Tentative Rulings

Civil Tentative Rulings and Probate Examiner Recommendations are available below. All attempts possible are made to have the information on these pages updated by 3:00pm the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.

Civil Tentative Rulings: The court does not issue tentative rulings on Writs of Attachment, Writs of Possession, Claims of Exemption, Claims of Right to Possession, Motions to Tax Costs After Trial, Motions for New Trial, or Motions to Continue Trial. Under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308 and Local Rule 701, any party opposed to the tentative ruling must notify the court and other parties by 4:00 p.m. today of their intention to appear for oral argument. The court's notice must be made by facsimile (fax) to 559-733-6774; by email to research_attorney@tulare.courts.ca.gov; or by telephoning (559) 730-5010.

Probate Examiner Recommendations: For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at 559-730-5000 ext #1430. The Probate Calendar Clerk may be reached at 559-730-5000 Option 4, then Option 6. Note: The court does not issue probate examiner recommendations on petitions for approval of compromise of claim.

Civil Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, June 30, 2026, are:

Re: Isquierdo, Daleyza et al vs. Kaweah Delta Health Care District et al

Case No.: VCU322088

Date: June 30, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: Kaweah’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts

Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on May 23, 2025, alleging Medical Negligence and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress against Defendant Kaweah Delta Health Care District (“KDHCD” or “Kaweah”) and Defendants Brock, Nwokidu-Aderibigbe, Concina, Ibonia and Dosado. (UMF No. 1.) On July 28, 2025, Kaweah answered the complaint. (UMF No. 2.)

On May 12, 2024, Ms. Meza was admitted to KDHCD. Ms. Meza was thirty weeks pregnant and hypertension. (UMF No. 3.)

Upon arrival, Ms. Meza signed KDHCD' s Conditions of Admissions ("COA"). Page 2 of the COA states:

PHYSICIANS ARE INDEPENDENT MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS:

As physicians and surgeons are providing care to you, including the anesthesiologists, pathologists, audiologists, emergency room physicians, physician's assistants, pediatric hospitalists, internal medicine hospitalists, and ICU hospitalists and other are not employees or agents of Kaweah Health. They have been granted the privilege of using Kaweah Health for the care and treatment of their patients. They are independent practitioners. You understand that you are under the care and supervision of your attending physician. Kaweah Health and its nursing staff are responsible for carrying out your physician's instructions. Your physician is responsible for obtaining your informed consent, when required, to medical and surgical treatment, special diagnostic or therapeutic procedures, or hospital services provided to you under your physician's general and special instructions. You will receive a separate bill from your physicians for their services. (UMF No. 4.)

Further, that Physicians, including but not limited to Dr. Concina, Dr. Brock, Dr. Aderibigbe, Dr. Ibonia, and Dr. Dosado were not employed by KDHCD, nor did KDHCD control them. These physicians were independent contractors. (UMF No. 20.)

On June 1, 2024, Daleyza was born via cesarean section. Thereafter, she was admitted into KDHCD's Neonatal Intensive Care Unit ("NICU"). (UMF No. 5.)

In the NICU, Daleyza was diagnosed with apnea of prematurity, a feeding intolerance, ileus, abdominal distention, cholestasis, elevated liver enzymes, and thrombocytopenia. (UMF No. 6.)

On June 2, 2024, at or around 16:30, KDHCD's nursing staff notified Daleyza's provider that Daleyza had emesis, distended abdomen with fussiness that was resolved after removing air and asked if it was ok to start feeds. It was noted that the provider was coming to the bedside. (UMF No. 7.)

On June 4, 2024, at or around 5:45, KDHCD's nursing staff made a Provider Notification notifying Daleyza's provider that Daleyza had suffered from regurgitation with slight green tinge. On the same day, Daleyza' s provider was made aware by KDHCD's nursing staff that Daleyza's abdomen was slightly distended but still soft. On the same day, at or around 11:14, KDHCD's nursing _staff notified Daleyza' s provider that" she had dark green colored emesis,. grass green colored residuals in her nasogastric tube, and that her abdomen had increased by 1 centimeter in size. It was noted that a provider was at bedside. (UMF No. 8.)

On June 5, 2024, at or around 17:01, KDHCD's nursing staff notified Daleyza's provider that her abdomen was distended, she appeared uncomfortable and had not stooled since glycerin was given. It was noted that a provider was at bedside and was aware of Daleyza's distended abdomen with feeding and air residuals. (UMF No. 9.)

On June 6, 2024, at or around 19: 16, KDHCD's nursing staff notified Daleyza's provider that she was suffering from emesis, had a firm and distended abdomen, and her abdomen had increased from 24.5 to 27 centimeters in 12 hours. It was noted that a provider was at bedside to assess Daleyza and view her x-ray image. (UMF No. 10.)

On June 9, 2024, KDHCD's nursing staff notified Daleyza's provider that she had a spell that required stimulant and repositioning and that Daleyza had a smear however, no stool yet. (UMF No. 11.)

On June 11, 2024, KDHCD's nursing staff notified Daleyza's provider that her face was looking jaundice and that a transcutaneous bilirubin test resulted in a 13.3. It was noted that a provider came to Daleyza' s bedside. (UMF No. 12.)

On June 12, 2024, KDHCD's nursing staff notified Daleyza' s provider that she had a distended and firm abdomen, decreased bowel sounds, and a change in color. That same day, KDHCD's nursing staff notified Daleyza's provider that Daleyza had a low temperature and a change in her abdomen. It was noted that a physician came to Daleyza's bedside and placed new orders. (UMF No. 13.)

On June 13, 2024, KDHCD's nursing staff notified Daleyza's provider that she had continued abdomen firmness and distention, green-yellow hue to skin color, was lethargic, had amber colored urine, and her abdominal girth had increased. (UMF No. 14.)

On June 13, 2024, Daleyza was transferred to Valley Children's Hospital. (UMF No. 15.)

Kaweah thereafter presents expert opinion that KDHCD acted within the applicable standard of care in providing care and treatment to Delayza in June of 2024 and that no act or omissions by KDHGD was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiffs' alleged harm, as detailed below. (UMF Nos. 16-19.)

In opposition, the Court notes first that Plaintiffs object to declaration of Kaweah’s Expert, Dr. Sonia L. Bonifacio, who opines as to the standard of care and causation of nursing, non-physician, and non-midlevel staff, citing to
Lattimore v. Dickey (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 959, 970.

Additionally, Plaintiffs dispute these facts based on the declaration of Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Phillipe Friedlich and notes that Plaintiffs are not challenging the care provided by non-physician staffing, but rather that Kaweah breached its duty as a Community NICU by failing to have a pediatric surgeon available for the neonatologists to consult. (Opposition 5:18-21; Complaint ¶18.)

Authority and Analysis

A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(a).) “The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(f)(1).) If a party seeks summary adjudication as an alternative to a request for summary judgment, the request must be clearly made in the notice of the motion. (Gonzales v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1544.) “[A] party may move for summary adjudication of a legal issue or a claim for damages other than punitive damages that does not completely dispose of a cause of action, affirmative defense, or issue of duty pursuant to” subdivision (t). (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(t).)

To prevail, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c).) The motion cannot succeed unless the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts; the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other evidence. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of material fact, “[a]ll doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment…” (Gold v. Weissman (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-99.) “In other words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true.” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 179.) However, if adjudication is otherwise proper the motion “may not be denied on grounds of credibility,” except when a material fact is the witness’s state of mind and “that fact is sought to be established solely by the [witness’s] affirmation thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(e).)

Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) “[T]here is no obligation on the opposing party... to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element... necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor.” (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)

“The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment motion. The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues and to frame the outer measure of materiality in a summary judgment proceeding.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493, quotations and citations omitted.) “Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff's theories of liability as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings.” (Id.)

Medical Malpractice

In a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must establish the following elements: “(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional's negligence. [citations.]” (Galvez v. Frields (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1420.)

Applicable Standard of Care

A defendant moving for summary judgment in a medical malpractice action must “present evidence that would preclude a reasonable trier of fact from finding it was more likely than not that their treatment fell below the standard of care.” (Johnson v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 297, 305.) The standard of care against which the acts of health care providers are to be measured is a matter within the knowledge of experts. (Elcome v. Chin (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 310, 317.) Unless the conduct required by the particular circumstances is within the common knowledge of the layman, the standard of care in a malpractice action can only be proved by an expert’s testimony. (Id.)

Kaweah’s Expert – Standard of Care; Objections

In support of the motion, Kaweah provides the declaration of Sonia L. Bonifacio, M.D. The Court’s review of Dr. Bonifacio’s declaration and CV indicates sufficient education and experience in pediatrics and neonatal-perinatal medicine. (Declaration of Dr. Bonifacio ¶¶1-3.) Dr. Bonifacio indicates retention in this matter by Kaweah’s counsel to offer expert opinion as to the standard of care applicable to the treatment of Plaintiff in or around June 2024 as to Kaweah’s nursing, non-physician and non-midlevel staff. (Declaration of Dr. Bonifacio ¶4.) Dr. Bonifacio notes familiarity with the standard of care applicable as to the treatment of Plaintiff in June 2024. (Declaration of Dr. Bonifacio ¶¶5, 6.)

Dr. Bonifacio indicates review of the complaint and pertinent medical records from Kaweah and provides a chronological factual summary of events in this case. (Declaration of Dr. Bonifacio ¶¶8, 9.)

However, as noted above, Plaintiffs object to the testimony of Dr. Bonifacio as insufficient regarding nursing, non-physician, and non-midlevel staff under Lattimore, supra, 239 Cal. App. at 969-970.

Lattimore states, as to an expert declaration submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment by a board certified doctor in family medicine and emergency medicine, that “…even if we liberally construe Dr. Turner's declaration, it does not indicate that he possesses any certification, expertise or relevant knowledge of the standards of care attributable to nurses, hospitals or hospital employees, other than physicians or surgeons.” (emphasis in original) (Id.)

The Court here, as to a moving party’s expert declaration, need not liberally construe the declaration and comes to the same conclusion as in Lattimore: Dr. Bonifacio has not sufficiently set out information in the declaration that substantiates expertise as to nursing, non-physician, and non-midlevel staff. Although Kaweah’s reply assets this expertise, it is not supported by the declaration of Dr. Bonifacio.

Therefore, the Court sustains Objection Nos. 1 through 10.

Moreover, the declaration of Dr. Bonifacio does not address the standard of care pled in the complaint, and noted in Plaintiffs’ opposition, as to the breach of the standard of care regarding Kaweah’s duty to have a pediatric surgeon available for the neonatologists to consult.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re: In the Matter of Jimmy L. Dreo and Charlotte L. Dreo 1996 Living Trust

Case No.: VCU331662

Date: June 30, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: Motion for Trial Preference

Tentative Ruling: To continue this motion to July 14, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 2 and order a declaration in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 36(c)(1) as to service or appearance of all essential parties.

Facts

Petitioner Jimmy L. Dreo (“Corky”) filed this petition for invalidation of power of attorney, successor trustee appointment, to invalidate trust amendment, for financial elder abuse, for breach of fiduciary duty, for orders determining title, for fraud, to compel an accounting, to prohibit use of trust funds and to revoke the trust, naming Ricky Lee Dreo, individually and as Successor Trustee of the Jimmy L. Dreo and Charlotte L. Dreo 1996 Living Trust; Pamela Lynn Dreo-Dotson, an individual and the Pamela Dreo Living Trust as Respondents.

On June 9, 2026, Corky filed this motion for trial preference pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 36(a). Further, Corky’s declaration establishes he is 87 years old, is the surviving settler and trustee of the Jimmy L. Dreo and Charlotte L. Dreo 1996 Living Trust, is currently being treated by a physician for coronary artery disease, is at a risk of being incapacitated if trial preference is not granted. (Declaration of Corky ¶¶1-7; Ex – A – Letter from Physician.)

No opposition appears to have been filed.

Authority and Analysis

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 36(a), any party to a civil action who is over 70 years of age may “petition the court for a preference, which the court shall grant if the court makes both of the following findings:

“(1) The party has a substantial interest in the action as a whole;

(2) The health of the party is such that a preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing the party’s interest in the litigation.”

The right to preference for litigants who qualify under Code of Civil Procedure § 36(a) is mandatory. (Koch-Ash v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 689, 698-99; Rice v. Superior Court (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 81, 86-87.) “The language of Section 36(a) was intended by the Legislature to be mandatory, and thus requires that a litigant qualifying under its terms be given preferential trial setting irrespective of the circumstances leading to the motion for preference.” (Rice v. Superior Court (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 81, 85.)

First, Corky is the Petitioner in this action and over the age 70, thereby giving Petitioner a substantial interest in this action before the court in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 36(a)(1).

There is no automatic preference based solely on age and the granting is conditioned on a finding of necessity under (a)(2). (Kline v. Superior Court (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 512, 514.) The Court must consider “the party's health when determining whether preference is required, and considering whether the party's health necessitates the preference to avoid prejudice to the party.” (Id.) Here, Corky’s declaration and letter from the physician are sufficient to meet this element.

However, the declaration of Corky fails to indicate, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 36(c)(1) “…that all essential parties have been served with process or have appeared.”

Therefore, the Court continues this motion to July 14, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 2, given the that the other elements of preference are met, and orders a supplemental declaration as to the issue of service or appearance pursuant to subsection (c)(1).

Re: Loza, Marisela vs. BH-TC Opco, LLC

Case No.: VCU316226

Date: June 30, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion

Background Facts

In this class action matter, Plaintiff sues Defendants BH-TC Opco, LLC, BH Social Rehab Holdings, LLC, BH-SD Social Rehab LM, LLC, BH-TC Opco Visalia, LLC, BH-SD DD Opco, LLC, BH-SD Opco, LLC, BH-SD Parentco, LLC, BH-SD RX, LLC, BH-SD West Coast, LLC, and BH-SD RE 7050, LLC as joint employers of Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶¶1-11.)

Plaintiff alleges causes of action for violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 and various sections of the Labor Code related to wage and hour claims, rest and meal period claims and reimbursement claims.

Defendant BH-TC OPCO, LLC dba Jackson House Tulare moves to compel arbitration, to strike the class action claims and to stay this action pending arbitration.

Facts – Agreement to Arbitrate

In support, Defendant provides the declaration of its human resources director who held this position during the time Plaintiff was employed by Defendant. (Declaration of Loders ¶¶1, 2.) Further, Defendant describes the onboarding process, including the execution of documents as part of hiring, payroll, and other employment processes and that a newly hired employee must acknowledge and electronically sign documents, including a Dispute Resolution Agreement (“Agreement”) before the employee can start work. (Declaration of Loders ¶¶ 4,5, 6, 8, 9.)

Plaintiff completed the onboarding process on July 27, 2023 via the process described above. (Declaration of Loders ¶14.) Further, Loders indicates that the Agreement executed by Plaintiff, attached as Exhibit A and bears Plaintiff’s name, her employee ID, her handwritten electronic signature, a unique identifier code and is dated July 27, 2023. (Declaration of Loders ¶15- Ex. A.)

No opposition to the electronic execution of the Agreement appears to be made by Plaintiff.

Authority and Analysis – Agreement to Arbitrate

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2(a), (b).) (emphasis added.) The motion to compel arbitration requires the facts are to be proven by affidavit or declaration and documentary evidence with oral testimony taken only in the court’s discretion. (Code Civ. Proc., §1290.2; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413–414.) The motion must set forth the provisions of the written agreement and the arbitration clause verbatim, or such provisions must be attached and incorporated by reference. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330; see Condee v. Longwood Mgmt. Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218.)

Absent a challenge by the nonmoving party, this burden is met by simply providing a copy of the arbitration agreement. (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2017) 13 Cal. App. 5th 1152, 1160; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.) “For purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 218; Sprunk v. Prisma LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 785, 793.)

However, when the opposing party disputes the agreement, then the opposing party must provide evidence to challenge its authenticity. (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.)

Under California law, "[t]he burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence …." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 164-165.)

"However, the burden of production may shift in a three-step process." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at. 165.)

"First, the moving party bears the burden of producing 'prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.' [Citation.]" (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) "The moving party 'can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party's] signature.' [Citation.]" (Id.) "For this step, 'it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.' [Citation.]” (Id.)

Here, Defendant has provided the Agreement it submits was executed electronically by Plaintiff in satisfaction of this initial burden.

When the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.) “The opposing party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may testify under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement.” (Id.)

Here, as noted above, Plaintiff does not appear to challenge the electronic execution of the Agreement.

Facts – Scope of Agreement

Here, the Agreement states that Plaintiff and Defendant agree to arbitrate “…all disputes that might arise out of or be related in any way to my application for employment and/or employment by the Company. Such disputes include, but are not limited to, claims I might bring against the Company for wrongful termination, discrimination, harassment, retaliation, breach of contract, wage and hour violations, any individual claims under the California Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”), and torts such as invasion of privacy, assault and battery, or defamation.” (Agreement ¶1.)

Authority and Analysis – Scope of Agreement

Here, the Agreement expressly applies to all disputes arising out of Plaintiff employment and therefore applies to the claims asserted in this matter.

Facts – FAA Application

The Agreement states “Any arbitration proceeding under this agreement shall proceed under and be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) because both I and the Company are engaged in interstate commerce.” (Agreement ¶7.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s declarations in support of affecting interstate commerce are insufficient, but does not address the language in the Agreement quoted above.

Authority and Analysis – FAA Application

The party asserting the FAA applies to an agreement has “the burden to demonstrate FAA coverage by declarations and other evidence.” (Hoover v. American Income Life Ins.Co. (2012) 206Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207; see Shepard v. Edward Mackay Enterprises, Inc. (2007) 148Cal.App.4th 1092, 1101)

In general, the FAA "governs arbitration provisions in contracts that involve interstate commerce." (Mastick v. TD Ameritrade, Inc. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1263, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 717.) Title 9 of the United States Code section 2, ("the primary substantive provision of the FAA" as noted by Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge Services (2005) 35 Cal.4th 376, 384) provides in part:

"A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract . . . ." (9 U.S.C. § 2,; see Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson (1995) 513 U.S. 265, 277 ["involving commerce" broadly construed].) “The FAA applies to contracts that involve interstate commerce (9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2), but since arbitration is a matter of contract, the FAA also applies if it is so stated in the agreement.” (Davis v. Shiekh Shoes, LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 956, 963.)

Therefore, the Court finds the FAA applies based on the plain language of the Agreement that states “…both I and the Company are engaged in interstate commerce.”

Facts – Class Action Waiver

Further, the Agreement states:

“I and the Company each specifically waive our respective rights to bring such claims against the other in a court of law and to have a trial by jury. By signing below, I expressly waive the right to bring a class, collective, representative or PAGA claim (unless such waiver is prohibited by controlling law) seeking any relief on behalf of others.” (Agreement ¶1.)

Additionally, that:

“Both I and the Company agree that any claims we might pursue against the other in arbitration under this agreement shall be brought in my individual capacity or that of the Company. This agreement shall not be construed to allow or permit the consolidation or joinder of claims of other claimants, or to permit such claims to proceed as a class or collective action. No arbitrator shall have the authority under this agreement to order any such class or collective action. Any dispute regarding the validity, scope, or enforceability of this agreement, or concerning the arbitrability of a particular claim, shall be resolved by a court, not by the arbitrator. I agree to waive any substantive or procedural rights that I may have to bring or participate in an action brought on a class or collective basis.” (Agreement ¶4.)

Authority and Analysis – Class Action Waiver

As the FAA applies, the class action waiver is enforceable. (Viking River Cruises v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 651 ["'a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so'"]; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 352 [holding class action waivers are enforceable under FAA and California rule to contrary preempted].)

Therefore, absent any defenses to arbitration as analyzed below, the Court is prepared to grant the motion to strike the class claims and compel Plaintiff’s now individual claims to arbitration.

Facts – Defenses to Enforcement – Unconscionability

Plaintiff, as to procedural unconscionability, states she was presented with, and signed, the Agreement along with numerous other documents that she had to quickly review and sign. (Declaration of Plaintiff ¶3.) Further, that Plaintiff was required to sign or acknowledge receipt of all onboarding documents prior to starting work and were prerequisites to starting employment with Defendant. (Declaration of Plaintiff ¶3.) Plaintiff indicates further that she was never told what the documents were, what the Agreement was or how it affected her rights, and that the office manager “pressured me to quickly sign the Arbitration Agreement in order to begin work.” (Declaration of Plaintiff ¶3.) Further, that the Agreement, and other onboarding documents, were exclusively prepared by Defendant, that Plaintiff was not given an opportunity to ask questions or negotiate any terms of the Agreement and that the Agreement was presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. (Declaration of Plaintiff ¶4.) Further, that Plaintiff lacks legal training, was not familiar with the limitations of the Agreement, that the Agreement failed to specify which version of the rules were applicable and that Defendant did not provide a copy of the applicable rules. (Declaration of Plaintiff ¶5.) Finally, that Plaintiff did not have counsel present when the Agreement was executed and was not afforded an opportunity to consult with an attorney independently. (Declaration of Plaintiff ¶6.)

As to substantive unconscionability, Plaintiff argues lack of mutuality, an overbroad class action waiver, an illegal representative PAGA waiver, an illegal waiver of PAGA standing, a “free peek” at Plaintiff’s claims, deprives Plaintiff of tolling of the statute of limitations, permits delay of payment of arbitration fees and that the Agreement does not permit judicial review.

Authority and Analysis - Defenses to Enforcement – Unconscionability

The inquiry into unconscionability consists of two prongs: A contract will be revoked if it is both procedurally unconscionable and substantively unconscionable. (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Service, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 82, 102.) Procedural and substantive unconscionability need not be present to the same degree. “[T]he more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” (Id. at 114.)

Procedural Unconscionability

“‘Procedural unconscionability’ concerns the manner in which the contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties at that time. It focuses on the factors of oppression and surprise. The oppression component arises from an inequality of bargaining power of the parties to the contract and an absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice on the part of the weaker party. The component of surprise arises when the challenged terms are ‘hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce them.’” (Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1281.)

The Court also considers whether circumstances of the contract’s formation created such oppression or surprise that closer scrutiny of its overall fairness is required. (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 126-127.) “The circumstances relevant to establishing oppression include, but are not limited to (1) the amount of time the party is given to consider the proposed contract; (2) the amount and type of pressure exerted on the party to sign the proposed contract; (3) the length of the proposed contract and the length and complexity of the challenged provision; (4) the education and experience of the party; and (5) whether the party's review of the proposed contract was aided by an attorney.” (Id.) As OTO recognizes, the pressure exerted on a standard employee to accept an adhesive arbitration agreement as a condition of employment is “particularly acute,” which indicates oppression. (Id. at 127.)

“An adhesive contract is standardized, generally on a preprinted form, and offered by the party with superior bargaining power on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. (Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1245.) Arbitration contracts imposed as a condition of employment are typically adhesive. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 114-115; Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 695, 704.) But the fact that an agreement is adhesive is not, alone, sufficient to render it unconscionable. (Malone v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1561.) “[A] compulsory pre-dispute arbitration agreement is not rendered unenforceable just because it is required as a condition of employment or offered on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.” (Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1127.)

Here, the Court agrees that the Agreement at issue has some degree of procedural unconscionability as a preprinted form provided to an employee, that the Agreement appears to be a condition of employment and that the Agreement was not the product of negotiation.

Substantive Unconscionability

“Substantive unconscionability occurs when a contract, particularly, contracts of adhesion, impose terms “that have been variously described as overly harsh, unduly oppressive, so one-sided as to shock the conscience, or unfairly one-sided. All of these formulations point to the central idea that the unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with a simple old-fashioned bad bargain, but with terms that are unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party. Unconscionable terms impair the integrity of the bargaining process or otherwise contravene the public interest or public policy or attempt to impermissibly alter fundamental legal duties.” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho, supra, 8 Cal. 5th at 129–30, internal quotations and citations omitted.)

Armendariz sets forth elements of essential substantive fairness as follows:

(1) provide for a neutral arbitrator:

(2) provide for adequate discovery;

(3) require the arbitrator to issue a written decision that permits limited judicial review;

(4) provide for the same remedies that would otherwise be available to the employee in court;

(5) not require the employee to bear costs unique to arbitration; and

(6) provide a “modicum of bilaterality” between the employer and employee. (Armendariz, supra. 24 Cal 4th at 102-113, 117-118.)

Non-Mutual Benefit

Here, Plaintiff argues that the Agreement provides Plaintiff waive her jury trial right as to Defendant as well as Defendant’s:

“[P]arent, subsidiaries, affiliates, customers, or client entities as well as against owners, directors, officers, managers, employees, agents, contractors, attorneys, benefit plan administrators, and insurers of the Company or of its parent, subsidiaries, affiliates, customers, or client entities. I also agree to arbitrate claims pursuant to the terms of this Agreement against any person or entity I allege to be a joint employer with the Company as well as claims brought against staffing companies, employee leasing companies, professional employer organization or payroll processing vendors that the Company has utilized.”

Plaintiff argues that there is no mutual requirement that these third parties waive jury trial and arbitrate claims against Plaintiff, citing to Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312 where “The agreement requires Cook to arbitrate any and all claims she may have against USC 'or any of its related entities, including but not limited to faculty practice plans, or its or their officers, trustees, administrators, employees or agents, in their capacity as such or otherwise.' However, the agreement does not require USC's 'related entities' to arbitrate their claims against Cook." (Id. at 326.) The Cook court concluded “This confers a benefit on USC and its broadly defined 'related entities' that is not mutually afforded to Cook.” (Id. at 327.)

The Court notes Ayala-Ventura v. Superior Court (Feb. 19, 2026, No. F089695) ___Cal.App.5th___ [2026 Cal. App. LEXIS 163] distinguished Cook, stating:

“The employee in Cook was obliged to arbitrate her claims against USC, its related entities, as well as its “officers, trustees, administrators, employees or agents,” but only USC was bound to arbitrate its claims against the plaintiff. The agreement lacked mutuality because USC’s “‘related entities’” were not bound to it. (Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 319.) Here, the Agreement’s definition of “Company” expressly includes CCS’s related entities and binds those entities to arbitration. Cook was also bound to arbitrate any claims against USC’s officers, trustees, administrators, employees or agents “‘in their capacity as such or otherwise.’” (Id. at p. 317, italics added.) This language was understood as requiring Cook to arbitrate any claims against these individuals even where they were not acting in their identified capacity. In contrast, the Agreement expressly limits arbitration to claims against CCS’s employees or agents in their capacity as such. Any claims Ayala-Ventura may have against employees or agents unrelated to their role are therefore not subject to the Agreement.” (Id. at *33-34.)

Here, the Agreement states that Plaintiff agrees to “…resolve all disputes that might arise out of or be related in any way to my application for employment and/or employment by the Company” and that “My agreement to arbitrate claims against the Company includes claims I might bring against the Company’s…” various related entities.

As such, the Court does not find the Agreement lacks mutuality as in Cook, where the claims included those against related entities in any capacity. Here, the Court finds any such claims that would be arbitrated against the related entities are limited to those related to the application for employment.

Therefore, the Court does not find a lack of mutuality.

Class Waiver – Public Injunctive Relief

Here, Plaintiff argues the class waiver too broadly waives claims for injunctive relief in any forum by requiring Plaintiff to “expressly waive the right to bring a class, collective, representative or PAGA claim (unless such waiver is prohibited by controlling law) seeking any relief on behalf of others...” (Agreement - ¶1) and “[b]oth I and the Company agree that any claims we might pursue against the other in arbitration under this agreement shall be brought in my individual capacity or that of the Company. This agreement shall not be construed to allow or permit the consolidation or joinder of claims of other claimants, or to permit such claims to proceed as a class or collective action.” (Agreement - ¶4.)

As such, Plaintiff notes no carve out for injunctive relief or public injunctive relief, citing to McGill v. Citibank, N.A. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 945, 961, where the California Supreme Court held that an arbitration provision that waives the right to request in any forum public injunctive relief is unenforceable.

In McGill, however, the Supreme Court noted that a person requesting public injunctive relief does so "on his or her own behalf, not 'on behalf of the general public" because “a request for [public injunctive relief] does not constitute the ‘pursu[it]’ of ‘representative claims or relief on behalf of others’ within the meaning of Business and Professions Code sections 17203 or 17535, such that ‘compli[ance] with Section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure’ is required.” (Id. at 959-960.)

As such, the language of Paragraph 1 of the Agreement does not waive an action for public injunctive relief, as this term only applies to “class, collective, representative or PAGA” claims.

Further, the agreement in McGill purported to waive the plaintiff’s right to seek public injunctive relief “in any forum” (Id. at 953-954.) Here, while there is arguably a waiver as to bringing such claims in a court of law or via a jury trial under the Agreement, the Court finds no bar on awarding public injunctive relief, on an individual claim, within arbitration, as the Plaintiff is bound to pursue individual claims within arbitration. (Agreement ¶4)

Therefore, the Court does not an impermissible waiver of public injunctive relief.

PAGA Representative Waiver

Plaintiff argues that the following term constitutes an impermissible “representative” PAGA waiver:

“Both I and the Company agree that any claims under PAGA must be pursued in my individual capacity in arbitration. This agreement shall not be construed to allow or permit the consolidation or joinder of PAGA claims of other claimants. No arbitrator shall have the authority under this agreement to order any such collective action or joinder of claims. Any dispute regarding the validity, scope or enforceability of this provision, or concerning the arbitrability of a PAGA claim, shall be resolved by a court, not by the arbitrator. To the full extent permissible under the law, I agree to waive any substantive or procedural rights that I may have to bring or participate in a PAGA action brought on a collective or non-individual basis. I acknowledge that nothing herein precludes me from pursuing my individual PAGA claim in arbitration.” (Agreement ¶5.)

In Viking River, the United States Supreme Court held that, under an agreement permitting such, a PAGA cause of action may be divided into individual and representative claims and that the individual claims may be ordered to arbitration: "PAGA authorizes any 'aggrieved employee' to initiate an action against a former employer 'on behalf of himself or herself and other current and former employees' to obtain civil penalties that previously could have been recovered only by the State in an [Labor Workforce and Development Agency] enforcement action." (Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 645.) The "individual PAGA claim" is the claim for the violations suffered by the aggrieved employee and the "representative PAGA claim" is the PAGA claim arising out of events involving other employees. (Id. at 648.)

The Viking River decision “left undisturbed” and “intact” both of the rules from Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th 348 that (1) prohibited categorical waivers of the right to bring a PAGA action in any forum and (2) prohibited waivers of PAGA claims on behalf of other employees, i.e., non-individual or representative claims. (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1117-1118.)

However, the United States Supreme Court held that the third rule, which prohibited the "'division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate'" was preempted by the FAA. (Id. at 1118.)

Specifically, the Viking River Court stated:

"The agreement between Viking and Moriana purported to waive 'representative PAGA claims. Under Iskanian, this provision was invalid if construed as a wholesale waiver of PAGA claims. And under our holding, that aspect of Iskanian is not preempted by the FAA, so the agreement remains invalid insofar as it is interpreted in that manner. But the severability clause in the agreement provides that if the waiver provision is invalid in some respect, any portion that remains valid must still be 'enforced in arbitration.' Based on this clause, Viking was entitled to enforce the agreement insofar as it mandated arbitration of Moriana's individual PAGA claim." (Id. at 1924-1925.)

As summarized by Adolph:

"The high court explained that an anti-splitting rule 'unduly circumscribes the freedom of parties to determine "the issues subject to arbitration" and "the rules by which they will arbitrate," [citation], and does so in a way that violates the fundamental principle that "arbitration is a matter of consent."' (Viking River, at p. 659.) Requiring parties to adjudicate a PAGA action entirely in one proceeding, the high court said, 'compels parties to either go along with an arbitration in which the range of issues under consideration is determined by coercion rather than consent, or else forgo arbitration altogether. Either way, the parties are coerced into giving up a right they enjoy under the FAA.' (Viking River, at p. 661.) Thus, Viking River requires enforcement of agreements to arbitrate a PAGA plaintiff's individual claims if the agreement is covered by the FAA." (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1118-1119.)

“There is no individual component to a PAGA action because '"every PAGA action . . . is a representative action on behalf of the state."' [Citation.]" (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 87.) The term "individual" refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by the plaintiff. (See Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 639, 648 [referring to these claims as "Type A" claims].) The term “non-individual” refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by employees other than the plaintiff. (Galarsa, at 649 [referring to these claims as "Type O" claims].)

As summarized by the California Supreme Court in Adolph, an agreement that is covered by the FAA may require arbitration of "alleged Labor Code violations personally sustained by a PAGA plaintiff — so-called 'individual' claims." (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1114, 1119.) "'[W]hen an appropriate arbitration agreement exists'" and "a plaintiff has filed a PAGA action comprised of individual and non-individual claims," the trial court must "'bifurcate and order [the] individual PAGA claim[] to arbitration.'" (Id. at 1126, 1123.) In this circumstance, the "order compelling arbitration of [the] individual claim[] does not strip the plaintiff of standing to litigate non-individual claims [i.e., claims on behalf of other employees] in court." (Id. at 1123) Instead, "'the individual PAGA claim[] in arbitration remain[s] part of the same lawsuit as the representative claims remaining in court.'" (Id. at 1126.) The plaintiff would thus be "'pursuing a single PAGA action "on behalf of [himself or herself] and other current or former employees," albeit across two fora.' [Citation.]" (Id.)

Here, the Agreement first states a waiver of “collective, representative or PAGA claim (unless such waiver is prohibited by controlling law) seeking any relief on behalf of others.” This initial statement appears to be a wholesale waiver of PAGA claims in violation of Iskanian above.

However, the Agreement then states “Both I and the Company agree that any claims under PAGA must be pursued in my individual capacity in arbitration” which, to the Court, evidences an intent to split the claim under Viking River.

On the other hand, the Agreement then states:

“To the full extent permissible under the law, I agree to waive any substantive or procedural rights that I may have to bring or participate in a PAGA action brought on a collective or non-individual basis. I acknowledge that nothing herein precludes me from pursuing my individual PAGA claim in arbitration. I further acknowledge that upon my execution of this Agreement, I lack standing to pursue, litigate, or act as a representative for any non-individual PAGA claims in a court of law. If any term, provision, or portion of this paragraph is deemed invalid or unenforceable, it shall be severed and the remainder shall remain enforceable in arbitration.” (Agreement ¶5.)

This portion of the Agreement does violate the rule above precluding waiver of representative, Type O PAGA claims in Court. While not a wholesale waiver of all PAGA claims, it expressly seeks to waive Type O PAGA claims.

The Court notes here that Hasty v. American Automobile Association (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 1041 provides that savings clauses limiting otherwise unconscionable terms to "the extent permitted by law" are ineffective to prevent substantive unconscionability because a lay person "…would have no way of knowing what would be covered or not covered by this provision." (Id. at 1062.) Further, that although no PAGA claims are made here, this is irrelevant under Najarro v. Sup. Ct. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5^th 871, 882.

As such, the Court finds the attempt to waive Type O PAGA claims substantively unconscionable.

Waiver of PAGA Standing

Here, Plaintiff argues that the Agreement’s term “I lack standing to pursue, litigate, or act as a representative for any non-individual PAGA claims in a court of law” is an impermissible attempt to waive PAGA standing.

The Court agrees that Viking River’s statement keeping intact one of Iskanian’s rules that precludes a waiver of representative standing in either arbitration or this Court requires a finding that this term is substantively unconscionable. (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at 694.)

Free Peek at Plaintiff’s Claims

Here, Plaintiff notes that Defendant’s Handbook’s terms related to dispute resolution requires Plaintiff to first speak with a supervisor, then a director and then the CEO before bringing claims via arbitration or otherwise.

The Court first notes that it will consider the terms of the Handbook under Alberto v. Cambrian Homecare (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 482, which states:

“‘Under Civil Code section 1642, it is the general rule that several papers relating to the same subject matter and executed as parts of substantially one transaction, are to be construed together as one contract [citation].’” (IMO Development Corp. v. Dow Corning Corp. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 451, 463.) According to that rule, documents executed as part of a single transaction are construed together, even if they do not expressly refer to one another. (Boyd v. Oscar Fisher Co. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 368, 378; Cadigan v. American Trust Co. (1955) 131 Cal.App.2d 780, 786–787 [“it [is] unnecessary for either instrument to refer to the other”].) (Id. at 490.)

Plaintiff cites to Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp., (2004) 120 Cal. App. 4th 1267, 1282 where employees were required “…to submit to discussions with [their] supervisors in advance of, and as a condition precedent to, having [a] dispute resolved through binding arbitration.”

The court in Nyulassy found this term substantively unconscionable “[g]iven the unilateral nature of the arbitration agreement, requiring plaintiff to submit to an employer-controlled dispute resolution mechanism (i.e., one without a neutral mediator) suggests that defendant would receive a ‘free peek’ at plaintiff's case, thereby obtaining an advantage if and when plaintiff were to later demand arbitration.” (Id. at 1282-1283)

Here, the Court does not view the Handbook provision as mandatory or a precondition of submitting a claim to arbitration where the Handbook states “…the following steps should be utilized for solution:…” The provision above in the paragraph stating “Before any problem can be solved, it must be expressed, and remedies must be explored” is too general, in the Court’s view, to mandate the steps below in a manner similar to Nyulassy.

Therefore, the Court does not find this term substantively unconscionable.

Statute of Limitation Tolling

Here, Plaintiff argues that the term “I further understand that I must present notice of any claim in arbitration before the statute of limitations expires for that type of claim” precludes a statutory right under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.12, providing:

“If an arbitration agreement requires that arbitration of a controversy be demanded or initiated by a party to the arbitration agreement within a period of time, the commencement of a civil action by that party based upon that controversy, within that period of time, shall toll the applicable time limitations…”

The Court, however, interprets the term in the Agreement as a statute of limitations term and that Plaintiff's choice to first file a lawsuit would equitably toll the limitations period for filing an arbitration claim under section 1281.12. In other words, the phrase “before the statute of limitations expires for that type of claim” accounts for any statutory tolling, as the statute of limitations would not expire due to that tolling.

Therefore, the Court does not find this provision unconscionable.

Delay of Payment of Arbitration Fees

Here, the Agreement states “…the Company shall not be responsible for paying the arbitrator's fees and costs for the arbitration hearing sooner than 60 days before the commencement of the arbitration hearing.” (Agreement - ¶8.)

Plaintiff argues that this violates Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281.97’s 30 day deadline to pay the initial arbitration fees.

The Court agrees that, under Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2025) 18 Cal. 5th 310, 323, this requirement is not preempted by the FAA’s application to this Agreement.

Further, the term does provide double the statutory period to pay the initial filing fees. As such, the Court finds this term to be substantively unconscionable.

Judicial Review

Here, Plaintiff argues the “Agreement is silent on the Court’s ability to review an arbitrator’s decision in this purportedly mandatory arbitration; thus, the Agreement does not guarantee a Court an opportunity to examine the award as required under Armendariz, or to vacate/modify the award. (See CCP § 1286.2).”

However, the Agreement states:

“Any arbitration proceeding under this agreement shall proceed under and be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) because both I and the Company are engaged in interstate commerce. To the extent they are not contrary to the FAA, the procedures of the California Arbitration Act (“Act”) shall also apply. The Act is found at California Code of Civil Procedure section 1280 and the following sections.”

As such, the Agreement appears to incorporate, amongst other provisions, Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2, as well as section 1285 “Any party to an arbitration in which an award has been made may petition the court to confirm, correct or vacate the award…”

Therefore, the Court does not find any substantive unconscionability on this issue.

Severance

The Court notes Paragraph 9 of the Agreement states:

“If any term or provision or any portion of this agreement is deemed invalid or unenforceable, it shall be severed and the remainder of this agreement shall be enforceable. Under no circumstances shall this agreement be construed to allow the joinder of claims in arbitration or arbitration on a class, collective, representative, or other similar basis. I acknowledge that this Agreement is not intended to interfere with my rights to collectively bargain, to engage in protected, concerted activity, or to exercise other rights protected under the National Labor Relations Act.”

Courts have discretion to sever unconscionable clauses and enforce the remainder of the contract. (Civ. Code, § 1670.5, subd. (a); Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1244.)

There is a strong preference for courts to sever unconscionable provisions unless unconscionability permeates the entire agreement. (De Leon v. Pinnacle Property Management Services, LLC (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 476, 492.) However, if "the central purpose of the contract is tainted with illegality, then the contract as a whole cannot be enforced." (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 124.) But if "the illegality is collateral to the main purpose of the contract, and the illegal provision can be extirpated from the contract by means of severance or restriction, then such severance and restriction are appropriate." (Id.)

Therefore, the Court will strike the following two sections, which cure the Agreement of the unconscionability noted above:

Paragraph 5: “…To the full extent permissible under the law, I agree to waive any substantive or procedural rights that I may have to bring or participate in a PAGA action brought on a collective or non-individual basis…I further acknowledge that upon my execution of this Agreement, I lack standing to pursue, litigate, or act as a representative for any non-individual PAGA claims in a court of law.”

Paragraph 8: “…It is agreed that the Company shall not be responsible for paying the arbitrator’s fees and costs for the arbitration hearing sooner than 60 days before the commencement of the arbitration hearing.”

As such, the Agreement, as modified, lacks substantive unconscionability.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion, having found a valid waiver of class claims above and compels arbitration of Plaintiff’s remaining claims.

Re: Loza, Marisela vs. BH-TC Opco, LLC

Case No.: VCU317716

Date: June 30, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion without prejudice

Background Facts

In this PAGA matter, Plaintiff sues Defendants BH-TC Opco, LLC, BH Social Rehab Holdings, LLC, BH-SD Social Rehab LM, LLC, BH-TC Opco Visalia, LLC, BH-SD DD Opco, LLC, BH-SD Opco, LLC, BH-SD Parentco, LLC, BH-SD RX, LLC, BH-SD West Coast, LLC, and BH-SD RE 7050, LLC as joint employers of Plaintiff for civil penalties for violations of Labor Code section 2699 (“PAGA”) as to violations of the Labor Code, Code of Regulations and associated wage orders. (Complaint ¶¶ 1, 5-14, 17.)

Plaintiff expressly pleads that “PLAINTIFF is not suing in her individual capacity; she is proceeding herein solely under the PAGA, on behalf of the State of California for all aggrieved employees, including herself and other aggrieved employees. Nothing in this complaint should be construed as PLAINTIFF suing in her individual capacity” (Complaint ¶4.)

Defendant BH-TC OPCO, LLC dba Jackson House Tulare moves to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s “individual claims” and to stay this matter as to the “non-individual” claims pending arbitration.

In opposition, Plaintiff notes the filing of this matter as a headless PAGA action, that no individual claims are presented, that only “representative” claims are pled and such “representative claims” cannot be compelled to arbitration.

For clarity, the Court will adopt the terminology from Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 639, noting that the term "individual" refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by the plaintiff. (Id. at 648 [referring to these claims as "Type A" claims].) Further, the term “non-individual” refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by employees other than the plaintiff. (Id. at 649 [referring to these claims as "Type O" claims].)

Headless PAGA Actions

The Court notes first that Plaintiff’s complaint attaches notice of violation letters dated October 2, 2024 and that this matter was filed January 31, 2025.

Section 2699 was revised effective July 1, 2024 and the revisions, pursuant to subdivision (v)(2), “shall not apply to a civil action with respect to which the notice required by" section 2699.3 "was filed before June 19, 2024.”

The appellate court’s opinion in Galarsa, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at 4, appears limited to such pre-amendment matters, stating:

“The first question is whether the version of PAGA in effect from mid-2016 to mid-2024 authorized an aggrieved employee to bring a PAGA action that seeks to recover civil penalties imposed for Labor Code violations suffered only by other employees. Such lawsuits are sometimes referred to as “headless” PAGA actions because the plaintiff employee has chosen not to pursue civil penalties for violations he or she suffered personally. (CRST Expedited, Inc. v. Superior Court (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 872, 882 [334 Cal.Rptr.3d 647] (CRST Expedited), review granted Sept. 17, 2025, S292005.) We again conclude such PAGA actions were allowed. (CRST Expedited, at p. 882.)”

The amendment to section 2699, which appears applicable here, involves subsection (c) and revisions thereto.

Prior to the amendment, subsection (c) stated “For purposes of this part, ‘aggrieved employee’ means any person who was employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed”

The courts in CRST Expedited, supra, Galarsa, supra, Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Servs. LTD., LLC, 109 Cal.App.5th 69, 75, and Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 533, 536 all found that, under this pre July 2024 version, no individual claim was necessary and headless PAGA (Type O Only) claims were permitted.

By contrast, Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1005, also under the prior version of the PAGA statute, notes “every PAGA action necessarily includes an individual PAGA claim” (that is a Type A and Type O claim) (See also Williams v. Alacrity Solutions Group, LLC, (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 932, 943 [agreeing with Leeper that "the inclusion of an individual PAGA claim [is] mandated by PAGA's text"].)

Those matters all appear to be on appeal pending consideration and disposition of related issues.

However, these decisions, and their pending status, would not appear to impact the analysis in this matter, as, noted above, subdivision (c) was revised, effective July 1, 2024, to state the following:

(c)

(1) For purposes of this part, "aggrieved employee" means any person who was employed by the alleged violator and personally suffered each of the violations alleged during the period prescribed under Section 340 of the Code of Civil Procedure…”

As such, the Court interprets this version to eliminate headless PAGA claims, like the one before the Court. This applicable version of the PAGA statute requires that an aggrieved employee personally suffered each violations alleged, even if the aggrieved employee does not seek individual claims. In other words, that the revised statute requires a plaintiff to have been employed and to have personally suffered each violation alleged during the requisite statutory period.

Plaintiff’s position, that this is a Type O PAGA claim only, impermissible under the current PAGA statute.

The Court will not, and cannot, modify Plaintiff’s pleading to include a Type A claim and therefore evaluate whether the Type A claim is subject to the arbitration agreement at issue in this matter.

The Court also cannot grant the motion to compel a non-existent Type A claim.

While the Court is not faced with a sufficiency of the pleading challenge (that is, via demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings, or motion to strike), the Court believes there must be some underlying viable claim to compel to arbitration. Based on the pleadings in this matter and Plaintiff’s argument in opposition of this motion, the Court finds no such claim for which to consider compelling arbitration thereto.

The Court, therefore, must deny the motion to compel arbitration without prejudice, on the basis that no PAGA claim has been properly alleged.

Re: JGI Wholesale Corp. vs. United Brands, LLC

Case No.: VCU330698

Date: June 30, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: Defendant’s Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Benjamin M. Low

Tentative Ruling: To grant the application

Facts and Analysis

The Court’s file indicates that timely and proper notice was given to all parties affected to attorney Low’s application to appear pro hac vice for Defendant United Brands, LLC.

The Court finds that attorney Low meets the statutory requirements under California Rule of Court 9.40(a) to submit applications to appear pro hac vice before this Court, and that the contents of the application of attorney Low indicates association with California counsel Colin A. Hardacre of The Law Offices of Colin A. Hardacre, APC, and as such meet the statutory requirements of California Rule of Court 9.40(c) and (d). The Court’s file for this matter further indicates that that the applicable fees that must be paid to the State Bar of California under Rule 9.40(e) to support applications for admission pro hac vice have been tendered to the State Bar.

The Court further notes that attorney Low’s application meets the statutory requirements under California Rule of Court 9.40(d) for pro hac vice applications and that the prior appearances before the courts in this state are not sufficiently numerous to warrant denial of this application under California Rule of Court 9.40(b).

Based on the foregoing, the application of Low to appear as counsel pro hac vice for Defendant in this action is granted.

Re: In the Matter of Betterton, Michael

Case No.: VPR053934

Date: June 30, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: Petitioner’s Motion to Compel Initial Responses to Form Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents as to Objector Danielle Davido; Sanctions

Tentative Ruling: To find the motions moot; to deny the request for sanctions.

Facts

As an initial matter, the Court notes one motion fee has been submitted to this Court, but that two motions are made here. The Court will condition the order as to initial responses upon payment of the remaining filing fee of $60.

In this matter, Petitioner served Form Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents on Objector Danielle Davido on March 4, 2026.

As of the filing of this motion on April 29, 2026, no responses have been received.

Petitioner seeks to compel initial responses without objections and seeks $3,640 in sanctions.

On June 22, 2026, Objector filed a late opposition to this motion. The opposition states Objector did not receive the original discovery responses on March 4, 2026, requested electronic copies, received electronic copies on April 14, 2026 and committed to producing responses by May 14, 2026. Further, that responses to the discovery noted above were served May 14, 2026.

In reply, Petitioner notes the untimely opposition, that discovery was served six weeks after the due date.

Authority and Analysis

To find the motions to compel initial responses moot by the service of responses on May 14, 2026.

Sanctions

Under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.290(c) (Interrogatories) and 2031.300(c) (Requests for Production), the Court shall impose sanctions “unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”

Here, there appears to be a dispute regarding receipt, by mail, of the discovery at issue that was sent March 4, 2026.

Additionally, based on the lack of receipt via mail and later service of the discovery by electronic means, the Court will not issue sanctions. It appears the discovery was received electronically April 14, 2026 and that responses were provided May 14, 2026, within 30 days of receipt.

Therefore, the Court declines to award sanctions.

Re: Estes, Jeremy Lee vs. Cheema Transport, Inc.

Case No.: VCU289306

Date: June 30, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: Continued Hearing re: Final Compliance; OSC

Tentative Ruling: On June 18, 2026, counsel for Plaintiff filed a declaration in response to this Court’s Order to Show Cause re: Final Compliance. The declaration indicates that Defendant has failed to fully fund the settlement fund. The parties agreed that the settlement would be funded in 30 equal payments with the final payment due November 1, 2026. However, Defendant has failed to make any payment since October 2025 and only $47,333.29 of the $100,000.00 gross settlement amount has been paid. Further counsel indicates an inadvertent calendaring mistake regarding the continued final compliance hearing. The Court, therefore, dismisses the OSC re: sanctions and/or dismissal.

The Court will inquire at the hearing regarding the status of the settlement funding and future hearings in this matter.

Re: Lopez, Joe vs. Gallardo, Adalberto Rivera

Case No.: VCU304254

Date: June 30, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts and Analysis

On April 28, 2026, this Court denied Defendants Baeto, Inc. and Adalberto Rivera Gallardo’s motion to set aside granting of summary judgment.

On May 13, 2026, Defendants filed this motion for reconsideration. On June 1, 2026, Defendants filed amended versions of the motion and declaration of counsel.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, which states:

"(a) When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown."

Section 1008 requires new or different facts, circumstances or law. New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal. App. 4th 206, 212, states:

"Section 1008, subdivision (a) requires that a motion for reconsideration be based on new or different facts, circumstances, or law. A party seeking reconsideration also must provide satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce the evidence at an earlier time. [Citation.]"

Further, the New York Times Co. court noted "The burden under section 1008 is comparable to that of a party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence: the information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it at the trial. [Citation.] Case law after the 1992 amendments to Section 1008 as relaxed the definition of 'new or different facts,' but it is still necessary that the party seeking that relief offer some fact or circumstance not previously considered by the court. [Citations.]" (Id. at 212-213.)

Here, the Court’s review of the amended declaration indicates no new or different facts are set forth under the standard above. The motion states, as to this requirement:

“Here, as supported by the Declaration of Starr Warson, the Motion to Set Aside Order was not entered and was served via U.S. Mail on April 28, 2026. Therefore, Defendant had not yet become indebted to Plaintiff until the entry of the order.”

This argument, supported by the declaration, does not relate to the underlying motion denying the motion to set aside the entry of summary judgment. The Court, finding no new facts or law under the standard set forth above, denies the motion for reconsideration.

Re: In the Matter of Sark Davidian Jr Living Trust February 4, 2009

Case No.: VPR053525

Date: June 30, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motions: Sarks Davidian III’s ex parte application for discovery orders; Angelina Ogata’s ex parte application to vacate this court’s June 16, 2026 order and for an OSC re: contempt and sanctions.

Tentative Ruling: Sarks Davidian III’s ex parte application is denied; Angelina Ogata’s ex parte application is granted, but the court denies the request for an OSC re: contempt and for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5.

Sarks Davidian III and Angelina Ogata have filed competing ex parte applications.

Davidian’s Application

Davidian “requests an expedited order compelling [Ogata] to produce documents that should have been available for her continued deposition on June 12, 2026, requiring a privilege/withholding log for any documents not produced, and permitting a brief continued deposition after production.”

By way of background, the parties filed competing ex parte applications in mid-May (a couple weeks before then-scheduled trial on June 1, 2026) in which Ogata sought to compel Davidian to appear for a deposition and in which Davidian sought to continue trial, along with orders to “[e]xtend or reopen discovery” for the following “limited” purposes: (1) “depositions not yet completed”; (2) “production/inspection of original trust/amendment instruments and directly related authentication materials, notary-journal issues to the extent lawfully obtainable, any necessary document-examiner work”; and (3) “discovery motions arising from those limited subjects.”

This court, at the hearing on both applications on May 15, 2026, announced orders (1) that discovery was to remain closed, aside from depositions of both parties and Davidian III’s expert witness, James Tarver (related to analysis of the challenged estate planning documents); (2) that any depositions were to be completed by June 15, 2026; and (3) that trial would be reset for July 6, 2026.

Following the May 15th hearing, Ogata’s counsel, Mark Chielpegian, submitted a proposed order conforming to the orders announced at that hearing, which this court signed and filed on May 19, 2026. According to Chielpegian, he sent the proposed order the same date as the May 15th hearing to Davidian for review and comment, and submitted the same for filing on May 19, 2026, after having received no response. Chielpegian served the May 19th filed order on Davidian on May 20, 2026.

Following the court’s order, Davidian reached out to Chielpegian regarding scheduling a deposition of Ogata. Davidian and Chielpegian agreed that deposition would take place on June 12, 2026, and it did. According to Davidian, though, “[n]o responsive documents were produced … at that deposition.”

Davidian’s reference to “responsive documents” is to documents he demanded Ogata produce at deposition, but the details of the source of the demand are murky.

Back on April 7, 2026, Davidian’s former counsel, Erika Rascon, noticed a deposition of Ogata, for April 29, 2026, which notice included a demand for several categories of documents to be produced at the deposition by Ogata.

Rascon, though, then substituted out as Davidian’s counsel on April 24, 2026. Immediately prior, Rascon and Chielpegian agreed to postpone Ogata’s deposition (as well as then-scheduled depositions of Tarver and Davidian) and to reset Ogata’s deposition for May 19, 2026. It bears noting that, around this time, on April 23, 2026, Ogata served several mostly boilerplate objections to the various categories of documents demanded in the April 7th notice.

The May 19th deposition date apparently did not proceed, but, as explained above, by mid-May, the parties were applying ex parte for orders regarding depositions each sought to take. Davidian filed his application on May 13th; Ogata filed hers May 14th.

As further indicated, it was later agreed that Ogata’s deposition would take place on June 12, 2026, and it did.

The day prior, June 11th, Davidian served an “updated deposition notice” which included a modified set of document demands. Davidian’s “updated” notice demanded categories of documents similar to the prior April 7th notice but was substantially more expansive in scope. For example, Davidian’s updated notice included 98 discrete requests (compared to 47 in the prior request), and, unlike the prior notice, included demands for “phone records,” “Google takeout data,” and “location data” (each defined terms in the updated notice).

In meet and confer correspondence subsequent to the June 12th deposition, Chielpegian asserted that Davidian’s June 11th updated notice was not timely served.

Davidian’s current position is that the updated June 11th notice was not intended “to waive or abandon the original April deposition notice and document requests.” It is not clear, though, if he asserts that Ogata was required to produce documents encompassed solely by the April 7th notice.

In any event, as indicated, Davidian now moves ex parte to compel Ogata “to produce documents that should have been available for her continued deposition on June 12, 2026, requiring a privilege/withholding log for any documents not produced, and permitting a brief continued deposition after production.” Davidian “further requests a preservation order and conditional evidentiary/adverse-inference relief if [Ogata] does not comply with the [requested] production order.” Davidian also concomitantly filed another ex parte application “for order shortening time” in which he asks for the same relief requested in the just described application

Davidian, in connection with his requests, references “the Court’s June 16, 2026 order reopening … limited discovery” as a basis for his document demands. That order is the subject of Ogata’s ex parte application.

Ogata’s Application

Following Davidian’s deposition of Ogata, and notwithstanding the orders announced by this court at the May 15, 2026, ex parte hearing and memorialized in the order submitted by Chielpegian and filed on May 19, 2026, Davidian, on June 16, 2026, submitted another proposed order purporting to state the court’s announced orders from the May 15th hearing, but which did not conform to those announced orders.

As pertinent here, contrary to the limited scope of permitted additional discovery announced by the court, Davidian’s order stated that “[d]iscovery is extended/reopened” for the “purposes” of (1) “production or inspection of original trust instruments/amendments and directly related authentication materials”; (2) “notary-journal or notarization-related records directly tied to the disputed trust amendment(s), pursued through proper legal procedure”; (3) “related document-examiner or expert inspection/report work”; and (4) “discovery motions arising from those subjects.”

Davidian did not send the draft of the proposed order to Chielpegian for review prior to submission to the court. This court signed and filed Davidian purported proposed order on June 16, 2026. Davidian then served notice of the purported order on Chielpegian.

Ogata now applies to vacate the June 16, 2026 purported order and requests that this court issue an order for Davidian to show cause why he should not be held in contempt, or, alternatively, for sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5.

RULING

The court denies Davidian’s ex parte application. This court’s order following the May 15, 2026 ex parte hearing in this case, correctly memorialized in the order submitted by Ogata’s counsel and filed on May 19, 2026, is that “[d]iscovery in this matter is closed, save and except for the following depositions: (a) Petitioner; (b) Respondent; and (c) Petitioner's expert, James Tarver,” and all three of those depositions were required to be completed by June 15, 2026.

Trial was originally set in this matter for February 2, 2026. Though it has been continued, once to June 1, 2026, and again to July 6, 2026, discovery has not been reopened except as stated by the court at the May 15, 2026 hearing.

Accordingly, except as to those discovery matters specifically permitted at the May 15, 2026 hearing, the discovery cutoff for non-expert discovery was 30 days before February 2, 2026, and the discovery cutoff for expert discovery was 15 days before February 2, 2026.

The court grants Ogata’s request to vacate its June 16, 2026 order for the obvious reason that the order does not conform to the orders announced by this court at the May 15, 2026 ex parte hearings. The court was unaware that Ogata’s deposition had already been completed when it signed that order and only intended to memorize the orders of the May 15^th hearing. Having reviewed both its notes and the minute order, the Court did not intend to expand discovery or allow for it to be reopened through an amended deposition notice. The Court’s notes and minute order both reflect that discovery is closed except as to the two depositions of the parties and the expert’s deposition.

The court declines to issue an order for Davidian to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. “Contempts of the authority of the court” are set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 1209, not cited by Ogata, and not section 128, which is. The court declines to speculate as to whether Davidian’s condemnable conduct of submitting a non-conforming proposed order to this court fits one of the categories of contempts defined in section 1209, absent briefing of the relevant points of law by Ogata.

The court further declines to award sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5. “A motion for sanctions under this section shall be made separately from other motions or requests” (§ 128.5, subd. (f)(1)(A)) and the motion is not made separately here.

Additionally, the court notes that Davidian, by way of at least his prior April 7th deposition notice, had demanded documents relevant to the issues in this case. Though the discovery cutoff had passed by then, Ogata’s objections did not indicate this point specifically, and, instead, rested on various boilerplate objections.

For this additional reason, the court is disinclined to view Davidian’s conduct as solely engaged in bad faith and frivolous. To be clear, though, Davidian absolutely should not have purported to address his discovery dispute with Chielpegian by submitting a non-conforming proposed order to this court.

Re: Oregon, Ana Maria Aguilera vs. Jimenez, Robert

Case No.: PCU322290

Date: June 30, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 19 - The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion: Defendant’s (1) Demurrer and (2) Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling: (1) To overrule the demurrer; (2) To deny the motion to strike; to order Defendant to answer the complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

Facts Common to (1) and (2)

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendant Robert Jimenez for two causes of action for motor vehicle negligence and general negligence, alleging the following:

“Robert Jimenez was the owner of the cow that was in the middle of Road 248, City of Porterville, County of Tulare, which Plaintiff struck on June 11, 2023, causing damages and injuries in an amount to be determined at trial.”

Defendant demurrers to the entirety of the complaint on grounds that it fails to allege a cause of action and that it is uncertain, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Further, Defendant moves to strike: “The Second Cause of Action for General Negligence as duplicative; Any and all allegations referring to DOES 1-10 to the extent they are used to improperly attribute liability without factual basis; Any conclusory allegations lacking supporting facts regarding ownership or control of the animal.”

In opposition, Plaintiff argues the complaint sufficiently pleads negligence theories to place Defendant on notice of the theory, that is, that Defendant owned a cow that Plaintiff’s vehicle struck. Further, that the complaint is not uncertain based on the same, sufficient allegations. Finally, that the two causes of action do not completely overlap and, in any event, duplicative causes of action are not a basis for demurrer or a motion to strike.

(1) Demurrer – Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220. To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer. (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

Judicial Form Complaint for Negligence

To start, the Court recognizes that “A Judicial Council form complaint may be subject to demurrer.” (People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Superior Court (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1483.) That court also noted “In some cases, merely checking a box on a Judicial Council form complaint will be sufficient. In other cases, such as this one, where specific allegations need be alleged, the form complaint is like a partially completed painting. It is up to the pleader to add the details that complete the picture.” (Id. at 1486.)

The elements of a negligence claim are: (1) a duty on the part of defendant toward plaintiff; (2) defendant's breach of that duty; (3) and harm to the plaintiff caused by the breach. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142.)

Here, the Court agrees that the allegations of the complaint that Defendant owned the cow that was in the road that was struck by Plaintiff’s vehicle are sufficient to allege causes of action for negligence. Further, the Court agrees that “[a]ll that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.” (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.)

Further, “demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848, fn. 3, citing Lickiss v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.) In addition, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, courts strictly construe a demurrer for uncertainty “because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

Finally, the Court agrees that the general negligence claim, at least at the pleading stage, has a broader scope than the motor vehicle negligence claim and therefore the claims are not wholly duplicative.

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer.

(2) Motion to Strike – Authority and Analysis

Any party may file a timely notice of a motion to strike the whole or any part of a pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b).) The motion may seek to strike any “irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading” or any part of the pleading “not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) Irrelevant allegations include allegations that are not essential to the statement of a claim, allegations that are not pertinent to or supported by the claim and demands for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b), (c).)

The Court, for the same reasons noted above, denies the motion to strike the second cause of action as duplicative or that the allegations are insufficient, noting the finding above on demurrer with respect to the sufficiency of the pleading.

The Court, therefore, orders Defendant to answer the complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

Re: Schuler, Dillon vs. Schuler, Terry

Case No.: PCU329769

Date: June 30, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 19 - The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motions: Motion in Limine; Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP)

Tentative Rulings: The motion in limine is denied without prejudice. The anti-SLAPP motion is denied.

Dillon Schuler filed a motion in limine and an anti-SLAPP motion.

Motion in Limine

By way of the first motion, Dillon seeks “an order excluding any testimony, evidence, or reference to … : Any expunged, dismissed, or sealed cases involving [Dillon]”; “Any past criminal history, allegations of criminal conduct, or ‘prior bad acts’ not directly relevant to this wrongful termination suit”; and “Any personal information, social media activity, or financial records irrelevant to work performance or employment claims.”

Dillon asserts “[t]his is a wrongful termination case” and that the categories of evidence identified in his motion should be excluded because they are “irrelevant” to such a case, and “prejudicial” in the context of the issues therein raised.

It is somewhat clear, as Dillon indicates, that a termination event is one thing at issue in his suit, but the scope of the complaint, generally, is uncertain. The allegations are difficult to follow; it is not easy to conclude Dillon’s suit is just “a wrongful termination case.”

There is, in any event, more at issue in this case than what is pled just in Dillon’s complaint (whatever its scope might be). Though not mentioned by Dillon, defendant Terry Schuler has filed a cross-complaint, and, in it, he alleges Dillon “physically attacked” him “[i]n 2025,” and, based on that allegation, he asserts an assault and battery claim (and he also asserts other, different claims).

Given the issues raised by the cross-complaint, the court is disinclined to determine, at this stage, that the categories of evidence presented in Diller’s motion would necessarily be “irrelevant” to the issues ultimately to be determined at trial, or that all such categories of evidence are unduly “prejudicial.” As a general practice, this court typically addresses in limine motions closer to trial when the parties are further along in trial preparation efforts. (See TCSC Local Rule 608, 611; see also Amtower v. Photon Dynamics, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1582, 1593 [71 Cal.Rptr.3d 361] [“In limine motions are designed to facilitate the management of a case, generally by deciding difficult evidentiary issues in advance of trial.”].)

Accordingly, the court denies the motion without prejudice to Dillon re-raising these or other objections, closer to trial, in a subsequent motion to exclude specific evidence that Terry intends to, or that Dillon believes Terry intends to, have admitted at trial. Also, this motion is denied without prejudice to any objection Dillon might raise to evidence Terry seeks to admit during trial.

Anti-SLAPP Motion

Dillon also filed an anti-SLAPP motion. Dillon’s motion states that he moves to strike Terry Schuler’s entire cross-complaint. On review of the whole of the motion, however, it’s clear Dillon only expressly targets Terry’s assault and battery claim.

Dillon maintains the cross-complaint “is a retalitory [sic] SLAPP suit.” By this, Dillon means that Terry sued him for assault and battery in retaliation for his having sued Terry.

Whether Terry sued Dillon for assault and battery in retaliation for his suit, however, is irrelevant. (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 74 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 519, 52 P.3d 695]; id., p. 77.) Dillon is required, instead, to make a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action—in this case, the assault and battery claim—“is one ‘arising from’ protected activity.” (Id., at p. 76, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)

Where, as here, Dillon asserts a lawsuit as the subject protected petitioning activity, he must specifically show that that petitioning activity “supplies one or more elements” of Terry’s assault and battery claim. (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 887 [249 Cal.Rptr.3d 569, 444 P.3d 706].)

Dillon fails to make such showing, and it is obvious why he cannot. Terry’s assault and battery claim is not based on Dillon’s suit, but on allegations that Dillon “physically attacked” him.

Accordingly, the anti-SLAPP motion is denied.

Probate Examiner Recommendations

Honorable Bret D. Hillman and Nathan D. Ide

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared June 30, 2026 and July 1, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status: Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR049252	In the Matter of Ehrlich, Gerhard	Accounting Hearing and Attorney’s Fees	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053212	In the Matter of Navarrete, Margaret	Petition for Order Confirming Sale of Real Property	Appearance Required	Documents in order

VPR054097	In the Matter of Gonzalez, Raul A.	Letters of Testamentary	Appearance Required	1. Petition Item 3g(1) omitted: regarding the appointment of executor, why the named executor cannot act: Item 5 shows, decedent is survived by spouse/named executor. 2. Petition Item 5, (3) or (4) and (7) or (8) omitted: re any surviving registered domestic partner and issue of a predeceased child. 3. Petition Item 8: Age of beneficiaries omitted and all persons mentioned in the will to be listed as required. 4. Notice of Hearing not served on all parties required to be listed in Petition. 5. Original will not lodged. 6. Proposed Order: incomplete and date of will does not reflect petition.
VPR053738	In the Matter of Pena, Joan Carol	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	Previous issues remain
VPR054148	In the Matter of Orduno, Maria Guadalupe	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Recommended for Approval
VPR054137	In the Matter of Faust, James Ethan	Spousal Property Hearing	Recommended for Approval
VPR053365	In the Matter of Bockmagill, Marie Antonie	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Agreement of total attorney’s fees not specified for court approval of the allowance of compensation, Prob C § 10831(d)
VPR054145	In the Matter of Lopez, Gricel	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054144	In the Matter of Lopez, Yesenia	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054012	In the Matter of Sanchez-Palomera, Ximena Itzel	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Order Appointing Court Investigator (GC-330) not filed
VPR053681	In the Matter of LeBeau, Jeffrey Stewart	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Contested Hearing
VPR053027	In the Matter of Hernandez, Merejilda Ortega Pimental	OSC Hearing	Appearance Required	Regarding dismissal

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

Probate calendar for June 25, 2026

Status: Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE: All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required. For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments

PPR053470	In the Matter of Gonzalez, Rita Maria	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing not served on all relatives within the 2nd degree; ProbC§1822
PPR054049	In the Matter of Akin, Samie Jane	Petition to Determine Trust Asset	Recommended for Approval
PPR054064	In the Matter of Gasco, Gregory	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	Waiver of Bond not filed by all heirs: missing petitioner’s, Prob C §8481(a)(2) Petition Item at #3e omitted: regarding bond Order not lodged
PPR054087	In the Matter of Moraga, Rita	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	Not filed- Proof of Publication Waiver of Bond not filed by all heirs, Prob C §8481(a)(2) Not filed- Notice of Petition to Administer Estate (DE-121)
PPR053968	In the Matter of Perez, Rosita	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	1. Petition Item 5a(3) or (4) omitted: re any surviving registered domestic partner 2. Original will to be lodged with attached translated copy, CRC RULE 3.1110(g) 3. Publication not in accordance with Probate C § 8120: Three publications in a newspaper published once a week or more often, with at least five days intervening between the first and last publication dates, not counting the publication dates, are sufficient.
PPR054109	In the Matter of Galbraith, Margie Fay	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance required	Issue re Petition Item 11(2): facts upon which the petitioner bases the allegation that the described real property was the decedent’s primary residence, Prob C § 13152(a)(2)
PPR054110	In the Matter of Hubble, Alvin C.	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance required	Petition to be signed by all successors/decedent’s children, Prob C § 13152(a) (re email signature)

South County Justice Center & Visalia-County Civic Center

SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared June 29 - July 1, 2026 that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE: All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required. For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date	Dept	Case	Comments
6/29/26	Dept 1	VPR047904; IMO A.J.S.	Notice of Hearing (GC-020) has not been filed indicating service was completed for MINOR, FATHER, and MOTHER

6/30/26	Dept 1	VPR053854; IMO J.S.	Proof of other state appointment has not been filed
6/30/26	Dept 1	VPR053361; IMO B.C.	Notice of Hearing (GC-020) has not been filed indicating service was completed pursuant to Probate Code §1460
6/30/26	Dept 9	VPR052004; IMO A.L.P.	Notice of Hearing (GC-020) has not been filed indicating service was completed pursuant to Probate Code §1460 NOT FILED- FORM EFS-005-CV, Consent to Electronic Service and Notice of Electronic Service Address, pursuant to CCP §1010.6; CRC 2.251.
6/30/26	Dept 2	VPR044873; IMO J.E.	Accounting filed
6/30/26	Dept 9	VPR053983; IMO A.W.	Matter submitted
6/30/26	Dept 19	PPR054176; IMO I.A.C.	Notice of Hearing (GC-020) has not been filed indicating Petition for Temporary Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §2250(e)(3). NOT LODGED- Order Appointing Temporary Guardian & Letters of Temporary Guardianship
6/30/26	Dept 19	PPR054174; IMO R.E.S.	Notice of Hearing (GC-020) has not been filed indicating Petition for Temporary Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §2250(e)(3). NOT LODGED- Order Appointing Temporary Guardian & Letters of Temporary Guardianship, needs to indicate Successor Appointment. Declaration of Due Diligence has not been filed for Mother

7/1/26	Dept 1	VPR053657; IMO A.G.	Matter submitted

Judicial Branch of California

Scam Text Messages — Traffic School Fines:

Tentative Rulings

Civil Tentative Rulings

Probate Examiner Recommendations

South County Justice Center & Visalia-County Civic Center

Scam Text Messages — Traffic School Fines:

Tentative Rulings

Current Tentative Rulings

Visalia-County Civic Center

South County Justice Center

Probate Guardianship cases scheduled in Visalia Division and South County Justice Center

South County Justice Center & Visalia-County Civic Center