Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Monday, December 22, 2025, are:

Re:                 Half Fast, a California Limited Liability Company vs. Corcoran, Tammy

Case No.:  PCL327564

Date:           December 22, 2025

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          19-The Honorable Glade F. Roper

Motion:     Defendant’s Demurrer to Amended Complaint

Tentative Ruling: To overrule the demurrer; to order Defendant to answer the complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

Facts

In this unlawful detainer matter, Plaintiff Half Fast, LLC is alleged as the owner of APN 328-140-003 (“Subject Property”). (FAC ¶¶1, 2, 4.) Further, that the named Defendant Tammy Corcoran is a “licensee/guest,” that the Tenant Protection Act does not apply, and that no notice is required pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1161. (FAC ¶¶6, 7, 9.)

The attachment to the amended complaint further alleges “Plaintiff is the legal owner” of the Subject Property and that the “Murline J. Fast and Micky S. Fast Trust, dated April 18, 2023 (“Trust”) is the sole owner and member of Plaintiff. (FAC - Attachment 17 ¶ I(1).)

Further, that on the Subject Property is a residence (the “Premises”) and that Murl Fast (“Decedent”), settlor and original trustee of the Trust lived on the Premises. (FAC - Attachment 17 ¶I(2).) Additionally, that in 2004, Decedent invited Defendant Corcoran to live on the Premises as his girlfriend. (FAC - Attachment 17 ¶ I(3).)

Until Decedent died on August 9, 2025, Decedent and Defendant lived in the Premises together, but Decedent “continued to handle all maters incidental to ownership, including payment of property taxes, bills, utilities and possession.”  (FAC - Attachment 17 ¶ I(5), (6).)

Further, that on September 13, 2025, Zachary White became the Successor Trustee of the Trust, and Manager of Half Fast, LLC. and that “On or around September 13, 2025, Mr. White has notified Ms. Corcoran that he intends to sell the Property, including the Premises, and has asked Ms. Corcoran to vacate the Premises.” (FAC – Attachment 17 ¶I(6), (8).)

Additionally, that “Defendants license to occupy the Property was revoked on September 13, 2025, when Zachary White, Manager of Half Fast, LLC, informed Defendant that she needed to vacate the Property. In addition, to address concerns of the legitimacy of revocation, on or around , 2025, Zachary White served Defendant with a Notice of Revocation of License, expressly stating the license was revoked.” (FAC - Attachment 17 ¶ II (14).) Further, that the “Defendant’s license to reside on the Premises has been lawfully revoked.” (FAC - Attachment 17 ¶ III (19).)

Plaintiff further alleges Defendant is a “…licensee/guest, not a tenant of the Premises, because she resided in the Premises by invitation only, paid no rent, did not have exclusive possession of the Premises, and Decedent continued to undertake all actions of ownership including payment of taxes, utilities, and bills” and that  because Defendant is not a tenant and has never paid rent, the California Tenant Protection Act does not apply to this action under Civil Code sections 1925, 1940, and 1946.2. (FAC - Attachment 17 ¶ III (17), (18).)

On December 15, 2025, Defendant filed a demurrer to the amended complaint, arguing it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and that it is uncertain. Defendant submits a declaration of herself as well as of counsel which alleges a number of extraneous facts to the complaint.

Specifically, Defendant argues that Defendant held a tenancy, that the tenancy required notice to terminate, that the amended complaint admits no such notice was provided and that therefore no cause of action for unlawful detainer has been stated in the amended complaint. Further, Defendant argues that the allegation of a lawful revocation of the license renders the complaint uncertain.

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Declarations of Counsel and Defendant

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

The Court, therefore, disregards the declarations of counsel and Defendant as to matters extraneous to the complaint.

Status of Defendant as Guest / Licensee

The operative complaint, via the attachment, alleges Defendant is a guest or licensee and not a tenant, because she resided by invitation only, did not have exclusive possession, and that Decedent, and not her, continued to undertake all actions of ownership.

The initial complaint alleged that the death of Decedent revoked the permission for Defendant to reside at the Premises. However, the amended complaint alleges that when Decedent died, Zachary White became successor trustee of the trust, manager of the LLC, had the power to revoke the license at that time and thereafter revoked the license via notice on September 13, 2025. 

Application of Code of Civil Procedure section 1161 to Licensees/Guests

First, the complaint relies upon the application of Code of Civil Procedure section 1161 beyond landlord and tenant relationships. Plaintiff argues first that this unlawful detainer procedure is available against any person who remains in possession of property after permission to possess has been revoked.

Further, Plaintiff cites to Roberts v. Casey (1939) 36 Cal.App.2d Supp. 767 in the complaint which “…indicates that Code of Civil Procedure sections 1160 and 1161 apply to “others who do not occupy that status [as tenant] by using the language, ‘including the case when the person to be removed became the occupant of the premises as a servant, employee, agent or licensee and the relation of master and servant or employer and employee or principal and agent or licensor and licensee has been lawfully terminated . . .’.” (Id. at 774) (emphasis in original.)  Further, that "Guests in a hotel, boarders in a boarding house, and roomers or lodgers, so called, are generally, mere licensees and not tenants. They have only a personal contract and no interest in the realty." (Id.)

Therefore, the Court, agrees that the plain language of 1161 permits use of the unlawful detainer procedure to relationships outside of tenancy. (The Court further notes that the unlawful detainer procedure, for example, is available to remove unnamed occupants. See Code Civ. Proc. § 415.46.)

Roberts further states, as to notice:

“Coming, then, to the question of notice, it will be at once observed that though a three-day notice to pay (or vacate) is provided for in case of the class of persons described in  the second subdivision of said section 1161, no notice whatever is provided for as required by the first subdivision of that section except in the single case of a tenant at will, which is something wholly different from that of a licensee. We conclude, therefore, that so soon as a guest or lodger has, either by default in making payments due or otherwise, breached his contract he may by appropriate proceedings be ousted without the requirement of any advance notice. His actual right to remain having ceased, his continued presence amounts to little more than a trespass and, as said in Godwin v. Stebbins, 2 Cal. 103, 105, ‘it would be absurd in such a case, to require either a demand or notice to quit.;” ." (Roberts, supra, 36 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 774) (emphasis added.)

Therefore, the Court also agrees that a guest or lodger may be considered a licensee, that upon legal revocation of a license, no notice appears required to sustain an unlawful detainer action.

Status as Licensee

As to Defendant’s status as a licensee, the Court generally accepts allegations of the complaint as true on demurrer.

Von Goerlitz v. Turner (1944) 65 Cal. App. 2d 425, 429 notes “The test, as this court stated in Shaw v. Caldwell, 16 Cal.App. 1 [115 P. 941], "whether an agreement for the use of real estate is a license or a lease is whether the contract gives exclusive possession of the premises against all the world, including the owner, in which case it is a lease, or whether it merely confers a privilege to occupy under the owner, in which case it is a license, and this is a question of law arising out of the construction of the instrument.”

Here, the complaint alleges “Defendant is a licensee/guest, not a tenant of the Premises, because she resided in the Premises by invitation only, paid no rent, did not have exclusive possession of the Premises, and Decedent continued to undertake all actions of ownership including payment of taxes, utilities, and bills.”  

The Court does not consider this allegation of status of licensee, under these facts alleged, to be an improper legal conclusion.

As such, the Court accepts as true on demurrer that Defendant was a licensee.

Lawful Revocation of License

The amended complaint further alleges an invitation to reside at the Premises as a “girlfriend” but that upon the death of Decedent, Zachary White became trustee of the trust, manager of the LLC and revoked the license to occupy on September 13, 2025. The amended complaint further states: “Thus, an action for unlawful detainer is available to evict a guest who remains in possession of property after permission has been lawfully revoked. (Bomberger v. McKelvey (1950) 35 Cal.2d 607, 618 [holding licenses are revocable at any time by the licensor].)”

Bomberger notes “A mere license to enter or use premises may be revoked at any time by the licensor. [citation omitted] Various factors, however, may render a license irrevocable, and it is generally recognized that a license coupled with an interest is not revocable but continues to exist for the period contemplated by the license” and that “ a revocable license may become irrevocable on the basis of estoppel where the licensee has performed work or expended money in reliance thereon.” (Id. at 618, 619.)

Further, Flick v. Bell (Cal. 1895) 42 P. 813, 814 distinguishes between executed and unexecuted licenses as follows:

“That an unexecuted parol license may be revoked by the licensor at any time, either expressly, or by a conveyance of the premises to be affected thereby, or that his death will so operate, is clearly settled; but, as to executed parol licenses, the decisions in the different states are not only conflicting, but incapable of being reconciled. One line of cases holds that a parol license to be exercised upon the land of another creates an interest in the land, is within the statute of frauds, and may be revoked by the licensor at any time, no matter whether or not the licensee has exercised acts under the license, or expended money in reliance thereon. Another line of cases holds that the licensor is deemed to be equitably estopped from revoking the license after permitting the licensee to perform acts thereunder, or to make expenditures in reliance upon the license.”

Additionally, the Flick court continues, noting various equities involved in the revocation:

“Coming to the case before us, if the license given by Gruber to the defendant is revocable unconditionally, at his pleasure, or that of his successors in Interest, and upon such revocation the personal property placed by defendant upon the licensor's land becomes his property, it follows that Gruber might have revoked the license the moment the defendant had completed the work, and before he had enjoyed for a single day the fruits of his labor and the expenditure of his money. Such revocation, followed as It must be (upon the theory of appellants) with the absolute forfeiture and loss of defendant's labor and property, would shock the sense of justice of every right-minded man, and would be a stain upon the administration of justice. Nor is it necessary, In order to do justice, to hold that the license given by Gruber amounted to a grant of any interest in the land, nor, upon the other hand, to hold that the license is not revocable at the pleasure of the licensor; but in such cases equity may impose, as a condition of such revocation, that the licensee may remove his improvements, if that can be accomplished without material loss, or, if not, that the licensor shall make just compensation therefor, as the circumstances of the case may require.” (Id. at 815.)

Taking the allegations as true as to Defendant’s status as a licensee, the issue of whether the license was unexecuted and thereby revoked by the death of the licensor, or irrevocable, or executed to any degree, cannot be answered from the four corners of the complaint alone. The extent of any such comparable equities in an unlawful detainer matter available to Defendant cannot be discerned on the face of the complaint. As such, the Court accepts, as alleged, that Defendant was a licensee, that the license was revocable upon death of the licensor, that the licensor died, that Zachary White, as trustee and manager of Plaintiff, revoked the license, and that this unlawful detainer matter, without other notice, was filed.

The Court, under the analysis above, does not otherwise find the complaint uncertain.

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer. Defendant is ordered to file an answer no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Examiner Notes for Probate Matters Calendared

• Visalia Division 
• South County Justice Center Division