Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Monday, June 15, 2026, are:

Re:              Putnam, Robert I. vs. Putnam, Robert A.

Case No.:    VCU324889

Date:           June 15, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:       Motion to Enter Judgment Pursuant to Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and enter judgment in the amount of $43,399.38.

Facts

In this breach of contract and financial elder abuse matter, Plaintiff filed a notice of conditional settlement on December 12, 2025.

On February 25, 2026, this matter was dismissed without prejudice and with the Court retaining jurisdiction pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Defendants were to pay Plaintiff the sum of $75,000.00 due on or before December 31, 2025, interest was to accrue at ten percent (10%) per annum after January 5, 2026.

In January 2026, counsel for Plaintiff received two (2) checks for a combined total of $35,000.00 towards the settlement. However, no payment has since been made.

Additionally, the Settlement Agreement, states:

"Both parties do hereby agree to bear their own attorney's fees and costs associated with Tulare County Superior Court, Case No. VCU324889 and the preparation of this Agreement. However, in any action or proceeding between the parties hereto concerning this Agreement, or the rights and duties of any party in relation thereto, the party prevailing shall be entitled, in addition to such other relief as may be granted, to recover from the losing party its reasonable attorney's fees and costs in such action or proceeding, or any other separate action brought for that purpose."

Therefore, Plaintiff seeks entry of judgment in the amount of $40,000.00, with interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum after January 5, 2026, plus attorney's fees in the amount of $4,287.50, and costs of $126.60.

Plaintiff has filed a memorandum of costs as well as itemized billing records reflecting 13.25 hours incurred at rates of $350 to $175 and 2 anticipated hours.

In opposition, Defendant indicates efforts to obtain the funds to pay the settlement, does not dispute that interest has accrued at 10% since January 5, 2026, argues that the attorneys’ fees and costs are excessive and states “Here, the terms of the Settlement Agreement did not state that the $75,000.00 had to be paid within a certain timeframe. Further, the terms of the Settlement Agreement did not state that the full amount had to be paid by January 5, 2026.” (Opposition 4:26-28.)

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states:

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1360) The mandatory requirements for application of Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6: (1) the request for the trial court to retain jurisdiction has been made during the pendency of the case; (2) by the parties themselves, and (3) in a writing signed by the parties expressly, clearly, and unambiguously requesting the court retain jurisdiction under this statute. (Mesa RHF Partners, LP. v. City of Lost Angeles (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 913, 917.)

It appears undisputed that the Court has retained jurisdiction and that the parties have entered into a valid, binding settlement agreement.

Section 664.6 permits the Court to enter a judgment in strict conformance with the terms of a settlement agreement.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 664.6(a) [“the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”]  Further, “if the court determines that the parties entered into an enforceable settlement, it should grant the motion and enter a formal judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”  (Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182.)

Further, the Court need not find a breach of the settlement agreement to enter judgment thereon, as disputes as to breach or compliance with the settlement agreement “…are not relevant to the entry of judgment pursuant to section 664.6.” (Machado v. Myers (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 779, 795 citing Hines, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at 1185 [ “a party moving for the entry of judgment pursuant to a settlement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 need not establish a breach of contract to support relief under the statute”].)

As such, the Court will enter judgment, as to the principal amount of $40,000, consisting of the stipulated sum of $75,000 less $35,000 credit for payments made, plus costs, attorneys’ fees and interest, as noted below.  

Costs and Attorneys’ Fees

As noted above, Plaintiff has filed a memorandum of costs seeking $126.60 in costs. Defendants challenge the $22.20 fee for electronic filing and the additional $44.40 fee.

The starting point is the verified Memorandum of Costs and Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. “[T]he verified Memorandum is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses and services therein listed were necessarily incurred” and the burden rests with the party seeking to tax costs to show they were improper, unreasonable or unnecessary. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 855-856.)

Allowable costs under section 1033.5 must be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation, and must be reasonable in amount.  An item not specifically allowable under Section 1033.5(a) nor prohibited under subdivision (b) may nevertheless be recoverable in the discretion of the court if they meet the above requirements (i.e., reasonably necessary and reasonable in amount). 

If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-774.)  On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs.  (Id.)  Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary to the litigation presents a question of fact for the trial court and its decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  (Id.)   

Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5(a)(14) permits recovery of fees for electronic filing or service only “if a court requires or orders electronic filing or service of documents” and that Tulare County does not mandate electronic filing or service. Therefore, the Court views 1033.5(a)(14) as precluding recovery for these types of costs when not required or ordered by this Court. The Court does not view these costs as valid on their face given the prohibition under section 1033.5(a)(14) because 1033.5(c)(4) states “(4) Items not mentioned in this section and items assessed upon application may be allowed or denied in the court’s discretion.” Here, the item of electronic filing and service is mentioned in this section under (a)(14).

Therefore, the Court will strike the $22.50 in electronic filing.

As to the $44.40, it is entered under Item 14 “Fees for electronic filing or service of documents through an electronic filing service provider (enter here if required or ordered by the court).” The Court is unaware of any order or mandatory requirement as to electronic filing and therefore strikes this amount as well.    

As to the attorneys’ fees, the Court finds the rates proposed comparable to the standard rates in this County.  However, the Court will reduce the hours as to enforcement of the stipulation as a judgment. The Court will reduce the “PT” entries, at a rate of $175 per hour, to 3 hours total and the “ER” entries, at a rate of $350 per hour, to 3 hours total.

As such, the Court will award $1,575 in fees and $60 in costs.

Interest

Plaintiff seeks interest at a rate of 10% per annum from January 5, 2026. The Court calculates a daily interest amount of $10.96 and therefore, as of the date of this hearing, the Court calculates interest in the amount of $1,764.38.

Conclusion

Therefore, the Court is prepared to enter judgment in the amount of $43,399.38, consisting of $75,000 of the principal balance plus $1,575 in fees and $60 in costs, plus $1,764.38 in interest, less $35,000 in credits for payments made.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              Mariner Finance, LLC vs. Castro, Arturo R

Case No.:    VCL329651

Date:           June 15, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:       Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 11 admitted.

Facts

On or about February 5, 2026, Plaintiff served by mail Requests for Admissions, Set One on Defendant. The discovery was mailed to the address on Defendant’s answer. As of the date of the filing of this motion, no response has been received by Plaintiff. Plaintiff now seeks to deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 11 admitted.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. Here, Defendant has failed to serve a timely response and Plaintiff has moved for an order to deem the admissions admitted.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion. The facts and allegations alleged in Requests for Admissions Nos. 1 through 11 of Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Admission shall be deemed admitted.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              Wolf, Sterling vs. College of the Sequoias

Case No.:    VCU324539

Date:           June 15, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:       Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Tentative Ruling:  To grant the District’s motion.

This is a California Public Records Act (CPRA) action. 

Sterling Wolf initiated the action with a petition seeking to compel College of the Sequoias Community College District (District) to produce further records in response to prior record requests.  Wolf’s original petition was filed August 12, 2025. 

Three days later, on August 15, 2025, Wolf received a further response from the District regarding his requests.  In a “Notice of Supplemental Facts and Amendments” filed on September 2, 2025, Wolf advised of his receipt of the District’s August 12th response.  Wolf described the response as having provided “certain documents” but also as having “postpone[d] production” of others.  Wolf did not indicate that the District’s response was otherwise incomplete. 

Wolf later filed, on November 6, 2025, an amended petition for writ of mandate, which is the current version of his operative opening pleading.  Wolf no longer, according to his prayers for relief in the first amended petition, seeks to compel disclosure of records.  Wolf’s amended petition, instead, seeks a writ “declaring that [the District] violated their statutory duties under Gov. Code §§ 7922.535 (timely response) and 7922,600 (duty to assist)”; and an injunctive order directing “[the District] to adopt or implement reasonable measures to ensure future compliance with deadlines and duties under the [CPRA].”

The District moves for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that Wolf’s action, as framed by the amended petition, is moot.  The District contends Wolf’s action is moot because he effectively concedes having received all records in response to his requests.

Wolf’s amended petition indicates some records remained outstanding, though again of note, Wolf did not pray for a writ directing any further production.  IN any event, in Wolf’s opposition to the motion, he appears to concede the District has, as of now, fully produced all documents he requested.  Wolf criticizes that the District’s “August 15 letter did not complete production of [a category of records he requested on June 11, 2025]” and that the District “instead made a belated determination and staged production … later completed on September 10, 2025,” but he does not assert that the District’s production, inclusive of the September 10th production, was incomplete. 

Wolf, nevertheless, contends: “The First Amended Petition alleges continuing and justiciable CPRA controversies, including multiple accrued violations of Gov. Code sections § 7922.535 and § 7922.600, prolonged nonresponse, and delayed staged disclosures continuing after litigation commenced. The Petition further alleges an unresolved catalyst dispute concerning whether this litigation substantially prompted Respondent’s eventual disclosures, as well as continuing disputes concerning Respondent’s CPRA obligations into the future. Eventual production alone does not necessarily establish full statutory compliance under the CPRA. Effective relief can remain available concerning the aforementioned unresolved controversies.”

Wolf’s arguments are difficult to follow, but his chief contention appears to be that there is a continuing controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of Wolf and the District, as pertaining to Wolf’s “ongoing need to submit materially similar CPRA requests to [the District].”

As to Wolf’s “ongoing need to submit materially similar CPRA requests,” Wolf explains that “[t]he First Amended Petition states that [Wolf’s] records requests are connected to an ongoing software and analytical project involving the collection and evaluation of public-agency information, including patterns of institutional transparency and administrative responsiveness. (1st Am. Pet., 10; Exh. A.) Exhibit A further explains that the requested records are sought for broader research purposes and are to be incorporated into … [an] information system for public viewing [as part of some project or entity Wolf references as ‘Existential’]. In that context, declaratory relief could still have practical effect by clarifying the parties’ rights and obligations in future CPRA interactions involving similar requests. This is relevant here because [the District’s] asserted positions, at times appearing contradictory, create ongoing disputes regarding its CPRA obligations, and those disputes have ‘some likelihood of affecting future requests for public records or future conduct relating to such requests.’ (City of Gilroy v. Superior Court (2026) 19 Cal.5th 38,__ [slip opn., p. 2].)”

In City of Gilroy v. Superior Court (2026) 19 Cal.5th 38 [340 Cal.Rptr.3d 711, 581 P.3d 1138] (Gilroy), cited by Wolf, the Supreme Court held “that the CPRA authorizes declaratory relief that a public agency has violated its provisions even in some circumstances when it is uncontested that there are no existing nonexempt records to disclose.”  (Id., at p. 63.)   The Supreme explained:  “Without attempting to delineate all circumstances in which declaratory relief may be available under the CPRA, we conclude that, at a minimum, declaratory relief is appropriate in situations in which an agency is reasonably likely to repeat past conduct that allegedly violates the CPRA in response to future records requests.”  (Id., at p. 54.)

In Gilroy, a plaintiff nonprofit had served a series of public records requests on the City of Gilroy referencing enforcement actions by the Gilroy Police Department.  (Id., at p. 46.)  The City took the position, in response to each of the requests, that certain categories of records sought by the nonprofit were exempt from disclosure.  (Id., at p. 47.)  Eventually, though, the City produced some of the previously withheld records, while also representing “it had no other responsive, nonexempt records to disclose” and that certain responsive material (bodycam footage taken before a certain date) “had been destroyed pursuant to the City’s records retention policy.” (Id., at p. 48.)  The nonprofit subsequently commenced suit in which it sought both to compel the City to produce the withheld records and “a declaration of ‘the rights of the parties, including [nonprofit’s] right to proper responses to its CPRA requests that compl[ied] with the time limits and rules for extensions set forth in the CPRA and that at the time of [the nonprofit’s] request, [that] [the City of] Gilroy [had] failed to produce responsive records that existed at the time and were subsequently destroyed.’ ” (Id., at pp. 48-49.)

The Supreme Court reversed a Court of Appeal’s determination that the trial court had erred in granting declaratory relief because it had not also ordered production of records, and no additional responsive, nonexempt records could be produced.  (Id., at p. 71; see id., at p. 49.)  The Supreme Court concluded that some of the underlying trial court’s judicial declarations “addressed contested issues regarding the City’s handling of records requests that were sufficiently likely to recur,” and that “declaratory relief [was] appropriate in these circumstances to help guide the parties’ future conduct and inform their rights and responsibilities under the CPRA.”  (Id., at p. 54.)

Contrary to Wolf’s apparent assertions, the court does not find that Wolf’s “ongoing software and analytical project involving the collection and evaluation of public-agency information,” notwithstanding the complained of trouble Wolf encountered in securing responsive records from the District, presents an analogous situation in which declaratory relief is warranted because “an agency is reasonably likely to repeat past conduct that allegedly violates the CPRA in response to future records requests.”  Wolf encountered no assertions of disclosure exemptions in his records request endeavor with the District akin to the positions the City asserted in Gilroy.  Instead, Wolf encountered, at best, undue delay followed by eventual complete response and production.  There are no continuing controversies presented by this factual background, as presented, that would call for anything beyond a proclamation of what the CPRA already and clearly provides with respect to an agency’s obligations to respond to records requests under the CPRA.  Wolf’s “software and analytical project” presents no unique considerations and is merely a description of his particular claimed need for records.  “[E]very person,” however, “has a right to inspect any public record, except as otherwise provided [under the CPRA]” (Gov. Code, § 7922.525, subd. (a)), irrespective of the purposes for which they desire to inspect such records. 

Accordingly, the court agrees with the District that Wolf’s petition is moot, or, more accurately, that declaratory relief is not warranted under the circumstances as presented in the amended petition.  And, while it is usually not appropriate to test the merits of a declaratory relief action at the pleading stage “because the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration of rights even if it is adverse to the plaintiff's interest’ [citation]” (Qualified Patients Assn. v. City of Anaheim (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 734, 751 [115 Cal.Rptr.3d 89]), where a complaint for declaratory relief concerns a disputed question of law, a decision properly may be made on a motion for judgment on the pleadings (see Wilson v. Board of Retirement of Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Asso. (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 195, 201 [319 P.2d 426]; see also Wilson v. Civil Service Com. (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 340, 344).

Here, no disputed question of fact is presented concerning Wolf’s request for declaratory relief.  Wolf’s petition presents solely a legal question of whether the circumstances of his engagement in “an ongoing software and analytical project” occasion the need for a judicial declaration of rights under the CPRA given the past difficulty Wolf encountered in obtaining records from the District.  The court can, and does, answer that question here:  It does not.  Accordingly, the District’s motion is granted and judgment shall be entered for the District.

The court’s determination here does not purport to, in any way, determine the prevailing party for the purposes of Government Code section 7923.115, or Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (b).  The court notes that, “In [CPRA] litigation, the plaintiff may be a prevailing party even though the court did not enter judgment in his or her favor.”  (Sukumar v. City of San Diego (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 451, 463 [221 Cal.Rptr.3d 418].)  The determination of the prevailing party in CPRA litigation turns on the question of whether the plaintiff’s lawsuit “spurred defendant to act or was a catalyst speeding defendant's response.” (Ibid., citing Belth v. Garamendi (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 896, 901 [283 Cal.Rptr. 829], internal quotation marks omitted.)

The court notes Wolf, as a self-represented party, may not be awarded attorney’s fees (see Musaelian v. Adams (2009) 45 Cal.4th 512, 517-520 [87 Cal.Rptr.3d 475, 198 P.3d 560]; Argaman v. Ratan (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1176-1181 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 917]); Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 285-292 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 902 P.2d 259]; Jacobson v. Simmons Real Estate (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1290-1294 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 699]), and though he might still otherwise be entitled to costs if he were determined the prevailing party, it happens that in this case Wolf was granted fee waivers for his costs. 

But, on the other side of this, if the District were determined to be the prevailing party, and if it were determined that Wolf’s case was “clearly frivolous,” the court would be required to “award court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees” to the District (§ 7923.115, subd. (b)).  Additionally, per Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (b), “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding,” and under that section, the District would be entitled to its costs if it were determined to be the prevailing party. 

Again, however, the court does not reach a prevailing party determination here. 

 If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              Valley First Credit Union vs. Saesee, Ekeo

Case No.:    VCL330207

Date:           June 15, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:       Plaintiff’s Motions to Deem Admissions Admitted as to (1) Defendant Saesee and (2) Defendant Leutakoun

Tentative Ruling: (1) and (2) To grant the motions and deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 8 admitted.

Facts Common to (1) and (2)

On or about February 20, 2026, Plaintiff served by mail Requests for Admissions, Set One on Defendants Saesee and Leutakoun. The discovery was mailed to the address on Defendants’ joint answer. As of the date of the filing of this motion, no responses have been received by Plaintiff.

Plaintiff now seeks to deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 8 admitted as to each Defendant.

(1) and (2) - Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted.

Here, Defendants Saesee and Leutakoun have failed to serve a timely response and Plaintiff has moved for an order to deem the admissions admitted as to each Defendant.  

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motions. The facts and allegations alleged in Requests for Admissions Nos. 1 through 8 of Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Admission shall be deemed admitted as to each Defendant.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              County of Tulare vs. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc.

Case No.:     VCL332725

Date:           June 15, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:       Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Summary Judgment on Bond Forfeiture is Denied.

Facts

This matter involves the posting of a bond by an agent of Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc., for the release of Diana Helen Peel in felony case no. VCF467791.

On August 13, 2025, Peel was placed on Supervised Own Recognizance and to remain free on bail. Peel was ordered to appear in court on September 10, 2025, at 8:30 am and failed to appear at that time.

On September 10, 2025, the trial court forfeited the bond and terminated Supervised Own Recognizance. The trial court sent notice of forfeiture to the defendant. The Clerk’s Certificate of Service by Mail indicates the clerk sent the notice to:

BAIL HOTLINE BAIL BONDS 3230 VINE ST STE 200, RIVERSIDE, CA 92507

FINANCIAL CASUALTY & SURETY, INC. 3131 EASTSIDE ST STE 250, HOUSTON, TX 77098

On March 26, 2026, the trial court mailed a notice of entry of summary judgment to the defendants at the following addresses:

BAIL HOTLINE BAIL BONDS 3230 VINE ST STE 200, RIVERSIDE, CA 92507

FINANCIAL CASUALTY & SURETY, INC. 3131 EASTSIDE ST STE 250, HOUSTON, TX 77098

On April 22, 2026, the defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Summary Judgement.

The Plaintiff filed their response on June 2, 2026.

Authority and Analysis

There Was Service of the Order Forfeiting Bail

Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 1013a, subd. (4) states,

In case of service by the clerk of a court of record, a certificate by that clerk setting forth the exact title of the document served and filed in the cause, showing the name of the clerk and the name of the court of which he or she is the clerk, and that he or she is not a party to the cause, and showing the date and place of deposit in the mail, the name and address of the person served as shown on the envelope, and also showing that the envelope was sealed and deposited in the mail with the postage thereon fully prepaid. This form of proof is sufficient for service of process in which the clerk or deputy clerk signing the certificate places the document for collection and mailing on the date shown thereon, so as to cause it to be mailed in an envelope so sealed and so addressed on that date following standard court practices. Service made pursuant to this paragraph, upon motion of a party served and a finding of good cause by the court, shall be deemed to have occurred on the date of postage cancellation or postage meter imprint as shown on the envelope if that date is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailing contained in the certificate.

Here, a deputy clerk of the California State Superior Court, County of Tulare certified on September 11, 2025, that she mailed the Notice of Order Forfeiting Bail. Specifically, the Clerk’s Certificate of Service by Mail states:

I certify that I am not a party to this cause.

I certify that I placed the Notice of Order Forfeiting Bail for collection and mailing on the date shown, so as to cause it to be mailed in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid on that date following standard court practices to the persons and addresses shown. The mailing and this certification occurred at Visalia, California on September 11, 2025.

The Notice Was Presumed Received Pursuant to Evid. Code § 641

“A letter correctly addressed and properly mailed is presumed to have been received in the ordinary course of mail.” (Evid. Code § 641.)

Here, the Notice of Order Forfeiting Bail was correctly addressed to Bail Hotline Bail Bonds and Financial Casualty and Surety, Inc., at the addresses listed on the bond pursuant to Pen. Code § 1305, subd. (b) and properly mailed by the clerk.

Consequently, the Notice of Order Forfeiting Bail was presumed to have been received in the ordinary course of mail.

The Presumption Created By Evid. Code § 641 Was Properly Rebutted Pursuant to Evid. Code § 604

Evid. Code § 604 states,

The effect of a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence is to require the trier of fact to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence, in which case the trier of fact shall determine the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact from the evidence and without regard to the presumption. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the drawing of any inference that may be appropriate.

In Bonzer v. City of Huntington Park (1993) 20 Cal. App. 4th 1474, 1476, the Court reversed the trial court’s denial of the City’s Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 473 motion. There, Bonzer filed a petition for a writ of mandate and properly served the respondents. (Id. at 1477.) Bonzer then filed a “Notice of Motion and Motion to Apply for Preemptory Writ of Mandate” and served it by mail. (Id.) On the date of the hearing, none of the respondents appeared and the trial court granted the motion. (Id.) The City then filed a Civ. Pro. Code § 473 motion. (Id.) In support of the City’s motion, it provided six declarations declaring that none of the defendants received the mailed notice of the motion. (Id. at 1479.) The trial court denied the motion and the City appealed. (Id. at 1477.)

The Court reversed the trial court’s decision reasoning, “[u]pon presentation of appellant’s detailed, credible, and unimpeached evidence of no actual notice –the presumption of such notice ceased to exist. The only remaining effect of the ‘Proof of Service’ declaration was to enable the trial court to draw ‘any inference that may be appropriate.’” (Id. at 1481.) The Court also noted that besides the proof of service, the six declarations declaring that there was no actual notice, “was neither impeached or contradicted.” (Id. at 1480.)

Here, Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc., put forth a declaration from Christopher Ramos, an employee of Bail Hotline Bail Bonds. He declared that he is the one who handles the bond forfeitures received by the trial court.

He further declared that when a notice of forfeiture is received, it is inputted into their system and processes them to assign a fugitive recovery agent to start the investigation process. If the investigator is unable to locate the defendant within the 180-day period, a motion to extend time is filed.

After receiving the notice of summary judgment from the trial court, he checked their records and verified that the Bail Hotline did not receive the forfeiture notice and did not have a notice of forfeiture on file. Consequently, the process laid out above did not take place.

Christopher Ramos’ declaration is detailed and credible evidence that no actual notice took place. Due to there being no impeachment evidence presented by the county, the presumption of actual notice created by Evid. Code § 641 ceased to exist.

However, unlike in Bonzer, where the Court only could draw a mere inference from the proof of service declaration made pursuant to Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 1013a, subd. (3) because it did not attest to actually mailing the notices or to having personal knowledge they were mailed, the court clerk did attest that she placed the Notice of Order Forfeiting Bail for collection and mailing on the date shown, so as to cause it to be mailed in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid on that date following standard court practices to the persons and addresses shown.

Weighing the inference of actual notice drawn from the court clerk’s declaration pursuant to Evid. Code § 604 against Christopher Ramos’ declaration, the Court finds that there was actual notice because if the Notice of Bail Forfeiture was deposited in the mail, it was sent. If it was sent, then it should have been delivered or received back by the court as undeliverable.

The Court cannot surmise why Bail Hotline Bail Bonds did not process it pursuant to its normal course of business. However, it was delivered.

Between both copies being sent to two different addresses, one of them must have received it.

Further, Christopher Ramos’ declaration does not demonstrate a specific reason they would not have received actual notice. For example, it does not state that the clerk sent the notice to the wrong address, the post office removed their mailbox, the post office prevented them from accessing their P.O. box, etc. Instead, the Court is expected to accept that the post office must have lost the notice without any evidence to support this contention and that Bail Hotline Bail Bonds always follows their mail intake procedure with no error. In the alternative, the Court would have to believe the court clerk did not actually mail the notice, which is improbable. 

The Court also notes that the Notice of Entry of Summary Judgment was sent to the exact same addresses that the Notice of Forfeiture was sent to. There is no explanation as to why Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. received the notice of summary judgment but not the notice of forfeiture.

As to the County points out, the declaration of Adrian Auilera, an employee of Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. declared that Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc.’s address is located at 2500 City West Blvd. Suite 1150, Houston, Texas. The address the notices were mailed to was 3131 EASTSIDE ST STE 250 HOUSTON, TX 77098. There is no explanation for the difference of address, much less that the Court was notified of an address change.

Lastly, Peel’s being released on Supervised Own Recognizance Release (SORR) in addition to posting bail has no bearing on the analysis. Ultimately, pursuant to In re Humphrey (2018) 19 Cal. App. 5th 1006, the trial court was expected to impose the least restrictive means to address their concerns regarding the safety of the community, continued criminal activity, and assurance that the defendant will return to court. A review of the case file indicates that the trial court must have had concerns that Peel would continue to harass the victim and placed her on SORR. The Court also was concerned about continued drug use and ordered her to be drug tested by probation. The continuation of bail was to assure her continued appearance at court. SORR and the continuation of bail addressed two separate concerns of the court and were permissible.

Consequently, the Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Summary Judgment on Bond Forfeiture is denied.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              Mackey, Michael vs. Imperial Ambulance, Inc.

Case No.:    VCU324455

Date:           June 15, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:       Kaweah’s Demurrer to Amended Complaint

Tentative Ruling: To overrule the demurrer; to order Defendant Kaweah to answer the complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

Facts

In the operative amended complaint, Plaintiff sues, amongst others, “Kaweah Delta Healthcare District, a California corporation” for medical negligence and negligence arising out of an incident on or about August 9, 2024.

Plaintiff alleges “Plaintiff was a patient at Defendants’ facility and was being transferred from an ambulance to a wheelchair by Defendants’ employee. As Defendants’ employee transferred Plaintiff, they improperly performed the transfer and dropped Plaintiff into the wheelchair and/or to the ground.” (FAC ¶12.)

As to claim presentation, Plaintiff alleges:

“KAWEAH DELTA HEALTH CARE DISTRICT and DOES 1 through 25, were served with a claim for damages pursuant to Government Code Section 911.2 on or about February 7, 2025 and has not been rejected by an agent for Defendants. Pursuant to KAWEAH DELTA HEALTH CARE DISTRICT’S bylaws, its principal place of business is located at 400 W Mineral King Ave., Visalia, CA 93291, which is the location that the claim was sent to. The claim was delivered and accepted on February 10, 2025. Plaintiff has complied with the claims statute or has substantially complied with the claims statute.” (FAC ¶9.)

Defendant Kaweah demurrers to the amended complaint as to failure to comply with the presentation requirements and no exception exists to excuse Plaintiff therefrom.

Defendant attaches the following in support of its demurrer:

“4. Attached hereto as "Exhibit B" and fully incorporated herein by this reference, is a true and correct copy of the February 7, 2025, letter which was sent from Plaintiffs counsel to Kaweah Delta Health Care District, Attn: Risk Management.

5. Attached hereto as "Exhibit C" and fully incorporated herein by this reference, is a true and correct copy of the August 5, 2025, letter which was sent from Plaintiffs counsel to ‘Kaweah Delta Hospital.’”

Further, Defendant seeks judicial notice of Kaweah’s Certificate of Filing with the State of California Secretary of State

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the certified claim was sent to the address noted as the principal place of business in the District’s bylaws, in satisfaction of the claim requirements.

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

Here, Defendant does not seek judicial notice of Exhibit B, nor could the Court take judicial notice thereof, as to the alleged claim sent February 7, 2025 to Kaweah. As such, the Court lacks a basis to consider the contents thereof in support of Kaweah’s arguments.

Government Code section 911.2 requires that a claim be presented to the relevant public entity not more than six months after the accrual of the cause of action. (Govt. Code, § 911.2.) Presentation of such a claim is a condition precedent to filing a suit against the public entity and is, therefore, an element of a cause of action which the plaintiff must prove. (DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 990; Govt. Code, § 945.4.) Failure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim-presentation requirement subjects a complaint to demurrer for failure to state a cause of action (State of California v. Superior Court (Bodde) (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1237, 1243.)

Here, however, the four corners of the complaint allege compliance with the claim statute, on a date within 6 months of the incident date.

The Court, on demurrer and lacking judicial notice, cannot evaluate the contents of the alleged claim as to the requirements under section 910 or delivery under 915(a).

Further, the argument set out by Kaweah, requiring evidentiary support as to the sufficiency of the delivery, recipient and the contents of the alleged claim, appears better suited for summary judgment (Hernandez v. City of Stockton (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1222, 1226; Connelly v. County of Fresno (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 29, 34.)

Compliance with the presentation requirement must be stated in the complaint. (Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School Dist. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 27, 31 [holding “In those circumstances in which a claim must be presented, the plaintiff must allege compliance or circumstances excusing compliance, or the complaint is subject to general demurrer.”].) Here, such general compliance has been met.

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer. Defendant Kaweah shall have ten (10) days to file an answer to the amended complaint.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              Urena, Javier vs. Bane, Alisha

Case No.:    VCU317137

Date:           June 15, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:       Defendant’s Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion as moot. Plaintiff filed a notice of settlement on April 13, 2026.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              Perez, Sabrina Veronica vs. Gomez, Jennifer

Case No.:    VCL296115

Date:           June 15, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:       Plaintiff’s Motions for (1) Sanctions; (2) Continue Settlement Conference; and (3) Compel Responses to Interrogatories

Tentative Ruling: To dismiss this matter

Facts and Analysis

On May 11, 2026, this Court deemed Plaintiff a vexatious litigant and, following an evidentiary hearing, entered an order requiring Plaintiff to post an undertaking in the amount of $25,000 within 30 days in order to proceed with this action and to enter a prefiling order under section 391.7 requiring approval of the Presiding Judge from filing any new litigation.

“If an order to furnish security is issued, the action is automatically stayed from the time the motion was filed until 10 days after the plaintiff posts the required security.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 391.6.) Therefore, this action was stayed pending the posting of the security or expiration of the 30 day period in which to post the security.

The thirty-day period expired June 10, 2026. No security has been posted.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 391.4 “When security that has been ordered furnished is not furnished as ordered, the litigation shall be dismissed as to the defendant for whose benefit it was ordered furnished.”

As such, the Court dismisses this matter as to the remaining Defendants Brogan, Pacheco, and Frausto.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared June 15, 2026 and June 17, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR050740	In the Matter of Flores, Rachel	Confirm Sale Real Property	Appearance Required	Appearance required pursuant to CRC, rule 7.452
VPR053647	In the Matter of Maria Mjia	Petition for Small Estate Set-Aside	Recommended for Approval
VPR052840	In the Matter of Racca, Christine Kent	Final Distribution Hearing	Recommended for Approval	Supplement document in order
VPR052773	In the Matter of Perez, Eusebio Elizarraraz	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053443	In the Matter of Lewis, Orville Dale	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR050199	In the Matter of Boykin, Thelma	OSC Hearing	Appearance Required	Continued hearing for missing accounting: The filed document does not comply with CRC, rule 7.575 for Accounting and Objection filed
VPR054101	In the Matter of Gundy, Gregory Dale	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Recommended for Approval
VPR045184	In the Matter of Chole Davis Special Needs Trust	Accounting Hearing	Recommended for Approval
VPR052768	In the Matter of Denham, Elsie	Status Conference	Appearance Required	Status of related case
VPR053673	In the Matter of Monty, Devon Robert	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Citation not filed. Petitioner’s Screening Form, Item 16 omitted.
VPR053900	In the Matter of Flowers, Karlen M.	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Capacity Declaration, Notice of Hearing and Citation not filed. Attachment Requesting Special Orders Regarding a Major Neurocognitive Disorder (form GC-313) not attached to petition.
VPR044298	In the Matter of Mesa, Alexander	Hearing: Transfer of Jurisdiction	Appearance Required	Review transfer of venue to Fresno County
VPR047970	In the Matter of Pineda, Francisco Javier Amaya	OSC Hearing	Appearance Required	Missing Accounting and Notice of Death

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                           There is no probate calendar for June 11, 2026 and June 18, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430.
 

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments

South County Justice Center & Visalia-County Civic Center

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared  June 15 – 18, 2026 that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date	Dept	Case	Comments
6/15/26	Dept 9	VPR049175; IMO R.V.	Appears in order
6/15/26	Dept 9	VPR048099; IMO A.M.	Service at issue
6/16/26	Dept 9	VPR054126; IMO A.F.C.	Service at issue
6/17/26	Dept 9	VPR053708; IMO R.N.
6/17/26, 1:30 PM	Dept 15	PPR054155; IMO J.C.H.	MATTER APPEARS TO BE IN ORDER
6/18/26	Dept 2	VPR053780; IMO C.G.	Proof of attendance of guardianship orientation needs to be filed.
6/18/26	Dept 9	VPR050092; IMO N.J.Z.K.