Tentative Rulings

Civil Tentative Rulings and Probate Examiner Recommendations are available below. All attempts possible are made to have the information on these pages updated by 3:00pm the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.

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Probate Examiner Recommendations: For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at 559-730-5000 ext #1430. The Probate Calendar Clerk may be reached at 559-730-5000 Option 4, then Option 6. Note: The court does not issue probate examiner recommendations on petitions for approval of compromise of claim.

Civil Tentative Rulings & Probate Examiner Recommendations

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, April 23, 2026, are:

Re: Yee, John vs. Margarita's Venture Properties, Inc.

Case No.: VCU305321

Date: April 23, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motions: (I.) Defendant Margarita’s Venture Properties, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment; (II.) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Protective Order

Tentative Rulings: (I) The motion for summary judgment is denied; (II) The motion for protective order is granted, specifically directing that First Priority’s deposition shall not proceed, absent further court order reopening discovery. Plaintiffs’ monetary and evidentiary sanctions requests are denied.

(I) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Margarita’s Venture Properties, Inc. (MVP), one of several defendants in this action, moves for summary judgment on the complaint of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are the Yee family, husband and wife, John and Joni, and their son, John, III.

BACKGROUND

The Yees were tenants residing at 1132 Crystal Street in Porterville, under a lease with a prior owner, Doris Witcher. At all relevant times, the Yees resided in a mobile home at 1132 Crystal Street. Non-party Charlene Clifford, plaintiff Joni Yee’s sister, also lived at 1132 Crystal Street in another unit on the property. Clifford had assisted Witcher with things like collecting rent from tenants (there were multiple other tenants at 1132 Crystal Street), relaying repair requests and communicating with repair service providers.

In June of 2023, Witcher sold the 1132 Crystal property to defendant Margarita’s Venture Properties, Inc. (MVP). MVP was represented in the transaction by brokerage firm, The Mora Partners, also a named defendant in the action. Another defendant, Jaspreet “Jaz” Dhillon, an employee of The Mora Partners, was MVP’s real estate agent.

Around two weeks prior to close of the transaction, Dhillon visited 1132 Crystal Street to take pictures. During his visit, he encountered Clifford and introduced himself as MVP’s real estate agent.

About three weeks after the transaction closed, on July 7, 2023, Dhillon visited the property again, allegedly this time to pick up rent payments from the tenants living there, which, except for rent from the Yee family, had already been collected by Clifford.

Dhillon contacted Clifford ahead of time and she directed him to go to the Yees’ home. When Dhillon arrived, he encountered Clifford and a group of tenants who were also there to meet him. Joni expressed concern about paying rent to Dhillon, whom she didn’t know. Dhillon explained he was MVP’s real estate agent and provided business cards to the group. Dhillon further explained MVP was the new landlord and he told the group MVP was owned by siblings Martha and John Haro. In addition, as Joni recalled at a deposition, Dhillon made a call, telling the group “he is calling the owner,” and, after that, wrote down Martha Haro’s cell phone number on a notepad. Dhillon, at some point, signed the back of a receipt for rent paid by Joni that Clifford had previously issued to her and, at Clifford’s request, handwrote receipts for the other tenants who were not present at the meeting.

About two weeks after the July 7^th meeting, on July 16, 2023, the air conditioning unit at the mobile home where the Yees lived went out. A fuse was blown, the circuit breaker flipped, and the power went out.

Joni called Clifford. Clifford then called a nearby handyman and, after that, called Dhillon. Clifford testified at a deposition that Dhillon rejected the local handyman and advised that he had “this guy” who “worked with us for 10 years on our properties,” and that “he was sending him out.”

The “guy” was defendant Ron Smith. Dhillon directed Joni, via text message, to send a photograph of the breaker panel and, after Joni sent it, advised her he was sending “Ron.”

Smith arrived at the Yees’ home late in the evening, around 9 or 10 pm, and during the visit, replaced an existing 20-amp circuit breaker with a 60-amp circuit breaker. Smith told John III he would return the next day to put in a correct 20-amp breaker. John III testified at a deposition that he asked Smith if the 60-amp breaker was safe and Smith told him that it was.

After Smith completed his work, John III walked Smith over to Clifford’s home for payment. Dhillon had apparently arranged for Clifford to pay Smith from money Clifford had on hand from another tenant’s rent payment. Clifford testified at a deposition that Dhillon directed her to give Smith an envelope containing a cash rent payment from the other tenant, and that Smith specifically asked for the envelope per Dhillon’s direction and Clifford gave it to him. Smith told Clifford that he had replaced the 20-amp breaker with the 60-amp breaker and that he would be back the next day to put in a correct 20-amp breaker.

Smith did not, however, return, and did not remove and replace the 60-amp breaker.

About a week later, on July 23, 2023, a fire broke out in the Yees’ mobile home.

A fire investigation was later conducted by Chief Michael Canales, who concluded the most likely cause of the fire was electrical failure. Canales testified at a deposition that he determined the fire originated in a middle bedroom and that burn indicators pointed to the fire being in the wall and/or ceiling. Canales testified that the interior electrical panel did not appear to be where the fire started, and, also, that a fire could start in a wall through electrical arcing from an outlet or the wiring in the wall, and that improperly insulated or bare wires inside walls can cause fires. Caneles testified he could not confirm the 60-amp fuse was in the 20-amp position, not being an electrical professional.

Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiffs filed their complaint commencing this action on January 22, 2024. They assert four causes of action against all defendants named in the complaint: negligence, trespass, nuisance, and violation of Health and Safety Code section 13007. All four causes of action are based on the occurrence of the fire, and all are derived from the first negligence cause of action.

Plaintiffs’ “general allegations” mostly inform a negligence theory based on Ron Smith’s replacement of the 20-amp breaker with a 60-amp breaker. Plaintiffs include various allegations framing that Smith was hired by Dhillon, who was acting as a “property manager” for MVP. Plaintiffs allege, moreover, that “owner and manager were aware” of the work Smith performed, and that Smith had never returned to replace the 60-amp breaker “because the Yees provided the information to the property manager, agent of the owner, and informed them of the job performed and failure to return.”

Plaintiffs generally allege, concerning this first, primary theory, that “the property was not properly managed including but not limited to the hiring of a qualified contractor to perform electrical work to update the electrical, who instead installed an inappropriate breaker.”

As pertinent to this first theory, under plaintiffs’ first negligence cause of action, they allege “Defendants had a duty to act as a reasonably prudent person would to prevent damage to others[’] [sic] property including as an owner instructing a manager to hire a contractor, a manager hiring a contractor, and performing … maintenance work,” and that “Defendants breached this duty when the owner as principal of the managers who hired contractor[] … ‘Ron’ who performed an inappropriate replacement of a circuit breaker, [who was] the agent[] of the owner and managers of the property including MPVI, Dhillon, and Team Eric Mora Real Estate [it appears plaintiffs misidentified The Mora Partners, which was later added as a defendant, as “Team Eric Mora Real Estate” in the complaint].”

Plaintiff’s complaint additionally suggests a negligence theory based on allegations concerning the condition of the mobile home existing prior to the condition of the allegedly improperly replaced circuit breaker installed by Smith.

In their “general allegations,” plaintiffs allege that “[a]lthough apparently the home had been remodeled by Davis Manufactured Homes [also named as a defendant], no updates to the wiring or electrical panel had been made”; that “[t]here was no air conditioning at the Property, despite temperatures becoming very hot, rising into the triple digits many times in this area”; and that “[p]rior construction was not adequately and properly performed such as electrical breaker installation, of which the previous owner and current owners were aware … .”

As pertinent to this other theory, plaintiffs’ allege, under their first cause of action, that “Defendants had a duty to act as a reasonably prudent person would to prevent damage to others[’] [sic] property including as an owner instructing a manager to hire a contractor, [or] a manager hiring a contractor, [to] perform[] construction [and] remodel … work,” and that “Defendants breached this duty when the owner as principal of the managers … hired contractors Davis Manufactured Homes to perform remodel and construction work … , [who was] the agent[] of the owner and managers of the property including MPV, Dhillon, and Team Eric Mora Real Estate [or The Mora Partners, per the note above].”

DISCUSSION

Summary Judgment Principles

A defendant is entitled to summary judgment if they can “show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) The defendant bears the initial burden of establishing that the plaintiff's cause of action has “no merit” by showing that the plaintiff cannot establish “one or more elements of [her] cause of action.” (Id., subd. (p)(2).) If this burden is met, the “burden shifts” to the plaintiff “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to [that] cause of action.” (Id., subd. (p)(2); see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849 [107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 841, 24 P.3d 493] (Aguilar).)

Authentication Issues

The court begins by noting plaintiffs’ arguments that much of MVP’s evidence cannot be accepted because it is not properly authenticated. These issues, however, are immaterial to the court’s determination based on what are largely undisputed facts and so the court does not reach these arguments.

Duty

Generally, “[a] landlord owes a duty of care to a tenant to provide and maintain safe conditions on the leased premises.” (Portillo v. Aiassa (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1134 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 755], citation omitted.)

However, “[u]nlike other owners of property, landlords typically surrender possession and control over their property to their tenants, and those tenants have a reciprocal right to quiet enjoyment of that property without undue interference from the landlords,” and while “[t]hese out-of-possession landlords still owe a duty of care,” “a landlord’s lack of possession—and the concomitant lack of control over the property—alters the scope of that duty of care.” (St. John v. Schaeffler (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1146, 1156-1157 [331 Cal.Rptr.3d 122].)

“Courts have effectuated the different public policy calculus for landowners who are not in possession of the property by fashioning two rules governing the scope of such landlords’ duty of care to third parties, each applying at a different point throughout the tenancy.” (Id., at p. 1158.)

First, “[i]f a dangerous condition on the property arises during the tenancy—and hence while the tenant and not the landlord is in possession and control of the property—the landlord owes a duty of care to third parties injured by that dangerous condition only if (1) the landlord has actual knowledge of that condition, and (2) the landlord has retained a ‘right and ability to reenter’ the property to ‘ “obviate the presence of the dangerous [condition].” ’ [Citations.] Actual knowledge may be established by ‘direct evidence’ that the landlord ‘actually knew’ of the dangerous condition or by ‘circumstantial evidence’ indicating ‘that the landlord must have known’ of the condition; evidence that the landlord ‘ “ ‘should have known’ ” ’ of the condition is not enough. [Citations.]” (Id., at pp. 1158-1159, italics added.)

Second, when a tenancy begins or is renewed, “[b]ecause a landlord has the right to enter property (and thus has possession and control over that property) … , a landlord owes a greater duty to third parties injured by dangerous conditions existing on the property at those moments in time [i.e., when the tenancy begins or is renewed]. [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 1159, italics in original.) “At these specific moments in time, a landlord has a duty (1) to conduct a reasonable inspection of the property if the landlord has a ‘ “ ‘reason to know’ ” ’ there may be a dangerous condition on the property at that time, and (2) to repair, if that inspection reveals a dangerous condition. [Citations.] … Because a landlord at these moments in time sometimes has a duty to conduct a ‘reasonable inspection,’ such a landlord is accordingly charged not only with what they actually knew but also with what they constructively knew (that is, what they ‘should have known’ by virtue of the inspection) [citations]; thus, the landlord's duty of care at these moments in time is more onerous than the duty of care extant during the tenancy itself … .” (Id., at pp. 1159-1160.)

Landlords have been held to hold a duty akin to the one described above (the duty when a tenancy begins or is renewed) when they purchase real property. (Peterson v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1185, 1197 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 899 P.2d 905] [landlord has a duty to inspect rental premises to determine whether they meet bare living standards, including whether they are safe, when purchasing the rental property.].) And, consistent with the above described standard, the duty to inspect charges the defendant with a duty to repair only “ ‘those matters which would have been disclosed by a reasonable inspection.’ ” (Ibid., citation omitted.)

Analysis

In the instant case, plaintiffs’ complaint asserts MVP violated duties of care both in connection with Smith’s replacement of the circuit breaker and with respect to the condition of the mobile home prior to Smith’s work, but in one instance, with the replacement of the circuit breaker, the condition arose during the tenancy, and, in the other, concerning the condition of the mobile home prior to Smith’s work, the conditions inferably existed when MVP purchased the property, at which time it had a duty to inspect and to remedy those matters that would have been disclosed by a reasonable inspection (ibid.).

MVP asserts that it had no duty to correct any dangerous conditions prior to Smith’s work on the property because “the electrical issues with the AC unit tripping the circuit breaker only manifested on July 16, 2023, well after MVPI's purchase of the property and while the plaintiffs were in possession of the property,” and there “was not a pre-existing condition that would have been discoverable during MVPI's pre-purchase inspection.”

MVP submits, intending to support its assertions, that plaintiffs acknowledged in depositions they didn’t “have any other issues with the residence” prior to July 16, 2023.

Even were the court to accept, however, the debatable proposition that plaintiffs’ acknowledgement during their depositions constituted a sufficient prima facie showing to establish plaintiffs did not possess and could not reasonably obtain evidence that the electrical system was in a dangerous condition prior to July 16, 2023 (see Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th 826, 854-855), the court nevertheless finds plaintiffs establish the existence of triable issues based on Fire Chief Canales’s deposition testimony that the interior circuit breaker panel was “basically dangling from a wire and it did not have a cover,” that wiring was not completely attached to structural members, and that a single circuit powered nearly the entire home, as well as based on the deposition testimony of plaintiffs’ expert, John Karlie, that light fixture replacement work performed by David Manufactured Homes was “problematic.”

Turning to the issue of whether MVP had actual or constructive notice of the electrical issues resulting from Smith’s circuit breaker replacement, MVP submits that, “[d]espite having Martha’s phone number, Plaintiffs did not notify MVPI about the electrical issues or Smith's repair work”; and that, when Joni reached out to Clifford about the electrical problem on July 16^th, “[i]nstead of calling Martha, Clifford took it upon herself to call Dhillon, the real estate agent who represented MVPI in the purchase of the Property and who provided the tenant[]s [sic] with Martha’s phone number.” MVP further submits evidence that none of the Yees notified Dhillon that Smith had arrived to repair the property, or that Smith had promised to return and put in the correct breaker and failed to do so.

Clifford’s testified, however, as noted above, that Dhillon arranged for Smith to come to the property, directed Clifford to pay Smith from rent funds, and corresponded with Joni about Smith’s coming out to perform repair work. Plaintiffs’ position is that Dhillon’s awareness of the breaker issues effectively constituted notice of those issues on the part of MVP.

MVP argues, in response, that Dhillon was not its agent, suggesting a basis for determining that the communication of the breaker issues to Dhillon could not establish actual notice to MVP. Confusingly, however, MVP presents this as an issue of whether MVP “intentionally or negligently caused plaintiffs to believe that Dhillon was its agent.”

While it is true, however, that MVP’s having “intentionally or negligently caused plaintiffs to believe that Dhillon was its agent” would tend to support that notification to him concerning a dangerous condition at the property effectively put MVP on actual notice of the dangerous condition, it obviously does not follow that MVP’s not having caused plaintiffs to believe Dhillon was its agent (assuming, arguendo, that had been established by MVP here) would, in turn, establish that notification to him concerning a dangerous condition at the property could not put MVP on notice of that condition.

MVP expends significant briefing efforts attacking this strawman, and plaintiffs expend considerable effort defending it, but the actual crux of the matter is whether MVP vis-à-vis Dhillon had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition reported to Dhillon, irrespective of any external representations concerning their agency relationship. It is not particularly material whether plaintiffs were intentionally or negligently led to believe that Dhillon was an agent of MVP; what matters, instead, is whether MVP could be determined, based on the evidence, to have actual knowledge of dangerous conditions known by Dhillon by virtue of its relationship with him, irrespective of what MVP had communicated to others about that relationship.

Viewed within the correct analytical framework, it is clear that MVP’s own factual submissions tend to support that a reasonable jury could conclude, more probably than not, that there was circumstantial evidence indicating MVP must have known of the electrical condition after Smith’s work. Dhillon made multiple visits to the property on MVP’s behalf, met with tenants to collect rent, provided rent payment receipts, and took it upon himself to arrange for the repair of the Yees’ electrical problem and to arrange for payment.

Notably, also, MVP presents no evidence indicating that Dhillon, in his involvement in the Yees’ repair request, was acting outside the scope of the relationship defined by MVP and Dhillon as between themselves.

MVP does submit that “there is no evidence that hiring an electrician to replace circuit breakers was within any scope of authority that MVPI might have granted to Dhillon,” but this assertion is not sufficient for summary judgment. Summary judgment requires “a defendant moving for summary judgment to present evidence and not simply point out that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.) MVP goes on to submit that Dhillon’s interactions with Clifford and the other tenants demonstrated that “he was not employed by MVPI” but none of these facts “preclude a reasonable trier of fact from finding that it was more likely than not” (Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1003 [4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103, 75 P.3d 30], italics added) that hiring an electrician to replace circuit breakers was within Dhillon’s scope of authority acting on behalf of MVP.

MVP last argues that Smith’s electrical repair work constituted an “independent intervening cause that breaks the chain of causation.” MVP argument, however, ignores a critical issue in this specific context. The law clearly establishes that MVP may be held vicariously liable for the acts of Smith if it is proven at trial that he was hired by MVP through Dhillon.

While, “[at] common law, a person who hired an independent contractor generally was not liable to third parties for injuries caused by the contractor's negligence in performing the work,” “courts have developed various exceptions to this general rule of nonliability,” one of which “is the doctrine of nondelegable duties.” (Srithong v. Total Investment Co. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 721, 726 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 672] (Srithong), citations omitted.) “Under this doctrine, a landlord cannot escape liability for failure to maintain property in a safe condition by delegating such duty to an independent contractor.” (Ibid., citations omitted.) As specifically pertinent here, a landlord cannot “delegate his responsibility for the use of due care in the repairing of property over which he retains control and has a duty to repair.” (Poulsen v. Charlton (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 262, 268.)

This nondelegable duty rule is a form of vicarious liability. (Srithong, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 726.) “[T]he nondelegable duty rule is a form of vicarious liability because it is not based on the personal fault of the landowner who hired the independent contractor. Rather, the party charged with a nondelegable duty is ‘held liable for the negligence of his agent, whether his agent was an employee or an independent contractor.’ [Citation.] Regardless of ‘ “how carefully” ’ the landowner selected the independent contractor, the landowner ‘ “is answerable for harm caused by the negligent failure of his contractor[.]” ’ [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 727.)

Accordingly, based on the nondelegable duty rule, MVP can be held liable for the negligence of Smith, irrespective of whether plaintiffs’ injuries were caused solely by the negligence of Smith.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment is denied.

(II) Motion for Protective Order

Plaintiffs move for a protective order preventing a deposition of “First Priority Electric, Inc.” (First Priority) pursuant to a subpoena issued by counsel for Richard L. Davis Jr. dba Davis Manufactured Homes (Davis).

Davis’s subpoena directed First Party to appear and testify on April 13, 2026. Davis gave notice of the deposition on March 20, 2026.

Trial was initially set in this matter in Department 7 by Hon. Judge Gary Johnson on October 13, 2025.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2024.020 provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this chapter, any party shall be entitled as a matter of right to complete discovery proceedings on or before the 30th day … before the date initially set for the trial of the action,” and that “[e]xcept as provided in Section 2024.050 [on motion to extend or reopen discovery], a continuance or postponement of the trial date does not operate to reopen discovery proceedings.”

Code of Civil Procedure section 2024.030 provides that “[a]ny party shall be entitled as a matter of right to complete discovery proceedings pertaining to a witness identified under Chapter 18 (commencing with Section 2034.010) [i.e., a designated expert] on or before the 15th day … before the date initially set for the trial of the action.

Plaintiffs contend Davis “did not disclose First Priority Electric, Inc. in discovery or as part of an expert designation,” and therefore that Davis was required to complete discovery pertaining to First Priority “on or before the 30th day … before the date initially set for the trial of the action,” which was September 12, 2025.

In the course of these proceedings, the October 13, 2025 trial date was vacated and later reset for May 11, 2026.

In late September 2025, the Tulare Superior Court announced Hon. Judge Russell P. Burke would be assigned to Department 7 effective October 6, 2025. Shortly thereafter, on September 25, 2025, MVP filed a motion to continue trial, and an ex parte application to shorten time to hear the motion, indicating that Judge Burke was a former partner of MVP’s counsel’s law firm. At hearing on September 29, 2025, Judge Johnson granted the application to shorten time to that date. Judge Johnson vacated the October 13, 2025 trial date and set a case management conference for October 10, 2025, and did not then set a new trial date.

At the case management conference on October 10^th, Judge Burke recused himself from this case and the matter was assigned to Hon. Judge Bret D. Hillman in Department 2 and a continued case management conference was set for October 24, 2025.

On October 13, 2025, MVP filed a Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 challenge as to Judge Hillman, which was accepted, with the matter thereafter being reassigned to this department. The continued case management conference, however, went forward on October 24, 2025, before Judge Hillman who then set trial for May 11, 2026.

Davis contends “[c]ounsel present at the October 24, 2025 case management conference when the trial date was set, including defendant/cross-complainant Margarita’s Venture Properties, Inc.’s counsel, understood from the court’s ruling that the May 11, 2026 trial date was deemed the initial trial date.” Here, Davis cites “Exhibit A,” a declaration of its counsel, in which she avers, essentially, that she “confirmed the May 11, 2026 trial date was deemed the initial trial date” with MVP’s counsel before she served her subpoena and deposition notice.

Davis concedes that First Priority’s deposition was noticed for a date less than 30 days even before the May 11, 2026 trial date, but maintains First Priority may be designated up to 15 days prior to the May 11^th date based on Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.310, which provides “[a] party may call as a witness at trial an expert not previously designated by that party if … [t]hat expert is called as a witness to impeach the testimony of an expert witness offered by any other party at the trial.”

The court is not persuaded by Davis’s counsel’s assertion that MVP “confirmed the May 11, 2026 trial date was deemed the initial trial date” because that confirmation, even if provided by MVP’s counsel, would be immaterial to determination of what the initial trial date actually was.

The court also notes that, under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.4, subdivision (a), “[a] disqualified judge, notwithstanding his or her disqualification may [inter alia] … [s]et proceedings for trial or hearing,” but, except as otherwise provided in section 170.4, “a disqualified judge shall have no power to act in any proceeding after his or her disqualification or after the filing of a statement of disqualification until the question of his or her disqualification has been determined.”

Accordingly, while Judge Hillman had the power to set this matter for trial, notwithstanding his disqualification, it does not appear he had any authority to determine “the May 11, 2026 trial date was deemed the initial trial date.” Unsurprisingly, the court’s minutes do not reflect any such determination.

Moreover, even were Judge Hillman not disqualified, he would have been unable to extend or reopen discovery absent a party motion. Code of Civil Procedure section 2024.020, subdivision (b) expressly provides that, “[e]xcept as provided in Section 2024.050”—i.e., on motion of a party to extend or reopen discovery (§ 2024.050)—“a continuance or postponement of the trial date does not operate to reopen discovery proceedings.”

The court also notes, though, that the trial date was not, strictly speaking, continued or postponed, but was vacated and subsequently reset on a later date, before a different judge. The court further notes that sections 2024.020 and 2024.030 do not specifically reference vacation of trial dates. No party submits authority or argument on this issue.

The court observes, for its part, authority from the California Supreme Court that supports that vacation of a trial date does not alter the determination of the “initial trial date.” In Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 250 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 70, 991 P.2d 156], in which the Supreme Court distinguished the setting of a new trial date after a mistrial from a situation in which trial has not yet proceeded to judgment, the court stated: “In the context of an action that has not yet proceeded to trial or otherwise resulted in a dispositive judgment, the phrase ‘date initially set for the trial of the action’ ( Code Civ. Proc., § 2024, subd. (a)) is unambiguous. In such instance, it plainly refers to the first date set for trial of the action.” (Id., at p. 250.)

Based on this authority, the court declines to find that May 11, 2026 was a new initial trial date incident to the vacation of the prior October 13, 2025 trial date.

Accordingly, the court grants plaintiffs’ request for protective order. For clarity, the court grants the request as to a protective order solely directing that First Priority’s deposition not be taken absent further order reopening discovery for that purpose.

Sanctions

Plaintiffs additionally request sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.420, under which “[t]he court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”

Additionally, plaintiffs request an order “exclud[ing] [First Priority] and any evidence derived from [First Priority] from this case and trial,” based on Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030, which authorizes “an evidence sanction by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from introducing designated matters in evidence.”

The court denies monetary and evidentiary sanctions. The court finds imposition of sanctions would be unjust and that evidentiary sanctions are not warranted under the circumstances.

Davis came upon the information leading it to seek a deposition of First Priority, as it happens, during a post-discovery-cutoff deposition of Doris Witcher, which took place on October 23, 2025, and at which plaintiffs’ counsel appeared.

Plaintiffs’ counsel indicated in a declaration in support of the initial moving papers that “[s]ubsequent to this date, discovery was served on Plaintiffs including by Defendant Davis, and Plaintiffs, each time, objected based on the cutoff,” but then, in reply, plaintiffs assert Witcher “was deposed on October 23, 2025, after the discovery cutoff, by agreement.”

Neither party explains the circumstances in which this post-discovery-cutoff deposition was permitted to proceed by agreement, but its occurrence does appear to cut against plaintiffs’ counsel’s representation in his declaration that plaintiffs “objected based on the cutoff” “each time” “discovery was served.”

Ultimately, Davis’s principal error is having not moved to extend or reopen discovery to depose First Priority under Code of Civil Procedure section 2024.050, and there is some indication, based on the deposition of Witcher having gone forward after the discovery cutoff, that it had good cause to assume such motion might not have been necessary.

What’s more, although Davis’s counsel does not give a particularly compelling account of why October 13, 2025 could not be deemed the initial trial date in this case, the court does view the circumstances were such that there would be some confusion since the initial trial date was not, strictly speaking, continued or postponed, but vacated and reset at a different hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re: Cuevas, Martin vs. Chavez, Rosalio

Case No.: VCU326631

Date: April 23, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Motion to Substitute Plaintiff

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion.

Attorneys Thanos Simoudis and Michael Huynh, representing that they, attorneys of the Culver Legal, LLP law firm, are “Plaintiff’s Attorney,” here purport to “move … for an order substituting LETICIA HUERTA ORTIZ in place of Plaintiff, MARTIN CUEVAS … , pursuant to the provision[s] [sic] of Code of Civil Procedure § 377.31 on the grounds that Plaintiff, MARTIN CUEVAS, passed away on November 29, 2024 … , and LETICIA HUERTA ORTIZ is [Cuevas’s] successor-in-interest … , as defined in Code of Civil Procedure § 377.11 and succeed[s] [sic] to [his] [sic] interest in the above-entitled proceeding.”

This action was commenced by complaint filed October 6, 2025. Attorney Simoudis and attorney Dario Gomez, of the Culver Legal firm, were listed in the caption of the complaint as attorneys for plaintiff Cuevas. As indicated in the notice of motion, and in the supporting declaration of attorney Huynh, however, Cuevas had died 311 days prior, on November 29, 2024.

What these facts establish, fatal to the relief sought by whomever is deemed the moving party here (addressed below), is that the Culver Legal attorneys who filed the complaint, purportedly on behalf of Cuevas on October 6, 2025, lacked authority to do so. That is because the death of a client terminates the authority of his attorney to act on his behalf. (Herring v. Peterson (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 608, 612 [172 Cal.Rptr. 240]; Smith v. Bear Valley etc. Co. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 590, 601 [160 P.2d 1]; Swartfager v. Wells (1942) 53 Cal.App.2d 522, 528 [128 P.2d 128]; Deiter v. Kiser (1910) 158 Cal. 259, 262 [110 P. 921].)

The court cannot even clearly discern from the moving papers here that Culver Legal ever represented Cuevas while he was alive—this is not even stated, let alone averred in the two supporting declarations of attorney Huynh or Ms. Ortiz—but even if that is assumed, it is clear that any such representation terminated on Cuevas’s death nearly a year prior to the filing of the complaint.

This in turn means that there is not a proper action before the court for which there could be a substitution of plaintiff. “Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as otherwise provided by statute.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 367.) This action, however, was commenced (the court assumes inadvertently) by attorneys, not themselves real parties, without a client.

Code of Civil Procedure section 377.31 does not address this scenario. That section states: “On motion after the death of a person who commenced an action or proceeding, the court shall allow a pending action or proceeding that does not abate to be continued by the decedent’s personal representative or, if none, by the decedent’s successor in interest.”

This section posits an action commenced by a real party in interest who died thereafter. That is not the situation presented here.

What’s more, even if Cuevas had commenced this action, the court is presented no legal basis for granting a motion to substitute the plaintiff on motion of attorneys Simoudis and Huynh of the Culver Legal firm, because they and the firm are not—or at least do not represent themselves to be—Cuevas’s personal representatives or successors in interest.

The court here acknowledges that movants’ points and authorities indicate Ms. Ortiz, who is represented to be Cuevas’s wife and Cuevas’s “successor-in-interest” within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 377.11, “retained Plaintiff’s counsel to represent her interests in her husband’s estate” (a statement, as it happens, not supported by the submitted declarations of Ms. Ortiz or attorney Huynh), but the moving papers, as presented, notwithstanding that representation, indicate that “Plaintiff’s Attorney,” not Ms. Ortiz, “move[s] [the] Court” for the relief sought.

Fundamentally, though, the court, by all indications in the moving papers, faces an action that was simply filed without a real party in interest. For this reason, the court cannot grant this motion, and so it is denied.

Re: Amezola, Carlos vs. Kawneer Company, Inc.

Case No.: VCU313248

Date: April 23, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. The Court takes this matter off calendar. Case Management Conference is continued to July 23, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

Re: Capital One, N.A. vs. Vazquez, Blanca

Case No.: VCL326123

Date: April 23, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion.

Facts

On September 19, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this action for a single cause of action for breach of contract. Plaintiff alleged damages in the amount of $3,812.17.

Defendant answered the complaint on October 17, 2025, checking the box on the form answer that “Defendant admits that all of the statements of the complaint or cross-complaint are true EXCEPT:…” and stating no exceptions to the admission.

The Court notes the answer states “Defendant is filing for bankruptcy” but the Court has received no notice of a bankruptcy proceeding.

On March 4, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that Defendant’s answer did not deny the breach of contract allegations in the complaint. Notice of this motion as mailed to the address indicated on Defendant’s answer.

Meet and Confer

Plaintiff states that counsel attempted to contact Defendant regarding this Motion in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 439(a).

“Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a).) However, “[a] determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to grant or deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a)(4).)

Authorities and Analysis

A motion for judgment on the pleadings (MJOP) is used to challenge a pleading in the same manner as a general demurrer, i.e., the challenged pleading (1) establishes that the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction or (2) does not allege facts sufficient to support a cause of action or defense.(Code Civ. Proc. § 438(c)(1); International Assn. of Firefighters v. City of San Jose (2011) 195 Cal.App.4^th 1179,1196.) Like a demurrer, the grounds for the motion must appear on the face of the pleading or be based on facts capable of judicial notice, including court records. (Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. Superior Court (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 978, 986, and fn. 6.)

A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be based upon “matters properly the subject to judicial notice.” Saltarelli & Steponovich v. Douglas (1995) 50 Cal.App.4th 1, 5. Judicial notice may be taken “of a party’s admissions or concessions, but only in cases where the admissions “cannot reasonably be controverted,’ such as in answer to interrogatories or request for admissions, or in affidavits and declaration filed on the party’s behalf.” (Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 485.) Here, the answer filed by Defendant sufficiently provides the basis to grant this motion, as Defendant unequivocally admits to owing the amount alleged in the complaint.

As noted above, Defendant does not deny the allegations of the complaint and therefore the Court grants the motion.

The Court will sign the proposed order granting judgment on the pleadings.

Plaintiff has also submitted a memorandum of costs in the amount of $356. The Court will enter judgment, including the principal amount and these costs, on the proposed judgment submitted.

Re: Bank of America, N.A. vs. Domnisse, Tonja L

Case No.: VCL322208

Date: April 23, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion.

Facts

On June 5, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this action for a single cause of action for breach of contract. Plaintiff alleged damages in the amount of $12,120.14

Defendant answered the complaint on July 28, 2025, checking the box on the form answer that “Defendant admits that all of the statements of the complaint or cross-complaint are true EXCEPT:…” and stating no exceptions to the admission, indicating that Defendant thought he had entered a debt relief program to assist with this debt.

Meet and Confer

Plaintiff states that counsel attempted to contact Defendant regarding this Motion in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 439(a).

Authorities and Analysis

As noted above, Defendant does not deny the allegations of the complaint and therefore the Court grants the motion.

The Court will sign the proposed order granting judgment on the pleadings.

Plaintiff has also submitted a memorandum of costs in the amount of $501. The Court will enter judgment, including the principal amount and these costs, on the proposed judgment submitted.

Re: Almega Partners, LLC vs. Lil' Wave Financial, Inc.

Case No.: VCU301737

Date: April 23, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion in part and award $87,847.10 to Defendant Jones; to deny the remainder of the motion. Case Management Conference is continued to July 23, 2026; 8:30 am; D1. If final judgment is entered by that date there is no reason to appear.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff’s complaint contains causes of action for (1) wrongful foreclosure, (2) fraudulent conveyance, negligent accounting, and deceptive practices (3) slander of title, (4) violation of California Civil Code section 1572 (5) [There is no fifth cause of action as pled, see Complaint ¶¶76-88] (6) Business and Professions Code section 17200, (7) violation of Federal Truth in Lending Act and (8) intentional misrepresentation.

The complaint alleges Plaintiff is the lawful owner of 13223 Avenue 80 Pixley, CA 93256 (“Subject Property” or “Midblock Lot”), that Defendant Lil Wave Financial Inc. dba Superior Loan Servicing (“Defendant SLS”) serviced a mortgage account designated RMF30877, that Defendant Scott Jones, M.D., initiated a foreclosure on the Subject Property on or around April 18, 2022 and that Defendant SLS misapplied a remittance of $46,667.61 to another distinct property of Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶¶16-18.)

The complaint alleges further that Defendant, Harry Harari, is an individual currently serving as the President of Defendant SLS and Defendant, Scott Hacker, is an individual currently holding the positions of COO and VP at Defendant SLS. (Complaint ¶¶7-8.)

The complaint further alleges non-compliance with California Civil Code §§2924, 2923.5, and 2923.6 during the foreclosure. (Complaint ¶22.)

Further, it is alleged “Notwithstanding the Trustee’s Deed proclaiming a payment exceeding $46,000 by Dr. Jones for Lot 9 (associated with Loan #30877), no such transaction has been identified. Instead, a payment from the Plaintiff, intended for another account i.e., Lot 8 (associated with Loan #30950), was redirected by SLS without transparent accounting.” (Complaint ¶23.)

The complaint further alleges missing cash payments in the amount of $78,387.11. (Complaint ¶26.)

On January 6, 2026, the Court issued its ruling on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication, as follows:

“To grant summary adjudication as to Issue Nos. 1 through 4 as to the first cause of action for wrongful foreclosure;
To grant adjudication as to Issue No. 7 as to the second cause of action for fraudulent conveyance; to find this issue dispositive to this cause of action and to decline to rule on Issues Nos. 6, 8, and 9;
To grant adjudication as to Issue No. 10 as to the third cause of action for slander of title;
To grant adjudication as to Issue No. 11 as to the fourth cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 1572; to find this issue dispositive to this cause of action and to decline to rule on Issue No. 12;
To grant summary adjudication as to Issue Nos. 13 and 14 as to the sixth cause of action for Business and Professions Code section 17200;
To grant summary adjudication as to Issue No. 15 as to the seventh cause of action for violation of Truth in Lending Act; to find this issue dispositive to this cause of action and to decline to rule on Issue No. 16;
To grant summary adjudication of Issue No. 17 to the eighth cause of action for intentional misrepresentation; to find this issue dispositive to this cause of action and to decline to rule on Issue No. 18;
To grant summary adjudication as to Issue Nos. 19 and 20 as to personal liability.

The Court notes there is no fifth cause of action pled.

The cumulative effect of this ruling is to grant summary judgment on the complaint.”

On March 9, 2026, the Court entered judgment consistent with this ruling, noting that Defendants were adjudicated as prevailing parties, that Defendants Jones and SLS recovered costs, as well as attorneys’ fees subject to this motion, and that Defendants Harari and Hacker shall also recover costs.

On March 11, 2026, Defendants Jones and SLS filed this motion seeking recovery of attorneys’ fees.

Defendant Jones requests an award of $96,194.60 in attorneys’ fees and Defendant SLS an award of $14,280.00.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims challenged the enforceability of the loan documents and that Plaintiff argued on summary judgment that the extension agreements were unenforceable. Further, that the loan documents, second extension agreements, and deed of trust contain attorneys’ fee provisions as follows:

The Second Extension Agreement - Midblock Loan

“Attorney’s Fees. In the event of any dispute between the parties regarding this Agreement or the release contained herein, the prevailing party shall be entitled to attorney’s fees, costs and expenses, whether or not litigation is commenced.” (Dec of Lenz. Ex B - SEA – Midblock)

Further, that Paragraph 10 of this SEA states:

“(a) Borrower and its agents, employees, attorneys, affiliates, successors and assignees, hereby, effective as of the date of this Agreement, absolutely release and forever discharge Lender and their agents, officers, directors, trustees, employees, successors and assignees, and each of them, of and from any and all claims demands, damages, liabilities, causes of action, attorney’s fees, costs and expenses of every nature, whether known or unknown or holds or at any time had owned or held, by reasons of any matter, fact or thing done, omitted or suffered to be done prior to the date of this Agreement, either directly or indirectly, by reason of or arising out of (1) the making or administration of the Loan; or (2) any other transaction relating to the Loan or the Property.” (Dec of Lenz. Ex B - SEA – Midblock)

The Deed of Trust – Midblock Loan

“13. Loan Charges. Lender may charge Borrower fees for services performed in connection with Borrower’s default, for the purpose of protecting Lender’s interest in the Property and rights under this Security Instrument, including, but not limited to, attorney’s fees, foreclosure fees, property inspection and valuation fees.” (Dec of Lenz - Ex C – Deed of Trust – Midblock)

Promissory Note – Midblock

“If this Note is not paid when due, the Borrower(s) promise to pay, in addition to the principal and interest due under this Note, all costs of collection and any reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred by the Beneficiary thereof on account of such collection, whether or not suit is filed hereon.” (Dec of Lenz - Ex D – Promissory Note – Midblock)

Further, that SLS is a third party beneficiary under the extension agreements and entitled to recover its fees because the SEA on the Midblock and Corner Loans includes contains the waiver of claims noted above that Plaintiff may have against Defendant Jones and “agents” including SLS “by reason of or arising out of (1) the making or administration of the Loan; or (2) any other transaction relating to the Loan or the Property.” (Dec. of Lenz - Exs. B and E.)

Jones indicates 415 hours at a rate of $315 per hour, for a total of $120,960, which Jones has voluntarily discounted to $87,847.10 plus an additional 26.5 hours incurred on the proposed judgment and this motion for an additional $8,347.50.

SLS indicates 40.80 hours at the rate of $350, for a total of $14,280.00.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that each cause of action sounds in tort, the terms above are limited to contract actions, and therefore the contract terms noted above related to attorneys’ fees do not permit recovery. Further, that SLS, a non-party to the documents noted above, should not recover its attorneys’ fees.

Further, that if fees are awarded, they should be reduced based on the number of hours expended, that the hourly rates are unsupported, that the voluntary reduction demonstrates that the hours are inflated, that the billing records contain block billed entries, vague descriptions and duplicative work, that a substantial amount of the hours relate to “discovery disputes, not contract claims” and that the Court, if fees are awarded, must apportion the fees between contract-related and non-contract-related work.

Finally, Plaintiff argues the SEA as to the Midblock Loan is “fabricated or doctored in some way.”

Authority and Analysis

Prevailing Party and Civil Code 1717

Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(b) provides “a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” Section 1033.5 (a) provides that an allowable cost under section 1032 includes:

“(10) Attorney’s fees, when authorized by any of the following:

(A) Contract.

(B) Statute.

Where there is an agreement for attorney’s fees, Civil Code 1717 provides:

“(a) In an action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs. ...Reasonable attorney’s fees shall be fixed by the court and shall be an element of the costs of suit.”

"[S]ection 1717 does not apply to tort claims; it determines which party, if any, is entitled to attorneys' fees on a contract claim only." (Exxess Electronixx v. Heger Realty Corp. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 698, 708.)

Rather, as to such tort claims, “…the question of whether to award attorneys' fees turns on the language of the contractual attorneys' fee provision, i.e., whether the party seeking fees has 'prevailed' within the meaning of the provision and whether the type of claim is within the scope of the provision." (Id.) “'Whether an action is based on contract or tort depends upon the nature of the right sued upon, not the form of the pleading or relief demanded. If based on breach of promise it is contractual; if based on breach of a noncontractual duty it is tortious. [Citation.] If unclear the action will be considered based on contract rather than tort. [Citation.] [¶] In the final analysis we look to the pleading to determine the nature of plaintiff's claim.'" (Kangarlou v. Progressive Title Co., Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1178-1179.)

Here, there is no dispute that Defendants are the prevailing party as to the summary judgment motion. The Court disregards Plaintiff’s vague and unsubstantiate statement that the SEA is “fabricated or doctored in some way” and therefore finds a valid attorney fee term contained therein. Additionally, the deed of trust and promissory note contain provisions referencing attorneys’ fees.

Therefore, the Court examines each source of attorneys’ fees noted above to determine if the express language thereof and whether the claims at issue in this matter can be considered based on contract or tort.

Attorney Fee Provisions and Claims at Issue

“While it is clear that an attorney fee provision may authorize an award of fees only to the party who prevails on a claim to enforce the terms of the contract containing that provision, it is equally clear that an attorney fee provision need not be so limited. …The attorney fees clause in a contract ‘may be broad enough to cover tort as well as contract causes of action.’” (Maynard v. BTI Group, Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 984, 991-992.)

The Maynard court noted:

“In the present case, the attorney fee provision, though somewhat unique in form, applies to fees incurred in the arbitration or litigation of ‘any dispute.’ Like provisions referring to any claim “‘in connection with’” a particular agreement [citation omitted], or to any action “‘arising out of’” an agreement [citations omitted], an attorney fee provision awarding fees based on the outcome of ‘any dispute’ encompasses all claims, whether in contract, tort or otherwise. ‘A “dispute” is a more general term that includes any conflict or controversy. … Any conflict concerning the effect of the agreements gives rise to a right to an attorney fees award by the prevailing party.” [citation omitted.] ‘[W]here the language of the agreement broadly applies to “any dispute” under it, the attorney fee clause encompasses any conflict concerning the effect of the agreement, including a tort claim.’ [citation omitted].” (Id. at 993.)

To start, the Court does not find application here with respect to Paragraph 10 of the SEA as to Plaintiff’s release or discharge of claims against Defendants as to an award of attorneys’ fees to Defendants. It does not appear to apply to non-contract claims under the standard stated above.

As to the deed of trust, the Court views this term narrowly as applicable to Defendant’s foreclosure on the property via the deed, which encompasses Defendants’ interest in the property.

Additionally, as to the promissory note, this fee provision is limited to collection of principal and interest on the loan.

Therefore, the Court turns to the SEA, which states “In the event of any dispute between the parties regarding this Agreement or the release contained herein, the prevailing party shall be entitled to attorney’s fees…”

The terms “any dispute” and “regarding this Agreement” are sufficient under the standard set forth above to encompass conflicts concerning the affect of the SEA, including a tort claim thereon.

Therefore, the Court turns to the issue of whether the claims here were “on the contract” such as to bring them within the scope of the attorney fee provision found in the SEA.

Kachlon v. Markowitz (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 316, 347, as to a fraud claim, states: “In determining whether an action is 'on the contract' under section 1717, the proper focus is not on the nature of the remedy, but on the basis of the cause of action. [Citation.] Here, although the remedy sought in the relevant causes of action was equitable, the claims were still actions 'on the contract,' i.e., the note and deed of trust.”

In Yoon v. Cam IX Trust (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 388, 393, the appellate court rejected arguments by a plaintiff that negligence and fraud claims were not “on he contract” under section 1717, where the borrower sued the lender in an attempt to prevent the lender from exercising its nonjudicial foreclosure rights under a deed of trust given to secure payment of the promissory note for the loan. (Id. at 391.)

In Yoon, causes of action for negligence and fraud proceeded to trial, where the lender prevailed and the appellate court affirmed the trial court's award of section 1717 attorney fees in favor of the lender, despite no contract claim by the borrower, as follows:

“[The borrower's] tort claims ‘directly relate to enforcement of the note through foreclosure,’ since, by his complaint, the borrower ‘sought to avoid his obligations under the note by making claims [the lender] acted negligently and fraudulently during the foreclosure process.’” (Id. at 393.)

Therefore, the Court has before it an attorney fee provision that encompasses tort claims and claims that constitutes “any dispute” regarding the SEA, including wrongful foreclosure, fraudulent conveyance, slander of title, violation of Civil Code section 1572, violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, violation of TILA and intentional misrepresentation, all of which relate to or arise from Defendant Jones’s exercises of rights under the SEA.

Therefore, the Court finds Defendant Jones is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees.

Third Party Beneficiary and Indemnification Theories

As to the SLS Defendants, the motion argues that SLS is a third party beneficiary and, alternatively, that it may recover its fees from Jones under a contractual indemnity obligation.

In Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 817, the California Supreme Court set forth a three-part test to determine whether a non-contracting party is a third-party beneficiary of a contract between others:

“[A] review of this court's third party beneficiary decisions reveals that our court has carefully examined the express provisions of the contract at issue, as well as all of the relevant circumstances under which the contract was agreed to, in order to determine not only (1) whether the third party would in fact benefit from the contract, but also (2) whether a motivating purpose of the contracting parties was to provide a benefit to the third party, and (3) whether permitting a third party to bring its own breach of contract action against a contracting party is consistent with the objectives of the contract and the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties. All three elements must be satisfied to permit the third-party action to go forward.” (Id. at 829-830, fn. omitted.)

Here, the Court cannot find the second element of this test met. The motivating purpose of the contracting parties was the purchase of real property via a loan transaction, with the servicing of the loan an incidental, rather than an intentional benefit, of the SEA. Further, as to the third element, SLS would not appear to have an independent right to bring a breach of contract claim against Plaintiff for breach of the SEA.

Therefore, the Court rejects the third party beneficiary theory.

As to the obligation of Jones to indemnify SLS via a master servicing agreement, the Court, Defendants cite to Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 280, which states “the usual and ordinary meaning of the words "attorney's fees," both in legal and in general usage, is the consideration that a litigant actually pays or becomes liable to pay in exchange for legal representation.” The Court agrees that Trope does not hold that a master indemnity agreement extends to a third party to such an agreement like Plaintiff with respect to the claims asserted against both Jones and SLS.

Therefore, the Court will not award fees as to SLS.

Lodestar

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623 624 [citation omitted].) The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily “begins with the ‘lodestar’ [method], i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154 [citation omitted].)

The lodestar (or touchstone) figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (See Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 [discussing factors relevant to proper attorneys’ fees award].) Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Id. at 48, fn. 23.) “[A] computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Margolin v. Reg’l Planning Comm’n (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.)

Reasonableness of Rate

The general rule is ‘[t]he relevant “community” is that where the court is located.’ (Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 26, 71.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5^th at 285.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (PLCM, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 1095.) Additionally, the determination of the value of the legal services is committed to the discretion of the trial court without necessity of expert testimony. (Cordero-Sacks, v. Housing Authority (2011) 200 Cal App 4th 1267, 1286.)

The Court finds the $315 rate by counsel for Jones reasonable for this community and congruent with regular attorney fee awards by this Court.

Reasonableness of Hours

Although detailed time records are not required, courts have expressed a preference for contemporaneous billing and an explanation of work. (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) “Of course, the attorney's testimony must be based on the attorney's personal knowledge of the time spent and fees incurred. (Evid.Code, § 702, subd. (a) [‘the testimony of a witness concerning a particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal knowledge of the matter’].) Still, precise calculations are not required; fair approximations based on personal knowledge will suffice.” (Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 257, 269.) The starting point for the determination as to hours is the attorney’s submitted time records. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 359, 395-397—verified time records entitled to credence absent clear indication they are erroneous.)

The Court may make a downward adjustment if the billing entries are vague, “blockbilled,” or unnecessary. (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 441.)

In opposition, Plaintiff does not challenge specific entries, but generally, argues the itemized billings are blockbilled, vague, unnecessary or related to discovery work that is not “on the contract.” The Court’s review of the billing submitted by Jones does not reveal, on its face, impermissible blockbilled work or vague work. This matter commenced in 2023, involved numerous loan documents and accountings thereof, had a number of theories and resulted in a successful motion for summary adjudication causing judgment to be entered in favor of Defendants. The Court cannot say the number of hours here is excessive.

However, the Court lacks, other than paragraph 11 of the declaration of Lenz, itemized billing for the “$8,347.50 in billable time (26.5 hours) for work on the proposed judgment and this motion” which constitutes block billing. Therefore, the Court will not award this sum.

Apportionment

“If the attorney fee provision is broad enough to encompass contract and noncontract claims, in awarding fees to the prevailing party it is unnecessary to apportion fees between those claims.” (Maynard, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at 992.) As such, the Court will not apportion the fees.

Conclusion

Therefore, the Court grants the motion in part and awards $87,847.10 in fees to Jones.

Re: Briseno, Guadalupe vs. Perfection Pet Foods, LLC

Case No.: VCU308266

Date: April 23, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Plaintiff Raymond Delayo’s Counsel’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion

Facts

On February 14, 2022, Plaintiff’s Counsel Erica Stepanian, Lawyers for Justice, PC, filed a motion to be relieved as counsel as to Plaintiff Ramond Delayo. Plaintiff’s Counsel filed the following with respect to withdrawing:

(1) MC-051 - Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as Counsel;

(2) MC-052 – Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel; and

(3) MC-053 - Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel

Additionally, Plaintiffs’ Counsel has filed proofs of service of these documents by mail.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 284 provides that “[t]he attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at any time before or after judgment of final determination, as follows: 1. Upon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes; [or] 2. Upon the order of the court, upon the application of either client or attorney, after notice from one to the other.”

California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) requires that the “notice of motion and motion to be relieved as counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) must be directed to the client and must be made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-051).”

As noted above, counsel has complied with California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) by submitting the notice and motion on MC-051 and by directing the notice and motion to all parties.

California Rule of Court 3.1362 (c) further mandates that: “The motion to be relieved as counsel must be accompanied by a declaration on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel--Civil (form MC-052). The declaration must state in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1). Specifically, the declaration that Rule 3.1362(c) requires must state that the moving attorney attempted to secure a “Substitution of Attorney” from the client as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1) and that the client refused to so stipulate.

Here, the declaration is properly made on form MC-052, uses general terms without compromising confidentiality and indicates that Plaintiff has already retained other counsel, having terminated Lawyers for Justice, PC’s representation.

Next, service under Rule 3.1362(d) requires personal service, electronic service, or mail and counsel’s declaration must note the service made. Here, service was by mail and email on March 9, 2026. The declaration of Counsel indicates that Plaintiff’s address was confirmed as current via service on Plaintiff’s new counsel.

Finally, Rule 3.1362(e) requires the proposed order be lodged with the Court on MC-053 with the moving papers, specifying all hearing dates scheduled, including date of trial. Plaintiff’s Counsel has complied with this requirement.

Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw. If no one requests oral argument, the Court is prepared to sign the order entitled “Order Granting Attorney’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel - Civil” that the moving party lodged with the Court.

Re: Beck, Christine Deann Watte vs. Tulare City School District

Case No.: VCU307004

Date: April 23, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and award $131,893.50.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff alleged a violation of FEHA under Government Code section 12940(h) as to retaliation and a second cause of action for retaliation as to workplace safety under Labor Code section 6310.

Plaintiff, after a jury trial, prevailed as to the FEHA claim, and was awarded damages in the amount of $207,123.00.

The jury did not find in favor of Plaintiff as to the Labor Code section 6310 claim.

Plaintiff now moves for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to Government Code section 12965(c)(6), seeking $245,335.50 in total fees consisting of $163,557 and a multiplier of 1.5, with 456.60 hours incurred at rates ranging from $345 to $425 per hour

In opposition, Defendant argues that a number of time entries are unrelated to the FEHA action, including pre-litigation activities as to the termination hearing and teacher credentialing administrative hearing, that these entries are block billed, that duplicative trial preparation entries appear and that the use of two attorneys constitutes overstaffing. Further, that the rates claimed are not prevailing in this community and that the multiplier is unwarranted.

Authority and Analysis

Government Code section 12965(c)(6) states, in part:

(c)

…

(6) In civil actions brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award to the prevailing party, including the department, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, including expert witness fees, except that, notwithstanding Section 998 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a prevailing defendant shall not be awarded fees and costs unless the court finds the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.

The Court notes further that Government Code section 12965(b), provides, in part, that: "In actions brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award to the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees and costs, including expert witness fees, except where the action is filed by a public agency or a public official, acting in an official capacity."

Here, the jury awarded monetary damages to Plaintiff on the claim under Government Code section 12940(h) and Plaintiff is therefore a prevailing party under the Government Code sections cited above.

Apportionment

Here, Plaintiff succeeded on the FEHA claim, but the jury found no liability as to the retaliation claim under Labor Code section 6310.

However, "…attorney fees need not be reduced for work on unsuccessful claims if the claims 'are so intertwined that it would be impracticable, if not impossible, to separate the attorney's time into compensable and noncompensable units.'" (Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 342.) Generally, a reduced attorney-fee award is appropriate when a claimant prevails on only some claims, except where they were closely intertwined. (Chavez v. City of L. A. (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 989.)

"Apportionment is not required when the claims for relief are so intertwined that it would be impracticable, if not impossible, to separate the attorney's time into compensable and noncompensable units, [citations.]" (Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 672, 687; see Drouin v. Fleetwood Enterprises (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 486, 493 ["Attorneys fees need not be apportioned between distinct causes of action where plaintiffs various claims involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories."].)

Plaintiff's claims arise out of the same nucleus of facts, and the claims are intertwined to an extent that prevents the apportionment of recoverable attorney's fees to time spent solely litigating the FEHA claim as opposed to the Labor Code claim. Thus, no apportionment of fees is required.

Lodestar

“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

“Under that [lodestar]method, the court ‘tabulates the attorney fee touchstone, or lodestar, by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work.’ (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5^th at 285.)

Reasonable Local Rate

“The lodestar calculation begins with a determination of the ‘reasonable hourly rate,’ i.e., the rate ‘prevailing in the community for similar work.’ (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5^th at 285.) “The general rule is ‘[t]he relevant “community” is that where the court is located.’ (Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 26, 71.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5^th at 285.) “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (Id.) Additionally, the determination of the value of the legal services is committed to the discretion of the trial court without necessity of expert testimony. (Cordero-Sacks, v. Housing Authority (2011) 200 Cal App 4th 1267, 1286.)

Here, the rates sought are between $345 and $425 per hour. This Court, based upon its experience as to the prevailing rates in Tulare County, sets the hourly rate at $345 per hour.

Number of Hours Reasonably Expended

Although detailed time records are not required, courts have expressed a preference for contemporaneous billing and an explanation of work. (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) “Of course, the attorney's testimony must be based on the attorney's personal knowledge of the time spent and fees incurred. (Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a) [‘the testimony of a witness concerning a particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal knowledge of the matter’].) Still, precise calculations are not required; fair approximations based on personal knowledge will suffice.” (Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 257, 269.)

The starting point for the determination as to hours is the attorney’s submitted time records. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 359, 395-397—verified time records entitled to credence absent clear indication they are erroneous.)

“Plainly, it is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, non-complex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.” (Morris, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at 39.)

Here, Defendant challenges, with limited specificity, the following:

March 7, 2023; March 13, 2023; and March 21, 2023: Here, Defendant argues that it is unclear whether these entries relate to administrative proceedings or the underlying claims in this lawsuit. The Court views the administrative hearings separate from the claims that proceeded to trial and does not find this issue similar to the one presented in Vines v. O'Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 174, which involved discrimination, retaliation and harassment claims within the same lawsuit and did not involve administrative proceedings. The Court will reduce the 4.5 hours allotted here by 3.5 hours (-1 hour as to MPS.)

April 11, 2023; April 12, 2023; April 27, 2023; August 30, 2023; September 13, 2023; September 15, 2023; September 20, 2023; September 21, 2023; September 27, 2023; October 5, 2023; October 9, 2023; October 17, 2023; October 18, 2023; October 30, 2023; October 31, 2023; November 9, 2023; November 16, 2023; February 9, 2024; February 20, 2024; May 3, 2024; August 30 2024; September 3, 2024; November 13, 2024; and January 29, 2025 – Defendant argues these entries relate, in part to the administrative hearing and are block billed with other compensable work. The Court’s review of these entries indicates a significant focus on the credentialing hearing, that attorney fee recovery for such is not within the scope of the FEHA attorney fee provision, and therefore the Court will reduce some of the hours as to these entries by 39.8 hours (-39.8 as to MPS.)

March 9, 2023; March 28, 2023 (block billed); April 14, 2023 (block billed); May 2, 2023 (block billed); May 8, 2023 (block billed); May 10, 2023 (block billed); May 12, 2023 (block billed); May 15, 2023 (block billed); May 17, 2023 (block billed); May 31, 2023; June 28, 2023 (block billed); August 3, 2023 (block billed); August 31, 2023; December 7, 2023; January 18, 2024; and June 20, 2024 (block billed) – Next, Defendant challenges these entries as vague and not clearly related to the FEHA claim. Again, the Court’s review of these entries indicates some block billing and the Court will reduce these hours by 7.7 (-7.7 as to MPS.)

October 2025 – November 2025: Here, Defendant challenges the 8-12 hour block billing as to trial preparation on consecutive days. The Court has reviewed these entries and will reduce the hours indicated by 16.5 (-14.3 as to MPS; -2.2 as to MJL)

December 2025 – January 2026: Defendant challenges the time billed between two attorneys regarding the memorandum of costs and this attorney fee motion. The Court will reduce these entries by 5.8 hours (-5.8 as to MPS; -0 as to MJL.)

Therefore, the Court adjusts the hours from 456.6 to 382.3, a reduction of 74.3 hours.

Multiplier

As to the 1.5 multiplier sought by Plaintiff, it is based on the following factors:

The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
The skill displayed in presenting them;
The extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorney; and
The contingent nature of the fee award. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

Here, the case was not a contingency matter, the Court does not find the litigation precluded other employment, notes no distinct novelty or difficulty of the claims or questions involved, but does recognize Plaintiff’s counsel’s success at jury trial as to the FEHA claim.

The Court will exercise its discretion to decline to award a fee multiplier in this matter.

Conclusion

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and awards $131,893.50 in fees to Defendant Jones.

Re: In the Matter of State of California, Agricultural Labor Relations Board

Case No.: VCU326221

Date: April 23, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Petition re: Judicial Enforcement of Administrative Subpoena

Tentative Ruling: To grant the petition

Facts

This matter arises out of a May 2, 2023 filing by Oscar Garcia alleging an unfair labor practice charge (2023-CE-002-VIS) against Solo Mio, Inc., a farming operation in Kings and Fresno counties. The charge alleges that the owner of Solo Mio terminated Garcia's employment in retaliation for Garcia giving an interview to a Fresno Spanish-language television station where he described the strain him and his coworkers were experiencing because of reduced hours and pay. (Declaration of Sanchez ¶4.)

During the investigation, the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB) found that Solo Mio contracted with RFL, Inc, a labor contractor, and that RFL employees witnessed an event related to the termination and surrounding events. (Declaration of Sanchez ¶5.)

Therefore, General Counsel staff sent the September 5, 2024, subpoena to the address for RFL's agent via certified mail, return receipt requested, as authorized by ALRB regulations. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, 20217, subd. (c).) The subpoenaed was returned as unclaimed. (Declaration of Sanchez ¶¶8, 9.)

On October 2, 2024, General Counsel staff hand delivered the subpoena duces tecum (Subpoena) at RFL's address registered with the Secretary of State and the Department of Industrial Relations licensing department. The subpoena was handed to an adult who identified herself as a relative of RFL's agent for service and CEO. The responsive documents were due October 16, 2024. (Declaration of Sanchez ¶10.)

On August 6, 2025, the General Counsel filed a request with the ALRB board (Board) to seek enforcement of the Subpoena. (Declaration of Sanchez ¶12.) Pursuant to Board regulations, RFL had until August 13, 2025, to respond to the General Counsel's request for enforcement of the Subpoena. It did not file a response. (Declaration of Sanchez ¶13.)

On August 25, 2025, the Board granted the General Counsel's request for enforcement. (Declaration of Sanchez ¶14.) To date, RFL has not provided any documents responsive to the Subpoena. (Declaration of Sanchez ¶15.)

The Subpoena at issue seeks documents as to the following categories:

“1. DOCUMENT(S) IDENTIFYING all AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYEES that RFL provided SOLO MIO to work at its Raisin City ranch from April 1, 2023, and April 30, 2023.

2. DOCUMENT(S) IDENTIFYING all AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYEES who RFL provided to work for SOLO MIO at its Raisin City location and who ceased working at SOLO MIO’s Raisin City location from April 1, 2023, to April 30, 2023.

3. Any COMMUNICATION between RFL and SOLO MIO RELATING TO the early termination of work at SOLO MIO’s Raisin City location.

4. Any COMMUNICATION between RFL and SOLO MIO RELATING TO any RFL AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYEE working at SOLO MIO from April 1, 2023, to April 30, 2023.”

Therefore, the Board petitions this Court to issue a subpoena enforcement order.

The Court finds that service on the Secretary of State following this Court’s order regarding service has been completed.

Authority and Analysis

Labor Code section 1151(b) states:

(b) In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person, any superior court in any county within the jurisdiction of which the inquiry is carried on, or within the jurisdiction of which such person allegedly guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides or transacts business, shall, upon application by the board, have jurisdiction to issue to such person an order requiring such person to appear before the board, its member, agent, or agency, there to produce evidence if so ordered, or there to give testimony touching the matter under investigation or in question. Any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by such court as a contempt thereof.

Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Laflin & Laflin (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 651, 663 notes the limited scope of judicial inquiry into enforcement proceedings pursuant to Labor Code section 1151(b) and that the “subpoena enforcement order should issue if it appears the administrative subpoena was regularly issued and the records sought are relevant to the administrative inquiry and identified with sufficient particularity, unless the subpoena is overbroad or unreasonably burdensome or oppressive.”

Here, the RLF’s headquarters are within the County of Tulare, establishing the jurisdiction of this Court. Further, the Court finds the subpoena was regularly issued and the records sought are relevant to the inquiry into the retaliation claim. Additionally, that the records sought are identified with sufficient particularity as to the identifies of employees who may have observed the alleged conduct at issue regarding the retaliation claim. Further, the subpoena does not appear to be overbroad or unreasonably burdensome or oppressive.

Therefore, the Court grants the petition.

Re: Bank of the Sierra vs. Prosperity Farms, LLC et al.

Case No.: VCU322686

Date: April 23, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Motion for Instructions to Receiver to Pay Water Invoices

Tentative Ruling: The court instructs receiver Bellann Raile to pay the remaining balance owed to the Tri-County Water Authority for water used to grow Tulare 22’s 2025 crop from any further 2025 crop proceeds received before using any such funds to make further payments to Bank of the Sierra on the amounts due and owing to it.

Receiver over the Tulare 22 real property, Focus Management Group (Focus), moves for an order instructing receiver over the Tulare 22 crops, Bellann Raile, to pay the remaining balance owed to the Tri-County Water Authority (TCWA) for water used to grow Tulare 22’s 2025 crop.

A January 2026 invoice for calendar year 2025 reflects Tulare 22 property is (or was as of that date) in default on $26,109.63 in groundwater extraction fees for Q1 of 2025; $337,812.17 in such fees for Q2; and $373,316.16 for such fees for Q3; as well as $8,691.02 in penalties, for a total (including $150 in current charges) of $729,386.36.

Focus discovered the Tulare 22 property was in default in February 2026 when it inquired with TCWA. Neither Raile, nor Prosperity, were getting water invoices from TCWA because TCWA had—after learning information causing it to believe, or having been advised, that the Tulare 22 property was transferred to Compeer Financial in April 2025—been sending its invoices to an address provided for Compeer—which, apparently, was actually an address for Corporate America Lending, Inc. (CAL). That purported transfer of the Tulare 22 property, and the role of CAL and its owner, Ron Cook, is the subject of Tulare Superior Court case number PCU323957, in which Compeer seeks cancellation of the purported transfer deed.

When Focus contacted TCWA, they advised they had issued a Notice of Violation concerning the outstanding water balance, indicating there would be a hearing on March 5, 2026. Back on February 2, 2026, TCWA had issued a Notice of Violation, which was no doubt not received by Raile or Prosperity incident to TCWA having an incorrect address to send such notice (as with the invoices prior). That Notice indicated the past due amounts and included on the January 2026 invoice described above, and advised both that TCWA intended to record its Notice of Violation as a lien against Tulare 22, and that it could order Tulare 22 to cease extraction, absent remedying of its outstanding balance within 30 days.

In any event, it appears Raile was not aware of the outstanding TCWA groundwater usage amounts owed when she was appointed receiver in this case on July 1, 2025 (or the Notice of Violation). Notably, here, when Bank of the Sierra (BOTS) sought Raile’s appointment in this case, one of the factors submitted as a basis for her immediate appointment was that the borrowers, whose loan issued by BOTS was secured by the Tulare 22 crops, were not paying associated farming bills, specifically for the Tulare 22 farm manager.

Regarding the TCWA balance, when Focus brought the matter to Raile’s attention she indicated, no doubt accurately, that she had no funds on hand to pay the outstanding balance. At that time, sometime around or after February 2026, Primex, the Tulare 22 crop processor, had not yet turned over to Raile any of the 2025 crop proceeds, despite that the harvest for the 2025 crop year was completed by October 20, 2025, and, at that time, the entire crop had been sold, with funds paid to Primex.

Focus and Raile went to the March 5, 2026 TCWA hearing and tried to convince TCWA to delay enforcement action, but they would not agree to forestall action.

By mid-March 2026, Primex had turned over $5,034,850 in 2025 crop proceeds to Raile. She used that money to pay $4,191,941.42 towards amounts owed and outstanding to BOTS and $374,239 to TCWA toward the outstanding groundwater amounts owed.

The amount Raile paid to TCWA was just over the amount reflected as outstanding for groundwater fees for Q3 of 2025 on the January 2026 invoice. Raile told Focus she had paid the amount attributable to the Tulare 22 water usage beginning on July 1, 2025 (her appointment date).

The amount Raile paid to BOTS was applied first to protective advances made by BOTS after establishment of the receivership—BOTS had advanced $2,815,224.64 as of that time—and the remainder was then applied to principal. After that payment was made, according to BOTS, $6,857,126.97 remained payable to the bank, including $5,923,283.22 in principal, $818,109.63 in accrued interest, $6,177.09 in late charges, and $109,556.25 in other charges and fees, with interest accruing on the balance at a daily rate of $1,878.99.

From the March 2026 $5,034,850 Primex payment, Raile also paid $47,018.04 to the Tulare 22 farm manager; $58,850.00 in unpaid receiver’s and counsel’s fees; and $245,66.19 to NAU Country Insurance Co., leaving her with $124,999.81 in funds on hand, which is the current balance of funds of the receivership to date.

In sum, then, as it roughly stands today:

TCWA is owed at least $355,147.36, exclusive of charges for amounts incurred after the January 2026 invoice;
BOTS is owed $6,857,126.97, including $5,923,283.22 in principal, $818,109.63 in accrued interest, $6,177.09 in late charges, and $109,556.25 in other charges and fees, exclusive of interest accruing on the balance since March 2026; and
Raile has, currently on hand, $124,999.81.

Primex has proposed to pay over to Raile additional 2025 crop year payments of $2,763,385.28 on April 30, 2026, and an additional $921,128.43 on July 31, 2026. According to Raile, she additionally anticipates payment of a “marketing bonus” but that amount will not be determined by Primex until October 31, 2026, and would not be paid until December 15, 2026.

Focus asserts, based on its own investigation with TCWA and its calculations, incident to increased charges associated with the Tulare 22 property having an outstanding, unpaid balance with TCWA, that the Tulare 22 property will face additional expenses (presumably in interest and penalties) of $75,000 as of May 2026, and $400,000 as of June 2026. Focus estimates, if the outstanding balance is not paid through 2026, the Tulare 22 property will incur a total of $1,404,825 over and above an estimated $752,958 ordinary groundwater extraction fees anticipated for the 2026 calendar year.

The motivations of Focus in making this motion, and the motivation of Raile and BOTS in opposing it are fairly easy to discern.

Raile and BOTS wants to avoid the risk of insufficient funds to fully repay BOTS after all the 2025 crop proceeds and any marketing bonus are collected by having as much as possible, as soon as possible, paid to BOTS towards its outstanding balance. Raile and BOTS are not concerned with the risk of insufficient funds to pay TCWA, or with escalated TCWA penalty and interests charges incident to delayed payment, because a lien against the Tulare 22 property and incurred penalty and interest charges are not of direct consequence to Raile or BOTS once BOTS is paid in full.

Focus, for its part, wants to avoid the costs associated with delayed payment of TCWA, or the risk of insufficient funds to fully repay TCWA after all the 2025 crop proceeds and any marketing bonus are collected, by having as much as possible, as soon as possible, paid toward the TCWA balance. Focus is not concerned with the risk of insufficient funds to fully repay BOTS because BOTS’s sole recourse is, ultimately, only to the Tulare 22 crops.

For Raile’s and BOTS’s part, they correctly note that Raile’s appointment order only expressly permits her to pay from crop proceeds costs of the receivership and of “operation and maintenance of the Collateral incurred since the time of appointment” (italics) and that payment of other costs and expenses incurred prior to her appointment is a matter committed to Raile’s discretion. Additionally they note, Raile is authorized to repay all sums owed BOTS, but is not to pay any surplus funds absent an agreement or further court order.

Raile maintains that she is not authorized by her appointment order to pay the funds as Focus requests over BOTS’s objection, and, of course, BOTS objects to Raile paying TCWA before it is fully repaid, contending that would interfere with their priority lien and violate their security interest in the 2025 crop proceeds.

The court, though, finds BOTS’s position on the matter somewhat disingenuous. BOTS maintains “there would be no crop, nor any proceeds thereof, without the significant protective advances made by Plaintiff and [Raile’s] cultivation of the 2025 Tulare 22 crop,” but of course those advances and cultivation efforts would be to no avail, and BOTS’s priority lien and security interest in the 2025 crop proceeds would be worthless, were the Tulare 22 property not provided water, with the obligation to pay TCWA for it, to grow the crops that generated those proceeds. What’s more, it appears BOTS has been repaid for its protective advances. And, in any event, nothing about BOTS lien priority or security interest in the 2025 crop obviates the necessity of paying for the essential inputs that caused that crop to come about in the first place. Indeed, had BOTS presented its current position to TCWA before benefiting from a year of groundwater use to grow the 2025 crop, undoubtedly it would have no 2025 crop proceeds at all to fight for now.

BOTS too easily ignores that, according to its own pleadings, it entered 2025 being owed $7,300,000, exclusive of interest and other charges, and by mid-2025, had come to determine its borrowers were failing in continuous operations to farm the ground to grow the crops that secured its loan entitlements, having failed to pay their farm manager. If this is not mere oversight, it is certainly too bold an assumption that these receivership proceedings were created with the possibility for BOTS to remedy its predicament by fully collecting its amounts outstanding on the loan proceeds from the Tulare 22 crop revenues, while simply stiffing the crop’s input creditors on the way out the door.

The court finds good cause exists to issue an order instructing Raile to pay the remaining balance owed to TCWA for water used to grow Tulare 22’s 2025 crop from any further 2025 crop proceeds received before using any such funds to make further payments to BOTS on the amounts due and owing to it.

The court declines to issue the requested order instructing Raile to pay the TCWA balance “within five (5) business days,” but here grants the motion with the qualification that the court’s order is an order instructing Raile to pay the TCWA balance from further 2025 crop proceeds received before using any such funds to make further payments to BOTS.

Re: Padilla, Irma vs. Alsumiri, Ahmed

Case No.: VCU296387

Date: April 23, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Motion to Consolidate

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion without prejudice

Facts

Via this motion, Defendants seek to consolidate this matter, VCU296387 with VCU328646.

The Court notes a proof of service with respect to the Defendants in the VCU328646 case, but no proof of service of this motion as to the Plaintiff in this matter, VCU296387.

Case No. VCU296387 (the “Habitability Case”)

In this matter, Case No. VCU296387 (the “Habitability Case”) the Padilla Plaintiffs sue under theories of failure to provide habitable dwelling, breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment, private nuisance, unfair business practices and negligence against Defendants Ahmed Alsumiri and Mayesah Alsumiri resulting from tenancy at 164 N. Filbert Road, Exeter, California.

Plaintiffs allege various failures to repair conditions of the property which rendered it untenable starting in June 2021 and continuing through March 2022 after the roof is alleged to have collapsed. (Complaint ¶¶7-13.)

Plaintiffs vacated the property March 2, 2022.

Trial in the Habitability Case is set for August 10, 2026.

Case No. VCU328646 (the “Insurance Case”)

In Case No. VCU328646 (the “Insurance Case”) the Plaintiff is Ahmed Alsumiri who alleges that on or about April 14, 2021, Plaintiff Ahmed Alsumiri and Defendant Nationwide/AMCO entered into a written homeowner's insurance policy (Policy No. ADP 00368476069.)

Further, that the policy insured the dwelling and other structures at 170 N. Filbert Rd., Exeter, CA against risk of direct physical loss and provided Replacement Cost Value (RCV) coverage. The "Policy Period" was from 04/14/2021-04/14/2022

Further, that on February 2, 2022, the insured premises sustained a sudden structural failure after roofing materials were delivered, and the structure was later deemed for demolition by local authorities.

Plaintiff Alsumiri alleges further that a claim for this event was “promptly submitted” through Nationwide's agent, Defendant Theodore Papanickolas.

Further, it is alleged that on or about April 29, 2022, Nationwide (through agent Papanickolas) prepared Homeowner Reconstruction Cost Notifications reflecting replacement-cost valuations including a total of $453,287 and a second valuation of $181,438.

Plaintiff Alsumiri, in early May 2022, after receiving settlement paperwork, alleges that Plaintiff communicated acceptance of the insurance benefits to begin rebuild, but that on October 24, 2025, AMCO/Nationwide issued a Partial Denial of Coverage and accompanying "Information about your payment" letters, re-issuing ACV and describing RCV holdback mechanics while refusing to pay full RCV benefits commensurate with Nationwide's own valuations and Plaintiff's acceptance.

The amended complaint further notes damages resulting from “another lawsuit by a tenant then in occupancy.”

Therefore, Plaintiff Alsumiri sues the insurers for breach of contract and breach of implied good faith, as well as the insurers and Papanickolas for breach of fiduciary duty.

Trial in the Insurance Case has not yet been set.

Motion to Consolidate

On April 1, 2026, the Alsumiri Defendants filed this motion in the Habitability Case to consolidate these matters pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1048(a), (b).

The Alsumiri Defendants argue the issues and facts in the Habitability Case involve the allegations concerning the roof leak notice, repair timeline, mold conditions, eviction threat theories and that these issues and facts are at issue in the Insurance case with respect to “Papanickolas mishandl[ing] a February 2, 2022 homeowner’s claim, curtailed or canceled benefits, and thereby causing economic loss and consequential damages.”

As such, the Alsumiri Defendants argue that both actions will require discovery and factual determinations with respect to “the same tenant-complaint narrative with same premises-condition and repair evidence…the same alleged tenant damages…and the same defense-cost consequences that Alsumiri now seeks to recover from his insurer.” Therefore, the motion argues, the matters arise from substantially identical events and there would be duplication of both discovery and judicial resources if consolidation did not occur.

No opposition appears to have been filed.

Authority and Analysis

Procedural Requirements

Under California Rules of Court Rule 3.350(a), the notice of motion to consolidate must be filed in each case sought to be designated. This procedural requirement is met in this case.

Further, the Alsumiri Defendants have filed a notice of related case as required by California Rule of Court 3.300 in the Insurance Case.

However, no notice of related case appears filed in the Habitability Case.

Additionally, California Rule of Court, Rule 3.350(c) requires a proposed order to be lodged in each case sought to be consolidated. While the proposed order has been lodged in the Habitability Case, no proposed order has been lodged in the Insurance Case.

The Court requires compliance with these procedural rules.

Substantive Requirements

Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1048, subd. (a), “[w]hen actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court…it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.”

“A consolidation of actions does not affect the rights of the parties. The purpose of consolidation is merely to promote trial convenience and economy by avoiding duplication of procedure, particularly in the proof of issues common to both actions.” (Wouldridge v. Burns (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 82, 86.) “Under the statute and the case law, there are thus two types of consolidation: a consolidation for purposes of trial only, where the two actions remain otherwise separate; and a complete consolidation or consolidation for all purposes, where the two actions are merged into a single proceeding under one case number and result in only one verdict or set of findings and one judgment.” (Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147.) “Consolidation under Code of Civil Procedure section 1048 is permissive, and it is for the trial court to determine whether the consolidation is for all purposes or for trial only.” (Id. at 1149.) Consolidation “is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial [court].” Fellner v. Steinbaum (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 509, 511.)

Here, the Court notes the Habitability Case alleges issues concerning the property that predate the roof collapse and the insurance claim.

Rather, the Padilla Plaintiffs allege issues starting in June 2021, replacement of a boiler, mold contamination, and threats of eviction, all of which occurred prior to the February 2, 2022 roof collapse and vacating of the property by the Padilla Plaintiffs on March 2, 2022.

It is not clear when the insurance claim exactly was submitted, as the allegation appears to be that the claim was “promptly submitted” after the February 2, 2022 roof collapse.

Given the lack of proof of service on Plaintiffs in the Habitability Case, the failure to comply with the local rules of Court and the failure to demonstrate proof of common issues, the Court denies the motion.

Judicial Branch of California

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Scam Text Messages — Traffic School Fines:

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Examiner Notes for Probate Matters Calendared