Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Monday, May 4, 2026, are:

Re:                Darko, Joseph K vs. M1 Support Services

Case No.:   VCU321734

Date:           May 4, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion to Deed Admissions Admitted

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and deem the admissions admitted

Facts

In this dispute over a settlement agreement as to a wage claim, Defendant M1 served in Requests for Admissions, Set One, on Plaintiff on January 7, 2026 via personal service on Plaintiff’s address of record.

Responses were due no later than February 6, 2026.

No responses were received and on March 18, 2026, Defendant M1 filed this motion to deem admissions admitted.

A notice of non-opposition to this motion has been filed.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. Here, Plaintiff has failed to serve a timely response and Defendant has moved for an order to deem the admission admitted.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Defendant’s motion. The facts and allegations alleged in Requests for Admissions Nos. 1 through 6 of Defendant’s First Set of Requests for Admission shall be deemed admitted.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Visalia Ceramic Tile, Inc., a California Corporation vs. De Anza Tile Co., Inc.

Case No.:   VCU327154 

Date:           May 4, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motions:    (I) Defendant De Anza Tile’s Demurrer; (II) Defendant Mondragon’s Demurrer

Tentative Rulings:  De Anza’s demurrer is sustained with leave to amend.  Mondragon’s demurrer is sustained to the second cause of action without leave to amend.  VCT shall file any amended complaint within 10 days of notice of this ruling. 

De Anza Tile Co. Inc. (De Anza) and Jordan Mondragon separately demurrer to Visalia Ceramic Tile, Inc.’s (VCT) first amended complaint, which contains causes of action for intentional interference with contractual relations (first cause of action); and for unfair competition (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17200, et seq.) (second cause of action).

VCT First Amended Complaint

VCT alleges it is a California tile contractor, in business since 1985, and about 40 to 50 percent of its work is on public works projects.  VCT alleges Fremont, California-based De Anza is a direct competitor, and that about 80 to 90 percent of De Anza’s work is on public works projects.  VCT alleges Richard Papapietro is a shareholder of De Anza, and its chief executive and chief financial officer (its CEO and CFO). 

1. The Halliwell Scheme

VCT alleges Jordan Mondragon, “an agent of … De Anza … and Papapietro,” reached out to a Northern California journeyman tile finisher, Steve Halliwell, who was apparently exploring job prospects with prospective employers, about a plan to surreptitiously secure employment with VCT, with the secrete purpose of acting as a spy for Mondragon, Papapietro and De Anza. 

Halliwell is not a party to the suit.  According to VCT, though, Mondragon attempted to secure Halliwell’s participation in the proposed spying operation by indicating that Papapietro, incident to his “reputation and power in the industry,” “could … make life extremely successful for Halliwell if he was cooperative, or extremely difficult if he was not.” 

The specific proposal was that Halliwell would “observe, report and collect information on [VCT], including [its] payment for public works projects, purported OSHA violations, and confidential trade secret information which would then be reported back to Mondragon and used by [De Anza] and Papapietro to obtain a competitive advantage over [VCT].”

VCT alleges that, on two occasions when Mondragon called Halliwell, he told him VCT “had committed serious OSHA violations and that [it] was violating California labor laws by not compensating its employees the proper prevailing wage for public works projects.”

VCT alleges Halliwell ultimately declined Mondragon’s proposal, but that after he did, his “job prospects ceased communicating with him.”

2. Supplier Disruption

“Shortly thereafter,” VCT alleges, “[Papapietro] instructed [VCT’s] most important supplier to cease doing business with Plaintiff if it wished to retain support and business from [De Anza] and other contractors in Northern California”; and that after that threat, “the supplier terminated its business relationship with [VCT].”

Under VCT’s first cause of action, it alleges (1.) it had “valid, existing contracts with third parties which provided [VCT] materials”; (2.) that defendants (De Anza, Papapietro, and 50 “Does”) “knew of” these “business relationships”; and (3.) that defendants “intentionally interfered with [VCT’s] contracts” by threats and coercion.

Under VCT’s second cause of action, it alleges “Defendants, acting through Papapietro and their agents, intentionally interfered with [VCT’s] existing contractual and ongoing business relationships by threatening [its] most important supplier with the loss of … business … unless the supplier ceased doing business with [VCT],” which resulted in the supplier terminating its relationship with VCT.  VCT alleges “[t]his conduct constitutes independently actionable violations of California law and therefore serves as predicate unlawful conduct under Business and Professions Code section 17200.”

VCT additionally alleges, under the second cause of action, that “Defendants further engaged in a coordinated scheme designed … to harm [VCT] [and] to eliminate a direct competitor in the California public works tile contracting market,” which scheme was Mondragon’s Halliwell-spy-gambit described above. 

VCT alleges “[t]his conduct [i.e., the coordinate scheme] included attempting to covertly infiltrate [VCT’s] workforce through a secretly compensated operative to obtain confidential, trade secret, and competitive bidding information relating to public works projects; spreading false and defamatory statements that [VCT] committed serious OSHA violations and violated California labor laws by unlawfully failing to pay prevailing wages on public works projects; and coercing a critical supplier to terminate its relationship with [VCT], impairing [its] ability to compete for public works contracts.”

(I) De Anza’s Demurrer

De Anza demurrers to the interference claim on the grounds that VCT fails to identify the contracts with which it is alleged to have interfered.  De Anza additionally demurrers to the unfair competition claim on multiple grounds addressed further below.

A. Failure to Identify the Subject Contracts in the Interference Cause of Action

To state an interference cause of action, the plaintiff must allege “a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party” and, of course, “intentional acts designed to induce,” and that actually induce, “a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship.”  (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1118, 1126 [270 Cal.Rptr. 1, 791 P.2d 587].)

De Anza essentially contends that VCT fails to allege the existence of a valid contract in its interference claim (i.e., the contract(s) alleged to be the subject of unlawful interference) because the first amended complaint does not “identify, specify or name the third party(ies) to [VCT’s] alleged contract(s).” 

De Anza additionally criticizes that VCT, in parts of the complaint, alleges interference with a contract with a single “most important supplier,” but, elsewhere, alleges interference with contracts with multiple suppliers. 

De Anza maintains “[t]his lack of clarity prejudices [De Anza’s] ability to respond and prepare a defense because, without a crystal ball, it is unclear who the third party [to the ‘most important supplier’ contract] is [or who the third parties to the multiple supplier contracts are].” 

VCT asserts its allegations that it “had ‘valid, existing contracts with third parties’ to supply materials for VCT’s projects at agreed-upon prices and terms” were sufficient—“is enough”–to establish a valid contract with a third party for the purposes of its interference claim.  VCT argues “[u]nder Construction Protective Services [(2002) 29 Cal.4th 189 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 908, 57 P.3d 372] (Construction Protection Services)] [this] is sufficient pleading of the contracts’ legal effect at the demurrer stage,” and that the requirement to allege a valid contract “does not impose a heightened pleading standard.”  Citing Construction Protective Services, VCT asserts it has properly alleged a valid contract “by its legal effect.”  VCT maintains “[a] plaintiff asserting interference is not required at the demurrer stage to attach the underlying contracts, identify every purchase order, or plead every formation fact as though suing directly for breach of contract.”

According to VCT, “Defendant’s argument that the FAC must identify the supplier by name confuses pleading with proof.” “California,” VCT maintains without citation to authority, “is a notice pleading jurisdiction.”  VCT then asserts: “The FAC gives De Anza Tile fair notice of the nature of the contracts at issue: supply contracts for project materials, known to De Anza Tile, disrupted through coercion directed at VCT’s supplier base and specifically its ‘most important supplier.’ The exact supplier identity, dates, purchase orders, and additional evidentiary particulars are matters for discovery, not a prerequisite to surviving demurrer.”

Analysis

To begin, VCT is fundamentally wrong about the pleading requirements in California, and fundamentally wrong about what is required to plead the element of a valid contract as part of its interference cause of action. 

First, California is not “a notice pleading jurisdiction.”  “[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize a form of ‘notice pleading,’ usually designed simply to put a defendant on notice of the nature of a claim.”  (Bach v. County of Butte (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 554, 561 [195 Cal.Rptr. 268].)  California, however, “requires the pleading of facts pursuant to its system of ‘code pleading’ derived from the New York Code of 1848, known as the ‘Field Code.’  [Citations.]” (Ibid., italics added.) 

California requires a plaintiff “ ‘to set forth the essential facts of his case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.’ ”  (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 714, 719 [104 Cal.Rptr. 897], citations omitted.)  “ ‘[The] particularity required,” in turn, “depends on the extent to which the defendant in fairness needs detailed information that can be conveniently provided by the plaintiff … .’ ”  (Ibid., citations omitted.)

The court finds no difficulty in concluding, under the circumstances presented, that defendants in fairness need at least the identity of the counter-party(ies) to the contracts allegedly at issue in the first cause of action to be properly acquainted with the nature, source and extent of VCT’s interference cause of action.  The court, additionally, sees no reason why such information cannot be conveniently provided by VCT. 

By presenting the first amended complaint to the court, VCT’s counsel has effectively certified that, amongst other things, the factual contentions within “have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subd. (b)(3).)  By this implied certification, the court can and must assume that, with VCT having asserted a cause of action for interference with contract(s), VCT’s counsel has impliedly certified that VCT can at least identify the counter-party(ies) to the contract(s) with which the named defendants are alleged to have interfered. 

Construction Protective Services lends no support to VCT’s position here.  The Supreme Court there said: “In an action based on a written contract, a plaintiff may plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language.” (Id., at p. 198-199.)  The relevant point, a collateral issue addressed in the opinion, was that a complaint by a plaintiff suing their insurer for breach was not defective incident to the failure to append the policy to the complaint, as “a plaintiff may plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language.”  (Ibid.)  The defect here, though, is that, by failing to identify the counter-party(ies) to the contract(s) at issue in VCT’s interference claim, De Anza doesn’t know which specific contract(s) VCT alleges were unlawfully interfered with by it. 

The court is at a loss to discern why this issue was not resolved during the conferral efforts preceding this demurrer.  VCT must know which contract(s) are the subject of its interference claim and could and should have provided this information when this challenge was brought to its attention.  

In any event, the court must, and now does, resolve the issue here.  De Anza’s demurrer is sustained to the first cause of action.   The demurrer is sustained with leave to amend, with the specific direction that VCT must specifically allege the identity of the contract counter-party to any contract alleged to be at issue in its interference cause of action.  

B. The Unlawful Competition Cause of Action

The Unfair Competition Law (UCL) defines unfair competition as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice … .” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) 

“The UCL covers a wide range of conduct. It embraces ‘ “ ‘ “anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” ’ ” [Citations.]’ ” (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1143 [131 Cal.Rptr.2d 29, 63 P.3d 937] (Korea Supply), citing Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 [83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548, 973 P.2d 527] (Cel-Tech).)  “By proscribing ‘any unlawful’ business practice, ‘section 17200 “borrows” violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices’ that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable. [Citation.]”  (Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 180.)

“However, the law does more than just borrow. The statutory language referring to ‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent’ practice (italics added) makes clear that a practice may be deemed unfair even if not specifically proscribed by some other law. ‘Because Business and Professions Code section 17200 is written in the disjunctive, it establishes three varieties of unfair competition--acts or practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent.’ In other words, a practice is prohibited as ‘unfair’ or ‘deceptive’ even if not ‘unlawful’ and vice versa.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

Here, De Anza demurrers on the grounds that VCT fails to state a claim under the UCL based on any act or practice that is “unlawful,” “unfair” or “fraudulent.”

1. Unlawful business act or practice

“The California Supreme Court has given the term ‘unlawful’ a straightforward and broad interpretation: [¶] [‘]The UCL covers a wide range of conduct. It embraces anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law. . . . Section 17200 “borrows” violations from other laws by making them independently actionable as unfair competitive practices.[’]”  (CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. Werner Enters. (9th Cir. 2007) 479 F.3d 1099, 1107, citing Korea Supply, supra, 29 Cal. 4th at p. 1143.)

Here, the first amended complaint alleges VCT’s interference claim as the basis of an “unlawful”-type UCL claim.  Because, for the reasons explained above, VCT fails to plead a viable contractual interference claim, however, such claim cannot support its unfair competition claim based on “unlawful” conduct under the UCL.

2. Unfair business act or practice

Providing guidance for courts charged to determine what constitutes “unfair” conduct under the UCL, the Supreme Court, in Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 548, 973 P.2d 527] (Cel-Tech), held “that any finding of unfairness to competitors under section 17200 [must] be tethered to some legislatively declared policy or proof of some actual or threatened impact on competition,” and the court, accordingly, adopted “the following test: When a plaintiff who claims to have suffered injury from a direct competitor's ‘unfair’ act or practice invokes section 17200, the word ‘unfair’ in that section means conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.”  (Id., at pp. 186-187.)

As a threshold matter, the court begins by noting that it ignores VCT’s allegations pertaining to its interference claim as part of the court’s analysis under the “unfairness” prong of section 17200, since VCT should be afforded no greater latitude to obfuscate necessary details about its interference claims merely by casting those same claims as a basis of an unfair competition claim.

Turning to the allegations regarding the Halliwell-spy-gambit, De Anza notes that this court found similar allegations insufficient to establish a UCL claim based on unfairness in a prior tentative ruling on a demurrer to the original complaint. 

That prior ruling was adopted, but then later withdrawn.  This case was originally assigned to Hon. Judge Russell Burke.  On January 23, 2026, the Friday before the Monday, January 26, 2026 hearing on the prior demurrer, though, Judge Burke recused himself and the matter was assigned to Hon. Judge Bret Hillman.  Later that same Friday, the court’s tentative ruling on the prior demurrer was posted.  Neither party requested oral argument, and neither party appeared at the hearing on January 23, 2026, and Judge Hillman adopted the tentative ruling.  The following Monday, February 2, 2026, however, VCT timely filed a Code of Civil Procedure 170.6 challenge as to Judge Hillman, whereafter this court withdrew the adopted tentative ruling on demurrer, incident to acceptance of the Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 challenge, and reset hearing on the demurrer for March 9, 2026.  On February 5, 2026, however, VCT filed its first amended complaint. 

The court’s prior tentative ruling, which, as noted, was not addressed by the parties at oral argument, concluded that VCT’s prior allegations did not “describe conduct ‘that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.’ ” 

The ruling explained that VCT’s allegations described “harms inflicted by defendants against VCT” and that VCT’s further allegations “that ‘Defendant De Anza Tile’s conduct was unfair because it was designed to restrain competition,’ and ‘is contrary to public policy favoring open competition and freedom of choice for businesses to operate without coercion’ [were] entirely conclusory on the essential issues necessary to support a UCL claim based on ‘unfair’ competition.”

In the demurrer here, De Anza presents a side-by-side comparison of the allegations found insufficient in the prior withdrawn tentative ruling on the original complaint and the revised similar allegations in the now first amended complaint, and it contends “[t]o the extent that [VCT] adds additional facts, those facts … are conclusory … and do not demonstrate the type of unfair conduct contemplated by Cel-Tech.”

The court finds that VCT’s amended allegations continue to show, at best, injury to VCT’s own interest in remaining competitive in the “California tile-contracting market, especially in the public works arena.”  Beyond this, VCT alleges, again in conclusory fashion, that, by attacking its interests in remaining competitive, defendants “exclusionary and deceptive conduct threatens an incipient violation of antitrust policy and significantly threatens competition in the relevant market.”

“[A]ntitrust laws,” however, “were enacted for the protection of competition, not competitors,” and “[t]hey do not require the courts to protect small businesses from the loss of profits due to continued competition, but only against the loss of profits from practices forbidden by the antitrust laws”; and “[i]njury to a competitor is not equivalent to injury to competition; only the latter is the proper focus of antitrust laws.”  (Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 186, citations and internal quotation marks omitted, italics in cited text.)

VCT’s response that it has set forth allegations amounting to “market sabotage” are unpersuasive.  The reasoning appears to be that because it “alleges that approximately 40 to 50 percent of VCT’s business is public works and approximately 80 to 90 percent of De Anza Tile’s business is public works,” the allegations regarding Halliwell-spy-gambit necessarily involve “an incipient antitrust threat” to the broader “California tile-contracting market, especially in the public works arena.”  VCT’s and De Anza’s status as competitors, however, does not transform De Anza’s adverse conduct against VCT, by virtue of that status, into a threat of a violation of an antitrust law. 

The court finds the allegations of the first amended complaint do not support a UCL claim based on the unfairness prong. 

3. Fraudulent business act or practice

“It has been stated that ‘In order to state a cause of action under the fraud prong of the UCL a plaintiff need not show that he or others were actually deceived or confused by the conduct or business practice in question. “The ‘fraud’ prong of [the UCL] is unlike common law fraud or deception. A violation can be shown even if no one was actually deceived, relied upon the fraudulent practice, or sustained any damage. Instead, it is only necessary to show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.” ’ [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Buller v. Sutter Health (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 981, 986 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 47].)

Here, VCT alleges that “Defendants’ conduct was … fraudulent within the meaning of Business and Professions Code section 17200 because it involved false, deceptive, and misleading statements likely to deceive members of the public and participants in the commercial construction industry, including prospective employees, suppliers, contractors, and public works stakeholders.”  VCT alleges, reasserting earlier allegations, that “Defendants, through Mondragon acting as their agent, repeatedly represented that [VCT] had committed serious OSHA violations and was violating California labor laws by failing to pay employees the required prevailing wage on public works projects.” 

As noted above, VCT had earlier alleged that Mondragon made this representation, on two occasions, to Halliwell.  VCT alleges, again in conclusory fashion, that these representations “were intended to be relied upon and repeated within the construction industry, thereby misleading market participants and undermining confidence in Plaintiff’s lawful eligibility to perform public works projects.”

The court finds that VCT allegations are insufficient to support that members of the public were likely to be deceived by Mondragon’s alleged misrepresentations.  By VCT’s own allegations, the misrepresentations were made to one person, Halliwell, as part of an ultimately unsuccessful effort to persuade him to serve as a De Anza spy.  

The court finds that the allegations of the first amended complaint do not support a UCL claim based on the fraudulent prong.

4. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the court sustains the demurrer.  The demurrer is sustained with leave to amend as the court is reticent, at this stage, to determine that there is no reasonable possibility of cure by further amendment, given the possibility of VCT being potentially able to state a valid interference claim on further amendment, which could potentially establish a basis for a UCL claim based on the “unlawful” prong.  The court finds that VCT presents no other reasonable possibility of cure by further amendment. 

The court, on a final note, also acknowledges De Anza’s challenge to “nonrestitutionary disgorgement.”

VCT impliedly concedes that such relief cannot be awarded under the UCL and represents that it “it seeks only the equitable relief authorized by Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203, including injunctive relief and restitution only to the extent Plaintiff can establish money or property in which it has a vested interest and that is recoverable as restitution under California law.”

Setting aside whether this is a proper basis for challenge on demurrer, the court observes that VCT’s allegations at paragraphs 34 and 35 do not well harmonize with its representations in its opposition brief and, to obviate the necessity of having to address this issue again, directs that, in any amended complaint, VCT’s allegations regarding relief it seeks, and any attendant prayer for relief, should be consonant with the limited provision of remedies available under section 17203. 

The court expects such issues, particularly at this point, should any persist, be easily resolvable as part of good faith conferral efforts by the parties, so as to obviate the need to address them in a further motion. 

(II) Mondragon’s demurrer

Mondragon is not named a defendant on the interference claim, but he directs his demurrer at both VCT’s causes of action.  Mondragon challenges the interference claim insofar as the unfair competition claim is predicated on it. 

Regarding the unfair competition claim, Mondragon raises various arguments that were also raised, and addressed above, in De Anza’s demurrer.

A. The Interference Cause of Action

VCT is correct that Mondragon is not named as a defendant on the interference claim, and it is further obvious that the complaint does not allege Mondragon was involved in the alleged interference activity underlying the first cause of action, as a predicate to VCT’s UCL claim or otherwise.  The court has already determined, above, that demurrer must be sustained to the first cause of action for the reasons identified by De Anza.  Mondragon presents no issues that separately need to be addressed on demurrer; his demurrer is to a claim not presented in this case. 

Accordingly, the court need not address Mondragon’s statute of limitations argument, his argument pertaining to the nature of his status as an agent and the asserted limitations of his liability for alleged conduct by De Anza, or his causation argument pertaining to the interference cause of action. 

B. The UCL Cause of Action

Mondragon’s demurrer adds no additional separate issues needing to be addressed.  To the extent Mondragon raises the same issues raised by De Anza, the court incorporates its above determinations in sustaining the demurrer to the second cause of action as against Mondragon. 

In the case of Mondragon, however, the court sustains his demurrer to the second cause of action without leave to amend. 

First, there is no reasonable possibility VCT can amend its UCL claim based on the “unlawful” prong against Mondragon, since that claim is predicated on the interference claim which is not stated against Mondragon. 

Second, VCT presents nothing to support a reasonable possibility of cure for the defects in its UCL claim to the extent that claim is predicated on “unfair” or “fraudulent” conduct, whether as to Mondragon or otherwise. 

Accordingly, Mondragon’s demurrer is sustained to the second cause of action without leave to amend. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                TENNAT, SUSAN vs. BRAZIL, REESE ANTONY

Case No.:     VCU326510

Date:           May 4, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion without prejudice.

Facts

On March 17, 2026, Plaintiff’s Counsel Valentina Mnatsakanyan of Downtown LA Law Group filed a motion to be relieved as counsel as to Plaintiff Susan Tennat. Plaintiff’s Counsel filed the following with respect to withdrawing:

(1) MC-051 - Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as Counsel;

(2) MC-052 – Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel; and

(3) MC-053 - Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel

Additionally, Plaintiff’s Counsel has filed proofs of service of these documents by mail.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 284 provides that “[t]he attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at any time before or after judgment of final determination, as follows: 1. Upon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes; [or] 2. Upon the order of the court, upon the application of either client or attorney, after notice from one to the other.”

California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) requires that the “notice of motion and motion to be relieved as counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) must be directed to the client and must be made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-051).”

As noted above, counsel has complied with California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) by submitting the notice and motion on MC-051 and by directing the notice and motion to Plaintiff.

California Rule of Court 3.1362 (c) further mandates that: “The motion to be relieved as counsel must be accompanied by a declaration on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel--Civil (form MC-052). The declaration must state in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1). Specifically, the declaration that Rule 3.1362(c) requires must state that the moving attorney attempted to secure a “Substitution of Attorney” from the client as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1) and that the client refused to so stipulate.

Here, the declaration is properly made on form MC-052 and uses general terms without compromising confidentiality, but does not indicate that counsel attempted to obtain a substitution by consent prior to making this motion. The additional declaration filed likewise does not address the attempt to obtain a substitution prior to moving to withdraw. Absent this information, the Court cannot grant the motion.

Next, service under Rule 3.1362(d) requires personal service, electronic service, or mail and counsel’s declaration must note the service made. Here, service was by mail on March 17, 2026. The declaration of counsel indicates that Plaintiff’s address was confirmed as current via conversation.

Finally, Rule 3.1362(e) requires the proposed order be lodged with the Court on MC-053 with the moving papers, specifying all hearing dates scheduled, including date of trial. Plaintiff’s Counsel has complied with this requirement.

The Court denies, without prejudice, Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw as to Plaintiff based upon the lack of compliance with California Rule of Court 3.1362(c) with respect to attempting to obtain a “Substitution of Attorney” prior to moving to withdraw and reflecting such efforts in the declaration. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

 Re:               Nunez, Margarita Martinez vs. Ford Motor Company

Case No.:  VCU317881

Date:           May 4, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:    Defendant’s Motion to Tax Costs

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and strike a total of $475 in costs.

Facts and Analysis

On February 26, 2026, Plaintiffs served Defendant with a Memorandum of Costs, seeking $1,319.25 in costs as follows:

Cost	Amount	Challenge by Defendant?
1. Filing and Motion Fees	$495.50	No
2. Jury Fees	$150.00	No
4. Deposition costs	$325.00	Yes
5. Service of Process	$163.00	No
14. Fees for electronic filing or service	$71.75	No
16. Other	$150.00	Yes
Total	$1,319.25

On March 18, 2026, Defendant filed this motion to tax costs, challenging $475 in costs as to the deposition costs as to a PMK deposition that never took place and the appearance attorney costs.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Song-Beverly expands the recovery of costs to include the challenged costs noted above.

Authority and Analysis

“Unless objection is made to the entire cost memorandum, the motion to strike or tax costs must refer to each item objected to by the same number and appear in the same order as the corresponding cost item claimed on the memorandum of costs and must state why the item is objectionable.” (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700(b)(2).)

Here, Plaintiffs’ motion follows Rule 3.1700(b)(2) as to specific categories identified above in the chart and discussed in greater detail below.

The starting point is the verified Memorandum of Costs and Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. “[T]he verified Memorandum is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses and services therein listed were necessarily incurred” and the burden rests with the party seeking to tax costs to show they were improper, unreasonable or unnecessary. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 855-856.)

Allowable costs under section 1033.5 must be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation, and must be reasonable in amount.  An item not specifically allowable under Section 1033.5(a) nor prohibited under subdivision (b) may nevertheless be recoverable in the discretion of the court if they meet the above requirements (i.e., reasonably necessary and reasonable in amount). 

If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-774.)  On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs.  (Id.)  Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary to the litigation presents a question of fact for the trial court and its decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  (Id.)   

“[T]he mere filing of a motion to tax costs may be a ‘proper objection’ to an item, the necessity of which appears doubtful, or which does not appear to be proper on its face. [Citation.] However, ‘[i]f the items appear to be proper charges, the verified memorandum is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses and services therein listed were necessarily incurred by the defendant [citations], and the burden of showing that an item is not properly chargeable or is unreasonable is upon the [objecting party].’ [Citations.]”  (Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 131.)

A party contesting costs must state why the contested item is objectionable. (California Rules of Court Rule 3.1700(b)(2)). Factual recitals rather than mere conclusions are required. Conclusory allegations that the item was “neither necessary nor reasonable” do not satisfy the objecting party’s burden. (County of Ker v. Ginn (1983) 146 Cal_App.3d 1107, 1113-1114; Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1266).

4. Deposition Costs

Here, Defendant challenges the costs sought related to deposition of a PMK that never occurred and was set during a stay in this matter. Therefore, the Court will tax the entire amount of $325.00.

16. Other

Here, Defendant challenges the use of a court appearance attorney.

A review of Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5(a) reveals that it does not identify costs for Court Call as an allowable cost. Further, section 1033.5(b) does not bar the recovery of these costs. However, Code of Civil Procedure section 367.6 provide that costs for telephonic appearances are recoverable costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5(c), the Court may award the cost if it is “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.” Court call costs, in the Court’s opinion, are a cost of convenience for counsel and the Court will tax the entire amount from $150.00 to $0.00.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                MOJARRO, DOMINGO VEGA vs. MONROVIA NURSERY COMPANY

Case No.:   VCU326191

Date:            May 4, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     (1) Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Motion to be Relieved; (2) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Matter

Tentative Ruling: (1) To grant the motion; (2) To grant the motion

(1) Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Motion to be Relieved

On April 7, 2026, Plaintiff’s Counsel Jason J. Buccat, Esq of DTLA Law Group, LLP filed a motion to be relieved as counsel as to Plaintiff Domingo Vega Mojarro in this class action matter. Plaintiff’s Counsel filed the following with respect to withdrawing:

(1) MC-051 - Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as Counsel;

(2) MC-052 – Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel; and

(3) MC-053 - Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel

Additionally, Plaintiff’s Counsel has filed proofs of service of these documents by mail.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 284 provides that “[t]he attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at any time before or after judgment of final determination, as follows: 1. Upon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes; [or] 2. Upon the order of the court, upon the application of either client or attorney, after notice from one to the other.”

California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) requires that the “notice of motion and motion to be relieved as counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) must be directed to the client and must be made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-051).”

As noted above, counsel has complied with California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) by submitting the notice and motion on MC-051 and by directing the notice and motion to Plaintiff.

California Rule of Court 3.1362 (c) further mandates that: “The motion to be relieved as counsel must be accompanied by a declaration on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel--Civil (form MC-052). The declaration must state in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1). Specifically, the declaration that Rule 3.1362(c) requires must state that the moving attorney attempted to secure a “Substitution of Attorney” from the client as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1) and that the client refused to so stipulate.

Here, the declaration is properly made on form MC-052 and uses general terms without compromising confidentiality. The declaration indicates that other counsel was initially supposed to substitute into this matter, but has now indicate they would not do so. Further, that current counsel’s attempts to contact Plaintiff have been unsuccessful.

Next, service under Rule 3.1362(d) requires personal service, electronic service, or mail and counsel’s declaration must note the service made. Here, service was by certified mail and email on April 7, 2026. The declaration of counsel indicates that Plaintiff’s address was confirmed via email.

Finally, Rule 3.1362(e) requires the proposed order be lodged with the Court on MC-053 with the moving papers, specifying all hearing dates scheduled, including date of trial. Plaintiff’s Counsel has complied with this requirement.

Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw as to Plaintiff. If no one requests oral argument, the Court is prepared to sign the order entitled “Order Granting Attorney’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel - Civil” that the moving party lodged with the Court. 

(2) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Class Action Case

Facts and Analysis

This case was filed as a putative class action with Plaintiff . Therefore, the case cannot be settled or dismissed without Court approval. (California Rules of Court, rules 3.769 and 3.770.) The moving party shall state all facts supporting the request and “clearly state whether consideration, direct or indirect, is being given for the dismissal and must describe the consideration in detail.” (California Rules of Court, rule 3.770(a).)  Dismissal may be entered without a hearing and where the class has not been certified, “the action may be dismissed without notice to class members if the court finds that dismissal will not prejudice them.” (California Rules of Court, rule 3.770(c).) The underlying purpose of this requirement for court approval is to ensure that the named plaintiff and the class counsel have represented the absent class members adequately. (7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp. (2000) 85 Cal. App. 4th 1135.)

Here, however, Defendant states that the single class representative Domingo Vega Mojarro has settled with Defendant, leaving the class “headless.”

The named plaintiff in a class action must be a member of the class he or she purports to represent. (CVS Pharmacy, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 300, 307.) Settlement of the individual, represented plaintiff claims, however, “a class representative's voluntary settlement of her individual claim constitutes a voluntary settlement of her only claim” (Watkins v. Wachovia Corp. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1576, 1590.) Additionally, “[a] voluntarily settling plaintiff no longer has any interest in the action” (Id. at 1592.)

Therefore, to the Court, this matter appears to be properly considered a “headless” class action as the lead Plaintiff, via the settlement, is no longer qualified to serve as class representatives.

The Court here notes counsel and Plaintiff have assumed a fiduciary duty to the members of the class when bringing a class action. (La Sala v. American Sav. & Loan Assn. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 864, 871.)

However, as Plaintiff has settled the matter and counsel has withdrawn, the Court examines its obligation under rule 3.770 as to notice. Pirjada v. Sup. Ct. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1086, as to this issue, notes:

“…But the obligation to notify absent class members before dismissing the case rests with the superior court, not the lead plaintiff or class counsel. The nature and extent of that notice must be decided by the court itself. (See La Sala, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 874 [action should not be dismissed “without undertaking such measures as [the court] may direct to notify the members of the class”]; Rule 3.770(c) [notice of proposed dismissal must be given “in the manner and to those class members specified by the court”].) Indeed, as Rule 3.770(c) provides, no notice to absent class members is required at all “if the court finds that the dismissal will not prejudice them.”

Here, the Court finds no notice is necessary, the class has not been certified and any absent potential class members will not be prejudiced via this dismissal.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. vs. Brace, Lewis W

Case No.:   VCL313363

Date:           May 4, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:      Motion Enter Judgment Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and enter judgment as requested

Facts

On September 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant for breach of contract and alleging $10,328.65 in damages.

Defendant answered the complaint.

On November 12, 2025, the parties entered into a stipulation to resolve this matter. Defendant agreed to pay $10,328.65 via montly payments as follows: (A) $438.65 shall be paid on or before September 12, 2025; (B) $430.00 shall be paid on or before the 12th of each and every consecutive month commencing on or before October 12, 2025 through and including July 12, 2027; (C) $430.00 shall be paid on or before August 12, 2027.

In the event of default, the stipulation indicates that Plaintiff is entitled to entry of judgment for the judgment amount noted above, less any credits.

The stipulation indicates that the Court shall retain jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6

Plaintiff indicates no payments have been made and therefore seeks entry of judgment.

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states: 

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1360.)

As indicated above, the Court retains jurisdiction over the parties and this matter and therefore is prepared to “enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”

Defendant appears to have breached the settlement, based upon the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel and, the Court, having no opposition, grants the motion and enters judgment in the amount requested of $10,628.65 representing the principal amount of $10,328.65 plus $300 in costs.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared Monday, May 4, 2026 that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR053972	In the Matter of The Jathan Quiroz Trust	Petition to Purchase Real Property	Appearance Required	Documents in order Continued hearing
VPR053982	In the Matter of Estudillo Ramirez, Maria	Petition Hearing	Appearance Required	Summons to be personally served on Respondent, Prob C § 851(a); CCP § 413.10
VPR053982	In the Matter of Estudillo Ramirez, Maria	Spousal Property Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053375	In the Matter of Chenowith, Mary Margie	Final Distribution Hearing	Recommended for Approval
VPR053172	In the Matter of Duel, Leenora Gail	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order. An award of extraordinary compensation to the attorney is within the discretion of the court, CRC, rule 7.703(a).
VPR052819	In the Matter of Keeline, Barbara A.	Accounting Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053066	In the Matter of Pressley, Virginia	Hearing: Report of Administration	Appearance Required	Status review
VPR054010	In the Matter of Gilheany, M. Pierce	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Conservatorship order of another state not attached as indicated in petition. Order Appointing Court Investigator and Capacity Declaration not filed.
VPR054009	In the Matter of Pugh, Joseph Robert	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Live scan, orientation and investigator’s report not completed

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared Thursday, April 30, 2026 at 8:30am that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 .

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comment
PPR054007	In the Matter of Sastre, Catalina	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	No notice to siblings- will need to be addressed at hearing
PPR053829	In the Matter of Pollock, Michael Ray	Spousal Property Hearing	Recommended for Approval
PPR053853	In the Matter of Castronova, Daniel Charles	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Matter of Bond and additional powers to be addressed by the court
PPR053988	In the Matter of the Don and Kathy Mabs Living Trust	Petition for Instructions	Recommended for Approval