Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, September 29, 2026, are:

Re:                Gonzalez, Arnulfo et al vs. ABLP Properties Visalia, LLC et al

Case No.:  VCU284145

Date:           September 29, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reopen Case

Tentative Ruling: The motion is denied. Plaintiffs seek to compel the disclosure of various records apparently related to the underlying case, which concluded in 2022. The Court notes Judgment was entered, this matter was dismissed and the Court has previously denied a motion to reconsider the dismissal and reopen the case on December 30, 2025. Former plaintiffs are advised that if they continue to file motions in a case that was resolved four years ago, they could be deemed vexatious litigants by the Court.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Nava, Fernando Ramon Puga vs. Munoz, Andres et al

Case No.:   VCU323257

Date:           September 29, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion to Amend Complaint

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. The Court, therefore, takes the motion off calendar.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Flores, Sergio vs. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

Case No.:   VCU332063

Date:           September 29, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and delegate issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator.

Background Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff alleges causes of action for breach of express and implied warranties under the Song Beverly Act.

Defendant American Honda moves to compel arbitration of these claims pursuant to a term in the warranty provided to Plaintiff upon lease of the vehicle at issue in this matter.

Facts – Agreement to Arbitrate and Delegation Clause

Defendant, via the declaration of counsel, attaches a true and correct copy of the warranty booklet as to the vehicle at issue in this matter.

The Court notes that the arbitration provision contained in the warranty contains the following delegation clause:

“All issues are for the arbitrator to decide, including the scope and enforceability of this arbitration provision. Disputes concerning  the validity, application, scope, enforceability, or interpretation of this Agreement will be exclusively decided by the arbitrator. The Agreement and associated proceedings, such as waiver, estoppel, breach, or default before, during, or after arbitration, will be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., and federal common law, not by any state laws or procedures regarding arbitration. The arbitrator at all times holds the exclusive authority to address challenges to this Agreement, including questions of waiver, estoppel, breach, default, or the validity or scope of any part of this Agreement.”

Plaintiff argues, in opposition, that there was no mutual assent as to the arbitration provision in the warranty, including the ability to opt out and further that terms contained therein are procedurally and substantially unconscionable pursuant to Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312 as to scope, duration and lack of mutuality.

Authority and Analysis – Agreement to Arbitrate and Delegation Clause

Malone v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1551 summarizes the applicable analysis with respect to delegation clauses:

“A delegation clause requires issues of interpretation and enforceability of an arbitration agreement to be resolved by the arbitrator. Delegation clauses have the potential to create problems of circularity. For example, suppose an arbitration agreement delegates the issue of enforceability to the arbitrator. If the arbitrator concludes that the arbitration agreement is, in fact, not enforceable, this would mean that the entire agreement, including the delegation clause, is unenforceable-a finding that would undermine the arbitrator's jurisdiction to make that finding in the first place. For this reason, courts have treated the delegation clause as a separate agreement to arbitrate solely the issues of enforceability…

“For this reason, when a party is claiming that an arbitration agreement is unenforceable, it is important to determine whether the party is making a specific challenge to the enforceability of the delegation clause or is simply arguing that the agreement as a whole is unenforceable. If the party's challenge is directed to the agreement as a whole--even if it applies equally to the delegation clause--the delegation clause is severed out and enforced; thus, the arbitrator, not the court, will determine whether the agreement is enforceable. In contrast, if the party is making a specific challenge to the delegation clause, the court must determine whether the delegation clause itself may be enforced (and can only delegate the general issue of enforceability to the arbitrator if it first determines the delegation clause is enforceable). (Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 70)”

Here, clear and unmistakable language is found in the warranty as to the arbitrator’s decision making over the validity, application, scope, enforceability, or interpretation of this Agreement.

Plaintiff argues first that there was no mutual assent as to the arbitration term contained in the warranty.

Caremark, LLC v. Chickasaw Nation (9th Cir. 2022) 43 F.4th 1021, 1029-1030 notes:

“…the issues reserved to the courts for decision ‘always include’ whether an arbitration agreement was formed, even in the presence of a delegation clause. [citations omitted]. That principle follows from the fundamental premise that arbitration is "strictly 'a matter of consent.'" [citations omitted] ‘To take the question of contract formation away from the courts would essentially force parties into arbitration when the parties dispute whether they ever consented to arbitrate anything in the first place." [citations omitted]...Accordingly, a court ‘should order arbitration of a dispute only where the court is satisfied that neither the formation of the parties' arbitration agreement nor (absent a valid provision specifically committing such disputes to an arbitrator) its enforceability or applicability to the dispute is in issue.”

Therefore, the Court turns to issues raised as to formation.

Under California law, an essential element of a valid contract is the mutual assent of the parties which must be communicated by each party to the other party. (Donovan v. RRL Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 261, 270; Civ. Code, § 1565, subd. (3).) “Mutual assent is determined under an objective standard applied to the outward manifestations or expressions of the parties, i.e., the reasonable meaning of their words and acts, and not their unexpressed intentions or understandings.” (Serafin v. Balco Properties Ltd., LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 165, 173.)

Here, the complaint alleges Plaintiff’s lease of the vehicle was accompanied by an express warranty and that Plaintiff, thereafter, took the vehicle for service under the warranty. (Complaint ¶¶13-18.) As such, while Plaintiff may not have expressly consent to the arbitration provision, the conduct after leasing the vehicle demonstrates acceptance of the benefits and terms in the warranty. By alleging that Plaintiff took the vehicle in for repair pursuant to the warranty and thereafter suing to enforce the express warranty, Plaintiff has sufficiently manifested his assent to the terms of the arbitration provision.

Plaintiff’s citation to Norcia v. Samsung Telecomms. Am., LLC (9th Cir. 2017) 845 F.3d 1279) is unavailing. There, the Ninth Circuit found lack of mutual assent where the plaintiff purchased a Samsung phone that contained an arbitration provision embedded in a warranty brochure included in the phone box, finding that generally, silence or inaction does not constitute acceptance of an offer and that the contractual nature of the document was not apparent. (Id. at 1281-1290.) As noted above, Plaintiff has invoked benefits under the warranty as to the alleged repair attempts.

Further, the Court does not find that the facts of Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc. (9th Cir. 2014) 771 F.3d 559 align with the facts here for the same reason as above, where the plaintiff in Knutson received a “welcome kit” in connection with a trial subscription.

Moreover, the Court notes the doctrine of equitable estoppel which applies where “…a plaintiff brings a claim which relies on contract terms against a defendant, the plaintiff may be equitably estopped from repudiating the arbitration clause contained in that agreement. [Citations.] There is no reason why this doctrine should not be equally applicable to a nonsignatory plaintiff. When that plaintiff is suing on a contract—on the basis that, even though the plaintiff was not a party to the contract, the plaintiff is nonetheless entitled to recover for its breach, the plaintiff should be equitably estopped from repudiating the contract’s arbitration clause.” (JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1239-1240.) 

As such, the Court rejects the arguments regarding lack of mutual assent.

Authority and Analysis – Challenge to Agreement in its Entirety as Unenforceable

Here, Plaintiff has challenged the entire warranty and arbitration term as procedurally and substantively unconscionable but does not expressly argue procedural or substantive unconscionability related to the delegation clause.

The Court, therefore, interprets this challenge, under Rent-A-Center and Malone, above, a challenge “…directed to the agreement as a whole--even if it applies equally to the delegation clause--the delegation clause is severed out and enforced; thus, the arbitrator, not the court, will determine whether the agreement is enforceable.”

Therefore, the Court will sever out the delegation clause and enforce it.

As such, the Court grants the motion and compels issues of interpretation, applicability, enforceability, and formation to the arbitrator pursuant to the Agreement.

The Court further stays this matter pending the arbitrator’s rulings on these issues.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Rogers, Deborah vs. Bryson Cancer Care, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU325710

Date:           September 29, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion for Leave to Amend

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts

Plaintiff initially filed this matter September 12, 2025, alleging (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Fraud — Intentional Misrepresentation, (3) False Promise, (4) Negligent Misrepresentation, (5) Failure to Pay All Wages By the Appropriate Pay Period — Lab. Code §§ 204 & 210, (6) Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation — Lab. Code § 510 & 1194; WO 4-2001 §§ 3 & 4, (7) Failure to Reimburse Expenses Incurred as a Result of Performing Work Duties — Lab. Code § 2802 and WO 4-2001 § 9, (8) Failure to Compensate For all Hours Worked — Lab. Code §§ 200, 218.5, 226, 500, 510 558, 558.1, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, and 1198 et seq., (9) Failure to Provide Accurate Wage Statements — Labor Code § 226(a), (10) Discrimination in Violation of FEHA, (11) Retaliation in Violation of FEHA, (12) Work Environment Harassment in Violation of FEHA, (13) Failure to Prevent Harassment, Discrimination or Retaliation in Violation of FEHA, (14) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, (15) Unfair Business Practices - Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq., (16) Violation of Labor Code §1102.5 (Whistleblower Protection)

Plaintiff alleged these causes of action against Defendants Bryson Cancer Care, Inc., David Bryson and Daniel Lopez.

The Court notes that unlike the other causes of action which are pled expressly against “Does 1 through 50, inclusive,” the 14^th cause of action for IIED is alleged against “All Defendants” which is not a specifically defined term, though the Court notes here that paragraph 7 of the complaint states “All Defendants are hereafter collectively referred to as ‘Defendants’.”

Via this motion for leave to amend, Plaintiff seeks to add Theresa Bryson as a named Defendant and include her within the 14^th cause of action. Plaintiff brings this motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §§ 476 and 576, California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324 and cases cited herein.

The motion further notes that the complaint refers to Theresa Bryson as “Bryson’s wife” in various paragraphs.  

No opposition appears filed.

Authority and Analysis

Section 473, subdivision (a)(1) permits a "party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect" upon such terms as the court may deem just.”

However, "[w]hether an amendment to change the name of a party will be allowed depends on whether the mistake is merely a misnomer in the description of the partyor 'a substitution or change of parties.' [Citation.]" (Diliberti v. Stage Call Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1468, 1470.)

While no party cites to Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1984) 160 Cal. App. 3d 594, the Court finds its reasoning and discussion applicable to the central issue presented via this motion: the attempt to use section 473 to add a new party to the action.

In Kerr-McGee., the trial court “…appears to have attempted to act pursuant to section 473 under the supposition that plaintiffs made a mistake in the names which authorized the trial court to, in effect, substitute ‘Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation, doing business as Trona Medical Clinic’ as a defendant in place of Trona Medical Clinic.” (Id. at 597.)

The plaintiffs had initially named and served “Trona Medical Clinic” but no fictitious name allegations were made regarding it. (Id. at 597.) Further Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. had not been named initially as a defendant. (Id.)

Plaintiff, however, served Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp.’s agent for service of process with a copy of the summons and first amended complaint that named as defendants a hospital, several doctors, “Trona Medical Clinic” and Does 1 through 30, inclusive. (Id.)

Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. moved to quash service of summons and complaint, and plaintiffs filed an amendment under section 474 to their complaint alleging both that they had been ignorant of the true name of a defendant and that the true defendant was Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp., doing business as Trona Medical Clinic. (Id at 596-597.) The trial court denied the motion to quash, reasoning that Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. had been served on behalf of named Defendant Trona Medical Clinic and that under section 473 and in furtherance of justice, it could allow a party to amend the complaint, as "there was apparently some mistake made" by the plaintiffs. (Id.)

The appellate court noted the time within which the plaintiff could re-serve Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp as a Doe defendant expired pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 581a [now section 583.140, 583.210, et seq] as to service of the summons and complaint within three years after commencement of the action. (Id. at p. 597, fn. 2.) Therefore, the appellate court examined the trial court’s use of section 473 as to adding a new defendant.

However, the appellate court rejected the trial court's attempt to correct the “misnomer” under section 473, stating that, "before the court allowed Kerr-McGee to be substituted into the action pursuant to section 473 it was a stranger to the action. Clearly, the court's action was nothing less than permitting the addition of a new party to replace a named party defendant. The court's order permitting such substitution was not authorized by law." (Id. at 599.) The appellate court continued, stating "…to construe section 473 to allow the substitution in this case would be to convert that statute into a substantive authority to add an entirely new party to a proceeding after the statute of limitations has run, rather than to interpret it as it always has been interpreted, as a procedural statute to authorize correction of obvious and minor mistakes, such as in spelling of a defendant's name. As has been pointed out, it is important to maintain the distinction between correcting an honest error in the name of a correctly named party and joining a new party in the litigation for the first time under the guise of a claim of misnomer. [Citations.]" (Id. at 599-560, fn. 3.)

Section 473(a)(1) is appropriately used and which involves typographical or clerical errors, as opposed to additions of new parties:

“Cases interpreting this section clearly hold that section 473 does not authorize the addition of a party for the first time whom the plaintiff failed to name in the first instance. Thus, in commenting on the section, the court in Stephens v. Berry 249 Cal. App. 2d 474, 478, said: ‘Code of Civil Procedure section 473 permits amendment of a pleading by adding or striking out the name of a party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party. The cited cases furnish good examples of the scope of the statute where its authority is used to correct a mistake in the name of a party.’” (Id. at 598-599.)

The Kerr-McGee appellate court, provided examples such as correcting "Southern Pacific Railroad Company" to "Southern Pacific Company" from Thompson v. Southern Pacific Co. (1919) 180 Cal. 730 and correcting "Clio Mill and Mining Company" to "Clio Mining Company" from Nisbet v. Clio Mining Co. (1905) 2 Cal. App. 436, amongst others.

Here, the Court applies Kerr-McGee to deny this motion, without prejudice, under section 473. Although no issue of mistake as to a party name appears present here, the Court applies the interpretation of the interplay between sections 473 and 474 to deny this motion where new parties are sought to be added via leave to amend under section 473. The moving papers note the defendant sought to be added is a new party and therefore the amendment to the complaint goes beyond section 473’s application. Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Jasmin Megana Delgado, Jacquelin vs. Ruiz Food Products, Inc. et al

Case No.:   VCU320097

Date:           September 29, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Defendants Ruiz Food Products, Inc., and Ruiz Foods Exports, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion based on waiver.

Background Facts

In this class action matter filed April 4, 2025, Plaintiff sues Defendants Ruiz Food Products, Inc and Ruiz Foods Exports, Inc. for

1. Failure to Pay Minimum Wages [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197];

2. Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1194 and 1198];

3. Failure to Provide Meal Periods [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7, 512];

4. Failure to Authorize and Permit Rest Breaks [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7];

5. Failure to Indemnify Necessary Business Expenses [Cal. Lab. Code § 2802];

6. Failure to Timely Pay Final Wages at Termination [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201-203];

7. Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements [Cal. Lab. Code § 226];

8. Unfair Business Practices [Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.]; and

Additionally, Plaintiff amended the complaint to add a cause of action for 9. Civil Penalties Under PAGA [ Cal. Lab. Code § 2699, et seq.].

On November 13, 2025, this Court set this matter for a fifteen day jury trial November 30, 2026.

On August 8, 2026, Defendant Ruiz Food Products, Inc. (hereinafter “Defendant”) filed this motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s class claims, to compel the “individual” PAGA claim to arbitration and to stay the “representative” PAGA claim pending arbitration based on a purported agreement to arbitrate signed in handwriting by Plaintiff.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant has waived their right to move for arbitration based on its conduct in this litigation and that the Agreement, as a whole is unconscionable.

The Court notes here no party discusses the delegation clause contained in the Agreement.

Facts - Delegation Clause

The Arbitration Agreement before the Court states:

“Except as otherwise provided you and the Company agree that any legal dispute or controversy covered by this Agreement, or arising out of, relating to, or concerning the scope, validity, enforceability or breach of this Agreement, shall be resolved by final, and binding arbitration…”

Authority and Analysis – Delegation Clause

Malone v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1551 summarizes the applicable analysis with respect to delegation clauses:

“A delegation clause requires issues of interpretation and enforceability of an arbitration agreement to be resolved by the arbitrator. Delegation clauses have the potential to create problems of circularity. For example, suppose an arbitration agreement delegates the issue of enforceability to the arbitrator. If the arbitrator concludes that the arbitration agreement is, in fact, not enforceable, this would mean that the entire agreement, including the delegation clause, is unenforceable-a finding that would undermine the arbitrator's jurisdiction to make that finding in the first place. For this reason, courts have treated the delegation clause as a separate agreement to arbitrate solely the issues of enforceability…

“For this reason, when a party is claiming that an arbitration agreement is unenforceable, it is important to determine whether the party is making a specific challenge to the enforceability of the delegation clause or is simply arguing that the agreement as a whole is unenforceable. If the party's challenge is directed to the agreement as a whole--even if it applies equally to the delegation clause--the delegation clause is severed out and enforced; thus, the arbitrator, not the court, will determine whether the agreement is enforceable. In contrast, if the party is making a specific challenge to the delegation clause, the court must determine whether the delegation clause itself may be enforced (and can only delegate the general issue of enforceability to the arbitrator if it first determines the delegation clause is enforceable). (Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 70)”

Caremark, LLC v. Chickasaw Nation (9th Cir. 2022) 43 F.4th 1021, 1029-1030 notes:

“…the issues reserved to the courts for decision ‘always include’ whether an arbitration agreement was formed, even in the presence of a delegation clause. [citations omitted]. That principle follows from the fundamental premise that arbitration is "strictly 'a matter of consent.'" [citations omitted] ‘To take the question of contract formation away from the courts would essentially force parties into arbitration when the parties dispute whether they ever consented to arbitrate anything in the first place." [citations omitted]...Accordingly, a court ‘should order arbitration of a dispute only where the court is satisfied that neither the formation of the parties' arbitration agreement nor (absent a valid provision specifically committing such disputes to an arbitrator) its enforceability or applicability to the dispute is in issue.”

Here, the Court will first examine whether the delegation clause is effective as to delegating the waiver issue to the arbitrator. “There are two prerequisites for a delegation clause to be effective. First, the language of the clause must be clear and unmistakable. [citation omitted] Second, the delegation must not be revocable under state contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.” (Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 231, 242.)

Here, the delegation clause does not expressly call out waiver as an issue for the arbitrator to decide. Rather, it broadly seeks to delegate issues regarding “the scope, validity, enforceability or breach of this Agreement.” While, arguably, waiver could be included in this list as to enforceability of the Agreement, the Court notes “California statutory and decisional authority recognizes the issue of waiver by litigation conduct is ordinarily resolved by the trial court, not an arbitrator…. The trial court correctly ruled it, rather than an arbitrator, should decide the merits of the waiver by litigation conduct defense to arbitration asserted by plaintiffs.” (Hong v. CJ CGV America Holdings, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 240, 243.)

Here, absent a delegation clause that expressly delegates waiver or waiver by litigation to the arbitrator, the Court will adjudicate the issue of waiver prior to further discussion as to the delegation clause.

Facts – Waiver by Litigation

In support, Plaintiff indicates the filing of this lawsuit April 4, 2025 and service on Defendants April 10, 2025. (Declaration of Braud ¶¶5, 6.) Defendants answered May 12, 2025. (Declaration of Braud ¶7.)

Plaintiff, on June 7, 2025, filed and served the operative first amended complaint on Defendants. (Declaration of Braud ¶8.) Plaintiff notes that the 26^th affirmative defense in both the answer to the original complaint and operative answer to the amended complaint (filed August 8, 2026) mentioned arbitration. (Declaration of Braun ¶9.)

Plaintiff notes, however, that neither the July 30, 2025 nor the October 29, 2025 case management conference statements checked the box as to private arbitration of this matter. (Declaration of Braun ¶10.)

The Court notes that on November 13, 2025, at the final case management conference, the Court set a 15-day jury trial for November 30, 2026. As the parties know, that trial and other trial-related dates were continued last week, without prejudice as to the issues raised in this motion.

On July 7, 2025, Plaintiff served Defendants with discovery requests, including Requests for Production and Special Interrogatories. (Declaration of Braun ¶11.)

Defendants served objection-only responses on August 8, 2026, asserting the existence of the arbitration agreement, but Plaintiff notes no arbitration agreement was produced at that time. (Declaration of Braun ¶12.)

Plaintiff met and conferred as to the discovery responses and included a request for a copy of the purported agreement to arbitrate, which was eventually produced September 8, 2025. (Declaration of Braun ¶15.)

On September 9, 2025, Plaintiff’s Counsel requested any other documents signed concurrently with the purported agreement, which were eventually produced October 22, 2025. (Declaration of Braun ¶16.)

Plaintiff thereafter filed motions to compel further responses to the discovery. In the opposition to the motion to compel further responses to discovery, Defendants stated the following:

“Defendants agreed to supplement their responses to discovery, as it does not intend to enforce its arbitration agreement, and to mediate this matter. The existence of the arbitration agreement was the primary reason for objecting to this discovery. In turn, Plaintiff proposed withdrawing this Motion should responses be received and mediation be scheduled. Defendants expect that this will be completed in time to withdraw the present Motion. Nevertheless, as Defendants have agreed to amend discovery responses, Plaintiffs Motion is moot.” (Declaration of Braun ¶23 – Ex. 1.)

Thereafter, the Court sanctions against Defendants pursuant to the motions to compel further responses and Plaintiff indicates Defendants paid those sanctions. (Declaration of Braun ¶24.)

However, Defendants failed to provide further responses to discovery and on August 3, 2026, indicated they would not provide such further responses, would not mediate the matter and would instead file this motion to compel arbitration. (Declaration of Braun ¶26.)

Finally, Plaintiff notes it filed a motion for compliance as to the requests for production on August 5, 2026, set for November 17, 2026.

Authority and Analysis – Waiver by Litigation

“[I]n determining whether a party to an arbitration agreement has lost the right to arbitrate by litigating the dispute, a court should treat the arbitration agreement as it would any other contract, without applying any special rules based on a policy favoring arbitration.” (Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562, 583.) “To establish waiver under generally applicable contract law, the party opposing enforcement of a contractual agreement must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the waiving party knew of the contractual right and intentionally relinquished or abandoned it.” (Id. at 584.)

St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1196 notes:

“ ‘In determining waiver, a court can consider “(1) whether the party's actions are inconsistent with the right to arbitrate; (2) whether ‘the litigation machinery has been substantially invoked’ and the parties ‘were well into preparation of a lawsuit’ before the party notified the opposing party of an intent to arbitrate; (3) whether a party either requested arbitration enforcement close to the trial date or delayed for a long period before seeking a stay; (4) whether a defendant seeking arbitration filed a counterclaim without asking for a stay of the proceedings; (5) ‘whether important intervening steps [e.g., taking advantage of judicial discovery procedures not available in arbitration] had taken place’; and (6) whether the delay ‘affected, misled, or prejudiced’ the opposing party.” ’ ”

However, the Court notes that Quach, supra, 16 Cal. 5^th at 585, FN5 has eliminated the requirement of prejudice, noting that waiver is to be determined “based on the words and conduct of the waiving party.”

Defendant’s knowledge of the existence of the arbitration agreement appears undisputed. Defendant pled the existence of the document in both answers via affirmative defenses, served objections to discovery based on a purported agreement to arbitrate, and produced the purported agreement on October 22, 2025. The Court finds Defendant knew of its contractual right to arbitrate this matter.

The delay in filing this motion, alone, is insufficient as to clear and convincing evidence of intentional relinquishment or abandonment. (Khalatian v. Prime Time Shuttle, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 651, 663; But see Fleming Distribution Co. v. Younan (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 73, 84 [“[A] party's unreasonable delay in demanding or seeking arbitration, in and of itself, may constitute a waiver of a right to arbitrate.”])

The Court recognizes here the 16-month time period from service of the complaint to the filing of this motion to compel arbitration, noting the delay in Quach was 13 months. (Quach, supra, 16 Cal. 5^th at 586.) Further, the Court notes the filing of this motion approximately four months prior to trial and adjudication of the motion approximately two months prior to trial. (St. Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at 1196.)

Additionally, a defendant’s response to discovery propounded by a plaintiff is likewise insufficient evidence of intentional relinquishment or abandonment. The Court contrasts the defendant in Quach, supra, 16 Cal. 5^th at 586-587 where the defendant propounded three sets of written discovery, took the plaintiff’s deposition and requested jury trial prior to moving to compel.

However, the Court must also evaluate Defendant’s statements in opposition to the motion to compel further responses to requests for documents, which states, unequivocally, that:

“Defendants agreed to supplement their responses to discovery, as it does not intend to enforce its arbitration agreement, and to mediate this matter. The existence of the arbitration agreement was the primary reason for objecting to this discovery.” (emphasis added.)

“Its intentional relinquishment or abandonment of the right may be proved by evidence of words expressing an intent to relinquish the right or of conduct that is so inconsistent with an intent to enforce the contractual right as to lead a reasonable fact finder to conclude that the party had abandoned it.” (Quach, supra, 16 Cal. 5^th at 584.)

Defendant indicated an intention to mediate this matter. “Prior to November, [defendant] behaved as if it intended to litigate the case, engaging in negotiations over the joint stipulation and representing to the court that it intended to mediate. After November, [defendant] presented the joint stipulation to the court, and until March 2023, behaved as if it intended to proceed with mediation and to follow the court's order. This, too, was inconsistent with its claimed right to arbitrate.” (Campbell v. Sunshine Behavioral Health, LLC (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 419, 432.)

Here, Defendants indicated an intent to mediate via the case management conference statements as well as this response to a motion to compel further responses to discovery, which is inconsistent with its claimed right to arbitrate as in Campell.

Moreover, and directly within the definition of “words expressing an intent to relinquish the right,”  the statement that Defendant “does not intend to enforce its arbitration agreement” is an unequivocal,  intentional relinquishment or abandonment of its right to compel arbitration.

In addition, Defendant’s case management conference statements do request jury trial, which is exclusively inconsistent with arbitration.

Taking into account, therefore, the immediate knowledge of Defendant as to a right to compel arbitration (established by the answers filed in this case), the 16 month delay from service, the (limited) participation in discovery, the requests for jury trial, the agreement to mediate and the statement that Defendant that it “does not intend to enforce its arbitration agreement,” the Court finds sufficient clear and convincing evidence of waiver.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Darko, Joseph vs. Soberanis, Luis

Case No.:  VCU331710

Date:           September 29, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     OSC re: Change of Venue

Tentative Ruling: To transfer venue to Los Angeles County; to order Plaintiff to pay the costs of transfer as indicated herein.

Facts

The complaint in this matter alleges “personal injury” suffered by Plaintiff including mental and physical harm due to Defendants Luis Soberanis and Victoria Soberanis “lied on stand & under oath.”

The complaint states that this court is proper because injury to person or damage to personal property occurred in its jurisdictional area and “everything is on court camera, 221 S Mooney Blvd Tulare.”

At the case management conference, this Court set an order to show cause hearing as to change of venue set for this date.

On July 24, 2026, Plaintiff filed a “declaration/statement of venue” which states venue is proper pursuant to 28 USC § 1391 and further that:

“[] The incident took place in the county/local area.

[] Tulare Court has Evidence/Proof of Incident via Court Cameras,

[]Tulare Court Sheriff Sergeant acknowledged and told Plaintiff to claim self-defense. Following this, Watch commander of Tulare courthouse reviewed incident via video that occurred around Nov 10. exclaimed “it looks like Stanni Soberanis is after plaintiff's livelihood & you, ‘Joseph Darko’ are a victim of battery in assault.”

[] All Parties are residents of the State in which the district is located.”

Authority and Analysis

The Court notes first that 28 USC § 1391 has no application here as to venue.

Rather, the starting point for this case, filed in the Superior Court, County of Tulare, is Code of Civil Procedure section 395, which states, in relevant part:

“(a) Except as otherwise provided by law and subject to the power of the court to transfer actions or proceedings as provided in this title, the superior court in the county where the defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is the proper court for the trial of the action. If the action is for injury to person or personal property or for death from wrongful act or negligence, the superior court in either the county where the injury occurs or the injury causing death occurs or the county where the defendants, or some of them reside at the commencement of the action, is a proper court for the trial of the action…”

For venue purposes, actions are classified as local or transitory. To determine whether an action is local or transitory, the court looks to the 'main relief' sought. Where the main relief sought is personal, the action is transitory. Where the main relief relates to rights in real property, the action is local." (Cholakian & Associates v. Superior Court (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 361, 367-68.)

Here, this is a transitory action and while the Court notes “personal injury” is claimed in this matter, courts have narrowly construed personal injury for the purposes of venue as requiring physical injury. In Carruth v. Superior Court (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 215, 219, a case involving malicious prosecution, the court interpreted section 395’s use of the term “injury to person…” in section 395 to refer only to injuries of a physical or bodily nature and not to injuries to character or reputation.

Here, the complaint itself alleges injury due based on the allegation that Defendants “lied on stand & under oath” at the Visalia courthouse. By contrast, the declaration in support of venue states “Stanni Soberanis is after plaintiff's livelihood & you, ‘Joseph Darko’ are a victim of battery in assault.”

The complaint fails to allege personal injury within the meaning of section 395 as to “injury to person.” As such, venue is proper in “…the superior court in the county where the defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is the proper court for the trial of the action.”

Plaintiff’s declaration appears to indicate that Defendants reside in Palmdale and Bakersfield, neither of which are within Tulare County. The General Denial filed by Victori Soberanis lists a P.O. Box address in Bakersfield, but she was served at an address in Lancaster, in Los Angeles County. The Proof of Service filed by Plaintiff indicates Defendant Luis Soberanis was served at an address in Lancaster. Plaintiff also resides in Lancaster.

As such, the Court finds this action is not proper in Tulare County.

The Court, therefore, orders transfer to Los Angeles County. Plaintiff shall pay the cost of transfer (Code. Civ. Proc.  § 399(a) [“If the transfer is sought solely, or is ordered, because the action or proceeding was commenced in a court other than that designated as proper by this title, those costs and fees, including any expenses and attorney's fees awarded to the defendant pursuant to Section 396b, shall be paid by the plaintiff before the transfer is made.”])

Matter is ordered transferred to Los Angeles County. upon payment of the transfer fee in the sum of $50.00 payable to the Tulare County Superior Court and the submission of a separate check for the filing fee in the sum of $435.00 payable to Los Angeles Superior Court, within 30 days of the date of this ruling by Plaintiff, to the Clerk's Office at the Tulare County Superior Court. It appears the proper courthouse would be the North District - Michael D. Antonovich Antelope Valley Courthouse in Lancaster, though the Clerk of the Court in Los Angeles County can make that determination.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Pierson, Joe Ann vs. Classic Charter, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU277224

Date:           September 29, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts

In this class action, Plaintiff sues Defendant Classic Charter, Inc.

The caption alleges six causes of action for 1. Failure to Pay Minimum Wages; 2. Failure to Pay Overtime Wages; 3. Failure to Provide Meal Breaks; 4. Failure to Authorize or Permit Rest Breaks; 5. Failure to Provide Itemized Wage Statements; and 6. Unfair Competition.

However, the body of the complaint alleges five causes of action as follows:

1. Failure to Pay Minimum Wages;

2. Failure to Pay Overtime Wages;

3. Failure to Authorize or Permit Rest Breaks;

4. Failure to Provide Itemized Wage Statements; and

5. Unfair Competition.

The Court will refer to the causes of action as pled in the complaint as opposed to as pled in the caption.

Defendant sets forth that Plaintiff was deposed in this matter and indicated that she was aware that she had to be certified to drive interstate trips before she would be hired by Defendant. (Declaration of Broslovsky ¶5.)

On January 6, 2021, this Court entered a stay of this matter pending an appeal in the matter California ex rel. Becerra v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin. (9th Cir. 2026) 177 F.4th 1032.

On August 13, 2026, the stay was lifted in this matter because the decision in California ex rel. Becerra v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin was published June 6, 2026.

On September 2, 2026, Defendant filed this motion to dismiss this matter, in its entirety, based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

In support, Defendant notes that Plaintiff drove and was qualified to drive interstate trips for Defendant, that Defendant is subject to federal rules and regulations through the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (“FMCSA”). (Declaration of Riddington ¶¶4, 5, 6.) Defendant does not maintain a separate pool of intrastate of “California only” drivers. (Declaration of Riddington ¶9.)

As such, Defendant argues that all of its drivers are subject to federal hours of service and meal and rest break regulations, California law on these issues is preempted by federal law.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that there is no statutory motion to dismiss, that the time to demurrer as passed, that, if treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings no evidence can be examined, that if treated as a summary judgment motion with evidence, the statutory period for service has not been met, that a dismissal of a class action must follow the Rules of Court, and that subject matter jurisdiction via preemption is an affirmative defense. Further, that, in any event, the recent 9^th Circuit rulings would apply only, if at all, the third cause of action for meal and rest break violations.

Authority and Analysis

To start, the Court agrees that this motion, labeled as a “motion to dismiss” fails to set forth authority for the relief sought.

Defendant first cites to Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stites Prof. Law Corp. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1718 for the general definition of subject matter jurisdiction, but this issue was raised, in that case, on a motion to petition to confirm an arbitration award. Beyond the definition that “Lack of "jurisdiction" in its "strict sense" refers to a court's or other tribunal's power or authority over the subject matter of or the parties to a dispute,” Nat’l Fire has no application here.

Therefore, the Court starts by noting the motion states the complaint “fails to plead facts sufficient to state any claim for relief as the Complaint makes clear there is no subject matter jurisdiction.” A  “motion to dismiss” is based on a failure to state a cause of action must be based on the sufficiency of the allegations of a complaint. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is the legal equivalent of a general demurrer. (Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Board. of Education (1975) 51 Cal. App. 3d 1, 38.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

Here, however, as noted by Plaintiff, Defendant has answered the complaint.

While no demurrer, therefore, lies, the Court could treat the motion as one for judgment on the pleadings. However, like a demurrer, such an analysis is limited to the sufficiency of the complaint. A motion for judgment on the pleadings is used to challenge a pleading in the same manner as a general demurrer, i.e., the challenged pleading (1) establishes that the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction or (2) does not allege facts sufficient to support a cause of action or defense. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438(c)(1), see International Assn. of Firefighters v. City of San Jose (2011) 195 Cal.App.4^th 1179,1196; Bufil v. Dollar Financial Group (2008) 162 Cal.App.4^th 1193, 1202.)  Like a demurrer, the grounds for this motion must appear on the face of the pleading or be based on facts capable of judicial notice, including court records.  (See Bufil, at 1202; Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. Superior Court (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 978, 986, and fn. 6.) As noted above, Defendant attempts to introduce extrinsic evidence via the declaration of Riddington and citations to Plaintiff’s deposition that cannot be considered on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Next, as Plaintiff notes, while a motion for summary judgment or adjudication permits introduction of extrinsic evidence, such a motion is subject to strict notice (and other procedural) requirements not met here. (Code of Civil Procedure section 473c(a)(2).) As such, the Court cannot consider this a motion for summary judgment.

Likewise, California Rule of Court, rule 3.770, while noting Court approval is required for a dismissal, does not apply to situations here where the sufficiency of the complaint is challenged.

Subsection (a) states “(a) Court approval of dismissal A dismissal of an entire class action, or of any party or cause of action in a class action, requires court approval. The court may not grant a request to dismiss a class action if the court has entered judgment following final approval of a settlement. Requests for dismissal must be accompanied by a declaration setting forth the facts on which the party relies. The declaration must clearly state whether consideration, direct or indirect, is being given for the dismissal and must describe the consideration in detail.” Here, there is no declaration as the consideration issue. Further, subsection (c) notes “(c) Notice to class of dismissal If the court has certified the class, and notice of the pendency of the action has been provided to class members, notice of the dismissal must be given to the class in the manner specified by the court.” Here, no notice to the certified class has been provided.

As to the argument that preemption would serve as a basis for challenging the sufficiency of the pleading, the Court notes the following from Apollo Capital Fund, LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 226, 250-251, parallel citations omitted):

"[W]hile preemption 'can' be decided on demurrer in a proper case, the implication that it should be decided on demurrer is erroneous. There are numerous circumstances in which the facts must be determined in order to decide whether a claim is preempted by federal law, and it is not uncommon to have preemption claims decided based on an evidentiary showing. Indeed, preemption is an affirmative defense as to which defendants have the burden of proof. (See, e.g., Shepard v. Edward Mackay Enterprises, Inc. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1101 [party claiming a state law is preempted by federal legislation has the burden of demonstrating preemption; defendants met their burden of showing the transaction involved interstate commerce, so that the Federal Arbitration Act 'preempt[ed] contrary state law in this case'].)"

This, therefore, precludes the application of a preemption defense on a sufficiency of the pleadings challenge.

Second, the Court finds that the 2021 and 2026 9^th Circuit decisions, if the evidentiary basis for preemption is met, would apply only to the third cause of action for meal and rest break period violations.

The Court finds the decision in Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 2785 v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin. (9th Cir. 2021) 986 F.3d 841 assists in framing the background as to federal regulation and the impact of the 2026 decision noted above.

The 9^th Circuit in Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 2785 stated:

“The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), an agency within the Department of Transportation, is tasked with issuing regulations on commercial motor vehicle safety. The FMCSA also has authority to determine that state laws on commercial motor vehicle safety are preempted, based on criteria Congress has specified.” (Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 2785, supra, 986 F.3d at 845.)

Further that:

“Federal regulations impose limits on the driving time for commercial motor vehicle drivers. These are known as the hours-of-service regulations. Under federal law, a property-carrying commercial motor vehicle  driver "may not drive without first taking 10 consecutive hours off duty," 49 C.F.R. § 395.3(a)(1) (2018), and "may not drive after the end of the 14-consecutive-hour period without first taking 10 consecutive hours off duty," id. § 395.3(a)(2). Within that 14-hour period, a driver may only drive 11 hours. Id. § 395.3(a)(3)(i). Federal regulations also impose weekly driving limits. Id. § 395.3(b) (prohibiting a driver from being on duty for more than 60 or 70 hours in seven or eight consecutive days, respectively).

In 2011, the FMCSA revised the federal hours-of-service regulations and adopted the rules on breaks for truck drivers that form the basis for the FMCSA's 2018 decision to preempt California's MRB rules.” (Id. at 846-847.)

The Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 2785 decision further notes:

“In response to a petition from a group of motor carriers, the FMCSA in 2008 declined to preempt California's MRB rules as applied to commercial motor vehicle drivers subject to FMCSA's hours-of-service regulations.

…

In 2018, two industry groups, the American Trucking Association and the Specialized Carriers and Rigging Association, asked the FMCSA to revisit its 2008 "no preemption" determination. After seeking public comment on the preemption question, see California Meal and Rest Break Rules, 83 Fed. Reg. 50,142 (Oct. 4, 2018), the FMCSA declared California's MRB rules preempted as applied to operators of property-carrying motor vehicles subject to the federal hours-of-service regulations… The FMCSA determined that the MRB rules were in fact "on commercial motor vehicle safety" and could not be enforced under 49 U.S.C. § 31141(c). 83 Fed. Reg. 67,472-80.” (Id. at 848.)

The Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 2785 court thereafter noted the “FMCSA only has authority to review for preemption State laws and regulations ‘on commercial motor vehicle safety’” and “the FMCSA permissibly determined that California's MRB rules were State regulations "on commercial motor vehicle safety," so that they were within the agency's preemption authority. 49 U.S.C. § 31141(a).” (Id. at 849, 854.)

As such, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 2785 found the FMCSA to have properly determined and faithfully interpreted the meal and rest break rules (“MRB rules”) were "additional to or more stringent than" the federal regulations. (Id. at 856.)

Further, the court in Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 2785 found the FMSCA could preempt the MRB rules  as applied to drivers of property-carrying commercial vehicles because the State law (1) "has no safety benefit" (2) "is incompatible with the regulation prescribed by the Secretary," and (3) that "enforcement of the State law or regulation would cause an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce." (Id. at 856.)

The 9^th Circuit in California ex rel. Becerra v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin. (9th Cir. 2026) 177 F.4th 1032 found that a petition challenging the FMSCA’s preemption decision lacked merit as the prior decision in Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 2785 foreclosed the arguments that the FMCSA lacked authority to preempt the MRB rules and that the decision was arbitrary and capricious. (Id. at 1038.)

This Court’s review of these cases provides a sufficient basis for the Court to dismiss the third cause of action which seek remedies for violations of California’s MRB rules. Both Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 2785 and California ex rel. Becerra extensively discuss the FMCSA’s authority to preempt the MRB rules and that the MRB rules are preempted by federal law. Defendant has sufficiently demonstrated that Plaintiff and the proposed class of drivers are subject to federal regulations.

However, neither Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 2785 nor California ex rel. Becerra discuss California’s minimum wage laws, overtime laws or wage statement laws. Each cases focuses on the MRB rules. The motion does not provide a basis in either statute or caselaw that indicates to the Court that the first, second, fourth and fifth causes of action are preempted by either case or by a decision by the FMCSA.

Defendant’s motion states, for instance, “Consistent with its 2018 determination concerning property-carrying commercial motor vehicles, the agency held that California's MRB rules, as applied to drivers of passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicles subject to federal HOS regulations, were regulations “on commercial motor vehicle safety” subject to its review under section 31141. Id. at 3,472- 74.” (Motion 10:23-28.)

The Court’s research as to Labor Code section 1197 (as to the first cause of action), Labor Code section 510 (as to the second cause of action), Labor Code section 226(a) (as to the fourth cause of action) and Business and Professions Code section 17200 (fifth cause of action) and the FMCSA’s preemption determination does not lead to the conclusion that the entire action should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Court notes the District Court’s decision in Lindsey v. WC Logistics, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2022) 586 F. Supp. 3d 983, 90, as to removal and federal question jurisdiction, the following analysis of Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 2785:

“Nothing in the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Teamsters suggests, let alone holds, that the FMSCA completely preempts state law with regards to wage and hour rules. Teamsters applied an ordinary conflict preemption analysis to reach its conclusion that California's meal and rest break rules were preempted; such an analysis would have been wholly unnecessary if the FMSCA completely preempted state law. That § 31141(c)(2) expressly allowing state laws with "the same effect as" the federal regulations to be enforced demonstrates Congress did not intend to entirely displace state law causes of action. And as noted, the FMSCA does not provide for a federal cause of action that regulations purport to find complete preemption…” (emphasis in original.)

The Court finds California ex rel. Becerra to confirm the reasoning and decision in Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 2785 as limited to the MRB rules and the FMCSA’s determination of preemption.

Therefore, while subject matter jurisdiction and standing may be raised at any time, the Court does not find the complaint reveals, in and of itself, an issue as to subject matter jurisdiction or standing. Plaintiff pleads employment by Defendant and claims based on California’s Labor Code. Defendant appears to have the ability to raise a defense thereto as to at least one cause of action under the analysis above. Even applying the 9^th Circuit decisions to the sufficiency of the complaint, Plaintiff has alleged at least one cause of action under California law for which standing and subject matter jurisdiction appear established.

Therefore, the Court denies this motion to dismiss this entire class action.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Rodriguez, Areli Zalazar vs. Doordash, Inc et al

Case No.:   VCU324891

Date:           September 29, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion to Quash

Tentative Ruling: The filing on August 19, 2026 indicates this motion to quash has been withdrawn.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Randhawa, Parminder S vs. Singh, Jatinder

Case No.:    VCL336069

Date:            September 29, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside “Default” Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and vacate the judgment; to set trial at the hearing.

Facts

In this unlawful detainer matter, Plaintiff obtained an order permitting service of the summons and complaint via posting and mailing.

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed proofs of service indicating service had been complete via posting and mailing as to Defendant and all other occupants.

On July 23, 2026, Defendant answered the complaint. The Court notes Defendant is and was represented by counsel. 

On July 28, 2026, Plaintiff filed a request to set trial and served the UD-150 on both Defendant and Defendant’s counsel.

On July 30, 2026, this Court sent notice of the setting of trial for August 10, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 2 in Visalia.

On August 10, 2026, the Court noted Defendant and Defendant’s counsel were not present and judgment for Plaintiff for possession and cancellation of the rental agreement was entered.

On August 18, 2026, the Court heard Defendant’s ex parte motion to set aside the judgment, noted the lack of appearance from Plaintiff’s counsel and set this motion to set aside for September 29, 2026. The Court entered the order on this motion on August 26, 2026.

Defendant’s counsel, in support of the motion to set aside, states:

4. This default and default judgment was due my mine and my offices excusable neglect, mistake, inadvertence, and surprise.

5. This case was set for trial on Monday, August 10, 2026 at 8:30 am.

6. The notice for said trial was received around 5:15 pm on Friday, August 7, 2026 and not opened until the morning of Monday, August 10, 2026. 7. On August 7th, my staff was in a calendar meeting as they always are on Friday afternoons. The post office rang the bell to the office and the mail for that day was received at approximately 5:15 pm.

8. The office closes at 5:30 pm. So the person in charge of opening the mail decided to open the mail the following Monday.

9. Upon opening the mail on Monday morning, it was discovered that this case had been set for trial that same day at 8:30am

10. The mail was opened around 9:00 am.

11. My office is in Modesto, CA, approximately a two and half hour drive to Visalia.

12. I called the clerk's office that day and learned that Plaintiff had filed a UD-150 and that the Court had mailed the order setting trial in late July.

13. My office did not receive the UD-150.” (Declaration of Birring ¶¶4-13.)

Defendant seeks relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b) based on attorney fault.

No opposition appears filed.

Authority and Analysis

Generally, under California Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b), the court may grant discretionary relief to a party from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding that was entered against the party due to excusable mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect on the part of the party. (Id.)

However, also under California Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b), the court must grant relief when an attorney for the party seeking relief submits a sworn affidavit attesting that his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect caused the judgment to be entered against the party. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473(b); Martin Potts & Associates, Inc. v. Corsair, LLC (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 432, 438 [explaining difference between mandatory and discretionary relief under section 473, subd. (b)].)

As to this mandatory relief provision, Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b) states, in relevant part, the following:

“…Notwithstanding any other requirements of this section, the court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which will result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment or dismissal entered against his or her client, unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 473(b))

Here, the motion is timely as it is made within six months of entry of judgment.

“Relief is mandatory when a complying affidavit is filed, even if the attorney's neglect was inexcusable.” (SJP Limited Partnership v. City of Los Angeles (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 511, 516-517; Henderson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 215, 225.)

“‘The only limitation is when the court finds [that] the default [or dismissal] was not in fact the attorney's fault, for example when the attorney is simply covering up for the client…’ (Rogalski v. Nabers Cadillac (1992) 11 Cal. App. 4th 816, 821.)” (Todd v. Thrifty Corp. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 986, 991.)

Motions brought under section 473 involve “an assessment of credibility by the trial court.” (Behm v. Clear View Techs. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1, 15.) In Behm, the court upheld the trial court’s determination that an attorney’s affidavit of fault lacked credibility based on “contradictions and discrepancies” between the attorney’s affidavit and his “earlier representations to the court.” (Id.) This included “different excuses” than those that had been provided earlier in the litigation for the same conduct. (Id.) The court concluded that the attorney had “forfeited his credibility when in his subsequent affidavit, he attempted ‘to change the facts and blame himself.’” (Id. at 16.) Thus, the court had not erred in finding the affidavit “incredible” and denying mandatory relief under § 473(b). (Id.)

Here, the Court does not find a lack of credibility stemming from the lack of receipt of the UD-150, though served on both Defendant and Defendant’s counsel and the approximately 8 days between mailing of the notice of trial setting and receipt of the notice on Friday, August 7, 2026. The Court finds a sufficient explanation as to the opening of the mail, for the first time, on Monday, August 10, 2026, the same date as the trial.

As such, the Court will grant the motion and vacate the judgment. The Court intends to set trial promptly in this matter at the hearing. The Court would also like to discuss with counsel how they plan to proceed considering the mutual stay away order signed by the parties in case VCU 337586 on August 19, 2026. A tenancy appears impractical given the agreement between the parties to stay 100 yards away from each other.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 In the Matter of Sark Davidian Jr Living Trust

Case No.:    VPR053525

Date:            September 29, 2026

Time:            8:30 A.M. 

Dept.            2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:      Petitioner’s Motion for New Trial

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Background Facts

On July 10, 2025, Sarkis Davidian III (“Davidian”) then in pro per, filed this petition to determine the validity of trust, to impose constructive trust and to award punitive damages and damages for elder abuse.

On August 25, 2025, Angelina Ogata, Successor Trustee of the Sark Davidian, Jr. Living Trust dated February 4, 2009 ("Ogata") filed an Objection to Petition to Determine Validity of Trust Amendment, denying all of Davidian's allegations, setting forth her own allegations and asserting affirmative defenses and (b) a Petition for Order Confirming Trust Assets and Determination of Additional Liability Under Probate Code Section 859, seeking a determination that the Fourth Amendment was valid and in full force and effect, an order compelling Davidian to vacate the subject property and a judicial determination that Davidian's unlawful breaking and entering, squatting and refusal to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property were wrongful, entitling her to damages equal to twice the value of the subject property and attorneys' fees pursuant to Probate Code Section 859.

On October 27, 2025 Davidian also filed an ex parte Petition to Suspend Trustee, Compel Accounting, and for Equitable Relief.

After continuances, Trial commenced on July 6, 2026, and lasted three days.

The Court’s judgment found that on February 4, 2009, Decedent established The Sark Davidian, Jr. Living Trust dated February 4, 2009 (“the original Trust”). Further, that multiple amendments were made, including that on November 20, 2017, Decedent exercised his right to amend the original Trust, as amended and restated, by executing the Fourth Amendment to The Sark Davidian, Jr. Living Trust dated February 4, 2009 (“Fourth Amendment”)

Further, the original amendments thereto were prepared by and executed in the presence of Decedent’s longtime estate planning attorney, James Peloian, who also notarized Decedent’s signature with respect to the original Trust and all amendments.

Additionally, that Decedent also executed other documents relating to his estate plan on November 20, 2017, all of which were prepared by Mr. Peloian, including but not limited to: (1) the Will of Sark Davidian, Jr.; (2) Advance Health Care Directive; and (3) a Power of Attorney Regarding Property.

The Court further found, after trial, that Decedent’s execution of the Fourth Amendment and related estate planning documents on November 20, 2017, was not brought about by the exercise of undue influence by Ogata or any other person. That Decedent was not vulnerable or susceptible to undue influence in November 2017.  Ogata did not have any authority over Decedent in November 2017. The evidence at trial indicated she was not even aware of the amendment when it was signed.  Ogata did not employ any actions or tactics as described in Welfare and Institutions Code Section 5610.70(a) (3). Further, that the result brought about by the Fourth Amendment was not inequitable.  The Court further noted Davidian bore the burden of proof with respect to his undue influence claim and because Davidian did not establish that Ogata had a confidential relationship with Decedent, or that Ogata actively participated in procuring the instrument and that Ogata unduly benefitted under the instrument, that burden never shifted to Ogata.

Further, Decedent was not prevented from making a fifth amendment due to undue influence by Ogata or any other person and no evidence was presented that Ogata, or any other person, in violation of Welfare and Institutions Code Section 15610.70, somehow prevented Decedent from making a further amendment.  Davidian attempted to prove his father was isolated and unable to call his lawyer, but more credible evidence showed that Ms. Ogata purchased and paid for phones for his use.

Further, that Decedent was not subjected to financial elder abuse by Ogata or any other person with respect to the Fourth Amendment, his failure to exercise a fifth amendment, his and Ogata’s purchase of real property, or any other transaction. The trial evidence portrayed him as a strong-willed somewhat opinionated man who was fully capable of making his own decisions until he had a final stroke in 2024. The most compelling evidence here was from his friend and attorney Mr. Peloian who drafted and was present when all the estate planning documents we executed.

Additionally, the Court found that on May 11, 2024, Davidian disclaimed any beneficial interest he might have had in the original Trust, as amended and restated, by way of Davidian’s execution of a Declaration of Disclaimer of Inheritance (“Disclaimer”), which he subsequently delivered to Ogata. The Court found the attempt on June 17, 2025, several months after Decedent’s death, to revoke the Disclaimer ineffective.

Last, the Court found Ogata was not entitled to damages or fees pursuant to Probate Code Section 859 due to Davidians’s wrongful taking of possession of 13109 Avenue 384, in Cutler, California 93615 (APN: 050-010-057), a trust asset. He had to be evicted and locked out but the trust eventually regained possession.

As such, the Court denied Davidian’s Petition to Determine the Validity of Purported Trust Amendment and to Impose Constructive Trust; and to Award Damages for Elder Abuse and Punitive Damages and Ex Parte Petition to Suspend Trustee, Compel Accounting, and for Equitable Relief were denied in their entirety.

Further, that the original Trust, as amended and restated by each amendment, including the Fourth Amendment, is valid, that Ogata is the duly appointed and validity acting Trustee, that the 13109 Avenue 384, Cutler, California 93615 (APN 050-010-057) real property is an asset of the Trust, and that the estate should be distributed according to the Fourth Amendment.

Further, the Court found the no-contest clause valid and enforceable, and that Davidian, via the filing of the petitions in this matter which lacked substantial factual or legal justification, violated the no-contest clause.

Thereafter, the parties stipulated that the date of entry of judgment was July 21, 2026, that notice of entry of judgment was served July 22, 2026.

On August 6, 2026, Davidian filed a notice of intention to move for new trial or further trial as to the following grounds:

Irregularity in the proceedings, orders, and adverse-party conduct; abuse of discretion (Code Civ. Proc., § 657(1))

Accident or surprise that ordinary prudence could not have guarded against (Code Civ. Proc., § 657(3)).

Newly discovered material evidence (Code Civ. Proc., § 657(4)).

Inadequate damages and relief (Code Civ. Proc., § 657(5))

Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision, and decision against law (Code Civ. Proc., § 657(6))

Errors in law occurring at trial and preserved in the record (Code Civ. Proc., § 657(7)).

On August 28, 2026, Davidian filed the motion for new trial on these same statutory grounds.

Ogata has filed an opposition to the motion, as discussed herein.

Authority and Analysis

“A motion for new trial is a creature of statute; . . .” (Neal v. Montgomery Elevator Co. (1992) 7 Cal. App. 4th 1194, 1198.)

A motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, who is vested with the authority to disbelieve witnesses, reweigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences that may differ from those made by the trier of fact. (Gordon v. Strawther Enterprises, Inc. (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 504.) The only relevant limitation on the court's discretion to grant a new trial based on excessive damages or insufficiency of evidence is that the trial court must state its reasons for granting the new trial, and there must be substantial evidence in the record to support those reasons. (Sandoval v. Qualcomm Inc. (2018) 239 Cal.Rptr.3d 269.) A new trial is authorized only if irregularity or misconduct has materially affected the substantial rights of the moving party, meaning that the error must be prejudicial. (TRC Operating Co., Inc. v. Chevron USA, Inc. (2024) 322 Cal.Rptr.3d 353.)

Irregularity in the proceedings, orders, and adverse-party conduct; abuse of discretion (Code Civ. Proc., § 657(1))

The irregularity must be so prejudicial that it deprived the moving party of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial. (Russell v. Dopp (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 765, 780; Carnes v. Superior Court (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 688, 694.) Misconduct may constitute an "irregularity in the proceedings of the court" that may warrant a new trial, but only if it is reasonably probable that the party moving for a new trial would have obtained a more favorable result absent the misconduct. (Garcia v. ConMed Corp. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 144, 148-149.)

Here, Davidian first identifies the following events in support of irregularity:

(1) Angelina Ogata's failure to produce responsive documents at her June 12 deposition despite the limited discovery authorized by the Court;

(2) the June 16, 2026 order mistakenly added to the case by the court hours after Davidian contacted Department 2 in an effort to acquire an Ex Parte hearing date for a motion to compel production of previously requested documents from Ms. Ogata included in the deposition notice,

(3) followed by the court attributing the error to Mr. Davidian as an intentional effort to deceive the Court stating that the actions were “condemnable” despite that being completely false;

(4) the Court's subsequent placement of the probate tentative ruling concerning that Motion to Compel in the civil tentative-ruling location, which prevented Mr. Davidian from discovering and challenging the ruling before the 4:00 p.m. deadline and depriving him of oral argument which would have clarified any confusion and allowed the motion to be properly adjudicated.

On August 27, 2025, the Court set both matters for trial on February 2, 2026.

Based on the February 2, 2026 trial date, the last day for regular discovery to be completed was January 5, 2026, such that the last day to hand-serve written discovery requests was December 6, 2025. The other discovery deadlines were as follows: (a) the last day for regular discovery motions to be heard was January 20, 2026; (b) the last day to conduct expert discovery was January 20, 2026; and ( c) the last day for expert discovery motions to be heard was January 23, 2026.

On May 13, 2026 Ogata filed an ex parte application as to a motion to compel Davidian’s deposition. Thereafter, on May 14, 2026 Davidian filed an ex parte application to continue the trial along with orders to “[e]xtend or reopen discovery” for the following “limited” purposes:  (1) “depositions not yet completed”; (2) “production/inspection of original trust/amendment instruments and directly related authentication materials, notary-journal issues to the extent lawfully obtainable, any necessary document-examiner work”; and (3) “discovery motions arising from those limited subjects.” 

This Court, at the hearing on both applications on May 15, 2026, announced orders (1) that discovery was to remain closed, aside from depositions of both parties and Davidian III’s expert witness, James Tarver (related to analysis of the challenged estate planning documents); (2) that any depositions were to be completed by June 15, 2026; and (3) that trial would be reset for July 6, 2026.

Thereafter, Davidian and Ogata agreed that deposition of Ogata would take place on June 12, 2026, which occurred. However, no “responsive documents” (that is documents that were requested as part of the deposition notice) were produced. However, the Court notes here that on April 23, 2026, Ogata served objections to the various categories of documents demanded in the initial deposition notice. Additionally, the Court notes that on June 11, 2026, Davidian served an “updated” notice demanding categories of documents similar to the prior deposition notice but substantially more expansive in scope. (Davidian’s updated notice included 98 discrete requests (compared to 47 in the prior request), and, unlike the prior notice, included demands for “phone records,” “Google takeout data,” and “location data.)

Thereafter, Davidian, on June 16, 2026, submitted a proposed order, signed by this Court, that purported to continue trial to July 6, 2026, as well as ordering:

“Discovery is extended/reopened for the following purposes: (a) depositions of Applicant and Respondent/Trustee not yet completed; (b) production or inspection of original trust instruments/amendments and directly related authentication materials; (c) notary-journal or notarization-related records directly tied to the disputed trust amendment(s), pursued through proper legal procedure; (d) related document-examiner or expert inspection/report work; and (e) discovery motions arising from those subjects.”

Further,  Davidian moved ex parte to compel Ogata “to produce documents that should have been available for her continued deposition on June 12, 2026, requiring a privilege/withholding log for any documents not produced, and permitting a brief continued deposition after production.”  references “the Court’s June 16, 2026 order reopening … limited discovery” as a basis for his document demands

The Court, at Ogata’s request, vacated the June 16, 2026 order submitted by Davidian because the order did not conform to the orders announced by this court at the May 15, 2026 ex parte hearings. 

The Court reaffirmed that except as to those discovery matters specifically permitted at the May 15, 2026, hearing, the discovery cutoff for non-expert discovery was 30 days before February 2, 2026, and the discovery cutoff for expert discovery was 15 days before February 2, 2026. 

The Court finds, therefore, there was no failure by Ogata to produce documents at the June 12, 2026 deposition, as the document requests fell outside the Court’s order on May 15, 2026. Davidian had sufficient time, prior to discovery cut off, to set depositions, request documents and otherwise obtain discovery in this matter. Regardless of the circumstances surrounding the June 16, 2026 order, no further discovery, outside of depositions, was permitted.

Moreover, even if documents could have been requested via the deposition notice, the Court’s prior orders precluded any such motion to compel documents beyond the deadlines tied to the initial trial date.

Additionally, Davidian served a notice to attend trial and produce documents, which promoted Ogata to produce documents on June 25, 2025.

Moreover, despite any purported irregularity as to the posting of tentative ruling concerning Davidian’s motion to compel, the Court, at the hearing, described the tentative ruling and asked if either party wished to be heard. Both sides offered arguments, after which the Court adopted the ruling as described above.

Next, Davidian appears to argue irregularity (and error in law) as to the final judgment being signed prior to the expiration of the objection period pursuant to Rule of Court, rule 3.1590(j), which affords a party 10 days to serve and file objections to a proposed judgment.

Here, Ogata electronically served the judgment July 9, 2026, and the Court entered judgment July 21, 2026. However, Ogata raised no objection during that time period and now argues the “the no-contest standard and disclaimer scope were legally wrong.”

However, the Court finds, as it did at trial, the contentions raised by Davidian in the Petitions to be without evidentiary support at trial as to a reasonable basis to believe the contentions at the time of the filing of the petitions and therefore without probable cause under the definition set forth in Probate Code section 21311(b). The Court, after three days of trial, found Davidian failed to produce or present evidence as to both the propriety of filing and maintaining this action, properly applying the standards under the Probate Code.

As to the disclaimer, the Court finds compliance with Probate Code section 278 and therefore enforced the disclaimer based on its plain language. The Court notes that the attempt by Davidian to revoke the disclaimer only after the death of Decedent substantiates, in part, the validity of the disclaimer. The Court finds sufficient evidence as to the compliance with Probate Codes section 280(a)(2) and that the disclaimer waived Davidian’s interest in assets of the Trust.

The Court, therefore, denies the motion under this ground.

Accident or surprise that ordinary prudence could not have guarded against (Code Civ. Proc., § 657(3)) and newly discovered material evidence (Code Civ. Proc., § 657(4)).

Here, Davidian argues “The June 25 PDF and pretrial anomaly analysis were available before trial, although too late and too difficult for this self-represented litigant to use effectively.”

However, Davidian had ample opportunity to retain counsel in this matter, having two lawyers prior to trial and his own inability to “use effectively” the documents relevant to this litigation do not support accident or surprise. “…[M]ere self-representation is not a ground for exceptionally lenient treatment. Except when a particular rule provides otherwise, the rules of civil procedure must apply equally to  parties represented by counsel and those who forgo attorney representation….  A doctrine generally requiring or permitting exceptional treatment of parties who represent themselves would lead to a quagmire in the trial courts, and would be unfair to the other parties to litigation.”
(Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.)

Further, Davidian, via the lack of discovery propounded in this case, cannot establish sufficient reasonable diligence that he could not have discovered this evidence prior to the trial. “The trial court may grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence if the moving party shows the evidence is newly discovered, reasonable diligence was used to find it, and the new evidence is material to the moving party's case” (Santillan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Fresno (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 708, 727-728.) Davidian argues he was prevented from using a handwriting expert, but this expert was never offered or mentioned at trial by Davidian. The Court continued the matter, allowing Mr. Tarver to be deposed, but no deposition transcript was offered, either.

The Court, therefore, denies the motion under this argument.

Inadequate damages and relief (Code Civ. Proc., § 657(5))

The motion states “Section 657(5) was designated in the notice, but it is not pressed as a standalone basis on the present record because the judgment did not quantify an inadequate damages award in Davidian's favor.”

The Court, therefore, denies the motion under this argument. This appears to be the only reference to subsection (5) and the memorandum admits it was designated in the notice but does not provide an avenue to grant this motion.

Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision, and decision against law (Code Civ. Proc., § 657(6))

“Denial of a motion for new trial on grounds that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict will be reversed only in those rare instances when as a matter of law, there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict.” (People v. Vallez (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 46, 57.)

Here, as detailed in the Court’s ruling, the Court finds substantial evidence via Davidian’s lack of carrying Davidian’s own burden of proof as to the allegations of the Petitions and elements of the claims made therein. In twelve years of hearing contested probate proceedings, the Court has rarely, if ever, heard a challenge of this nature backed by so little evidentiary support. Given this dearth of relevant evidence, it is unsurprising that experienced probate counsel would be reluctant to take this case to trial on behalf of Davidian.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion on this ground.

Errors in law occurring at trial and preserved in the record (Code Civ. Proc., § 657(7)).

Davidian appears to use this ground as to the discovery issues discussed above, the Court’s interpretation of the disclaimer and no contest standard, and “lost objection” period, for which Davidian lodged no objection.

The Court, therefore, denies the motion under this ground.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding - Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared September 30, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054258	In the Matter of Plascencia, Mario	Spousal Property Hearing	Appearance Required	Petition Item 9:  the relationship of a party to decedent is omitted
VPR054269	In the Matter of Siagan, Santos B	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054268	In the Matter of Lee, Betty Lou	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053960	In the Matter of The Diane M. Flores Living Trust	Petition Hearing	Appearance Required	Continued hearing for status of property and attorney fees
VPR053324	In the Matter of Williams, Ruth	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Supplemental documents in order
VPR052922	In the Matter of Soto, Victor Jr	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	There is no entitlement of statutory fees and costs from the estate as the value of the estate accounted for is zero, Prob C § 10810.  Compensation may be sought with a fee agreement with Personal Representative
VPR054143	In the Matter of Gonsalez Zuniga, Valeria	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Screening Form and Declaration on Medical Ability to Attend Hearing incomplete. Notice of Hearing and Citation not filed
VPR054193	In the Matter of Coates, Claudia M	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing not served on all relatives within the second degree; Orientation not completed
VPR054156	In the Matter of Nadler, Caleb D.	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054080	In the Matter of Subejano, Psalm Ramos	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing and Citation not filed
VPR054066	In the Matter of Hurtado Chavez, Jesus Alejandro	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054072	In the Matter of Gamez, Fatima	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing not served on all relatives within the second degree; Citation not filed

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         Probate calendar for September 24, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR052024	In the Matter of Cannon, Preston Lloyd	Petition Hearing	Recommended for Approval	Documents in order
PPR052972	In the Matter of Mora, Erick Geovanni	Appoint Conservator	Appearance required	Orientation not completed by proposed successor conservators. Screening Forms incomplete for both proposed successor conservators.
PPR053556	In the Matter of Quintero, Leonides	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance required	Notice of Petition to Administer Estate (DE-121)  needs to be served all persons listed in the Will. Petition Item 8: Names of all persons mentioned in decedent’s Will.
PPR053975	In the Matter of Lopez, Ronald	Contested Hearing - Probate	Appearance required	No court filings since the 8/13/26 conference.
PPR054179	In the Matter of Lara, Paul Sr	Letters of Administration	Recommended for Approval	Documents in order
PPR054182	In the Matter of Olvera Reyes, Jose Adalberto	Letters of Administration	Appearance required	#3.e –  heirs at law are not all adults. Guardian Ad Litem must sign for a minor to waive bond on behalf of the minor. #2.d(2) re BOND setting is too low. NEEDS to be filed - Notice of Hearing—Decedent's Estate or Trust (DE-120)
PPR054202	In the Matter of Bjorkman, Douglas	Letters of Administration	Appearance required	There have been no filings to correct previous issues since last hearing. Numerous filings are required.
PPR054254	In the Matter of Siterlet, Lorraine M	Letters of Administration		Conditional Approval
PPR054283	In the Matter of Orr, James Olin	Petition Hearing	Recommended for Approval	Documents in order

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

GUARDIANSHIP CASES

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared AS STATED BELOW that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
9/24/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR054006	In the Matter of R.F.	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment and Notice of Hearing were personally on PARENTS, and served by mail on GRANDPARENTS, pursuant to Probate Code §1511 DOJ Background Record Check needs to be completed by household member Petition for Appointment ATTACHMENT GC-210(CA) is incomplete – no relatives are listed at #2
9/24/26 8:30 AM	Department 19	PPR053989	In the Matter of M.M.	Co-Petitioner has not yet submitted to DOJ Background record check
9/24/2026 8:30	Department 09	VPR054297	In the Matter of A.G.W.	Submit proof of parent’s D.O.D. the Notice of Hearing and TEMP Appointment Petition, are required to be personally served on parents with 5 court days notice, pursuant to Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3).
9/24/2026 8:30	Department 01	VPR054294	In the Matter of Cardenas Medina, Angel Abdiel	DOJ Background Record Check needs to be completed by household member
9/24/2026 8:30	Department 09	VPR054293	In the Matter of B.U.T.	Notice of Hearing needs to be filed indicating MOTHER & GUARDIAN were personally served with a copy of the Petition for Appointment of Temporary Guardian, with 5 court days notice required according to Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3).
9/24/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054277	In the Matter of Ayon, Osiris Malakai	No issues to address for this hearing