Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, May 14, 2026 are:

Re:               Capital Resource International, Inc. vs. Martin, Miguel Angel

Case No.:   VCU329358

Date:           May 14, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Defendant’s Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; the order will be deemed effective upon the filing with the court of proof of personal service of the order as indicated herein. Case Management Conference is continued to July 1, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

Facts

On March 11, 2026, Defendant’s Counsel Thomas Sands filed a motion to be relieved as counsel as to Defendant Miguel Angel Martin Dba Martin Ai Breeding Service. Defendant’s Counsel filed the following with respect to withdrawing:

(1) MC-051 - Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as Counsel;

(2) MC-052 – Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel; and

(3) MC-053 - Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel

Additionally, Defendant’s Counsel has filed proof of service of these documents by mail.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 284 provides that “[t]he attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at any time before or after judgment of final determination, as follows: 1. Upon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes; [or] 2. Upon the order of the court, upon the application of either client or attorney, after notice from one to the other.”

California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) requires that the “notice of motion and motion to be relieved as counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) must be directed to the client and must be made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-051).”

As noted above, counsel has complied with California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) by submitting the notice and motion on MC-051 and by directing the notice and motion to all parties.

California Rule of Court 3.1362 (c) further mandates that: “The motion to be relieved as counsel must be accompanied by a declaration on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel--Civil (form MC-052). The declaration must state in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1). Specifically, the declaration that Rule 3.1362(c) requires must state that the moving attorney attempted to secure a “Substitution of Attorney” from the client as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1) and that the client refused to so stipulate.

Here, the declaration is properly made on form MC-052, as well as a supplemental declaration attached to the Notice, and uses general terms without compromising confidentiality and indicates that Counsel has attempted to obtain a substitution by stipulation, but that Defendant has refused.

Next, service under Rule 3.1362(d) requires personal service, electronic service, or mail and counsel’s declaration must note the service made. Here, service was by mail on March 11, 2026. The declaration of counsel indicates that Defendant’s address was confirmed as current by conversation.

Finally, Rule 3.1362(e) requires the proposed order be lodged with the Court on MC-053 with the moving papers, specifying all hearing dates scheduled, including date of trial. Defendant’s Counsel has complied with this requirement.

Therefore, the Court grants Defendant’s Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw as to Defendant. If no one requests oral argument, the Court is prepared to sign the order entitled “Order Granting Attorney’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel - Civil” that the moving party lodged with the Court.  This order will be deemed effective upon the filing with the court of a proof of personal service of the “Order Granting Attorney’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – Civil” as to Defendant.

The Court further directs counsel to attach to the Order an additional notice of the date, time, and Department of this court for any future hearing dates for this case as calendared.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Colburn, Ron vs. Halsey's Tree Service

Case No.:   VCU323949

Date:           May 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Defendants Wright and SCE’s Motion to Strike Punitive Damages

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion to strike with leave to amend; to order an amended complaint filed no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing. Case Management Conference is continued to July 30, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

Facts

In this amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege causes of action for trespass to timber and conversion against Defendants Halsey’s Tree Service, Inc., Southern California Edison Company, American Tree Medics, Inc. and Wright Tree Service Inc.

Plaintiffs allege that they own real property “dotted with mature redwood, oak, and pistachio trees.” (FAC ¶9.) Further that, in February 2025, an employee of Plaintiffs, spoke with an individual from Defendant Hasley’s, who informed the employee that Hasley’s was contemplating cutting down a large redwood tree on Plaintiffs’ property. (FAC ¶11.) The employee “strictly informed the Halsey’s employee that the Colburns did not consent to the cutting of the tree, they were not permitted to enter onto the Colburns’ property, and they did not have permission to cut any part of their foliage.” (FAC ¶11.)

Later that evening, Plaintiffs noticed a redwood tree had been “topped and maimed,” “destroyed” and “illegally cut and killed.” (FAC ¶12.) Plaintiffs found a door tag from Defendant Hasley which stated the tree had been topped because of broken roots and a heavy lean towards power lines. (FAC ¶12.)

“On information and belief, Halsey served as the inspector of the tree and recommended it be cut. However, on information and belief, American Tree Medics, Inc. and Wright Tree Service, Inc., performed the unlawful cutting. Halsey, American Tree, and Wright are hereafter collectively referred to as the ‘Tree Cutting Defendants.’” (FAC ¶12.)

Further, that “…at all relevant times described herein the Tree Cutting Defendants were acting as agents of SoCal Edison in the course and scope of their agency relationship. Further that SoCal Edison pays local arborists a fee for each tree that they cut which purport to improve the safety of their power lines, thereby incentivizing local vendors, such as the Tree Cutting Defendants, to cut trees, irrespective of whether permission has been obtained.” (FAC ¶13.)

Plaintiffs alleged further than an arborist has determined the tree is dead and will not regrow due to the cut. (FAC ¶14.)

As to conversion, Plaintiffs seek punitive damages, stating “The unlawful cutting of the redwood tree described herein was wanton, malicious, and intentional. The Tree Cutting Defendants were explicitly instructed to not cut that specific tree on the Colburns’ Property, yet nevertheless did so. Such actions entitle the Colburns to punitive damage, which they seek herein.” (FAC ¶20.)

Defendants Wright Tree Service of the West, Inc. (erroneously sued as Wright Tree Service, Inc.) and SCE move to strike the references to punitive damages on the basis that the operative complaint fails to contain factual allegations against Wright and SCE, that no employee of Wright or SCE is identified, that no officer, director, or managing agent is likewise identified and no facts as to advanced knowledge or ratification are alleged.

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the trespass onto a gated, private road to cut down the tree at issue for a profit motive under an SCE program constitutes sufficient facts to sustain a claim of punitive damages. Further, that it is reasonably inferable that Wrights’ management knew or ratified the conduct, given the SCE program.

Authority and Analysis

Any party may file a timely notice of a motion to strike the whole or any part of a pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b).) The motion may seek to strike any “irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading” or any part of the pleading “not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) Irrelevant allegations include allegations that are not essential to the statement of a claim, allegations that are not pertinent to or supported by the claim and demands for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b), (c).)

“Punitive damages are imposed as punishment for the defendant’s serious misconduct.”  (5 Witkin Cal. Proc. (5th ed. 2019) Pleading, § 933.)  “Although the basic principle of damages is compensation, additional damages may be given in tort actions where the defendant's conduct has been outrageous, for the purpose of punishing and deterring him or her and others from outrageous conduct in the future. Citations.]”  (6 Witkin Sum. Cal. Law (11th ed. 2017) Torts, § 1727.)

Claims for punitive damages are governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 3294, which limits their availability to circumstances where “the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.”  Consequently, punitive damages “cannot be recovered without a pleading of malice, oppression, or fraud … .”  (5 Witkin Cal. Proc. (5th ed. 2019) Pleading, § 933, citing Hall v. Berkell (1955) 130 Cal. App. 2d 800, 804.)

Relevant here, “malice” as used in section 3294, means conduct “intended … to cause injury to the plaintiff” or “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”  Section 3294’s reference to “despicable conduct” represents a “substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.”  (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)  “Absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs' interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found. [Citations.]”  (Ibid.)

In reviewing a motion challenging the sufficiency of punitive damages allegations, the court must consider whether the factual allegations concerning the actual conduct alleged “apprises the adversary of the factual basis of the claim. [Citations.]”  (Kiseskey v. Carpenters' Trust for So. California (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 222, 234.)

The factual allegations, in addition, must support entitlement to punitive damages. “Notwithstanding relaxed pleading criteria” permissible with other claims, punitive damages “demand firm allegations.”  (G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29.) 

“Animus malus or evil motive, then, is the central element of the malice which justifies an exemplary award.”  (G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 30.)  “[C]onscious disregard of safety as an appropriate description of the animus malus which may justify an exemplary damage award when nondeliberate injury is alleged.”  (Id. at 32.)

Here, it appears sufficient that Plaintiffs allege Wright, as SCE’s agent, trespassed on the property, intentionally cut the tree as motivated by a reward program from SCE and did so despite explicit instructions not to cut the Subject Tree. “Where a trespass is committed from wanton or malicious motives, or a reckless disregard of the rights of others, or under circumstances of great hardship or oppression, it is clear that punitive damages may be awarded.” (Haun v. Hyman (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 615, 620.)

The Court finds sufficient the allegations of agency to find notice to Wright and SCE occurred even if notice was directly provided to Defendant Halseys.

With respect to employers, section 3294 provides that “[a]n employer shall not be liable for [punitive damages], based upon acts of an employee …, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.”

Here, however, there are no allegations that an officer, director or managing agent of Wright or SCE had advanced knowledge, authorized or ratified the act of altering the tree. The Court will not infer these allegations from the complaint itself. Therefore, the Court grants the motion to strike as to Wright with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Conterra Agricultural Capital, LLC vs. Prosperity Farms, LLC et al

Case No.:   PCU325122

Date:           May 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     The Grahams’ Motion for Instructions

Tentative Ruling:   The Grahams’ motion is denied.

Michael and Cynthia Graham move for an order instructing the receiver in this case, Focus Management Group (Focus), to market and sell, together, two adjacent real properties referred to by the parties as the Tulare 22 and Tulare 20 parcels.

The Grahams believe the receiver will get a higher price if Tulare 22 and Tulare 20 are sold together. 

Tulare 20 is a roughly 380-to-400-acre property with pistachio trees; Tulare 22 is a roughly 1,800-to-2,000-acre property, approximately 1,500 acres of which has pistachio trees.  The Grahams maintain the properties mutually benefit from shared water infrastructure (and other minor shared facilities, i.e., a storage unit on one property, a trailer on another) and from having trees of the same age that carry alternate bearing cycles and, for these reasons, will sell for more together. 

Focus Management Group (Focus); Conterra Agricultural Capital, LLC (Conterra); and CA Farms LLC (CA Farms), each separately oppose the motion.

BACKGROUND

Focus has been appointed receiver in this case over all assets and property of Prosperity Farms, LLC (Prosperity).  While both Tulare 22 and Tulare 20 were formerly titled to Prosperity, however, that is not the state of title of those properties today.

It is not evidently in dispute, though, that Tulare 22 will soon find its way back in the receivership estate, and that marketing of that property can now, or soon, begin moving forward.  On April 9, 2026, this court granted a motion by Focus authorizing it to enter a stipulated judgment in settlement of a pending suit by the current title holder of Tulare 22, to cancel the deed by which Tulare 22 was purportedly transferred to it (PCU323957), and the result of this settlement, all appear to recognize, will be restoration of title to Prosperity.

Tulare 20, however, is currently titled to an entity called Property Farms Ranch 20, LLC (Prosperity R20), and the recovery of that property to Prosperity is not as straightforward.  The Grahams’ contentions about the transfer reveal part of the reason why.  

About the transfer, Michael Graham states:

“In or around June of 2025, Tulare 20 was transferred from Prosperity Farms to Prosperity Farms Ranch 20, LLC. I did not participate in, consent to, or otherwise know about this transfer, which I am informed and believe was carried out by Ron Cook. In July of 2025, Mr. Cook had me execute certain documents in connection with this transfer. Mr. Cook represented to me that my signature was necessary to simply effectuate a transfer that was already completed. I now understand that Mr. Cook’s representations to me about the transfer were misleading. Title to Tulare 20 should never have been transferred to Prosperity Farms Ranch 20, LLC and I am not aware of any consideration exchanged as part of that transfer. I believe that title to Tulare 20 should be restored to Prosperity Farms and support any effort to accomplish that restoration of title. To date, it is my understanding that title to Tulare 20 remains with Prosperity Farms Ranch 20, LLC.”

By way of background, Michael and Cynthia Graham are 50% owners of Prosperity, and the remaining 50% is owned by CA Farms; and, on June 24, 2025, Ron Cook, purporting to act alone on behalf of Prosperity, executed a grant deed reflecting Prosperity’s grant of Tulare 20 to Prosperity R20 (CA Farms requests, and the court grants, judicial notice of the deed).

A subsequent transaction, asserted to have occurred by the Grahams, Focus and Conterra, and not disputed to have occurred by CA Farms, further reflects why recovery of Tulare 20 to Prosperity is not straightforward.  According to the Grahams, Focus, and Conterra, and, again, not disputed by CA Farms, after Tulare 20 was transferred to Prosperity R20, Tulare 20 was encumbered with a deed of trust.  The deed of trust purportedly evidenced an encumbrance securing a $2.5 million loan.  The beneficial interest in the loan was later assigned to an entity named SA9 Properties, LLC. 

About this encumbrance, the Grahams alleged, in their cross-complaint filed in this action on February 18, 2026, as follows:

“The Grahams have … discovered that in June 2025, Mr. Cook had transferred title of Tulare 20, to Cross-Defendant PFR 20 [i.e., Prosperity R20]. … . [¶] Immediately leveraging the fact that Tulare 20 was outside the scope of the receivership action on or around July 25, 2025, Mr. Cook, through CAL [Corporate America Lending, Inc.], recorded a Deed of Trust against the Tulare 20 showing a loan for $2,500,000.00 had been recorded. [¶] That loan was pulled without the Grahams’ knowledge or consent. When the Grahams discovered the existence of the loan, Mr. Cook told the Grahams that it was paper only, and recorded in an effort to evade his creditors. Mr. Cook then sent Mr. Graham a reconveyance of the deed of trust, purporting to show the loan had been satisfied and there was no actual debt. In actuality, however, the Grahams subsequently discovered through a title search that Mr. Cook assigned the beneficial interest in the loan to SA9 Properties, LLC [(SA9)]. That assignment was and remains recorded against the property.”

Despite these representations, the Grahams, in their brief in support of the instant motion, contend that the title/encumbrance issue with Tulare 20 resulting from the above-described purported transactions “is a self-imposed obstacle whereby the return of title to Prosperity Farms is not, and has not been, opposed by the Grahams at any point.”  The Grahams fault Focus for having “taken no steps to initiate the process of returning [Tulare 20] to the Receivership Estate,” “[d]espite having both the knowledge and the means to act.”  The Grahams maintain that “a title restoration” of Tulare 20 back in Prosperity “has been feasible for months and can be achieved expeditiously once initiated.”

The Grahams say little about the piece of this “title restoration” process that would necessarily involve CA Farms.  CA Farms, for its part, provides no assurances that the “title restoration … can be achieved expeditiously.” 

Instead, CA Farms, as noted, lodges an objection to the Grahams’ motion.  In it, CA Farms contends, amongst other things, that Tulare 20 “belongs to [Prosperity R20]” and that it is “undisputed that CA Farms owns 50% of … [Prosperity R20].”

CA Farms represents the Grahams own the “other half” of Prosperity R20 but also that it has “exercised” a purported statutory right “to purchase the 50% membership in [Prosperity R20]” it represents the Grahams own.

None of this, for obvious reasons, reflects that “title restoration … can be achieved expeditiously.”  It is clear the Grahams are willing to cooperate in such efforts willingly, but there is no such indication from CA Farms and/or Cook. 

ANALYSIS

“A receiver has the power, with court authorization, to take possession of property, receive rents, collect debts, borrow money, and sell real or personal property in receivership pursuant to court order.”  (City of Sierra Madre v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 648, 656 [244 Cal.Rptr.3d 118], citing Code Civ. Proc., §§ 568, 568.5.)

The court’s order appointing Focus, accordingly, gives Focus “authority to sell any or all of the Receivership Estate … outside the ordinary course of business with Court approval”; “[t]o hire brokers … to assist with listing and marketing the Property”; and “in consultation with Conterra and the Grahams, … to determine the best offer for the sale of the Property.”  Generally, “ ‘[t]he receiver has the affirmative duty to endeavor to realize the largest amount from the sale of the receivership property.’ [Citation.]”  (Cal-American Income Property Fund VII v. Brown Dev. Corp. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 268, 276, fn. 8 [187 Cal.Rptr. 703].)  Relatedly, “[a] court confirming the sale of property should also attempt to obtain the best bargain possible under the circumstances.”  (Ibid.)

At present, of course, the court has no motion to confirm any sale.  Instead, the Grahams seek a prophylactic order for instructions requiring that Tulare 22 and Tulare 20 be marketed and sold together. 

The court denies the Grahams’ motion because it is not persuaded that such prophylactic measures are merited under the circumstances. 

Focus and Conterra indicate they are assessing options with respect to recovery of Tulare 20 to Prosperity.  At this stage, Conterra has not agreed to pay for the litigation, which would almost certainly be necessary, to accomplish that aim (and, importantly, it is Conterra’s choice whether it chooses to fund such litigation).  Focus has prepared a proposed litigation budget and Conterra is evaluating that budget and assessing whether the probable sale value of Tulare 20 would exceed its anticipated costs from the efforts to secure marketable title.

Conterra additionally notes, correctly in this court’s view, that the potential timeline for recovery of Tulare 20 is uncertain, even if it were to decide to fund the litigation effort.  Conterra also correctly notes that, while litigation drags on, it would be faced with the burden of bearing the attendant market risks and maintenance costs, and, further, that, during all of this period of uncertain duration, interest would continue to accrue on its underlying loan.  According to Conterra’s Chief Credit Officer, interest is accruing on the loan in the approximate amount of $3,750,000 a year.

The Grahams contend “the sole driver” of Focus’s declination to delay marketing of Tulare 22 until title to Tulare 20 is secured is “Conterra, and its desire to sell Tulare 22 expeditiously so it can pursue a deficiency from the Grahams.”

The court believes, however, that the Grahams have misapprehended Conterra’s and Focus’s incentives.  The court cannot think of any credible reason Conterra would desire “a deficiency from the Grahams” or larger such “deficiency” against them in the abstract.  Clearly, a sale of Tulare 22 and Tulare 20 at the best possible price would only increase the value of assets against which Conterra could recover on the underlying loan and in repayment of the funds it has advanced to the receivership.  If the economics tipped in favor delaying sale of Tulare 22 to secure recovery of Tulare 20 first so as to sell the properties together, Conterra and Focus would, obviously, both be incentivized to pursue that course of action. 

Focus, indeed, credibly represents that it “is very receptive to any expedited, inexpensive, and non-litigation path to bring Tulare-20 into the Receivership Estate.”  As Focus notes, however, and not disputed by anyone, “no one, including the Grahams, has suggested any ideas that the Receiver can implement without substantial funding which the Receivership Estate does not currently have.”

Currently, the only pending action on the recovery front is the Grahams’ cross-complaint in these proceedings, wherein the Grahams assert 14 causes of action against a number of defendants, including, amongst others, CA Farms; Cook, an alleged majority owner of CA Farms and its self-professed Chief Executive Officer; Cook’s wife, Jennifer Cook; and Alex Aretakis, an alleged minority owner of CA Farms.  In the cross-complaint, the Grahams seek, inter alia, judicial dissolution of Property R20 (and, separately, the court notes, Prosperity), as well as “[r]ecission of fraudulent instruments (e.g., guarantees, deeds, loans),” which presumably include the deed transferring Tulare 20 to Prosperity R20; the subsequently recorded deed of trust purporting to evidence encumbrance of Tulare 20; and the associated assignment of the beneficial interest in the related loan to SA9.

It is clear the Grahams recognize they are not simply seeking an order instructing the receiver to market and sell Tulare 22 and Tulare 20 together in the face of objections based on a “self-imposed obstacle.”  The Grahams, instead, are effectively seeking an order requiring the receiver to take on the litigation efforts like those they are currently now pursuing at their cost, but at Conterra’s cost. 

The Grahams purport to dress-up this implicit proposal in arguments that the economics of its desired course of action necessarily support a higher ultimate recovery to the receivership estate, but is clear that the responsibility for the cost of litigation to recover Tulare 20 is the actual matter underlying the dispute. 

As to the economic arguments, they are not decisively persuasive. 

The court is not persuaded, firstly, by the declarations of Michael Graham and Rick Schuil of Schuil Ag Real Estate that the economics of this proposal necessarily tip in favor of a better recovery for the receivership estate.  While Graham and Schuil well describe claimed “synergies” between the respective properties incident to existing facilities to share water, Schuil manages only a vague assertion that their “operational integration reduces per-acre costs and increases the efficiency and profitability of the combined operation—increasing [the] market value [of the properties, if sold together],” and that he is “not aware of any current market conditions where a brief delay would negatively impact the value or marketing Tulare 22 and Tulare 20” and that “[i]f anything, a short delay would increase the price per acre.”  Only Graham offers an actual dollar figure for the anticipated value of Tulare 20 if sold with Tulare 22, which he assesses is “$4,000,000.00,” but neither Graham, nor Schuil, express a view on the value of Tulare 20 being sold as part of a separate transaction. 

What’s more, the declaration of Sullivan Grosz, a broker with the firm retained to assist Focus with marketing and selling Tulare 22, just as credibly supports that delayed marketing of Tulare 22 would be “unwise.”  Grosz as his colleagues have observed a “downward trajectory” in prices for pistachio farms “for the past several years” militating against further delay.  In addition, Grosz is doubtful that the represented water-sharing synergies add significant value in a combined sale transaction, since “[g]iven the significant reductions in future groundwater pumping allocations already announced by the local groundwater management agency, it is unlikely that either Tulare-22 or Tulare-20 can sustainably be farmed in their entirety in coming years.”

The respective sides also each weigh in the probable benefits, or lack thereof, of the other claimed synergies (i.e., same pistachio varieties, alternate bearing cycles, shareable use trailer and storage unit, etc.), but it essentially all amounts to the Grahams’ side contending the synergies generally support more value and the objectors generally disputing that they do not. 

The court does not purport to weigh in on which of these respective opinions most accurately assesses the market realities associated with the respective sale approaches advances by the parties, but it does conclude from this that there is significant uncertainty, and reasonable disagreement, as to whether delayed sale of Tulare 22 would benefit, as opposed to harm, the ultimately recovery to the receivership estate, even abstracting out the litigation considerations for recovery of Tulare 20.   

Considering this uncertainty, and the uncertainty associated with the litigation that would be required to secure marketable title to Tulare 20, and the current lack of available funds to pursue such litigation in the receivership estate, the court is not persuaded that it should, in these circumstances, substitute the Grahams’ assessment in place of the receiver’s for how to market the real property involved in the effort to secure the best ultimate recovery for the receivership estate.

Accordingly, the Grahams’ motion is denied.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Soria, Sylvia vs. Onyx Properties

Case No.:   VCU323334

Date:           May 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Tentative Ruling:   To grant the motion without leave to amend as to the seventh cause of action (failure to provide accurate wage statements), and to grant the motion with 20 days leave to amend as to the remaining causes of action.

Defendant Lisa Scott, doing business as “Onyx Properties,” moves for judgment on the pleadings against the complaint of Sylvia Soria, filed on July 3, 2025, in her asserted capacity as “successor in interest to Deirdra Riordon, deceased.”  Scott chiefly contends all claims in the complaint are time-barred.  Scott also contends Soria lacks standing as a successor in interest to Riordon, and that the complaint misidentifies Scott as a defendant. 

The Complaint

The complaint contains eight wage-and-hour causes of action based on “defendants” alleged failure: (1) to pay overtime; (2) to provide meal periods; (3) to provide rest periods; (4) to pay for off-the-clock time; (5) to pay minimum wages; (6) to pay wages due on termination; (7) to provide accurate wage statements; and (8) to reimburse business expenses. 

With the benefit of the parties’ respective briefing, the court is able to discern that Soria’s complaint is an action on behalf of Deirdra Riordon, a deceased former employee of Scott, for alleged wage-and-hour Labor Code violations occurring during Riordon’s employment. 

The complaint, itself, however—though clear on which claims are asserted—poorly identifies who is suing whom (i.e., the plaintiff and defendant).

Regarding the plaintiff, the case title identifies Soria, as “successor in interest to Deirdra Riordon, deceased,” but also, at the top of the first page, lists counsel JenEece Phillips of E-Justice Project, APC as attorneys for “Plaintiff, Deirdra Riordon.”  The first sentence of the complaint then states:  “Plaintiff Deirdra Riordon (‘Plaintiff’) hereby complains against defendants … .”

If, as the court assumes, Riordon was, in fact, deceased when the complaint was filed, however, it, of course, cannot be the case that Riordan is/was the plaintiff who “hereby complains,” nor can/could it be the case that JenEece Phillips of E-Justice Project, APC is/was/were “Attorneys for” Riordon (The death of a client terminates the authority of her attorney to act on her behalf (Herring v. Peterson (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 608, 612 [172 Cal.Rptr. 240]; Smith v. Bear Valley etc. Co. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 590, 601 [160 P.2d 1]; Swartfager v. Wells (1942) 53 Cal.App.2d 522, 528 [128 P.2d 128]; Deiter v. Kiser (1910) 158 Cal. 259, 262 [110 P. 921])).

Accordingly, it also cannot be the case, as the complaint represents, that the person represented in the first sentence to be the plaintiff—Riordon—“is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a competent adult residing in the State of California” (she could have been, while living, of course, a competent adult residing in California, but could not have been at the time the complaint was filed). 

The court might, from this, infer a mere typographical error (of meaningful magnitude) that the complaint simply misidentified the plaintiff as Riordon, and meant to indicate, instead, consistent with the case title, that Soria is the plaintiff, but that inference, in turn, runs into conflict with other allegations to the effect that “Plaintiff was employed with Onyx Properties” and, according to the complaint’s “Specific Allegations,” that “Plaintiff” suffered myriad alleged Labor Code violations during her alleged employment. 

The court gathers, at this point, informed by the parties’ briefing, that it is not maintained in this case that Soria, herself, was ever employed with “Onyx Properties.”

Further, by way of the parties’ briefing it is evident that the plaintiff is Soria, and the complaint, presumably prepared with the assistance of Riordon’s former counsel, who is now Soria’s current counsel, means to assert claims based on Labor Code violations allegedly perpetrated against Riordon. 

Even with that loosely in order, however, the complaint’s identification of defendant (or defendants) presents another set of problems. 

In the case title, the complaint identifies both “Onyx Properties, a California Corporation” and Lisa Scott (along with 100 “Does) as defendants, but then the body of the complaint contains a series of confusing allegations about who these parties are purported to be. 

The first of two “General Allegations” states:  “Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, Onyx Properties, Lisa Scot [sic], by and through its sole proprietors, owners, shareholders, officers, directors, members and managing agents, and alter egos, and Does 1 Through 100, inclusive (collectively ‘Defendants’): violated provisions of the Labor Code, applicable wage order, other laws and regulations and Plaintiff’s rights.”

Here, Soria (the court infers) presumably meant “Onyx Properties” and “Lisa Scot[t],” “by and through” their “sole proprietors, owners, shareholders, officers, directors, members and managing agents, and alter egos … violated provisions of the Labor Code, applicable wage order, other laws and regulations and Plaintiff’s rights.”  From this, though, the court would also have to infer that both “Onyx Properties” and “Lisa Scot[t]” are/were entities of some type, such that they would be deemed to act through “sole proprietors, owners, shareholders, officers, directors, members and managing agents, and alter egos.”

The complaint, though, includes various allegations strongly indicating that drafter understood “Lisa Scot[t]” to be a human being, an individual, namely, a human being who is/was “the owner” of “Onyx Properies.”  For example, “Lisa” is alleged to have had text communications with “Plaintiff” (here, inferably meaning Riordon). 

Still, though, contrary to this human-adjacent portrayal of Scott, the complaint includes an allegation “that Defendant Lisa Scott, at all relevant times, was a business entity of unknown form”—and, further notable in the circumstances of this complaint—includes no allegations that Scott is an “individual” (or an “adult,” as the “Plaintiff” is identified) or that she occupied some other typically-human capacity in relation to some relevant entity identified as a defendant. 

Adding to this, one or more persons/entities, referenced in the complaint solely by the vague identifier “Defendant,” is also identified in the complaint (amongst allegations setting forth “The Parties”) as follows: 

“Plaintiff [this time, inferably Soria] is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, that Defendant, at all relevant times, was a business entity of unknown form with its principal place of business located in the City of Visalia, County of Tulate [sic], State if California”;

“Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, that at all relevant times, Defendant held itself out to the public as Onyx Properties and vice versa and used these Defendant entity names and other permutations of these entity names as the name of the business entity which employed Plaintiff”; and

“Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, that Defendant was, at all times relevant herein, the owner, shareholder, sole proprietor, superintendent, officer, director, manager, or managing agent of Defendants.”

With significantly less resulting confusion, at least so it might have seem, “Onyx Properties” is identified simply as “a California Corporation purportedly authorized to do business within the State of California with its principal place of business located in the City of Visalia , County of Tulate [sic], State if California.”  But, then, it turns out this designation was not as helpful as it might have seemed because Soria, in her opposition, states that this one ostensibly clear defendant identification in the whole complaint—of “Onyx Properties” as a corporation—was “a misnomer that can be corrected by amendment.”

Anyway, by way of the parties’ briefing, it can at least now be discerned with fair certainty that Lisa Scott, a human individual who evidently operates a sole proprietorship doing business by the name “Onyx Properties,” and who was apparently Riordon’s employer during the periods relevant to the complaint, is the only intended target of the complaint’s various alleged Labor Code violation claims. 

Scott’s Motion

As first noted above, the now evidently intended sole human defendant in this case, Scott, here moves for judgment on the pleadings against the complaint, which, as can now also be discerned, is a complaint of Soria, purportedly as successor in interest of Riordon, based on alleged Labor Code violations suffered by Riordon. 

Scott, again, chiefly contends all eight claims are time-barred.  She also contends, for obvious reasons, that she is misidentified in the complaint as a defendant, and, further still, that Soria lacks standing as a successor in interest to Riordon.  As to this last argument, the basis of it is that Soria has failed to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 377.32, which requires a “person who seeks to commence an action … as the decedent’s successor in interest” (§ 377.32, subd. (a)), to have complied with that section by filing the requisite affidavit/declaration described therein. 

Timeliness

Ironically in a late-filed opposition, Soria impliedly concedes she commenced suit after the limitations period applicable to each of the claims in the complaint ostensibly expired, but, she contends, “the pleadings support equitable tolling” under Addison v. State (1978) 21 Cal.3d 313, 315 [146 Cal.Rptr. 224, 578 P.2d 941].

“Equitable tolling is a judicially created doctrine that, where applicable, will ‘ “suspend or extend a statute of limitations as necessary to ensure fundamental practicality and fairness.” ’ (McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 99 [84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 734, 194 P.3d 1026] (McDonald).) ‘Broadly speaking, the doctrine applies “ ‘[w]hen an injured person has several legal remedies and, reasonably and in good faith, pursues one.’ ” [Citation.] Thus, it may apply where one action stands to lessen the harm that is the subject of a potential second action; where administrative remedies must be exhausted before a second action can proceed; or where a first action, embarked upon in good faith, is found to be defective for some reason.’ (Id. at p. 100.) The purpose of equitable tolling is to ‘ease[] the pressure on parties “concurrently to seek redress in two separate forums with the attendant danger of conflicting decisions on the same issue.” ’ (Ibid.) It is intended to benefit the court system ‘by reducing the costs associated with a duplicative filing requirement, in many instances rendering later court proceedings either easier and cheaper to resolve or wholly unnecessary.’ (Ibid.)” (Long v. Forty Niners Football Co., LLC (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 550, 554-555 [244 Cal.Rptr.3d 887] (Long).)

Addison, cited by Soria in her brief, is a case often cited when the equitable tolling doctrine is invoked. 

“In Addison v. State (1978) 21 Cal.3d 313 [146 Cal. Rptr. 224, 578 P.2d 941] (Addison), the plaintiffs timely sued the defendants in federal court, alleging claims under federal and state law. (Id. at pp. 315–316.) After the statute of limitations for an action in state court expired, the defendants moved to dismiss the federal action for lack of jurisdiction, and the plaintiffs then filed suit in state court. (Ibid.) The federal action was subsequently dismissed ‘without prejudice to the prosecution of the superior court proceeding,’ but the superior court sustained the defendants' demurrer on the ground that the state complaint was untimely. (Id. at p. 316.) Applying equitable tolling, the Supreme Court held that the filing of the federal action suspended the running of the state limitations period. (Id. at p. 315.)” (Saint Francis Memorial Hospital v. State Dept. of Public Health (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 965, 977 [273 Cal.Rptr.3d 810].)

Notable from the above, one of the key features of an equitable tolling scenario is that a plaintiff has chosen one of multiple available remedies.  “Broadly speaking, the doctrine applies [w]hen an injured person has several legal remedies and, reasonably and in good faith, pursues one.”  (Long, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 555.)

In this case, though, Soria’s complaint alleges nothing of any other legal remedies pursued preceding the filing of her complaint.  Another thing that can, and notably can only, be discerned from the parties’ briefing, though, is that Soria means to assert that the equitable tolling doctrine applies based on Riordon’s evident prior efforts to seek redress for her wage-and-hour claims in proceedings with the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE). 

Scott evidently anticipated that Soria would raise an equitable tolling argument on this basis and expressly addresses it in her opening brief.   

In arguing that the doctrine cannot be applied in this case, Scott contends “California courts have consistently held that filing an administrative wage claim with the Labor Commissioner [i.e., with the DLSE—the Labor Commissioner is the chief of the DLSE (Lab. Code, § 21))] does not equitably toll the statute of limitations for subsequent civil actions because exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required.” 

By way of example, Scott maintains “[t]he California Court of Appeal directly addressed whether filing with the Labor Commissioner tolls the statute of limitations in Aubry v. Goldhor (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 399 [[247 Cal.Rptr. 205] (Aubry)],” and in that case “held that the statute of limitations was not equitably tolled during the period that the employee was pursuing an administrative remedy by filing a wage claim with the Labor Commissioner, as exhaustion of such remedy was not a condition of the right to sue the employer.”

Scott, though, is wrong about Aubry, to the extent she suggests that the case supports that the equitable tolling doctrine cannot be invoked when a plaintiff pursues a remedy the exhaustion of which is not a condition of the right to sue. 

In Aubry, the California Labor Commissioner, who had sued the former employers of an employee, argued the three-year statute of limitations applicable to the employee’s wage claim was equitably tolled during the period he was pursuing an administrative remedy with the Labor Commissioner, and, further, argued this was the case “even though no statute makes exhaustion of such remedy a condition of the right to sue.”  (Id., at pp. 406-407.) 

Notably, the Supreme Court had already held, at the time Aubry was decided, that “ ‘regardless of whether the exhaustion of one remedy is a prerequisite to the pursuit of another, if the defendant is not prejudiced thereby, the running of the limitations period is tolled “[w]hen an injured person has several legal remedies and, reasonably and in good faith, pursues one.” [Citations.]’ (Addison, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 318, citing Elkins v. Derby (1974) 12 Cal.3d 410, 414 [115 Cal.Rptr. 641, 525 P.2d 81] (Elkins); Mize v. Reserve Life Ins. Co. (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 487, 492-494 [121 Cal.Rptr. 848]. 

Although the court of appeal in Aubry did find the complaint insufficient to establish applicability of the equitable tolling doctrine, the court’s ruling had nothing to do with whether exhaustion of the administrative remedy was a requirement for the employee to commence suit. 

Instead, the court of appeal found that the Labor Commissioner had simply failed to allege facts showing the “existence of the elements necessary for application of the doctrine of equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.”  (Id., at p. 407.)  Aubry merely based its ruling on the principle that if,  “ ‘ “on the face of the complaint the action appears barred by the statute of limitations, plaintiff has an obligation to anticipate the defense and plead facts to negative the bar.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)   Neither Aubry, nor any other case cited in Scott’s brief, reflects that “California courts have consistently held that filing an administrative wage claim with the Labor Commissioner does not equitably toll the statute of limitations for subsequent civil actions because exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required.”

Aubry is, nevertheless, pertinent here for the stated principle that, where, as here, plaintiff’s claims appear time-barred on the face of the complaint, plaintiff has an obligation to “ ‘ “anticipate that defense’ ” ” and to “ ‘ “plead facts to negative the bar,” ’ ” such as those that support application of the doctrine of equitable tolling.  (Ibid., citations omitted.)

As noted above, no facts are alleged in Soria’s complaint that would support application of the doctrine of equitable tolling, and, in that respect, the complaint is deficient in the same respect as the complaint in Aubry. 

Soria, for her part, maintains that the “pleadings support equitable tolling,” but by that, she cannot mean her complaint—there are no allegations whatsoever about any prior DLSE proceedings—and she can only mean her late-filed pleadings in opposition, including her request for judicial notice of documents from the DLSE proceedings, which she exclusively cites for her various statements about the DLSE proceedings in her opposition brief. 

The material supplied by Soria in her opposition, however, “does not fill the void created by the complaint's failure to allege the factors necessary to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling” (Aubry, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d at p. 407) and, accordingly, Scott’s motion for judgment on the pleadings must be granted as to whole of the complaint. 

Leave to Amend

The only remaining question is whether Soria should be given leave to amend.  Preliminarily, the court finds that Soria makes an ostensibly sufficient showing that she could allege additional facts in her complaint supporting the factors necessary to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling, but the court first considers whether the doctrine, even if sufficiently pled as Soria indicates she could plead it in her opposition, would support that her claims are not time-barred. 

The court begins by noting that Soria raises no dispute to the assertion of Scott “that the last possible violation [referencing plaintiff’s various asserted wage-and-hour Labor Code violations] occurred no later than January 31, 2022,” and that, absent the applicability of equitable tolling, “any claims with a three-year limitations period expired no later than January 31, 2025.” 

The court further notes that the allegations of the complaint support the uncontroverted assertion that all plaintiff’s claims had accrued no later than January 31, 2025. 

Plaintiff alleges “[i]n our [sic] about late December 2021, [defendant] … [communicated] that she would not pay for overtime”; and then later that, “[t]he following weekend, [defendant] called and texted repeatedly, and [decedent Riordon] did not respond”; and that “[w]hen [Riordan] reported to work the following Monday, she was told not to work or report to the property”; and that “Defendant terminated [Riordan’s] employment, via email two (2) days later.”

Indeed, the court further notes that these allegations appear to support that the latest possible termination date was January 5, 2022, well before January 31, 2022. 

That is because December 31, 2021, a Friday, was the last possible date that could be deemed “late December 2021”; the latest “following weekend” when “[defendant] called and texted repeatedly,” then, would had to have been January 1, 2022 to January 2, 2022, the next “following” Saturday and Sunday; the latest “following Monday” when Riordon was allegedly “told not to work or report to the property,” then, would had to have been Monday, January 3, 2022; and “two (2) days later” after that “following Monday,” when “Defendant terminated [Riordan’s] employment, via email,” would had to have been on January 5, 2022.

The court also notes that Soria asserts that Riordan “filed the DLSE wage claim on August 23, 2022” and, according to a “Notice-Investigation Completed,” of which Soria requests judicial notice, the Labor Commissioner advised, by notice dated January 24, 2023, that it had exercised its discretion to decline jurisdiction over the case, explaining that “a Labor Commissioner proceeding does not provide an appropriate forum in which to pursue the instant claim in which the claimant is deceased.” 

Referencing this Notice, Soria states that the DLSE “closed the administrative matter because its procedures were not designed to accommodate claims brought by or on behalf of deceased parties.”

What this, in turn, supports, is that any period of equitable tolling was between August 23, 2022, when Riordan filed her wage claim with the DLSE, and January 24, 2023, when the Labor Commissioner advised that it had “closed the administrative matter.” 

Accordingly, based on Soria’s representations in her opposition and the documents of which she requests judicial notice, the tolled interval that would be tacked onto the limitations periods applicable to her claims would be 153 days.  (See Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363, 370 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 655, 73 P.3d 517] [“[T]he effect of equitable tolling is that the limitations period stops running during the tolling event, and begins to run again … when the tolling event has concluded. As a consequence, the tolled interval, no matter when it took place, is tacked onto the end of the limitations period, thus extending the deadline for suit by the entire length of time during which the tolling event previously occurred.”].)

Further still, the court notes that Soria does not dispute Scott’s contention that a three-year limitations period applies to her first through sixth and eighth causes of action; and that a one-year limitations period applies to her seventh cause of action. 

In addition, the court’s own analysis supports that Scott correctly identifies the applicable statutory limitations periods. 

Soria’s first through fifth causes of action are claims “upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture,”—i.e., Labor Code section 1194, subdivision (a)—and therefore subject to a three-year limitations period under Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (a).  (See Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1114 [56 Cal.Rptr.3d 880, 155 P.3d 284] (Murphy) [Re: meal and rest period claims].)  Soria’s eighth cause of action—for recovery of business expenses allegedly incurred—is also based “upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture” and, also, therefore, subject to a three-year limitations period under Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (a).  And, Soria’s sixth cause of action—for the failure to pay wages due on termination—arises under Labor Code section 203 and based on subdivision (b) of that section, a three-year limitations period applies to that claim.  (Pineda v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1389, 1393 [117 Cal.Rptr.3d 377, 241 P.3d 870], citing Murphy, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1109 [“The Legislature expressly provided that a suit seeking to enforce the section 203 penalty would be subject to the same statute of limitations as an action to recover wages.”].)

Soria’s seventh cause of action, though, based on the alleged failure to provide accurate wage statements, is brought pursuant to Labor Code section 226, subdivision (e)(1), which provides that an employee who suffers injury as a result of a knowing and intentional failure by an employer to provide an accurate wage statement as required under section 226, subdivision (a) “is entitled to recover the greater of all actual damages or fifty dollars ($50) for the initial pay period in which a violation occurs and one hundred dollars ($100) per employee for each violation in a subsequent pay period, not to exceed an aggregate penalty of four thousand dollars ($4,000), and is entitled to an award of costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.”  (Italics added.) 

Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (a), in turn, prescribes a one-year limitations period for an action “for a penalty … , except if the statute imposing it prescribes a different intention.” 

Accordingly, a one-year limitations period applies to Soria’s seventh cause of action.  (See Falk v. Children's Hospital Los Angeles (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1469 [188 Cal.Rptr.3d 686] [referencing a wage statement claim as a claim subject to a one-year limitations period].)

The court next considers, given these factors, whether the equitable tolling doctrine, if sufficiently pled as Soria indicates she could plead it in her opposition, would support that her claims are not time-barred. 

Starting with the seventh cause of action, subject to a one-year limitations period, it is clear that the equitable tolling doctrine would be of no avail.  If that claim accrued, as Scott asserts without dispute from Soria, and as the allegations support, no later than January 31, 2022, and the one-year limitations period, absent tolling, would expire no later than January 31, 2023, then the latest possible date the one-year limitations period could be extended by tolling would be July 3, 2023.  Soria’s complaint was filed on July 3, 2025, however, well after the latest date she could have asserted her seventh cause of action were the equitable tolling doctrine applied.

Accordingly, the court finds that Scott’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, as to the seventh cause of action, must be granted without leave to amend. 

Turning to the other seven causes of action subject to a three-year limitations period, if the limitations period applicable to those claims, absent tolling, would have expired on January 31, 2025 (three years after January 31, 2022), then the latest possible date the limitations period applicable to the other seven claims could be extended by tolling would be July 3, 2025.

As noted, here, Soria filed her complaint exactly on that maximum-tolled expiration date of July 3, 2025.

The court again notes that, based on its own analysis of the allegations, the latest possible date of accrual of Soria’s claims appears to have been January 5, 2022, not January 31, 2022, but is, in any event, reticent to make a determination that the motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted without leave based on a determined accrual date that Scott did not, herself, argue should apply. 

For this reason, the court, at this point, determines that the motion for judgment on the pleadings shall be granted as to the first through sixth and eighth causes of action, but with leave to amend. 

The court, though, also notes that while deeming January 31, 2022 as the accrual date of Soria’s claims may be sufficient to establish a basis for leave to amend to plead applicability of the equitable tolling doctrine, nothing in this ruling or the law cited by the parties supplies a basis for a determination in these proceedings that any of Soria’s claims, to the extent they are deemed to have accrued prior to January 31, 2022, are not time-barred. 

At this stage, though, Scott’s motion frames a much narrower question.  This court’s determination on that narrower question is merely that there appears to be a reasonable possibility that, given leave to amend, Soria could plead facts sufficient to show that her claims in her first through sixth and eighth causes of action, at least to the extent those claims are deemed to have occurred on or after January 31, 2022, are not entirely time-barred.

Soria, therefore, is granted leave to amend as to the first through sixth and eighth causes of action, and specifically directed to plead the facts necessary to negative the statutory time bar revealed on the face of her complaint, as currently constituted, based on the doctrine of equitable tolling. 

The court recognizes Scott’s argument on reply that Soria has failed to establish “ ‘reasonable and good faith conduct on the part of the plaintiff,’ ” (McDonald, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 102), which is a necessary element Soria must establish to support application of equitable tolling, but the court declines to reach that issue at this stage before Soria has had the opportunity to state her supporting facts supporting application of the equitable tolling doctrine in an amended complaint. 

The court does specifically direct that, in any amended complaint, Soria will be required to show all three elements necessary to invoke the equitable tolling doctrine, which are:  “ ‘timely notice, and lack of prejudice, to the defendant, and reasonable and good faith conduct on the part of the plaintiff.” ’ (McDonald, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 102.)   So, in any amended complaint, the court does direct Soria to address, amongst other things, her “reasonable and good faith conduct” in light of her having commenced this action 891 days after DLSE gave notice that it was closing Riordon’s case. 

The court additionally notes that the complaint appears to contain additional issues given that equitable tolling could only, at best, appear to save Soria’s claims to the extent they had not accrued prior to January 31, 2022.  Soria is going to have to reckon with this in stating claims in any amended pleading, and not simply change her allegations, as “[w]hen a complaint contains allegations that are fatal to a cause of action, a plaintiff cannot avoid those defects simply by filing an amended complaint that omits the problematic facts or pleads facts inconsistent with those alleged earlier.”  (Panterra GP, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 697, 729 [289 Cal.Rptr.3d 743].)  

Identification of Parties

Based on the litany of confusion allegations described above, it should be obvious that, in any amended complaint, Soria will be required to clearly identify the named plaintiff (herself) and to clearly identify Riordon, where appropriate, as the subject of her substantive allegations pertaining to her Labor Code violation claims.  Also, Soria must clearly identify the named defendant in this case, without the litany of confusing allegations that obfuscate the identify or numerosity of defendants named. 

Compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 377.32

When commencing an action based on causes of action that survive a decedent, Code of Civil Procedure section 377.32 requires that a “person who seeks to commence an action … as the decedent’s successor in interest” must “execute and file an affidavit or a declaration under penalty of perjury” that includes various items of information, as well as statements that “ ‘[n]o proceeding is now pending in California for administration of the decedent’s estate’ ”; that the person “ ‘is the decedent’s successor in interest’ ” or “ ‘authorized to act on behalf of the decedent’s successor in interest’ ”; and that “[n]o other person has a superior right to commence the action.”  (Id., subd. (a).)  Section 377.32 further requires that “[a] certified copy of the decedent’s death certificate shall be attached to the affidavit or declaration.” (Id., subd. (c).)

Contrary to Soria’s contention, the “Secretary of State registration form” of which she requests judicial notice, does not establish that she has “substantially complied with the Code of Civil Procedure section 377.32.”  Additionally, it is not the case that Soria alleges representative standing simply by having identified herself, in the case title, as “successor in interest” of decedent Riordan. 

The obvious next step, here, at least now it should be obvious, is for Soria to file the required section 377.32 declaration along with a certified copy of a death certificate for decedent Riordon. 

Strictly speaking, the failure to have filed a section 377.32 affidavit or declaration does not, itself, appear to supply a ground for judgment on the pleadings, it is rather the case that, in the absence of it, there is not the statutorily required proof that Soria is the real party interest with the right to sue (i.e., that plaintiff has standing). 

Still, though, under the real party in interest doctrine, where the complaint shows the plaintiff is not the person entitled to assert a cause of action—because it is a decedent’s cause of action that survives the decedent—the complaint may be attacked at the pleading stage on the ground that it fails to assert a breach of the identified plaintiff’s primary right.  (5 Witkin Cal. Procedure (6th Ed. 2023) Pleading § 969.) 

For pleading, but not proof, purposes, Soria could presumably cure the defect in her complaint, as pertains to standing, merely by alleging the facts required to be submitted in the declaration required by section 377.32, but, of course, the preferrable course of action would be for Soria to simply properly comply with the section by filing the required declaration with a certified copy of the decedent Riordon’s death certificate. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Alsumiri, Ahmed vs. Amco Insurance Company et al

Case No.:   VCU328646

Date:            May 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motions:   (I) AMCO Demurrer; (II) Nationwide Demurrer

Tentative Rulings: (I) AMCO’s demurrer is overruled; (II) Nationwide’s Demurrer is overruled.

(I) AMCO’s Demurrer

AMCO Insurance Company demurrers to Ahmed Alsumiri’s amended complaint. 

AMCO asserts all Alsumiri’s causes of action against it are time barred based on a contractually agreed two-year suit limitation period in Alsumiri’s insurance policy.

In his amended complaint, Alsumiri alleges he and “Nationwide/AMCO entered into a written homeowner’s insurance policy,” which is identified as “Policy No. ADP 0036847606,” but a copy of the policy is not attached to the amended complaint (and was not attached to the original complaint) and the complaint includes no allegations regarding any limitations period in Alsumiri’s policy.   

A demurrer, of course, can only be sustained based on defects appearing on the face of the pleadings, or from a “matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).)

AMCO, recognizing the policy is not attached to the complaint, requests judicial notice of the policy, based on Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h), under which this court may take judicial notice of “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.”

In a string cite, AMCO cites seven cases purportedly supporting that this court may take judicial notice of the policy in the present circumstances.  None of the cited cases, however, support AMCO’s position. 

First off, the cited case of Zakk v. Diesel (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 431 [245 Cal.Rptr.3d 215] is of no assistance in evaluating the propriety of judicial notice at all because there was no pertinent holding in the case on that issue—while the trial court’s ruling on a request for judicial notice was challenged on appeal, the appellate court expressly declined to reach the issue incident to its holding on other issues obviating that necessity.  (Id., at p. 454.)

Next, City of Pomona v. Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 793 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 710] (Pomona), at the cited page 800; Qualcomm, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 184 [73 Cal.Rptr.3d 770], at the cited page 191; La Serena Properties, LLC v. Weisbach (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 893 [112 Cal.Rptr.3d 597], at the cited page 897; and Hollister Park Inv. Co. v. Goleta County Water Dist. (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 290 [147 Cal.Rptr. 91], at the cited page 292, each support that written documents attached to a complaint may be considered on demurrer, but none address consideration of outside documents, not attached to the complaint. 

Next, in the cited case of Ingram v. Flippo (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1280 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 60] (Ingram), at the cited footnote 3 on page 1285, the Sixth District held, on review of a trial court’s ruling on a demurrer, that it could properly take judicial notice of a letter and media release (“which were substantially the same”) even though they were not attached to the complaint, but in distinguishable circumstances.  There, “the complaint excerpted quotes from the letter and summarized parts of it in some detail,” and “both sides referred to the letter and quoted from it” at the hearing on the demurrer under review.  (Ibid.)  Here, though, again, there were no references in the amended complaint to the contractual limitations provision at issue. 

Notably also, in the more recent case of Tenet Healthsystem Desert, Inc. v. Blue Cross of California (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 821 [199 Cal.Rptr.3d 901] (Tenet)—a case not cited by AMCO—the Fourth District, also on review of a trial court’s ruling on a demurrer, found “inappropriate” a defendant’s request for the court to consider letters it alleged it had sent to the other party (which defendant submitted as contradicting certain of plaintiff’s allegations as to what defendant had represented in various alleged communications) that had not been “incorporated into the operative pleading.”  (Id., at p. 834.) 

Although the court found defendant’s failure to file a motion seeking judicial notice sufficient reason, alone, to reject the defendant’s request, it held that even if defendant had filed such motion, it would have been denied.  (Id., at pp. 834-835.)  The court determined “[t]he only arguable ‘matter’ identified in [Evidence Code sections 451 and 452] under which [the] letters could fall would be those matters identified in subdivision (h) of Evidence Code section 452 [i.e., the same subdivision relied upon by AMCO here],” but the letters, “having been ostensibly created by a party to the litigation regarding the subject of the litigation would appear to be the very epitome of items ‘subject to dispute,’ as opposed to ‘not reasonably subject to dispute.’ ” (Id., at p. 836, citing Ev. Code, § 452, subd. (h).) 

“Further,” the court held, “although the existence of a document, such as a document recorded in the official records of a government body, may be judicially noticeable, the truth of statements contained in the document and their proper interpretation are not subject to judicial notice. [Citations.]”  Accordingly, the court concluded, “even if we were to conclude that it would be proper to take judicial notice of the existence of the letters to which [the defendant] repeatedly cites, the existence of the letters would offer [the defendant] no assistance in supporting its position [on the demurrer ruling under review].”  (Ibid.)

The Court of Appeal specifically found the defendant’s reliance on Ingram to support judicial notice of the letters “misplaced,” finding, first, that, in Ingram, the complaint’s having “ ‘excerpted quotes from the letter and summarized parts of it in some detail’ ” presented a distinguishing circumstance; and, second, that “[t]he [Ingram] court appear[ed] to have accepted the appellant's concession that such material was properly the subject of judicial notice without undertaking an independent analysis as to the propriety of taking judicial notice.”  (Id., at p. 836, fn. 14.)  The Tenet court specifically stated that it “[did] not consider Ingram to be useful authority for purposes of [evaluating the disputed judicial notice issue presented in the case before it].”  (Ibid.)

Lastly, the court notes AMCO’s citation to Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743 [154 Cal.Rptr.3d 394] (Scott), at page 753, which AMCO cites as an instance of, in AMCO’s words, the court of appeal “taking judicial notice of both the existence of the contract between FDIC and a solvent bank and its legal effect.”  Scott, though, is distinguishable.  “[T]he document being judicially noticed in that case was a government document and was accordingly governed by Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c), under which judicial notice may be taken of ‘ “[o]fficial acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States.” ’ (Scott, at p. 752.) Scott does not provide authority allowing a court to take judicial notice of a contract between private parties.”  (The Travelers Indemnity Co. of Connecticut v. Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 341, 354 [285 Cal.Rptr.3d 289].)

After the seven-case string cite, AMCO’s brief moves on to another two-case string cite for the submitted proposition that “a court may take judicial notice of something that cannot reasonably be controverted ‘even if it negates an express allegation of the pleading.’” AMCO cites Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1382 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 659] (Alfaro) and Hoffman v. Smithwoods RV Park, LLC (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 390, 400 [102 Cal.Rptr.3d 72] (Hoffman).) 

Alfaro observed that “ ‘[a] court may take judicial notice of something that cannot reasonably be controverted [such as a recorded deed], even if it negates an express allegation of the pleading [citation]’ ” (id., at p. 1382), and Hoffman stated that “[u]nder the doctrine of truthful pleading, the courts ‘will not close their eyes to situations where a complaint contains allegations of fact inconsistent with attached documents, or allegations contrary to facts which are judicially noticed’ [citation]” (id., at p. 400). 

Taken together, Alfaro and Hoffman merely support that the court, on review of a demurrer, may properly consider matters subject to judicial notice and documents attached to a complaint that contradict allegations contained in the complaint.  Neither case lends support to the court taking judicial notice of a limitations period contained in a private contractual agreement (i.e., the insurance policy) where the agreement was not attached to the complaint and there are no allegations in the complaint concerning the limitations period at issue.

Perhaps there is some good and persuasive argument for patching together determinations from the string-cited cases noted by AMCO to support this court’s taking judicial notice of the policy at issue in this case, but if there is, AMCO hasn’t made it.  The court is not persuaded on its own review of the cases cited that judicial notice is appropriate under the circumstances presented.  The request for judicial notice is, accordingly, denied. 

As the factual matter of the existence of the contractual limitations period in Alsumiri’s policy is not disclosed on the face of his amended complaint and is not, this court finds, a matter of which the court may take judicial notice, AMCO cannot properly challenge the amended complaint on demurer based on the contractual limitations period.  No other grounds having been submitted in support of AMCO’s demurrer, it is, based on the foregoing, overruled. 

On a final note, the court presumes the issue of the timeliness of Alsumiri’s claims against AMCO will inevitably resurface again in the course of this litigation, perhaps in a motion for summary judgment.  The court notes, for future reference, that AMCO did not address in its demurrer the issue of the effect of any potential tolling that may have occurred in this case, despite that, based on this court’s review, the statutory contractual period of limitations included in a policy “is tolled from the time the insured gives notice of the claim to the insurance company until ‘the time the insurer formally denies the claim in writing.’ ” (Migliore v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 592, 604 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 548], citing Prudential-LMI Com. Ins. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 674, 678 [274 Cal.Rptr. 387, 798 P.2d 1230].)  This issue should be addressed if and when the issue of the timeliness of Alsumiri’s claims is again addressed in this litigation. 

 (II) Nationwide’s Demurrer

Nationwide General Insurance Company (Nationwide) demurrers on the ground that it did not issue, and is therefore not a party to, Alsumiri’s insurance contract, and, as a result, Alsumiri cannot state any of his asserted causes of action against Nationwide. 

Alumiri’s complaint separately identifies AMCO and Nationwide as defendants. 

Under his breach of contract claim, Alsumiri alleges he and “Nationwide/AMCO entered into a written homeowner’s insurance policy” and he refers to Nationwide and AMCO as his “Insurers.” 

Under his “insurance bad faith”/“breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing” claim, Alsumiri states his claim is against “Defendants AMCO Insurance Company d/b/a Nationwide” and, separately, against “Nationwide General Insurance Company.”  Under this claim, Alsumiri alleges he “was insured under a homeowner’s policy issued and/or administered by AMCO Insurance Company dba Nationwide and Nationwide General Insurance Company.”

Nationwide asserts, without reference to these or other allegations, that “Alsumiri’s insurance policy was issued by AMCO Insurance Company, not Nationwide” (italics in original); that “no contract existed between [Alsumiri] and Nationwide”; and that “Nationwide is not a part to the policy.”

Nationwide, like AMCO, requests judicial notice of Alsumiri’s policy, based on Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h).  Nationwide’s request is identical to the request submitted by AMCO. 

After Nationwide’s statement that it “is not a party to the policy,” it cites its request for judicial notice and, in so doing, apparently suggests that its asserted lack of contractual privity with Alsumiri is matter of which this court may take judicial notice under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h).

Nationwide’s request for judicial notice, however, which, again, is identical to AMCO’s, fails to persuade this court that judicial notice of the policy is appropriate under the circumstances for the reasons explained above with respect to AMCO’s request. 

In a subsequent part of its brief, Nationwide contends Alsumiri’s “sparing allegations that AMCO was ‘doing business as’ Nationwide are insufficient [to support the existence of a contractual relationship between Nationwide and Alsumiri].”  Nationwide here pretends like Alsumiri’s identification of “AMCO Insurance Company d/b/a Nationwide” as a defendant under his bad faith claim is the only reference to Nationwide in the amended complaint—that “there is nothing other than the allegation that AMCO is ‘doing business as’ Nationwide” that references Nationwide, as a separate entity, in the amended complaint.  Clearly, though, as noted above, “Nationwide General Insurance Company” is separately identified as a defendant under the bad faith claim and as an issuer “and/or” administrator of the subject policy.  Additionally, Nationwide is clearly identified as the contractual counter-party to the policy in Alsumiri’s breach cause of action.   

The court is not persuaded that Alsumiri’s allegations support that it solely names Nationwide as a defendant by way of its reference to “Nationwide” as a “d/b/a” designation of AMCO, and, therefore, not persuaded that the factual matter of Nationwide’s non-privity with Alsumiri is disclosed on the face of the amended complaint.   

As the factual matter of Nationwide’s non-privity with Alsumiri is not disclosed on the face of his amended complaint, and is not, this court again finds, a matter of which the court may take judicial notice, Nationwide cannot properly challenge the amended complaint on demurer based on its asserted non-privity with Alsumiri.

Nationwide also demurrers on the ground that Alsumiri’s action is time barred, based on the same asserted contractual limitations period in Alsumiri’s policy asserted in AMCO’s demurrer.  Like AMCO’s demurrer on this ground, Nationwide’s demurrer on timeliness grounds depends on this court taking judicial notice of the policy, and because the court denies the judicial notice request, the demurrer on this ground necessarily fails on this ground as well. 

Based on the foregoing, Nationwide’s demurrer is overruled. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Cota, Samantha vs. The Sandwich Stations, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU331382

Date:           May 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendant Sandwich Stations, Inc. on a classwide basis for various violations of the Labor Code and Business and Professions Code, as well as under for violations of the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”).

Defendant answered the complaint and filed this motion to compel arbitration of these claims, including a waiver of class claims.

Facts – Agreement to Arbitrate

In support, Defendant provides the declaration of an officer of Defendant indicating knowledge of the hiring practices and procedures applicable to Plaintiff. (Declaration of Ivy ¶2.) Plaintiff, having been offered employment was provided a copy of the “Sandwich Stations Inc Official Employee Handbook and the Employee Handbook Acknowledgement and Receipt,” was instructed to take the Handbook home and read it and, if agreeable to the terms, to sign the Handbook, Acknowledgement, which occurred in this matter. (Declaration of Ivy ¶¶3, 4 – Ex. 1.)

In opposition, Plaintiff does not dispute signing the Acknowledgement, but argues that no agreement to arbitrate was formed via the process described above. Plaintiff notes that the Handbook Acknowledgment explicitly instructed Plaintiff to sign the Acknowledgment to indicate she had received the Handbook, the Handbook Acknowledgment stated: “I acknowledge that this handbook is neither a contract of employment nor a legal document,” the Handbook’s introduction states “neither you nor any Sandwich Stations Inc representative have entered into a contract regarding the terms or the duration of your employment” and that it contains no mention of any arbitration provision and does not instruct Plaintiff that signing the Acknowledgment will result in a waiver of her right to a judicial forum. Further, that the arbitration provision is located at the end of the Handbook, has the same format and is visually indistinguishable from the other sections in the Handbook. Finally, that the Handbook permitted that “any and all policies and practices may be changed at any time by SANDWICH STATIONS INC. . . . Only the Owner of SANDWICH STATIONS INC has the ability to adopt any revisions to the policies in this handbook.”

Authority and Analysis – Agreement to Arbitrate

The Court must first determine whether the parties actually agreed to arbitrate the dispute, and general principles of California contract law help guide the court in making this determination. (Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534, 541.)

Plaintiff cites to Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport (2022) 75 Cal. App. 5th 748, 784, Esparza v. Sand & Sea, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal. App. 5th 781, 784–785, and Sparks v. Vista Del Mar Child & Family Services (2012) 207 Cal. App. 4th 1516, 1520 (abrogated on other grounds by Harris v. TAP Worldwide, LLC (2016) 248 Cal. App. 4th 373) in support of the argument that an agreement to arbitrate is not formed where an employee signs an acknowledgment of a handbook that states no contract is formed and fails to inform the employee of the arbitration provision.

In Esparza, the plaintiff was provided an employee handbook and signed a form acknowledging both that she received that handbook and was expected to read it within one week. (Esparza, supra, 2 Cal. App. 5th at 784-785.) While the handbook contained an “Agreement to Arbitrate” section, the signed acknowledgment form "did not state that [plaintiff] agreed to abide by the arbitration agreement within the handbook." (Id. at 784, 790.) The appellate court rejected the argument that plaintiff was expected to read the handbook within a week, that plaintiff continued to work for a week and therefore impliedly agreed to the arbitration term. (Id. at 790.) The appellate court focused on the fact that neither the acknowledgment form nor the employee handbook stated that agreeing to arbitrate was a condition of employment and/or that by continuing employment, the employee would be deemed to have consented to that condition. (Id.) Ultimately, the appellate court affirmed the denial of the motion to compel.

Here, the Handbook Acknowledgment form signed by Plaintiff lacked a reference to the arbitration term.

In Sparks, 207 Cal. App. 4^th at 1522, a case relied upon by Esparza, the appellate court noted “the acknowledgment form did not reference the arbitration clause, much less advise plaintiff that he would be bound by it.” Further, the Sparks court noted that “[a]n agreement to arbitrate is illusory if, as here, the employer can unilaterally modify the handbook.” (Id. at 1523.)

Mendoza, 75 Cal. App. 5^th at 783 noted that a lack of signature lines to acknowledge the arbitration provision in the handbook factored into finding no agreement existed:

“…there are no signature lines on either the Arbitration Policy or anywhere else in the Handbook. Like the arbitration provision in [Sparks], a decision in which the court held that there was no agreement to arbitrate,] there was no place for Mendoza to acknowledge the arbitration provision in writing.”

These cases, taken together, provide a sufficient basis for the Court to find no agreement to arbitrate exists via the Handbook and Handbook Acknowledgment. The terms of arbitration could be modified at any time, rending the arbitration term illusory. (Sparks, supra, 207 Cal. App. 4^th at 1523.) No signature lines are present for Plaintiff to separately acknowledge the arbitration terms. (Mendoza, supra, 75 Cal. App. 5^th at 783.) The Acknowledgement failed to reference the arbitration term. (Sparks, supra, 207 Cal. App. 4^th at 1522.) The Handbook itself states “neither you nor any Sandwich Stations Inc representative have entered into a contract regarding the terms or the duration of your employment.” The Handbook, in the Court’s opinion, gives general information as to the policies in contrast to creating an agreement to arbitrate. (Sparks, supra, 207 Cal. App. 4^th at 1520.)

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                SDP REIT, LLC vs. Summerstone 46, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU333954

Date:           May 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Application for Appointment of Receiver and Injunctive Relief

Tentative Ruling: To inquire at the hearing as to the status of the sale set for the end of May 2026.

Facts

In this complaint for breach of contract, foreclosure of personal property collateral, judicial foreclosure, appointment of receiver and breach of guaranty, Plaintiffs sue Defendants Summerstone 46, Inc., Marlene Bailey and Daniel Bailey.

Plaintiffs have loaned Defendant Summerstone an initial principal amount of $51,879,312.00 (the “Loan”) (Declaration of Kirkpatrick ¶2.)

The Loan is evidenced by a promissory note (the “Note”) secured by the following collateral (“Pledged Collateral”):

a. that certain Trust Deed, Assignment of Rents, Security Agreement, and Fixture Filing dated December 28, 2021, recorded against certain real property (the “Visalia 216 Property”)

b. that certain Trust Deed, Assignment of Rents, Security Agreement, and Fixture Filing dated December 28, 2021, recorded against certain real property (the “Visalia 144 Property”)

c. that certain Trust Deed, Assignment of Rents, Security Agreement, and Fixture Filing dated December 28, 2021, recorded against certain real property (the “Hanford 216 Property”) (Declaration of Kirkpatrick ¶¶3, 4.)

Further, the Loan is personally guaranteed by the Bailey Defendants (the “Guaranty”). (Declaration of Kirkpatrick ¶6.)

Plaintiffs and Summerstone amended the Note, extending the maturity date of the note first to November 1, 2025 and again to March 31, 2026. (Declaration of Kirkpatrick ¶7, 8, 9.)

Events of default under the various loan documents include:

a. Pursuant to the First Amendment and the Second Amendment, the Note matured on March 31, 2026, at which time all outstanding principal, accrued interest, and other amounts due under the Loan Documents became immediately due and payable. SUMMERSTONE 46, INC. has failed to pay the indebtedness in full on or before March 31, 2026, and such failure constitutes an Event of Default under the Note and other Loan Documents, and all rights and remedies of Plaintiffs thereunder have been triggered;

b. SUMMERSTONE 46, INC. failed to consistently deliver to Plaintiffs rent rolls pursuant to the First Amendment;

c. SUMMERSTONE 46, INC. failed to provide proof of insurance as required under the Loan Documents absent demands from Plaintiffs;

d. As of the Maturity Date, Defendants have failed to turn over the rent received to Plaintiffs despite requests to do so. (Complaint ¶21.)

Plaintiffs state further “Defendants have not made any payments towards the Loan. As of April 1, 2026, the Loan has fully matured, and all outstanding principal, accrued interest, and other amounts due under the Loan Documents are immediately due and payable.” (Declaration of Kirkpatrick ¶10.)

In response to the default for lack of payment, Defendant Daniel Bailey states the mortgage payment is not delinquent, with a payment of $535,353.44 made April 1, 2026 and there is no “delinquency on interest.” (Declaration of Daniel Bailey 2:8-12.) Defendant Daniel Bailey further notes the Loan is “well secured,” that the current appraisal as to the Project is $82,000,000 and “the other two parcels which are fully entitled with plans ready to pull permits, are appraised at $6,756,000 and 8,938,000.” (Declaration of Daniel Bailey 2:14-20.) As such, Defendant Daniel Bailey notes an “equity cushion” of over $38,000,000 as to the Loan. (Declaration of Daniel Bailey 2:21-23.)

Further, the total balance immediately due and owing to Plaintiffs is as of April 10, 2026 totals $59,330,497.63. (Declaration of Kirkpatrick ¶19; Declaration of Schiess ¶3)

As to this issue, Defendant Daniel Bailey notes the Project is in escrow, with a sale price of $80,000,000, with escrow set to close at the end of May 2026. (Declaration of Bailey 2:24-28, 3:1-4.)

Additionally, Defendant Daniel Bailey states that Plaintiff “misled” Defendants into signing an extension to “Clean Up Lender’s Books for their internal Investors. Borrower signed the extension in March with a due date at the end of March 31, 2026 under the Premise that Borrower would get a forbearance until the end of 2026 to allow the property to be completed, leased up and stabilized. Instead of providing the forbearance, Lender immediately filed this action to foreclose based on the due date. The due date of March 31, 2026 was never supposed to stay in place.” (Declaration of Daniel Bailey 3:26-28, 4:1-6.) Defendant Daniel Bailey provides Exhibit 8, a copy of an email chain between Plaintiffs and Defendants which states, wherein Kirkpatrick on February 26, 2026 states first:

“Dave and I have been able to get you some relief through March. We still need to get a forbearance agreement put together that takes you to the end of the project, but we ran into a problem with investor bylaws. The investor bylaws don’t let us go forward/forebear if we are 90+ days past due. This would put us in a tough position come March 1^st.

We are putting together an interim extension through the end of march that just extends the loan…The plan is to have a negotiated forbearance bore you bring in the equity in and that we will have it wrapped up by March 31.The agreement will look a lot like the one you signed in August.” (Exhibit 8.)

Additionally, on February 27, 2026, Plaintiffs emailed Defendants stating “Attached are the documents for that extension. Please look them over and sign them today. It allows us to go towards forbearance.” (Exhibit 8.)

Further, that Plaintiffs advanced inspection and impact fees to the City of Visalia to assist Defendants receive temporary occupancy certificates for 60 of the 216 units and on December 31, 2025, the City issued a correction notice requiring an approved plan to complete the paving on the roundabout in the complex before the City would issue additional temporary certificates of occupancy or permanent certificates of occupancy. (Declaration of Kirkpatrick ¶¶11, 12; Declaration of Schiess ¶8.)

On April 9, 2026, Defendants produced partial financial records to Plaintiffs, which included bank statements for one of Defendants' bank accounts ("Bank Statements"), a rent roll for April, 2026 ("Rent Roll"), and an estimated budget ("Estimated Budget") to complete the Project. The Rent Roll states that units 136-204. 136-201, and 214-301 are leased, which Plaintiffs believe is improper as Defendants have not procured occupancy certificates for these units. (Declaration of Kirkpatrick ¶14; Declaration of Schiess ¶¶5, 6.)

Further, that “On April 9, 2026, Defendants produced a profit and loss statement detailing Defendants' profit and loss for the time period covering January 1, 2026 through April 9, 2026 (the "April 2026 Profit and Loss".) The April 2026 Profit and Loss illustrates $279,596.25 in rental income and $29,534 in expenses categorized as "Property Management - Other". Defendants have not turned over the rental income received since the Maturity Date to Plaintiffs, despite Plaintiffs' request.” (Declaration of Kirkpatrick ¶13; Declaration of Schiess ¶¶5, 6.)

Further, that Defendants have only produced selected, incomplete, reports that do not satisfy Defendants' obligations under the Loan Documents. The bank statements produce on April 9, 2026 are only for Defendants' rental account, and not the operating account. (Declaration of Kirkpatrick ¶18.)

Defendants last provided Plaintiffs with an estimated budget to complete the Project in April, 2026 and according to Defendants' estimated budget, Defendants themselves estimate that the Project will require $6,597,765 to $8,302,505 to complete. (Declaration of Kirkpatrick ¶15.)

Plaintiffs indicate the Baileys have informed Plaintiffs that the Project is managed through a separate entity and “that they have not hired a general contractor to complete the Project, which is in further breach of the Loan Documents…” (Declaration of Kirkpatrick ¶¶16, 17.) Further, that Defendants caused subcontractors to go unpaid, these subcontractors have recorded liens against the Project and have commenced litigation to perfect the liens. (Declaration of Schiess ¶7.)

As to the appointment of a receiver, the complaint alleges further that the trust deed as to the Visalia 216 provides as follows:

Assignment of Rents, Leases and Purchase Agreements.

That as additional security, Trustor hereby assigns to Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all Purchase Agreements, Leases, rents, issues, royalties, and profits of the Property affected by this Deed of Trust and of any personal property or improvements located thereon (collectively, the “Rents”). Such assignment is made concurrently with the granting by Trustor to Beneficiary of a security interest in such Rents, Leases, and the Purchase Agreements pursuant to this Deed of Trust, which security interest shall be subject and subordinate to this assignment….If any Event of Default shall occur, Trustor’s right to collect If any Event of Default shall occur, Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without taking possession of the Property affected hereby, to collect all Rents. In furtherance thereof Trustor irrevocably appoints Beneficiary its true and lawful attorney-in-fact (which appointment is coupled with an interest), at the option of Beneficiary at any time and from time to time following any Event of Default, to demand, receive and enforce payment, to give receipts, releases and satisfactions, and to sue, in the name of Trustor or Beneficiary, for all Rents and apply the same to the payment of Trustor's obligations to Beneficiary in such order as Beneficiary shall determine. Trustor hereby authorizes and directs the lessees, tenants and occupants to make all payments under any Leases affecting the Property directly to Beneficiary upon written demand by Beneficiary, without further consent of Trustor. Failure or discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from time to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same…

Upon the occurrence of an Event of Default, Beneficiary may, at any time without notice, either in person, by agent or by a receiver appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of Beneficiary or another receiver designated by a court and agreed to by Beneficiary as such receiver upon the occurrence of any Event of Default, and without regard to the adequacy of any security for the obligations secured hereby, enter upon and take possession of the Property, or any part thereof, and, with or without such entry or taking possession, in its own name sue or otherwise collect the Rents (including, without limitation, those past due and unpaid) and apply the same, less costs and expenses of operation and collection (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees) to payment of the obligations secured hereby in such order as Beneficiary may determine. The collection of such Rents or the entering upon and taking possession of the Property, or the application of the Rents as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done in response to such default or pursuant to such notice of default. Trustor also hereby authorizes Beneficiary upon such entry, at its option, to take over and assume the management, operation and maintenance of the Property and to perform all acts Beneficiary in its sole discretion deems necessary and proper and to expend such sums out of Rents as may be needed in connection therewith, in the same manner and to the same extent as Trustor theretofore could do (including, without limitation, the right to enter into new leases, to cancel, surrender, alter or amend the terms of and/or renew existing leases, and/or to make concessions to tenants). Trustor hereby releases all claims of any kind or nature against Beneficiary arising out of such management, operation and maintenance, excepting the liability of Beneficiary to account as hereinafter set forth.

Further, that the Visalia 144 Trust Deed and the Hanford 216 Trust Deed contain identical language.

In support of the appointment of receiver, Plaintiffs note Defendants' January, 2026 Profit and Loss shows that the Project is generating rental income, but Defendants refuse to turnover these funds, noting that “Defendants are paying themselves with rent money that lawfully belongs to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are forced to defend themselves in litigation against subcontractors that Defendants refused to pay, all while Plaintiffs enjoy the benefit of the Project's rental income.” (Declaration of Schiess ¶11.)

As to this issue, Defendant Daniel Bailey states that Defendants and Plaintiff have agreed that the rent collections are to be reinvested into the project to complete construction. (Declaration of Daniel Bailey 3:8-10.)

Further, that a receiver is necessary to “protect the existing tenants. Approximately 60 of the 216 units are leased. As demonstrated by the photos of the Project filed concurrently herewith, the Project lacks paving and solar, which creates a safety hazard for the existing tenants. A competent management team is necessary to ensure that the tenants are protected until the Project is completed.” (Declaration of Schiess ¶12.)

Additionally, that Defendants failed to properly insure the Project for months, and only procured insurance after extensive demands, leaving the Project vulnerable. (Declaration of Schiess ¶6.)

Further, the current tenant occupancy certificates are set to expire in June 2026 and if a receiver is not appointed, “it is almost certain that the City of Visalia will revoke the current certificates and refuse to issue any further certificates. Defendants' financial documents demonstrate it is mathematically impossible for them to complete the Project by June, 20 2026. The Project is not fully paved, which creates a significant safety hazard for the existing tenants, and there is not a competent management company for the existing tenants.” (Declaration of Schiess ¶13.)

On this issue, Defendant Daniel Bailey states Defendants have invested $174,000 over the last 30 days, in addition to the rents, as to asphalt deposit and insurance to maintain the Project. (Declaration of Daniel Bailey 3:11-16.)

Further, Defendant Daniel Bailey states that Plaintiffs have delayed draws, which as in turn, delayed the Project, resulting in non-payments to the general contractor and subcontractor. (Declaration of Daniel Bailey 3:20-25.)

Plaintiffs further seek:

“…[A] permanent injunction restraining and enjoining Defendants and their partners, members, managers, agents, employees, and representatives, and each of them, from engaging in, or performing, directly or indirectly, any of the following acts:

(a) Interfering, hindering, or molesting in any way the receiver in the performance of the receiver’s duties and any duties incidental thereto;

(b) Transferring, directly or indirectly, any interest by sale, pledge, grant of security interest, assignment, or encumbrance in any manner, in the property, and all proceeds thereof or transferring, concealing, destroying, defacing, or altering any books and records for the property;

(c) Demanding, collecting, receiving or in any other way diverting or using any of the rents, issues, profits or proceeds from the property;

(d) Causing any mail of Defendants to be forwarded to any addresses other than Defendants’ business address, or otherwise interfering with or intercepting any mail intended for Defendants;

(e) Failing or refusing to immediately turn over to the receiver all monies, checks, funds or proceeds belonging to or for the benefit of Defendants, and all premises from which Defendants conduct business; and

(f) Such and other further injunctive relief sought by Plaintiffs in any of the receiver’s work, as described in motions and applications as may be separately filed with the Court.” (Complaint – Prayer.)

On April 22, 2026, Plaintiffs filed this ex parte motion for appointment of a receiver and for injunctive relief. On April 24, 2026, the Court set this matter for hearing May 14, 2026.

Authority and Analysis

Appointment of Receiver

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 564(b)(2), (9), (11) and (12) Plaintiff seeks the appointment of a receiver as Plaintiffs are an assignee under an assignment of leases, rents, issues and profits, as seeking specific performance under the various loan and trust deed documents.

Section 564(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure states, in part, the following:

(b) A receiver may be appointed by the court in which an action or proceeding is pending, or by a judge of that court, in the following cases:

(2) In an action by a secured lender for the foreclosure of a deed of trust or mortgage and sale of property upon which there is a lien under a deed of trust or mortgage, where it appears that the property is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured, or that the condition of the deed of trust or mortgage has not been performed, and that the property is probably insufficient to discharge the deed of trust or mortgage debt. …

(9) In all other cases where necessary to preserve the property or rights of any party

(11) In an action by a secured lender for specific performance of an assignment of rents provisions in a deed of trust, mortgage, or separate assignment document. The appointment may be continued after entry of a judgment for specific performance if appropriate to protect, operate, or maintain real property when encumbered by a deed of trust or mortgage or to collect rents therefrom while a pending nonjudicial foreclosure under power of sale in a deed of trust or mortgage is being completed.

(12) In a case brought by an assignee under an assignment of leases, rents, or profits pursuant to subdivision (g) of Section 2938 of the Civil Code.”

Here, Plaintiffs focus on (b)(12) of the Code of Civil Procedure, section 564, noting further that Civil Code section 2938 provides:

“Upon default of the assignor under the obligation secured by the assignment of rents, leases, issues, and profits, the assignee shall be entitled to enforce the assignment in accordance with this section. . . The assignment shall be enforced by one or more of the following: (1) The appointment of a receiver”

The Court notes “…at the outset that the availability of other remedies does not, in and of itself, preclude the use of a receivership…Rather, a trial court must consider the availability and efficacy of other remedies in determining whether to employ the extraordinary remedy of a receivership.” (City and County of San Francisco v. Daley (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 734, 745.)

Appointment of a receiver is recognized as “drastic” and “must be exercised with due regard to the facts presented in each particular case” because “‘[o]rdinarily, if there is any other remedy, less severe in its results, which will adequately protect the rights of the parties, a court should not take property out of the hands of its owners.’” (Alhambra-Shumway Mines, Inc. v. Alhambra Gold Mine Corp. (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 869, 873.)

"The appointment of a receiver is a drastic remedy and is one which should not be invoked unless there is an actual or threatened cessation or diminution of the business." (In re Jamison Steel Corp. (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 27, 35.)

Further, “although a trust deed's recital that upon default the beneficiary shall be entitled to the appointment of a receiver is not binding upon the courts, such a recital nevertheless has some evidentiary weight.” (Barclays Bank of California v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 593, 602.)

The Court, to start, cannot determine, at this time whether Defendants executed the second extension to March 31, 2026 of the due date under the promise that a forbearance agreement would be forthcoming and preclude default by that date. Further, Defendants raise issues as to an agreement regarding the use of the rents regarding their reinvestment into the Project, including attempts by Defendants to finalize various outstanding issues as to paving and insurance.

In the Court’s view, the least drastic remedy, insofar as the end of May 2026 is concerned, is the sale of the Subject Property in an amount well over the balance of the loan. Defendants represent that the sale is in escrow, set to close at the end of May 2026 and that the purchase price is $80,000,000. Where a lesser remedy is sufficient to protect Plaintiffs, the Court would be inclined to avoid the cost and formality of a receiver.

Such a sale, and repayment of the balance, would appear to cure the various issues as to accounting and collecting of rents, assignment thereof, and other issues presented by Plaintiffs.

As such, the Court will inquire at the hearing further as to the pending sale noted by Defendants.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Contreras, Gabriela vs. ACMPC California 6, LLC et al

Case No.:  VCU290391

Date:          May 14, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Continued Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to set the motion for final approval for January 21, 2027; 8:30 am; D1.

Facts

The Court previously continue this matter as to information to calculate the lodestar. On May 4, 2026, Plaintiff filed supplemental declarations addressing this issue.

Attorneys’ Fees

Attorneys’ fees of 33.3% of the gross settlement fund of $386,000 or $128,666.67 are sought.

Counsel has utilized the percentage of common fund methodology as well as provided adequate lodestar information to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee request.

Law Offices of Sahag Majarian II, APC indicates the firm as spent 17.4 hours at $900 per hour resulting in a lodestar of $15,660. (Declaration of Majarian II ¶6.) The Court notes that this rate are already higher than what is typically “…prevailing in the community for similar work.”  (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) The Court will reduce the rate here to $800 per hour, resulting in a modified base lodestar of $13,290.

Cohelan Khoury & Singer indicates the firm has spent a total of 213.3 hours on this matter at rates ranging from $1,250 to $175 per hour, resulting in a lodestar of $127,520. (Supplemental Declaration of Khoury ¶3.) As with the above, the Court will reduce these rates as follows:

Name	Stated Hourly Rate	Approved Hourly Rate	Hours	Total Adjusted Lodestar
Isam C. Khoury	$1,100	$850	26.9	$22,865
Michael P. Singer	$1,250	$850	15.7	$13,345
Jeff Geraci,	$900	$800	1.8	$1,440
Rosemary C. Khoury	$500	$350	143.6	$50,260
Amber Worden	$200	$125	18.1	$2,263
Matthew Atlas	$175	$100	7.2	$720
Total Adjusted Base Lodestar:	$90,893

Therefore, the combined, adjusted base lodestar amount is $104,813.

To award the $128,666.67, the Court would need to apply a multiplier of 1.23. The Court permits a maximum lodestar multiple of 1.5 in these cases. As such, the Court approves the fees as requested.

Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $386,000 are preliminarily approved as follows:

Preliminarily Approved Attorney Fees (33.3%):	$128,666.67
Preliminarily Approved Attorney Costs (up to):	$35,000.00
Preliminarily Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :	$5,000.00
Preliminarily Approved Settlement Administrator Costs	$6,850.00
Preliminarily Approved Total PAGA Payment:	$11,580.00
Preliminarily Approved Net Settlement Amount	$198,903.33

The Court, therefore, grants the motion. The Court sets the motion for final approval for January 21, 2027; 8:30 am; D1.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Barriga, Marina vs. Mineral King Radiological Medical Group, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU305834

Date:          May 14, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Continued Motion for Preliminary Approval

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to set the motion for final approval for January 21, 2027; 8:30 am; D1.

Facts

The Court previously continue this matter as to information to calculate the lodestar. On April 29, 2026, Plaintiff filed a supplemental declaration addressing this issue.

Attorneys’ Fees

Attorneys’ fees of 33.3% of the gross settlement fund of $287,500 or $95,833.33 are sought here.

Counsel has utilized the percentage of common fund methodology as well as provided adequate lodestar information to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee request.

Here, Counsel indicates that the firm has spent 116.5 hours at rates ranging from $1,045 to $250 per hour resulting in a base lodestar of $78,162. (Supplemental Declaration of Bliznets ¶ 23.)

The Court notes that these rates are already higher than what is typically “…prevailing in the community for similar work.”  (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) The Court, therefore, adjusts the hourly rates as follows:

Name	Stated Hourly Rate	Approved Hourly Rate	Hours	Total Adjusted Lodestar
Antonia Bliznets	$585	$450	40.6	$18,270
Roman Shkodnik	$1,045	$850	23.7	$20,145
Amanda Fazio	$475	$400	23.4	$9,360
Robert Payaslyan	$585	$450	11.9	$5,355
Enoch Kim	$1,045	$850	8.9	$7,565
Mason Doidge	$475	$400	.3	$120
Jose Lopez	$300	$200	3.9	$780
Katheryn Perez	$250	$150	3.1	$465
Sasha Zambrano	$250	$150	.3	$45
Janet Linares	$250	$150	.3	$45
Jonathan Morataya	$300	$200	.1	$20
Total Adjusted Base Lodestar:	$62,170

Therefore, the award the $95,833.33 requested, the Court would need to apply a multiplier of 1.5. The Court permits a maximum lodestar multiple of 1.5 in these cases. As such, the Court approves the fees as requested.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $287,500 are preliminarily approved as follows:

Preliminarily Approved Attorney Fees (33.3%):	$95,833.33
Preliminarily Approved Attorney Costs (up to):	$20,000.00
Preliminarily Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff:	$5,000.00
Preliminarily Approved Settlement Administrator Costs	$3,590.00
Preliminarily Approved PAGA Payment	$28,000.00
Preliminarily Approved Net Settlement Amount	$135,076.67

The Court, therefore, grants the motion. The Court sets the motion for final approval for January 21, 2027; 8:30 am; D1.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared Wednesday, May 13, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054001	In the Matter of Douma, Darlene Fay	Letters of Administration	Recommended for Approval
VPR052457	In the Matter of Dodds, Donald R.	Petition Hearing	Appearance Required	Contested. Declarations filed
VPR050556	In the Matter of Roman, Guadalupe	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Creditor's Claim filed on 11/22/2021 by AscensionPoint Recovery obo Citibank, N.A. (Citi Mastercard) not addressed in Petition/Allowance or Rejection of Creditor’s Claim not filed with the court, CRC rule 7.401
VPR052201	In the Matter of Rahman, Kazi Shajedur	Final Distribution Hearing	Recommended for Approval
VPR053870	In the Matter of Albarran, Kyle Jose Jesus	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053681	In the Matter of LeBeau, Jeffrey Stewart	Contested Hearing – Conservatorship	Appearance Required	Investigation not completed
VPR053379	In the Matter of Hernandez, Sergio Hector	Motion Hearing	Appearance Required	Motion hearing continued
VPR050677	In the Matter of Saechao, Sadie	OSC Hearing	Appearance Required	Failure to file accounting and appraisal
VPR050199	In the Matter of Boykin, Thelma	OSC Hearing	Appearance Required	Failure to file accounting

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared Thursday, May 14, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR054028	In the Matter of Yraceburu, Richard Joseph	Letters of Administration	Recommended for Approval
PPR053310	In the Matter of Long, Beverly Jane	Final Distribution Hearing	Approval Conditional	Approval upon review of proposed order to be submitted