Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, April 30, 2026, are:

Re:                American Express National Bank vs. Joseph, Judy

Case No.:   VCL188358

Date:           April 30, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Motion for Entry of Judgment Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and enter judgment in the amount of $1,259.25.

Facts

The complaint in this matter seeks recovery for breach of contract in the amount of $5,675.56.

On or about July 9, 2019, the parties filed a stipulation for dismissal and retention of jurisdiction based on a settlement agreement, under which Defendant agreed to pay the settlement sum of $2,900 with monthly payments due in the amount of $181.25.

In the event of default, the stipulation states that judgment could be entered for the amount of $5,675.56 plus costs, less any credits for payments made and that this amount does not constitute liquidated damages, that the amount of damages is not speculative or uncertain.

Defendant made payments totaling $1,993.75.

The stipulation indicates that the Court shall retain jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. On July 9, 2019, this matter was dismissed, with the Court retaining jurisdiction pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

On February 19, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion to enforce the settlement in this matter as a judgment, seeking $4,034.81 consisting of $5,675.56 in principal, costs of $353.00 and less credits of $1,993.75.

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states: 

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1360.)

As indicated above, the Court has retained jurisdiction over the parties and this matter and therefore is prepared to “enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”

Greentree

The initial issue for the Court is whether the “stipulated judgment amount” of $5,675.56 is an unenforceable penalty in light of the settlement with this Defendant for 2,900. The starting point for this issue appears to be Greentree Financial Group, Inc. v. Execute Sports, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 495.

The Court noted above a term of the stipulation purporting to “voluntarily disclaim and waive any rights or benefits under the holding in Greentree Financial Group, Inc., v. Execute Sports, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 495, and any other similar law, which states in essence that an acceleration clause seeking a judgment amount that exceeds the damages arising strictly from a breach of the minimum payment stream called for herein may be deemed an unenforceable penalty.”

However, Civil Code section 1671 renders contractual penalties or forfeitures illegal and unenforceable as against public policy if they bear no reasonable relationship to the actual damages caused by the breach that triggered them. (Ridgley v. Topa Thrift & Loan Assn. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 970, 976-977); Purcell v. Schweitzer (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 969, 974-975.) In the Court’s view, the public policy expressed in that code section may not be waived or circumvented by language in the settlement agreement as to liquidated damages, as even an express waiver of the right to appeal or the right to contest a stipulated judgment on any ground will not prevent a party from challenging a penalty or forfeiture included in the stipulated judgment. (Purcell, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at 972, 975; see Sybron Corp. v. Clark Hosp. Supply Corp. (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 896, 902, fn. 3.) The law cannot prevent a party from challenging an illegal term in a contract simply because the party agreed to the illegal term.

In Greentree, the plaintiff sued defendant for breach of contract for failure to pay $45,000 due under the contract. (Id. at 498.) The parties resolved this dispute via stipulation for entry of judgment providing that defendant would pay $20,000 in two installments of $15,000 and $5,000. (Id.) Further, if the defendant defaulted on either installment, the plaintiff would be entitled to have judgment entered for the amount prayed for in the complaint, plus interest, attorney fees and costs, less any amounts already paid. (Id. at 498.) The defendant defaulted on the first payment, and the plaintiff sought entry of judgment pursuant to the stipulation. (Id.) The trial court entered judgment in the amount of $61,232.50, consisting of the $45,000 prayed for in the complaint, plus $13,912.50 in prejudgment interest, $2,000 in attorney fees, and $320 in costs. (Id.) The defendant argued at the appellate level that the judgment of $61,232.50 for failure to make a $15,000 payment constitutes enforcement of an illegal penalty. (Id. at 498-499.)

The appellate court, agreeing with the defendant, interpreted the stipulation as an unenforceable liquidated damages clause that effectively imposed $61,232.50 in liquidated damages for breach of the defendant's obligation to pay $15,000 as follows:

“Greentree and ESI did not attempt to anticipate the damages that might flow from a breach of the stipulation. Rather, they simply selected the amount Greentree had claimed as damages in the underlying lawsuit, plus prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs. But the appellate record contains nothing showing Greentree's chances of complete success on the merits of its case—the record contains only the complaint, the answer, and the stipulation. In the stipulation, ‘[e]ach party disclaims any admission of wrongdoing, fault, liability, or violation of law.’ The lack of a guarantee of success at trial may explain, at least in part, why Greentree was willing to accept in settlement less than half the amount demanded in the complaint.

Also, the $ 61,232.50 amount in the judgment bears no reasonable relationship to the range of actual damages the parties could have anticipated from a breach of the stipulation to settle the dispute for $20,000. ‘[D]amages for the withholding of money are easily determinable—i.e., interest at prevailing rates…’ [citation omitted.] The amount of the judgment, however, was more than triple the amount for which the parties agreed to settle the case.” (Id. at 499-500.)

The court in Greentree noted that the validity of a liquidated damages provision is governed by section 1671, subdivision (b) and that “‘A liquidated damages clause will generally be considered unreasonable, and hence unenforceable under section 1671[, subdivision] (b), if it bears no reasonable relationship to the range of actual damages that the parties could have anticipated would flow from a breach.’” (Id. at 499.) Damages for failing to pay money are “‘easily determinable’” and are limited to “‘interest at [the] prevailing rate[]’” and (perhaps) “reasonable costs [incurred] in pursuing the payment.” (Id. at 500.)

Last, the court in Greentree concluded that:

“The stipulation does not contain any provision for an award of attorney fees or prejudgment interest, although the judgment included $ 2,000 in attorney fees and $ 13,912.50 in prejudgment interest. The $20,000 settlement sum in the stipulation is unallocated, and may or may not have included Greentree's claimed attorney fees and prejudgment interest. We find no basis for awarding Greentree its attorney fees and prejudgment interest in addition to the stipulated settlement sum. Greentree is entitled to recover its costs in the trial court (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032), and postjudgment interest.” (Id. at 502.)

Vitatech International, Inc. v Sporn (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 796 is also instructional here. In that case, the parties settled before trial for payment of $75,000 although plaintiff was seeking $166,000 in its complaint. Like this case, there was an agreement to “forbear” collection if Defendant paid the lesser sum. Defendant defaulted, and Plaintiff sought and obtained a judgment of over $300,000, including compensatory damages, prejudgment interest, attorney’s fees and costs.

In that case, plaintiff also argued that it sought damages that were no more than it could have recovered at trial and that all parties expressly accepted the amount that would be paid on default. The appellate court focused on the damages that could have flowed from the breach of the stipulation, not the amount claimed in the complaint:

“We reversed because "[the parties] did not attempt to anticipate the damages that might flow from a breach of the stipulation. Rather, they simply selected the amount [the plaintiff] had claimed as damages in the underlying lawsuit, plus prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs. But the appellate record contains nothing showing [the plaintiff's] chances of complete success on the merits of its case .... [¶] Also, the ……. amount in the judgment bears no reasonable relationship to the range of actual damages the parties could have anticipated from a breach of the stipulation to settle the dispute…” (Id. at 809)

Here, the Court does not find the principal amount of $5,675.56 claimed by Plaintiff were damages that might flow from breach of the stipulation, but rather the amount Plaintiff claimed in the underlying lawsuit. The Court sees the essential question from the cases noted above as to what the relationship is between the stipulated amount and the damages that flow from the breach. The total amount sought is essentially double the amount owed under the settlement agreement without explanation.

The Court, therefore, sets the principal amount at $906.25, taking the $2,900 and deducting the payments of $1,993.75.

The Court will add the costs sought in the amount of $353 and enter judgment in the total amount of $1,259.25.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Pierce, Ronald vs. Singlepoint Outsourcing

Case No.:   VCU314801

Date:           April 30, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action

Tentative Ruling: To continue this motion for preliminary approval to May 21, 2026; 8:30 am; D1; to order a supplemental declaration as to the lodestar, the presently incurred costs of counsel and the administrative costs. The OSC against Plaintiff’s counsel is hereby dismissed.

1. Sufficiency of Amount of Settlement (Net Estimated: $431,833.33 less administrative costs)

This matter arises out of an alleged Data Security Incident suffered by SinglePoint on or about November 8, 2023 through November 9, 2023. Specifically, a third-party threat actor allegedly gained unauthorized access to SinglePoint’s systems and may have accessed and acquired files containing the personal information of certain current and former SinglePoint clients, including their Social Security numbers, dates of birth, driver's license numbers, and/or bank account information (the “Private Information” or “PII”). SinglePoint notified approximately 11,861 individuals, including Representative Plaintiff, of the Data Security Incident via written notice beginning on or about February 8, 2024.

On November 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed his action against SinglePoint seeking relief for injuries arising from the Data Security Incident.

The gross settlement amount is $650,000 and consists of a non-reversionary common fund from which Settlement Class Members may elect to claim: (i) a Documented Loss Payment of up to $5,000 per claimant for documented losses that are attributable to the Data Security Incident; (ii) an Alternative Cash Payment, estimated to be $50 but which may be adjusted on a pro rata basis from the Net Settlement Fund; (iii) a California Statutory Cash Payment in the amount of $100, which may be adjusted downward on a pro rata basis based on the number of claims filed; and (iv) two years of three-bureau credit monitoring services.

 Plaintiff estimates approximately 11,861 proposed Settlement Class Members. The Settlement Class Members consists of:

“All individuals residing in the United States whose PII was compromised in the Data Breach, including all those who received notice of the breach.” Defendant estimates that the Settlement Class includes 11,676 individuals. Excluded from the Settlement Class are: (1) the Judge(s) presiding over the Action and members of their immediate families and their staff; (2) SinglePoint and its subsidiaries, parent companies, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which SinglePoint, has a controlling interest; (3) natural persons who properly execute and submit a Request for Exclusion prior to the expiration of the Opt-Out Period; and (4) the successors or assigns of any such excluded natural person.”

Counsel indicates the relief obtained for Settlement Class Members is well within the range of approval, as the California Consumer Privacy Act provides statutory damages that range from $100 to $750 per individual. (Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.150(a)(1)(A)) or individual out of pocket losses, whichever is greater. Here, Plaintiff has negotiated a California Statutory Claim Benefit of $100.00 per claimant. (Declaration of Nelson ¶17.) Additionally, that the pro rata cash payment for all Class Members estimated at $50 and that all class members are entitled to claim up to $5,000 is within the estimated range of litigated exposure of social security numbers. (Declaration of Nelson ¶18.)

After agreeing to participate in mediation, Defendants informally records related to the breach as to the Settlement Class members, key class data points, and other documents and information relevant to the claims alleged in advance of mediation. The parties reached the settlement after mediation. 

The Court finds the information provided in support of the gross settlement amount sufficient for the Court to preliminarily approve the gross settlement amount, as the settlement amount appears to be within the recognized range of reasonableness given the claims and defenses asserted in this case.

Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $650,000 are proposed as follows:

Proposed Court Approved Attorney Fees and Costs (33.3%):	$216,666.67
Proposed Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff:	$1,500.00
Proposed Settlement Administrator Costs	$ Unknown
Proposed Net Settlement Amount	$ 431,833.33 (less costs)

2.  Class Notice

The settlement agreement provides no claim form will be required of class members to participate in distributions.  Only those wishing to object or opt out must file notice with the settlement administrator. 

Objections or opt out notices are to be made within 60 days. The Court regularly approves notice periods of 60 days or longer. The class notice period is approved.

With respect to the content of the Notice, the Court finds the Class Notice to be reasonable.  It clearly provides to the class member an estimate of the settlement share the employee is to receive and provides adequate instructions for any class member to opt out of the settlement or to submit an objection.

3.  Enhancement Award to Class Representative

The court preliminarily approves Plaintiff as class representative for settlement purposes. The proposed enhancement award to Plaintiff is $1,500.

The Court has, in past cases, approved enhancement awards of up to $5,000 routinely and approves the award as requested in the amount of $1,500

4. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees and costs no greater than of 33.3% of the gross settlement fund of $650,000 or $216,666.67 are sought in this matter.

Although the Court recognizes the utilization of the percentage of the common fund methodology to award attorneys’ fees, the Court requires a declaration from counsel that provides an estimate as to what the lodestar would be in this case. The ultimate goal of the Court is to award reasonable attorneys’ fees irrespective of the method of calculation. As such, the court needs to know the estimate of the approximate lodestar supported by declarations for preliminary approval. Counsel should submit information as to the time spent on this action and the hourly rates of all counsel working on the case. Without such information, the Court declines to preliminarily approve the fees.

The Court further finds that Plaintiff’s counsel is an experienced class action attorney through the declaration of counsel.

5.  Claims Administrator

The Court preliminary approves EisnerAmper as the claims administrator for this class action. However, no estimated cost as to the administration of this lawsuit has been provided. The Court will require such information prior to preliminary approval.

6. Unclaimed Settlement Proceeds

The Court preliminarily approves the distribution of unclaimed settlement proceeds to Electronic Frontier Foundation a 501(c)(3) non-profit that advocates for digital privacy rights.

7. Release

The Court finds the proposed release of claims reasonable under the circumstances.

8. Class Certification for Settlement Purposes

Code of Civil Procedure section 382 permits certification “when the question is of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 382.)  The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that class certification under section 382 is proper.  (See City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 460.)  To do so, “[t]he party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.”  (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.) 

Here, the Motion and accompanying declaration of counsel sufficiently sets forth the basis for finding the class is numerous and ascertainable as 11,676 individuals subject to the breach. Additionally, common questions of law and fact predominate the action. The Court finds a sufficient basis to conditionally certify the class for the purposes of settlement.

Therefore, the Court continues this motion for preliminary approval to May 21, 2026; 8:30 am; D1 and orders a supplemental declaration as to the lodestar, the presently incurred costs of counsel and the administrative costs.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Alvizo, Michael vs. California Bioenergy OPCO LLC

Case No.:  VCU323767

Date:          April 30, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:       Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to (1) Form Interrogatories - Employment (2) Special Interrogatories and (3) Requests for Production of Documents

Tentative Ruling: (1) through (3): There are no tentative rulings on the merits for these motions. The parties are directed to meaningfully meet and confer before the hearing of these motions to resolve the discovery disputes identified in the moving and opposition papers for these discovery motions. If unable to resolve, counsel are directed to personally appear for the hearing on these discovery motions. No CourtCall or Zoom appearances will be permitted if the parties are unable to resolve this matter prior to the scheduled hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Medina, Moises Salazar vs. Harris Ranch Beef Company

Case No.:   VCU298705

Date:           April 30, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Motion for Renewed Stay

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to stay this matter for a period of six months until October 30, 2026; to set a status hearing for October 29, 2026; 8:30 am; D1 and obtain a status as to the Pimentel and Paradez actions before consideration of a further stay or a lifting of this stay.

Background Facts and Prior Stay

The Court previously entered a stay in this matter pending mediation of two other cases against Defendant for which the Court applied the exclusive concurrent jurisdiction doctrine. The stay was lifted February 17, 2026.

Facts

Defendant, via this motion, seeks a further stay in this matter, noting now that the mediation of the other matters has stalled and discovery has re-commenced.

Pimentel Action

On January 29, 2021, a former employee of Defendant Harris Ranch Beef Company, Almarys Espinosa Pimentel, filed a wage and hour class action lawsuit against Defendant in Kings County Superior Court (the "Pimentel Action").

As of January 29, 2021, the Pimentel Action alleges the following causes of action:

1. Violation of California Labor Code §§ 510 and 1198 (Unpaid Overtime);

2. Violation of California Labor Code §§ 1182.12, 1194, 1197, 1197.1, and 1198 (Unpaid Minimum Wages);

3. Violation of California Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512(a), 516, and 1198 (Failure to Provide Meal Periods);

4. Violation of California Labor Code §§ 226.7, 516, and 1198 (Failure to Auth01ize and Pe1mit Rest Periods);

5. Violation of California Labor Code §§ 201 and 202 (Wages Not Timely Paid Upon Termination)

6. Violation of California Labor Code § 204 (Failure to Timely Pay Wages During Employment);

7. Violation of California Labor Code § 2802 (Unreimbursed Business Expenses);

8. Violation of California Business & Professions Code§§ 17200, et seq; and

9. Violation of California Business & Professions Code§§ 17200, et seq. (Unfair Business Practices)

The Pimentel Action seeks to recover damages on behalf of Pimentel and other "class members" and defines the proposed class as "[a]ll persons who worked for Defendants as non-exempt hourly paid employees in California within four years prior to the filing of the initial complaint until the date of trial."

Paredez Actions

On January 10, 2022, Daniel Paredez filed a Class Action complaint, which also seeks to recover damages against Defendant for Labor Code violations and Unfair Business Practices on behalf of himself and other "class members" in the Fresno County Superior Court (“Paradez Class Action”).

The Paradez Class Action, as of January 10, 2022, alleges the following causes of action:

1. Violation of California Labor Code §§ 510 and 1198 (Unpaid Overtime)

2. Violation of California Labor Code§§ 226.7 and 512(a) (Unpaid Meal Period Premiums);

3. Violation of California Labor Code § 226. 7 (Unpaid Rest Period Premiums);

4. Violation of California Labor Code §§ 1194, 1197, and 1197.1 (Unpaid Minimum Wages);

5. Violation of California Labor Code§§ 201 and 202 (Final Wages Not Timely Paid);

6. Violation of California Labor Code § 204 (Wages Not Timely Paid During Employment);

7. Violation of California Labor Code § 226(a) (Non-Complaint Wage Statements);

8. Violation of California Labor Code § l 174(d) (Failure to Keep Requisite Payroll Records);

9. Violation of California Labor Code §§ 2800 and 2802 (Unreimbursed Business Expenses); and

10. Violation of California Business & Professions Code § § 17200, et seq.

On August 29, 2022, the Fresno Superior Court sustained Defendant's demurrer to Paredez' Class Action complaint and the matter has been stayed pending resolution of the Pimentel Action.

However, also on January 10, 2022, Plaintiff Paredez filed a separate complaint seeking PAGA penalties (“Paradez PAGA Action”) on behalf of aggrieved employees from November 5, 2020 to the present. In November 2023, the parties agreed to stay the action pending mediation to toll the five year trial deadline requirement.

Medina Action

On September 6, 2023, Plaintiff Moises Salazar Medina filed a First Amended Complaint (the "Medina Action") in this Court, which also seeks to recover damages against Defendant for Labor Code violations and Unfair Business Practices on behalf of himself and other "class members” as follows:

1. Failure to Pay Minimum Wages;

2. Failure to Pay Overtime Wages;

3. Failure to Provide Meal Periods;

4. Failure to Permit Rest Breaks;

5. Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements;

6. Failure to Pay Wages Timely During Employment;

7. Failure to Pay All Wages Due Upon Separation of Employment;

8. Violation of Business and Professions Code§§ 17200, et seq., and

9. Enforcement of Labor Code § 2698 et seq. ("PAGA")

The Medina Action defines the proposed class as "[a]ll California citizens currently or formerly employed by Defendants as nonexempt employees in the State of California at any time between November 29, 2018 and the date of class certification."

Further, "aggrieved employees" in the Medina Action include those employees employed by Harris Ranch Beef Company from July 3, 2022 to the present.

Motion to Stay

Defendant seeks to stay the Medina Action because the Pimentel and Paredez Actions were filed before it and contain the same causes of action between the same class and aggrieved employees. Further, that the Pimentel Action and the Paredez Action are represented by two different law firms, and all parties have invested a significant amount of time into these matters. Additionally, written discovery has been exchanged, and Defendant has provided Plaintiffs with a significant amount of class information and documents. Defendant has produced over 500 pages of documents, including numerous excel files containing thousands of lines of data representing class information. Defendant has noticed the deposition of both Plaintiff Pimentel and Plaintiff Paredez.

In opposition, Plaintiff notes that the other matters failed to settle at mediation, that the classes have not been certified, that the Paradez Action’s stay has been lifted and that PAGA cases may proceed in parallel.

Authority and Analysis

"Trial courts generally have the inherent power to stay proceedings in the interests of justice and to promote judicial efficiency." (Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489.) A stay may be ordered "to avoid a multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigation, conflicting judgments, confusion and unseemly controversy between litigants and courts." (Simmons v. Superior Court (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 119, 125.)

The California Supreme Court has stated that the “first-filed rule in California means that when two courts of the same sovereignty have concurrent jurisdiction, the first to assume jurisdiction over a particular subject matter of a particular controversy takes it exclusively, and the second court should not thereafter assert control over that subject matter.” (Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 697, 707.)

Defendant cites to Shaw v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 245 noting a plaintiff filed a PAGA action against defendant for violations of California Labor Code (the “Shaw Action”), but more than a year before the Shaw Action was filed, the Paez Action was filed, also seeking PAGA penalties. (Id. at 251.) Defendant sought to stay the proceedings in the Shaw Action under the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction. (Id. at 252.)

Pursuant to Plant Insulation Co. v. Fibreboard Corp. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 781, this rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction operates "when two superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter and all parties involved in litigation" and then, "the first to assume jurisdiction has exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the subject matter and all parties involved until such time as all necessarily related matters have been resolved." (Id. at 786-787)

Further, "[t]he rule is established and enforced not 'so much to protect the rights of parties as to protect the rights of Courts of coordinate jurisdiction to avoid conflict of jurisdiction, confusion and delay in the administration of justice' [Citation]"  (Id. at 787-788.) The exclusive concurrent jurisdiction rule is broader, however, than the statutory plea of abatement because it does not require absolute identity of parties, causes of action, or remedies sought in the initial and subsequent action. (Id. at 789.) “The rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is mandatory. Thus, if the conditions are met, the issuance of a stay order is a matter of right.” (People ex rel. Garamendi v. American Autoplan, Inc. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 760, 772.)

To start, there is no dispute that the Pimentel Action and Paredez Class and PAGA Actions were filed prior to the Medina Action.

The Pimentel Action defines the class as "[a]ll persons who worked for Defendants as non-exempt hourly paid employees in California within four years prior to the filing of the initial complaint [January 29, 2021] until the date of trial."  The Paredez PAGA Action seeks penalties on behalf of aggrieved employees from November 5, 2020 to the present. These class and aggrieved employee definitions wholly overlap with the Medina Action’s proposed class definition and aggrieved employee definitions.

Further, the allegations and causes of action in the Pimentel Action and Paredez Class and PAGA Actions overlap significantly, if not completely, with the Medina Action.

The opposition fails to address the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction.

Therefore, the Court finds the Medina Action arises from the same facts and theories, involve the same groups of proposed class members and aggrieved employees, has been filed against the same Defendant, and was filed after the Pimentel and Paredez Actions.

The Court will therefore stay this matter for a period of six months until October 30, 2026, set a status hearing for October 29, 2026; 8:30 am; D1 and, at that time, obtain a status as to the Pimentel and Paradez actions before consideration of a further stay or a lifting of this stay.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                In the Matter of Buck, Michelle

Case No.:   VCU324766

Date:           April 30, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Motion to Set Aside Minor’s Compromise

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts

In this matter, driver, Alexis Cross, and passenger, Anthony Burum, were killed after the vehicle hit a guardrail and struck a security booth in a one vehicle accident that occurred in April 2024. Alexis Cross had a minimum coverage insurance policy of $15,000/$30,000 with The General Insurance Company

Burum left behind two minor children, Bailee Burum and Jackson Burum.

On May 3, 2024, the General Insurance Company offered insured’s Alexis Cross’s per person bodily injury liability limits of $15,000 for the settlement of Anthony Burum’s injury claim and to assist in retaining counsel for the heirs to complete the settlement.

The estate accepted the settlement.

In June 2025, counsel, Mr. Smee, drafted the Settlement Agreement and Release related to this matter, included a total payment of $30,000, that is $15,000 to each minor, as opposed to a total amount of $15,000.

By August 18, 2025, the agreement had been signed by the Minor’s Guardians ad litem and their respective counsel.

Counsel for minor Baliee Burum filed a minors compromise with this court on August 15, 2025, which stated that the amount going to Baliee Burum was $15,000.

On October 1, 2025, this Court approved the minors compromise.

Thereafter, Mr. Smee left the firm and Mr. Hamilton took over this matter. When attempting to procure settlement checks, Mr. Hamilton and the carrier apparently noticed the error noted above.

This motion for relief from the order granting the minor’s compromise followed. Defendant seeks relief under the mandatory provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b).

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that this is a unilateral mistake that does not warrant relief, enforcement of the judgment provides finality to the judgment and Defendant’s negligence caused the circumstance for which relief is sought.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b) provides, in relevant parts:

“(b) The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken. . . . Notwithstanding any other requirements of this section, the court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney's sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which will result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment or dismissal entered against his or her client, unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney's mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect…”

Therefore, it appears mandatory relief under this section applies narrowly to default judgment and dismissal. Here, there is no default judgment.

The Court has not been presented authority that a minor’s compromise, approved by the Court, is a dismissal. Rather, the minor’s compromise appears to be the Court’s approval of a settlement. "The … guardian ad litem so appearing for any minor … shall have power, with the approval of the court in which the action or proceeding is pending, to compromise the same, to agree to the order or judgment to be entered therein for or against the ward … ." (Code Civ. Proc, § 372, subd. (a)(3).)  Further

Pearson v. Superior Ct. (2012) 202 Cal. App. 4th 1333, 1337 states: “We conclude that while the motion for approval of the minor's compromise is pending, the settlement agreement is voidable only at the election of the minor or his guardian. Neither the letter nor the spirit of section 372 confers any right on the defendant and/or its carrier to object when the court approves or disapproves of a settlement agreement.” Further, that “The purpose of section 372 is to protect the minor involved in litigation by adding an extra layer of scrutiny to the settlement of the minor's claims. This statute is a “shield” to protect the interests of a minor. It was not enacted to be a “sword” for a defendant and/or its insurance carrier. The defendant and its carrier “bought peace” at the settlement conference and were bound as of that time.” (Id. at 1339.)

The Court, therefore, finds that section 473(b)’s mandatory relief provision cannot be applied to void the order approving the minor’s compromise. The Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Barriga, Marina vs. Mineral King Radiological Medical Group, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU305834

Date:           April 30, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA

Tentative Ruling: To continue this motion for preliminary approval to May 21, 2026; 8:30 am; D1; to order a supplemental declaration as to the lodestar

1. Sufficiency of Amount of Settlement (Net Estimated: $135,076.67.)

The gross settlement amount is $287,500. Plaintiff estimates approximately 82 proposed Class Members, providing an estimated average payout of $1,647.28 per member.

The Class Members consist of all non-exempt, hourly employees who worked for Defendant in California during the Class Period, February 5, 2020, through November 24, 2024.

Plaintiffs primarily alleged the following violations: (1) Failure To Pay Minimum Wages, (2) Failure To Pay Wages And Overtime Under Labor Code § 510, (3) Meal-Period Violation Under Labor Code § 226.7, (4) Rest-Break Violation Under Labor Code § 226.7, (5) Reimbursement of Necessary Expenditures Under Labor Code § 2802, (6) Failure To Keep Required Payroll Records Under Labor Code §§ 1174, and 1174.5, (7) Penalties Pursuant to Labor Code § 203, (8) Violation Of Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq and (9) violations of PAGA.

Plaintiffs provide estimates of the maximum recovery for each of the asserted wage and hour claims and penalties with information showing how the estimates were calculated including the damages models utilized. (Declaration of Kim ¶¶ 39 – 62.) Plaintiffs have provided a detailed discussion of the value of each claim, applied various discount rates regarding the chance of success as to each claim which corresponds to the final gross settlement amount. Counsel estimates Defendant faced approximately $464,186.00 in total realistic exposure on Plaintiff’s main claims and therefore the gross settlement amount of $287,500 represents recovery of 62% of the realistic exposure. (Declaration of Kim ¶62.)

After agreeing to participate in mediation, Defendants informally produced time and pay records for Settlement Class members, key class data points, and other documents and information relevant to the claims alleged in advance of mediation. The parties reached the settlement after a full day mediation. 

The Court finds the information provided in support of the gross settlement amount sufficient for the Court to preliminarily approve the gross settlement amount, as the settlement amount appears to be within the recognized range of reasonableness given the claims and defenses asserted in this case.

Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $287,500 are proposed as follows:

Proposed Court Approved Attorney Fees (33.3%):	$95,833.33
Proposed Attorney Costs (up to):	$20,000.00
Proposed Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff:	$5,000.00
Proposed Settlement Administrator Costs	$3,590.00
Proposed PAGA Payment	$28,000.00
Proposed Net Settlement Amount	$135,076.67

2.  Class Notice

The settlement agreement provides no claim form will be required of class members to participate in distributions.  Only those wishing to object or opt out must file notice with the settlement administrator. 

Objections or opt out notices are to be made within 60 days. The Court regularly approves notice periods of 60 days or longer. The class notice period is approved.

With respect to the content of the Notice, the Court finds the Class Notice to be reasonable.  It clearly provides to the class member an estimate of the settlement share the employee is to receive and provides adequate instructions for any class member to opt out of the settlement or to submit an objection.

3.  Enhancement Award to Class Representative

The court preliminarily approves Plaintiffs as class representative for settlement purposes. The proposed enhancement award to Plaintiffs is $5,000.

The Court has, in past cases, approved enhancement awards of $5,000 routinely and approves the award as requested.

4. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees of 33.3% of the gross settlement fund of $287,500 or $95,833.33 and actual costs incurred of $14,766.49 are sought in this matter.

Although the Court recognizes the utilization of the percentage of the common fund methodology to award attorneys’ fees, the Court requires a declaration from counsel that provides an estimate as to what the lodestar would be in this case. The ultimate goal of the Court is to award reasonable attorneys’ fees irrespective of the method of calculation. As such, the court needs to know the estimate of the approximate lodestar supported by declarations for preliminary approval. Counsel should submit information as to the time spent on this action and the hourly rates of all counsel working on the case. Without such information, the Court declines to preliminarily approve the fees.

The Court will preliminarily approve costs up to $20,000, given the current costs incurred are $14,766.49.

The Court further finds that Plaintiff’s counsel are experienced class action attorneys through the declarations of counsel.

5.  Claims Administrator

The Court preliminary approves Apex Class Action as the claims administrator for this class action based on prior experience with this settlement administrator in other class actions litigated in this Court.  The Court preliminarily approves administration costs not to exceed $4,090.

6. Unclaimed Settlement Proceeds

The Court preliminarily approves the distribution of unclaimed settlement proceeds to California Controller’s Office Unclaimed Property Division, with an identification of the Participating Class Member to whom the funds belong, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

7. Release

The Court finds the proposed release of claims reasonable under the circumstances.

8. LWDA Notice

The declaration of Kim indicates confirmation from the LWDA of receipt of proof of submission of the proposed settlement agreement. (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (l)(2).) (Declaration of Kim ¶76 – Exhibit 4.)

9. Class Certification

Code of Civil Procedure section 382 permits certification “when the question is of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 382.)  The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that class certification under section 382 is proper.  (See City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 460.)  To do so, “[t]he party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.”  (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.) 

Here, the Motion and accompanying declaration of counsel sufficiently sets forth the basis for finding the class is numerous and ascertainable as 82 employees have been identified through Defendant’s employment records. Additionally, common questions of law and fact predominate within the individual causes of action based on class wide policies and procedures of Defendant. Further, the class representative, through their declaration, indicate they will adequately and fairly represent the Class Members and will not place their interests above any Class Member. The Class Representative was employed by Defendant during the relevant time period and thus worked under the same policies and procedures as the Class Members.

Therefore, the Court continues this motion for preliminary approval to May 21, 2026; 8:30 am; D1 and orders a supplemental declaration as to the lodestar.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Square 1 Development, LLC vs. Kinwork, LLC a California Limited Liability Company

Case No.:   VCU317240

Date:           April 30, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Demurrer to Amended Cross-Complaint

Tentative Ruling: To sustain the demurrer as to all Individual Cross-Defendants as to the fourth cause of action for concealment and fifth cause of action for waste with leave to amend; to sustain the demurrer with leave to amend as to Cross-Defendant Bravinder as to the second and third causes of action with leave to amend; Cross-Complainant shall have ten (10) days to file an amended cross-complaint; to overrule the demurrer as to the second and third causes of action as to Cross-Defendants Brien and Thomason.

Facts

In the amended complaint, Plaintiff Square 1 Development, sues Defendants Kinwork, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; Kinwork Collective; Saegan Brien, individually; Gurdeep Singh, individually, for breach of contract, common counts, fraud, and enforcement of mechanics lien arising out of an alleged failure to pay for a work of improvement to real property.

On May 2, 2025, Singh answered the amended complaint and filed a cross-complaint against Kinwork LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; Kinwork Collective; Saegan Brien, individually; Jalisca Thomason, individually, and Megan Bravinder, individually for breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation and concealment.

On December 4, 2025, Cross-Defendants Megan Bravinder, Jalisca Thomason, and Saegan Brien (“Individual Cross-Defendants”) filed this demurrer to the cross-complaint as to intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation and concealment.

On January 8, 2026, the Court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend.

On February 20, 2026, Cross-Complainant filed the operative second amended cross-complaint alleging causes of action for breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation and concealment, fraud-concealment, and for waste.

Cross-Complainant alleges purchase of property at 2301 Augusta St. Visalia, CA 93277 ("Property") on December 12, 2022. (SACC ¶10.) Further, that on June 5, 2023, Singh and Kinwork, LLC, by and through Brien and Thomason and alleging that negotiations regarding the lease “…took place over several weeks prior to execution between Singh and the Individual Defendants, largely Brien on the behalf of the Individual Defendants.” (SACC ¶11.) The lease commenced July 2, 2025 and ended June 30, 2029. (SACC ¶12.) Further, that the Individual Cross-Defendants are the managing members of Kinwork, LLC. (SACC ¶25.)

Cross-Complainant alleges further that “According to the Individual [Cross-] Defendants, the agreed use of the space was for co-working office space, training event and art exhibits.” (SACC ¶16.)

On May 20, 2024, Kinwork LLC entered into The Building Construction Contract Agreement ("Agreement") with Square 1 Development, LLC ("Square 1"), with Brien signing the Agreement as the CEO of Kinwork LLC. (SACC ¶¶18, 19.)

“Based on representations by Brien,” on April 15, 2024 Cross-Complainant provided Kinwork LLC with $100,500.00 for tenant improvements at the Property, which were to be paid to Square 1 Development through the Individual Cross-Defendants. (SACC ¶20.)

Further that:

“During the Lease negotiations, beginning in May, 2023 through the date of execution of the Lease, Kinwork LLC, by and through Seagan Brien and Jalisca Thomason promised to Gurdeep Singh the $100,500 provided for tenant improvements would only be used for tenant improvements to the Property and paid to Square 1 Development. Further, Brien and Thomason verbally represented to Singh that they had enough money to pay for all of the other improvements to the Property, which were necessary to open and operate their business. When Singh inquired as to Individual Defendants' out of pocket expenses to complete the necessary improvements for the Property, both Brien and Thomason made further verbal assurances to Singh, on the date they delivered the executed Lease to Singh, that with his contribution of $100,500 and their individual contributions they would be able to easily afford the improvements.” (SACC ¶21.)

The cross-complaint further alleges that Kinwork, LLC did not use the $100,500 for tenant improvements, left and vacated the Property without notice, at some point after August 8, 2024. (SACC ¶¶23, 24)

As to intentional misrepresentation, Singh alleges “Cross-Defendants made the following representations to Singh to induce him to enter into the Lease: (1) the $100,500 was paid by Singh would be used only for tenant improvements; (2) the remaining balance for tenant improvement after the $100,500 would be paid by the Cross-Defendants; (3) Cross-Defendants would be renting the Property for 5 years, (4) Property would be insured by Cross-Defendants for 5 years ("Representations"); and that they had the financial means to pay their obligations under the Lease and for the tenant improvements.” (SACC ¶35.)

As to negligent misrepresentation, Singh alleges “Cross-Defendants requested Singh to pay $100,500 for improvements and promised to use that amount for improvements, pay the remaining amount to Square 1, and would rent the Property for 5 years and pay all obligations under the Lease.” (SACC ¶44.)

As to concealment, Singh pleads:

“Cross-Defendants, and each of them, concealed a material fact from Cross-Complainant when they requested $100,500 for tenant improvements from Cross-Complainant and promised to use that towards tenant improvements, and other Lease obligations, pay the remaining cost for tenant improvements and rent the Property for 5 years — i.e., that the Cross Defendants, and each of them, did not have the ability to pay for the improvements, the intent to use the amount paid by Cross-Complainant towards improvements or rent the Property for 5 years and pay the Lease obligation or, in the alternative Cross-Defendants, and each of them, concealed their desire and lack of intent to pay for the improvements or use the amount paid by Cross-Complainant towards improvements or rent the Property for 5 years and pay the Lease obligations.” (SACC ¶52.)

Finally, as to waste, Cross-Complainant alleges “Cross-Defendants were tenants of the property owned by Cross-Complainant. Thus Cross-Defendants were under a duty to preserve and protect the Property” and that “Cross-Defendants substantially or permanently diminished the market value of the Property through their unreasonable conduct in stripping the interior of the building on the Property including its flooring, sheet rock, and everything but the framing” (SACC ¶¶59,60.) Further, that “After stripping the interior of the building, Cross-Defendants abandoned the property, stopped paying rent, and stopped paying their contractor, thus causing a mechanic's lien to be filed against the Property, further diminishing the value of the Property.”

Cross-Defendants demurrer to each cause of action each of these causes of action for failure to meet the specificity requirements as to fraud and negligent misrepresentation causes of action, and that the allegations related to waste are not permanent and can be remedied through monetary recovery.

In opposition, Cross-Complainant argues that the essential facts are sufficiently pled as to each Individual Cross-Defendant.

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

Specificity of Pleading Fraud-Intentional Misrepresentation, Fraud-Concealment and Negligent Misrepresentation

“‘The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or “scienter”); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.’” (Tenet Healthsystem Desert, Inc. v. Blue Cross of California (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 821, 837.)

“ ‘[T]he elements of an action for fraud and deceit based on concealment are: (1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage [citations omitted]’ Thus, the elements of fraud and deceit based on concealment are the same as for intentional fraud, with the additional requirement that the plaintiff allege that the defendant concealed or suppressed a material fact in a situation in which the defendant was under a duty to disclose that material fact.” (Id. at 844.)

“The tort of negligent misrepresentation is similar to fraud, except that it does not require scienter or an intent to defraud.” (Id. at 845.)

Further, “In California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice. [Citations.] ‘Thus “‘the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings … will not ordinarily be invoked to sustain a pleading defective in any material respect.’” [Citation.] [¶] This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which “show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.”’” [citation omitted]” (Id. at 837-838.)

“The specificity requirement serves two purposes. The first is notice to the defendant, to ‘furnish the defendant with certain definite charges which can be intelligently met.’ [Citations.] The pleading of fraud, however, is also the last remaining habitat of the common law notion that a complaint should be sufficiently specific that the court can weed out nonmeritorious actions on the basis of the pleadings. Thus the pleading should be sufficient ‘“to enable the court to determine whether, on the facts pleaded, there is any foundation, prima facie at least, for the charge of fraud.”’” [citation omitted]” (Id. at 838.)

Here, as to Individual Cross-Defendants Brien and Thomason, the Court finds the allegations in paragraph 21 of the SACC sufficient as to the specificity requirement. Cross-complainant alleges a date range where the statements were made, the contents of the statements, the verbal manner in which the statements were communicated, that the statements were made to Cross-Complainant. This is sufficient under the standard above.

Further, the Court finds a sufficient pleading that Cross-Complainant was induced to pay the $100,500, that Cross-Complainant reasonably relied on these representations as to the use of the funds and the ability pay for other improvements necessary to open and operate the business, that the business was not opened and that Kinwork vacated the Property after August 8, 2024.

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer to the second cause of action for intentional misrepresentation and third cause of action for negligent misrepresentation as to Individual Cross-Defendants Brien and Thomason.

However, paragraph 21 makes no specific reference to Individual Cross-Defendant Bravinder and the remaining allegations lack specificity, having grouped all Cross-Defendants together.

As such, the Court sustains the demurrer as to Cross-Defendant Bravinder with leave to amend as to the second cause of action for intentional misrepresentation and third cause of action for negligent misrepresentation.

As to the fourth cause of action for concealment, "[i]n transactions which do not involve fiduciary or confidential relations, a cause of action for non-disclosure of material facts may arise in at least three instances: (1) the defendant makes representations but does not disclose facts which materially qualify the facts disclosed, or which render his disclosure likely to mislead; (2) the facts are known or accessible only to defendant, and defendant knows they are not known to or reasonably discoverable by the plaintiff; (3) the defendant actively conceals discovery from the plaintiff." (Warner Construction Corp. v. City of Los Angeles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 285, 294.)

Here, there is no fiduciary or confidential relationship alleged and no allegation of active concealment as to all three Individual Cross-Defendants.

Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer to the fourth cause of action for concealment as to all three Individual Cross-Defendants with leave to amend.

Fifth Cause of Action – Waste

A cause of action for waste requires a plaintiff allege the defendant is under a duty to preserve and protect the property involved, that damage to the property was sufficiently substantial and permanent to cause injury to its interest in the property. (Schellinger Brothers v. Cotter (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 984, 1000; Avalon Pacific-Santa Ana, L.P. v. HD Supply Repair & Remodel, LLC (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1213.) Further, the requirement of substantial and permanent damage requires a "…substantial depreciation in the market value…" of the property. (Smith v. Cap Concrete, Inc. (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 769, 776.)

Cross-Complainant cites Avalon, supra, 2 192 Cal. App. 4^th regarding a waste claim. There, the operative complaint alleged waste on the grounds of ““demolishing a portion of the Premises, without either completing the demolition job or concluding the refurbishment of the Premises,” failing to “return the Premises to their pre-existing condition or finishing the improvements contemplated when the demolition commenced,” abandoning the renovation and construction work on the Premises, failing to maintain the Premises in good condition of repair, allowing the Premises to become damaged from theft and vandalism, and failing to repair damage from theft and vandalism. The first amended complaint alleged Defendants committed waste by “failing to properly secure the premises and abandoning the work of improvement midway through the job, … le[aving] the [P]remises available for intruders and others.” (Id. at 1195.)  Further that “Avalon's waste cause of action was not based solely on the demolition of the office space. Avalon also alleged Defendants committed waste by “failing to properly secure the premises and abandoning the work of improvement midway through the job, le[aving] the [P]remises available for intruders and others.” The evidence established the Premises had been stripped of copper wiring, fixtures had been stolen, windows  were boarded up, and the landscaping became overgrown. (Id. at 1213.)

Further, the Avalon court noted the definition of “permanent” in the context of waste as follows: ““Permanent” does not inflexibly mean eternal; instead, “permanent” means a degree of irremediableness sufficient to cause injury to a reversion interest that will not become a possessory interest until the end of the lease term.” (Id. at 1215.)

The Court does not find the facts alleged in the SACC sufficiently aligned with the facts of Avalon. Here, the SACC is conclusory as to the substantial and permanent nature of the damage. The stripping of “everything but the framing” including the flooring and sheet rock does not sound in permanent and substantial damage. Rather, as noted in the demurrer, it would appear, from the allegations before the Court, the sheet rock, flooring and other materials could be replaced, though at a cost to Cross-Complainant. As such, the Court sustains the demurrer to the waste cause of action with leave to amend.

Summary

Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer as to all Individual Cross-Defendants as to the fourth cause of action for concealment and fifth cause of action for waste with leave to amend. Cross-Complainant shall have ten (10) days to file an amended cross-complaint.

The Court further sustains the demurrer with leave to amend as to Cross-Defendant Bravinder as to the second and third causes of action with leave to amend. Cross-Complainant shall have ten (10) days to file an amended cross-complaint.

The Court overrules the demurrer as to the second and third causes of action as to Cross-Defendants Brien and Thomason.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared Wednesday, April 29, 2026 that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comment
VPR053896	In the Matter of Cutts, John Strickland	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	Supplemental Statement of Birth Date and DL Number not filed (DE-147S), TCSC LR, rule 1000(c)(4)
VPR051715	In the Matter of Duran, Josefina L	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	1. Petition paragraph 6: Date of Notice to Creditors omitted 2. Notice to public entities not addressed in petition as required in Probate Code §9202(a - c): a) Notice to Director of Health Care Services or explanation of no notice; b) Notice to Director of CA Victim Compensation Board or explanation of no notice; c) Notice to Franchise Tax Board 3. Notice of Hearing not served on all parties, Prob C § 11601
VPR053288	In the Matter of Alexander, Ronald Gary	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Notice to the following public entities not addressed in petition as required in Probate Code § 9202(b),(c): 1. Notice to Director of CA Victim Compensation Board or explanation of no notice 2. Notice to Franchise Tax Board
VPR054008	In the Matter of Vargas, Teodamira Cruz	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing not filed
VPR053745	In the Matter of Rubalcaba, Orion Jacob	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents all in order
VPR053793	In the Matter of Santillan Saldana, Guadalupe	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents all in order
VPR053816	In the Matter of Renteria, Maria Lorenza	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Capacity Declaration incomplete, Items 1-4: Name of declarant, office address, profession, last date proposed conservatee was seen by physician/psychologist
VPR053710	In the Matter of Ochoa, Martha	OSC Hearing	Appearance Required	Missing Inventory & Appraisal and Accountings

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared Thursday, April 30, 2026 at 8:30am that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 .

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comment
PPR054007	In the Matter of Sastre, Catalina	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	No notice to siblings- will need to be addressed at hearing
PPR053829	In the Matter of Pollock, Michael Ray	Spousal Property Hearing	Recommended for Approval
PPR053853	In the Matter of Castronova, Daniel Charles	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Matter of Bond and additional powers to be addressed by the court
PPR053988	In the Matter of the Don and Kathy Mabs Living Trust	Petition for Instructions	Recommended for Approval