Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, June 11, 2026, are:

Re:                Citibank, N.A. vs. Eaton, Derek

Case No.:   VCL324520

Date:           June 11, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Motion for Entry of Judgment Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and enter judgment as requested.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract, alleging $4,558.03 in damages.

On or about September 22, 2025, the parties stipulated to resolve this matter for the amount alleged, payable in one payment of $358.03 and $200 monthly payments thereafter.

The stipulation indicates Plaintiff may recover its costs in the event of default and that the Court shall retain jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 if the matter is dismissed.

No dismissal appears to have occurred.

On April 10, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion to enforce the stipulation as a judgment pursuant to its terms and enter judgment in the amount of $4,854.05.

Plaintiff indicates Defendant has made no payments.

Plaintiff further indicates costs incurred of $296.02.

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states: 

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1360.)

As indicated above, the Court retains jurisdiction over the parties and this matter because it has not been dismissed.  

Defendant appears to have breached the settlement, based upon the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel and, the Court, having no opposition, grants the motion and enters judgment in the amount requested of 4,854.03 consisting of the principal amount due of $4,558.03 plus the costs of $296.02.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Barron, Oscar vs. City of Tulare

Case No.:   VCU297068

Date:           June 11, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Plaintiffs’ Motion to Tax Costs

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion in part and award $8,998.92 in costs

Facts

In this matter, the Court entered judgment following the granting of Defendant City’s motion for summary judgment. Notice of entry of judgment occurred May 5, 2026.

On May 5, 2026, Defendant City filed its memorandum of costs seeking $38,406.30 as follows:

Cost	Amount	Challenge by Plaintiff?
1. Filing and Motion Fees	$830.54	Yes
4. Deposition costs	$8,079.55	Yes
5. Service of Process	$507.32	No
14. Fees for electronic filing or service	$251.40	Yes
16. Other	$28,737.48	Yes
Total	$38,406.30

On May 11, 2026, Plaintiffs filed this motion to tax costs, challenging each category as noted below.

“Unless objection is made to the entire cost memorandum, the motion to strike or tax costs must refer to each item objected to by the same number and appear in the same order as the corresponding cost item claimed on the memorandum of costs and must state why the item is objectionable.” (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700(b)(2).)

Here, Plaintiffs’ motion follows Rule 3.1700(b)(2) as to specific categories identified above in the chart and discussed in greater detail below.

The starting point is the verified Memorandum of Costs and Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. “[T]he verified Memorandum is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses and services therein listed were necessarily incurred” and the burden rests with the party seeking to tax costs to show they were improper, unreasonable or unnecessary. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 855-856.)

Allowable costs under section 1033.5 must be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation, and must be reasonable in amount.  An item not specifically allowable under Section 1033.5(a) nor prohibited under subdivision (b) may nevertheless be recoverable in the discretion of the court if they meet the above requirements (i.e., reasonably necessary and reasonable in amount). 

If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-774.)  On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs.  (Id.)  Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary to the litigation presents a question of fact for the trial court and its decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  (Id.)   

“[T]he mere filing of a motion to tax costs may be a ‘proper objection’ to an item, the necessity of which appears doubtful, or which does not appear to be proper on its face. [Citation.] However, ‘[i]f the items appear to be proper charges, the verified memorandum is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses and services therein listed were necessarily incurred by the defendant [citations], and the burden of showing that an item is not properly chargeable or is unreasonable is upon the [objecting party].’ [Citations.]”  (Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 131.)

A party contesting costs must state why the contested item is objectionable. (California Rules of Court Rule 3.1700(b)(2)). Factual recitals rather than mere conclusions are required. Conclusory allegations that the item was “neither necessary nor reasonable” do not satisfy the objecting party’s burden. (County of Ker v. Ginn (1983) 146 Cal_App.3d 1107, 1113-1114; Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1266).

1. Filing and Motion Fees

Plaintiffs generally argue that Defendant’s claimed amount is excessive and are unsupported by sufficient documentation establishing that the claimed amounts were reasonably necessary to the litigation.

However, the Court notes these appear to be standard filing and motion fees associated with this case. Guillemin v. Stein (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 156, 163-164 indicates that “Filing fees are therefore costs incurred but not paid, which are recoverable under the general costs statute. Moreover, section 6103.5 specifically prescribes the inclusion of these fees as costs in a judgment; therefore a trial court does not have any discretion to tax them.”

As such, the Court denies the motion as to this category.  

4. Deposition Costs

Court Reporter Costs

In this category, Plaintiffs first challenge Defendant’s court reporter costs of $1,000 as to a hearing on challenge to judgment January 29, 2026. Plaintiffs note no hearing was held, as the Court tentatively ruled on the issue and no oral argument was requested.

Code of Civil Procedure section § 1033.5(a)(11) expressly allows recovery of "court reporter fees as established by statute." (Code Civ. Proc § 1033.5(a)(11).) Additionally, transcripts of court proceedings not ordered by the court are not recoverable. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(b)(5).)

Gov. Code, § 68086(d) states, in relevant part:

“"(2) That if an official court reporter is not available, a party may arrange for, at the party's expense, the presence of a certified shorthand reporter to serve as an official pro tempore reporter. At the arranging party's request, the court shall appoint the certified shorthand reporter to be present in the courtroom and serve as the official reporter pro tempore unless there is good cause shown for the court to refuse that appointment. The fees and charges of the certified shorthand reporter shall be recoverable as taxable costs by the prevailing party as otherwise provided by law.

(3) That if the services of an official pro tempore reporter are utilized pursuant to paragraph (2), no other charge shall be made to the parties.”

Here Court reporter fees are authorized by statute and Defendant hired a court reporter at its own expense pursuant to Gov. Code § 68086(d)(2) above. That no oral argument was requested, and hence no hearing took place, does not obviate the need to hire the reporter in anticipation of a request for oral argument and hearing.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion as to this category.

Deposition Costs

Here, Plaintiffs note that as to the deposition of Arturo Torres conducted on May 6, 2024, Defendant seeks recovery of $911.00 under Item 4A, while also separately claiming $685.00 on Attachment 4A for the same deposition. Additionally, as ot the deposition of Euler Torres conducted on August 22, 2024, Defendant seeks recovery of $651.55, while also separately claiming $1,255.00 and an additional $651.00 on Attachment 4A relating to the same deponent.

California Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5(a)(3) expressly states that costs are allowable for: “taking, video recording, and transcribing necessary depositions, including an original and one copy of those taken by the claimant and one copy of depositions taken by the party against whom costs are allowed.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(a)(3).) (emphasis added.) Fees for an interpreter are likewise recoverable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(a)(3).) “A prevailing party is entitled to the reasonable cost of taking depositions unless it appears that the taking of the depositions was unnecessary.” (Ceranski v. Muensch (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 751, 755.)

Here, Defendant notes that the $911 under Item 4.a. as to Arturo Torres was for the transcript and the $685 on Attachment 4A was for the interpreter at the deposition.

Similarly, the Defendant notes the $1,255.00 incurred as to Euler Torres on Attachment 4A was for the certificate of nonappearance and the additional $651.00 was for the transcript thereof. However, Defendant does not address the $651.55 listed on Item 4.d.

Therefore, the Court will tax this category in the amount of $651.55.

14. Electronic Fees

Plaintiffs seek to tax $227.73 for electronic filing fees, noting that Defendant has already requested filing fees in Item No. 1 above.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5(a)(14) permits recovery of fees for electronic filing or service only “if a court requires or orders electronic filing or service of documents” and that Tulare County does not mandate electronic filing or service.

The Court views 1033.5(a)(14) as precluding recovery for these types of costs if not required or ordered by this Court.

The Court does not view these costs as valid on their face given the prohibition under section 1033.5(a)(14) because 1033.5(c)(4) states “(4) Items not mentioned in this section and items assessed upon application may be allowed or denied in the court’s discretion.” Here, the item of electronic filing and service is mentioned in this section under (a)(14). This subsection explicitly states electronic filing fees are only recoverable if they are court-ordered.

Therefore, the Court will strike the entire amount sought in this category.

16. Other

As an initial matter, the Court notes the expert fees are totaled under Category 16 on the first page of the memorandum, but listed under 8b of the worksheet.

Additionally, the total listed under Category 16 is $28,737.48. However, the expert fees are stated as $27,230.00 and the other costs are stated as $1,361.41, adding up to $28,591.41.

As such, the Court first strikes the $146.07 in what appears to be mathematical error.

Expert Costs

Plaintiffs seek to strike the entire $27,230.00 in expert costs noting no section 998 offer in this matter. Defendant stipulates to the striking of this cost.

The Court, therefore, strikes the entire $27,230.00.

Investigation, Mileage, FedEx and Copying

Here, Defendant seeks cost in the amount of $1,361.41.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5(b) expressly excludes investigation expenses, postage and photocopying charges, except for exhibits.

Additionally, "The only travel expenses authorized by section 1033.5 are those to attend depositions. (§1033.5, subd. (a)(3).) Routine expenses for local travel by attorneys or other firm employees are not reasonably necessary to the conduct of litigation." (Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal. App. 4th 761, 775-776.)

$233.06 appears to be related to travel costs incurred to attend the deposition and therefore the Court will not tax this amount.

However, Defendant cites to no statutory or case authority permitting the recovery of investigation expenses, postage and photocopying charges unrelated to exhibits, other than arguing these costs were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation.

Therefore, the Court will tax this category in the amount of $1,128.35

Summary

Therefore, the Court awards $8,998.92 in costs as follows:

Cost	Amount Sought	Amount Awarded
1. Filing and Motion Fees	$830.54	$830.54
4. Deposition costs	$8,079.55	$7,428.00
5. Service of Process	$507.32	$507.32
14. Fees for electronic filing or service	$251.40	$0.00
16. Other	$28,737.48	$233.06
Total	$38,406.30	$8,998.92

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Graham, Michael vs. CA Farms, LLC

Case No.:   VCU324716

Date:           June 11, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Motion to Consolidate

Tentative Ruling:  To grant the motion, except the court does not order joint trial of all matters in issue. 

Michael and Cynthia Graham move to consolidate this case and Conterra Agricultural Capital, LLC v. Prosperity Farms, LLC, et al., case no. PCU325122, with this case as the lead case.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1048, subdivision (a), states: “When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.”

The case was commenced with a “Complaint for Declaratory Relief” filed on August 14, 2025, by the Grahams against CA Farms, LLC (CA Farms); Ron Cook; and Prosperity Farms Ranch 20, LLC (Prosperity R20).

In the complaint, the Grahams allege, on information and belief, that CA Farms and Cook were attempting to secure a loan or other financing against real property owned by Prosperity R20 without the Grahams’ knowledge or consent.  The Grahams seek, amongst other relief, “a declaration that any encumbrance on the Property [in Prosperity R20] without [the Grahams’] consent is invalid and void.”

CA Farms filed a cross-complaint on October 7, 2025, asserting, against the Grahams (and also naming Prosperity R20 as a defendant), claims for breach of the Prosperity R20 operating agreement and breach of fiduciary duties allegedly owed by the Grahams as managers of Prosperity R20.

The case that the Grahams seek to consolidate with this case, PCU325122, is, as initiated, a receivership action by Conterra Agricultural Capital, LLC (Conterra), which relates to an approximate $32 million loan Conterra made to Prosperity Farms, LLC (Prosperity) and the Grahams, secured by certain real property of Prosperity. 

In PCU325122, the Grahams filed, on February 18, 2026, a cross-complaint asserting 17 causes of action and identifying as cross-defendants, amongst others, Ron Cook; CA Farms, LLC; and Prosperity R20.  Most closely related to the Grahams’ complaint in this case, the Grahams allege in their cross-complaint that “in June 2025, Mr. Cook had transferred title of [certain identified real property] to [Prosperity R20],” which transfer “was never disclosed to the Grahams”; that “Mr. Cook, through [another entity he allegedly controlled, Corporate America Lending], recorded a Deed of Trust against the [aforementioned real property transferred to Prosperity R20] showing a loan for $2,500,000.00 had been recorded,” which “loan was pulled without the Grahams’ knowledge or consent”; and that the Grahams “subsequently discovered … that Mr. Cook assigned the beneficial interest in the loan to [an entity identified as ‘SA9 Properties, LLC’].”

It is clear that the claims in the Grahams’ complaint in this declaratory relief action, and the Grahams’ claims concerning the encumbrance of Prosperity R20’s property in their PCU325122 cross-complaint, are closely related; and, further, that these claims, the claims in CA Farms’s cross-complaint in this case, and the broader claims in the Grahams’ PCU325122 cross-complaint, “arise,” as the Grahams put it, “from the exact same business relationships, governing documents, real property, and alleged course of conduct”—at least in general terms of the overall business relationship as between the involved parties. 

Perhaps for this reason, there has been no opposition filed to the Grahams’ motion. 

Less clear, though, is the connection between Conterra’s underlying receivership action (which includes claims for judicial foreclosure and entry of a deficiency judgment).

Indeed, the court is somewhat intrigued as to why Grahams did not, instead of filing their cross-complaint in PCU325122, simply seek leave to amend their complaint in this action to assert the claims now contained in that cross-complaint.  The declination to do so, unfortunately, leaves this court with the business of deciding how and in what manner to synchronize the related matters of the Grahams’ declaratory relief action, CA Farms cross-action, and the Grahams’ PCU325122 cross-complaint, without creating confusion in the manner of how Conterra’s underlying action in PCU325122 is to proceed. 

Presumably in partial acknowledgement of this issue, the Grahams’ motion states that they seek consolidation of this case and PCU325122, “specifically as to the Cross-Complaint filed by the Grahams therein.” The Grahams request that the Court consolidate the Declaratory Relief and Conterra Action for discovery and trial purposes,” meaning, by this, that the court should allow “ ‘the evidence presented in one case … to be deemed applicable in the other insofar as it is relevant thereto’ while maintaining separate findings and judgments in each case.”  (The Grahams cite Stubblefield Construction Co. v. City of San Bernardino (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 687, 701 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 413], omitting reference to that case’s cited quote of McClure v. Donovan (1949) 33 Cal. 2d 717, 721-722 [205 P.2d 17].)

The court would have preferred to see these issues worked out in meaningful meet and confer efforts regarding the manner of how the respective actions should proceed.  In any event, though, the court agrees that the cross-complaint in this case, the complaint in PCU325122, and the cross-complaint in PCU325122, should be consolidated for all purposes.  It does not, as indicated, however, agree that these matters should be tried jointly with the underlying Conterra action in PCU325122. 

As a result, the court grants the Grahams’ motion with an exception.  As requested, this case and PCU325122 shall be consolidated, with this case designated as the lead case.  The court declines, however, to order a joint trial of the original Conterra action with the Grahams’ cross-action and declaratory relief action.  Conterra’s action, on the one hand; and the Grahams’ declaratory relief action (along with defendants’/cross-complaints’ cross-action) and the Grahams’ cross-action in PCU325122, on the other, shall, absent further order to the contrary, be tried separately.  Relatedly, the court does not here determine that evidence from the aforementioned related matters is “to be deemed applicable” to Conterra’s underlying PCU325122 action. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Capital One, N.A. vs. Barnett, David T

Case No.:   VCL331502

Date:           June 11, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Defendant’s Motion for Relief from Default Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts

In this common counts complaint, Plaintiff filed a proof of service purporting that personal service occurred on February 26, 2026, 2:35 pm at 3144 W Monte Vista Court, Visalia, on Defendant David Barnett. The proof of service was completed by a registered California process server.

Default was entered April 20, 2026. Default judgment in the amount of $2,160.85 was entered April 24, 2026.

On April 29, 2026, Defendant filed this motion for relief from default judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473. In support, Defendant declares “I timely filed a General Denial in response to the complaint. As a self-represented litigant, I did not understand that I was also required to serve Plaintiff’ s counsel with a copy of my response. Because of that mistake, I did not appear and judgment was entered against me. I respectfully request that the Court vacate the judgment and allow this matter to be heard on the merits. I dispute the amount claimed and request the opportunity to defend this case.”

Defendant has filed a proof of service of this motion.

No opposition has been filed.

Authority and Analysis

The Court may relieve a party or counsel from a judgment, dismissal, order or other proceeding taken against the party resulting from mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).)  The application for relief must be made within a reasonable time, not to exceed six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order or proceeding was taken.  (Id.)  

“Section 473 is often applied liberally where the party in default moves promptly to seek relief, and the party opposing the motion will not suffer prejudice if relief is granted.  [Citations.]  In such situations ‘very slight evidence will be required to justify a court in setting aside the default.’  [Citation.]”  (Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 233.)

“A ‘mistake’ exists when a person, under some erroneous conviction of law or fact, does, or omits to do, some act which, but for the erroneous conviction, he would not have done, or omitted. It may arise either from unconsciousness, ignorance, forgetfulness, imposition, or misplaced confidence.” (Salazar v. Steelman (1937) 22 Cal.App.2d 402, 405, 410.) 

“Surprise” is defined as “some condition or situation in which a party to a cause is unexpectedly placed to his injury, without any default or negligence of his own, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.” (Miller v. Lee (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 10, 16.)

Further, “excusable neglect” has been defined as “neglect that might have been the act or omission of a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.” (Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.App.3d 427, 435.)

“Finally, as for inadvertence or neglect, ‘[t]o warrant relief under section 473 a litigant's neglect must have been such as might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances. The inadvertence contemplated by the statute does not mean mere inadvertence in the abstract. If it is wholly inexcusable it does not justify relief.’ ” (Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1206.)” (Henderson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 215, 230.)

Here, however, Defendant’s statement that an answer was filed timely, but not served, is insufficient to grant the relief requested. To start, the Court notes no timely filing of an answer. Had an answer been filed, but not served, no entry of default or would have occurred and no default judgment would have been entered. However, in the absence of a timely filed answer, the Court does not find a basis for mistake, surprise, neglect or inadvertence.

Additionally, the Court notes a completed proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption that the documents as indicated in the proof of service were received.  (Colleen M. v. Fertility & Surgical Assocs. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1479-1480.)  The presumption of proper service can be rebutted by introducing evidence that the document was not received.  (Phay Him v. City & County of San Francisco (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 437, 445.)  A rebuttal of the presumption of proper service should be supported by sworn testimony that neither the attorney of record nor the party received the document.  (Bonzer v. City of Huntington Park (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1479-1480.)  

Here, the motion and declaration provide no grounds to rebut the presumption of proper service.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Boutin, Raymond vs. City of Yreka, et al

Case No.:   25CV09044

Date:           June 11, 2026

Time:           9:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Defendant’s Demurrer to First Amended Complaint

Tentative Ruling: To overrule the demurrer; to order Defendant to answer the amended complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

Facts

The first amended complaint alleges the following causes of action against the Defendant City for:

(1) Whistleblower Retaliation (Labor Code § 1102.5);

(2) Age Discrimination – Disparate Treatment (Gov. Code § 12940(a));

(3) Age Discrimination – Disparate Impact (Gov. Code § 12940(a));

(4) Disability Discrimination (Gov. Code § 12940(a));

(5) Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process (Gov. Code § 12940(n);

(6) Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation (Gov. Code § 12940(m);

(7) Hostile Work Environment Harassment (Gov. Code § 12940(j));

(8) Retaliation (Gov. Code § 12940(h)); and

(9) Failure to Prevent Discrimination, Harassment, and Retaliation (Gov. Code 12940(k)).

Generally, Plaintiff alleges he began working for the City in 1992 in the police department as a part time dispatcher, eventually reaching the rank of Lieutenant. (FAC ¶6.) Plaintiff alleges that on or about May 21, 2024, Plaintiff was issued a Notice of Placement on Paid Administrative Leave and a Notice of Intent to Terminate. (FAC ¶92.) On or about June 21, 2024, Plaintiff received a Notice of Discipline – Termination, stating the termination would not be overturned. (FAC ¶96.)

Defendant City demurrers to the second, third, fifth, sixth and seventh causes of action for failure to allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. Plaintiff, in opposition, identifies allegations purportedly in satisfaction of the elements of these causes of action.

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Second Cause of Action - Age Discrimination – Disparate Treatment (Gov. Code § 12940(a))

Under Government Code section 12940(a), it is impermissible to discriminate “…in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” based on age. (Gov. Code, § 12940(a).) “‘To establish a disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff must prove the defendant intentionally discriminated.’ [citation omitted]…Under the FEHA, the discriminatory intent does not need to be proven as the sole motivation behind the challenged action, but the plaintiff must produce evidence that, taken a whole, permits a rational inference that intentional discrimination was a substantial motivating reason for the adverse action. [citation omitted].” (Carroll v. City and County of San Francisco (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1192, 1204.) Such a claim can be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. (Id.)

"To succeed on a disparate treatment claim at trial, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, to wit, a set of circumstances that, if unexplained, permit an inference that it is more likely than not the employer intentionally treated the employee less favorably than others on prohibited grounds. Based on the inherent difficulties of showing intentional discrimination, courts have generally adopted a multifactor test to determine if a plaintiff was subject to disparate treatment. The plaintiff must generally show that: he or she was a member of a protected class; was qualified for the position he sought; suffered an adverse employment action, and there were circumstances suggesting that the employer acted with a discriminatory motive. (Jones v. Department of Corrections (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1379, internal citations omitted; See also CACI 2500.)

It appears undisputed that Plaintiff was a member of a protected class (FAC ¶133.)

Further, it appears undisputed that an adverse employment action or actions occurred and that Plaintiff was otherwise qualified for his position. Plaintiff notes allegations including retaliatory investigations (FAC ¶¶ 11-16, 37, 43-49, 73-87, 92, 95), disciplinary proceedings (FAC ¶¶ 92, 95, 104-105), exclusion from workplace decision-making (FAC ¶ 27), and ultimately termination from employment (FAC ¶ 96.) (See also FAC ¶132.)

Additionally, it appears undisputed that Plaintiff was qualified to perform his position within the department. (FAC ¶¶6-9, 33, 36, 110.)

Here, Defendant challenges the final element as to the alleged circumstances suggesting the City acted with a discriminatory motive based on Plaintiff’s age.

Plaintiff alleges “Plaintiff’s age was a substantial motivating reason for Defendant(s)’ decision to subject Plaintiff to adverse employment actions…” (FAC ¶133.) Further, that there exists a “pattern in which younger employees, ranging from a near-decade to two decades younger than Plaintiff, received preferential treatment, and Plaintiff, the oldest in rank, was repeatedly targeted, scrutinized, and ultimately terminated on grounds pretextually inflated by subordinates who had long expressed hostility toward him” (Opposition to Demurrer 5:2-5.)

Plaintiff first notes allegations that Chief Gamache was appointed to Chief in April 2018 despite being 8 or 9 years younger than Plaintiff, with less seniority and less experience than Plaintiff. (FAC ¶19.) Plaintiff alleges the former chief, Chief Bowles gave “preferential treatment” toward Gamache, Betts and Potter, all of whom were younger than Plaintiff and all of whom were alleged to have been less experienced and less senior than Plaintiff. (FAC ¶20.)

Additionally, that in and around May 2018, Chief Gamache appointed Potter to one of the vacant Sergeant positions and placed Potter in charge of training and scheduling, despite that Potter was 17 years younger than Plaintiff. (FAC ¶21.)

Further, that Chief Gamache would promote, or give special duties and/or assignments, to Betts, Duncan, and Potter (all younger than Plaintiff) without interviewing other potential candidates “who were usually older and more senior than Chief Gamache’s clique of subordinates.” (FAC ¶22.)

Additionally that Gamache offered free time off chips to younger employees, that Betts was permitted to work only about 2 hours per day and that Betts used a work cellular phone as a personal phone with the approval of Gamache. (FAC ¶25.)

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff was made “Sergeant in Charge” but that City Manager Baker, instead of promoting Plaintiff, rehired former Senior Sergeant Mark Gilman to become the Acting Chief and that “City Manager Baker’s decision appeared to be retaliatory and discriminatory, as BOUTIN was qualified for the position and had more seniority at the time, as he was a current DEPARTMENT employee.” (FAC ¶33.)

In sum, Plaintiff alleges younger employees were treated more favorably as to assignments, privileges of employment, placement, and promotion than Plaintiff.   “At least three types of evidence can be used to show pretext: (1) direct evidence of retaliation, such as statements or admissions, (2) comparative evidence, and (3) statistics.” (Iwekaogwu v. City of L.A. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 803, 816.) The amended complaint sufficiently alleges, at the demurrer stage, that intentional discrimination occurred based on Plaintiff’s age, as only younger employees were given preferential treatment.

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer as to the second cause of action, finding sufficient circumstantial allegations of disparate treatment on the basis of age.

Third Cause of Action - Age Discrimination – Disparate Impact (Gov. Code § 12940(a))

"The first step in raising a disparate-impact claim is to identify the specific employment practice allegedly causing the discriminatory impact." (Carpenter v. Boeing Co., (9th Cir. 2006) 456 F.3d 1183, 1193.) Further, “Plaintiffs generally cannot attack an overall decisionmaking process in the disparate impact context, but must instead identify the particular element or practice within the process that causes an adverse impact.” (Stout v. Potter (9^th Cir. 2022) 276 F.3d 1118, 1124.)

Here, the amended complaint alleges the City “…had an employment practice of discipline that had a disproportionate adverse effect on employees 58 years of age and older.” (FAC ¶ 144.) 

Paragraph 37 alleges requests to remove an older report from Plaintiff’s personnel file pursuant to an internal policy for which Chief Gilman refused. (FAC ¶¶37, 49, 73.) This, in combination with the allegations of preferential treatment of younger employees discussed above, is sufficient to state a cause of action for disparate treatment, as these paragraphs reflect a “facially neutral employer practice or policy” that is alleged to have “…had a disproportionate adverse effect on members of the protected class.” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354, fn. 20.)

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer to this cause of action.

Fifth Cause of Action - Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process (Gov. Code § 12940(n)

“Under FEHA, an employer must engage in a good faith interactive process with the disabled employee to explore the alternatives to accommodate the disability. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (n); Claudio v. Regents of the University of California (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 224, 242.)” (Wysinger v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 413, 424.)

FEHA requires an employer and a disabled employee to engage in a timely, good faith "interactive process" to identify or implement effective, reasonable accommodations that will enable the employee to perform their job effectively. (Gov't. Code § 12940(n); 2 Cal. Code Regs. § 11069(a); Scotch v. Art Institute of California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1013.)  To prevail on a claim under Government Code section 12940(n), "…the employee must be able to identify an available accommodation the interactive process should have produced." (Id. at 1018-1019.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges, amongst other allegations, “On or about August 11, 2021, BOUTIN injured his left shoulder while struggling with a suspect. BOUTIN informed the DEPARTMENT of his injury and resulting limitations. However, the DEPARTMENT refused to engage in the interactive process with BOUTIN and failed to accommodate BOUTIN’s left shoulder injury.” (FAC ¶40.) Further, that Plaintiff, after filing a workers compensation claim related to this injury, informed Defendant of his injury and resulting limitations. (FAC ¶53.) However, Defendant “…refused to engage in the interactive process with BOUTIN and failed to accommodate BOUTIN’s left shoulder injury.” (FAC ¶53.) Further, Plaintiff alleges “In and between March 2023 and April 2023, after BOUTIN’s left shoulder surgery, the DEPARTMENT placed BOUTIN on light duty for only one month to recover. Although needed beyond one month, the DEPARTMENT removed BOUTIN from light duty and did not consider any other reasonable accommodations.” (FAC ¶61.)

The Court finds these allegations sufficient, at least as to the left shoulder injury that initially occurred August 11, 2021, to allege a claim for failure to engage in the interactive process. The Court finds sufficient that Plaintiff alleges an extended period of light duty is an available accommodation that the process should have produced, as opposed to a single month of light duty.

Because “[a] demurrer must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained,” the Court does not adjudicate whether the other allegations as to other injuries or processes are sufficient. (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer to the fifth cause of action.

Sixth Cause of Action - Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation (Gov. Code § 12940(m)

Further, “An employer… has an affirmative duty to make reasonable accommodation(s) for the disability of any… employee if the employer… knows of the disability, unless the employer…can demonstrate, after engaging in the interactive process, that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship." (2 Cal. Code Regs. § 11068(a).)  To establish the failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the employee suffered a disability (2) the employee could perform the essential functions of the job with reasonable accommodation, and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the employee's disability." (Nealy v. City of Santa Monica (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 359, 373.) 

Here, as with the above, the August 11, 2021 left shoulder injury constitutes a sufficient allegation of a disability, that Plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job with a reasonable accommodation (such as light duty) and that Defendant failed to accommodate the disability by failing to provide an extended period of light duty. Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer to this cause of action.

Seventh Cause of Action - Hostile Work Environment Harassment (Gov. Code § 12940(j))

Government Code section 12940, subdivision (j)(1) prohibits harassment of an employee "because of…physical disability…medical condition…[and] age." The elements of a cause of action for harassment under FEHA are: (1) plaintiff belongs to a protected group; (2) plaintiff was subject to harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on the plaintiff's membership in the protected group; and (4) the harassment complained of was sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment (Jones v. Dep't of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1377.)

As to the remaining elements, the Court notes hostile work environment is determinable only by considering all of the circumstances, which may include frequency, severity and job interference. (Miller v. Dept. of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 462.) Further, the elements of severe or pervasive harassment unreasonably interfering with work performance are assessed from the perspective of a reasonable person of the protected class. (Thompson v. City of Monrovia (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 860, 877.)

“Ostracism, of course, does not amount to a hostile environment, and no cause of action can be pled on that basis alone.” (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 615.) Harassment does not typically include commonly necessary personnel management actions, such as hiring, firing, job assignments, promotion, demotion, performance evaluations, excluding from meetings, and laying off. (Thompson, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at 879.) "[H]arassment consists of conduct outside the scope of necessary job performance, conduct presumably engaged in for personal gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or for other personal motives. Harassment is not conduct of a type necessary for management of the employer's business or performance of the supervisory employee's job." (Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 646.)

However, "[I]n some cases the hostile message that constitutes ... harassment is conveyed through official employment actions, and therefore evidence that would otherwise be associated with a discrimination claim can form the basis of a harassment claim." (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 708.) AS such, official employment actions can evidence a harassment claim where the action communicates a hostile or offensive message to the employee. (Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 918, 932-933.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges his age and shoulder injury meet the first element as to protected class. (FAC ¶¶ 201, 203.)

As the Court has found a sufficient cause of action for discrimination based on disparate treatment above related to Plaintiff’s age, the Court finds a sufficient showing here that the circulation of rumors (FAC ¶34, 35, 38) and that Plaintiff “was routinely left out of meetings, did not receive feedback on DEPARTMENT issues, did not receive any supervision, and was given the “silent treatment” even in professional communications” (FAC ¶27) are sufficiently beyond simple ostracism and routine employment actions. While the Court notes that some of these appear more directly connected to Plaintiff’s alleged whistleblowing or reporting activities, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that preferential treatment of younger employees underlies the alleged harassment described above. (FAC ¶¶20-22, 25.)

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer to the seventh cause of action.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared June 15 - June 17, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR050740	In the Matter of Flores, Rachel	Confirm Sale Real Property	Appearance Required	Appearance required pursuant to CRC, rule 7.452
VPR053647	In the Matter of Maria Mjia	Petition for Small Estate Set-Aside	Recommended for Approval
VPR052773	In the Matter of Perez, Eusebio Elizarraraz	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053443	In the Matter of Lewis, Orville Dale	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR050199	In the Matter of Boykin, Thelma	OSC Hearing	Appearance Required	Continued hearing for missing accounting: The filed document does not comply with CRC, rule 7.575 for Accounting and Objection filed
VPR054101	In the Matter of Gundy, Gregory Dale	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Recommended for Approval
VPR045184	In the Matter of Chole Davis Special Needs Trust	Accounting Hearing	Recommended for Approval
VPR052768	In the Matter of Denham, Elsie	Status Conference	Appearance Required	Status of related case
VPR053673	In the Matter of Monty, Devon Robert	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Citation not filed. Petitioner’s Screening Form, Item 16 omitted.
VPR053900	In the Matter of Flowers, Karlen M.	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Capacity Declaration, Notice of Hearing and Citation not filed. Attachment Requesting Special Orders Regarding a Major Neurocognitive Disorder (form GC-313) not attached to petition.
VPR044298	In the Matter of Mesa, Alexander	Hearing: Transfer of Jurisdiction	Appearance Required	Review transfer of venue to Fresno County
VPR047970	In the Matter of Pineda, Francisco Javier Amaya	OSC Hearing	Appearance Required	Missing Accounting and Notice of Death

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                           There is no probate calendar for June 11, 2026 and June 18, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430.
 

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments

South County Justice Center & Visalia-County Civic Center

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared  June 10 – 12, 2026 that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date	Dept	Case	Comments
6/10/2026	Dept 2	VPR052643; In the Matter of C.A.K	Notice to parents needs to be completed NOT LODGED- Order Terminating Guardianship
6/11/26	Dept 2	VPR054063; IMO of L.M., S.M., V.M., L.M., I.M.	Notice for L.M. needs to be addressed; Notice for Father of the Petition for SIJF needs to be completed; Confidential Guardian Screening From needs to be filed; SIJF Order form GC-224 should be issued for each youth; Declaration of Orientation needs to be filed; Petitioner & adult Household members need to submit to background check.
6/11/26	DEPT 2	VPR054089; IMO R.E.H	Notice for Father of the GS Petition and SIJF Petition needs to be completed; Notice for Paternal & Maternal Grandmother for the GS hearing needs to be completed; Confidential Guardianship Screening Form is incomplete; Declaration of Orientation needs to be filed; Petitioner & adult Household members need to submit to background check
6/12/26	Dept 2	VPR054096; IMO E.E.H.	SAME ISSUES ADDRESSED FOR RELATED CASE, VPR054089
6/12/26	Dept 9	VPR053787; IMO N.H.	Livescan Not Completed; Mandatory Guardianship Orientation not completed; Interviews not completed
6/12/26	Dept 9	VPR053770; IMO P.M.	Same issues as related case VPR053770