant and expressly warned Defendant not to dispose of, damage, conceal, or interfere with Plaintiff’s Personal Property, and demanded its preservation and prompt return.

12. Defendant acknowledged possession of Plaintiff’s Personal Property and represented that she would later “send an email” to arrange a date to allow Plaintiff to retrieve her belongings.

13. Defendant’s representation was false and misleading. No such arrangements were ever made.

14. Despite repeated demands, Defendant failed to return Plaintiff’s Personal Property and instead retained exclusive control over it.

…

20. On or about January 9, 2026, Plaintiff again contacted Defendant and demanded the return of her Personal Property.

21. Defendant then admitted that she had already “packed all your stuff and put it in a storage room”…

24. Defendant has never provided proof of storage, an inventory, access to the property, or any meaningful opportunity for Plaintiff to retrieve her belongings.” (Complaint ¶¶6-14, 20, 21, 24/)

Defendant demurrers to this complaint on the basis that it is duplicative of VCU330278. Further, that the causes of action are uncertain and fail to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the causes of action in VCU330278 are distinct from the conversion causes of action presented in this complaint. Further, that the complaint is not uncertain and that sufficient allegations as to conversion have been pled. Finally, that these allegations support injunctive relief as requested.

As an initial matter, the Court notes that VCU330278 pleads separate causes of action for intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage and therefore the Court does not consider these matters duplicative.

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Conversion Following Writ of Possession

The elements of a conversion claim are: (i) Plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of the property; (ii) Defendant's conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (iii) Damages. (Burlesci v. Petersen (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1066).

A writ of possession issued by a court as to an unlawful detainer matter typically states:

“WRIT OF POSSESSION OF REAL PROPERTY….Except for a mobile home, personal property remaining on the premises will be sold or otherwise disposed of in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 1174 unless you or the owner of the property pays the judgment creditor the reasonable cost of storage and takes possession of the personal property not later than 15 days after the time the judgment creditor takes possession of the premises.”

Therefore, under the facts pled, the Court cannot find a sufficient allegation as to “wrongful act or disposition of property rights” via storage of personal property pursuant to a writ of possession following an unlawful detainer matter and Code of Civil Procedure section 1174(g). The conclusory allegation that the writ was issued “wrongfully” is insufficient and Plaintiff has not otherwise demonstrated conduct beyond what is permitted pursuant to the writ’s plain language noted above. Further, section 1174(g) states no requirement as to where the storage must occur, only that it is “in a place of safekeeping.” No allegations in the complaint indicate a violation of the language in the writ of section 1174(g).

Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer to the first and second causes of action for conversion with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days from the date of this hearing to file an amended complaint.

Injunctive Relief

It is well settled that injunctive relief is an equitable remedy, not a cause of action. (See Shell Oil Co. v. Richter (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 164, 168 ["Injunctive relief is a remedy and not, in itself, a cause of action, and a cause of action must exist before injunctive relief may be granted."]; See also Venice Coalition to Preserve Unique Community Character v. City of Los Angeles (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 42, 54 ["An injunction is a remedy, not a cause of action."].)

Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer to injunctive relief without leave to amend because it is a remedy as to other causes of action, but not a stand alone cause of action.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Dowling, Nicole vs. Leyva, Marycruz

Case No.:   VCU330278

Date:           May 12, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Demurrer

Tentative Ruling: To sustain the demurrer with leave to amend; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days from the date of this hearing to file an amended complaint.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendant for intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage.

Plaintiff alleges the following:

“7. Prior to the events described herein, Plaintiff had established and ongoing prospective economic relationships, including but not limited to:

• Existing professional engagements;
• Established contractual relations;
• Anticipated contracts and business opportunities;
• Ongoing income-generating work requiring stability, access to property, and freedom from coercion or disruption.

8. These relationships had a probability of future economic benefit, not mere hope or speculation.

9. Defendant was aware, or reasonably should have been aware, of Plaintiff's economic activities, work requirements, and reliance on uninterrupted access to housing, personal property, communications, and physical stability to maintain such opportunities.

10. Beginning on or about 2005 to 2010, 2011 to 2017, 2019 to 2020, and continuing on through 2021 to 2025, Defendant engaged in a course of conduct that substantially disrupted Plaintiff's ability to pursue and realize these economic opportunities.

11. Defendant intentionally and/or negligently engaged in wrongful acts including, but not limited to:

• Creating housing instability and uncertainty;
• Interfering with Plaintiff’s access to essential Property and work materials;
• Forcing sudden displacement (on more than one occasion) without lawful process;
• Withholding or delaying access to Plaintiff’s personal and professional property;
• Engaging in coercive communications intended to pressure Plaintiff into submission rather than allow independent economic activity.

12. Defendant’s conduct was independently wrongful, unlawful, and outside any legitimate business or legal justification, and was undertaken with knowledge that it would foreseeably disrupt Plaintiff's economic pursuits.

13. Defendant’s actions were not accidental or isolated but part of a broader pattern of control, domination, and interference with Plaintiff's autonomy and economic independence.” (Complaint ¶¶7-13.)

As to the intentional cause of action, Plaintiff alleges:

“15. Plaintiff had existing Prospective economic relationships with identifiable third Parties that were likely to result in future economic benefit.

16. Defendant knew of these relationships or knew facts making their existence reasonably foreseeable.

17. Defendant intentionally engaged in wrongful conduct designed to disrupt Plaintiff's ability to maintain and pursue such economic relationships.

18. Defendant’s conduct was undertaken with the purpose of:

• Controlling Plaintiff's movements;
• Depriving Plaintiff's personal liberties and professional choices;
• Preventing Plaintiff from achieving financial independence;
• Forcing Plaintiff into economic dependence or submission.

19. Defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing disruption, delay, loss, or termination of Plaintiff's Prospective economic advantages.” (Complaint ¶¶15-19.)

As to the negligent cause of action, Plaintiff alleges:

“22. Defendant knew or should have known that her conduct created an unreasonable risk of interfering with Plaintiff's economic relationships.”

Defendant demurrers to this complaint on the basis that it is duplicative of VCU331283. Further, that the causes of action are uncertain and fail to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that various arguments should be disregarded as not stated in the notice of demurrer, that VCU331283 is not duplicative of this matter, that sufficient allegations have been pled as to these causes of action and that the complaint is not uncertain.

As an initial matter, the Court notes that VCU331283pleads separate causes of action for conversion and injunctive relief and therefore the Court does not consider these matters duplicative.

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Interference with Economic Advantage

The elements of a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage include: "(1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third party, with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional or negligent acts on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the defendant." (Crown Imports, LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1404, citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted.)

The third element of the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage "also requires a plaintiff to plead intentional wrongful acts on the part of defendant designed to disrupt the relationship." (Marsh v. Anesthesia Services Medical Group, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 480, 504) "An act is independently wrongful if it is unlawful, that is, if it is proscribed by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or other determinable legal standard, not merely the product of an improper, but lawful purpose or motive." (Redfearn v. Trader Joe's Co. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 989, 1006, internal citations and punctuations omitted.) "Such conduct must also be independently actionable, meaning the legal standards must provide for, or give rise to, a sanction or means of enforcement for a violation of the particular rule or standard that allegedly makes the defendant's conduct unlawful." (Id., internal citations and punctuations omitted.)

The elements of negligent interference with prospective economic relations are: (1) an economic relationship existed between the plaintiff and a third party which contained a reasonably probable future economic benefit or advantage to plaintiff; (2) the defendant knew of the existence of the relationship and was aware or should have been aware that if it did not act with due care its actions would interfere with this relationship and cause plaintiff to lose in whole or in part the probable future economic benefit or advantage of the relationship; (3) the defendant was negligent; and (4) such negligence caused damage to plaintiff in that the relationship was actually interfered with or disrupted and plaintiff lost in whole or in part the economic benefits or advantage reasonably expected from the relationship. (N. Am. Chem. Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 764, 786.)

"When negligent, yet disruptive, acts allegedly interfere with an economic relationship, the acts are deemed tortious only where there was an existing duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff." (Golden Eagle Land Investment, L.P. v. Rancho Santa Fe Assn. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 399, 429.)

Here, the Court agrees that the allegations are too conclusory and merely recite the elements of these causes of action without sufficient allegations in support thereof. The Court, therefore, sustains the demurrer to both causes of action with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                LaRumbe-Torres, Josian vs. Kaweah Health Medical Center et al

Case No.:   VCU313564

Date:           May 12, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production by Defendant Dobbs

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion in part and order further responses and production as to Request Nos. 1, 3, 5 and Amended Notice Request Nos. 1 [where this limited date range is at issue] and 3 where limited to the time period of January 11, 2024 and January 12, 2024. Responses shall be due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiffs served Plaintiffs’ Requests for Production (Set One) to Defendant Dobbs on December 22, 2025.

Defendant Dobbs provided verified responses to Plaintiffs’ Request for Production of Documents (Set One) on March 2, 2026.

Plaintiffs, on March 4, 2026, sent a meet and confer letter to Defendant Dobbs seeking further responses and production.

Defendant Dobbs responded March 5, 2026 and Plaintiffs again met and conferred as to the responses.

Additionally, Plaintiffs noticed the deposition of Defendant Dobbs, including a Request for Production of Documents.

On March 12, 2026, Defendant Dobbs provided objections and responses to Requests for Production stated in the deposition notice.

Plaintiffs and Defendant Dobbs met and conferred March 23, 2026, April 2, 2026 and April 6, 2026 as to these requests.

At issue are Defendant Dobbs’ cell phone records for January 11, 2024 - June 11, 2024, all text messages during her January 11-12, 2024 shift (regardless of whether those text messages related to the care) and all text messages after her shift which concern the care at issue.”

Therefore, Plaintiff seeks further responses to Request Nos. 1-6 and the deposition Request Nos. 1 and 3.

Plaintiffs position as to compelling further responses is that Defendant Dobbs testified to use of her cellular phone during her shift, including text messaging and that Dobbs did not search her cellular phone for these messages.

In opposition, Defendants argue the requests are overbroad and lacking a limitation as to the patient-care communications, specific facts or a proper timeframe.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.210 requires, in response to a request for production, the following:

“(a) The party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed shall respond separately to each item or category of item by any of the following:

(1) A statement that the party will comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling by the date set for the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 2031.030 and any related activities.

(2) A representation that the party lacks the ability to comply with the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of a particular item or category of item.

(3) An objection to the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling.”

 Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.220 provides “A statement that the party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed will comply with the particular demand shall state that the production, inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, and related activity demanded, will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production.”

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230 provides “A representation of inability to comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party. The statement shall set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item.”

Finally, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310(a) permits a party to demand a further response where:

“(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete.

(2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive.

(3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.”

Under subsection (b), the motion must “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” In Digital Music News LLC v Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216 at 224, the court defined “good cause” as a showing that there “a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.”  If the moving party has shown good cause for the requests for production, the burden is on the objecting party to justify the objections. (Kirkland v. Sup.Ct (2002) 95 Cal. App.4th 92, 98.) 

At issue are the following requests:

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1

All phone calls, call logs, and telecommunication records and service provider bills from January 11-12, 2024 for Jacqueline Dobbs RN.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1

Objection. This request is overly broad. The request seeks information protected by constitutional right to privacy. The request seeks information neither relevant nor reasonably likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2

All phone calls, call logs, telecommunication records and service provider bills from January 11, 2024- June 11, 2024 for Jacqueline Dobbs RN for all calls in any way related to the care, treatment or code of JLT or related to the potential litigation.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2

Objection. This request is overly broad, burdensome and oppressive in scope. The request calls for information protected by the attorney-client and attorney work product doctrine. The responding party has no documents compliant with this request.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3

All phone calls and message recordings from January 11-12, 2024 for Jacqueline Dobbs RN.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3

Objection. This request is overly broad. The request seeks information protected by constitutional right to privacy. The request seeks information neither relevant nor reasonably likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4

All phone calls and message recordings from January 11, 2024- June 11, 2024 for Jacqueline Dobbs RN for all calls in any way related to the care, treatment of JLT or related to the potential litigation.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4

Objection. This request is overly broad, burdensome and oppressive in scope. The request calls for information protected by the attorney-client and attorney work product doctrine. The responding party has no documents compliant with this request.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5

All text messages, iMessages, iMobile, SMS, MMS, Whats App, Facebook, Messenger, Instagram, Snapchat, Slack, GChat, WeChat, or Teams messages and any other messages or records along with service provider bills from January 11-12, 2024 for Jacqueline Dobbs RN.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5

Objection. This request is overly broad and oppressive in scope. The request seeks information protected by constitutional right to privacy. The request seeks information neither relevant nor reasonably likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6

All text messages, iMessages, iMobile, SMS, MMS, Whats App, Facebook, Messenger, Instagram, Snapchat, Slack, GChat, WeChat, or Teams messages, and any other messages or records in any way related to the care, treatment, code or related to the potential litigation along with service provider bills from January 11, 2024- June 11, 2024 for Jacqueline Dobbs RN.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6

Objection. This request is overly broad, burdensome and oppressive in scope. The request calls for information protected by the attorney-client and attorney work product doctrine. The responding party has no documents compliant with this request.

As to the amended notice of deposition requests, the following are at issue:

AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION TO RN DOBBS-REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1

All documents sought in Plaintiffs’ Request for Production of Documents.

OBJECTION TO AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION TO RN DOBBS-REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1

This request is vague and ambiguous and uncertain. This request is overly broad. The request calls for documents protected by the witness’s right to privacy. The request calls for documents that are neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The request is compound.

AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION TO RN DOBBS-REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3

The billing statements and detailed records for all cellular/smart phone and all mobile communication devices in your possession on January 11 and January 12, 2024.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3 This request is overly broad. The request calls for documents protected by the witnesses (sic) right to privacy. The request seeks information neither relevant nor reasonably likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiving the foregoing objections defendant Jacqueline Dobbs responds that she has never had possession of billing statements or records of phone devices provided by Kaweah Delta. After a diligent search, Jacqueline Dobbs responds that she does not have possession of any other documents related to billing statements or records of any phone communication devices in use on January 11 or January 12, 2024

Good Cause

Here, Plaintiffs allege Defendant Dobbs was responsible for providing nursing care to Plaintiffs. Dobbs’ responses noted above indicate no documents were produced. However, Plaintiff notes that Dobbs testified she used her personal cell phone while on shift to communicate with others, that this occurred on breaks and that Dobbs exchanged messages with colleagues about the delivery at issue in this case.

However, as noted by Plaintiffs, Dobbs testified that she did not search her phone to obtain the text messages and make a copy responsive to either set of requests.

On a professional negligence claim, the Court finds sufficient good cause as to the documents sought above, where it is alleged that Dobbs was involved in the care of Plaintiffs, that Dobbs used her cellular phone during the relevant time period and that Dobbs discussed the factual events of the incident via text message.

Therefore, the Court examines the objections lodged.

The Court notes the vague, uncertain and ambiguous objections are considered nuisance objections and the Court finds no justification for these objections. (Standon Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 898, 901.)

Further, West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 418, notes that an objection based upon burden must be sustained by evidence showing the quantum of work required.

As to overbreadth, the Court does not find Request Nos. 1, 3, 5 and Amended Notice Request Nos. 1 [where this limited date range is at issue] and 3, when limited to the time period of January 11, 2024 and January 12, 2024. Further, as the theory is that Dobbs was using a cellphone to the extent that it impacted patient care, the information sought need not be fact specific as to the care or treatment at issue.

However, the Court lacks sufficient information to compel a further response as to a date range of January 11, 2024 to June 11, 2024 (Nos. 2, 4, 6 and Amended Notice No. 1 [where the extended date range is at issue].)

As to privacy, the Court agrees that private, text message communications with third parties enjoy protection requiring the use of the balancing test set out in Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552, citing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1.

The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. (Id.) "The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy." (Id.)

Courts must carefully balance a right of privacy against the interest in having just litigation. (Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 371.) If there is a serious invasion of a constitutional right to privacy, the party seeking the evidence must establish that the information sought is not only essential and directly relevant, but also that this information could not be discovered through less intrusive means. (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 552; Harris v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661, 665 [information must be "directly relevant to a cause of action or defense... i.e., that it is essential to determining the truth of the matters in dispute].)

Here, the Court finds a sufficient legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy and that seeking the contents of the text messages and other data surrounding them is a serious intrusion.

However, the Court finds sufficient countervailing interests present here, where it is alleged that Defendant Dobbs was text messaging during the care of Plaintiffs and the infant, that Defendant Dobbs was negligent in the care and that Defendant Dobbs has admitted to text messaging during the relevant period of January 11, 2024 to January 12, 2024. Further, that Dobbs has admitted no search took place in order to respond to these requests.

Plaintiffs have attempted a less intrusive means through the deposition of Dobbs.

Moreover, Plaintiffs did subpoena AT&T for records, but withdrew the subpoena based upon a representation that the records would be requested by Dobbs and produced. Dobbs now claims the cell phone at issue was issued by Kaweah and that she otherwise lacks access in order to provide a further response. This, however, is inconsistent with the deposition testimony that she failed to search her personal cellular phone for the messages prior to the deposition.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion as to Request Nos. 1, 3, 5 and Amended Notice Request Nos. 1 [where this limited date range is at issue] and 3 where limited to the time period of January 11, 2024 and January 12, 2024.

However, the Court lacks a sufficient basis to compel a further response as to a date range of January 11, 2024 to June 11, 2024 (Nos. 2, 4, 6 and Amended Notice No. 1 [where the extended date range is at issue].)

The Court, therefore, orders further responses and production as to Request Nos. 1, 3, 5 and Amended Notice Request Nos. 1 [where this limited date range is at issue] and 3 where limited to the time period of January 11, 2024 and January 12, 2024. Responses shall be due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                JGI Wholesale Corp. vs. United Brands, LLC

Case No.:   VCU330698

Date:          May 12, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion for Reclassification

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion.

Facts

Plaintiff sues Defendant United for breach of contract and Defendant Valley Wide for intentional interference with contractual relations.

Relevant here, this is a contract for exclusive distribution by Plaintiff as to Defendant United’s products within a set territory for a period of ten years beginning December 27, 2024. (Complaint – Ex. 1 – Page 1.)

 Plaintiff alleges a Defendant United breached when Defendant United entered into a separate distribution agreement for the Products with Valley Wide for an area containing six and a half counties that had been included in the exclusive area and that Defendant United told Plaintiff “United would not honor the Contract and would be using Valley Wide as its distributor of the Product.” (Complaint ¶¶13, 15.)

Further that:

“21. United breached the Contract by refusing to honor Plaintiff's exclusive distribution rights within the Exclusive Area.

22. United breached the Contract by refusing to permit Plaintiff to operate in the Disputed Counties.

23. United further breached the Contract by permitting Valley Wide or another distributor to sell Products in the Exclusive Area.

…

25. Alternatively, United unilaterally terminated the Contract, and failed to pay to Plaintiff the termination payment as set forth in the Contract.” (Complaint ¶¶21-23, 25.)

Section 7.5 of the Contract states the following:

“Section 7.5 of the Contract provides that “in the event of a termination of this Agreement by [United] without cause, [United] shall pay to Distributor a sum amount 2X the Distributor’s preceding twelve months [sic] average sales from the date of termination[.]” (Complaint ¶9.)

Plaintiff alleges sales of $50,995.20 between December 27, 2024 and May 5, 2025, the alleged date of the termination. (Complaint ¶15.)

As to each cause of action, Plaintiff seeks damages of $288,577.51. (Complaint ¶¶26, 33.)

On March 27, 2026, Defendant United filed this motion to reclassify this matter as a limited civil case. Defendant United argues that the damages sought in the complaint cannot exceed the jurisdictional limit of $35,000 based upon the breach formula in the contract.

Defendant United argues that the average monthly sales were, at best, $12,748.80, calculated by dividing the total sales of $50,995.20 by the four months between execution of the contract December 27, 2024 and May 5, 2025. Therefore, the maximum amount of damages as to breach of contract could only total $25,497.60, two times the average sales.

As to the second cause of action, Defendant United argues that the tort damages are limited to the financial loss from the benefit of the contract at issue, which results in the same damages amount of $25,497.60.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the breach of contract is based on two theories: one as to failure to pay the double the average sales damages and a second as to breaching the exclusivity provisions of the agreement. Therefore, Plaintiff argues that damages beyond double the average sales amount are available. 

Authority and Analysis

Reclassification from an unlimited civil court to a limited civil court is only allowed when "it appears to a legal certainty that plaintiff cannot recover the amount [of the] demand." (Ytuarte v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 266, 277 [citing Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 270].) If there is a possibility that the damages will exceed $25,000.00, the case cannot be transferred to limited. (Walker, supra, 53 Cal. App. at 270.) This high standard is appropriate in light of “…the circumscribed procedures and recovery available in the limited civil courts.” (Ytuarte, surpa, 129 Cal.App.4th at 278.)

"To reclassify an action because it does not meet the jurisdictional amount involves evaluation of the amount fairly in controversy, not an evaluation of the merits of the claim. The trial court must reasonably determine that the verdict will "necessarily" fall short of the $[35,001] required for an unlimited civil case." (Stern v. Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 223, 233; See Code Civ. Proc. §85)

Breach of Contract Damages

“California courts have long recognized that “‘[t]he rules of law governing the recovery of damages for breach of contract are very flexible.’” (Brandon & Tibbs v. George Kevorkian Accountancy Corp. (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 442, 455.) Under California contract law, “the theory is that the party injured by a breach should receive nearly as possible the equivalent of the benefits of performance. [Citations.] The aim is to put the injured party in as good a position as he would have been had performance been rendered as promised.” (Id.) Accordingly, California law generally permits recovery of damages “which might have been reasonably contemplated or foreseen by both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach.” (Id. at p. 456.)” (Shah v. Skillz Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 285, 299.)

“‘Damages for breach of contract include general (or direct) damages, which compensate for the value of the promised performance, and consequential damages, which are indirect and compensate for additional losses incurred as a result of the breach’ [citation]. Direct damages are typically expectation damages, measured by what it would take to put the non-breaching party in the same position that it would be in had the breaching party performed as promised under the contract [citations]. Special, or consequential damages, on the other hand, are ‘extraordinary in that they do not so directly flow from the breach [and] are recoverable only upon a showing that they were foreseeable and within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made’ [citation].’ [citation omitted]”
(Speirs v. BlueFire Ethanol Fuels, Inc. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 969, 989.)

“Special damages for breach of contract are limited to losses that were either actually foreseen (see, e.g., Dallman Co. v. Southern Heater Co. (1968) 262 Cal. App. 2d 582, 586  [in contract negotiations, supplier was put on notice that its failure to perform would result in lost profits]) or were “reasonably foreseeable” when the contract was formed.” (Lewis Jorge Construction Management, Inc. v. Pomona Unified School Dist. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 960, 969-970.)

The California Supreme Court in Lewis Jorge continued, stating, as to lost profit damages:

“Lost profits from collateral transactions as a measure of general damages for breach of contract typically arise when the contract involves crops, goods intended for resale, or an agreement creating an exclusive sales agency. …Brunvold v. Johnson (1939) 36 Cal. App. 2d 226 [termination of exclusive agent for sale of rope and twine products]; Tahoe Ice Co. v. Union Ice Co. (1895) 109 Cal. 242 [termination of supply contract by ice retailer];  Grupe v. Glick (1945) 26 Cal.2d 680 [defective oil refining machines purchased for resale by exclusive agent]…The likelihood of lost profits from related or derivative transactions is so obvious in these situations that the breaching party must be deemed to have contemplated them at the inception of the contract.”

Here, while the Court recognizes that the Contract contains a term that, as to without cause termination, damages are equal to twice the prior average sales, the Court agrees that, at this stage of the case and on a motion for reclassification, the Court cannot say that this term limits the damages available for breach of the Contract. Therefore, other damages such a lost profits, have been pled and the Court cannot say that any verdict int his matter will necessarily fall short of the jurisdictional limit.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Reyes, Roque vs. JCH Family Limited Partnership

Case No.:   VCU294703

Date:           May 12, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion in part as to substitution of Soto for Plaintiff; to deny the motion in part as to the addition of Soto as a plaintiff as to a separate injury; to order a revised proposed amended complaint consistent with this ruling filed no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

Facts

This matter, initially filed December 23, 2022, was filed by Plaintiff Roque Reyes against Defendant JCH for violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Code section 51 and seeks damages and injunctive relief.

The complaint alleges “Plaintiff went to the Business on or about December 9, 2022, as a customer and purchased items sold at the Defendant’s Business Establishment and also as an advocate for the civil rights of disabled persons to verify whether Defendants comply with the ADA and the UCRA.” (Complaint ¶10.) Plaintiff alleges a lack of accessible parking and no accessible route. (Complaint ¶12.)

Plaintiff seeks $4,000 per occurrence under Civil Code section 52(a) and additional award of $4,000 as deterrence damages, as well as attorneys’ fees and injunctive relief.

On July 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed a notice that Plaintiff died June 17, 2025.

On March 26, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion for leave to amend the complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473(a)(1) to add Julia Soto as a plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 12182(b)(1)(E).

Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration states “Proposed Plaintiff Ms. Soto has recently been approved as an administrator of Mr. Reyes’ estate and is obtaining a bond” and that “The effect of Plaintiff’s proposed amendment to the Complaint, is to add Julia Soto as a plaintiff and facts that establish her standing based on her relationship and association with Plaintiff Roque Reyes.” (Declaration of Fitzgerald ¶¶3, 4.)

Further, that “The amendment is necessary because Plaintiff ROQUE REYES is deceased and Ms. Soto has a cognizable claim under the ADA and the UCRA pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 12182(b)(1)(E). The amendment is proper because Defendants will not be prejudiced by the amendment” and “The facts that gave rise to the proposed allegations rely on the same set of facts as Mr. Reyes’ original allegations.” (Declaration of Fitzgerald ¶¶5, 6.)

Finally that “The proposed amendment is requested now due the death of Mr. Reyes, the imminent appointment of Ms. Soto as representative of Mr. Reyes estate.” (Declaration of Fitzgerald ¶7.)

Plaintiff attaches a copy of the proposed amended complaint as well as a redlined version thereof. (Declaration of Fitzgerald ¶8 – Ex. B.)

In opposition, Defendant argues that the allegations as to Soto are based on an independent right and separate injury and therefore do not relate back to the filing of this complaint. Therefore, Defendant argues, the statute of limitations renders the proposed amendment futile.

Authority and Analysis

In the Court’s view, Plaintiff’s proposed amendment seeks to accomplish two things.

The first is to substitute Soto for Plaintiff based on the death of Plaintiff.

The second is to establish Soto as a second plaintiff who:

“seeks relief based on her association with her former spouse, long-term partner, and companion REYES. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 12182(b)(1)(E), Plaintiff SOTO has been discriminated against and has suffered an injury within the meaning of the ADA that is separate, direct, and independent from that suffered by Plaintiff REYES as a result of the barriers that exist at the Subject Property. As the care provider of Plaintiff REYES, Plaintiff SOTO would necessarily accompany Plaintiff REYES to the Subject Property. Plaintiff SOTO experienced frustration and discrimination when she encountered the barriers at the Subject Property. These injuries are specific to her independent right to access the Subject Property with her partner. Plaintiff SOTO has been denied full and equal access to the Subject Property because of her association with a person with a mobility disability.” (Proposed FAC ¶36.)

Substitution of Soto for Plaintiff

The Court may, in the furtherance of justice, and upon any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 473, 576.)  In general, California courts liberally exercise discretion to permit amendment of pleadings in light of a strong policy favoring resolution of all disputes between parties in the same action.  (Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939; Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 296 [“[T]here is a strong policy in favor of liberal allowance of amendments.”].)  Pursuant to this policy, requests for leave to amend generally will be granted unless the party seeking to amend has been dilatory in bringing the proposed amendment before the Court, and the delay in seeking leave to amend will cause prejudice to the opposing party if leave to amend is granted.  (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490; Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565.)  The decision on a motion for leave is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 

Rule 3.1324 regulates the content of the motion and supporting declaration as follows:

“(a) Contents of motion

A motion to amend a pleading before trial must:

(1)  Include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments;

(2)  State what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and

(3)  State what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located.

(b) Supporting declaration

A separate declaration must accompany the motion and must specify:

(1)  The effect of the amendment;

(2)  Why the amendment is necessary and proper;

(3)  When the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and

(4)  The reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier.”

Here, subsection (a) is complied with via Exhibit B.

Additionally, subsection (b) is sufficient as to the effect of the amendment to substitute Soto for Plaintiff, that the amendment is necessary because Plaintiff has passed away, that this fact became known upon the death of Plaintiff and that Soto was recently approved as the administrator of the estate.

The court in Engel v. Pech (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1236 noted:

“…when it comes to adding a new plaintiff, courts have refined the general rule: A new plaintiff's claims relate back to claims asserted in a previously and timely filed complaint if the new plaintiff is seeking to enforce the same right as a previously named plaintiff (because, in that case, the amendment relies on the same general set of facts, involves the same injury, and refers to the same instrumentality of the defendant's conduct)…This is why amendments that do no more than swap in a new plaintiff for an existing cause of action—when the new plaintiff is the real party in interest and the original plaintiff was not—typically relate back.”

The Court views the proposed amended complaint to, first, substitute Soto for Plaintiff.

The Court, therefore, turns to the unaddressed issue of whether a cause of action under the Unruh Act survives the death of the Plaintiff. The Court notes both injunctive relief and monetary damages are sought.

Claims for injunctive relief require that there exist a real or immediate threat of irreparable harm. (Hangarter v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co. (9th Cir. 2004) 373 F.3d 998, 1021-1022.) The death of Plaintiff, in the Court’s opinion, rendered moot any claim for injunctive relief under, as there is necessarily no prospect of future injury to Plaintiff.

However, the Unruh Act provides for damages and therefore the estate could be compensated for past harm (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.34.) Defendant has not presented authority that has held that a claim for a violation of the Unruh Act does not survive death.

Therefore, as to substitution of Plaintiff for Soto as a survival claim, the Court will permit an amended complaint to be filed. However, as discussed below, the proposed amended complaint also seeks to add Soto as a separate plaintiff who suffered independent harm via association with Plaintiff.

Soto as a Second, Separate Plaintiff

Here, the Court cannot find compliance with subsection (b) of Rule 3.1354, as the amended complaint alleges that Soto suffered independent and unique harm at the same time as Plaintiff, but has waited nearly three and a half years to seek adjudication of these allegations. Soto, at all times, has been aware of this independent harm and basis for the claims now asserted in the proposed amended complaint.

Further, Defendant opposes the motion on substantive grounds, that Soto’s proposed amendments fail due to the statute of limitations.

The Court will not generally consider the validity of the proposed amended pleading in ruling on a motion for leave as “the preferable practice would be to permit the amendment and allow the parties to test its legal sufficiency by demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings or other appropriate proceedings.” (California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 274, 281 disapproved of on other grounds by Kransco v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 390.)

However:

“While the cases cited for the point are not overly explicit, we are confident Mr. Witkin is correct that the failure of a proposed amendment to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action or defense may support an order denying a motion to amend. (See 5 Witkin, op. cit. supra, Pleading, § 1125, and cases cited.) That rule would find its most appropriate application, however, in cases in which the insufficiency of the proposed amendment is established by controlling precedent and where the insufficiency could not be cured by further appropriate amendment. (Id. at 280-281.)

The Court applies this rationale here as to the statute of limitations argument and relation back.

Gatto v. County of Sonoma (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 744, 759 notes, as to the statute of limitations issue and the Unruh Act:

“Because some of the provisions commonly treated by the courts as part of the Unruh Civil Rights Act derive from the common law and some do not, we conclude that no single statute of limitations applies to all. The one-year statute will apply to causes of action under provisions that evolved from the common law; the three-year statute will apply to others. Accordingly, our determination of the statute of limitations applicable to the specific claims before us does not necessarily apply to causes of action arising under provisions of the Civil Code not invoked in this case, even though they may also be described as Unruh Civil Rights  Act claims.”

Here, however, Soto seeks to assert this independent right and separate injury beyond the three-year limitation period and therefore the Court need not decide which statute applies here.

As to the attempt here to include Soto as a separate plaintiff who asserts an independent right and separate injury, the Engel court noted:

“Conversely, a new plaintiff's claims do not relate back if the new plaintiff is seeking to “enforce a[] … right” “independent” of the right asserted by the previously named plaintiff(s)….This occurs when (1) the new plaintiff's claims rest on a “wholly different legal liability or obligation” (that is, a “distinct” “cause of action”) “from that originally [alleged]” (Klopstock, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 20 [claim does not relate back “where the effect of such amendment is to state ‘another and distinct cause of action’”]; see Branick, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 243–244; Pasadena Hospital, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 1035); (2) the new plaintiff's claims entail a distinct injury (Quiroz, at p. 1279); or (3) the new plaintiff's claims “‘impose greater liability upon the defendant’” than the original plaintiff's claims (Quiroz, at p. 1278; see Bartalo, at p. 533; Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 685, 715…(See Quiroz, at pp. 1278–1279 [amendment adding spouse as a plaintiff in her capacity as representative for the decedent in a survivor action does not relate back to prior complaint naming spouse as a wrongful death plaintiff because the two claims involve “different injur[ies]”]…Bartalo, at p. 533 [amendment adding injured person's spouse as a plaintiff to assert a loss of consortium claim does not relate back to complaint alleging personal injury to person because the two claims involve distinct injuries]; Shelton v. Superior Court (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 66, 74 [same].) (Engel, supra, 95 Cal. App. 5^th at 1237-1238.)

As such, Soto’s claims arise under an association with Plaintiff, resting on a different legal liability and obligation, entailing a distinct injury to Soto and therefore do not relate back to the filing of the complaint.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion insofar that it seeks to add Soto as a Plaintiff who seeks recovery under the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Summary of Ruling

The Court, therefore, grants the motion in part as to substitution of Soto for Plaintiff and denies the motion in part as to the addition of Soto as a plaintiff as to a separate injury.

The proposed amended complaint, therefore, is inconsistent with this ruling. The Court will order a revised proposed amended complaint consistent with this ruling filed no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Flores, Rafael vs. HR Mobile Services, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU314557

Date:           May 12, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion for Preliminary Approval

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. The Court takes this hearing off calendar.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. vs. Torres-Olivera, Maribel

Case No.:   VCL327738

Date:           May 12, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion for Relief from Default

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion to set aside entry of default; the Court will file the proposed answer lodged April 2, 2026 as of this hearing date.  

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendant for breach of contract.

On November 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a proof of service indicating Defendant had been personally served at 200 N Steven Ave Apt 302, Farmersville, CA (“Service Address”) on November 18, 2025 at 4:05 pm, stating “I delivered the documents to MARIBEL TORRES-OLIVERA with identity confirmed by subject stating their name. The individual accepted service with direct delivery. The individual appeared to be a black-haired Hispanic female contact 25-35 years of age, 5'-5'4" tall and weighing 120-140 lbs.” The proof was completed by a registered California process server.

On January 6, 2026, default and default judgment were entered.

On January 15, 2026, Defendant filed an ex parte motion for relief from default, which the Court denied on January 23, 2026.

On January 29, 2026, Defendant filed a motion for relief from default, which the Court denied on March 3, 2026.

On April 2, 2026, Defendant filed this motion to set aside default pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5.

On April 3, 2026, Defendant filed a proof of service of this motion on Plaintiff’s counsel via mail.

In support, Defendant provides a declaration stating that they do not reside at the Service Address, that they have not lived there since September 2024, that their brother received the documents, that Defendant did not receive notice of the documents until two months later, that Defendant did not receive notice of the January 6, 2026 default, and that Defendant learned of the default January 12, 2026. (Declaration of Defendant ¶¶1-7.)

Further, Defendant’s brother declares he was given the documents at the Service Address, that he informed the process server that Defendant does not reside at the address, that he does not identify as her, that he is a male and that he does not match the description on the proof of service. (Declaration of Torres ¶¶1-8.)

The Court notes an answer lodged with this motion that was filed and set aside.

No opposition appears filed.

Authority and Analysis

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5 where service of summons has not resulted in actual notice to a party and default has been entered, the party may file a notice of motion to set aside the default and for leave to defend the action. Under subsection (a), the motion must be made within a reasonable time, but “in no event exceeding the earlier of: (i) two years after entry of a default judgment against him or her; or (ii) 180 days after service on him or her of a written notice that the default or default judgment has been entered.

Here, the motion is timely, as default judgment was entered January 6, 2026.

Subsection (b) additionally requires the filing of “an affidavit showing under oath that the party’s lack of actual notice in time to defend the action was not caused by his or her avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect. The party shall serve and file with the notice a copy of the answer, motion, or other pleading proposed to be filed in the action.”

The Court starts with the filed proof of service, which creates a rebuttable presumption that the service was proper if the service declaration complies with the statutory requirements regarding such proofs (Code Civ. Proc. § 417.10; Lebel v. Mai (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1163.) The return of a registered process server establishes a presumption of the facts stated in the return. (Evid. Code § 647; American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 390.) Here, the presumption is established.

This rebuttable presumption shifts the burden to Defendant to produce evidence showing that they were improperly served. (See American Express, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at 390.)

Here, Defendant states she does not reside at this address where service occurred, that her brother received the documents, that the property address is not Defendant’s dwelling, usual place of abode or usual place of living. Further, Defendant’s brother has filed a declaration which indicates that he was contacted by the process server at the Service Address and that he is not Defendant.

Further, the Court finds Defendant’s declaration sufficient as to lack of actual notice in time to defend and that such was not caused by avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect. “Excusable neglect” has been defined as “neglect that might have been the act or omission of a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.” (Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.App.3d 427, 435.) The Court finds that service at an address for which Defendant does not reside in combination with an estranged relationship with Defendant’s brother is sufficient to find no avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect.

Further, as to subsection (b), the Court will deem the answer filed and struck on April 2, 2026 sufficient.

 Based on the above, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to set aside entry of default and will file the proposed answer lodged April 2, 2026 as the answer in this matter.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                TD Bank USA, N.A. vs. Avila, Antonio

Case No.:   PCL327979

Date:           May 12, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:     Defendant’s Counsel’s Motion to be Relieved

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion as moot, as this case was dismissed by Plaintiff on January 23, 2026.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Rocky Top Rentals, LLC vs. Fernandez Bravo, Jose Benito et al

Case No.:   PCL328318

Date:           May 12, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:      Motion to Authorized Forced Entry re: Levy

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion

Facts

In this verified complaint for breach of contract and possession of personal property, Plaintiff sued Defendants Jose Benito Fernandez Bravo and Diana Fernandez Ontiveros as to the failure to make timely monthly payments as to a portable storage building.

Plaintiff filed proofs of personal service as to each Defendant, obtained entry of default on January 6, 2026 and obtained a default judgment in the amount of $15,295.05 on January 26, 2026. The judgment included that “Plaintiff is entitled to possession of a Portable Storage Building described as a Utility with dimensions of 10 feet by 16 feet and Inventory No. WSUTD-BF783-l016-021225-SP.”

On March 3, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion for an order authorizing forced entry to levy a writ pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 699.030.

In support, counsel notes “I am informed and believe Tulare County Sheriff's Office will be unable to effectuate the levying of a writ of possession against the subject building that Rocky Top seeks to recover without a private property order.” (Declaration of Rich ¶5.) Further, that the property is located on Defendants’ private property at 430 W. Garden Lane, Porterville.

No opposition appears filed. The Court notes a proof of service of this motion on Defendants.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 699.030 states:

If personal property sought to be levied upon is located in a private place of the judgment debtor:

(a) The levying officer making the levy shall demand delivery of the property by the judgment debtor and shall advise the judgment debtor that the judgment debtor may be liable for costs and attorney’s fees incurred in any further proceedings to obtain delivery of the property. If the judgment debtor does not deliver the property, the levying officer shall make no further effort to obtain custody of the property and shall promptly notify the judgment creditor of the failure to obtain custody of the property.

(b) The judgment creditor may apply to the court ex parte, or on noticed motion if the court so directs or a court rule so requires, for an order directing the levying officer to seize the property in the private place. The application may be made whether or not a writ has been issued and whether or not demand has been made pursuant to subdivision (a). The application for the order shall describe with particularity both the property sought to be levied upon, and the place where it is to be found, according to the best knowledge, information, and belief of the judgment creditor. The court may not issue the order unless the judgment creditor establishes that there is probable cause to believe that property sought to be levied upon is located in the place described. The levying officer making the levy, at the time delivery of the property pursuant to the order is demanded, shall announce his or her identity, purpose, and authority. If the property is not voluntarily delivered, the levying officer may cause the building or enclosure where the property is believed to be located to be broken open in such manner as the levying officer reasonably believes will cause the least damage, but if the levying officer reasonably believes that entry and seizure of the property will involve a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm to any person, the levying officer shall refrain from entering and shall promptly make a return to the court setting forth the reasons for believing that the risk exists. In such a case, the court shall make such orders as may be appropriate. (emphasis added.)

Here, Plaintiff seeks enforcement of its judgment by seeking an order authorizing the levying officer to enter 430 W. Garden Lane, Porterville and seize the Utility subject to the levy.

Under section 699.030(b), it is not required that the levying officer first attempt retrieval by demanding it and this order may be issued without issuance of a writ.

The Court notes that if the levying officer discovers someone living in the Utility, the levying officer is ordered to refrain from taking the Utility, on the basis that the Court finds it would involve substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm to the occupants.

The Court, therefore, grants the application and will issue the order as requested.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Rodriguez, Delia vs. Rocha, Anthony III

Case No.:   PCU334212

Date:           May 12, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:      Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application for TRO

Tentative Ruling: To deny the application

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff, on April 29, 2026, filed a verified complaint against Defendants Rocha III, Nixon and Rispoli for: 1. Quiet Title (CCP § 760.010) 2. Constructive Trust 3. Financial Elder Abuse (WIC § 15610.30) 4. Fraud and Misrepresentation 5. Unjust Enrichment 6. Cancellation of Instruments 7. Declaratory Relief 8. Injunctive Relief.

On April 30, 2026, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging the same causes of action.

Plaintiff alleges:

“8. On or about August 25, 2016, Plaintiff entered into an owner-financed purchase of the subject property.

9. Plaintiff paid a down payment of $30,732.82, evidenced by cashier's check, attached as Exhibit "A".

10. Plaintiff was assisted by First American Title and reasonably believed she was purchasing the home and would be placed on title attached as Exhibit "8".

11. From 2016 to present, Plaintiff has:

• Paid approximately $1,300 monthly

• Paid property taxes attached as Exhibits "C" and "D"

• Maintained exclusive possession

12. Plaintiff relied on Defendants' representations and would not have paid these sums otherwise.

13. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, title was transferred by Anthony Rispoli to Anthony Rocha 111 in or about 2020 attached as Exhibit "E".

14. Plaintiff was never informed, did not consent, and received no consideration.

15. Defendant Rocha III has since:

• Retained benefits of Plaintiffs payments

• Refinanced the property

• Retained approximately $75,000 in proceeds

16. On March 16, 2026, Plaintiff was served with a 60-Day Notice to Terminate Tenancy attached as Exhibit "F".

17. Plaintiff is not a tenant, but an equitable owner.” (FAC ¶¶8-17.)

No proof of service of the summons and complaint has been filed with this Court.

Also on April 29, 2026, Plaintiff filed this ex parte application for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction on the basis that Plaintiff is an equitable owner, Plaintiff paid funds and maintained the property while in possession, and Plaintiff faces “imminent eviction.” Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the eviction, enjoin any further transfer and “maintain the status quo.”

On April 30, 2026, a proof of service of electronic service and telephonic notice was provided as to the ex parte application.

Authority and Analysis

TRO and Preliminary Injunction

Here, Plaintiff seeks a TRO and preliminary injunction by this ex parte application.

California Rules of Court, rule 3.1150, entitled “Preliminary injunctions and bonds” notes, in subsection (a), that:

“A party requesting a preliminary injunction may give notice of the request to the opposing or responding party either by serving a noticed motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1005 or by obtaining and serving an order to show cause (OSC). An OSC must be used when a temporary restraining order (TRO) is sought, or if the party against whom the preliminary injunction is sought has not appeared in the action. If the responding party has not appeared, the OSC must be served in the same manner as a summons and complaint.” (California Rules of Court, rule 3.1150(a).)

Rule of Court, rule 3.1150, subdivision (c) states:

(c) Form of OSC and TRO The OSC and TRO must be stated separately, with the OSC stated first. The restraining language sought in an OSC and a TRO must be separately stated in the OSC and the TRO and may not be incorporated by reference. The OSC must describe the injunction to be sought at the hearing. The TRO must describe the activities to be enjoined pending the hearing. A proposed OSC must contain blank spaces for the time and manner of service on responding parties, the date on which the proof of service must be delivered to the court hearing the OSC, a briefing schedule, and, if applicable, the expiration date of the TRO.”

Here, no party has appeared, a TRO is sought and therefore an OSC must be served in the same manner as the summons and complaint.

Service by electronic means, therefore, is insufficient.

Further, an OSC must be sought, which has not occurred here. 

Ex Parte Notice

The application lacks compliance with California Rule of Court, rule 3.1204 subdivisions (b) and (c) entitled “Contents of notice and declaration regarding notice” states:

(b) Declaration regarding notice An ex parte application must be accompanied by a declaration regarding notice stating:

(1) The notice given, including the date, time, manner, and name of the party informed, the relief sought, any response, and whether opposition is expected and that, within the applicable time under rule 3.1203, the applicant informed the opposing party where and when the application would be made;

(2) That the applicant in good faith attempted to inform the opposing party but was unable to do so, specifying the efforts made to inform the opposing party; or

(3) That, for reasons specified, the applicant should not be required to inform the opposing party.

(c) Explanation for shorter notice If notice was provided later than 10:00 a.m. the court day before the ex parte appearance, the declaration regarding notice must explain:

(1) The exceptional circumstances that justify the shorter notice; or

(2) In unlawful detainer proceedings, why the notice given is reasonable.

No such declaration is provided here, though the Court notes the proof of service by electronic service above. 

Further, California Rule of Court, rule 3.1202, entitled “Contents of application” which, under subdivision (a), requires the following:

(a) Identification of attorney or party An ex parte application must state the name, address, e-mail address, and telephone number of any attorney known to the applicant to be an attorney for any party or, if no such attorney is known, the name, address, e-mail address, and telephone number of the party if known to the applicant.

The application too is silent as to this information.

Therefore, the Court denies the application on these procedural grounds.

Injunction Standard

Additionally, the burden is on plaintiff to show all elements necessary to support issuance of the injunction.  (O’Connell v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.)  “A superior court must evaluate two interrelated factors when ruling on a request for a preliminary injunction: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial and (2) the interim harm that the plaintiff would be likely to sustain if the injunction were denied as compared to the harm the defendant would be likely to suffer if the preliminary injunction were issued.  (Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 729, 749.)  The court employs a more probable than not standard.  (Robbins v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 206.)

Here, the 60 day notice period stated in the complaint has not yet expired, and no unlawful detainer case has yet been filed. There is no pending eviction at this moment. The Court, therefore, cannot say there is interim harm at this point in time.

The application, therefore, is denied on these grounds. 

Further, the filing of the amended complaint after the ex parte application creates an issue because “ ‘It is well established that an amendatory pleading supersedes the original one, which ceases to perform any function as a pleading.’ [citations omitted] Thus, an amended complaint supersedes all prior  complaints.” (State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Superior Court (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1130.)

The ex parte application is based upon the initial complaint, which ceases to perform any function as a pleading at this point, and therefore Court lacks a basis to grant the application where the amended pleading has superseded the original one.

The application, therefore, is denied on these grounds.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared Monday, May 11, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR053972	In the Matter of The Jathan Quiroz Trust	Petition to Purchase Real Property	Appearance Required	Continued hearing
VPR054022	In the Matter of Mitchell, Erilla M	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	Proof of Publication not filed. Possible issue: The will was not witnessed by at least two persons during the testator’s lifetime, Prob C § 6110(c)
VPR054021	In the Matter of Taylor, Phoebe	Letters of Administration	Recommended for Approval
VPR053738	In the Matter of Pena, Joan Carol	Letters of Administration		Notice of Petition to Administer: a valid service shall be completed by a non-party, Prob C § 1261; CCP § 1013a. Proof of Publication does not contain contents of the Notice of Hearing of Petition to Administer as required by Prob C §§ 8100, 8120
VPR054023	In the Matter of Bastardo, Mary O.	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Recommended for Approval
VPR052707	In the Matter of Zendejas, Penelope Estrada	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order An award of extraordinary compensation to the attorney is within the discretion of the court, CRC, rule 7.703(a)
VPR053637	In the Matter of Chester, Patsy Jane	Attorney Fee Allowance Hearing	Recommended for Approval
VPR053995	In the Matter of the Rejean Houle Revocable Trust	Petition for Appointment of Successor Trustee	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053994	In the Matter of 2010 Kee Family Revocable Trust	Petition to Confirm Assets	Appearance Required	Summons to be personally served on Respondent, Trustee of the Bracamonte Trust, Prob C § 851(a); CCP § 413.10
VPR052911	In the Matter of Chatman, Alan	Petition to Confirm Assets to the Estate	Appearance Required	Summons to be personally served on Respondent, Prob C § 851(a); CCP § 413.10. OSC hearing scheduled
VPR053997	In the Matter of Garcia Romero, Yanexil Eberardo	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Attachment Requesting Special Orders Regarding a Major Neurocognitive Disorder (form GC-313) NOT attached to petition. Citation not served. Investigation not completed.

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared Thursday, May 7, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR053685	In the Matter of Ochoa, Jayra	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required
PPR053767	In the Matter of Lloyd, Helen Maria	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	The court to consider the reimbursement of expenses, Attachment D.  Prob C § 11005
PPR053577	In the Matter of White, Dorothy Annella	Final Distribution Hearing	Recommended for Approval