Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Monday, June 1, 2026, are:

Re:                Munger Bros., LLC vs. Nutrien AG Solutions, Inc.

Case No.:  VCU311567

Date:           June 1, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:    Defendants’ Continued Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Jeffrey R. Baron

Tentative Ruling: To grant the application

Facts and Analysis

The Court’s file indicates that timely and proper notice was given to all parties affected to attorney Baron’s applications to appear pro hac vice for Defendants. Further, the Court notes Baron’s declaration filed May 15, 2026 contains all the requisite information as to this application.

The Court finds that attorney Baron meets the statutory requirements under California Rule of Court 9.40(a) to submit applications to appear pro hac vice before this Court, and that the contents of the application of attorney Baron indicates association with California counsel Joshua N. Kastan of DKM Law Group LLP, and as such meet the statutory requirements of California Rule of Court 9.40(c) and (d). The Court’s file for this matter further indicates that that the applicable fees that must be paid to the State Bar of California under Rule 9.40(e) to support applications for admission pro hac vice have been tendered to the State Bar.

The Court further notes that attorney Baron’s application meets the statutory requirements under California Rule of Court 9.40(d) for pro hac vice applications and that the prior appearances before the courts in this state are not sufficiently numerous to warrant denial of this application under California Rule of Court 9.40(b).

Based on the foregoing, the application of Baron to appear as counsel pro hac vice for Defendants in this action is granted.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. vs. Rogers, Douglas W

Case No.:  VCL304372

Date:           June 1, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Enter Judgment Pursuant to Stipulation

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and enter judgment as requested.

Facts

In this breach of contract and common counts matter, Plaintiff alleges damages of $10,810.03.

Defendant was served with the summons and complaint, but did not file an answer.

On June 10, 2024, the parties filed a stipulation for entry of judgment and dismissal with retention of jurisdiction pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

The stipulation required one payment of $410.03 on or before April 7, 2024 and monthly payments of $400 thereafter until the total of $10,810.03 was paid. In the event of breach, Plaintiff may recover costs.

On June 24, 2024, the matter was dismissed pursuant to the stipulation.

On March 26, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion for entry of judgment pursuant to the stipulation. Plaintiff indicates payments of $4,010.03, resulting in a balance of $6,800. Plaintiff further seeks $300 in costs.

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states: 

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1360.)

As indicated above, the Court retained jurisdiction over the parties and this matter and therefore is prepared to “enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”

Therefore, the Court enters judgment as requests in the amount of $7,100, consisting of $10,810.03 in principal minus $4,010.03 in payments, plus $300 in costs.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                County of Tulare vs. Bail Hotline Bail Bonds

Case No.:   VCL331936

Date:           June 1, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment re: Bond Forfeiture

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts

This matter involves the posting of a bond by an agent of Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc., for the release of Angie Hernandez Bernal in felony case no. VCF470954. Bernal was ordered to appear in court on August 22, 2025, at 8:30 am and failed to appear at that time.

On August 22, 2025, the trial court forfeited the bond and sent notice of forfeiture to the defendant. The Clerk’s Certificate of Service by Mail indicates the clerk sent the notice to:

BAIL HOTLINE BAIL BONDS 3230 VINE ST STE 200 RIVERSIDE, CA 92507

FINANCIAL CASUALTY & SURETY, INC. 3131 EASTSIDE ST STE 250 HOUSTON, TX 77098

On March 3, 2026, the trial court mailed a notice of entry of summary judgment to the defendants at the following addresses:

BAIL HOTLINE BAIL BONDS 3230 VINE ST STE 200 RIVERSIDE, CA 92507

FINANCIAL CASUALTY & SURETY, INC. 3131 EASTSIDE ST STE 250 HOUSTON, TX 77098

On March 30, 2026, the defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Summary Judgement.

The Plaintiff filed their response on May 18, 2026.

Authority and Analysis

There Was Service of the Order Forfeiting Bail

Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 1013a, subd. (4) states,

In case of service by the clerk of a court of record, a certificate by that clerk setting forth the exact title of the document served and filed in the cause, showing the name of the clerk and the name of the court of which he or she is the clerk, and that he or she is not a party to the cause, and showing the date and place of deposit in the mail, the name and address of the person served as shown on the envelope, and also showing that the envelope was sealed and deposited in the mail with the postage thereon fully prepaid. This form of proof is sufficient for service of process in which the clerk or deputy clerk signing the certificate places the document for collection and mailing on the date shown thereon, so as to cause it to be mailed in an envelope so sealed and so addressed on that date following standard court practices. Service made pursuant to this paragraph, upon motion of a party served and a finding of good cause by the court, shall be deemed to have occurred on the date of postage cancellation or postage meter imprint as shown on the envelope if that date is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailing contained in the certificate.

Here, a deputy clerk of the California State Superior Court, County of Tulare certified on August 22, 2025, that she mailed the Notice of Order Forfeiting Bail. Specifically, the Clerk’s Certificate of Service by Mail states:

I certify that I am not a party to this cause.

I certify that I placed the Notice of Order Forfeiting Bail for collection and mailing on the date shown, so as to cause it to be mailed in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid on that date following standard court practices to the persons and addresses shown. The mailing and this certification occurred at Porterville, California on August 22, 2025.

The Notice Was Presumed Received Pursuant to Evid. Code § 641

“A letter correctly addressed and properly mailed is presumed to have been received in the ordinary course of mail.” (Evid. Code § 641.)

Here, the Notice of Order Forfeiting Bail was correctly addressed to Bail Hotline Bail Bonds and Financial Casualty and Surety, Inc., at the addresses listed on the bond pursuant to Pen. Code § 1305, subd. (b) and properly mailed by the clerk.

Consequently, the Notice of Order Forfeiting Bail was presumed to have been received in the ordinary course of mail.

The Presumption Created By Evid. Code § 641 Was Properly Rebutted Pursuant to Evid. Code § 604

Evid. Code § 604 states,

The effect of a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence is to require the trier of fact to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence, in which case the trier of fact shall determine the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact from the evidence and without regard to the presumption. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the drawing of any inference that may be appropriate.

In Bonzer v. City of Huntington Park (1993) 20 Cal. App. 4th 1474, 1476, the Court reversed the trial court’s denial of the City’s Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 473 motion. There, Bonzer filed a petition for a writ of mandate and properly served the respondents. (Id. at 1477.) Bonzer then filed a “Notice of Motion and Motion to Apply for Preemptory Writ of Mandate” and served it by mail. (Id.) On the date of the hearing, none of the respondents appeared and the trial court granted the motion. (Id.) The City then filed a Civ. Pro. Code § 473 motion. (Id.) In support of the City’s motion, it provided six declarations declaring that none of the defendants received the mailed notice of the motion. (Id. at 1479.) The trial court denied the motion and the City appealed. (Id. at 1477.)

The Court reversed the trial court’s decision reasoning, “[u]pon presentation of appellant’s detailed, credible, and unimpeached evidence of no actual notice –the presumption of such notice ceased to exist. The only remaining effect of the ‘Proof of Service’ declaration was to enable the trial court to draw ‘any inference that may be appropriate.’” (Id. at 1481.) The Court also noted that besides the proof of service, the six declarations declaring that there was no actual notice, “was neither impeached or contradicted.” (Id. at 1480.)

Here, Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc., put forth a declaration from Christopher Ramos, an employee of Bail Hotline Bail Bonds. He declared that he is the one who handles the bond forfeitures received by the trial court.

He further declared that when a notice of forfeiture is received, it is inputted into their system and processes them to assign a fugitive recovery agent to start the investigation process. If the investigator is unable to locate the defendant within the 180 day period, a motion to extend time is filed.

After receiving the notice of summary judgment from the trial court, he checked their records and verified that the Bail Hotline did not receive the forfeiture notice and did not have a notice of forfeiture on file. Consequently, the process laid out above did not take place.

Christopher Ramos’ declaration is detailed and credible evidence that no actual notice took place. Due to there being no impeachment evidence presented by the county, the presumption of actual notice created by Evid. Code § 641 ceased to exist.

However, unlike in Bonzer, where the Court only could draw a mere inference from the proof of service declaration made pursuant to Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 1013a, subd. (3) because it did not attest to actually mailing the notices or to having personal knowledge they were mailed, the court clerk did attest that she placed the Notice of Order Forfeiting Bail for collection and mailing on the date shown, so as to cause it to be mailed in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid on that date following standard court practices to the persons and addresses shown.

Weighing the inference of actual notice drawn from the court clerk’s declaration pursuant to Evid. Code § 604 against Christopher Ramos’ declaration, the Court finds that there was actual notice because if the Notice of Bail Forfeiture was deposited in the mail, it was sent. If it was sent, then it should have been delivered or received back by the court as undeliverable.

The Court cannot surmise why Bail Hotline Bail Bonds did not process it pursuant to its normal course of business. However, it was delivered.

Between both copies being sent to two different addresses, one of them must have received it. Further, Bernal had two different cases with two different bonds. A Notice of Bail Forfeiture was sent for each of these bonds and cases to both the bail agency and surety. Between these four mailings, the bail agency or surety would have had to receive at least one of them. What they did with it after receiving it, is beyond the scope of this hearing.

Further, Christopher Ramos’ declaration does not demonstrate a specific reason they would not have received actual notice. For example, it does not state that the clerk sent the notice to the wrong address, the post office removed their mailbox, the post office prevented them from accessing their P.O. box, etc. Instead, the Court is expected to accept that the post office must have lost the notice without any evidence to support this contention and that Bail Hotline Bail Bonds always follows their mail intake procedure with no error. In the alternative, the Court would have to believe the court clerk did not actually mail the notice, which is improbable. 

The Court also notes that the Notice of Entry of Summary Judgment was sent to the exact same addresses that the Notice of Forfeiture was sent to. There is no explanation as to why Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. received the notice of summary judgment but not the notice of forfeiture.

Lastly, as the County points out, the declaration of Adrian Auilera, an employee of Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. declared that Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc.’s address is located at 2500 City West Blvd. Suite 1150, Houston, Texas. The address the notices were mailed to was 3131 EASTSIDE ST STE 250 HOUSTON, TX 77098. There is no explanation for the difference of address, much less that the Court was notified of an address change.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 County of Tulare vs. Bail Hotline Bail Bonds

Case No.:  VCL331939

Date:           June 1, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment re: Bond Forfeiture

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts

This matter involves the posting of a bond by an agent of Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc., for the release of Angie Hernandez Bernal in felony case no. VCM463381. Bernal was ordered to appear in court on August 22, 2025, at 8:30 am and failed to appear at that time.

On February 27, 2026, the trial court forfeited the bond and sent notice of forfeiture to the defendant. The Clerk’s Certificate of Service by Mail indicates the clerk sent the notice to:

BAIL HOTLINE BAIL BONDS 3230 VINE ST STE 200 RIVERSIDE, CA 92507

FINANCIAL CASUALTY & SURETY, INC. 3131 EASTSIDE ST STE 250 HOUSTON, TX 77098

On March 3, 2026, the trial court mailed a notice of entry of summary judgment to the defendants at the following addresses:

BAIL HOTLINE BAIL BONDS 3230 VINE ST STE 200 RIVERSIDE, CA 92507

FINANCIAL CASUALTY & SURETY, INC. 3131 EASTSIDE ST STE 250 HOUSTON, TX 77098

On March 30, 2026, the defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Summary Judgement.

The Plaintiff filed their response on May 18, 2026.

Authority and Analysis

There Was Service of the Order Forfeiting Bail

Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 1013a, subd. (4) states,

In case of service by the clerk of a court of record, a certificate by that clerk setting forth the exact title of the document served and filed in the cause, showing the name of the clerk and the name of the court of which he or she is the clerk, and that he or she is not a party to the cause, and showing the date and place of deposit in the mail, the name and address of the person served as shown on the envelope, and also showing that the envelope was sealed and deposited in the mail with the postage thereon fully prepaid. This form of proof is sufficient for service of process in which the clerk or deputy clerk signing the certificate places the document for collection and mailing on the date shown thereon, so as to cause it to be mailed in an envelope so sealed and so addressed on that date following standard court practices. Service made pursuant to this paragraph, upon motion of a party served and a finding of good cause by the court, shall be deemed to have occurred on the date of postage cancellation or postage meter imprint as shown on the envelope if that date is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailing contained in the certificate.

Here, a deputy clerk of the California State Superior Court, County of Tulare certified on August 22, 2025, that she mailed the Notice of Order Forfeiting Bail. Specifically, the Clerk’s Certificate of Service by Mail states:

I certify that I am not a party to this cause.

I certify that I placed the Notice of Order Forfeiting Bail for collection and mailing on the date shown, so as to cause it to be mailed in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid on that date following standard court practices to the persons and addresses shown. The mailing and this certification occurred at Porterville, California on August 22, 2025.

The Notice Was Presumed Received Pursuant to Evid. Code § 641

“A letter correctly addressed and properly mailed is presumed to have been received in the ordinary course of mail.” (Evid. Code § 641.)

Here, the Notice of Order Forfeiting Bail was correctly addressed to Bail Hotline Bail Bonds and Financial Casualty and Surety, Inc., at the addresses listed on the bond pursuant to Pen. Code § 1305, subd. (b) and properly mailed by the clerk.

Consequently, the Notice of Order Forfeiting Bail was presumed to have been received in the ordinary course of mail.

The Presumption Created By Evid. Code § 641 Was Properly Rebutted Pursuant to Evid. Code § 604

Evid. Code § 604 states,

The effect of a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence is to require the trier of fact to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence, in which case the trier of fact shall determine the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact from the evidence and without regard to the presumption. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the drawing of any inference that may be appropriate.

In Bonzer v. City of Huntington Park (1993) 20 Cal. App. 4th 1474, 1476, the Court reversed the trial court’s denial of the City’s Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 473 motion. There, Bonzer filed a petition for a writ of mandate and properly served the respondents. (Id. at 1477.) Bonzer then filed a “Notice of Motion and Motion to Apply for Preemptory Writ of Mandate” and served it by mail. (Id.) On the date of the hearing, none of the respondents appeared and the trial court granted the motion. (Id.) The City then filed a Civ. Pro. Code § 473 motion. (Id.) In support of the City’s motion, it provided six declarations declaring that none of the defendants received the mailed notice of the motion. (Id. at 1479.) The trial court denied the motion and the City appealed. (Id. at 1477.)

The Court reversed the trial court’s decision reasoning, “[u]pon presentation of appellant’s detailed, credible, and unimpeached evidence of no actual notice –the presumption of such notice ceased to exist. The only remaining effect of the ‘Proof of Service’ declaration was to enable the trial court to draw ‘any inference that may be appropriate.’” (Id. at 1481.) The Court also noted that besides the proof of service, the six declarations declaring that there was no actual notice, “was neither impeached or contradicted.” (Id. at 1480.)

Here, Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc., put forth a declaration from Christopher Ramos, an employee of Bail Hotline Bail Bonds. He declared that he is the one who handles the bond forfeitures received by the trial court.

He further declared that when a notice of forfeiture is received, it is inputted into their system and processes them to assign a fugitive recovery agent to start the investigation process. If the investigator is unable to locate the defendant within the 180-day period, a motion to extend time is filed.

After receiving the notice of summary judgment from the trial court, he checked their records and verified that the Bail Hotline did not receive the forfeiture notice and did not have a notice of forfeiture on file. Consequently, the process laid out above did not take place.

Christopher Ramos’ declaration is detailed and credible evidence that no actual notice took place. Due to there being no impeachment evidence presented by the county, the presumption of actual notice created by Evid. Code § 641 ceased to exist.

However, unlike in Bonzer, where the Court only could draw a mere inference from the proof of service declaration made pursuant to Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 1013a, subd. (3) because it did not attest to actually mailing the notices or to having personal knowledge they were mailed, the court clerk did attest that she placed the Notice of Order Forfeiting Bail for collection and mailing on the date shown, so as to cause it to be mailed in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid on that date following standard court practices to the persons and addresses shown.

Weighing the inference of actual notice drawn from the court clerk’s declaration pursuant to Evid. Code § 604 against Christopher Ramos’ declaration, the Court finds that there was actual notice because if the Notice of Bail Forfeiture was deposited in the mail, it was sent. If it was sent, then it should have been delivered or received back by the court as undeliverable.

The Court cannot surmise why Bail Hotline Bail Bonds did not process it pursuant to its normal course of business. However, it was delivered.

Between both copies being sent to two different addresses, one of them must have received it. Further, Bernal had two different cases with two different bonds. A Notice of Bail Forfeiture was sent for each of these bonds and cases to both the bail agency and surety. Between these four mailings, the bail agency or surety would have had to receive at least one of them. What they did with it after receiving it, is beyond the scope of this hearing.

Further, Christopher Ramos’ declaration does not demonstrate a specific reason they would not have received actual notice. For example, it does not state that the clerk sent the notice to the wrong address, the post office removed their mailbox, the post office prevented them from accessing their P.O. box, etc. Instead, the Court is expected to accept that the post office must have lost the notice without any evidence to support this contention and that Bail Hotline Bail Bonds always follows their mail intake procedure with no error. In the alternative, the Court would have to believe the court clerk did not actually mail the notice, which is improbable. 

The Court also notes that the Notice of Entry of Summary Judgment was sent to the exact same addresses that the Notice of Forfeiture was sent to. There is no explanation as to why Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. received the notice of summary judgment but not the notice of forfeiture.

Lastly, as the County points out, the declaration of Adrian Auilera, an employee of Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. declared that Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc.’s address is located at 2500 City West Blvd. Suite 1150, Houston, Texas. The address the notices were mailed to was 3131 EASTSIDE ST STE 250 HOUSTON, TX 77098. There is no explanation for the difference of address, much less that the Court was notified of an address change.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Midland Credit Management Inc. vs. Vasquez, Fatima

Case No.:   VCL319916

Date:           June 1, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Vacate Default Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts

In this collection matter, Plaintiff has filed a proof of service purporting substitute service on Plaintiff occurred November 3, 2025 at 4:25 pm on “Jane Doe…an individual who refused to give their name who identified themselves as the co-resident. The individual accepted service with direct delivery. The individual appeared to be a brown-haired Hispanic female contact 18-25 years of age, 5'4"-5'6" tall and weighing 120-140 lbs with glasses.”

The proof of service indicates the summons and complaint, and related documents, were thereafter mailed to the same address. The proof of service was completed by a registered California process server and includes a statement of due diligence as to prior attempts to personally serve Defendant.

Default was entered March 17, 2026 with default judgment in the amount of $2,585.12 entered on March 24, 2026.

On April 9, 2026, Defendant filed this motion to vacate default and default judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 473 and 473.5. Plaintiff declares that “Defendant was not properly served with the Summons and Complaint and did not have notice of the lawsuit in time to respond” and “Defendant was not properly served with the Summons and Complaint.”

No responsive pleading appears to have been lodged with this motion.

No proof of service appears to have been filed as to this motion.

Authority and Analysis

The Court notes first that under Evidence Code section 647: “[t]he return of a process server registered pursuant to Chapter 16 (commencing with Section 22350) of Division 8 of the Business and Professions Code upon process or notice establishes a presumption, affecting the burden of producing evidence, of the facts stated in the return.”  (Evid. Code § 647.) Under Evidence Code section 604: “[t]he effect of a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence is to require the trier of fact to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence, in which case the trier of fact shall determine the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact from the evidence and without regard to the presumption.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the drawing of any inference that may be appropriate.”  (Evid. Code § 604.)

Defendant’s general declaration that service did not occur is insufficient to rebut the presumption afforded by the completed proof of service.

As such, the Court cannot find a basis under section 473 as to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, or under section 473.5 as to lack of actual notice.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Valadez, Brenda et al vs. DLR Management Group, Inc.

Case No.:    VCU310362

Date:            June 1, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:      Motion to Withdraw as Counsel

Motion:     Defendant Kamohai’s Counsel’s Motion to be Relieved

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; the order will be deemed effective upon the filing with the court of proof of personal service of the order as indicated herein.

Facts

On April 10, 2026, Defendant’s Counsel David M. Hillings, Esq. of Clinton and Clinton filed a motion to be relieved as counsel as to Defendant Robert John Kamohai. Defendant’s Counsel filed the following with respect to withdrawing:

(1) MC-051 - Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as Counsel;

(2) MC-052 – Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel; and

(3) MC-053 - Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel

Additionally, Defendant’s Counsel has filed proof of service of these documents by mail and email.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 284 provides that “[t]he attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at any time before or after judgment of final determination, as follows: 1. Upon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes; [or] 2. Upon the order of the court, upon the application of either client or attorney, after notice from one to the other.”

California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) requires that the “notice of motion and motion to be relieved as counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) must be directed to the client and must be made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-051).”

As noted above, counsel has complied with California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) by submitting the notice and motion on MC-051 and by directing the notice and motion to all parties.

California Rule of Court 3.1362 (c) further mandates that: “The motion to be relieved as counsel must be accompanied by a declaration on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel--Civil (form MC-052). The declaration must state in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1). Specifically, the declaration that Rule 3.1362(c) requires must state that the moving attorney attempted to secure a “Substitution of Attorney” from the client as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1) and that the client refused to so stipulate.

Here, the declaration is properly made on form MC-052, as well as a further declaration attached to the Notice, and uses general terms without compromising confidentiality. The declaration indicates counsel has been unable to communicate with Defendant since November 12, 2025 and Defendant has been wholly nonresponsive to attempts to communicate since that time. As such, the Court will find the requirement of attempting to obtain a substitution of counsel from Defendant satisfied under these circumstances. 

Next, service under Rule 3.1362(d) requires personal service, electronic service, or mail and counsel’s declaration must note the service made. Here, service was by mail and email on April 10, 2026. The declaration of counsel indicates that Defendant’s address was confirmed as current by private investigator.

Finally, Rule 3.1362(e) requires the proposed order be lodged with the Court on MC-053 with the moving papers, specifying all hearing dates scheduled, including date of trial. Defendant’s Counsel has complied with this requirement.

Therefore, the Court grants Defendant’s Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw as to Defendant. If no one requests oral argument, the Court is prepared to sign the order entitled “Order Granting Attorney’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel - Civil” that the moving party lodged with the Court.  This order will be deemed effective upon the filing with the court of a proof of personal service of the “Order Granting Attorney’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – Civil” as to Defendant Kamohai.

The Court further directs counsel to attach to the Order an additional notice of the date, time, and Department of this court for any future hearing dates for this case as calendared.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Wilkerson, Alexa et al vs. Redwood Family Care Network, Inc. et al

Case No.:  VCU319541

Date:           June 1, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion, to compel arbitration of Plaintiffs’ Type A “individual” PAGA claims and to stay this matter pending arbitration as to Plaintiffs’ Type O “representative” claims.

Background Facts

In this single cause of action under PAGA complaint, Plaintiffs Wilkerson and Sellers sue Defendants Redwood Family Care Network, Inc., People’s Care, LLC, People’s Care Developmental Services, LLC, People’s Care Northern California, LLC, People’s Care Holdings, LLC; Supported and Independent Living Services (Sails) Bakersfield, Inc.; and The Sails Group Inc.

Defendants Redwood Family Care Network, Inc., Sails Group Inc. and Supported and Independent Living Services (Sails) Bakersfield, Inc. (“Defendants”) move to compel arbitration of the “representative” Type A portion of the PAGA claim and stay this matter as to the “individual” Type O portion of the PAGA claim.

Facts – Agreement to Arbitrate

In support, Defendants submit a number of declarations.

As to Plaintiff Wilkerson, Defendant Redwood’s talent acquisition manager indicates they are the duly authorized custodian of records for Defendants and that Plaintiff Wilkerson’s conditional offer of employment contained the Mutual Arbitration Agreement (“MAA”) as part of the onboarding packet. (Declaration of Heaslip ¶¶1-4.)

From 2021 onward, SAILS Bakersfield, Inc. routinely used Docusign to communicate and provide employment-related documents and agreements, including the MAA, to both prospective and current employees and that the MAA was sent to the email address provided by the applicant. (Declaration of Heaslip ¶5-10.) On July 14, 2021, Plaintiff Wilkerson signed the MAA using Docusign and, as a resulted, the execution generated Docusign envelope number 370D00AC-59DC-48D2-9925-7D3988D76193. (Declaration of Heaslip ¶13-Ex. A.)

As to Plaintiff Sellers, Defendant Redwood provides the declaration of its director of fleet and maintenance. (Declaration of Villatoro ¶1.) This declarant indicates that Plaintiff Sellers joined SAILS Bakersfield prior to use of Docusign and instead, Plaintiff Sellers visited an office located in California and executed the “Assigned Employee Notice and Acknowledgements.” (Declaration of Villatoro ¶¶1-6 – Ex. A.)

No timely opposition has been filed.

Authority and Analysis – Agreement to Arbitrate

(b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2(a), (b).) (emphasis added.) The motion to compel arbitration requires the facts are to be proven by affidavit or declaration and documentary evidence with oral testimony taken only in the court’s discretion. (Code Civ. Proc., §1290.2; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413–414.) The motion must set forth the provisions of the written agreement and the arbitration clause verbatim, or such provisions must be attached and incorporated by reference. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330; see Condee v. Longwood Mgmt. Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218.)

Absent a challenge by the nonmoving party, this burden is met by simply providing a copy of the arbitration agreement.  (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2017) 13 Cal. App. 5th 1152, 1160; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.)  “For purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 218; Sprunk v. Prisma LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 785, 793.)  

However, when the opposing party disputes the agreement, then the opposing party must provide evidence to challenge its authenticity.  (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) 

Under California law, "[t]he burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence …." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 164-165.)

"However, the burden of production may shift in a three-step process." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at. 165.)

"First, the moving party bears the burden of producing 'prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.' [Citation.]" (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) "The moving party 'can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party's] signature.' [Citation.]" (Id.) "For this step, 'it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.' [Citation.]” (Id.)

Here, Defendants have provided copies of the executed MAA as to Plaintiff Wilkerson and the Employee Notice as to Plaintiff Sellers in satisfaction of this requirement.

Given no opposition, the Court finds an agreement to arbitrate formed with each  Plaintiff.

Facts – Application of FAA

Defendant Redwood provides the declaration of its CEO, who states that SAILS Group, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Redwood Family Care Network, Inc. and SAILS Bakersfield, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of SAILS Group, Inc. (Declaration of Cottrell ¶¶1-4.) Further that “Defendants engage in interstate commerce in a number of ways including, without limitation, using interstate communication networks such as the internet, cellular phone, and U.S. Mail to conduct business” and “Defendants purchase or lease numerous products originating from outside California, including, but not limited to, food and cleaning supplies.” (Declaration of Cottrell ¶¶7, 8.) Additionally, that Defendants lease vehicles from a company based in Missouri and obtain vehicles regularly used in operations from states outside of California. (Declaration of Cottrell ¶9.) Finally, that Defendants use banking institutions and corporate support services based outside of California. (Declaration of Cottrell ¶10.)

Authority and Analysis – Application of FAA

"A party seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement has the burden of showing FAA preemption. [Citation.] For example, a petitioner seeking an order to compel arbitration must show that the subject matter of the agreement involves interstate commerce." (Lane v. Francis Capital Management LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 676, 687-688.)

"[T]he word 'involving,' … signals an intent to exercise Congress' commerce power to the full." (Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson (1995) 513 U.S. 265, 277.) The words "involves interstate commerce" "therefore cover more than only persons or activities within the flow of interstate commerce." (Id. at 273.) "Congress' Commerce Clause power 'may be exercised in individual cases without showing any specific effect upon interstate commerce if in the aggregate the economic activity in question would represent a general practice subject to federal control." (Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc. (2003) 539 U.S. 52, 56-57.)

In Allied-Bruce, the Supreme Court held that an arbitration clause contained in a residential pest control contract between an Alabama customer and a local Allied-Bruce Terminix franchise "involved interstate commerce" because, in part, "the termite-treating and house-repairing material used by" the defendant "came from outside Alabama." (Allied-Bruce, supra, 513 U.S. at 282.)

Here, Defendants’ use of services and products outside the state involve interstate commerce for the purpose of conducting business meet the standard above and therefore the Court finds the FAA applies.

Facts - Scope of Agreement and PAGA

Plaintiff Wilkerson’s MAA states:

“This is a mutual agreement and is binding for claims of either party. For example, such claims include claims under Federal, State, and Local statutory or common law, including, but not limited to, wage and overtime claims under the California Labor Code or Federal Fair Labor Standards Act, claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code § 12940, et seq.), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the law of contract and the law of tort.

…

Unless controlling authority requires otherwise, there shall be no right or authority for any dispute to be heard or arbitrated on a class action basis. Applicant agrees that this Waiver of Class Action applies to all claims of Applicant including claims arising prior to the date of this Agreement. The arbitrator may not consolidate more than one person’s claims.”

Plaintiff Sellers’ Employee Notice states that:

“any legal dispute…arising from or relating to my employment, wages…will be resolved exclusively through binding arbitration…and that I will participate only in my individual capacity, not as a member or representative of a class or part of a class action or in a consolidated case…”

Authority and Analysis – Scope of Agreement and PAGA

Both the MAA and Employee Notice apply to the PAGA claims asserted in this matter.

In Viking River, the United States Supreme Court held that, under an agreement permitting such, a PAGA cause of action may be divided into individual and representative claims and that the individual claims may be ordered to arbitration: "PAGA authorizes any 'aggrieved employee' to initiate an action against a former employer 'on behalf of himself or herself and other current and former employees' to obtain civil penalties that previously could have been recovered only by the State in an [Labor Workforce and Development Agency] enforcement action." (Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 645.) The "individual PAGA claim" is the claim for the violations suffered by the aggrieved employee and the "representative PAGA claim" is the PAGA claim arising out of events involving other employees. (Id. at 648.)

The Viking River decision “left undisturbed” and “intact” both of the rules from Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th 348 that (1) prohibited categorical waivers of the right to bring a PAGA action in any forum and (2) prohibited waivers of PAGA claims on behalf of other employees, i.e., non-individual or representative claims. (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1117-1118.)

However, the United States Supreme Court held that the third rule, which prohibited the "'division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate'" was preempted by the FAA. (Id. at 1118.)

Specifically, the Viking River Court stated:

"The agreement between Viking and Moriana purported to waive 'representative PAGA claims. Under Iskanian, this provision was invalid if construed as a wholesale waiver of PAGA claims. And under our holding, that aspect of Iskanian is not preempted by the FAA, so the agreement remains invalid insofar as it is interpreted in that manner. But the severability clause in the agreement provides that if the waiver provision is invalid in some respect, any portion that remains valid must still be 'enforced in arbitration.' Based on this clause, Viking was entitled to enforce the agreement insofar as it mandated arbitration of Moriana's individual PAGA claim." (Id. at 1924-1925.)

As summarized by Adolph: "The high court explained that an anti-splitting rule 'unduly circumscribes the freedom of parties to determine "the issues subject to arbitration" and "the rules by which they will arbitrate," [citation], and does so in a way that violates the fundamental principle that "arbitration is a matter of consent."' (Viking River, at p. 659.) Requiring parties to adjudicate a PAGA action entirely in one proceeding, the high court said, 'compels parties to either go along with an arbitration in which the range of issues under consideration is determined by coercion rather than consent, or else forgo arbitration altogether. Either way, the parties are coerced into giving up a right they enjoy under the FAA.' (Viking River, at p. 661.) Thus, Viking River requires enforcement of agreements to arbitrate a PAGA plaintiff's individual claims if the agreement is covered by the FAA." (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1118-1119.)

 “There is no individual component to a PAGA action because '"every PAGA action . . . is a representative action on behalf of the state."' [Citation.]" (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 87.) The term "individual" refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by the plaintiff. (See Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 639, 648 [referring to these claims as "Type A" claims].) The term “non-individual” refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by employees other than the plaintiff. (Galarsa, at 649 [referring to these claims as "Type O" claims].)

As summarized by the California Supreme Court in Adolph, an agreement that is covered by the FAA may require arbitration of "alleged Labor Code violations personally sustained by a PAGA plaintiff — so-called 'individual' claims." (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1114, 1119.) "'[W]hen an appropriate arbitration agreement exists'" and "a plaintiff has filed a PAGA action comprised of individual and non-individual claims," the trial court must "'bifurcate and order [the] individual PAGA claim[] to arbitration.'" (Id. at 1126, 1123.) In this circumstance, the "order compelling arbitration of [the] individual claim[] does not strip the plaintiff of standing to litigate non-individual claims [i.e., claims on behalf of other employees] in court." (Id. at 1123) Instead, "'the individual PAGA claim[] in arbitration remain[s] part of the same lawsuit as the representative claims remaining in court.'" (Id. at 1126.) The plaintiff would thus be "'pursuing a single PAGA action "on behalf of [himself or herself] and other current or former employees," albeit across two fora.' [Citation.]" (Id.)

As such, the Court, as requested by Defendants, splits the PAGA claim, orders arbitration of the Type A “individual” claims and stays this matter pending the arbitration as to Plaintiffs’ Type O “representative” claims.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Ogata, Angelina vs. Davidian III, Sarkis

Case No.:  VCL326121

Date:           June 1, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Set Aside Default

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. The Court, therefore, takes the matter off calendar.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Martinez, Juana vs. FCA US, LLC

Case No.:  VCU331528

Date:          June 1, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Demurrer to Sixth Cause of Action for Concealment

Tentative Ruling: To overrule the demurrer; to order FCA to answer the complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

Facts

This lawsuit was filed March 21, 2025.

Relevant here, Plaintiff sues Defendant FCA for, amongst other causes of action, concealment involving the purchased of a 2017 Ram 1500 (hereafter “Vehicle” or “Subject Vehicle”). (FAC ¶7.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant FCA entered into a warranty contract with Plaintiff based on the purchase of the Subject Vehicle from an authorized retail dealership. (FAC ¶8, 9.)

Plaintiff alleges that, prior to purchase, Plaintiff reviewed FCA’s marketing and advertising materials, viewed FCA's vehicle-specific window sticker, and took the Vehicle for a test drive. (FAC ¶10.) However, at no point prior to purchase was Plaintiff advised the Vehicle and its 3.61 V6 engine were defective. (FAC ¶10.)

Plaintiff experienced defects in the Vehicle including, but not limited to, overheating, hesitation on acceleration, check engine lights, engine replacement, shuddering, engine head replacement, harsh shifts, jerking, and slipping in gear. (FAC ¶12.)

Plaintiff presented the Vehicle to FCA’s authorized repair facilities on February 19, 2019, July 19, 2019, December 21, 2020, May 26, 2022, June 3, 2022, November 22, 2022, August 20, 2024, January 14, 2025 and February 3, 2025 as to various warranty repairs involving the engine, amongst other issues. (FAC ¶¶13-21.) Plaintiff further alleges there was “no way of uncovering Defendant’s deception with respect to the defects given that Defendant performed various diagnostics and/or undertook repairs and claimed that nothing was wrong with the Subject Vehicle or that the Vehicle had been repaired.” (FAC ¶22.)

Plaintiff alleges further that the defects substantially impair the use, value, or safety of the Vehicle, and that “FCA knew since prior to Plaintiff purchasing the Subject Vehicle, that the 2017 Ram 1500 vehicles equipped with the 3.6L engine have one or more defects that can result loss of power, stalling, engine running rough, engine misfires, failure or replacement of the engine (the "Engine Defect").” (FAC ¶¶27, 30.) Further, that the Engine Defect is a safety concern. (FAC ¶31.) Further, that FCA failed to disclose the existence of the Engine Defect to Plaintiff, despite having exclusive knowledge thereof via internal sources such as testing data, customer complaints, and aggregate warranty data. (FAC ¶¶32, 33, 36-40.)

Further, that FCA “failed to disclose the defective nature of the Vehicle and its Engine Defect to its sales representatives and Plaintiff at the time of sale and thereafter. FCA omitted mention of the Engine Defect to its consumers.” (FAC ¶34.)

Additionally that Plaintiff is a reasonable consumer who would not have purchased the Vehicle had the Engine Defect been disclosed. (FAC ¶35.)

Plaintiff generally asserts various tolling doctrines as to the statute of limitations including class action tolling, discovery rule tolling, estoppel, and the COVID-19 tolling. (FAC ¶51-71.)

As to concealment, Plaintiff realleges the prior allegations and reasserts them. (FAC ¶¶96-103.)

Defendant FCA demurrers the concealment cause of action on the basis of the statute of limitations, economic loss rule and failure to state sufficient facts.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the claim was filed within the statute of limitations, that the economic loss rule does not apply, that FCA had a duty to disclose and that Plaintiff has otherwise sufficiently pled the concealment cause of action.

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

Statute of Limitations

Defendant contends the statute of limitations begins the date the Vehicle was purchased on October 2, 2016 and that the three-year statute of limitations for fraud therefore bars Plaintiffs' fraudulent inducement - concealment cause of action against Defendant, as the complaint was filed March 21, 2025. Further, that delayed discovery does not apply because Plaintiff’s Vehicle suffered numerous defects that Plaintiff sought repair thereon and, as such, Plaintiff has sufficient time to investigate any potential fraud during that period.

A three-year limitations period applies to fraud claims. (Code Civ. Proc. § 338, subd. (d).)

Under the delayed discovery rule, a cause of action accrues at the time when the cause of action is complete with all its elements. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806-807.) The test for when the statute of limitations on a claim starts to run under the delayed discovery rule is "whether the plaintiff has information of circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry, or has the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to his or her investigation." (McGee v. Weinberg (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 798, 803.)

"In order to invoke this special defense to the statute of limitations, the plaintiff must specifically plead facts which show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence." (Saliter v. Pierce Brothers Mortuaries (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 292, 300.) "The burden is on the plaintiff to show diligence, and conclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer." (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1319 (internal quotations omitted).

Further,  "[i]t has long been established that the defendant's fraud in concealing a cause of action against him tolls the applicable statute of limitations, but only for that period during which the claim is undiscovered by plaintiff or until such time as plaintiff, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered it. [Citation.] Like the discovery rule, the rule of fraudulent concealment is an equitable principle designed to effect substantial justice between the parties; its rationale is that the culpable defendant should be estopped from profiting by his own wrong to the extent that it hindered an 'otherwise diligent' plaintiff in discovering his cause of action. [Citations.]" (Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Indus. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 926, 931.)

The Court does not believe the statute of limitations started until after purchase of the Vehicle and after successive presentations of the Vehicle to an authorized dealer based on the Engine Defect underlying this cause of action.

Here, the Vehicle was presented to an authorized dealer regarding a number of defects including repeated fluid leaks presenting in December 2020, August 2024 and February 2025. The Court does not believe that a single repair attempt in December 2020 would start the statute of limitations under the doctrines noted above. Further, Plaintiff notes that paragraph 21 alleges that FCA's authorized dealer replaced the Vehicle's entire engine long block on February 3, 2025, 46 days before this action was filed. However, the second and/or third repair attempts would constitute reasonable diligence as to discovery of the defect. As those second and third repair attempts, however, took place within the last three years from the date of filing on March 21, 2025, the Court overrules the demurrer as to the statute of limitations.

Fraudulent Inducement - Specificity

“As with all fraud claims, the necessary elements of a concealment/suppression claim consist of ‘“(1) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (scienter); (3) intent to defraud (i.e., to induce reliance); (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage.”’” [citation omitted]”  (Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 843.)  “Suppression of a material fact is actionable when there is a duty of disclosure, which may arise from a relationship between the parties, such as a buyer-seller relationship.  [citation omitted]” (Id.)

Concealment must be pled with specificity.  (Id. at 843-844) General and conclusory allegations are not sufficient. (Nagy v. Nagy (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1262, 1268.) Unlike most causes of action where the “the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings,” fraud requires particularity, that is, “pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) Every element of a fraud cause of action must be alleged both factually and specifically. (Cooper v. Equity General Insurance (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1252, 1262.) Less specificity is required when "it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy," (Bradley v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. (1973) 30 Cal. App. 3d 818, 825.) "Even under the strict rules of common law pleading, one of the canons was that less particularity is required when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party ...." (Turner v. Milstein (1951) 103 Cal. App. 2d 651, 658.)

Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 844 is instructive on the issue of specificity at the pleading stage, providing in relevant part:

“Plaintiffs alleged the above elements of fraud in the SAC. As we have discussed, plaintiffs alleged the CVT installed in numerous Nissan vehicles (including the one plaintiffs purchased) were defective; Nissan knew of the defects and the hazards they posed; Nissan had exclusive knowledge of the defects but intentionally concealed and failed to disclose that information; Nissan intended to deceive plaintiffs by concealing known transmission problems; plaintiffs would not have purchased the car if they had known of the defects; and plaintiffs suffered damages in the form of money paid to purchase the car….

Nissan also contends plaintiffs did not provide specifics about what Nissan should have disclosed. But plaintiffs alleged the CVT were defective in that they caused such problems as hesitation, shaking, jerking, and failure to function. The SAC also alleged Nissan was aware of the defects as a result of premarket testing and consumer complaints that were made both to National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and to Nissan and its dealers. It is not clear what additional information Nissan believes should have been included. We decline to hold (again in the absence of a more developed argument on this point) that plaintiffs were required to include in the SAC more detailed allegations about the alleged defects in the CVT. We conclude plaintiffs' fraud claim was adequately pleaded.” (Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 844.)

Further, the Court notes less specificity is required if it appears from the nature of allegations that defendant must necessarily possess full information, or if the facts lie more in the knowledge of opposing parties.  (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384-1385.

Here, Plaintiff pleads that the Defective Engine was installed in numerous similar vehicles, that Defendant knew or should have known of the Defective Engine , that Defendant had exclusive knowledge thereof as a result of internal sources or data, including customer complaints, that Defendant failed to disclose the Defective Engine, that Plaintiffs would not have purchased the Vehicle had the Defective Engine been disclosed and that Plaintiffs suffered damages. Further, to the Court, this goes beyond the defects that are presupposed by the warranty and Plaintiffs have alleged the Engine Defect existed in vehicles of the same engine as the Subject Vehicle, in contrast to the holding in Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 344.

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer on this basis.

Fraudulent Inducement – Duty to Disclose

As to the allegation of a duty to disclose, there are “‘four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts.’”  (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336.)  However, unless the parties were in a fiduciary relationship, the other three circumstances “presupposes the existence of some other relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in which a duty to disclose can arise.”  (Id. at p. 337.)  “Thus, a duty to disclose may arise from the relationship between seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual agreement.” (Ibid.)

On this issue, the court in Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 844 noted:

“In its short argument on this point in its appellate brief, Nissan argues plaintiffs did not adequately plead the existence of a buyer-seller relationship between the parties, because plaintiffs bought the car from a Nissan dealership (not from Nissan itself). At the pleading stage (and in the absence of a more developed argument by Nissan on this point), we conclude plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient. Plaintiffs alleged that they bought the car from a Nissan dealership, that Nissan backed the car with an express warranty, and that Nissan's authorized dealerships are its agents for purposes of the sale of Nissan vehicles to consumers. In light of these allegations, we decline to hold plaintiffs' claim is barred on the ground there was no relationship requiring Nissan to disclose known defects.” (Id.)

Here, the amended complaint alleges Defendant FCA provides an express warranty, and that the Subject Vehicle was purchased from an authorized FCA dealership. (FAC ¶¶7, 8, 9.)

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer on this basis, finding the allegations are sufficient under Dhital as to the buyer-seller relationship.

Economic Loss Rule

As to the economic loss doctrine, "economic loss consists of damage for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective product or consequent loss of profits-without any claim of personal injury or damages to other property." (Food Safety Net Services v. Eco Safe Systems USA, Inc. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 118, 1130.)

The economic loss doctrine, in some cases, bars a tort action in the absence of personal injury or physical damage to property. (Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 984.) "The economic loss rule requires a purchaser to recover in contract for purely economic loss due to disappointed expectations, unless he can recover harm above and beyond a broken contractual promise." (Id. at 988.) The holding of Robinson, permitting both recover under fraud and contract, “is narrow in scope and limited to a defendant's affirmative misrepresentations on which a plaintiff relies and which expose a plaintiff to liability for personal damages independent of the plaintiff's economic loss." (Id. at 993.) The economic loss rule, therefore, does not bar recovery as to a claim for fraudulent inducement. (Id. at 990; see also Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 838.)

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer on this basis, finding an exception to the economic loss doctrine is sufficiently pled here.

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer. FCA is ordered to answer the amended complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared Monday, June 1, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054068	In the Matter of 2024 Lemus Family Trust, dated September 11, 2024	Petition to Confirm Trust Asset	Recommended for Approval
VPR054067	In the Matter of 2025 Judith L. Lopez Separate Property trust, dated December 23, 2025	Petition to Confirm Trust Asset	Recommended for Approval
VPR053197	In the Matter of Carkhuff, James Leroy Jr	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order An award of extraordinary compensation to the attorney is within the discretion of the court, CRC, rule 7.703(a)
VPR052504	In the Matter of De La Rosa, Anita Louisa	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order An award of extraordinary compensation to the attorney is within the discretion of the court, CRC, rule 7.703(a)
VPR053433	In the Matter of Hannah, Joseph Edward	Final Distribution Hearing	Recommended for Approval
VPR053797	In the Matter of Donaldson, Elida M	Final Distribution Hearing	Recommended for Approval
VPR053312	In the Matter of Alvarez, Josephine	Final Distribution Hearing	Recommended for Approval
VPR054065	In the Matter of Chavez, Mark Anthony	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Capacity Declaration not filed Notice of Hearing not served on all relatives within the second degree
VPR054062	In the Matter of Guerrero, Bibiana	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared Thursday, May 21, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR054038	In the Matter of Turnbough, Jerrilee Ann	Letters of Administration	Recommended for Approval
PPR054033	In the Matter of Frazier, Joan	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	Petition Incomplete: Caption not selected – Authorization to Administer under the IAEA (full authority requested). Item 6(b) – No selection made, but issues of deceased parents are listed in 8. Item 8 – Age of siblings, and need notion if there is no issue of deceased siblings.
PPR053952	In the Matter of Havekost, Kathleen Louise	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	Supplemental Statement of Birth Date and DL Number incomplete, TCSC LR, rule 1000(c)(4). Proof of Publication not filed.
PPR054049	In the Matter of Akin, Samie Jane	Petition Hearing	Appearance Required	Incomplete/untimely notice: A 30-day notice of hearing is required pursuant Probate Code §851(a)