Tentative Rulings

Civil Tentative Rulings and Probate Examiner Recommendations are available below. All attempts possible are made to have the information on these pages updated by 3:00pm the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.

Civil Tentative Rulings: The court does not issue tentative rulings on Writs of Attachment, Writs of Possession, Claims of Exemption, Claims of Right to Possession, Motions to Tax Costs After Trial, Motions for New Trial, or Motions to Continue Trial. Under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308 and Local Rule 701, any party opposed to the tentative ruling must notify the court and other parties by 4:00 p.m. today of their intention to appear for oral argument. The court's notice must be made by facsimile (fax) to 559-733-6774; by email to research_attorney@tulare.courts.ca.gov; or by telephoning (559) 730-5010.

Probate Examiner Recommendations: For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at 559-730-5000 ext #1430. The Probate Calendar Clerk may be reached at 559-730-5000 Option 4, then Option 6. Note: The court does not issue probate examiner recommendations on petitions for approval of compromise of claim.

Civil Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, May 5, 2026, are:

Re: Lal, Chaman vs. Singh, Avtar

Case No.: VCU321658

Date: May 5, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: Continued Review Hearing re: Appraisal Value

Tentative Ruling: The Court previously granted Plaintiff’s motion to appoint an appraiser, appointed Jake Hower and held a hearing as to the appraisal value of the property at issue. Jake Howser agreed to appraise the property at 770-778 E. Date Avenue, Porterville CA (The Multi-Family Property). At his suggestion, Rachel Enger agreed to appraise the Property at 814. E. Date Avenue, Porterville, CA (The Gas Station Property).

The Court continued the prior hearing to this date. On April 27, 2026, plaintiff lodged a copy of the appraisals with the court and filed a notice of election to purchase defendant’s interest in the Multi-Family Property at the appraised value. On April 29^th defendant dismissed the partition cause of action in their cross complaint. The Court will inquire as to the intent of the parties as to the Gas Station Property at the hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re: Delayo, Raymond vs. Perfection Pet Foods, LLC

Case No.: VCU308280

Date: May 5, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; Plaintiff will be in propria persona until new counsel is substituted into this matter.

Facts

On March 9, 2026, Plaintiff’s Counsel Erica Stepanian of Lawyers for Justice, PC filed a motion to be relieved as counsel as to Plaintiff Raymond Delayo. Plaintiff’s Counsel filed the following with respect to withdrawing:

(1) MC-051 - Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as Counsel;

(2) MC-052 – Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel; and

(3) MC-053 - Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel

Additionally, Plaintiff’s Counsel has filed proofs of service of these documents by electronic mail, including service on Plaintiff’s purported new counsel, Kruger Law Firm.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 284 provides that “[t]he attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at any time before or after judgment of final determination, as follows: 1. Upon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes; [or] 2. Upon the order of the court, upon the application of either client or attorney, after notice from one to the other.”

California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) requires that the “notice of motion and motion to be relieved as counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) must be directed to the client and must be made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-051).”

As noted above, counsel has complied with California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) by submitting the notice and motion on MC-051 and by directing the notice and motion to Plaintiff.

California Rule of Court 3.1362 (c) further mandates that: “The motion to be relieved as counsel must be accompanied by a declaration on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel--Civil (form MC-052). The declaration must state in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1). Specifically, the declaration that Rule 3.1362(c) requires must state that the moving attorney attempted to secure a “Substitution of Attorney” from the client as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1) and that the client refused to so stipulate.

Here, the declaration is properly made on form MC-052 and uses general terms without compromising confidentiality. It appears from the proof of service that this motion was served on Plaintiff’s purported new counsel, Kruger Law Firm. As it appears Plaintiff has, at least, contacted new counsel, the Court will find compliance with the attempt to substitute requirement.

Next, service under Rule 3.1362(d) requires personal service, electronic service, or mail and counsel’s declaration must note the service made. Here, service was by mail and electronic mail on March 9, 2026. The declaration of counsel indicates that Plaintiff’s address was confirmed as current via request to send correspondence to new counsel.

Finally, Rule 3.1362(e) requires the proposed order be lodged with the Court on MC-053 with the moving papers, specifying all hearing dates scheduled, including date of trial. Plaintiff’s Counsel has complied with this requirement.

Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw as to Plaintiff. If no one requests oral argument, the Court is prepared to sign the order entitled “Order Granting Attorney’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel - Civil” that the moving party lodged with the Court.

The Court notes that, if this motion is granted, Plaintiff will be in propria persona until new counsel is substituted into this matter.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re: Knox, Sean vs. Visalia Unified School District

Case No.: VCU327313

Date: May 5, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to (1) Form and Special Interrogatories, (2) Requests for Admissions and (3) Requests for Production of Documents; and for Sanctions

Tentative Ruling:

(1) To grant the motion as to Nos. 200.4, 38 and 39; further responses are due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing; to deny the remainder of the motion;

(2) To grant the motion as to Nos 24 and 34; further responses are due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing; to deny the remainder of the motion;

(3) To grant the motion as to Nos. 6 through 12, 14, 17, 18, 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, and 37, as noted below; further responses are due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing; to deny the remainder of the motion;

To deny the requests for sanctions.

Facts Common to (1) through (3)

In the second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges causes of action for racial discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

On November 26, 2025 Plaintiff served Request for Production of Documents, Set One; Request for Admission, Set One; Form Interrogatories-Employment, Set One; and Special Interrogatories, Set One.

On January 27, 2026 VUSD served verified responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents, Set One; Request for Admission, Set One; Form Interrogatories, Set One; and Special Interrogatories, Set One

On February 7, 2026 Plaintiff sent a meet and confer letter identifying alleged deficiencies in VUSD’s responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents, Set One; Request for Admission, Set One; Form Interrogatories-Employment, Set One; and Special Interrogatories, Set One.

On March 13, 2026 Plaintiff filed these Motions to Compel Further Responses to their Request for Production of Documents, Set One; Request for Admissions, Set One; Form Interrogatories-Employment, Set One; and Special Interrogatories, Set One.

In opposition, Defendant argues its objections are valid, it has complied with the discovery requests, that Plaintiff did not sufficiently meet and confer prior to filing these motions.

Authority and Analysis

(1) Interrogatories

A party may move to compel further responses to interrogatories if the propounding party deems that (1) an answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete, (2) an exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate, or (3) an objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).) The responding party has the burden of justifying the objections to the requests. (Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)

Form Interrogatories

As to Form Interrogatory No. 200.4, the Court notes that Defendant’s response to the separate statement identifies a number of documents by Bates Number, which is not present in the initial response. Additionally, there is no requirement to print out all applicable Government Code and Education Code sections, but rather a requirement, as to this interrogatory, to identify the responsive documents. A response containing a list of applicable code sections is permissible here. The Court will order a further response to No. 200.4 that contains the information requested by the interrogatory. Responses are due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

The Court finds the responses to Nos. 201.2, 208.1, 211.1, 211.2, 211.3, 216.1 sufficient with respect to information provided, or lack thereof, including that No. 216.1 cannot be answered where no answer has yet been filed. The Court will not order a further response to Nos. 201.2, 208.1, 211.1, 211.2, 211.3, 216.1.

As to No. 217.1, the Court also finds the responses sufficient. Plaintiff appears to argue that the response requires a statement of a reasonable inquiry. However, section 2030.220 does not appear to require this to be stated in the response. The Court finds a sufficient reasonable and good faith effort demonstrated by the responses set forth, despite some missing information. The Court will not order a further response to No. 217.1.

Special Interrogatories

Nos. 17 through 20 and 25 through 27 all seek the identity of employees or other persons who were, or were not, disciplined in some manner for involvement, or lack thereof, in student altercations.

Defendant objects on a number of grounds as to vagueness, ambiguity, overbreadth and privacy.

As to the vague and ambiguous objection, these are considered nuisance objections. (Standon Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 898, 901.) The interrogatories are not so vague as to “student altercations” that Defendant cannot understand them and provide a substantive response. Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 notes even if a discovery request is somewhat ambiguous, the appropriate response is to provide a substantive response when “the nature of the information sought is apparent.”

As to the privacy issue, “[t]he party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. [Citation.] The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations. [Citation.]” (Williams v. Sup. Ct. (Marshalls of CA, LLC) (2017) 3 Cal.5^th 531, 552.)

Courts have found that “personnel records and employment history are within the scope of the protection provided by the state and federal Constitutions.” (San Diego Trolley, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4^th 1083, 1097.) Here, discipline and termination, or lack thereof, are subject to privacy protections. The Court finds the requests overbroad in relation to the claims at issue. Plaintiff alleges discrimination on the basis of race, but these interrogatories are not reasonably restricted to such issues. For instance, there would be no privacy issue as to identifying employees anonymously, but including their race, who were or were not subject to discipline and, thereafter, tailored discovery as to the their identities or details surrounding such incidents to overcome the privacy interest.

At this point in time, however, Defendant has asserted an objectively reasonable privacy interest and the Court finds a serious intrusion as to the disciplinary files of an employee. At this time, the Court finds an insufficient countervailing interest in discourse where the requests are broadly drawn in comparison to the allegations of the complaint.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion as to Nos. 17 through 20 and 25 through 27.

As to Nos. 38 and 39, these seek the identities of persons who received the civil rights complaint and who reviewed the tort claim presented by Plaintiff.

The Court agrees that disclosure of persons who reviewed the complaint or tort claim does not, in and of itself, invoke attorney client privilege or work product protections and especially so if no attorney review is disclosed. Rather, employees or personnel of Defendant who received or reviewed the claims appears subject to disclosure. The Court does not find the requests overbroad or harassing. As to relevance, discovery is generally allowed for any non-privileged “if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) Information is “relevant” to the subject matter of an action if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4^th 1539, 1546.) The Court cannot, therefore, sustain a relevance objection here.

Therefore, the Court will order a further response to Nos. 38 and 39. Responses are due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

(2) Requests for Admissions

“Each answer in a response to requests for admission shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits. Each answer shall: (1) Admit so much of the matter involved in therequest as is true, either as expressed in the request itself or as reasonably and clearly qualified by the responding party. (2) Deny so much of the matter involved in the request as is untrue. (3) Specify so much of the matter involved in the request as to the truth of which the responding party lacks sufficient information or knowledge. © If a responding party gives lack of information or knowledge as a reason for a failure to admit all or part of a request for admission, that party shall state in the answer that a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter in the particular request has been made, and that the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable that party to admit the matter.” (Code Civ. Proc. §2033.220.)

A party may move for an order compelling further response to a request for admission or request for production of documents if the demanding party deems that responses are incomplete, evasive, or contain meritless objections. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2031.310, subd. (a); 2033.290, subd. (a).) If a timely motion to compel has been filed, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure fully to answer the discovery. (Coy v. Sup.Ct. (Wolcher) (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221; Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Sup.Ct. (Stendell) (2000) 22 Cal.4^th 245, 255.)

Here, the central issue as to Nos. 24 and 34 appears to be a failure to include the language that “…a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter in the particular request has been made, and that the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable that party to admit the matter.” The Court will order a further response to Nos. 24 and 34 on this basis. Responses are due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

As to Nos. 38 and 39, Defendant’s response is that the request is duplicative of Nos. 17 and 20, respectively. The Court agrees that Request No. 17 seeks a response sought by No. 38 and Request No. 20 seeks a response sought by No. 39. Therefore, the Court finds Nos. 38 and 39 duplicative and denies the motion as to Requests for Admissions Nos. 38 and 39.

(3) Requests for Production

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.210 requires, in response to a request for production, the following:

“(a) The party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed shall respond separately to each item or category of item by any of the following:

(1) A statement that the party will comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling by the date set for the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 2031.030 and any related activities.

(2) A representation that the party lacks the ability to comply with the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of a particular item or category of item.

(3) An objection to the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling.”

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.220 provides “A statement that the party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed will comply with the particular demand shall state that the production, inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, and related activity demanded, will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production.”

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230 provides “A representation of inability to comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party. The statement shall set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item.”

Finally, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310(a) permits a party to demand a further response where:

“(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete.

(2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive.

(3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.”

Under subsection (b), the motion must “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” In Digital Music News LLC v Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216 at 224, the court defined “good cause” as a showing that there “a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.” If the moving party has shown good cause for the requests for production, the burden is on the objecting party to justify the objections. (Kirkland v. Sup.Ct (2002) 95 Cal. App.4th 92, 98.)

The Court finds that the promise to produce the personnel file is a sufficient response as to Nos. 1, 2 and 3. Therefore, the Court will not order a further response to Nos. 1, 2 and 3.

The Court agrees that Nos. 4 and 5, as stated, are overbroad as to all communications, with Defendant, as to any subject. Therefore, the Court will not order a further response to Nos. 4 and 5.

As to Nos. 6 through 12, and 31 these seek documents relating to complaints by Plaintiff, documents related to the investigation and termination of Plaintiff following the incident and documents related to communications regarding the incident. Defendant objects on a number of grounds, including that production of such documents would necessitate disclosure of student information beyond directory information, but indicates that non-privileged documents will be produced.

The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) (20 U.S.C. § 1232g; 34 CFR Part 99) allows schools to disclose student records, without consent, to comply with a judicial order or lawfully issued subpoena. Pursuant to 20 USC §1232g(b)(2)(B), Defendant VUSD may release such information of any involved students in compliance with a judicial order, “upon condition that parents and the students are notified of such orders...in advance of the compliance therewith by the education institution or agency...” (20 USC §1232g(b)(2)(B).) Here, the Court will order redaction of any student names and compel production of documents responsive to these categories, to the extent such production has not already occurred.

As to any employees of Defendant whose names may be present in such documents, the Court here notes such persons, under the categories identified above, such persons are either percipient witnesses or akin to percipient witnesses with respect to complaints by Plaintiff (and who received such complaints), investigation into the incident, and the like. The Court, however, recognizes that, at some point, retained counsel may have been involved in the processes identified in Nos. 6 through 12 and 31, and therefore such documents would be excluded from any production. With these principles in mind, the Court will order a further response to Nos. 6 through 12, and 31. Responses are due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

As to Nos. 18, 34 and 37, the Court also agrees that redaction of student names and production of non-privileged documents appears proper. To the extent not already produced, the Court will order further production here. With the same issues not above, the Court will order a further response to Nos. 18, 34 and 37. Responses are due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

Nos. 13, 14, 17, 20, 21, 24 and 32 appear to relate to policies of Defendant or training by Defendant as to various issues related to the complaint in this matter.

Responses to Nos. 13, 20, 21, 24 and 32 indicate that the policies or records will be produced. As such, no further production as to Nos. 13, 20, 21, 24 and 32 is ordered.

However, as to Nos. 14 and 17, these contains responses indicating no documents are promised to be produced and objections that the requests are vague, ambiguous, overbroad, harassing, invade privilege and work product, are not relevant and under privacy. The Court does not find disclosure of documents related to training, selection, hiring and training of persons involve din Plaintiff’s termination to be objectionable or subject to any increased privacy right. However, No. 17 seeks “evaluation” of such persons, which involves the personnel file of such employees and therefore is subject to privacy concerns noted in the Court’s ruling above. Therefore, the Court will order a further response to No. 14 and a further response to No. 17 that excludes any “evaluation” related documents. Responses are due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

As to Nos. 15, 16, 19 and 25, the Court considers these requests seeking “me too” documents. "Courts have sanctioned the use of 'me too' evidence, which is evidence of an employer's alleged gender bias 'in the form of harassing activity against women employees other than the plaintiff' in certain circumstances." (Pinter-Brown v. Regents (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 55, 96.) Such evidence may be utilized evidence is permitted to prove certain things like motive. (Johnson v. United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children's Foundation (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 740, 763-767 (“me too” evidence about pregnancy discrimination to prove motive where workers were in the same location and same supervisors; Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87, 114-118 (“me too” evidence as to motive where same supervisor and same protected class involved.) However, such evidence must relate to the same protected class and same decision maker. (Pinter-Brown, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at 97-98.) "The 'me too' doctrine, however, does not permit a plaintiff to present evidence of discrimination against employees outside of the plaintiff's protected class to show discrimination or harassment against the plaintiff." (Id. at 96.)

Here, the requests are drawn too wide, as there is no showing that any such complaints involved the same decision maker as was involved in Plaintiff’s discipline and termination. Therefore, the Court will not order a further response to Nos. 15, 16, 19 and 25.

As to Nos. 22 and 23, these requests involve law enforcement communication as well as Defendant’s internal findings or conclusions with respect to the incident and investigation thereto. The Court finds the responses to each sufficient in that no such documents exist as to No. 22 and non-privileged documents will be produced as to No. 23. Therefore, the Court will not order a further response to Nos. 22 and 23.

As to Nos. 26 and 30, these requests seek documents related to individuals involved in the termination decision and internal discussions regarding Plaintiff following the incident. Defendant has objected on a number of grounds, including privacy. However, the Court does not find merit to these objections and finds sufficient direct relevance to overcome any privacy arguments with respect to those persons involved in the decision making process. As with above, the Court notes some involvement by retained counsel regarding an internal investigation may have occurred and excludes such documents from any production. However, as to documents outside of that issue, the Court will order a further response to Nos. 26 and 30. Responses are due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

As to Nos. 27, 28 and 29, the Court finds the response as to production of non-privileged documents sufficient and no further response will be required as to Nos. 27, 28 and 29.

As to No. 33, the Court does not consider video of the incident to implicate FERPA as to disclosure of a student’s personally identifiable information and will order production of any such surveillance or other video recordings responsive to No. 33. Responses are due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

Sanctions

The requests for sanctions are denied. (Mattco Valley Forge v. Arthur Young & Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1429, 1437 [court’s authority to deny sanctions upon mixed results].)

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re: Gill, Jai vs. Deluxe Foods II, Inc. et al

Case No.: VCU319543

Date: May 5, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: Plaintiff’s Motion for Monetary, Evidence, Issue Sanctions

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion in part and order compliance as to Nos. 22 and 23; to impose total monetary sanctions of $700, jointly and severally, against Defendant Deluxe and its counsel of record; Compliance as to Nos. 22 and 23, as well as the payment of all sanctions, shall be due no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing; to deny the remainder of the motion.

Background Facts

In this breach of contract, open account, foreclosure mechanic’s lien and action for mechanic’s lien release bond, Plaintiff, on May 27, 2025, served a first set of requests for production of documents on Defendant Deluxe Foods II, Inc. on May 27, 2025.

Defendant failed to respond and Plaintiff sent a letter on July 11, 2025, seeking responses.

On August 25, 2025, Defendant Deluxe served written responses, with objections and without verification. On September 12, 2025, verification was provided.

However, as no documents had been produced, Plaintiff reached out on September 17, 2025, seeking production of the documents and questioning the validity of the objections.

On September 26, 2025, counsel for Defendant Deluxe responded, explaining the objections and stating documents could be produced the first week of October 2025. That same day, Plaintiff’s counsel responded, seeking production of the documents.

On November 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel compliance, having received no production of documents despite agreement regarding production to some of the categories.

On January 6, 2026, The Court ruled “…as to any responses for which Defendant responded ‘Will be made available…’ the Court grants the motion. Documents are to be produced are due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.” The Court further noted that no promise to produce had been made as to Request Nos. 5, 6, 20, 21, 24, and 25. At the prior hearing, the Court further imposed sanctions of $350 against Defendant Deluxe and its counsel of record, jointly and severally.

Facts as to Motion for Sanctions

On March 17, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion for issue, evidentiary and monetary sanctions for the refusal to comply with Court orders.

Plaintiff notes first no monetary sanctions have been paid. Additionally, on February 3, 2026, counsel for Plaintiff received an email from Defendant Deluxe’s counsel forwarding 20 pages of documents. On February 16, 2026, additional documents were provided. Plaintiff notes that a further demand as to Request Nos. Nos. 9, 15, 22, 23 and 25. Plaintiff seeks sanctions in the amount of $3,150.

In opposition, Defendant argues that the failure to pay monetary sanctions does not result in evidentiary or issue sanctions and that Defendant has produced all documents responsive to the requests and the Court’s prior ruling.

Authority and Analysis

The Court’s review of the exhibits to Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration indicates, to the Court, that documents have been produced as to No. 9 and No. 15, but that Plaintiff is unsatisfied with the production. To the Court, this is not a compliance issue or failure to follow the Court’s order but sounds in a motion to compel further responses. As such, the motion is denied as to Nos. 9 and 15.

As to No. 25, this request was expressly excluded from the prior motion and therefore, there is no violation of the Court’s order as to any further production.

As to Nos. 22 and 23, there appears to be no production attempted as to these categories. The initial response to each states, “Will be made available for inspection and copying.” Plaintiff’s Exhibit G shows no indication to the Court that documents were produced as to Nos. 22 and 23. Defendant’s opposition and declaration does not address this issue directly, as Defendant’s Exhibit 5 does not break down the production by the corresponding request number.

As such, the Court finds a failure to comply with the Court’s order as to Nos. 22 and 23, as well as the $350 in monetary sanctions.

As to the remaining requests for non-monetary sanctions, “[t]he Civil Discovery Act (section 2016.010 et seq.) imbues trial courts with broad discretion to sanction the misuse of the discovery process. [Citations]” (Siry Investment, L.P. v. Farkhondehpour (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1116. In Siry Investment, L.P., 45 Cal.App. at 1117-18, the appellate court described the process of incremental discovery sanctions:

“When faced with a party’s misuse of the discovery process, a trial court should impose [t]he penalty ... appropriate to the dereliction. That is because the purpose of discovery sanctions is to protect the interests of the party entitled to[,] but denied[,] discovery, not to punish the non-compliant party or to put the prevailing party in a better position than he would have had if he had obtained the discovery sought. Proportionality is critical when it comes to terminating sanctions because they altogether deny the non-compliant party a hearing on the merits and thus implicate due process.

To ensure proportionality, trial courts should generally take an incremental approach—that is, they should attempt less severe alternative[sanctions] unless the record clearly shows lesser sanctions would be ineffective. In calibrating the sanction that is appropriate for the dereliction, trial courts must make a meaningful effort to determine whether ... alternative[, lesser sanctions] would be effective at inducing the non-compliant party to produce the discovery, thereby protect[ing] the interests of the party entitled to ... discovery. In undertaking this effort, trial courts should examine the totality of the circumstances, including: (1) whether the party’s non-compliance is the latest chapter in a longer history of abuse, which looks to the number of formal and informal attempts to obtain the discovery as well as whether prior court orders compelling discovery have gone unheeded; (2) whether the party’s non-compliance was willful; (3) whether the non-compliance persisted despite warnings from the court that greater sanctions might follow; (4) whether the non-compliance encompasses all or only some of the issues in the case [citation]; and (5) the extent of the detriment to the propounding party that flows from the inability to obtain the discovery at issue [citation].

Because terminating sanctions are the most drastic penalty, they are typically a last resort to be used sparingly. However, they may still be appropriate as a first measure in extreme cases where a litigant violates a court order and persists in the outright refusal to comply with [its] discovery obligations. Put differently, the imposition of lesser sanctions is not an absolute prerequisite to the imposition of terminating sanctions for violation of a court order.”

The Court will not impose any sanctions beyond monetary sanctions at this time.

The Court notes no discussion of payment of the prior $350 sanctions.

Therefore, the Court will order compliance as to Nos. 22 and 23 a second time. The Court will reimpose the prior $350 sanction, jointly and severally, against Defendant Deluxe and its counsel of record, as well as add an additional $350 for this motion (consisting of one additional hour at the $350 rate.)

Compliance as to Nos. 22 and 23, as well as the $700 in sanctions, shall be due no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re: Fonseca, David vs. Chimienti & Associates

Case No.: VCU315048

Date: May 5, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action

Tentative Ruling: To continue this motion for preliminary approval to May 26, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 2; to order a supplemental declaration as to the lodestar, the presently incurred costs of counsel and the administrative costs.

1. Sufficiency of Amount of Settlement (Net Estimated: $420,833.33 less administrative costs)

This matter arises out of an alleged cybersecurity incident impacting one of Defendant’s email accounts. The information potentially accessed included names, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, state-issued identification (such as driver’s license or non-driver ID), financial account information, and health information. Defendant notified 37,959 affected individuals, including Plaintiffs, that their Private Information may have been impacted by the incident.

Settlement Class Members include all individuals residing in the United States whose Private Information was impacted in the Data Incident and exclude (i) the judges presiding over this Litigation, and members of their immediate families; (ii) Defendant, their subsidiaries, parent companies, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendant or their parents have a controlling interest, and their current or former officers and directors; and (iii) Settlement Class members who submit a valid Request for Exclusion prior to the Opt-Out Deadline.

Four putative class actions were filed against Defendant: (i) David Fonseca v. Chimienti & Associates, No. VCU315048 (filed on November 12, 2024); (ii) Kahyun Kim v. Chimienti & Associates, No. VCU315371 (filed on November 22, 2024); (iii) Robert Simplicio v. Chimienti & Associates, No. VCU315629 (filed on November 25, 2024); and (iv) Terry Marshall v. Chimienti & Associates, No. VCU316879 (filed on January 13, 2025)

Counsel in the related actions conferred and agreed to jointly pursue the claims on behalf of Plaintiffs and the putative class.

On July 3, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Consolidated Class Action Complaint asserting claims for: (i) negligence and negligence per se; (ii) breach of third-party beneficiary contract; (iii) unjust enrichment; (iv) violation of the California Consumer Privacy Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100, et seq.; (v) violation of the California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 56, et seq.; (vi) violation of the California Customer Records Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.80, et seq.; (vii) and violation of the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Civ. Code § 17200, et seq.

In resolution of this matter, Defendant has agreed to establish a $650,000.00 non-reversionary common fund from which Settlement Class members may elect to receive either: (i) reimbursement for documented losses up to $5,000.00; or (ii) a pro rata alternate Cash Payment of up to $100.00 per Valid Claimant. In addition, all Settlement Class members who submit a Valid Claim may elect to receive two years of Credit Monitoring. All Settlement Class Members will also benefit from the Data Security Enhancements Defendant will implement as part of the Settlement.

After agreeing to participate in mediation, Defendants informally produced records related to the breach as to the Settlement Class members, key class data points, and other documents and information relevant to the claims alleged in advance of mediation. The parties reached the settlement after mediation.

The Court finds the information provided in support of the gross settlement amount sufficient for the Court to preliminarily approve the gross settlement amount, as the settlement amount appears to be within the recognized range of reasonableness given the claims and defenses asserted in this case.

Plaintiffs’ deductions from the gross settlement of $650,000 are proposed as follows:

Proposed Court Approved Attorney Fees and Costs (33.3%):	$216,666.67
Proposed Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Fonseca:	$2,500.00
Proposed Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Kim:	$2,500.00
Proposed Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Simplicio:	$2,500.00
Proposed Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Marshall:	$2,500.00
Proposed Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Prendez:	$2,500.00
Proposed Settlement Administrator Costs	$ Unknown
Proposed Net Settlement Amount	$420,833.33 (less costs)

2. Class Notice

The settlement agreement provides no claim form will be required of class members to participate in distributions. Only those wishing to object or opt out must file notice with the settlement administrator.

Objections or opt out notices are to be made within 30 days. The Court regularly approves notice periods of 60 days or longer.

The Court sets the class notice period at 60 days in this matter.

With respect to the content of the Notice, the Court finds the Class Notice to be reasonable. It clearly provides to the class member an estimate of the settlement share the employee is to receive and provides adequate instructions for any class member to opt out of the settlement or to submit an objection.

3. Enhancement Award to Class Representative

The Court preliminarily approves Plaintiffs David Fonseca, Kahyun Kim, Robert Simplicio, Terry Marshall, and Rachel Prendez as class representative for settlement purposes. The proposed enhancement award to each Plaintiff is $2,500.

The Court has, in past cases, approved enhancement awards of up to $5,000 routinely and approves the awards as requested in the amount of $2,500

4. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees and costs no greater than 33.3% of the gross settlement fund of $650,000 or $216,666.67 are sought in this matter.

Although the Court recognizes the utilization of the percentage of the common fund methodology to award attorneys’ fees, the Court requires a declaration from counsel that provides an estimate as to what the lodestar would be in this case. The ultimate goal of the Court is to award reasonable attorneys’ fees irrespective of the method of calculation. As such, the court needs to know the estimate of the approximate lodestar supported by declarations for preliminary approval. Counsel should submit information as to the time spent on this action and the hourly rates of all counsel working on the case. Without such information, the Court declines to preliminarily approve the fees.

The Court further finds that Plaintiffs’ counsel are experienced class action attorneys through the joint declaration of counsel.

5. Claims Administrator

The Court preliminary approves Simpluris, Inc. as the claims administrator for this class action. However, no estimated cost as to the administration of this lawsuit has been provided. The Court will require such information prior to preliminary approval.

6. Unclaimed Settlement Proceeds

The Court preliminarily approves the distribution of unclaimed settlement proceeds to Electronic Privacy Information Center.

7. Release

The Court finds the proposed release of claims reasonable under the circumstances.

8. Class Certification for Settlement Purposes

Code of Civil Procedure section 382 permits certification “when the question is of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 382.) The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that class certification under section 382 is proper. (See City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 460.) To do so, “[t]he party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.” (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.)

Here, the Motion and accompanying joint declaration of counsel sufficiently sets forth the basis for finding the class is numerous and ascertainable as 37,959 individuals subject to the breach. Additionally, common questions of law and fact predominate the action. The Court finds a sufficient basis to conditionally certify the class for the purposes of settlement.

Therefore, the Court continues this motion for preliminary approval to May 26, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 2 and orders a supplemental declaration as to the lodestar, the presently incurred costs of counsel and the administrative costs.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re: Brambila, Leonor vs. Familia Partida, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company et al

Case No.: PCU318630

Date: May 5, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion: Defendant’s (1) Motion to Compel Initial Responses to Form Interrogatories – General, Form Interrogatories – Employment, Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents and (2) Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted

Tentative Ruling: (1) and (2): To order the parties meet and confer over the next 45 days as indicated herein; to set a status conference as to these motions to compel initial responses and deem admissions admitted for July 14, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 19.

Facts Common to (1) and (2)

In this matter, Defendant Familiar Partida, LLC, on January 16, 2026, served Form Interrogatories – General, Form Interrogatories – Employment, Special Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents and Requests for Admissions on Plaintiff Brambila.

Defendant’s counsel’s declaration states on February 17, 2026, Plaintiff served unverified responses to this discovery “which consist solely of boilerplate objections with no substantive responses, save for the Response to Form Interrogatory – General 1.1.”

On March 19, 2026, Defendant filed two motions: (1) to compel initial responses to Form Interrogatories – General, Form Interrogatories – Employment, Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents and (2) to deed admissions admitted to the Requests for Admissions. Defendant further seeks sanctions.

In opposition, Plaintiff indicates that requests for admissions were served February 17, 2026.

Further, that Plaintiff seeks a continuance of 45 days as to the remaining motion to compel further interrogatories to permit additional time to respond.

Additionally, Plaintiff challenges the sufficiency of the declaration as to the additional interrogatories beyond the first 35 special interrogatories.

(1) and (2) - Authority and Analysis

While the Court notes these motions are brought as motions to compel initial responses and deem admissions admitted because the initial responses were unverified and consisted of objections (for which no meet and confer is required), Defendant sent a meet and confer letter on February 26, 2026.

Plaintiff’s response thereto was to seek an extension of time to provide verified, substantive responses by March 18, 2026. Defendant declined the offer and filed these motions March 19, 2026.

The meet and confer requirement is designed “to encourage the parties to work out their differences informally so as to avoid the necessity for a formal order . . . . This, in turn, will lessen the burden on the court and reduce the unnecessary expenditure of resources by litigants through promotion of informal, extrajudicial resolution of discovery disputes.” (Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1016, quoting Townsend v. Superior Ct. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435, internal quotations and citations omitted.) Thus, there must be a serious effort at negotiation and informal resolution. (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294.)

“[T]he law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate.” (Id.) The particular level of effort required in each case depends on the circumstances including the amount of discovery propounded, the time available to confer before the motion filing deadline, and the extent to which a party was complicit in the lapse of available time. (Obregon v. Superior Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 432.) “An evaluation of whether, from the perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the discovering party, additional effort appeared likely to bear fruit, should also be considered. Although some effort is required in all instances, the level of effort that is reasonable is different in different circumstances, and may vary with the prospects for success.” (Id. at pp. 432–33.) To that end, trial courts are entrusted with discretion and judgment to determine the necessary effort required to satisfy the requirement of an informal resolution. (Id. at 433.)

The response from Plaintiff to the meet and confer letter is precisely the purpose of the practice of meeting and conferring. Plaintiff acknowledged insufficient responses, sought additional time and was prepared to provide substantive responses.

Therefore, the Court will order the parties to meet and confer over the next 45 day period. The Court orders the parties to discuss the sufficiency of the further responses to the requests for admissions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280(c) as to substantial compliance. The Court orders the parties to discuss the sufficiency of the declaration as to additional interrogatories under section 2030.040. The Court orders the parties to discuss an extension of time for Plaintiff to provide further, substantive responses.

Should Defendant receive further, verified responses to the interrogatories and requests for production and should Defendant find substantial compliance as to the further responses to admissions, the Court will consider these motions moot. Any issues with the further responses will require a motion to compel further responses, including a meet and confer requirement and separate statement.

Therefore, the Court sets a status conference as to these motions to compel initial responses and deem admissions admitted for July 14, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 19.

As to the request for sanctions, the Court denies the request for Defendant’s failure to meet and confer on these discovery issues.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re: Romero, Luis Fernando vs. Young's, Inc et al

Case No.: PCU324051

Date: May 5, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion: Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to (1) Special Interrogatories and (2) Requests for Production of Documents; Sanctions

Tentative Ruling:

(1) To order the Bellaire-West notice process to occur as to Nos. 1, 2, 6 – 9 and to order a further response no later than fifteen (15) days from the competition of the notice process To grant the motion as to Nos. Nos. 3 - 5 and 10 - 48 order a further response no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing

(2) To grant the motion as to Nos. 1-7, 8-21, 25 and 27 and order a further response no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing; To order the Bellaire-West notice process to occur as to Nos. 22, 23, 24 and 26 and 2 and to order a further response no later than fifteen (15) days from the competition of the notice process; to order a further response to No. 28 consistent with either the Belaire-West notice process or within 30 days of this hearing, depending on the interrogatory at issue.

To deny the counter requests for sanctions

Facts Common to (1) and (2)

In this class action matter, Plaintiff alleges a number of Labor Code and Business and Professions Code violations.

On September 12, 2025, Plaintiff served, via email, the first set of Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents.

On November 7, 2025, Defendant responses to each set of discovery, entirely with objections.

On November 24, 2025, Defendant served further responses to both sets of discovery, but, as noted by Plaintiff, limited the responses to Plaintiff, a opposed to the putative class. Defendant has taken the position that until Plaintiff’s deposition has been taken, discovery must be limited to claims belonging to Plaintiff.

On December 23, 2025, Plaintiff sent a meet and confer letter, which was followed up by a January 9, 2026 Zoom conference and a January 27, 2026 letter from Defendant reasserting the positions taken in the prior meet and confer conference.

On March 12, 2026, the parties again met and conferred.

Throughout this process, the parties have unsuccessfully attempted to draft and send out a Belaire-West notice.

On April 3, 2026, Plaintiff filed these motions to compel further responses, including a separate statement as to each motion.

In opposition, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff failed to electronically serve all of Defendant’s counsel and counsel’s staff, that Plaintiff has failed to meet and confer, and that the responses are code-compliant.

Authority and Analysis

Service

Defendant first opposes these motions for the failure to electronically serve counsel and staff via exclusion of email addresses as to these motions. While the motions were served electronically on Defendant’s counsel, Defendant takes the position that under Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6(b)(4), all persons on the e-service list must be served and the failure to do so results in the denial of this motion.

Section 1010.6(b)(4) states: “(4) A person represented by counsel shall, upon the request of any person who has appeared in an action or proceeding and who provides an electronic service address, electronically serve the requesting person with any notice or document that may be served by mail, express mail, overnight delivery, or facsimile transmission.”

While it does appear that Plaintiff did not serve this motion on the entire e-service list, the Court does not find this a basis to deny the motions in total. Rather, at most, the Court would have permitted a continuance to permit service and adjudicated the motion thereafter. Here, Defendant does not seek this relief, but has elected to oppose the motion on its merits.

Therefore, the Court will not deny the motion as to this service issue.

Meet and Confer

The meet and confer requirement is designed “to encourage the parties to work out their differences informally so as to avoid the necessity for a formal order . . . . This, in turn, will lessen the burden on the court and reduce the unnecessary expenditure of resources by litigants through promotion of informal, extrajudicial resolution of discovery disputes.” (Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1016, quoting Townsend v. Superior Ct. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435, internal quotations and citations omitted.) Thus, there must be a serious effort at negotiation and informal resolution. (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294.)

“[T]he law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate.” (Id.) The particular level of effort required in each case depends on the circumstances including the amount of discovery propounded, the time available to confer before the motion filing deadline, and the extent to which a party was complicit in the lapse of available time. (Obregon v. Superior Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 432.) “An evaluation of whether, from the perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the discovering party, additional effort appeared likely to bear fruit, should also be considered. Although some effort is required in all instances, the level of effort that is reasonable is different in different circumstances, and may vary with the prospects for success.” (Id. at pp. 432–33.) To that end, trial courts are entrusted with discretion and judgment to determine the necessary effort required to satisfy the requirement of an informal resolution. (Id. at 433.)

The Court’s review of the correspondence here indicates a sufficient attempt to meet and confer by the parties prior to bringing this motion. Further responses were initially provided and thereafter the parties appear to have settled into their respective positions as to any additional, supplemental responses.

Therefore, the Court finds a sufficient meet and confer process here.

Pre-Certification Class Action Discovery

A central issue throughout the discovery is Defendant’s position that Plaintiff must be deposed prior to responding to discovery and that Defendant is only obligated to provide responses relative to Plaintiff’s claims, as opposed to the class claims pled in the complaint.

To start, there is no validity to the argument that discovery must take place in a certain order or that Plaintiff’s deposition must be complete before Defendant is under an obligation to respond to discovery on a classwide basis

The scope of discovery is broad and is construed liberally in favor of disclosure. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010; Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541.) There is "no obligation on a party propounding interrogatories to establish good cause or prove up the merits of any underlying claims." (Id. at. 550.) Further, class-wide discovery is allowed prior to certification: "Each party ... must have an opportunity to conduct discovery on class action issues before filing documents to support or oppose a class action certification motion ... so the trial court can realistically determine if common questions are sufficiently pervasive to permit adjudication in a class action." (Stern v. Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 223, 232-233.)

The court in Carabini v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 239, 244 noted, “Due process requires an order with such significant impact on the viability of a case not be made without a full opportunity to brief the issues and present evidence…In addition, each party should have an opportunity to conduct discovery on class action issues before its documents in support of or in opposition to the motion must be filed.” (See also Bartold v. Glendale Fed. Bank (2000) 81 Cal. App. 4th 816, 836 [plaintiffs are entitled to discovery necessary to support a motion for class certification].)

Therefore, the Court will order further responses where Defendant has attempted to limit the call of the interrogatory or request to information about Plaintiff, as opposed to other potential class members.

Second, there is no ordering or sequencing of discovery, “unless restricted by the trial court, are free to utilize any of the prescribed discovery methods during the action in any sequence (§§ 2019.010, 2019.020).” (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 402.) Only upon a "…motion for good cause” may “the court may establish the sequence and timing of discovery for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2019.020(b).) No such motion or showing of good cause has occurred here.

As such, the Court rejects the positions that Plaintiff’s deposition must occur prior to responding to discovery or that Defendant may limit its responses only to Plaintiff’s claims, as opposed to the class claims alleged in the complaint.

Belaire-West Notice

The parties appear to agree to the use of a Belaire-West notice, but cannot come to a consensus as to the form thereof.

The Court first notes the identity of potential class members is discoverable. (Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 554, 562.) “The current and former employees are potential percipient witnesses to [the employer's] employment and wage practices, and as such their identities and locations are properly discoverable.” (Id.)

Further, as noted above, such information is discoverable prior to class certification. (Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 373.)

However, third parties must be notified and given an opportunity to either consent or object, before discovery responses revealing their private information, and parties cannot waive such rights of third parties. (Belaire-West, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at 561-562; Pioneer Electronics, supra, 40 Cal.4th at 374-375; DOE 2 v. Sup. Ct. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4^th 1504, 1521.)

Here, some requests and interrogatories, as noted below, may implicate some privacy interests. Therefore, the Court will not order further responses or production where indicated below until the completion of the process outlined in Belaire-West. In ordering disclosure after completion of this process, the Court recognizes that current and former employees could reasonably be expected to want their employment information disclosed to a representative plaintiff who might ultimately recover their share of damages and penalties based on Defendant’s alleged Labor Code violations. (Id. at 562.)

(1) Interrogatories

A party may move to compel further responses to interrogatories if the propounding party deems that (1) an answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete, (2) an exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate, or (3) an objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).)

The responding party has the burden of justifying the objections to the requests. (Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)

Special Interrogatory Nos. 1, 2, 6 – 9

The Court finds these interrogatories seek contact information and/or information contained in class member’s personnel files for which a Belaire-West notice is required.

The Court notes that the parties have engaged in meet and confer efforts regarding the contents of the Belaire-West notice. The Court orders the parties to continue these efforts. A failure to arrive at an agreed notice and process may be presented to the Court by either party for final resolution by ex parte application.

The parties shall split the costs of the Belaire-West notice procedure.

Defendant shall have fifteen (15) days following close of the agreed notice process to provide a verified further response to Special Interrogatory Nos. 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, and 9.

Special Interrogatory Nos. 3 - 5 and 10 - 48

In the Court’s opinion, these interrogatories seek raw data, information, policies, information about Defendant’s business operations, or the identity of persons with knowledge as to these categories and do not implicate any privacy interests of other employees. The responses and further responses improperly attempt to limit the response to information only as to Plaintiff, which has been rejected above. The Court overrules the objections to these interrogatories and orders a further response to Nos. 3-5 and 10 - 48 no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

(2) Requests for Production