Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Monday, August 17, 2026, are:

Re:                Wells Fargo Bank, NA vs. Gomez Ill, John M

Case No.:   VCL326586

Date:           August 17, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:    Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the unopposed motion

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendant under breach of written contract and breach of implied contract.

Defendant applied for and was issued a Wells Fargo credit card ("Subject Account") ending in 9870. (UMF Nos. 1, 16.)

Plaintiff sent Defendant the credit card along with the written Customer Agreement associated with the credit card. (UMF Nos. 2, 17.) Defendant accepted the terms of the written agreement when they used the Wells Fargo Visa Credit Card. (UMF Nos. 3, 18.)

Pursuant to the terms of the Customer Agreement associated with the card, Plaintiff would extend credit to Defendant whereby Defendant could charge goods, services, or obtain cash advances on the credit line. (UMF Nos. 4, 19.) In exchange, Defendant was to repay the principal amount lent plus applicable interest and finance charges. (UMF Nos. 5, 20.)  In accordance with the Customer Agreement, Defendant used the account, and made payments, charges, and incurred a balance thereon. (UMF Nos. 6, 21.)

Plaintiff sent Defendant monthly statements of the Subject Account each and every billing period. (UMF Nos. 7, 22.) The statements of the account reflected all charges, payments, minimum payment due that billing period, and any fees and interest incurred for each billing period. (UMF Nos. 8, 23.)

There is no record of any unresolved disputes on the account. (UMF Nos. 9, 24.) There is no record of any active lawsuits against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. for unresolved disputes on this credit card account. (UMF Nos. 10, 25.)

Defendant’s last payment on the Subject Account was on August 5, 2024. (UMF Nos. 11, 26.) Thereafter, no further payments were made by the Defendant, and therefore, pursuant to the terms of the Customer Agreement, Defendant was in default. (UMF Nos. 12, 27.)

The balance due on Defendant’s Subject Account is $8,701.10. (UMF Nos. 13, 28.) As a result of Defendant’s unpaid balance, Plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of $8,701.10. (UMF Nos. 14, 29.)

Defendant admitted all of the above facts in response to Plaintiff’s Request for Admissions. (UMF Nos. 15, 30.)

No opposition has been filed.

Authority and Analysis

A plaintiff moving for summary judgment must make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of fact to meet its initial burden of production. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.App.4th 826, 861.)  “[A] [plaintiff] moving for summary judgment [must] present evidence, and not simply point out that the [plaintiff] does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” Aguilar, at 854, fn. omitted.  Circumstantial evidence to support a plaintiff’s summary judgment motion “can consist of factually devoid discovery responses from which an absence of evidence can be inferred,” but the burden should not shift without stringent review of the direct, circumstantial, and inferential evidence.” (Scheiding v. Dinwiddle Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 83.)

Once the plaintiff has met its burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to make a prima facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at 850.)  “A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question. [citation] No more is called for.” (Id. at 851.) The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material facts and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. 437c(c).)

From a review of the undisputed material facts supplied in Plaintiff’s separate statement of undisputed material facts and the evidence that offered in support of these material facts that plaintiff supplied in this response, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met its burden to that no triable issues of fact exist.

To establish a claim for breach of contract, Plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence of the contract, (2) Plaintiffs' performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendants' breach, and (4) the resulting damage to Plaintiff." (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)

“A cause of action for breach of implied contract has the same elements as does a cause of action for breach of contract, except that the promise is not expressed in words but is implied from the promisor's conduct.” (Yari v. Producers Guild of America, Inc. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 172, 182.)

Here, the first elements are met by Nos. 1 through 8 and 16 through 23. 

The second elements are met by Nos. 4, 9, 10, 12, 13, 19, 24, 25, 27, and 28.

The third elements are met by Nos. 5, 11, 12, 13, 14, 20, 26, 27, 28, and 29.

The fourth elements are met by Nos. 13, 14, 28, and 29.  

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and will sign the proposed order.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Wilson, Tatyana et al vs. Sierra Minit Marts, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU308861

Date:           August 17, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. The Court, therefore, takes this hearing off calendar.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings. 

Re:                Martinez, Elva vs. YBR Enterprises Limited Partnership

Case No.:   VCU330935

Date:           August 17, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:      Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion in part and compel Plaintiff’s non-PAGA claims to arbitration; to deny the motion in part as to Plaintiff’s PAGA claims; to stay Plaintiff’s PAGA claims pending the completion of arbitration.

Background Facts

In this mater, Plaintiff sues Defendants YBR Enterprises Limited Partnership, Toto Ventures, LLC and VTP Enterprises for the following:

(1) Violation of California Labor Code §§ 510 and 1198 (Unpaid Overtime);

(2) Violation of California Labor Code §§ 1182.12, 1194, 1197, 1197.1, and 1198 (Unpaid Minimum Wages);

(3) Violation of California Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512(a), 516, and 1198 (Failure to Provide Meal Periods);

(4) Violation of California Labor Code §§ 226.7, 516, and 1198 (Failure to Authorize and Permit Rest Periods);

(5) Violation of California Labor Code §§ 226(a), 1174(d), and 1198 (Non Compliant Wage Statements and Failure to Maintain Payroll Records);

(6) Violation of California Labor Code §§ 201 and 202 (Wages Not Timely Paid Upon Termination);

(7) Violation of California Labor Code § 204 (Failure to Timely Pay Wages During Employment);

(8) Violation of California Labor Code § 2802 (Unreimbursed Business Expenses);

(9) Civil Penalties for Violations of California Labor Code, Pursuant to PAGA, §§ 2698, et seq.;

(10) Violation of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. (Unlawful Business Practices); and

(11) Violation of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. (Unfair Business Practices)

Defendant YBR Enterprises Limited Partnership (“Defendant”) moves to compel arbitration of these claims, waiver of class claims and to stay the “non-individual” PAGA claim pending arbitration of the individual claims, including the “individual” PAGA claim.

Facts – Agreement to Arbitrate

In support, Defendant provides the declaration of its Human Resources Manager who indicates Defendant uses “PeopleMatter by Fourth to provide an online digital employment application and employee onboarding tracking software system, and PeopleMatter was used for the employment application and personnel file for Elva Martinez's employment with YBR Enterprises Limited Partnership; it is accessed at my.peoplematter.com.” (Declaration of Wozufia ¶2.) Wozufia further states these records were kept in the ordinary course of business and that while Defendant has access to this information, it cannot alter any documentation via PeopleMatter. (Declaration of Wozufia ¶2, 3.) Plaintiff was employed by Defendant from August 4, 2025 through January 25, 2026, that during that time, Plaintiff never withdrew the  “Consent to Receive, Review, Access, Sign, & Authenticate Certain Documents, Forms, Letters, & Other Information Electronically" and that Plaintiff never notified Defendant she wanted to opt out of the Dispute Resolution Agreement. (“Agreement”). (Declaration of  Wozufia ¶¶4, 5, 6.)

Additionally, Defendant provides the declaration of the product manager for Fourth People Matter, LLC who indicates access to the electronic applications and records submitted by applicants and who attaches a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s e-signed Agreement as Exhibit 2. (Declaration of Wilson ¶10 – Ex. 2.)

Plaintiff does not dispute executing the Agreement.

Authority and Analysis – Agreement to Arbitrate

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2(a), (b).) (emphasis added.)

Absent a challenge by the nonmoving party, this burden is met by simply providing a copy of the arbitration agreement.  (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC, 13 Cal. App. 5th 1152, 1160 (2017); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.)  “For purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001), 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218; Sprunk v. Prisma LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 785, 793.)  

However, when the opposing party disputes the agreement, then the opposing party must provide evidence to challenge its authenticity.  (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) 

Under California law, "[t]he burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence …." (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164-165.)“However, the burden of production may shift in a three-step process." (Id. at 165.)

“First, the moving party bears the burden of producing 'prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.' [Citation.]” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) “The moving party 'can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party's] signature.' [Citation.]” (Id..) “For this step, 'it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.’ [Citation.]” (Id.)

Here, this burden is met through attachment of Exhibits 1 and 2 as to Plaintiff’s electronic signature to the Agreement.

As noted above, Plaintiff does not contest the execution of the Agreement. Therefore, the Court finds an agreement to arbitrate.

Facts – Scope of Agreement

The Agreement expressly applies to “…any dispute that Company may have against Employee or that Employee may have against: (I) Company; (2) its officers, directors, principals, shareholders, members, owners, employees, or agents; (3) Company's benefit plans or the plan's sponsors, fiduciaries, administrators, affiliates, or agents; and (4) all successors and assigns of any of them…”

Further, that “this Agreement also applies, without limitation, to disputes with any entity or individual arising out of or relating to the application for employment, background checks, privacy, employment relationship, or the termination of that relationship (including post-employment defamation or retaliation), trade secrets, unfair competition, compensation, classification, minimum wage, seating, expense reimbursement, overtime, breaks and rest periods, or retaliation, discrimination, or harassment and claims arising under…all other federal or state legal claims (including without limitation torts) arising out of or relating to Employee's employment or the termination of employment”

Authority and Analysis – Scope of Agreement

Based on the claims pled in the complaint under the Labor Code and Business and Professions Code, the Court finds the claims at issue here are within the scope of the Agreement.

Facts – FAA Application

The Agreement states “This Agreement is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § I et seq. and evidences a transaction involving commerce.”

Authority and Analysis – FAA Application

The party asserting the FAA applies to an agreement has “the burden to demonstrate FAA coverage by declarations and other evidence.” (Hoover v. American Income Life Ins.Co. (2012) 206Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207; see Shepard v. Edward Mackay Enterprises, Inc. (2007) 148Cal.App.4th 1092, 1101)

“The FAA applies to contracts that involve interstate commerce (9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2), but since arbitration is a matter of contract, the FAA also applies if it is so stated in the agreement.” (Davis v. Shiekh Shoes, LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 956, 963.)

Plaintiff does not contest the application of the FAA. Therefore, the Court finds the FAA applies.

Facts - Class Action Waiver

Here, the Agreement states:

“Employee and the Company agree to bring any dispute in arbitration on an individual basis only, and not on a class, collective or private attorney general representative action basis. Accordingly,

(a) There will be no right or-authority for any dispute to be brought, heard or arbitrated as a class action ("Class Action Waiver"). The Class Action Waiver shall be severable from this Agreement in any case in which (1) the dispute is filed as a class action and (2) there is a final judicial determination that the Class Action Waiver is invalid, unenforceable, unconscionable, void or voidable. In such instances, the class action must be litigated in a civil court of competent jurisdiction.

(b) There will be no right or authority for any dispute to be brought, heard or arbitrated as a collective action ("Collective Action Waiver"). The Collective Action Waiver shall be severable from this Agreement in any case in which (1) the dispute is filed as a collective action and (2) there is a final judicial determination that the Collective Action Waiver is invalid, unenforceable, unconscionable, void or voidable. In such instances, the collective action must be litigated in a civil court of competent jurisdiction.”

Authority and Analysis – Class Action Waiver

As the FAA applies, the class action waiver is enforceable. (Viking River Cruises v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 651 ["'a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so'"]; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 352 [holding class action waivers are enforceable under FAA and California rule to contrary preempted].)

Additionally, Plaintiff does not contest the dismissal of the class claims.

Facts – Private Attorney General Waiver

Here, the Agreement states:

“Employee and the Company agree to bring any dispute in arbitration on an individual basis only, and not on a class, collective or private attorney general representative action basis. Accordingly…

(c) There will be no right or authority for any dispute to be brought, heard or arbitrated as a private attorney general representative action ("Private Attorney General Waiver"). The Private Attorney General Waiver does not apply to any claim Employee brings on Employee's own behalf and not on behalf of others for recovery of Employee's unpaid wages. The Private Attorney General Waiver shall be severable from this Agreement in any case in which (1) the dispute is filed as a private attorney general representative action and (2) there is a final judicial determination that the Private Attorney General Action Waiver is invalid unenforceable, unconscionable, void or voidable. In such instances, the private attorney general representative action must be litigated in a civil court of competent jurisdiction.”

Authority and Analysis – Private Attorney General Waiver

To start, the Court notes “[t]here is no individual component to a PAGA action because '"every PAGA action . . . is a representative action on behalf of the state."' [Citation.]" (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 87.) The term "individual" refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by the plaintiff. (See Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 639, 648 [referring to these claims as "Type A" claims].) The term “non-individual” refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by employees other than the plaintiff. (Galarsa, at 649 [referring to these claims as "Type O" claims].)

As such, the Court will utilize this terminology for clarity.

In Viking River, the United States Supreme Court held that, under an agreement permitting such, a PAGA cause of action may be divided into individual, Type A and representative or non-individual Type O claims and that the individual claims may be ordered to arbitration: 

"PAGA authorizes any 'aggrieved employee' to initiate an action against a former employer 'on behalf of himself or herself and other current and former employees' to obtain civil penalties that previously could have been recovered only by the State in an [Labor Workforce and Development Agency] enforcement action." (Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 645.)

The "individual PAGA claim" (Type A) is the claim for the violations suffered by the aggrieved employee and the "representative PAGA claim" (Type O) is the PAGA claim arising out of events involving other employees. (Id. at 648.)

The Viking River decision “left undisturbed” and “intact” both of the rules from Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348 that (1) prohibited categorical waivers of the right to bring a PAGA action in any forum and (2) prohibited waivers of PAGA claims on behalf of other employees, i.e., non-individual or representative claims. (Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104,1117-1118.)

However, the United States Supreme Court held that the third rule, which prohibited the "'division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate'" was preempted by the FAA. (Id. at 1118.) Specifically, the Viking River Court stated:

"The agreement between Viking and Moriana purported to waive 'representative PAGA claims. Under Iskanian, this provision was invalid if construed as a wholesale waiver of PAGA claims. And under our holding, that aspect of Iskanian is not preempted by the FAA, so the agreement remains invalid insofar as it is interpreted in that manner. But the severability clause in the agreement provides that if the waiver provision is invalid in some respect, any portion that remains valid must still be 'enforced in arbitration.' Based on this clause, Viking was entitled to enforce the agreement insofar as it mandated arbitration of Moriana's individual PAGA claim." (Id. at 1924-1925.)

As summarized by the California Supreme Court in Adolph, an agreement that is covered by the FAA may require arbitration of "alleged Labor Code violations personally sustained by a PAGA plaintiff — so-called 'individual' claims." (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1114, 1119.) "'[W]hen an appropriate arbitration agreement exists'" and "a plaintiff has filed a PAGA action comprised of individual and non-individual claims," the trial court must "'bifurcate and order [the] individual PAGA claim[] to arbitration.'" (Id. at 1126, 1123.) In this circumstance, the "order compelling arbitration of [the] individual claim[] does not strip the plaintiff of standing to litigate non-individual claims [i.e., claims on behalf of other employees] in court." (Id. at 1123) Instead, "'the individual PAGA claim[] in arbitration remain[s] part of the same lawsuit as the representative claims remaining in court.'" (Id. at 1126.) The plaintiff would thus be "'pursuing a single PAGA action "on behalf of [himself or herself] and other current or former employees," albeit across two fora.' [Citation.]" (Id.)

Mondragon

In Mondragon v. Sunrun Inc. (2024) 101 Cal. App. 5th 592, the carve out provision excluded claims brought “as a representative of the state of California as a private attorney general under” the Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA; Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.)” and the trial court denied the motion to compel Plaintiff’s causes of action under PAGA to arbitration. (Id. at 599-601.)

The Mondragon court concluded that “There is no other language in the arbitration agreement suggesting the parties intended to treat PAGA claims seeking penalties for violations regarding Mondragon (i.e., individual PAGA claims) separately from PAGA claims seeking penalties for violations regarding other employees (i.e., non-individual PAGA claims). The PAGA carve-out is not reasonably susceptible to the interpretation…” that it applies only to Type A “individual” claims. (Id. at 613.)

The Mondragon court noted that Viking River’s analysis did not change this result and instead supports it:

“If anything, Viking River confirms Mondragon's interpretation that the carve-out applies to both individual and non-individual claims…Here, the language of the PAGA carve-out more closely tracks the language describing representative claims in the first sense—claims brought “as a representative of the state of California.” Therefore, under Viking River, the carve-out included (and the agreement to arbitrate excluded) “every PAGA claim.” (Viking River, at p. 648.)” (Id. at 614-615.)

Application to the Present Case

Here, the Agreement first states that the parties agree to arbitrate claims “on an individual basis only and not on a class, collective or private attorney general representative action basis.” Unlike in the agreement Mondragon, which lacked any reference to any “individual” language, the Court notes the presence of the term “on an individual basis” here.

Further, the Agreement here states, under subsection (c) of the waiver states “The Private Attorney General Waiver does not apply to any claim Employee brings on Employee's own behalf and not on behalf of others for recovery of Employee's unpaid wages.” This language, in part, appears to also suggest an intent to split the claims.

However, Plaintiff notes that PAGA claims seek penalties, not unpaid wages, on behalf of both the plaintiff and the aggrieved employees. As such, the attempted carve out “The Private Attorney General Waiver does not apply to any claim Employee brings on Employee's own behalf and not on behalf of others for recovery of Employee's unpaid wages” is ineffective to preclude a finding of wholesale waiver. This term carves out nothing from a PAGA claim which does not seek recovery of wages.

Rather, the Agreement contains an impermissible wholesale waiver: “There will be no right or authority for any dispute to be brought, heard or arbitrated as a private attorney general representative action ("Private Attorney General Waiver")” because this language attempts to waive PAGA claims in any forum.

Therefore, the Court does not find Plaintiff’s PAGA claims, Type A or Type O, to be arbitrable under the language of the Agreement. Plaintiff’s PAGA claims shall remain in this Court.

Stay

Defendant seeks to stay Plaintiff’s PAGA claims pending arbitration of the now individual (former class) claims under the Labor Code and Business and Professions Code. The Court agrees there appears to be a split of authority as to the preclusive effect, if any, that arbitration of Plaintiff’s individual Labor Code and Business and Professions Code claims has on the PAGA claims that remain before this Court.

In Gavriiloglou v. Prime Healthcare Mgmt., Inc. (2023) 83 Cal. App. 5th 595, the court held that an arbitrator’s decision that there were no Labor Code violations against the plaintiff cannot deprive that plaintiff of standing as an aggrieved employee to bring a PAGA action based on the same Labor Code violations. (Id. at 603.)

However, the court in Rocha v. U-Haul Co. of California (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 65 reached a different conclusion that Gavriiloglou, holding that an "arbitrator's finding that the [plaintiffs] did not suffer a [Labor Code] section 1102.5 violation as alleged in the operative complaint precludes them from qualifying as 'aggrieved employees' based on that same alleged violation." (Id. at 76.)

The Court notes that the present situation, where Plaintiff’s individual (former class) Labor Code claims are sent to arbitration and Plaintiff’s PAGA claims, Type A and Type O, remain before this Court, differs from that in Adolph, where the California Supreme Court noted:

“First, the trial court may exercise its discretion to stay the non-individual claims pending the outcome of the arbitration pursuant to section 1281.4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Following the arbitrator's decision, any party may petition the court to confirm or vacate the arbitration award under section 1285 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the arbitrator determines that [the plaintiff] is an aggrieved employee in the process of adjudicating his individual PAGA claim, that determination, if confirmed and reduced to a final judgment (Code Civ. Proc., § 1287.4), would be binding on the court, and [the plaintiff] would continue to have standing to litigate his nonindividual claims. If the arbitrator determines that [the plaintiff] is not an aggrieved employee and the court confirms that determination and reduces it to a final judgment, the court would give effect to that finding, and [the plaintiff] could no longer prosecute his non-individual claims due to lack of standing.” (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1123-1124, citing Rocha, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th 65, 76-82.)

However, the Court’s understanding is that, under the reasoning employed by Adolph, an arbitrator’s hypothetical finding that Plaintiff did not suffer any violations under the Labor Code would have a preclusive effect on both Plaintiff’s Type A PAGA claim and Type O PAGA claim. As such, the Court, stays the PAGA claims pending arbitration.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Zuniga Espinoza, Wendy vs. Black Bear Diner - Visalia L.P.

Case No.:   VCU334024

Date:           August 17, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion, find a valid waiver of the class claims, and compel Plaintiff’s individual claims, as well as the Type A PAGA claim to arbitration; To stay Plaintiff’s Type O PAGA pending the competition of arbitration.

Background Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendants Black Bear Diner – Visalia L.P.; Black Bear Diner – Madera L.P.; Black Bear Diner – Los Banos L.P.; Black Bear Diner – SLO L.P.; Black Bear Diner – San Joaquin Valley Corporation; Black Bear Diner – Hanford Limited Partnership; Black Bear Diner – Porterville Limited Partnership; and Black Bear Diner – Tulare L.P. (“Defendants”) for:

1. Failure to Pay All Wages;

2. Failure to Provide Meal Periods or Compensation in Lieu Thereof;

3. Failure to Permit Rest Periods or Provide Compensation in Lieu Thereof;

4. Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements;

5. Waiting Time Penalties;

6. Failure to Provide Recovery Periods;

7. Failure to Reimburse Business Expenses;

8. Violations of the Unfair Competition Law; and

9. Violation of Private Attorneys General Act of 2024.

Defendants seek to dismiss the class claims, compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s “individual” claims and stay any remaining claims pending arbitration.

Facts – Agreement to Arbitrate

In support, Defendants provide the declaration of its Director of Operations who assists with providing management and human resources assistance to Defendant Black Bear Diner – Visalia L.P. who indicates maintenance of employee records, including Plaintiff’s personnel file. (Declaration of Rose ¶1, 2.)

Rose further indicates that the personnel file of Plaintiff contains a true and correct copy of the Black Bear Diner — Visalia L.P. Dispute Resolution Agreement (the “Agreement”) signed by Plaintiff on February 12, 2025. (Declaration of Rose ¶3 – Ex. A.)

Further, Counsel for Defendants notes the English translation of the Agreement has been certified under oath by a qualified interpreter, attached as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the interpreter’s Certification of Accuracy and attached as Exhibit C is the English version of the Agreement certified under oath by a qualified interpreter. (Declaration of Stratford-Jones ¶4.)

In opposition, Plaintiff provides a declaration stating that:

“4. On or about February 12, 2025, my employer told me they were updating their policies and needed me and other employees to sign for documents. At that time, I was given a stack of documents to sign. I do not recall exactly how many, but it was several pages.

5. My manager handed me the stack of papers and told me to sign them. I was told that I needed to sign the papers in order to continue working.

…

7…I did not read the documents before signing them, and I would not have been able to understand them if I had.

13. My attorneys have shown me the document attached to the Rose declaration as Exhibit A, which is in Spanish. The writing on the last page looks like my handwriting, however I do not recognize this document or recall ever signing…

14. At the time I signed, I did not understand that I was agreeing to give up any legal rights. I believed I was signing routine policy paperwork that was required in order to be employed.”

Further, Plaintiff objects to the declaration of Rose and of Defendants’ counsel.

Authority and Analysis – Agreement to Arbitrate

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2(a), (b).) (emphasis added.)

Absent a challenge by the nonmoving party, this burden is met by simply providing a copy of the arbitration agreement.  (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC, 13 Cal. App. 5th 1152, 1160 (2017); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.)  “For purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001), 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218; Sprunk v. Prisma LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 785, 793.)  

However, when the opposing party disputes the agreement, then the opposing party must provide evidence to challenge its authenticity.  (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) 

Under California law, "[t]he burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence …." (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164-165.)“However, the burden of production may shift in a three-step process." (Id. at 165.)

“First, the moving party bears the burden of producing 'prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.' [Citation.]” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) “The moving party 'can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party's] signature.' [Citation.]” (Id..) “For this step, 'it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.’ [Citation.]” (Id.)

Here, the Court finds a sufficient showing as to the business records exception and that the “normal procedures” of document authentication regarding Exhibits A and C via the declaration of Rose. A qualified witness need not be the custodian, the person who created the record, or one with personal knowledge in order for a business record to be admissible under the hearsay exception. (Jazayeri v. Mao (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 301, 322.) “A trial judge has broad discretion in admitting business records under Evidence Code section 1271.” (People v. Dorsey  (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 953, 961.) The criteria for establishing that a document is subject to the business records exception to the hearsay rule may be inferred from the circumstances. (Id.) “Indeed, it is presumed in the preparation of the records not only that the regular course of business is followed but that the books and papers of the business truly reflect the facts set forth in the records brought to court. [Citations.]” (Id.) Here, Defendants’ initial burden is met through attachment of Exhibits A and B as to Plaintiff’s handwritten signature to the Agreement and English translation thereof.

“If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.) “The opposing party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may testify under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement.” (Id.)

In Gamboa, the Court of Appeal found that the plaintiff “met her burden on the second step by filing an opposing declaration, saying she did not recall the agreement and would not have signed it if she had been aware of it: ‘I do not remember these documents at all .... Had I been made aware of the existence of an arbitration agreement, and been explained its provisions, I would not have signed any such documents.’” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 167.)

Here, Plaintiff indicates, similar to the plaintiff in Gamboa, she does not recognize the document, does not recall signing the document and has never previously read the document. (Declaration of Plaintiff ¶¶4, 5, 6, 8, 12, 13.)

Under Ramirez v. Golden Queen Mining Co., LLC (May 15, 2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 821, Plaintiff’s declaration is insufficient, as she fails to deny the signature is her own:

“There is a split of authority among the Courts of Appeal as to what constitutes sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute about the authenticity of a handwritten signature on a document agreeing to arbitration. (Compare Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 757–758, review den. Apr. 26, 2023, S278817 with Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164–165) We join Iyere in concluding that an individual is capable of recognizing his or her handwritten signature and if that individual does not deny a handwritten signature is his or her own, that person's failure to remember signing the document does not create a factual dispute about the signature's authenticity. (Iyere, supra, at p. 757.)” (Id. at 825.)

In Ramirez, the appellate court found that the employer had met the initial burden via a declaration that asserted the employee was employed, that the declarant was the custodian of records, that the personnel file containing employee documents was kept in the regular course and scope, that a personnel file was maintained for the employee, that the employee signed the agreement and that true and correct copies were attached to the declaration. (Id. at 831.) As noted above, and in line with Ramirez (as well as with Gamboa and other cases), the Court has found Defendant has carried its initial burden.

Further, under Ramirez and in a handwritten signature case like this one, Plaintiff’s failure to deny she signed the Agreement is fatal the challenge to the authenticity. The Ramirez court noted that “Ramirez's declaration stated (1) he did “not recall ever being presented with an arbitration agreement,” (2) he did “not recall ever signing an arbitration agreement,” (3) no one informed him about an arbitration agreement, informed him of a desire that he sign an arbitration agreement, or explained to him what an arbitration agreement was, and (4) if someone had explained to him what an arbitration agreement was, he would not sign it.” (Id. at 836.)

The court, therefore, found the declaration insufficient to challenge the authenticity, stating “His declaration does not assert the signature on that document is not his and, furthermore, does not even state that he cannot recall signing that particular document.  Consequently, we conclude Ramirez, like the plaintiffs in Iyere, has offered no admissible evidence creating a dispute as to the authenticity of the handwritten signature on the acknowledgement.” (Id. at 836-837.)

The Court here agrees that “the inability to recall signing a document does not ‘afford[] an independent basis to find that a contract was not formed’” and therefore, the burden has not shifted back to Defendant.

Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that she signed the Agreement. (Declaration of Plaintiff ¶¶13, 14.)

Therefore, the Court finds an agreement to arbitrate exists.

Facts – Scope of Agreement

The Agreement expressly applies to: 

“…all disputes arising out of, or related directly or indirectly to, my employment relationship with, or the termination of my employment from, the Company and/or any putative joint or client employer (including but not limited to a client employer that retains labor from the Company) shall be resolved only by an Arbitrator through final and binding arbitration and not by way of court or jury trial. This includes, without limitation, any disputes or claims that I might bring against the Company concerning any or all of the following: wage and hour law(s) (federal, state and local), compensation, breaks and rest periods, uniform maintenance, training, termination, discrimination, harassment, and claims arising under statute and/or common law addressing the same or similar subject matters. It also includes, without limitation, any disputes or claims the Company might bring against me concerning any or all of the following: trade secrets, unfair competition, confidentiality, defamation, breach of contract, return of Company property, and claims arising under statute and/or common law addressing the same or similar subject matters…”

Authority and Analysis – Scope of Agreement

Based on the claims pled in the complaint under the Labor Code and Business and Professions Code, the Court finds the claims at issue here are within the scope of the Agreement.

Facts – FAA Application

The Agreement states:

“This Agreement is an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. sections 1 et seq., and evidences a transaction involving commerce.

Authority and Analysis – FAA Application

The party asserting the FAA applies to an agreement has “the burden to demonstrate FAA coverage by declarations and other evidence.” (Hoover v. American Income Life Ins.Co. (2012) 206Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207; see Shepard v. Edward Mackay Enterprises, Inc. (2007) 148Cal.App.4th 1092, 1101)

“The FAA applies to contracts that involve interstate commerce (9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2), but since arbitration is a matter of contract, the FAA also applies if it is so stated in the agreement.” (Davis v. Shiekh Shoes, LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 956, 963.)

No opposition appears to be raised to the application of the FAA.

Therefore, the Court finds the FAA applies.

Facts - Class Action Waiver

Here, the Agreement states:

“7. Class Action Waiver. There will be no right or authority under this Agreement for any dispute to be brought, heard, or arbitrated as a class or collective action (“Class Action Waiver”). Notwithstanding any other clause contained in this Agreement, this Paragraph is not severable from this Agreement in any case in which the dispute to be arbitrated is brought as a class or collective action. Notwithstanding any other clause contained in this Agreement, any claim that the Class Action Waiver is unenforceable, unconscionable, void or voidable, must be determined by a court of competent jurisdiction and not by an Arbitrator.”

Authority and Analysis – Class Action Waiver

As the FAA applies, the class action waiver is enforceable. (Viking River Cruises v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 651 ["'a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so'"]; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 352 [holding class action waivers are enforceable under FAA and California rule to contrary preempted].)

Facts – PAGA Claims

As to PAGA claims, the Agreement states:

“8. PAGA Claims. The Company and I mutually agree that, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, all disputes arising out of the California Private Attorneys General Act, or related directly or indirectly to any claims derived from the California Labor Code, shall be subject to binding arbitration under this Agreement on an individual basis only. The parties agree that in the event any PAGA claims are filed in civil court, my individual PAGA claims shall be resolved only by an Arbitrator on an individual basis through final and binding arbitration and not by way of court or jury trial. There shall be no right or authority for non-individual PAGA claims to be asserted in arbitration on behalf of other parties.”

Authority and Analysis – PAGA Claims

In Viking River, the United States Supreme Court held that, under an agreement permitting such, a PAGA cause of action may be divided into individual and representative claims and that the individual claims may be ordered to arbitration: "PAGA authorizes any 'aggrieved employee' to initiate an action against a former employer 'on behalf of himself or herself and other current and former employees' to obtain civil penalties that previously could have been recovered only by the State in an [Labor Workforce and Development Agency] enforcement action." (Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 645.) The "individual PAGA claim" is the claim for the violations suffered by the aggrieved employee and the "representative PAGA claim" is the PAGA claim arising out of events involving other employees. (Id. at 648.)

The Viking River decision “left undisturbed” and “intact” both of the rules from Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348 that (1) prohibited categorical waivers of the right to bring a PAGA action in any forum and (2) prohibited waivers of PAGA claims on behalf of other employees, i.e., non-individual or representative claims. (Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104,1117-1118.)

However, the United States Supreme Court held that the third rule, which prohibited the "'division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate'" was preempted by the FAA. (Id. at 1118.)

Specifically, the Viking River Court stated:

"The agreement between Viking and Moriana purported to waive 'representative PAGA claims. Under Iskanian, this provision was invalid if construed as a wholesale waiver of PAGA claims. And under our holding, that aspect of Iskanian is not preempted by the FAA, so the agreement remains invalid insofar as it is interpreted in that manner. But the severability clause in the agreement provides that if the waiver provision is invalid in some respect, any portion that remains valid must still be 'enforced in arbitration.' Based on this clause, Viking was entitled to enforce the agreement insofar as it mandated arbitration of Moriana's individual PAGA claim." (Id. at 1924-1925.)

As summarized by Adolph: "The high court explained that an anti-splitting rule 'unduly circumscribes the freedom of parties to determine "the issues subject to arbitration" and "the rules by which they will arbitrate," [citation], and does so in a way that violates the fundamental principle that "arbitration is a matter of consent."' (Viking River, at p. 659.) Requiring parties to adjudicate a PAGA action entirely in one proceeding, the high court said, 'compels parties to either go along with an arbitration in which the range of issues under consideration is determined by coercion rather than consent, or else forgo arbitration altogether. Either way, the parties are coerced into giving up a right they enjoy under the FAA.' (Viking River, at p. 661.) Thus, Viking River requires enforcement of agreements to arbitrate a PAGA plaintiff's individual claims if the agreement is covered by the FAA." (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1118-1119.)

 “There is no individual component to a PAGA action because '"every PAGA action . . . is a representative action on behalf of the state."' [Citation.]" (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 87.) The term "individual" refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by the plaintiff. (See Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 639, 648 [referring to these claims as "Type A" claims].) The term “non-individual” refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by employees other than the plaintiff. (Galarsa, at 649 [referring to these claims as "Type O" claims].)

As summarized by the California Supreme Court in Adolph, an agreement that is covered by the FAA may require arbitration of "alleged Labor Code violations personally sustained by a PAGA plaintiff — so-called 'individual' claims." (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1114, 1119.) "'[W]hen an appropriate arbitration agreement exists'" and "a plaintiff has filed a PAGA action comprised of individual and non-individual claims," the trial court must "'bifurcate and order [the] individual PAGA claim[] to arbitration.'" (Id. at 1126, 1123.) In this circumstance, the "order compelling arbitration of [the] individual claim[] does not strip the plaintiff of standing to litigate non-individual claims [i.e., claims on behalf of other employees] in court." (Id. at 1123) Instead, "'the individual PAGA claim[] in arbitration remain[s] part of the same lawsuit as the representative claims remaining in court.'" (Id. at 1126.) The plaintiff would thus be "'pursuing a single PAGA action "on behalf of [himself or herself] and other current or former employees," albeit across two fora.' [Citation.]" (Id.)

Here, the Agreement sufficiently evidences the intent to split the claims via reference to resolution of “individual” (Type A) claims in arbitration only and that non-individual claims cannot be arbitrated. The Court reads the Agreement as a whole and finds it demonstrates the requisite intent to split the claims pursuant to Viking River and as instructed by Adolph.

Facts - Defenses to Enforcement – Unconscionability

As to procedural unconscionability, Plaintiff states she was given a stack of documents to sign, that she was told to sign them by a manager, that signing the paperwork was a condition of employment, that no one explained the documents or that the documents contained an arbitration agreement, that Plaintiff was not provided an opportunity to read or review the documents, that Plaintiff did not receive a copy of the documents and that Plaintiff did not understanding she was giving up any legal rights by signing. (Declaration of Plaintiff ¶¶4-14.)

As to substantive unconscionability, Plaintiff identifies a lack of mutuality, near infinite scope and waiver of statutory rights under the UCL.

Authority and Analysis - Defenses to Enforcement – Unconscionability

The inquiry into unconscionability consists of two prongs: A contract will be revoked if it is both procedurally unconscionable and substantively unconscionable. (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Service, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 82, 102.) Procedural and substantive unconscionability need not be present to the same degree. “[T]he more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” (Id. at 114.)

Procedural Unconscionability

“‘Procedural unconscionability’ concerns the manner in which the contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties at that time.  It focuses on the factors of oppression and surprise. The oppression component arises from an inequality of bargaining power of the parties to the contract and an absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice on the part of the weaker party. The component of surprise arises when the challenged terms are ‘hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce them.’” (Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1281.)

The Court also considers whether circumstances of the contract’s formation created such oppression or surprise that closer scrutiny of its overall fairness is required. (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 126-127.) “The circumstances relevant to establishing oppression include, but are not limited to (1) the amount of time the party is given to consider the proposed contract; (2) the amount and type of pressure exerted on the party to sign the proposed contract; (3) the length of the proposed contract and the length and complexity of the challenged provision; (4) the education and experience of the party; and (5) whether the party's review of the proposed contract was aided by an attorney.” (Id.) As OTO recognizes, the pressure exerted on a standard employee to accept an adhesive arbitration agreement as a condition of employment is “particularly acute,” which indicates oppression.  (Id. at 127.)

“An adhesive contract is standardized, generally on a preprinted form, and offered by the party with superior bargaining power on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. (Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1245.) Arbitration contracts imposed as a condition of employment are typically adhesive. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 114-115; Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 695, 704.) But the fact that an agreement is adhesive is not, alone, sufficient to render it unconscionable. (Malone v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1561.) “[A] compulsory pre-dispute arbitration agreement is not rendered unenforceable just because it is required as a condition of employment or offered on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.” (Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1127.)

Here, the Agreement appears to be a compulsory pre-dispute agreement for which Plaintiff was provided little time to review or comprehend, with some pressure exerted by management to sign the Agreement. The Agreement is relatively short, but does contain dense paragraphs setting forth the terms of arbitration. Plaintiff further indicates she would not have understood the terms of the Agreement even if given time to review them and that review was no aided by an attorney.

The Court finds a relatively high degree of procedural unconscionability under these circumstances.

Substantive Unconscionability

“Substantive unconscionability occurs when a contract, particularly, contracts of adhesion, impose terms “that have been variously described as overly harsh, unduly oppressive, so one-sided as to shock the conscience, or unfairly one-sided. All of these formulations point to the central idea that the unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with a simple old-fashioned bad bargain, but with terms that are unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party. Unconscionable terms impair the integrity of the bargaining process or otherwise contravene the public interest or public policy or attempt to impermissibly alter fundamental legal duties.” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho, supra, 8 Cal. 5th at 129–30, internal quotations and citations omitted.)

Armendariz sets forth elements of essential substantive fairness as follows:

(1) provide for a neutral arbitrator:

(2) provide for adequate discovery;

(3) require the arbitrator to issue a written decision that permits limited judicial review;

(4) provide for the same remedies that would otherwise be available to the employee in court;

(5) not require the employee to bear costs unique to arbitration; and

(6) provide a “modicum of bilaterality” between the employer and employee. (Armendariz, supra. 24 Cal 4th at 102-113, 117-118.)

Scope and Duration

Here, the Agreement applies to “…all disputes arising out of, or related directly or indirectly to, my employment relationship with, or the termination of my employment from, the Company…” as well as “…without limitation, any disputes or claims that I might bring against the Company concerning any or all of the following: wage and hour law(s) (federal, state and local), compensation, breaks and rest periods, uniform maintenance, training, termination, discrimination, harassment, and claims arising under statute and/or common law addressing the same or similar subject matters. It also includes, without limitation, any disputes or claims the Company might bring against me concerning any or all of the following: trade secrets, unfair competition, confidentiality, defamation, breach of contract, return of Company property, and claims arising under statute and/or common law addressing the same or similar subject matters.”

Further, that “I must arbitrate whatever individual claims I have against the Company, and that the Company is also obligated to arbitrate any claims it has against me.”

Plaintiff cites to  Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312, where the court found agreement was overbroad in scope because it required arbitration of "all claims, whether or not arising out of Employee's University employment, remuneration or termination." (Id. at 321.)  The court found the term substantively unconscionable as it "required Cook to arbitrate claims that are unrelated to her employment with USC." (Id.)

The Cook court contrasted its clause with the one in  Roman v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1462. In Roman, the clause at issue stated it applied to “all disputes and claims arising out of the submission of this application," and “all disputes . . . which might arise out of my employment with the company.” (Id. at 1467.) Cook noted: "In Roman, unlike here, the arbitration clause in question was expressly limited to claims arising from the employee's job application and subsequent employment." (Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at 323.)

As to the duration, the Agreement appears to apply indefinitely. Read together with the scope of the Agreement noted above, the reasonable interpretation of this term is that it applies indefinitely. (See Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at 325 ["…the arbitration agreement was unconscionable because it survived indefinitely following Cook's termination from USC") While the agreement in Cook could not be revoked except for the president of USC signing it, there is no limit on the duration here where post-employment claims are within the scope of the Agreement.

However,  the court in Ayala-Ventura v. Superior Court (2026) 119 Cal. App. 5th 241 noted Cook is factually distinguishable from its facts and further that unconscionability is highly dependent on context, stating:

“Cook must be considered in its own context which differs materially from the circumstances in this case. (Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 911 [“An evaluation of unconscionability is highly dependent on context.”].) As in Cook, the Agreement potentially covers a broad array of claims regardless of whether they arise out of Ayala-Ventura’s employment with CCS. But the Cook court did not conclude an arbitration agreement covering all claims including those unrelated to employment is per se unconscionable as Ayala-Ventura seems to argue. Because “parties are free to contract for asymmetrical remedies and arbitration clauses of varying scope,” the Agreement’s purportedly broad scope does not necessarily mandate a finding of unconscionability. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 118.) The agreement in Cook was unconscionable in part because of the multifarious ways in which a claim against USC “completely unrelated to [Cook’s] employment” could arise. (Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 318.) As an example, the trial court observed that if Cook were to undergo a botched surgery at USC’s hospital in 15 years, her claims would still be subject to arbitration. (Ibid.) Given CCS solely provides commercial janitorial services, we are hard pressed to discern how a similarly vast range of claims completely unrelated to Ayala-Ventura’s employment could arise, nor does Ayala-Ventura offer a similar panoply of potential claims she might assert. The Agreement’s scope is not unconscionably broad under the circumstances in this case.

This more limited potential claims bears on Ayala-Ventura’s claim the Agreement is unconscionable because it is infinite in duration. The Agreement states it “shall survive the termination of [Ayala-Ventura’s] employment. It can only be revoked or modified by a writing signed by [Ayala-Ventura] and the Human Resources Representative of the Company that specifically states an intent to revoke or modify this Arbitration Agreement.” Ayala-Ventura argues this language is substantially the same as the language the Cook court found unconscionable because the agreement survived indefinitely following the plaintiff employee’s termination. Specifically, the agreement in Cook provided it “‘shall survive the termination of Employee’s employment, and may only be revoked or modified in a written document that expressly refers to the “Agreement to Arbitrate Claims” and is signed by the President of the University.’” (Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 317.) Though the Agreement’s language is substantially like that in Cook, we reiterate the importance of context in determining unconscionability. The various potential claims that could arise against USC together with the agreement’s infinite duration made it unconscionable. Ayala-Ventura claims if she were injured in an automobile accident caused by one of CCS’s company vehicles 10 years after her employment, she would be compelled to arbitrate a claim. But without facts about the number of company vehicles generally in use by CCS, we are unable to assess the probability of this occurrence, which appears speculative at best. Nothing in the record indicates CCS’s operations have anything like the well-known, broad capacity of USC’s reach. Cook could be subject to the arbitration agreement forever in any manner of ways including not just a botched surgery but an injury while attending a USC football game in 15 years.” (Id. at 257-258.)

Similarly, here, any anticipated claims against Defendant that do not arise out of employment and which may occur years in the future are speculative under this analysis as Defendants are not similarly situated as USC. Given that Defendants operate restaurants and lacking evidence as to the probability of the occurrence of a future claim involving a vehicular accident, slip and fall or other cause of action against Defendant, the Court finds Ayala-Ventura applicable to distinguish Cook and find no substantive unconscionability present based on these terms.

Mutuality

Here, the Agreement, as  Plaintiff notes, requires Plaintiff to arbitrate all claims against Defendants and “its affiliates, subsidiaries, related entities, or parent companies....and/or any putative joint or client employer.” However, the Agreement does not require those other entities to arbitrate claims against Plaintiff.

Cook also examined the issue of mutuality, noting “The agreement requires Cook to arbitrate any and all claims she may have against USC 'or any of its related entities, including but not limited to faculty practice plans, or its or their officers, trustees, administrators, employees or agents, in their capacity as such or otherwise.' However, the agreement does not require USC's 'related entities' to arbitrate their claims against Cook." (Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at 326.) The court concluded “This confers a benefit on USC and its broadly defined 'related entities' that is not mutually afforded to Cook.” (Id. at 327.)

On this issue, the Ayala-Ventura court also distinguished Cook, stating:

“The employee in Cook was obliged to arbitrate her claims against USC, its related entities, as well as its “officers, trustees, administrators, employees or agents,” but only USC was bound to arbitrate its claims against the plaintiff. The agreement lacked mutuality because USC’s “‘related entities’” were not bound to it. (Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 319.) Here, the Agreement’s definition of “Company” expressly includes CCS’s related entities and binds those entities to arbitration. Cook was also bound to arbitrate any claims against USC’s officers, trustees, administrators, employees or agents “‘in their capacity as such or otherwise.’” (Id. at p. 317, italics added.) This language was understood as requiring Cook to arbitrate any claims against these individuals even where they were not acting in their identified capacity. In contrast, the Agreement expressly limits arbitration to claims against CCS’s employees or agents in their capacity as such. Any claims Ayala-Ventura may have against employees or agents unrelated to their role are therefore not subject to the Agreement.” (Id. at 258.)

The Court also factually distinguishes the present Agreement from Cook and Ayala-Ventura. The Agreement defines “Company” as “Black Bear Diner - Visalia L.P. or one of its affiliates, subsidiaries, related entities, or parent companies” and states “I understand that by signing below I am agreeing that I must arbitrate whatever individual claims I have against the Company, and that the Company is also obligated to arbitrate any claims it has against me.”

As such, the Court finds sufficient mutuality and does not find this term unconscionable.

Statutory Rights under the UCL

Next, Plaintiff argues that Paragraph 6 provides that the arbitrator may award any remedy to which a party is entitled under applicable law, “...but such remedies shall be limited to those that would be available to a party in his or her individual capacity in a court of law for the claims presented to and decided by the Arbitrator.”

Plaintiff notes that the eight cause of action arises under the UCL and seeks injunctive relief for the benefit of the general public.

Plaintiff, in support, cites to McGill v. Citibank (2017) 2 Cal.5th 945, 951:

“The question we address in this case is the validity of a provision in a predispute arbitration agreement that waives the right to seek this statutory remedy in any forum. We hold that such a provision is contrary to California public policy and is thus unenforceable under California law. We further hold that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA; 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. ) does not preempt this rule of California law or require enforcement of the waiver provision.”

Here, the Court does not interpret the Agreement to bar public injunctive relief, as such relief remains available in a court of law by an individual Plaintiff bringing the UCL claim. DiCarlo v. MoneyLion, Inc. (9th Cir. 2021) 988 F.3d 1148, 1153 notes: “To refresh, if public injunctive relief is available in an individual lawsuit under California law, then the arbitrator is "authorized" to grant it under the all-remedies clause.” Here, Plaintiff’s individual cause of action under the UCL (as the Court has enforced the class action wavier above) permits public injunctive relief and therefore the Agreement’s term limiting remedies to those available by an individual in a court of law does not run afoul of McGill.

Therefore, the Court does not find this term substantively unconscionable.

As such, the Court finds no substantive unconscionability in the Agreement and therefore, finds the Agreement enforceable.

Discovery

Plaintiff argues that, if the Court is to grant the motion, a continuance to take limited discovery as to the depositions of Rose and Scorzelli, as well as production of personnel records is necessary as the evidence raises a material conflict as to the existence or terms of an arbitration agreement, citing to Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413-414 and Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2.

Rosenthal states, as to discovery, “Plaintiffs do not, however, assert they actually had insufficient time to conduct discovery before hearing of the petition, or that they sought and were refused discovery of any matter pertinent to the enforceability of the arbitration clause. Plaintiffs, of course, have full access to, and have made full use of, their own recollections of the transactions, the principal evidence upon which their claim of fraud in inception of the arbitration agreement is based.” (Id. at 412.)

Here, however, the Court has a declaration from Plaintiff that does not deny the signature on the document at issue is her own, has a complete version of the Spanish version of the Agreement and its English translation and has found procedural unconscionability as to the circumstances of its execution. Plaintiff has not demonstrated what discovery would assist as to rebut the findings above that Plaintiff signed the Agreement and that the terms of the Agreement, fully set forth before this Court and the parties, are not substantively unconscionable.

The Court denies the request for discovery.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion, finds a valid waiver of the class claims, and compels Plaintiff’s individual claims, as well as the Type A PAGA claim to arbitration. Plaintiff’s Type O PAGA claim is stayed in this Court pending the competition of arbitration.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Wells Fargo Bank, NA vs. Yang, Sarah

Case No.:  VCL316634

Date:           August 17, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion Set Aside / Vacate Dismissal and Enter Judgment Pursuant to Section 664.6

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and enter judgment as requested.

Facts

On March 21, 2025, the parties filed a stipulation for entry of judgment and settlement of this matter for $7,188.68, plus costs, minus credit for any payments actually made, paid as follows:

(A) $405.68 shall be paid on or before March 07, 2025;

(B) $399.00 shall be paid on or before the 7th of each and every consecutive month commencing on or before April 07, 2025 through and including July 07, 2026;

(C) $399.00 shall be paid on or before August 07, 2026.

In the event of such default, the Parties agreed that the Court was authorized to enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $7,188.68, plus costs, minus credit for any payments.

The stipulation expressly reserved this Court’s jurisdiction following dismissal under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

This matter was dismissed on March 24, 2025.

Plaintiff indicates Defendant made a single payment of $405.68 and no other payments have bene made. Plaintiff further indicates $315 incurred in costs.

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states: 

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1360.)

As indicated above, the Court retained jurisdiction over the parties and this matter pursuant to the filed stipulation and order dismissing this matter.

Based upon the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel and, the Court, having no opposition, grants the motion and enters judgment in the amount requested of $7,098.00 consisting of the $7,188.68 principal amount less the single payment of $405.68 plus costs of $315.00.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                  Proctor, Dianna Renee vs. Huerta, Javier

Case No.:    VCU326737

Date:            August 17, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Leave to File Cross-Complaint

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to order the proposed cross-complaint filed no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

Facts

In this automobile accident matter, Plaintiff Dianna Renee Proctor sues Defendant Javier Huerta.

Defendant answered the complaint on April 9, 2026. Defendant, at that time, did not file a cross-complaint.

On July 6, 2026, Defendant filed this motion for leave to file a cross-complaint for indemnity, contribution and declaratory relief against proposed Cross-Defendant Cathleen Rosenberger. In support, Defendant’s counsel states the proposed cross-complaint arises out of the same transaction and occurrence as the complaint, “but was not pleaded earlier as a result of inadvertence.” (Declaration of Phillips ¶3.)  Further, that “Defense counsel was not fully aware of the facts of this incident at the time of the filing of the answer under after further review of the facts and legal analysis.” (Declaration of Phillips ¶7.)

Defendant attaches the proposed cross-complaint as Exhibit A.

No opposition appears to have been filed.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 428.50 states:

(a) A party shall file a cross-complaint against any of the parties who filed the complaint or cross-complaint against him or her before or at the same time as the answer to the complaint or cross-complaint.

(b) Any other cross-complaint may be filed at any time before the court has set a date for trial.

(c) A party shall obtain leave of court to file any cross-complaint except one filed within the time specified in subdivision (a) or (b). Leave may be granted in the interest of justice at any time during the course of the action.

Here, no trial date has been set. Further, the cross-complaint is directed at a non-party to this case. No leave is required.

However, the Court under section 428.10 must find that the proposed cross complaint “ (b)…(1) arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause brought against him or (2) asserts a claim, right, or interest in the property or controversy which is the subject of the cause brought against him.” Here, the declaration indicates the indemnity and related claims arise from the same transaction or occurrence.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and orders the filing of the proposed cross-complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Pelorus Fund LOC, LLC vs. Mogul Investments LLC

Case No.:   VCU327181

Date:           August 17, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Receiver’s Motion to Approve Sale of Assets

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and approve the sale

Facts and Analysis

In this matter, Plaintiff sought judicial foreclosure and specific performance of loan documents, appointment of a receiver and injunctive relief as to real property located at 34368 Road 196, Woodlake, California 93286 and undeveloped, vacant land in Woodlake, California 93286 (the “Property”).

Ryan Baker was appointed on November 6, 2025 by this Court as Receiver in this matter.

Baker indicates that the Property is improved with cannabis cultivation facilities, including twelve (12) flowering rooms totaling approximately 15,000 square feet of canopy space, greenhouse structures, and associated infrastructure. However, Baker also indicates that, on the same day of the appointment and upon inspecting the Property, ten to fifteen people were actively stripping the Property of equipment and other assets. The cultivation facility had been stripped of all equipment, including lighting, HVAC systems, irrigation infrastructure, and processing equipment and there were no employees, no plants, no inventory, and no ongoing operations.

Baker further indicates that the Receivership Estate holds three active state cannabis licenses issued by the California Department of Cannabis Control: (i) CCL19-0002610 (Cultivation – Medium Indoor), expiring February 6, 2027; (ii) C9-0000568-LIC (Retailer – Non-Storefront), expiring May 11, 2027; and (iii) C11-0000873-LIC (Distributor), expiring July 21, 2026. In addition, the Estate holds four local cannabis licenses issued by the City of Woodlake: (i) 18-0001 (Cultivation); (ii) 18-002 (Manufacturing); (iii) 18-003 (Distribution); and (iv) 21-006 (Non Storefront Retail.)

Further, that Baker successfully renewed the cultivation license in February 2026 and the non storefront retail license in May 2026, and continues to work with the DCC to obtain access to the retail and distribution licenses, which remain associated with legacy Bureau of Cannabis Control accounts.

Baker indicates these licenses are significant assets of the Estate, but require continued preservation, including $309,000 in unpaid cultivation taxes, $35,044.61 in unpaid regulatory fees, $400 in LiveScan fees, $4,471.82 in unpaid trash fees, and additional unknown retail, distribution, and manufacturing taxes.

Further, delinquent property taxes on the Property total approximately $71,654.92, plus additional accrued penalties and default interest.

The Property is also subject to multiple deeds of trust and other encumbrances, including by Plaintiff Pelorus Fund LOC, LLC who holds the senior deed of trust.

Further, junior liens include deeds of trust in favor of Collect Access LLC ($250,000, Instrument No. 2022 0050714) and Jaskum Singh Briana ($200,000 and $100,000, Instrument Nos. 2023-0051379 and 2023-0051380, respectively). A UCC Financing Statement was filed by AGRI-BEST FINANCIAL in 2008, however no continuation statement appears of record.

The Estate generates no operating revenue. In April 2026, cash receipts totaled $18,952.85 and consisted solely of funding from Plaintiff, while disbursements totaled $11,624.83 for fire monitoring, insurance, utilities, and bank fees.

Baker has sought additional funding from Plaintiff to cover current and prior operating costs, engage engineering to comply with the City’s CUP requirements, and pay utilities, insurance, and professional fees.

Baker utilized Green Life Business Group (“GLBG”), a firm that specializes in selling cannabis licenses and real estate, to market and solicit buyers for the licenses and Property. Initially, Plaintiff initially made a credit bid of $4,000,000 and a third party made a bid of $5,000,000. Thereafter, Plaintiff increased its credit bid to $5,100,000 and Plaintiff was the prevailing buyer. No cash changes hands at closing as the purchase price reduces Plaintiff’s outstanding claims by $5,100,000. The transaction is structured as a sale of substantially all assets of the Receivership Estate.

Baker indicates Plaintiff’s credit bid is in the best interest of the estate because: (a) the business is defunct with no prospect of generating revenue; (b) the Property is incurring ongoing costs that deplete the Estate; (c) the cannabis licenses and CUP require continued funding and regulatory attention to avoid loss of value; (d) the credit bid eliminates financing risk and ensures certainty of closing; (e) the Property was broadly marketed through GLBG, and the only third-party bid received was $5,000,000, which Plaintiff exceeded; and (f) the alternative, continued deterioration of the assets, license jeopardy, and further depletion of the Estate’s limited cash, would result in even greater loss to the Estate and its creditors.

Baker seeks approval of the sale that includes lien stripping pursuant to this Court’s equitable authority and Code of Civil Procedure section 568.5.

Further, Baker requests authority to borrow funds and issue super property receiver certificates in an aggregate principal amount not to exceed $500,000, only if and to the extent necessary to fund costs and expenses of the Receivership Estate. Baker indicates this is a reasonable estimate of the maximum funding that may be required through closing and the post-closing period and that Baker would not draw on this amount unless and until receivership costs require it pursuant to the authority in paragraph 9(k) of the Receivership Order.

No opposition to this motion appears filed.

Matters related to receiverships rest in the Court's sound discretion and are "afforded considerable deference on review." (City of Santa Monica v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 905, 931.) In exercising such discretion, the Court considers all material facts and evidence and "…applies legal principles essential to an informed, intelligent, and just decision. ... Where there is no evidence of fraud, unfairness, or oppression, the court has wide discretion in approving the receiver's proposed actions." (County of Sonoma v. Quail (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 696, 671.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 568 states “The receiver has, under the control of the court, power to bring and defend actions in his own name, as receiver; to take and keep possession of the property, to receive rents, collect debts, to compound for and compromise the same, to make transfers, and generally to do such acts respecting the property as the court may authorize.”

Further, section 568.5 states “A receiver may, pursuant to an order of the court, sell real or personal property in the receiver’s possession upon the notice and in the manner prescribed by Article 6 (commencing with Section 701.510) of Chapter 3 of Division 2 of Title 9. The sale is not final until confirmed by the court.”

Prior to authorizing an involuntary sale, “The receiver here had to establish actual, not imaginary, necessity for the sale… and also needed to demonstrate the sale had to be consummated at that time.” (Cal-American Income Property Fund VII v. Brown Development Corp. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 268, 276, FN7.) Further, "The receiver has the affirmative duty to endeavor to realize the largest amount from the sale of the receivership property." (Id., FN8.)

“‘Generally speaking if no good reason appears for refusing to confirm a receiver's sale, such as chilling of bids or other misconduct or gross inadequacy of price, the sale should be confirmed. . . . The order of confirmation gives the judicial sanction of the court, and when made, it relates back to the time of sale and cures all defects and irregularities except those founded in want of jurisdiction of the persons or the subject matter, or in fraud. The court has power to confirm the sale although the terms of the decree of sale may not have been strictly followed. The matter of confirmation rests upon the sound discretion of the appointing court to be judicially exercised in view of all the surrounding facts and circumstances and in the interest of fairness, justice and rights of the respective parties.’” (People v. Riverside University (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 572, 582.)

Here, Baker has sufficiently set forth the bid process, the estimated value of the Receivership Estate and the necessity to confirm this sale to preclude further loss to the property, including loss of the cannabis licenses and related land-use approvals.

Further, the Court  has the power to order the sale of property free and clear of liens and encumbrances. (City of Riverside v. Horspool (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 670, 684.) Here, the proposed sale will result in the extinguishment of Plaintiff’s lien, as well as three junior liens. As Plaintiff is the bidder on the sale, there appears no objection to lien stripping the first priority lien. The Receiver further indicates that the junior liens were acquired after Plaintiff’s first priority lien and without the authorization or consent of Plaintiff. In any event, the sale price, a credit bid, is insufficient to cover these junior liens.

As to the accrued property taxes on APN 059-090-002 and APN 059-090-049 totaling approximately $71,654.92 at the time of the Receiver’s appointment, plus additional accrued penalties and default interest, the Court notes no objections from the taxing authorities.

As to any taxes accruing after appointment of the Receiver, the Court approves the payment of such taxes from the funds to be borrowed by the receiver for which issue super property receiver certificates in an aggregate principal amount not to exceed $500,000 are issued.

The Court will authorize the receiver’s certificates as requested under Code of Civil Procedure section 568.

The Court will order the Receiver to execute the necessary documents and discharge following completion of post-closing obligations or nine (9) months after closing, whichever occurs first.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and will sign the proposed order lodged with this Court on July 17, 2026.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared August 17, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054191	In the Matter of Webley, John Clive	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Recommended for Approval	Documents in order
VPR054213	In the Matter of Rodriguez, Isabel	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	DE-300 not attached as required by Probate Code § 13152(e)
VPR054199	In the Matter of Macke, Joseph J.	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Recommended for Approval	Documents in order
VPR054107	In the Matter of Cooksey, Kelly Renee	Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Order	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054206	In the Matter of Gonzales, Patrick Joseph	Spousal Property Hearing	Appearance Required	1. Petition Item 4c omitted: decedent died intestate or testate. 2. Petition Item 7 Attachment omitted: the legal description of the properties that petitioner requests to be determined as having passed to the surviving spouse. 3. Petition Item 9 omitted: the names, relationships, ages and addresses of issues to decedent. 4. Notice of Hearing not served on all heirs 15 days prior, Prob C § 13655. 5. Order not submitted
VPR054196	In the Matter of Daniel M. Jones Family Trust	Petition to Confirm Trust Asset	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR051031	In the Matter of Joanna M. Wall Irrevocable Trust	Accounting Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR050041	In the Matter of the Stanley Carty Special Needs Trust	Accounting Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR052225	In the Matter of the McClatchey Family Trust	Accounting Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
PPR049398	In the Matter of Zimmer, Elke Susan	Petition Hearing– Conservatorship	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053681	In the Matter of LeBeau, Jeffrey Stewart	Contested Hearing – Conservatorship	Appearance Required	Initial Petition: documents in order. Competing Petition: Citation not served on proposed conservatee

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         Probate calendar for August 13, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR054075	In the Matter of McCue, Patricia Louise	Determine Succession to Primary Residence & OSC	Appearance required	Amended Petition needs to be filed addressing #11,  #13, and #14. All heirs should have signed this petition, pursuant to Prob C §13006
PPR054202	In the Matter of Bjorkman, Douglas	Letters of Administration	Appearance required	Petitioner claims priority in Attachment 3g(2)(a) – NO ATTACHMENT explaining priority NOT FILED - Waiver of Bond all heirs NOT FILED - Notice of Petition to Administer served on all parties 15 days prior, Prob C 8110 NOT FILED - Supplemental Statement of Birth Date and DL Number NOT FILED - Proof of Publication NO Order submitted

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared August 13, 2026 to August 17, 2026that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
8/13/2026 8:30	Department 9	VPR054221	In the Matter of J.I.Z.D.	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service to be in accordance with Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3), re notice to parents
8/13/2026 8:30	Department 9	VPR054228	In the Matter of K.O.	Matter appears to be in order
8/13/26 8:30 AM	Department 19	PPR053908	In the Matter of L.A.G.M.	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating the relatives named in the Petition for Appointment were served with 15 calendar days notice, as required by PROB Code §1460,1510, with a copy of the Petition for Appointment and Notice of Hearing.
8/13/26 8:30 AM	Department 9	VPR053168	In the Matter of L.M.	Petition Hearing- VISIT NEED Notice of Hearing GC-020 form to be filed for GUARDIAN indicating party was served with a copy of the Notice of Hearing pursuant to Prob Code §1460, service to be given 15 days before hearing Notice of Change of Address of Ward  needs to be serve on father
8/13/26 8:30 AM	Department 19	PPR052832	In the Matter of V.S.	Terminate Guardianship Hearing NEED Notice of Hearing to be filed indicating CO-GUARDIAN, Ronald Owens, MATERNAL GRANDPARENTS, and PATERNAL GRANDPARENTS were served by mail with 15 court days prior to this Termination hearing (Prob Code §1460, 1510, 1601)                               Petition for Termination at #9, doesn’t list all of the child’s grandparents.
8/14/26 10:00 AM	Department 9	VPR053787	In the Matter of N.M.	Court Investigator requests continuance
8/14/26 10:00 AM	Department 9	VPR053770	In the Matter of P.M.	Court Investigator requests continuance
8/17/26 8:30 AM	Department 1	VPR054112	In the Matter of M.A.C.C.	Matter appears to be in order
8/17/26   8:30 AM	Department 9	VPR054265	In the Matter of B.M.	CONFIDENTIAL GUARDIAN SCREENING FORM is INCOMPLETE at #1, information about the proposed guardian. ATTACHMENT TO THE PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT, FORM GC-210(CA) IS INCOMPLETE – NO GRANDPARENTS AND SIBLINGS LISTED ATTACHMENT TO THE PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT, UCCJEA IS INCOMPLETE AT #3 RESIDENCE ADDRESS HISTORY ATTACHMENT TO THE PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT, ICWA-010(A) IS INCOMPLETE. Inquiry not completed on mother & child, not asked about possible Indian ancestry, pursuant to CRC Rule 5.481(1). MOTHER is required to be personally served with a copy of the Notice of Hearing and TEMPORARY Appointment Petition, 5 court days notice required according to Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3).