Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, July 2, 2026, are:

Re:                Correa, Estella vs. FCA US, LLC

Case No.:  VCU332542

Date:          July 2, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      (1) Order to Show Cause as to Change of Venue re: Defendant; (2) Order to Show Cause as to Change of Venue re: Plaintiff; Defendant FCA’s Motions to Compel Mandatory Initial Depositions of (3) Plaintiff Estella Correa and (4) Plaintiff Sofia Cruz; Sanctions

Tentative Ruling: (1) and (2): To order this matter transferred to Kings County. Case Management Conference is continued to September 22, 2026; 8:30 am; D1 to verify transfer.  If transferred, no appearances required.

Facts and Analysis Common to (1) and (2)

In this Song Beverly matter, Plaintiffs’ allege a February 28, 2021, purchase of a 2021 Jeep Cherokee, VIN 1C4PJMLB2MD157009 (the “Vehicle”) from Defendant Hanford Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram, located in Kings County. (FAC ¶5.)

The Court has set orders to show cause hearings as to both Plaintiffs and Defendants as to why this matter should not be transferred to Kings County.

No response by either side has been provided regarding the venue issue.

Therefore the Court orders this case transferred to the County where Plaintiffs allege they purchased the Vehicle, Kings County.

Facts and Analysis Common to (3) and (4)

There is no tentative ruling on these motions.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Salinas, Olivel vs. Dinuba Police Department

Case No.:   VCU329523

Date:           July 2, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Defendant’s (1) Demurrer; (2) Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling: (1) To overrule the demurrer; (2) To deny the motion to strike; to order Defendants to answer the complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing. Case Management Conference is continued to July 30, 2026; 8:30 am; D1 to set trial dates.

Facts Common to (1) and (2)

The complaint in this matter alleges that Plaintiff suffered injuries via a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff sues Defendants Dinuba Police Department; City of Dinuba; Cesar Morales; and Does 1 to 100 for “general negligence” and “motor vehicle” negligence.

As to general negligence, the complaint alleges:

“1) Defendants so negligently owned, operated, maintained, entrusted, and/or controlled the subject vehicle to cause it to collide with Plaintiff's vehicle.

2) Defendants owed Plaintiff a legal duty or duties. Defendants breached their duty or duties to Plaintiff. Furthermore, pursuant to Government Code §§815.2, 815.4, 820 as well as Vehicle Code §§17001 and 17002, the public entity defendants are statutorily liable for their negligence and the negligence of their employees, and are exempt from immunity.

3) Defendants' vehicle did actually collide with Plaintiff's vehicle.

4) As a result, Defendants actually and proximately caused damages to Plaintiff and Plaintiff's vehicle, in an amount according to proof at trial.

5) Plaintiff is further informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendants were subject to and violated, among others, California Vehicle Code §§ 21056, 21453, 21800, 22350 and/or 23123 and these violations actually and legally caused Plaintiff's damages, the occurrence resulting in the damages was of a nature that the regulation was designed to prevent and Plaintiff was among the class of persons for whose protection the regulation was adopted.”

As to the second cause of action for motor vehicle negligence, Plaintiff pleads

“Furthermore, pursuant to Government Code §§815.2, 815.4, 820 as well as Vehicle Code §§17001 and 17002, the public entity defendants are statutorily liable for their negligence and the negligence of their employees, and are exempt from immunity”

Defendants demurrer to the first cause of action on the basis that general negligence theories cannot be pled against public entities and that the first cause of action is uncertain because “it improperly combines a common-law general negligence theory with conclusory references to statutory duties and duplicative allegations already encompassed by Plaintiff’s separately pled motor vehicle cause of action.”

Defendants state “Defendants admit Officer CESAR MORALES was acting within the course and scope of his employment with the City of Dinuba at the time of the incident alleged in the Complaint. (Zimmer Decl., ¶¶ 5-6.) In light of that admission, Plaintiff’s direct-negligence allegations concerning negligent entrustment, hiring, supervision, training, retention, maintenance, control, and similar theories are unnecessary, duplicative, irrelevant, and improper under Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148.”

As to the motion to strike, Defendants seek to strike all allegations found under the first cause of action, all allegations stating Defendant City and PD entrusted, hired, supervised, trained, retained, maintained, controlled, or otherwise directly caused the subject incident, all allegations that Defendants “negligently owned, operated, maintained, entrusted and/or controlled” the subject vehicle, to the extent those allegations are asserted against Defendants City and PD as independent direct-negligence theories and all allegations “…asserting or implying that Plaintiff may pursue discovery or liability theories directed to Officer Morales’s hiring, training, supervision, retention, discipline, personnel file, prior incidents, or similar employment-related issues after Defendants’ course-and-scope admission.”

In opposition, Plaintiff notes the declaration of Defendants’ counsel constitutes extrinsic evidence beyond the four corners of the complaint and must be disregarded on demurrer. Further, that duplication is not a grounds for demurrer. 

Authority and Analysis

(1) Demurrer

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

As such, the Court disregards the declaration of counsel for Defendants.

Public Entity Liability

The starting point is that, except as otherwise provided by statute, “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.”  (Gov. Code § 815(a).)  “[T]his section ‘abolished all common law or judicially declared forms of liability for public entities, except for such liability as may be required by the federal or state Constitution. Thus, in the absence of some constitutional requirement, public entities may be liable only if a statute declares them to be liable’ [Citation.]”  (Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1457.)  It has been recognized that it is impermissible to sue a public entity for common law negligence. (Torres v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 844, 850.) 

Government tort claims must be pled with particularity. (Susman v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 809.) They must also be grounded in statute. (Gov. Code § 815; E.L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach (1978) 21 Cal.3d 497, 512, fn. 9.)

Further, “[a]lthough the Act provides that a public employee generally is liable for an injury caused by his or her act or omission 'to the same extent as a private person' (Gov. Code, § 820, subd. (a)) and that, when the act or omission of the public employee occurs in the scope of employment the public entity will be vicariously liable for the injury (Gov. Code, § 815.2), the Act contains no provision similarly providing that a public entity generally is liable for its own conduct or omission to the same extent as a private person or entity. Rather, the Act provides that a public entity is not liable for an injury '[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute ....' (Gov. Code, § 815.) Certain statutes do provide expressly for public entity liability in circumstances that are somewhat parallel to the potential liability of private individuals and entities but, as past cases have explained, '"[T]he intent of the [Tort Claims Act] is not to expand the rights of plaintiffs in suits against governmental entities, but to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances ...."' [Citation.]" (Id. at 1127-1128.)

Koussaya v. City of Stockton (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 909, 943 summarizes the theories of recovery against a public entity as follows:

“When a party is injured by a tortfeasor and seeks to affix liability on the tortfeasor's employer, the injured party ordinarily must demonstrate either (1) the  employer violated a duty of care it owed to the injured party and this negligence was a proximate cause of the resulting injury (the direct liability theory), or (2) the tortfeasor-employee was liable for committing the tortious conduct that caused the injury while acting within the course and scope of his or her employment (the vicarious liability theory). [Citation.] When the employer is a governmental agency, the statutory framework permits the injured party to pursue the vicarious liability theory in accordance with these general common law principles. [Citation.] However, the statutory framework requires, as a condition to the injured party's recovery on a direct liability theory against a governmental agency, that the injured party identify a ‘specific statute declaring [the entity] to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care’ by the agency in favor of the injured party. [Citations.]” (de Villers v. County of San Diego (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 238, 247–248, fn. omitted)”

In other words: “[T]he public entities' potential liability…has two sources: (1) the public entities' liability based on their own conduct and legal obligations, and (2) the public entities' liability, based on respondeat superior principles, for the misconduct of their employees that occurred in the scope of their employment.” (de Villers, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at 251-252.)

First and Second Cause of Action

Here, the Court finds sufficient differences between the two causes of action, where the first adds that Defendant City “negligently owned, operated, maintained, entrusted, and/or controlled the subject vehicle” and the second lacks this contention. In any event, the first cause of action contains sufficient statutory references which allege liability against a government entity under either a direct liability theory or vicarious liability theory. As such, the Court does not find these causes of action wholly duplicative. Disregarding the extrinsic evidence presented by declaration, the Court overrules the demurrer to the first cause of action.

(2) Motion to Strike

Any party may file a timely notice of a motion to strike the whole or any part of a pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b).) The motion may seek to strike any “irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading” or any part of the pleading “not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) Irrelevant allegations include allegations that are not essential to the statement of a claim, allegations that are not pertinent to or supported by the claim and demands for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b), (c).)

As with the demurrer, the Court may not consider extrinsic evidence on the motion to strike. Further, the Court cannot strike unidentified allegations nor allegations that may “imply” direct liability for common law negligence, negligent entrustment or other negligence theories. Further, the Court will not preemptively restrict discovery in this matter.

As such, the Court denies the motion to strike.  

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              Graham, Michael vs. CA Farms, LLC

Case No.: VCU324716

Date:         July 2, 2026

Time:         8:30 A.M. 

Dept.         1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:    Motion to Coordinate

Tentative Ruling:  To deny the motion.

This case was recently consolidated with Conterra Agricultural Capital, LLC v. Prosperity Farms, LLC, et al., case no. PCU325122, with this case designated as the lead case.

This case was commenced as a declaratory relief action, wherein Michael and Cynthia Graham sought, and still seek, a declaration that any encumbrance on a 400-acre ranch known as “Tulare 20,” without their consent, “is invalid and void.”  The complaint alleges Tulare 20 was owned by an entity called “Prosperity Farms Ranch 20, LLC” (Prosperity R20); that Prosperity R20 is owned 50% by the Grahams and 50% by defendant CA Farms, LLC (CA Farms), whose majority owner is defendant Ron Cook; and that defendants were attempting to encumber Tulare 20 “with loans or other liens.”   

PCU325122 is a receivership action initiated by Conterra Agricultural Capital, LLC (Conterra), but as pertains to the basis supporting consolidation of that case with this one, it also involves a cross-complaint by the Grahams, which states claims arising from allegations that Cook, without any disclosure to the Grahams, transferred title to Tulare 20 to Prosperity R20; that Cook, through an entity he allegedly controlled, Corporate American Lending, Inc. (CAL), recorded a deed of trust against Tulare 20 purporting to secure a $2.5 million loan; and that Cook assigned the beneficial interest in the loan to an entity they identify as SA9 Properties, LLC. 

The Grahams now seek to coordinate a Fresno County Superior Court case, case number 25CECG03816, Michael Graham and Cynthia Graham v. CA Farms, LLC, et al., with this now consolidated matter.  The Fresno case was commenced, like this case, as a declaratory relief action, and is of a similar tenor.  The Grahams seek a declaration that any encumbrance on real property located at 2505 E. Copper Avenue, in the city of Clovis (Clovis Property), “is invalid and void.”  The complaint in the Fresno case alleges the Clovis Property 20 was owned by an entity called “Prosperity Development, LLC” (Prosperity Development); that Prosperity Development is owned 50% by the Grahams and 50% by defendant CA Farms, whose majority owner is defendant Ron Cook; and that defendants were attempting to encumber the Clovis Property “with loans or other liens.”     

The Grahams’ cross-complaint in PCU325122 identifies Prosperity Development as a defendant, and includes allegations that Cook induced the Grahams to invest in the acquisition of the Clovis Property and that, “[t]o that end, the parties formed [Prosperity Development], which acquired [the Clovis Property]” with “profits” from another entity owned jointly by the Grahams and CA Farms, Prosperity Farms, LLC (Prosperity).  Notable, here, the Grahams also allege in the cross-complaint that Tulare 20 was originally acquired by Prosperity, and that they “believed the monies to fund the transaction were from [Prosperity’s] operating account.”

The Grahams’ cross-complaint includes two causes of action for judicial dissolution of both Prosperity R20 and Prosperity Development (amongst 15 other causes of action), and includes, as with Prosperity R20, allegations of malfeasance by the named cross-defendants relating to Prosperity Development. The Grahams’ specifically request expressly, with respect to Prosperity Development, “an order of sale of all real property owned by Prosperity Development, LLC.”

As of this court’s last check of the docket, no opposition to the Grahams’ motion has been filed.  According to the Grahams’ counsel, Jacob Sarabian, he sent a letter, dated March 26, 2026, to counsel for Cook and CA Farms, Russell Georgeson, as well as counsel for the other relevant parties, requesting stipulation to the consolidation and coordination of the Fresno case and the now consolidated Tulare cases (this case and PCU325122), and Georgeson responded with a letter that stated, in full:   “In response to your March 26, 2026 letter: No.”

ANALYSIS

Code of Civil Procedure section 403 permits a judge, on motion, to “transfer an action … from another court to that judge’s court for coordination with an action involving a common question of fact or law within the meaning of [Code of Civil Procedure] Section 404,” provided the actions are not complex.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 403.)  Complex actions may also be coordinated, but following a different procedure provided under Code of Civil Procedure section 404.

The motion must be supported by an affidavit “showing that the actions meet the standards specified in Section 404.1, are not complex as defined by the Judicial Council and that the moving party has made a good faith effort to obtain agreement to the transfer from all parties to each action.”  (See also Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.500, subd. (c) [the same requirements for a supporting “declaration,” while also adding that the declaration must state facts showing that “[t]he moving party has notified all parties of their obligation to disclose to the court any information they may have concerning any other motions requesting transfer of any case that would be affected by the granting of the motion before the court.”].)

The Grahams maintain, and their attorney avers in a declaration, that the actions are not complex because they “present straightforward business disputes” and “involve claims for declaratory relief, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and related equitable remedies arising from limited liability company governance and real property management.”

“In deciding whether an action is a complex case … , the court must consider, among other things, whether the action is likely to involve:

(1) Numerous pretrial motions raising difficult or novel legal issues that will be time-consuming to resolve;

(2) Management of a large number of witnesses or a substantial amount of documentary evidence;

(3) Management of a large number of separately represented parties;

(4) Coordination with related actions pending in one or more courts in other counties, states, or countries, or in a federal court; or

(5) Substantial postjudgment judicial supervision.”

The court is not persuaded, based on the Grahams cursory representations, that the actions are not complex based on these standards. 

There has been, since commencement of the consolidated actions in August of last year, 11 separate law and motion matters adjudicated in the consolidated cases.  The Grahams cross-complaint in PCU325122 states 17 causes of action arising, according to the cross-complaint, “from a decades-long scheme of fraud, deceit, and embezzlement” stretching back to the 1990s.  The number of witnesses and volume of documentary evidence is, the court surmises, potentially very high given the breadth of claims and relevant factual events.  On top of this, there are currently four separate pending cases, including the consolidated actions, involving one or more of the parties to this case, directly or indirectly relating to “business disputes” between the Grahams, Ron Cook, and entities associated with them.  At least six separate counsel representing different parties, or groups of parties, have appeared in the proceedings now consolidated. 

The Court has also reviewed and considered the remaining factors set forth in CCP 404.1, in addition to complexity, as follows:

1. Are common questions of fact and law predominant and significant to the litigation.

2. Does Coordination appear to present any issues regarding convenience of parties, witnesses or counsel

3.  The relative development of the actions and the work product of counsel.

4. Would Coordination facilitate effective utilization of judicial facilities and staff resources.

5. Would the calendar of the courts be unduly impacted.

6. The disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments supporting coordination.

7. Settlement of the actions without further litigation would be facilitated if coordination is permitted.

Analysis of these factors likewise supports denial of the request.

Given that the bulk of the claims are presented in the consolidated matters before this court, a settlement between the parties of their principal disputes would occur in the consolidated cases in this court and it, therefore, would be likely that further litigation would be required to resolve the outstanding Fresno case if coordination were denied. 

Accordingly, the court’s determination, at this stage, is that the appropriate procedure to seek coordination of the consolidated actions and the Fresno litigation is by way of a petition for coordination under Code of Civil Procedure section 404, and the Grahams’ motion is, therefore, denied.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Aidan Sollars vs. Visalia Unified School District a public entity

Case No.:   VCU320906

Date:           July 2, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Plaintiff’s Motion for Preferential Trial Date

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and confirm the preference as to the currently set trial date.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff was born October 30, 2012 and is currently 13 years old. (Declaration of Vespermann ¶7.) Further that all essential parties have been served with this action and have appeared. (Declaration of Vespermann ¶2.) Further, that Plaintiff is an injured party in this lawsuit, having alleged suffering of traumatic brain injuries. (Declaration of Vespermann ¶8.)

Trial in this matter is set for August 17, 2026.

However, Plaintiff indicates that the Court’s docket does not reflect that this matter has preferential status based on Plaintiff’s age pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 36(b).

As such, Plaintiff moves to obtain an order granting this matter preference as to the currently set trial date.

No opposition appears to have been filed as to this motion.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 36(b) specifically provides:

“A civil action to recover damages for wrongful death or personal injury shall be entitled to preference upon the motion of any party to the action who is under 14 years of age unless the court finds that the party does not have a substantial interest in the case as a whole. A civil action subject to subdivision (a) shall be given preference over a case subject to this subdivision.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 36(b).)

Here, Plaintiff is under 14 years old and has a substantial interest in this matter.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 36(c), a motion for trial preference by a party not older than 70 years of age must be accompanied by a declaration that all essential parties have been served with process or have appeared. (Code Civ. Proc. § 36(c)(1).)

Here, Plaintiff’s counsel has verified that all essential parties have been served or have appeared.

Trial preference under section 36(b) is mandatory. Peters v. Superior Court (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 218, 224 states: “In contrast to the use of “shall” in section 36, subdivisions (a) and (b), the Legislature used the term “may” in subdivisions (d) and (e), in each latter reference linking the word “may” with the phrase “in its discretion.” Thus, the Legislature made unmistakably clear that motions for preference under subdivisions (d) and (e) were not mandatory. Equally clear, by the omission of the phrase “in its discretion” and by the use of “shall” instead of “may,” is that subdivisions (a) and (b) were intended to be mandatory.”

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and confirms the status of preference for the scheduled trial date.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Alvarado, Blanca vs. Caltrans

Case No.:   VCU328832

Date:            July 2, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     (1) Kaweah’s Demurrer; (2) Plaintiff’s Motion re: Section 474 Doe Amendment

Tentative Ruling: (1) To sustain the demurrer with leave to amend; Plaintiff is ordered to file an amended complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing; (2) To deny the motion

(1) Kaweah’s Demurrer

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendants Caltrans and Kaweah Delta under “common counts” for injuries sustained while falling outside of Kaweah Delta Hospital on June 13, 2025. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit December 5, 2025.

The complaint does not identify Defendant Kaweah as a public entity and does not state that Plaintiff has complied with the claim presentation statute or been excused from complying.

On April 17, 2026, Defendant Kaweah filed this demurrer and request for judicial notice of Kaweah’s Certificate of Filing with California Secretary of State. Kaweah demurrers on the basis that the complaint fails to allege compliance with the claim presentation requirements.

No opposition appears to have been filed.

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

Judicial Notice

The request for judicial notice provides a copy of a certificate of filing with the Secretary of State for California. “A court may take judicial notice of documents in its own records and those reflecting the official acts of local and state agencies, including resolutions, minutes, and agendas. (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c), (d), (h); see Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 375, fn. 4)” (Julian Volunteer Fire Co. Assn. v. Julian-Cuyamaca Fire Protection Dist. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 583, 600.)

Under Elmore v. Oak Valley Hospital Dist. (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 716, 721, the statement filed with the Secretary of State become a public record and a document of which the court may properly take judicial notice. The Court therefore takes judicial notice of this document, as well as the “facts that can be deduced, and/or clearly derived from, its legal effect, such as the names and dates contained in the document, and the legal consequences of the document.” (Julian Volunteer Fire Co. Assn, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at 60

Therefore, the Court finds Kaweah has established it is a public entity.

Government Tort Claims Act Compliance

Defendant Kaweah brings this motion chiefly on the grounds that Plaintiff’s complaint has not demonstrated compliance with the Government Tort Claims Act and that it is now too late to comply.

California Government Code section 911.2 requires that such a claim be presented to the relevant public entity not more than six months after the accrual of the cause of action. Presentation of such a claim is a condition precedent to filing a suit against the public entity. (Cal. Govt. Code, § 945.4.) If the injured party fails to file a timely claim, “a written application may be made to the public entity for leave to present such claim.” (Cal. Govt. Code, § 911.4, subd. (a).) The deadline to apply to for leave to present a late claim is a reasonable time not to exceed one year. (Cal. Govt. Code, § 911.4, subd. (b).)

Important here, compliance with the presentation requirement must be stated in the complaint. (Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School Dist. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 27, 31 [holding “In those circumstances in which a claim must be presented, the plaintiff must allege compliance or circumstances excusing compliance, or the complaint is subject to general demurrer.”].)

Here, there is no statement of compliance with the Act in the complaint.

As such, the Court sustains the demurrer.

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

As such, the Court grants leave to amend and orders an amended complaint filed no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

(2) Plaintiff’s Motion re: Section 474 Doe Amendment

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendants Caltrans, Kaweah Delta and Does 1 through 10, has marked “common counts” and negligence as the causes of action, indicates Plaintiff has suffered “considerable bodily injuries” arising out of a slip and fall “just outside the entrance to the Visalia Kaweah Delta Hospital” that occurred “On before June 13, 2025.”

Further “Based upon the foregoing, evaluation and investigation of this matter, it is apparent that Delta Hospital and does, Caltrans, 1-10 was 100% at fault in causing me extreme financial hardship.”

The complaint attaches a claim for damages submitted to the City of Visalia on July 25, 2025 related to the incident described above.

The complaint further a letter from the City of Visalia stating “The claim you filed against the City of Visalia, referenced above, is misdirected. The City of Visalia is a separate public entity from Caltrans. Accordingly, you must file your claim with that entity.”

Via this motion, Plaintiff seeks to substitute Defendant City of Visalia as to Doe 1 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 474.

In support, Plaintiff declares that:

8. Shortly after the incident, I was not represented by an attorney. I was acting in propria persona—representing myself—without any legal training or education. I did not consult with a lawyer before taking the steps described below.

9. On or about July 25, 2025, I completed and signed a Claim for Damages form and submitted it to the City of Visalia's Risk Management Division. I filed this claim because the intersection where my injury occurred is physically located within the City of Visalia's municipal boundaries, and it seemed like the natural and obvious step for me to take. I understood at that time only that I had been injured at a location within the City's limits, and I believed the City might have some involvement, but I did not understand the specific legal basis for the City's liability or the City's particular role with respect to the storm drain catch basin inlet, signage, or the conditions at the intersection.

10. On September 29, 2025, I received a letter from the City of Visalia's Risk Management Division. The letter was signed by Andrew Guzman, Risk Manager. The letter stated that my claim was "misdirected" and that "the City of Visalia is a separate public entity from Caltrans." The letter further stated: "Accordingly, you must file your claim with that entity." The letter characterized any effort to involve the City of Visalia as "unmeritorious and frivolous" and warned that the City might seek to recover costs of defense pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 128.5 and 1038. The letter also informed me that my claim had been rejected by operation of law and that I had six months from the date of the notice to file a court action, citing Government Code section 945.6.

…

12. On December 5, 2025, I filed a civil Complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of Tulare, Visalia Courthouse. I prepared and filed this Complaint by myself, without the assistance of an attorney. In my Complaint, I named Caltrans and Kaweah Delta Hospital as defendants, along with Doe defendants 1 through 10.

…

14. I included Doe defendants 1 through 10 in my Complaint because I understood, based on my limited knowledge of the legal process, that there might be additional parties who bore responsibility for my injuries whose identities or specific roles I did not yet know. At the time of filing, I was genuinely ignorant of the specific facts establishing the City of Visalia's independent liability in connection with the storm drain catch basin inlet and the conditions at the intersection.

15. I want to be clear about what I knew and did not know at the time I filed my Complaint. I knew that the intersection where I was injured was located within the City of Visalia. I knew that I had filed a government tort claim with the City as a precaution, because the incident occurred within the City's boundaries. However, I did not know that the City of Visalia had independent control and authority over the placement of warning signage at the intersection or that the City had the authority to relocate or modify the storm drain catch basin inlet to remove it from the pedestrian path of travel. I did not know the specific facts that gave rise to a cause of action against the City distinct from and in addition to any claim against Caltrans. The City's own rejection letter confirmed my misunderstanding by telling me my claim against the City was misdirected and frivolous.”

Based on the above, Plaintiff argues ignorance as to the identify of the City of Visalia and ignorant of the facts giving rise to the cause of action against the City of Visalia.

Authority and Analysis

When a Plaintiff amends a complaint to add a new defendant, “the general rule is that [the] amended complaint … does not relate back to the date of filing the original complaint and the statute of limitations is applied as of the date the amended complaint is filed, not the date the original complaint is filed.”  (Woo v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 169, 176.)  “A recognized exception to the general rule is the substitution under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 474 of a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant named in the original complaint as to whom a cause of action was stated in the original complaint.”  (Id.) 

“Code of Civil Procedure section 474 permits a plaintiff to amend complaints by adding parties as Doe defendants when the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant at the time the complaint is filed. The purpose of section 474 is to enable a plaintiff to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations when he or she is ignorant of the identity of the defendant. The cases discussing section 474 deal with whether the plaintiff was truly ignorant of the identity of the person brought into the case as a Doe defendant because if that requirement is met, the amendment to the complaint relates back to the date the complaint was filed and the statute of limitations is preserved.” (Davis v. Marin (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 380, 386–387.)

"Section 474 contains two mandatory requirements, each of which must be met before the benefits of the statute may be claimed by a plaintiff. The first requirement is that of ignorance of the true name of the defendant. There are not many instances in the law where absolute ignorance is vital and may serve to advance a litigant's cause, but section 474 contains one. The decided cases have made it clear that a plaintiff's ignorance, to satisfy the statute, must be genuine, that is, real and not feigned. [Citations]… [¶] The second requirement of section 474 is that a plaintiff make a clear statement in his pleading that he is ignorant of the true name of the defendant sued by a fictitious name. [Citation]" (Stephens v. Berry (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 474, 477.)

'"Section 474…is restricted to the knowledge of the plaintiff at the time of the filing of the complaint.' [Citations] 'The lack of knowledge of the true name of the defendant…must be 'real and not feigned.' [Citation.]… 'Ignorance of the facts is the critical issue, and whether it be due to misinformation or negligence is not relevant.' [Citations.]' [Citations] Under section 474, therefore, a plaintiff has no duty 'to exercise reasonable diligence prior to filing the complaint to discover the defendant's identity.' [Citation]" (Balon v. Drosi (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 483, 487-488.)

The Court, starts with the statement in Fuller v. Tucker (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1172:

“…the normal situation for which the fictitious name statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 474, is designed: when the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of 'a defendant,' the plaintiff must file suit against the known wrongdoers, and, when the Doe's true name is discovered, the complaint may be amended accordingly. (Code Civ. Proc., § 474.)”

The “duty to investigate” or “diligence” that is relevant to the statute of limitations discussions “is not relevant to whether a Doe amendment is timely. (Code Civ. Proc., § 474.); Although it is true that a plaintiff's ignorance of the defendant's name must be genuine (in good faith) and not feigned [citations] and that a plaintiff need not be aware of each and every detail concerning a person's involvement before the plaintiff loses his ignorance [citations], it is equally true that the plaintiff does not relinquish her rights under section 474 simply because she has a suspicion of wrongdoing arising from one or more facts she does know. [Citations.]’ [citation omitted] Code of Civil Procedure ‘[s]ection 474 allows a plaintiff in good faith to delay suing particular persons as named defendants until [plaintiff] has knowledge of sufficient facts to cause a reasonable person to believe liability is probable.’ [citation omitted] ‘[S]ection 474 does not impose upon the plaintiff a duty to go in search of facts she does not actually have at the time she files her original pleading. [Citation.]’[citation omitted]” (Id. at 1172.)

The Fuller court applied these principles to its own case, noting first that the trial court incorrectly obligated the plaintiff to make a reasonable inquiry to discover the identity of the wrongdoer and the connection not the injury under a statute of limitations analysis. (Id. at 1172-1173.) The Fuller court noted that no evidence was presented that the plaintiff heard the doe doctor’s name during surgery. (Id. at 1173.) Further, the Fuller court noted that the mere existence of the doe doctor’s name in the medical records, without proof that the plaintiff had these records, did not prevent relation back to the initial filing of the complaint. (Id.) “In order for [the doe doctor] to successfully argue that the Doe amendment was untimely, he had to prove that even if [plaintiff] knew his identity, [plaintiff] also knew facts giving rise to a cause of action against [the doe doctor].” (Id.)

Here, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff truly ignorant as to the identity of the City of Visalia nor that Plaintiff was truly ignorant of the facts to cause a reasonable person to believe liability was probable based on the timely presentation of a government claim against the City of Visalia and that the incident is alleged to have occurred, via the allegations stated in the claim, when Plaintiff’s foot became stuck “on the storm sewer Drainage [sic].” Further, the attachments to the complaint appear to indicate the injury took place on the corner of a two public streets.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman and Nathan D. Ide

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared June 30, 2026 and July 1, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR049252	In the Matter of Ehrlich, Gerhard	Accounting Hearing and Attorney’s Fees	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053212	In the Matter of Navarrete, Margaret	Petition for Order Confirming Sale of Real Property	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054097	In the Matter of Gonzalez, Raul A.	Letters of Testamentary	Appearance Required	1. Petition Item 3g(1) omitted: regarding the appointment of executor, why the named executor cannot act:  Item 5 shows, decedent is survived by spouse/named executor. 2. Petition Item 5, (3) or (4) and (7) or (8) omitted: re any surviving registered domestic partner and issue of a predeceased child. 3. Petition Item 8: Age of beneficiaries omitted and all persons mentioned in the will to be listed as required. 4. Notice of Hearing not served on all parties required to be listed in Petition. 5. Original will not lodged. 6. Proposed Order: incomplete and date of will does not reflect petition.
VPR053738	In the Matter of Pena, Joan Carol	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	Previous issues remain
VPR054148	In the Matter of Orduno, Maria Guadalupe	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Recommended for Approval
VPR054137	In the Matter of Faust, James Ethan	Spousal Property Hearing	Recommended for Approval
VPR053365	In the Matter of Bockmagill, Marie Antonie	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Agreement of total attorney’s fees not specified for court approval of the allowance of compensation, Prob C § 10831(d)
VPR054145	In the Matter of Lopez, Gricel	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054144	In the Matter of Lopez, Yesenia	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054012	In the Matter of Sanchez-Palomera, Ximena Itzel	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Order Appointing Court Investigator (GC-330) not filed
VPR053681	In the Matter of LeBeau, Jeffrey Stewart	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Contested Hearing
VPR053027	In the Matter of Hernandez, Merejilda Ortega Pimental	OSC Hearing	Appearance Required	Regarding dismissal

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         Probate calendar for June 25, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR053470	In the Matter of Gonzalez, Rita Maria	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing not served on all relatives within the 2nd degree; ProbC§1822
PPR054049	In the Matter of Akin, Samie Jane	Petition to Determine Trust Asset	Recommended for Approval
PPR054064	In the Matter of Gasco, Gregory	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	Waiver of Bond not filed by all heirs: missing petitioner’s, Prob C §8481(a)(2) Petition Item at #3e omitted: regarding bond Order not lodged
PPR054087	In the Matter of Moraga, Rita	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	Not filed- Proof of Publication Waiver of Bond not filed by all heirs, Prob C §8481(a)(2) Not filed- Notice of Petition to Administer Estate (DE-121)
PPR053968	In the Matter of Perez, Rosita	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	1. Petition Item 5a(3) or (4) omitted: re any surviving registered domestic partner 2. Original will to be lodged with attached translated copy, CRC RULE 3.1110(g) 3. Publication not in accordance with Probate C § 8120:  Three publications in a newspaper published once a week or more often, with at least five days intervening between the first and last publication dates, not counting the publication dates, are sufficient.
PPR054109	In the Matter of Galbraith, Margie Fay	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance required	Issue re Petition Item 11(2): facts upon which the petitioner bases the allegation that the described real property was the decedent’s primary residence, Prob C § 13152(a)(2)
PPR054110	In the Matter of Hubble, Alvin C.	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance required	Petition to be signed by all successors/decedent’s children, Prob C § 13152(a)   (re email signature)

South County Justice Center & Visalia-County Civic Center

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared  June  29 - July 1, 2026 that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date	Dept	Case	Comments
6/29/26	Dept 1	VPR047904; IMO  A.J.S.	Notice of Hearing (GC-020) has not been filed indicating service was completed for MINOR, FATHER, and MOTHER
6/30/26	Dept 1	VPR053854; IMO  J.S.	Proof of other state appointment has not been filed
6/30/26	Dept 1	VPR053361; IMO  B.C.	Notice of Hearing (GC-020) has not been filed indicating service was completed pursuant to Probate Code §1460
6/30/26	Dept 9	VPR052004; IMO  A.L.P.	Notice of Hearing (GC-020) has not been filed indicating service was completed pursuant to Probate Code §1460 NOT FILED- FORM EFS-005-CV, Consent to Electronic Service and Notice of Electronic Service Address, pursuant to CCP §1010.6; CRC 2.251.
6/30/26	Dept 2	VPR044873; IMO  J.E.	Accounting filed
6/30/26	Dept 9	VPR053983; IMO  A.W.	Matter submitted
6/30/26	Dept 19	PPR054176; IMO  I.A.C.	Notice of Hearing (GC-020) has not been filed indicating Petition for Temporary Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §2250(e)(3). NOT LODGED- Order Appointing Temporary Guardian & Letters of Temporary Guardianship
6/30/26	Dept 19	PPR054174; IMO  R.E.S.	Notice of Hearing (GC-020) has not been filed indicating Petition for Temporary Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §2250(e)(3). NOT LODGED- Order Appointing Temporary Guardian & Letters of Temporary Guardianship, needs to indicate Successor Appointment. Declaration of Due Diligence has not been filed for Mother
7/1/26	Dept 1	VPR053657; IMO A.G.	Matter submitted