Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, March 19, 2026, are:

Re:                 City of Dinuba vs. Estate of Bobby Woodrow Garrett

Case No.:   VCU285453

Date:           March 19, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Receiver’s Motion for Approval of Final Accounting

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion as requested. CMC is continued to May 19, 2026; 8:30 am; D1 for status of final judgment or dismissal. 

Background Facts

On September 28, 2023, this Court granted the motion to approve sale of the 740 East Harvard Avenue, Dinuba, California 93618, Assessor’s Parcel Number 017-243-008-000 (the “Property”), having previously appointed Receiver Beatty to rehabilitate the Property in accordance with the rehabilitation plan approved by this Court and shall bring the Property into compliance with all applicable State and local laws, among other powers and having previously approved the plan of rehabilitation for the Property.

The rehabilitation of the Property commenced in September 2022 and was completed, inspected and given final approval by the City in June 2023. The Receiver thereafter entered into an agreement to sell the Property to Juan De Dios Hernandez and Saul Hernandez for $320,000.

The Property is a three bedroom, two bathroom single-family home and attached two-car garage built in 1960. The record owner of the Property as of the date of the Receiver’s appointment was Defendant Bobby Garret (“Mr. Garrett”), who died in 2007. Mr. Garrett is survived by his wife, Defendant Jeri Barsoom.

The Property was encumbered by a 1997 deed of trust in the amount of $70,000 held by Ms. Barsoom. The City named and joined Ms. Barsoom in these proceedings, but she did not file a timely response or otherwise enter an appearance and the Court entered default in May 2021.

The Court’s October 11, 2023 order stated the following:

“Defendant JERI BARSOOM is hereby ordered to cooperate with the Receiver in his performance of this order by, without limitation, executing any instruments or documents required by the Receiver in order to complete the sale of the Property in a timely manner and free and clear of all liens and clouds upon title. This specifically includes, but is not limited to, execution and delivery of an accommodation demand and a reconveyance of the Barsoom Deed of Trust.”

Thereafter, the Court granted an order requesting appointment of an elisor which the Court granted December 19, 2024. The Clerk of the Court executed the accommodation demand and reconveyance of the Barsoom Deed of Trust and escrow released the net proceeds of the sale of the Property in January, 2025.

Facts as to Receiver’s Motion to Approve Final Report and Accounting

The Receiver indicates, as to this motion, total fees and costs have been incurred, through October 15, 2025, in the amount of $77,847.08, that this amount is comprised of fees in the amount of $37,994.50 and costs in the amount of $39,842.58, that the Receiver has received interim payments of $59,000, that the Receiver only seeks a total of $69,677.32, that is payment of an additional $10,677.32, representing the funds on hand in the Receivership Estate.

The Receiver notes no objections to the interim accountings and final accounting.

Authority and Analysis

The receiver acts as a ministerial officer and a temporary occupant and caretaker of the property for the Court. (Gill v. Rich (2005) 128 Cal. App. 4th 1254, 1267. The receiver represents the Court as the medium through which the Court acts. (Id.) "The receiver's functions and powers are controlled by statute, by the order appointing him, and by the Court's subsequent orders." (Cal-American Income Property Fund VII v. Brown Dev. Corp. (1982) 138 Cal. App. 3d 268, 273-274.)

Receivers are entitled to compensation for their own services and the services performed by their attorneys. (Venza v. Venza (1951) 101 Cal. App.2d 678, 680.) Generally, the costs of a receivership are paid from the property in the receivership estate. (Andrade v. Andrade (1932) 216 Cal. 108, 110.)

California Rules of Court, rule 3.1184 requires a receiver to submit a final report and account to obtain a discharge. The final account and report may be presented by noticed motion, as is the case here.

Notice must be provided to every person or entity known to the receiver to have a substantial, unsatisfied claim that will be affected by the order, "whether or not the person or entity is a party to the action or has appeared in it." (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1184(c).) "If any allowance of compensation for the receiver or for an attorney employed by the receiver is claimed in an account, it must state in detail what services have been performed by the receiver or the attorney and whether previous allowances have been made to the receiver or attorney and the amounts." (Rule 3.1184(d).)

Receiver’s Motion and Fees/Costs

The Receiver, as noted above, submits a compilation of billing statements within the noticed motion.

A review of the billing statements and declaration shows that the purpose of the referee has concluded because the property sold and the only business left is the distribution of the remaining funds. No party has submitted any opposition papers to show any problems with the receiver's work. No party objected to the prior reports, and the final report shows no unusual items or expenses.

“[F]ees awarded to receivers are in the sound discretion of the trial court and in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion, a reviewing court is not justified in setting aside an order fixing fees.” (People v. Riverside University (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 572, 587; see also Jones v. Union Bank of California (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 542, 549-550 [trial court abuses its discretion in awarding fees/costs when the award is not supported by the evidence].) Ultimately, the amount of fees and expenses must be reasonable and related to the receivership.

Given the prior orders, documented expenses, sale of the property and lack of objection, the court finds the receiver fees reasonable. Accordingly, the Court approves the final report and account as to the receiver’s fees in total amount of $69,677.32 and authorizes the payment of $10,677.32, representing the funds on hand in the Receivership Estate in satisfaction of the Receiver’s duties in this matter.

Given the approval of the final report and accounting, the Court also issues an order exonerating the bonds and discharging the receiver.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 Chapman, Brian et al vs. General Motors, LLC

Case No.:   VCU328139

Date:           March 19, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     (1) Demurrer; (2) Motion to Strike Punitive Damages

Tentative Ruling: (1) To overrule the demurrer; (2) To deny the motion to strike; to order Defendant to answer the complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing. Case Management Conference is continued to April22, 2026; 8:30 am; D1 for trial setting.

Facts Common to (1) and (2)

Plaintiff filed the initial complaint on November 14, 2025.

In the operative amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege that on November 12, 2021, they purchased a new 2022 Chevrolet Suburban 1500, VIN 23 1GNSKFKT4NR107124 ("Vehicle") from Merle Stone Chevrolet in Porterville, California, for personal, family, and/or household purposes. (FAC ¶¶5, 6.) Plaintiffs allege further that Defendant provided a new vehicle limited warranty. (FAC ¶9.)

Plaintiffs thereafter allege that the Vehicle suffers from a Defective Engine that results “in dangerous functional failures and impairment of use including, but not limited to, misfiring, extended cranking, stalling, startup failure, incessant illumination of the "Check Engine" and "Service Engine Soon" warning lights, overheating, excessive diesel emissions, rattling/vibrating, motive hesitation and loss of power, premature engine wear of internal components and total engine failure.” (FAC ¶16.) Further, that Defendant has known of the Defective Engine since 2020, has not disclosed it, and has not recalled the affected vehicles. (FAC ¶¶18, 19, 20.)

Further, that Plaintiffs reviewed marketing materials, visited an authorized dealership, were assisted by a salesperson, that the salesperson “reiterated many of the same Vehicle attributes and benefits Plaintiffs had viewed in Defendants' marketing materials, touting the quality durability and performance of the Chevrolet Suburban” and that Plaintiffs, thereafter, purchased the Vehicle in reliance on Defendants’ reputation and the above described process. (FAC ¶¶34-35.)

On October 18, 2022, Plaintiffs presented the Vehicle to Defendants for repairs related to: (a) recall N222372380 to address the "Third Row Seatbelt Buckle Retention;" (b) a damaged door weather strip; (c) the Vehicle emitting a coolant odor; (d) recall N242454440 to address the "Momentary Rear Wheel Lock-Up;" (e) recall N242435631 to address the "Serial Data Gateway Module;" (f) Customer Satisfaction Program N252494770 to address the "Updated California Warranty;" (g) the exhaust back pressure valve leaking fluid; and (h) defective cooling fans.” (FAC ¶37.)

Further, with respect to the Defective Engine, on January 31, 2024, Plaintiffs “…delivered the Vehicle to a repair facility authorized by Defendants. Defendants performed recall N212355140 to address a defect with the engine control module. Defendants authorized service technician programmed the engine control module and represented to Plaintiffs that the Vehicle was then operating as intended and was safe to drive. Plaintiffs reasonably relied on this representation by the service technician at the Defendants' authorized repair facility.” (FAC ¶38.)

On August 15, 2024, Plaintiffs delivered the Vehicle to a repair facility authorized by Defendants, reporting to Defendants that the Defective Engine was causing the "Check Engine" warning light to illuminate. Defendants authorized service technician verified the concern, and represented to Plaintiffs that the Vehicle was then operating as intended and was safe to drive.”

Further, that “Plaintiffs delivered the Vehicle to a repair facility authorized by Defendants, on August 21, 2024, notifying Defendants that the Defective Engine was causing the "Check Engine" warning light to illuminate. Defendants authorized service technician performed recall N242441450 to address the Defective Engine failing to restart after "an auto stop event." Defendants authorized service technician and reprogrammed the engine control module, upon returning the Vehicle to Plaintiffs, represented to Plaintiffs that the Vehicle was then operating as intended and was safe to drive.” (FAC ¶40.)

Plaintiffs delivered the Vehicle again on December 16, 2024, December 26, 2024, January 16, 2025, August 19, 2025, September 3, 2025, and October 2, 2025 related to the Check Engine light. (FAC ¶¶41-46.)

Plaintiffs alleged Defendants had prior, exclusive knowledge of the Defective Engine via TSBs and customer complaints. (FAC ¶¶51-82.)

Further, that Defendants still advertised and produced the Defective Engine, concealing the defects from consumers like Plaintiffs. (FAC ¶¶84-92.)

Further, that Defendants had a duty to disclose known information about the Defective Engine, including from Defendants’ authorized dealer. (FAC ¶¶94-100.)

As to the third cause of action for fraudulent concealment, Plaintiffs reallege the above, noting further that the Defective Engine posed safety issues, that the failure to disclose was done in order to drive up sales and maintain marketing power, that the acts were “were perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent, were done to enrich themselves at the expense of consumers, gain commercial advantage over competitors, and to drive consumers away from consideration of competitor's vehicles” and that there was a “widespread inherent product defect.” (FAC ¶¶126-132.) Plaintiffs seek punitive damages.

As to the fourth cause of action for violation of the CRLA, Civil Code section 1760 et seq, Plaintiffs allege violations of

• Civil Code 17 Section 1770(a)(5), which provides that Defendants: "[r]epresented the goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have, or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection that the person does not have."
• Civil Code 8 § 1770(a)(7), which provides that Defendants: "[r]epresented that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are another."
• Civil Code 20 Section 1770(a)(9), which provides that Defendants: "[a]dvertised goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised.”
• Civil Code 3 Section 1770(a)(l4), which provides that Defendants: "[r]epresented that a transaction confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations that it does not have or involve or that are prohibited by law."

Defendant demurrers to the third cause of action on the basis of the three year statute of limitations, that there is a failure to plead fraud with the requisite specificity, that Plaintiffs fail to allege a transactional relationship, that the CRLA violation lacks adequate notice and that the CRLA allegation as to fraud lacks the requisite specificity. Further, Defendants seek to strike punitive damages.

(1) Demurrer

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

Statute of Limitations

Defendant contends the statute of limitations begins the date the Vehicle was purchased on November 12, 2021 and that the three-year statute of limitations for fraud therefore bars Plaintiffs' fraudulent inducement - concealment cause of action against Defendant, as the complaint was filed November 14, 2025.

A three-year limitations period applies to fraud claims. (Code Civ. Proc. § 338, subd. (d).)

Under the delayed discovery rule, a cause of action accrues at the time when the cause of action is complete with all its elements. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806-807.) The test for when the statute of limitations on a claim starts to run under the delayed discovery rule is "whether the plaintiff has information of circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry, or has the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to his or her investigation." (McGee v. Weinberg (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 798, 803.)

"In order to invoke this special defense to the statute of limitations, the plaintiff must specifically plead facts which show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence." (Saliter v. Pierce Brothers Mortuaries (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 292, 300.) "The burden is on the plaintiff to show diligence, and conclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer." (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1319 (internal quotations omitted).

The Court does not find the statute of limitations commenced until after purchase of the Vehicle and after presentation of the Vehicle to an authorized dealer based on the Defective Engine underlying this cause of action. Here, the Vehicle was presented to an authorized dealer regarding the Defective Engine for the first time on January 31, 2023, which is less than three years from the filing of this complaint.

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer on this argument.

Fraudulent Inducement - Specificity

“As with all fraud claims, the necessary elements of a concealment/suppression claim consist of ‘“(1) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (scienter); (3) intent to defraud (i.e., to induce reliance); (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage.”’” [citation omitted]”  (Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 843.)  “Suppression of a material fact is actionable when there is a duty of disclosure, which may arise from a relationship between the parties, such as a buyer-seller relationship.  [citation omitted]” (Id.)

Concealment must be pled with specificity.  (Id. at 843-844) General and conclusory allegations are not sufficient. (Nagy v. Nagy (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1262, 1268.) Unlike most causes of action where the “the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings,” fraud requires particularity, that is, “pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) Every element of a fraud cause of action must be alleged both factually and specifically. (Cooper v. Equity General Insurance (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1252, 1262.) Less specificity is required when "it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy," (Bradley v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. (1973) 30 Cal. App. 3d 818, 825.) "Even under the strict rules of common law pleading, one of the canons was that less particularity is required when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party ...." (Turner v. Milstein (1951) 103 Cal. App. 2d 651, 658.)

Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 844 is instructive on the issue of specificity at the pleading stage, providing in relevant part:

“Plaintiffs alleged the above elements of fraud in the SAC. As we have discussed, plaintiffs alleged the CVT installed in numerous Nissan vehicles (including the one plaintiffs purchased) were defective; Nissan knew of the defects and the hazards they posed; Nissan had exclusive knowledge of the defects but intentionally concealed and failed to disclose that information; Nissan intended to deceive plaintiffs by concealing known transmission problems; plaintiffs would not have purchased the car if they had known of the defects; and plaintiffs suffered damages in the form of money paid to purchase the car….

Nissan also contends plaintiffs did not provide specifics about what Nissan should have disclosed. But plaintiffs alleged the CVT were defective in that they caused such problems as hesitation, shaking, jerking, and failure to function. The SAC also alleged Nissan was aware of the defects as a result of premarket testing and consumer complaints that were made both to National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and to Nissan and its dealers. It is not clear what additional information Nissan believes should have been included. We decline to hold (again in the absence of a more developed argument on this point) that plaintiffs were required to include in the SAC more detailed allegations about the alleged defects in the CVT. We conclude plaintiffs' fraud claim was adequately pleaded.” (Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 844.)

Further, the Court notes less specificity is required if it appears from the nature of allegations that defendant must necessarily possess full information, or if the facts lie more in the knowledge of opposing parties.  (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384-1385.

Here, Plaintiff pleads that the Defective Engine was installed in numerous similar vehicles, that Defendant knew or should have known of the Defective Engine , that Defendant had exclusive knowledge thereof as a result of internal sources or data, including customer complaints, that Defendant failed to disclose the Defective Engine, that Plaintiffs would not have purchased the Vehicle had the Defective Engine been disclosed and that Plaintiffs suffered damages. Further, to the Court, this goes beyond the defects that are presupposed by the warranty and Plaintiffs have alleged the Engine Defect existed in vehicles of the same engine as the Subject Vehicle, in contrast to the holding in Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 344.

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer on this basis.

Fraudulent Inducement - Fiduciary Relationship

As to the allegation of a fiduciary relationship, there are “‘four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts.’”  (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336.)  However, unless the parties were in a fiduciary relationship, the other three circumstances “presupposes the existence of some other relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in which a duty to disclose can arise.”  (Id. at p. 337.)  “Thus, a duty to disclose may arise from the relationship between seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual agreement.” (Ibid.)

On this issue, the court in Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 844 noted:

“In its short argument on this point in its appellate brief, Nissan argues plaintiffs did not adequately plead the existence of a buyer-seller relationship between the parties, because plaintiffs bought the car from a Nissan dealership (not from Nissan itself). At the pleading stage (and in the absence of a more developed argument by Nissan on this point), we conclude plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient. Plaintiffs alleged that they bought the car from a Nissan dealership, that Nissan backed the car with an express warranty, and that Nissan's authorized dealerships are its agents for purposes of the sale of Nissan vehicles to consumers. In light of these allegations, we decline to hold plaintiffs' claim is barred on the ground there was no relationship requiring Nissan to disclose known defects.” (Id.)

Here, the amended complaint alleges that Defendant backs the car with an express warranty, and that the Subject Vehicle was purchased from an authorized GM dealership and that such authorized dealerships are agents for the purpose of sale. (FAC ¶99.)

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer on this basis, finding the allegations are sufficient under Dhital as to the buyer-seller relationship.

Fourth Cause of Action - CRLA

Notice

The California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), Civil Code section 1750 et seq., protects consumers from a broad range of unfair or deceptive business practices.

Under the Act, in order to sue for money damages, a plaintiff must first provide the defendant with notice and a 30-day opportunity to cure the issue. (Civ. Code § 1782(a).) The consumer shall notify the defendant of the alleged violations of Civil Code section 1770, and demand that the defendant correct, repair, replace, or otherwise rectify the goods or services alleged to violate that section. (Civ. Code § 1782(a)(1).) The notice must be in writing and must be sent by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested. (Civ. Code § 1782(a)(2).)

However, an action for injunctive relief can be brought without complying with the notice requirements; and that complaint may be amended after 30 days without leave of court to include a request for damages, after compliance with section 1782(a). (Civ. Code § 1782(d).)

Here, Plaintiff amended the complaint to include an allegation that provided the proper notice concurrent with filing his complaint.

Plaintiff seek “all available remedies pursuant to Civil Code Section 1780, including restitution, actual damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees, costs, and expenses, according to proof” and thus seek more than injunctive relief.

However, because demurrers do not lie as to only parts of causes of action, where some valid claim is alleged, the Court cannot sustain the demurrer because a claim for injunctive relief is pled, which requires no notice. (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119 [“A demurrer must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.”].)

As such, the Court overrules the demurrer on the notice issue.

Specificity

The Court applies the analysis above regarding the concealment cause of action, including what the Court considers a diminished specificity requirement due to the nature of a concealment claim, and overrules the demurrer regarding specificity of the CRLA claim as it relates to concealment.

(2) Motion to Strike

Defendants seek to strike the section of the prayer seeking punitive damages.

Any party may file a timely notice of a motion to strike the whole or any part of a pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b).) The motion may seek to strike any “irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading” or any part of the pleading “not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) Irrelevant allegations include allegations that are not essential to the statement of a claim, allegations that are not pertinent to or supported by the claim and demands for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b), (c).)

Based on the Court's review of the operative amended complaint and as is detailed above regarding concealment, the Court has found a sufficient pleading as to concealment and therefore punitive damages as a remedy for this cause of action is properly pled.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion to strike.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Cavalry SPV I, LLC vs. Diaz, Daniel

Case No.:   VCL317360

Date:           March 19, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; the order will be deemed effective upon correction of the case number on the proposed order and the filing with the court of proof of personal service of the order as indicated herein.

Facts

On January 22, 2026, Defendant’s Counsel Dustin Young filed a motion to be relieved as counsel as to Defendant Daniel Diaz. Defendant’s Counsel filed the following with respect to withdrawing:

(1) MC-051 - Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as Counsel;

(2) MC-052 – Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel; and

(3) MC-053 - Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel

Additionally, Defendant’s Counsel has filed proof of service of these documents by mail.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 284 provides that “[t]he attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at any time before or after judgment of final determination, as follows: 1. Upon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes; [or] 2. Upon the order of the court, upon the application of either client or attorney, after notice from one to the other.”

California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) requires that the “notice of motion and motion to be relieved as counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) must be directed to the client and must be made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-051).”

As noted above, counsel has complied with California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) by submitting the notice and motion on MC-051 and by directing the notice and motion to all parties.

California Rule of Court 3.1362 (c) further mandates that: “The motion to be relieved as counsel must be accompanied by a declaration on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel--Civil (form MC-052). The declaration must state in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1). Specifically, the declaration that Rule 3.1362(c) requires must state that the moving attorney attempted to secure a “Substitution of Attorney” from the client as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1) and that the client refused to so stipulate.

Here, the declaration is properly made on form MC-052, as well as a supplemental declaration attached to the Notice, and uses general terms without compromising confidentiality and indicates that Counsel has attempted to obtain a substitution by stipulation, but that Defendant has refused.

Next, service under Rule 3.1362(d) requires personal service, electronic service, or mail and counsel’s declaration must note the service made. Here, service was by mail on January 22, 2026. The declaration of counsel indicates that Defendant’s address was confirmed as current by return receipt requested.

Finally, Rule 3.1362(e) requires the proposed order be lodged with the Court on MC-053 with the moving papers, specifying all hearing dates scheduled, including date of trial. Defendant’s Counsel has complied with this requirement.

The Court notes, however, that the proposed order (as well as the notice and declaration) contain the incorrect case number.

Therefore, the Court grants Defendant’s Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw as to Defendant. If no one requests oral argument, the Court is prepared to sign the order entitled “Order Granting Attorney’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel - Civil” that the moving party lodged with the Court.  This order will be deemed effective upon the filing with the court of a proof of personal service of the “Order Granting Attorney’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – Civil” as to Defendant.

The Court further directs counsel to attach to the Order an additional notice of the date, time, and Department of this court for any future hearing dates for this case as calendared.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Cavalry SPV I LLC as assignee of Citibank N.A. vs. Castillo, Damaris A

Case No.:   VCL325477

Date:           March 19, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Motion to Set Aside Default

Tentative Ruling: The Court’s ruling at the hearing on the motion to quash set February 19, 2026 granted the motion to quash, vacated the entry of default, vacated the entry of default judgment, and granted Plaintiff’s prior request for dismissal. Therefore, the Court finds this motion moot, as this matter was ordered dismissed February 19, 2026.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                City of Tulare vs. Guerrero, Raul A.

Case No.:   VCU327182

Date:           March 19, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion

Facts

In this matter, the City brings a single claim for abatement of nuisance against Defendants Raul Guerrero (“Guerrero”) and Scott’s Social Services, Inc. (“SSS”), alleging that Defendants operate a home for troubled youth, but that residents thereof have “been involved in activities that constitute a nuisance including, but not limited to, verbal altercations, physical altercations, simple and felonious assaults, sexual assaults and exploitations, possession and use of contraband considered illegal for minors, and numerous noise and hazard complaints” (Complaint ¶11.)

Defendants, each of them, were served personally on October 26, 2025 and October 27, 2025.

Neither Defendant responded to the complaint and default as entered against both on February 3, 2026.

On March 5, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion for preliminary injunction.

In support, Plaintiff states Defendant Guerrero acquired the 531 Arciero Drive, City of Tulare, State of California 93274 “Subject Property” on June 10, 2022. (Request for Judicial Notice – Ex. A.) Further, that Defendant SSS is Defendant Guerrero’s tenant and operates a home for troubled youth on the Subject Property. (Matoian Decl. ¶¶4, 5.)

The Tulare Police Department responded to the Subject Property over one hundred (100) times between June 2025 and the date of this filing. (Ynclan Decl. ¶4; RJN – Ex. B) Between January 9, 2026 and January 31, 2026, the Tulare Police Department conducted forty-nine (49) patrol checks at the Subject Property. (RJN – Ex. 5.)

Offenses occurring at the Subject Property from June 2025 to October 21, 2025 include verbal and physical altercations, loud and disruptive noises, and unsupervised, loitering minors, including liquor bottles thrown over the fence to a property abutting the Subject Property, residents of the Subject Property lighting items on fire in front of the Subject Property, razor blade found on abutting property, resident of Subject Property berated neighboring property owner with profanity and challenged neighboring property owner to a physical altercation, resident of Subject Property placed hands on neighboring property owner’s vehicle; lipstick graffiti on a neighboring property owner’s vehicle. (Bakker Decl. ¶¶7-11, 14; Klassen Decl. ¶¶7-11.)

On these facts, Plaintiff seeks an order that Defendants, and their agents, servants, employees, representatives, tenants and all persons acting in concert or participating with them are ordered to cease all activities constituting a public nuisance at the Subject Property within 7 days of the date of this order, and any violation thereafter requiring the response of City of Tulare Police Department be deemed a violation of this order requiring Defendants to cease operations as Scotts Social Services, Inc. at the Subject Property during the pendency of this action.

Authority and Analysis

The granting or denial of a preliminary injunction does not amount to an adjudication of the ultimate rights in controversy. It merely determines that the court, balancing the respective equities of the parties, concludes that, pending a trial on the merits, the defendant should or that he should not be restrained from exercising the right claimed by him.” (Cont’l Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 528.) “The general purpose of such an injunction is the preservation of the status quo until a final determination of the merits of the action.” (Id.) “Thus, the court examines all of the material before it in order to consider ‘whether a greater injury will result to the defendant from granting the injunction than to the plaintiff from refusing it.’” (Id.)

An injunction is permitted under Code of Civil Procedure section 526 where, for example, it appears by the complaint that Plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and the relief, or any part, where the commission or continuance of some act would produce great or irreparable injury. (Code Civ. Proc. § 526(a)(2).) Injunctive relief is available where pecuniary compensation is inadequate and where it is “extremely difficult” to ascertain adequate compensation. (Code Civ. Proc § 526(a)(4), (5).)

The burden is on plaintiff to show all elements necessary to support issuance of the injunction.  (O’Connell v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.)  “A superior court must evaluate two interrelated factors when ruling on a request for a preliminary injunction: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial and (2) the interim harm that the plaintiff would be likely to sustain if the injunction were denied as compared to the harm the defendant would be likely to suffer if the preliminary injunction were issued.  (Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 729, 749.)  The court employs a more probable than not standard.  (Robbins v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 206.)

Further, provisional injunctive relief is appropriate when the evidence shows that the nuisance is likely to continue. (Rosicrucian Fellowship v. Rosicrucian Non-Sectarian Church (1952) 39 Cal.2d 121, 144.) "An abatement of a nuisance is accomplished by a court of equity by means of an injunction proper and suitable to the facts of each case." (County of Santa Clara v. Richfield (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 310.) California courts have approved injunctive relief as a proper remedy for abatement. (City and County of San Francisco v. City Investment Corp (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 1031; City and County of San Francisco v. Padilla (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 388.)

Civil Code section 3479 defines a nuisance as including "[a]nything which is... offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free ... use, in the customary manner, of any ... public ... street, or highway ...."

The definition of a public nuisance is codified in Civil Code section 3480, which provides that "[a] public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal."

Here, the acts described in the submitted declarations constitute a public nuisance as they constitute acts offensive to the senses and obstructions to free use of property as to the neighbors of the Subject Property, including physical altercations, lighting items on fire, throwing bottles, use of alcohol and illegal substances, and the loitering of minors.

Further, Defendants are in default, which eliminates the right to appear in the action or participate in the proceedings, except as to relief from default. (Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 381, 385-386.) After a default, a defendant is deemed to admit the material allegations of a complaint for purposes of the action. (Molen v. Friedman (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1156.)

As such, the Court finds Plaintiff has met the burden as to probability of success on the merits.

Additionally, the acts described above have consistently occurred for a significant period of time and therefore the Court finds Defendants will not suffer significant harm from the issuance of the injunction.

Further, the Court agrees that a pecuniary award would be insufficient as to abatement or cessation of the acts described above.

Finally, no bond is required as Plaintiff is a public entity. (Code Civ. Proc. §529(b).)

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and issues the preliminary injunction as requested.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:               Cruz, Adrian Anthony vs. Lopez, Mariana

Case No.:   VCU325769 

Date:           March 19, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motions:    Demurrer; Motion to Strike

Tentative Rulings:  The demurrer and motion to strike are ordered to be taken off calendar by the clerk without prejudice.   

The minutes of a settlement conference held on February 5, 2026 in the Matter of The Victor Jesus Cruz and Juanita Cruz Family Trust (VPR053180) reflect a settlement was recited on the record, which provided, inter alia, for dismissal of the complaint in this action. 

The demurrer and motion to strike, and related papers, of Mariana Lopez, in this case, were filed prior to that settlement conference, on January 14, 2026.  Plaintiff Adrian Cruz has filed no opposition (nothing has been filed in this case since January 14, 2026). 

It appears these matters remain on calendar (as of March 16, 2026) only because plaintiff Adrian Cruz has not taken the step, per the apparent settlement in VPR053180, of filing a dismissal of this case.

Assuming the court is not mistaken as to what transpired at the settlement conference in VPR053180, Cruz is directed to file a dismissal forthwith. 

Based on that same assumption, and the related assumption that the demurrer and motion to strike are effectively moot, the demurrer and motion to strike are ordered to be taken off calendar by the clerk without prejudice. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Examiner Notes for Probate Matters Calendared

• Visalia Division 
• South County Justice Center Division