Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Monday, February 23, 2026, are:

Re:                Alsumiri, Ahmed vs. Amco Insurance Company et al

Case No.:   VCU328646

Date:           February 23, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Defendant Papanickolas’s Demurrer to Third Cause of Action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Tentative Ruling: To sustain the demurrer with leave to amend; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint

Facts

Planitiff alleges on or about April 14, 2021, Plaintiff Ahmed Alsumiri and Nationwide/AMCO entered into a written homeowner's insurance policy (Policy no. ADP 0036847606 9).

Further, that the policy insured the dwelling and other structures at 170 N. Filbert Rd., Exeter, CA against risk of direct physical loss and provided Replacement Cost Value (RCV) coverage. The "Policy Period" was from 04/14/2021-04/14/2022

Further, that on February 2, 2022, the insured premises sustained a sudden structural failure after roofing materials were delivered, and the structure was later deemed for demolition by local authorities.

Plaintiff promptly submitted a claim through Nationwide's agent, Defendant Theodore Papanickolas.

On or about April 29, 2022, Nationwide (through agent Papanickolas) prepared Homeowner Reconstruction Cost Notifications reflecting replacement-cost valuations including a total of $453,287 and a second valuation of $181,438.

In early May 2022, after receiving settlement paperwork, Plaintiff communicated acceptance of the insurance benefits to begin rebuild.

On October 24, 2025, AMCO/Nationwide issued a Partial Denial of Coverage and accompanying "Information about your payment" letters, re-issuing ACV and describing RCV holdback mechanics while refusing to pay full RCV benefits commensurate with Nationwide's own valuations and Plaintiff's acceptance.

Directly relevant here, Plaintiff sues Defendant Papanickolas for breach of fiduciary duty, alleging that Defendant Papanickolas acted as “Defendants' insurance agent/point of contact for Plaintiff's homeowner's claim No. 928524-GM arising from a February 2, 2022 loss at the insured Exeter, California premises.”

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Papanickolas “pressed Plaintiff to sell the property (including a $650,000 proposal through a third party), told Plaintiff he would "get nothing" if he did not sell, and-without authority communicated to the carrier that Plaintiff declined, leading toa purported claim cancellation.”

On October 6, 2025, Plaintiff's counsel clarified in writing that Plaintiff was not seeking "code enforcement" upgrades, but only the replacement cost value (RCV) as Nationwide itself had estimated.

Further that Papanickolas solicited Plaintiff to sell the insured property to him or a developer associate for $650,000, threatened Plaintiff would "get nothing" if he did not sell, and offered a swap for a 4-unit property--acts directly adverse to Plaintiff's interests in receiving policy benefits and rebuilding. Papanickolas misrepresented to the adjuster that Plaintiff declined Nationwide's offer despite Plaintiff's acceptance, leading to a purported claim cancellation around May 20, 2022

As such, Plaintiff alleges that “By virtue of the fiduciary/confidential relationship alleged and the duties inherent in an agent's advisory role during an open claim, Papanickolas owed Plaintiff the duties to: (a) act with utmost good faith and loyalty; (b) avoid conflicts and self-dealing; (c) fully and fairly disclose all material facts; (d) faithfully convey Plaintiff's decisions to the insurer; and (e) refrain from using his position to coerce business advantages for himself or third parties”

Defendant Papanickolas demurrers to this third cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty Defendant Papanickolas owes no fiduciary duty to Plaintiff as an insurance agent or broker.

Plaintiff, in opposition, argues that Defendant Papanickolas acted as a claim intermediary, purported to convey Plaintiff’s decisions to the carrier, which “plead[s] a relationship of accepted confidence sufficient to support a fiduciary duty claim” citing to Sequioa Vacuum Sys. v. Stranksy (1964) 229 Cal. App. 2d 281, 287.

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

"The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are the existence of a fiduciary relationship, its breach, and damage proximately caused by that breach." (Hasso v. Hapke (2014) 227 Cal. App. 4th 107, 140.)

"[B]efore a person can be charged with a fiduciary obligation, he must either knowingly undertake to act on behalf and for the benefit of another, or must enter into a relationship which imposes that undertaking as a matter of law." (Id.)

“Fiduciary duties are imposed by law in certain technical, legal relationships such as those between partners or joint venturers trustees and beneficiaries, principals and agents, and attorneys and clients [citation]." (Id.)

An insurer or insurance broker typically owes limited fiduciary duties to insureds or potential insureds. (Mark Tanner Constr. v. Hub Internat. Ins. Servs. (2014) 224 Cal. App. 4th 574, 584-86.) "[O]ther than when handling an insured's money, a broker's duty—whether or not phrased as a fiduciary duty—is no greater than the duty to use reasonable care and diligence in procuring insurance. As one leading treatise has observed: 'It is not clear in what respect the 'fiduciary duty' owed by an independent insurance agent [broker] differs from the duty of due (reasonable) care. As used in respect to an independent agent, 'fiduciary duty' may refer merely to avoidance of conflict of interest, self-dealing, excessive compensation, etc'." (Id.)

The law, therefore, precludes a fiduciary duty based on the insurance agent or broker relationship, absent allegations of mishandling of premiums.

However, a fiduciary duty under common law may arise “when one person enters into a confidential relationship with another.” (Hasso, supra, 227 Cal. App. 4th at 140,)

“A fiduciary duty is undertaken by agreement when one person enters into a confidential relationship with another. As the court explained in Barbara A. v. John G., supra, 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, a confidential relationship arises "where a confidence is reposed by one person in the integrity of another, and . . . the party in whom the confidence is reposed, . . . voluntarily accepts or assumes to accept the confidence[.]" (Id. at p. 382; Sime v. Malouf, supra, 95 Cal. App. 2d 82, 98-99 ["One who voluntarily assumes a position of trust and confidence is a fiduciary, and he remains a fiduciary as long as trust and confidence are reposed in him..."].) Not surprisingly, the existence of such a relationship founded upon agreement (the "repose" and "acceptance" of a confidence) is a question of fact. (Barbara A. v. John G., supra, 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 383.)” (Gab Bus. Servs. v. Lindsey & Newsom Claim Servs. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 409, 417).)

The allegations in support of this is that that Defendant Papanickolas “By virtue of the fiduciary/confidential relationship alleged and the duties inherent in an agent's advisory role during an open claim,” and that he “…prepared reconstruction cost notifications (estimate totals $453,287 and $181,438), relayed claim communications, and purported to speak on Plaintiff's behalf with the carrier. While the claim was pending, Papanickolas solicited Plaintiff to sell the insured property to him or a developer associate for $650,000, threatened Plaintiff would "get nothing" if he did not sell, and offered a swap for a 4-unit property--acts directly adverse to Plaintiff's interests in receiving policy benefits and rebuilding.”

“Traditional examples of fiduciary relationships in the commercial context include trustee/beneficiary, directors and majority shareholders of a corporation, business partners, joint adventurers, and agent/principal” (Wolf v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 25, 30.) “Inherent in each of these relationships is the duty of undivided loyalty the fiduciary owes to its beneficiary, imposing on the fiduciary obligations far more stringent than those required of ordinary contractors” (Id.)

The Court finds that Defendant Papanickolas’s role as an insurance agent precludes a finding of a common law duty of confidence akin to those cited in Wolf, despite allegations that Defendant Papanickolas “relayed claim communications, and purported to speak on Plaintiff's behalf with the carrier.” In other words, the scope of the relationship here appears defined by the insurance agent/broker and insured relationship, for which, other than a limited circumstance not at issue here, no fiduciary duty arises.

Sequioa Vacuum Sys., supra, 229 Cal. App. 2d at 287, cited by Plaintiff, involved an employee, secretary treasurer and director duties, noting that “corporate officers stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders. Here, likewise, the actionable wrong is premised upon appellant's violation of his duties as a managerial employee and director of the respondent corporation.”

Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer.

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

The Court will permit leave to amend here. Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Jones Vernon K Vs. Musgrove, Pest

Case No.:  VCU181111-97

Date:          February 23, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Continued Motion for Reconsideration

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion.

Facts and Analysis

On or about March 25, 1986, Workers Comp Judge James Tarr issued an award in favor of Plaintiff in an amount of less than $10,000. Plaintiff, as well as Defendants, brought a motion for reconsideration of that initial award. The May 28, 1986  opinion denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.

On Defendants’ reconsideration hearing in August 1986, the workers compensation board reduced the award to $1,165 and to payable directly to a treating physician, Dr. Baker and, that Plaintiff sustained no actual injury.

On or about December 18, 1997, Plaintiff filed a judgment for over $4,000,000. 

Upon discovery of this filing, Judge O’Hara vacated the judgment filed by Plaintiff on February 25, 1998.

Instead, a judgment was obtained in this case by Defendant California Insurance Guarantee for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 against Plaintiff in the amount of $1,625 as to the circumstances surrounding the submission of the $4,000,000 judgment.

The judgment in favor of Defendant California Insurance, was renewed in 2009 and it was satisfied in full March 22, 2012.

On October 6, 2025, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to set aside or vacate the dismissal of the $4,000,000 judgment on February 25, 1998. 

On October 7, 2025, the Court mailed notice of this ruling to Plaintiff.

On October 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed this motion for reconsideration.

On December 15, 2025, the Court continued the motion to this hearing date.

On January 16, 2026, Plaintiff filed a proof of service of the continued hearing and of the motion for reconsideration.

A motion for reconsideration must be filed within 10 days of service on him of notice of entry of the order in question. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1008(a).) As provided in section 1013, a 5 day extension of time for mail service applies in the absence of a specific exception, and no such exception is present in section 1008 (Code Civ. Proc. § 1013(a).)

As noted above, service by mail was made October 7, 2025 of the underlying ruling sought to be reconsidered, providing Plaintiff 15 days from that date to file this motion under sections 1008 and 1013(a),

Therefore, Plaintiff was required to file this motion no later than October 22, 2025.

Here, the motion was filed October 27, 2025 and therefore is beyond the time permitted in section 1008.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion on this ground.

Additionally, section 1008 requires new or different facts, circumstances or law/ New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal. App. 4th 206, 212, states, "Section 1008, subdivision (a) requires that a motion for reconsideration be based on new or different facts, circumstances, or law. A party seeking reconsideration also must provide satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce the evidence at an earlier time. [Citation.]"  Further, the New York Times Co. court noted "The burden under section 1008 is comparable to that of a party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence: the information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it at the trial. [Citation.] Case law after the 1992 amendments to Section 1008 as relaxed the definition of 'new or different facts,' but it is still necessary that the party seeking that relief offer some fact or circumstance not previously considered by the court. [Citations.]" (Id. at 212-213.) Here, Plaintiff has not presented new evidence or facts under this standard, and cannot be said to have met his burden under section 1008.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion on this ground.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 Uqdah, Priscilla vs. Friends of Allensworth, a California Public Benefit Corporation

Case No.:   VCU306537 

Date:           February 23, 2025

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motions:   (I) Motion for Order Setting Aside Dismissal and Reinstating Defaults; (II) Motion for Preliminary Injunction

Tentative Rulings:   

I.       The motion for set aside is granted as herein modified.  The dismissal of the cross-complaint entered on July 28, 2025 is set aside and is deemed to be of no effect with respect to the defaults entered as against Ann Williams, Emmett Harden, and Bernia Walker on June 20, 2025.  The default entered as against Priscilla Uqdah on August 11, 2025 is stricken.  Cross-plaintiff will need to file a new request for dismissal properly identifying the scope of its intended dismissal (i.e., as to David Schwartz only) and will need to file a new request for entry of default as to Uqdah, if they intend to proceed by default against her. 

II.      The motion for preliminary injunction is granted as follows:  Plaintiffs/cross-defendants are hereby enjoined, pending trial of this case or further order of the court, from in any manner disposing of any of the $70,773.80 in funds returned to Williams by the court following this court’s September 2, 2025 ruling on the prior motion for deposit of funds.

Cross-plaintiff, which identifies itself as “Friends of Allensworth,” moves (1) to set aside the dismissal of its cross-complaint and to “reinstat[e]” the defaults entered against certain of the cross-defendants; and (2) for a preliminary injunction restraining cross-defendant Ann Williams from disposing of $70,773.80 in disputed funds in this case. 

I.       Motion for Set Aside

On April 18, 2025, cross-plaintiff, which is represented by attorney Daryl Reese, filed a cross-complaint against Ann Williams, Emmett Harden, Priscilla Uqdah, Bernia Walker, David Schwartz, and 100 “Does.”

Schwartz was, when this case started, counsel for Uqdah, Walker and Williams, and, apparently in some related capacity, Harden, though Harden was not listed as a plaintiff in the original complaint.   

On April 17, 2025, the day before cross-plaintiff filed its cross-complaint, Schwartz substituted out as counsel for Uqdah, Walker and Williams. 

Uqdah, Walker, Williams and Harden did not timely file answers to the cross-complaint.  On June 20, 2025, defaults were entered as against Walker, Williams and Harden.

Schwartz was named in cross-plaintiff’s cross-complaint as a defendant on two causes of action, for abuse of process and malicious prosecution, for his participation in the allegedly “baseless interpleader proceeding”—the underlying action that commenced this case—which cross-plaintiff asserted was brought in “bad faith.”

On June 27, 2025, Schwartz responded to the cross-complaint with an anti-SLAPP motion. 

Following the filing of that motion, on July 28, 2025, cross-plaintiff filed a request for dismissal, with prejudice, as to its entire cross-complaint and dismissal was entered that same date.  On August 11, 2025, though, cross-plaintiff filed a request for default as to Uqdah, and that default was “entered” even though the cross-complaint was already, ostensibly, dismissed in its entirety. 

Over five months later, on January 20, 2026, cross-plaintiff filed the instant motion to set aside the dismissal of its cross-complaint and to “reinstat[e]” the defaults entered against Uqdah, Walker, Williams and Harden.  Cross-plaintiff asks, though, to “confirm[] the dismissal as to Cross-Defendant David Schwartz … , consistent with Cross-Complainant’s original intent.”

Attorney Reese avers it was his “intention,” on his client’s “instruction” “to dismiss only … Schwartz … while proceeding against [Uqdah, Walker, Williams and Harden],” but while he “specifically instructed [his] staff to prepare and file a Request for Dismissal … identifying only David Schwartz,” “[his] staff prepared and filed a complete dismissal of the entire Cross-Complaint … .”

Reese apparently did not review the request for dismissal filed by his office before it was filed, and apparent did not review the entry of dismissal after it was filed, but, rather, “discovered this error on November 21, 2025,” during a case management conference when Williams advised the court she had been told, by the court clerk, the case “had been dismissed in its entirety.” 

Reese, for what’s worth, though, takes “full responsibility” for his “inadvertence and mistake … as the supervising attorney … “ in support of cross-plaintiff’s instant motion, made under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). 

There has been no opposition filed in response to the motion. 

The court finds that the motion to set aside the dismissal based on the erroneously submitted request should be, and therefore is, granted.  Relief under section 473(b) is routinely granted for the types of “clerical or ministerial mistake[s] that could have been made by anybody” (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 259 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 187, 47 P.3d 1056]), as occurred here. 

The effect of set aside of the dismissal is that it is of no force or effect with respect to the previously entered defaults as to Walker, Williams and Harden, and this ruling confirms as much. 

As to the default entered against Uqdah, default was not properly entered against her at the time that default was entered, because, at that time, the cross-complaint was ostensibly dismissed incident to cross-plaintiff’s erroneously submitted request.  Accordingly, the previously entered default as to Uqdah is stricken. 

The court is disinclined to “reinstate” the entry of default as to Uqdah as of the date her default was entered (in error) because Uqdah was and has been, until now, entitled to rely on the entry of dismissal of the cross-complaint based on cross-plaintiff’s erroneously submitted request as a basis for having no cause to take any further action in connection with the cross-complaint against her.   Cross-plaintiff can resubmit a new request for entry of default if they wish to proceed by default against Uqdah now. 

The court acknowledges that cross-plaintiff intended to dismiss Schwartz when it submitted its erroneous request for dismissal.  If cross-plaintiff still intends to do so, though, it must file a new request for dismissal properly identifying the scope of its intended dismissal, and, perhaps this time, counsel should at least review the request prior to its submission. 

II.      Motion for Preliminary Injunction

This two-year-old case is about a governance dispute over Friends of Allensworth (FOA), a public benefit corporation that operates Colonel Allensworth State Historic Park, and a related transfer of FOA funds. 

What set the dispute off is that plaintiffs/cross-defendants Uqdah, Walker, and Williams moved FOA’s funds from FOA accounts controlled or “maintained by” defendant Sasha Biscoe into new, different FOA accounts controlled by plaintiffs.  There have been related allegations, on both sides, of efforts to seize governing control by the competing factions. 

Plaintiffs first tried to interplead the funds and frame a cause of action to, in effect, determine the directors of the FOA.  As part of this effort, plaintiffs deposited the disputed funds with this court.  After repeated demurrers by the California Department of Parks and Recreation (State Parks), however, which sides with defendants in the underlying disputes, the interpleader approach was nixed, and, at present, only plaintiffs’ claims to determine the leadership of FOA persists from their original complaint. 

Sustaining of the demurrer without leave to plaintiffs’ interpleader cause of action left uncertainty as to return of the funds interplead by plaintiffs, which, despite prior law and motion efforts, persist at present.

Cross-plaintiffs, together with State Parks, previously moved for an order directing the court to “release the funds Plaintiffs[/Cross-Defendants] deposited [with] the Court to … Friends of Allensworth to their attorney of record, Daryl Reese Law Group PC.” 

The court denied this motion, stating:  “With demurrer to the interpleader claim having been sustained without leave, it has only effectively been established that the court had no legal basis for receiving the funds in the first place, and it is left, now, only with the option of returning the funds to the person(s) who deposited them.”

Attorney Reese avers that “[o]n or about September 2, 2025, the Court released the $70,773.80 back to Cross-Defendant Ann Williams, so the funds will be transferred to Ms. Williams imminently. “

Reese further avers that he sent a demand letter to Williams on October 24, 2025, demanding measures to ensure preservation and protection of the disputed funds as a condition of cross-plaintiff’s participation in “any settlement discussions,” and that Williams has not responded. 

“In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a court must weigh two ‘interrelated’ factors: (1) the likelihood that the moving party will ultimately prevail on the merits and (2) the relative interim harm to the parties from issuance or nonissuance of the injunction.”  (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 677-678 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 480, 842 P.2d 1240], citation omitted.)

Regarding the first factor, it is imminently clear that if this litigation accomplishes anything, and the court assumes that someday it will, it will result in an order directing at least the $70,773.80 amount of disputed funds to be delivered to those persons determined—by litigation, agreement or concession—to be the rightful recipient of the funds on behalf of FOA.  Indeed, the very exegesis of this litigation was an effort on the part of Williams, Uqdah and Walker to interplead the disputed funds with the aim of ultimately having the funds delivered to those persons adjudicated to be entitled to receive them.  In this sense, the potential merit factor tips strongly in favor of a preliminary injunction to secure the disputed funds, as it neatly corresponds with plaintiffs’ original intention in seeking to interplead the funds in the first place. 

For this same reason, the relative interim harm factor also tips in favor of the requested preliminary injunction.  Plaintiffs/cross-defendants cannot be said to suffer any harm from being directed to preserve and protect funds that they earlier sought to interplead for their preservation and protection, and cross-plaintiffs, obviously, face immediate and irreparable harm if the funds are not preserved and protected. 

Unsurprisingly, perhaps, it does not appear plaintiffs/cross-defendants, including Williams, who is now represented by counsel, have filed any opposition to cross-plaintiff’s motion. 

Based on the foregoing, the court grants cross-plaintiff’s motion as follows:  Plaintiffs/cross-defendants are hereby enjoined, pending trial of this case or further order of the court, from in any manner disposing of any of the $70,773.80 in funds returned to Williams by the court following this court’s September 2, 2025 ruling on the prior motion for deposit of funds.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Valadez, Brenda et al vs. DLR Management Group, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU310362

Date:           February 23, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Continued Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling: The Court previously continued this motion based on argument and evidence presented by Plaintiff as to the necessity of discovery responses from Defendant Kamohai. Based on the Court’s file, it notes a number of motions to compel further responses set for March 9, 2026 and March 16, 2026 directed at Defendant Kamohai based upon service of both unverified responses in July 2025 and verified responses served November 12, 2025. As such, it appears that the issues regarding contact of Defendant Kamohai have been resolved, at least to the degree of verification of some discovery responses. However, the Court notes a failure to appear at a noticed deposition on January 8, 2026.

As such, the Court is inclined to continue this summary judgment motion to permit resolution of the discovery disputes, as well as the deposition of Defendant Kamohai in order to permit Plaintiffs to oppose the motion for summary judgment.

The Court intends to inquire as to the estimated time to complete sufficient discovery as to Defendant Kamohai, including the motion to compel the deposition of Defendant Kamohai set for March 9, 2026, and continue the summary judgment motion appropriately.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Munger Bros., LLC vs. Nutrien AG Solutions, Inc.

Case No.:  VCU311567

Date:           February 23, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts

In this negligence, products liability and trespass matter, Plaintiff alleges that Oxystar 4L was sprayed on 275 acres of pistachio trees at the recommendation of Defendant Neece, who is employed by Defendant Nutrien. It is further alleged that Defendant Alpaugh manufactures Oxystar. Plaintiff further alleges that subsequent to the application of Oxystar, the trees sustained chemical spray damage that affects the lifetime yield of the trees.

Relevant here, on or about April 7, 2025, Nutrien served Requests for Admission, Set One, on Munger.

Request Nos. 7, 8, and 9 stated the following as to three different pistachio orchards:

“REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7: Admit that You did not use a spray shield during the application of OxyStar 4L to pistachio trees at the S-1 Ranch in April 2022.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 8: Admit that You did not use a spray shield during the application of OxyStar 4L to pistachio trees at the S-12 Ranch in April2022.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 9: Admit that You did not use a spray shield during the application of OxyStar 4L to pistachio trees at the S-13 Ranch in April 2022.”

Plaintiff denied each request.

Plaintiff seeks leave to amend the response to each request.

In support, counsel states the following:

“4…Requests Nos. 7, 8, and 9, all concerned whether a "spray shield" was employed during the application of OxyStar 4L to the pistachio "trees" on ranches S-1, S-12, and S-13 in April 2022. The appropriate response was not obvious, since OxyStar was never applied to the "trees" themselves: since it is an herbicide, Oxystar was applied to the ground surrounding the trees - not to the trees. My client, specifically, David Munger, advised me that a spray shield was in fact utilized for each application of OxyStar to the soil surrounding the trees on the three ranches referred to in Requests Nos. 7, 8, and 9. Ultimately, since the three requests specifically referred to the trees, we decided the most appropriate response was to admit that no spray shield was used. To have denied the requests would have implied that OxyStar had been applied to the trees themselves, which did not occur.

5. On December 23, 2025, Nutrien and Defendant Garrett Neece filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against Munger. Upon reviewing the motion ,I realized that it was based in part on the admissions in response to Requests Nos. 7,8, and 9. I also realized that counsel for Nutrien/Neece considered the responses to be admissions that a spray shield was not used during application of OxyStar to the ground surrounding the trees - which was false.

…

7. Attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit "A" are two photos depicting the spray shield on the spray rig that were produced via Munger's Response to Nutrien's Request for Production of Documents, Set One, dated August 6, 2025. The photos are identified as MUNGER 0009 and MLTNGER 0017. Counsel's joint retained expert Gary Osteen further testified on November 19, 2025, that there was a spray shield on the spray rig. Mr. Osteen's testimony is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit "B."” (Declaration of Hoppe ¶¶4, 5, 7.)

In further support of the motion, Plaintiff’s managing member, who was involved in the determination of how to respond to the requests at issue, states:

“3. Determining how to respond was puzzling, since OxyStar was never applied to the “trees” themselves: since it is an herbicide, Oxystar was applied to the ground surrounding the trees - not to the trees. We did, in fact, employ a spray shield for each application of OxyStar to the soil surrounding the trees.

4. Ultimately, it was determined that since the three requests specifically referred to the trees, we would admit that no spray shield was used. Since no such application was made, a spray shield would not have been used.” (Declaration of David Munger ¶¶3, 4.)

Plaintiff seeks leave to amend the answers pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.300 to state a “qualified denial” indicating that “that a spray shield was used during application of OxyStar to the ground surrounding the pistachio trees.” (Motion 3:10-11.)

In opposition, Defendants note this motion is made eight months after the admissions and after the filing of Defendants’ summary judgment motion that relies, expressly, on the responses to the admissions. Defendants add that the admissions were unqualified and no objection was lodged thereto.

Further, that Plaintiff used the following similar language as to application of Oxystar to the trees in the operative amended complaint:

“[t]he S-1, S-12 and S-13 Ranches are relatively young pistachio trees which were in their sixth year of growth when they were sprayed with Oxystar 4L (“Oxystar”) on April 9, 2022.” (FAC at 1:27-28)

“[f]ailed to prevent the dangerous product from being placed into the stream of commerce with the intended use of applying the Oxystar on the Plaintiff’s pistachio trees.” (FAC at 4:21-22)

Further, that Plaintiff Munger used this same language when it answered Nutrien’s Form Interrogatory No. 17.1 by alleging that the Mungers “…relied on Garrett Neece to ensure that the chemicals were applied appropriately to Responding Party’s bearing trees.”

Further, that in its Requests for Admission 4, 5, and 6, Defendant Nutrien asked Plaintiff to “[a]dmit that [it] applied OxyStar 4L to pistachio bearing trees” at the S-1, S12, S13 Ranches respectively in April 2022. Plaintiff admitted each of these requests.

Additionally, that Defendants will be substantially prejudiced if amendment were permitted, as Defendants have relied on these admissions as to the pending summary judgment motions.

Alternatively, Defendants seek recovery of reasonable fees and costs if the Court permits leave to amend.

Authority and Analysis

Both parties cite to New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403 as authority on the requirements for leave to amend under section 2033.300.

"Any matter admitted in response to request for admission is conclusively established against the party making the admission for purposes of the pending action, unless the court permits a withdrawal or amendment of the admission under section 2033.300. (§2033.410, subd. (a).)" (Id. at 1418.)

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.300 subdivision (a), a party may withdraw or amend an admission on leave of court granted after notice to all parties. (Code Civ. Proc., §2033.300(a).)

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.300(b), the court may permit withdrawal or amendment of an admission if the admission was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, and if the court finds that the party who obtained the admission will not be substantially prejudiced in maintaining its action or defense on the merits. (Code Civ. Proc., §2033.300(b).)

"The statutory language 'mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect' ( §2033.300, subd. (b)) is identical to some of the language used in section 473, subdivision (b)." (New Albertsons, Inc., supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at 1418.) "[T]he legislative history of section 2033, subdivision (m), the predecessor of section 2033.300, suggests that the Legislature intended 'mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect' to have the same meaning in the statute as those terms have in section 473, subdivision (b)." (Id. at 1419.)

Joyce v. Ford Motor Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1489 notes a motion to withdraw or amend an admission "would have been granted as long as the trial court determined that [defendant's] mistake in admitting the matter was not clearly inexcusable and withdrawal would not substantially prejudice [plaintiff]."

"Section 2033.300 eliminates undeserved windfalls obtained through requests for admission and furthers the policy favoring the resolution of lawsuits on the merits. [Citation.]" (New Albertsons, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1418.) While the Court's discretion is not unlimited, any doubts in applying section 2033.300 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief. (Id. at 1420-1421.)

The trial court's discretion to deny a motion for relief based on the failure to establish excusable neglect is limited to circumstances where inexcusable neglect is clear. (Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 235, superseded by statute on another basis as described in Tackett v. City of Huntington Beach (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 60, 64-65.) Further, denial of relief is appropriate where the discovery violations are willful. (Standard Microsystems Corp. v. Winbond Electronics Corp. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 868, 906.)

An order denying discretionary relief under section 473 is more carefully scrutinized on appeal than an order permitting trial on the merits. (Rodriguez v. Henard (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 529, 535, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313.) Attorney error can constitute excusable neglect, depending on the nature of the error and whether counsel was otherwise diligent. (Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College Dist. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 270, 276, 278) If the neglect by counsel is of the excusable variety, relief may be warranted. (Conway v. Municipal Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1018.) However, if an attorney's neglect is inexcusable, it is imputed to the client, and does not warrant relief. (Id.)

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), "[t]he test of whether neglect was excusable is whether '"a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances" might have made the same error. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Luri v. Greenwald (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1128.)

"A 'mistake' justifying relief may be either a mistake of fact or a mistake of law. 'A mistake of fact exists when a person understands the facts to be other than they are; …' [Citation.]" (H.D. Arnaiz, Ltd. v. County of San Joaquin (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1368.) For example, "[a] mistake sufficient to vacate a dismissal may be found where a party, under some erroneous conviction, does an act he would not do but for the erroneous conviction." (Id. at 1369.)

Finally, "'"[t]he inadvertence contemplated by the statute does not mean mere inadvertence in the abstract. If it is wholly inexcusable it does not justify relief. [Citations.] It is the duty of every party desiring to resist an action or to participate in a judicial proceeding to take timely and adequate steps to retain counsel or to act in his own person to avoid an undesirable judgment. Unless in arranging for his defense he shows that he has exercised such reasonable diligence as a man of ordinary prudence usually bestows upon important business his motion for relief under section 473 will be denied."'" (McClain v. Kissler (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 399, 414-415.)

In the Court’s opinion, there is little doubt that the mistake, neglect, or inadvertence is inexcusable in this matter. The central issue is interpretation of the term “application…to trees.” This phrase, however, is used by Plaintiff in the complaint and in response to discovery, which indicates to the Court that the explanation now provided that “application…to trees” is different than application to the ground surrounding the trees or that the requests were “…puzzling since OxyStar was never applied to the ‘trees’ themselves…” is not excusable. Munger’s responses to RFA 4, 5, and 6 are indicative that it understood that applications “to the trees” referred to the application of OxyStar at issue in this case. Moreover, there is no objection lodged as to ambiguity or vagueness. In light of the references to “application…to trees” throughout the pleadings in this matter, the Court does not find the explanation as to the admission that no spray shield was used excusable because Oxystar is not sprayed directly on the trees. 

Further, the timing of the motion, after a summary judgment motion that relies on the responses to the request for admissions, presents substantial prejudice to Defendants. To the extent Plaintiff relies on information obtained from the deposition of the expert, Osteen, this deposition occurred November 19, 2025, approximately one month before Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was filed and approximately two months prior to the filing of this motion. Had this motion been made immediately following the deposition of Osteen, the substantial prejudice found here would have not been present.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 Marquez, Vianey Ardi vs. Rojas, Martin Jr

Case No.:   VCU322613

Date:           February 23, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Initial Responses to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents; and for sanctions

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motions upon the payment of the remaining filing fees of $90; to order responses due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of payment of the filing fee and notice to Defendant; to issue sanctions in the amount of $440 total, due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of payment of the filing fee and notice to Defendant; to order Plaintiff to give notice.

Facts

As an initial matter, the Court notes one motion fee has been submitted to this Court, but that three total motions are made here. The Court conditions the order as to initial responses upon payment of the remaining filing fees of $90.

On February 7, 2025, Plaintiff served the following discovery on Defendant Martin Rojas, Jr: Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production. The Court notes this discovery was served on Defendant, as, at that time, Defendant was represented in pro per.

On November 4, 2025, Defendant’s counsel requested a thirty day extension to respond, making responses due no later than December 5, 2025.

No responses were received and on January 5, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion to compel initial responses.

No opposition appears filed.

Authority and Analysis

Interrogatories

Based on Defendant’s failure to respond to the first set of form and special interrogatories, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.290(a), that Defendant provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Plaintiff’s first set of form interrogatories and first set of special interrogatories, within thirty days after payment of the additional $90 filing fee and service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Plaintiff shall give notice.

Requests for Production

Based on Defendant’s failure to respond to the first set requests for production of documents, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.300(a) that Defendant provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Plaintiff’s first set of requests for production of documents, within thirty days after payment of the additional $90 filing fee and service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Plaintiff shall give notice.

Sanctions

Under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.290(c) (Interrogatories) and 2031.300(c) (Requests for Production), the Court imposes sanctions of $440, consisting of 1 hour total for this motion, plus a total of $180 in filing fees, against Defendant. Sanctions are due within thirty days after payment of the additional $90 filing fees and service of the notice of this ruling for this motion; Plaintiff shall give notice.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Moreno, Azucena Viveros vs. Horizon Nut, LLC

Case No.:  VCU326610

Date:           February 23, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Defendant’s Demurrer to Complaint

Tentative Ruling: To sustain the demurrer with leave to amend; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint.

Facts and Analysis

In this matter, Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action against Defendant:

1. Discrimination in Violation of FEHA

2. Failure to Prevent Discrimination (FEHA)

3. Retaliation in Violation of FEHA

4. Labor Code § 98.6

5. Labor Code § 1102.5

6. Labor Code § 6310

7. Failure to Engage in a Good Faith Interactive Process

8. Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation

9. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy

Plaintiff alleges generally the elements of each cause of action without any factual allegation beyond identification of the Plaintiff and the Defendant. Defendant characterizes the pleading as listing “statutory buzzwords” and failing to allege any fact. By way of example, Plaintiff alleges:

“Defendants subjected Plaintiff to discrimination/harassment/retaliation on the bases of disability, request for/exercise of reasonable accommodation, reporting workplace injury, opposition/refusal to perform/disclosure of discrimination/harassment/retaliation, opposition/refusal to perform/disclosure of violation of the law, opposition/refusal to perform/disclosure of workplace safety violations, opposition/refusal to perform/disclosure of Labor Code violations, and assertion of rights under the Labor Code” (Complaint ¶6.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues the complaint pleads sufficient ultimate facts to place Defendant on notice of the claims.

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.)

The court “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. . . .”  (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.)  “In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 452; see also Stevens v. Sup. Ct. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.)  “When a court evaluates a complaint, the plaintiff is entitled to reasonable inferences from the facts pled.”  (Duval v. Board of Trustees (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 902, 906.) 

The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts.  (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.)  “All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.”  (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.)  

Here, the complaint fails to plead essential facts with reasonable precision and sufficient particularity.

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Plaintiff offers additional facts in opposition to the motion which, to the Court accepts as a showing of the requisite reasonable possibility of amendment. Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer to each cause of action with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 Munoz, Bryan vs. State of California

Case No.:   VCU307598 

Date:           February 23, 2025

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Leave to Amend Answer

Tentative Ruling:   State motion for leave to amend its answer is denied.

The State of California/CalFire moves to amend its answer to assert an affirmative defense of immunity based on Government Code section 818.6, which immunizes public entities for the “failure to make an inspection,” or “an inadequate or negligent inspection,” “of any property, other than its property (as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 830).”

This defense, however, is not targeted at any of plaintiffs’ liability theories at issue in the case, and, for that reason, the motion for leave is denied. 

State/CalFire maintains, in its motion, that deposition testimony by plaintiffs’ retained expert, Craig Fry, setup a theory of liability against it “premised … on an allegedly negligent inspection,” and, for that reason, it should be granted leave to assert a defense based on section 818.6 immunity.  Even if Fry’s testimony did suggest the existence of such a theory, however (and the court need not determine whether it did), it wouldn’t matter because plaintiffs’ pleadings define the issues to be tried (Simmons v. Ware (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1049 [153 Cal.Rptr.3d 178]), not the deposition testimony of its expert. 

As it stands today, plaintiffs’ first amended complaint frames two theories of liability remaining at issue for trial: (1) a theory based on an alleged dangerous condition of public property; and (2) a theory based on CalFire’s vicarious liability for acts/omissions of its employees.  Section 818.6 immunity applies to neither of these theories as they remain at issue for trial. 

As to plaintiffs’ dangerous condition of public property theory, this theory requires plaintiffs to establish State/CalFire “controlled” the premises where the subject injury occurred (within the meaning of Gov. Code, § 830, subd. (c)), and section 818.6 immunity does not apply with respect to a public entity’s own property (“(as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 830)”). (Gov. Code, § 818.6.)  The Legislative Committee Comments to section 818.6 expressly note that “[s]o far as its own property is concerned, a public entity may be held liable under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 830) for negligently failing to discover a dangerous condition by conducting reasonable inspections … .” 

As to plaintiff’s vicarious liability theory based on the acts/omissions of its employees (a theory distinguishable in that it posits liability irrespective of whether State/CalFire controlled the subject premises), the court does note plaintiffs’ allegation that State/CalFire is liable for “acts and omissions of their employees … including but not limited to,” amongst other things, “failing to inspect … in a timely manner, the SUBJECT PREMISES.” This specific basis of liability, however, as it stands at present, like plaintiff’s first theory, ultimately requires plaintiffs to establish State/CalFire “controlled” the premises where the subject injury occurred (within the meaning of Gov. Code, § 830, subd. (c)) because, to the extent premised on State/CalFire’s “failure to make an inspection,” or “an inadequate or negligent inspection,” “of any property, other than its property (as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 830),” such that section 818.6 immunity would apply, this court already sustained, without leave to amend, State/CalFire’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ previously asserted cause of action for “failure to inspect or negligent inspection of property (Government Code § 818.6).” 

In other words, this court has already sustained a demurrer to whatever basis of liability under plaintiff’s vicarious liability theory that could be premised on acts/omissions to which section 818.6 might apply (i.e., the “failure to make an inspection,” or “an inadequate or negligent inspection,” “of any property, other than [State/CalFire’s own] property”).

The court agrees with State/CalFire that “Plaintiffs have … been on notice of the potential of this statute applying to this matter from early on in the case” incident to its prior demurrer, and for that reason, plaintiffs would suffer little prejudice from the granting of leave to amend State/CalFire’s answer, but the prior demurrer having been sustained to plaintiff’s prior cause of action, without leave, based on “failure to inspect or negligent inspection of property (Government Code § 818.6)” precisely eliminated the theory of liability that would warrant the assertion of the defense that State/CalFire seeks to amend its answer to assert here. 

Accordingly, State/CalFire’s motion for leave to amend its answer is denied. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:               Wilmington Savings Fund Society vs. Salazar, Joseph

Case No.:  VCL322425

Date:           February 23, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Lift Stay

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. Therefore, the Court takes the matter off calendar.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:              Pritchett, Demetria Christine vs. Family Healthcare Network, Inc.

Case No.:    VCU290948

Date:           February 23, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:       Continued Motion for Preliminary Approval of PAGA and Class Action Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion as modified herein; to set the motion for final approval for October 5, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 7.

Facts

The Court ordered a supplemental declaration as to the notice period, lodestar, and presently incurred costs at the prior hearing. On February 18, 2026, Plaintiff’s counsel filed supplemental declarations addressing these issues.

Class Notice

The settlement agreement provides no claim form will be required of class members to participate in distributions.  Only those wishing to object or opt out must file notice with the settlement administrator.  Objections or opt out notices are now to be made within 60 days.

The Court regularly approves notice periods of 60 days or longer. The class notice period is therefore approved.

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees of 35% of the gross settlement fund of $1,838,926 or $643,624 and costs not to exceed $36,000 are sought by Plaintiffs’ counsel.

Counsel has utilized the percentage of common fund methodology as well as provided adequate lodestar information to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee request.

Here, Counsel Bradley indicates that the firm Bradley/Grombacher, LLP has spent 182.5 hours on this case, at rates between $1,200 and $500 per hour, resulting in a base lodestar of $193,240  (Supplemental Declaration of Bradley ¶6.)

Additionally, Counsel Baker indicates the firm James Hawkins APLC has spent 228.5 hours at rates ranging from $1,050 to $200 per hour, creating base lodestar of $241,550. (Supplemental Declaration of Baker ¶21.)

As such the total combined lodestar set forth is $434,790.

However, the Court notes that these rates are already higher than what is typically “…prevailing in the community for similar work” or what the Court permits on these settlements.  (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) The Court, therefore, adjusts the hourly rates as follows:

As to Bradley/Grombacher, LLP:

Name	Stated Hourly Rate	Approved Hourly Rate	Hours	Total
Marcus Bradley	$1,200	$900	142.5	$128,250
Lirit King	$850	$650	28	$18,200
Emilie MacLean	$500	$350	12	$4,200

Total Adjusted Base Lodestar:

$150,650

As to James Hawkins APLC:

Name	Stated Hourly Rate	Approved Hourly Rate	Hours	Total
Mr. Hawkins	$1,050	$900	39	$35,100
Ms. Fernandez	$975	$650	110	$71,500
Mr. Draper	$500	$350	152	$53,200
Mr. Do	$475	$300	26	$7,800
Ms. Whitson	$200	$150	25	$3,750

Total Adjusted Base Lodestar:

$171,350

Therefore, the Court finds an adjusted lodestar of $322,000

To award $643,624 in attorneys’ fees, therefore, the Court would need to apply a multiplier of 2.

The Court permits a maximum lodestar multiple of 1.5 in these cases.

The Court has reviewed the declarations of counsel in support of what is now an additional .5 multiplier, but, in its discretion, rules that the additional .5 awarded adequately takes into account the quality of the representation, the novelty and complexity of the issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk presented. (See In re Vitamin Cases (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1052 quoting Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 833) Despite any agreement by the parties to the contrary, the Court has an independent responsibility to review the attorney fee provision of the settlement agreement and award an amount that it determines to be reasonable. (Garabedian v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 123, 128.)

Therefore, the Court will preliminarily approve $483,000 in fees, equal to 1.5 times the current lodestar.

Counsel Bradley has also provided the current costs expended in amounts of  $2,452.53 (Supplemental Declaration of Bradley ¶8.) Counsel Draper indicates current costs of $33,672.15. (Supplemental Declaration of Baker ¶23.)

Therefore, the Court preliminarily approves costs not to exceed $36,000.

Plaintiffs’ deductions from the gross settlement of $1,838,926 are therefore preliminarily approved as follows:      

Preliminarily Approved Attorney Fees (1.5 multiplier):	$483,000
Preliminarily Approved Attorney Costs (up to):	$36,000
Preliminarily Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Pritchett:	$5,000
Preliminarily Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Rojas:	$5,000
Preliminarily Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Baker:	$5,000
Preliminarily Approved Settlement Administrator Costs	$17,250
Preliminarily Approved PAGA payment to the LWDA	$45,000
Preliminarily Approved Net Settlement Amount	$1,242,676

Therefore, the Court grants the motion, as modified herein, and sets the motion for final approval for October 5, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 7.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:               Quintero, Joel vs. Rojas Jr., Martin

Case No.:  VCU327185

Date:           February 23, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion upon the lodging or presentation of the proposed responsive pleading; to order that the proposed responsive pleading be filed no later than ten (10) days from the date of the hearing.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff filed a proof of service evidencing personal service on Defendant on November 5, 2025.

Default was entered December 9, 2025.

On January 16, 2026, Defendant filed this motion for relief from default. In support, Defendant declares that he consulted with current counsel on November 10, 2025 but inadvertently did not retain current counsel until January 6, 2026, after entry of the default. (Declaration of Rojas, Jr. ¶1, 2.)

No responsive pleading is attached to the motion.

No opposition appears filed.

Authority and Analysis

The Court may relieve a party or counsel from a judgment, dismissal, order or other proceeding taken against the party resulting from mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).)  The application for relief must be made within a reasonable time, not to exceed six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order or proceeding was taken.  (Id.)  

“Section 473 is often applied liberally where the party in default moves promptly to seek relief, and the party opposing the motion will not suffer prejudice if relief is granted.  [Citations.]  In such situations ‘very slight evidence will be required to justify a court in setting aside the default.’  [Citation.]”  (Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 233.)

 “A ‘mistake’ exists when a person, under some erroneous conviction of law or fact, does, or omits to do, some act which, but for the erroneous conviction, he would not have done, or omitted. It may arise either from unconsciousness, ignorance, forgetfulness, imposition, or misplaced confidence.” (Salazar v. Steelman (1937) 22 Cal.App.2d 402, 405, 410.) 

“Surprise” is defined as “some condition or situation in which a party to a cause is unexpectedly placed to his injury, without any default or negligence of his own, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.” (Miller v. Lee (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 10, 16.)

Further, “excusable neglect” has been defined as “neglect that might have been the act or omission of a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.” (Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.App.3d 427, 435.)

“Finally, as for inadvertence or neglect, ‘[t]o warrant relief under section 473 a litigant's neglect must have been such as might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances. The inadvertence contemplated by the statute does not mean mere inadvertence in the abstract. If it is wholly inexcusable it does not justify relief.’ ” (Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1206.)” (Henderson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 215, 230.)

Here, the Court has before it “very slight evidence” of excusable inadvertence as to the failure to retain current counsel prior to the entry of default. Therefore, the Court finds this portion of section 473(b) has been satisfied.

Next, subsection (b) additionally requires the filing of “a copy of the answer, motion, or other pleading proposed to be filed in the action.”

Although no copy of a responsive pleading was attached to the motion, this is not fatal to granting relief. This requirement is not jurisdictional and substantial compliance may suffice. (Carmel, Ltd. v. Tavoussi (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 393, 403: finding substantial compliance where counsel offered proposed answer at motion hearing rather than serving it with moving papers.)

Therefore, upon lodging or presentation of the proposed responsive pleading, the Court is inclined to grant the motion, relieve Defendant form default and order that the responsive pleading be filed no later than ten (10) days from the date of the hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:               PCA Acquisitions V, LLC vs. Castillo, Abigail

Case No.:  VCL327455

Date:           February 23, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Defendant’s Continued Motion to Quash

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts

The Court previously continued this motion as to proof of service thereof. On February 2, 2026, Defendant provided a proof of service indicating the motion to quash had been sent by certified mail and received by Plaintiff’s counsel in Arizona.

Defendant moves to quash service. The Court notes Defendant’s motion does not contain a declaration, but argues Defendant was not personally served, that the summons was discovered left hanging from the door of Defendant’s residence, that no in-person adult resident received the documents.

Further, that the summons is facially defective as it lacks the VCL prefix.

Further, that the proof of service alleging personal service on Defendant “Abigail Castillo Desc: Sex: F - Age: 25 to 30 - Skin: HISPANIC - Hair: BROWN - Height: 5ft5 to 5ft8 - Weight: 144 to 148 * N*” occurred at 5932 W Iris Ct, Visalia, CA on November 22, 2025 at 1:36 pm by a registered California process server.

No opposition appears filed.

Authority and Analysis

The burden of proof on a challenge to service of process is on the plaintiff. (Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 413.) However, the filing of a proof of service declaration creates a rebuttable presumption that the service was proper if the service declaration complies with the statutory requirements regarding such proofs (Code Civ. Proc. § 417.10; Lebel v. Mai (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1163.) The return of a registered process server establishes a presumption of the facts stated in the return. (Evid. Code § 647; American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 390.)

This rebuttable presumption shifts the burden to Defendant to produce evidence showing that they were improperly served. (See American Express, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at 390.)

However, as noted above, Defendant’s motion lacks a declaration attesting to the facts alleged in the motion or authenticating the documents attached thereto. None of these allegations are declared under penalty of perjury.

Therefore, the Court has, even in the absence of an opposition to this motion, a filed proof of service executed by a registered California process server which establishes a presumption of service and a lack of evidence by Defendant. (Reid v. Overland Machined Products (1961) 55 Cal.2d 203, 209 ["Statements in the pleadings or memoranda of counsel are hearsay, self-serving, and incompetent as evidence."]; See Fuller v. Tucker (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1173 [“Argument of counsel is not evidence”]; See also Ponte v. County of Calaveras (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 551, 556 [“the arguments of counsel in a motion are not a substitute for evidence...”].)

Further, the Court does not find the lack of the VCL prefix to render the summons facially defective. This is the only civil matter with “327455” in the case number.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Examiner Notes for Probate Matters Calendared

• Visalia Division 
• South County Justice Center Division