Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Monday, May 11, 2026, are:

Re:                Pursley, Richard vs. FCA US LLC

Case No.:  VCU330916

Date:          May 11, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:    (1) Demurrer; (2) Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling: (1) and (2): To find the demurrer and motion to strike moot by the filing of the amended complaint.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Perez, Sabrina Veronica vs. Gomez, Jennifer

Case No.:  VCL296115

Date:          May 11, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Defendants’ Motion (1) to Quash Subpoena and (2) to Declare Plaintiff Vexatious

Tentative Ruling: (1) To grant the motion; (2) To find Plaintiff a vexatious litigant; to hold the evidentiary hearing as to probable validity on the remaining claims.

(1) Defendants’ Motion to Quash Subpoena

Facts and Analysis

On March 13, 2026, Plaintiff purported to issue a subpoena as to videos from Farmersville PD from March 13, 2023 and May 12, 2021. However, the subpoena is not directed at any party, and there is no information as to the date of appearance or production. Further, the proof of service is blank. There is a notice to consumer that appears to direct the subpoena at “Farmersville Police Department 909 W. Visalia Rd. Farmersville, CA. 93223” but again no date for production appears.

Defendants move to quash the subpoena based on these omissions.

No opposition to this motion appears filed.

“[S]ervice of a subpoena on a witness is an original exercise of jurisdiction over him” (In re Abrams (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 685, 692) and “[n]o person is compelled to act in a judicial proceeding in which jurisdiction over her person has not been obtained” (Sousa v. Freitas (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 660, 668.) Accordingly, “a deposition subpoena that has not been personally served in compliance with [Code of Civil Procedure] section 2020.220 imposes no obligations on a nonparty deponent.”  (In re Marriage of Moore (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1275, 1288.) 

Here, there is no proof of service of the subpoena.

Further, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1985(a) “The process by which the attendance of a witness is required is the subpoena. It is a writ or order directed to a person and requiring the person’s attendance at a particular time and place to testify as a witness.” Here, without a time, date and place for attendance or production, the subpoena cannot be complied with by the entity  to whom it is directed. Further, there is no entity or person to whom the subpoena is directed.

Therefore, the Court quashes the subpoena in its entirety.

(2) Defendants’ Motion to Deem Plaintiff Vexatious

Background

On or about February 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed the complaint in this matter. The Court sustained Defendants Farmersville, Brogan, Vasquez and Gomez’s (“Defendants”) demurrer with leave to amend on uncertainty grounds and for violations of California Rule of Court, rule 2.112.

On July 14, 2023, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint alleging two tort-based causes of action against Defendants and alleging that Plaintiff had filed a simple “complaint form” with the Farmersville Police Department in 2021 in satisfaction of the tort claims presentation requirement. The Court again sustained Defendants’ demurrer with leave to amend to permit pleading compliance with the presentation of tort claims requirements.

On October 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed the Second Amendment Complaint alleging negligence, sexual battery, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress related to an interaction with police officers of the named Defendant, Farmersville Police Department and naming individual Defendants Jenifer Gomez, Jay Brock, Jeremy Brogan, Luis Frausto and Ralph Vasquez. Plaintiff seeks between $8 billion and $88 billion in damages. The Court again sustained a demurrer for failure to plead compliance with the Tort Claims Act.

On December 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed this Third Amended Complaint alleging (1) negligence; (2) battery; (3) sexual battery; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (6) defamation against Defendant Farmersville Police Department and individual Defendants Jenifer Gomez, Jay Brock, Jeremy Brogan, Luis Frausto and Ralph Vasquez. Plaintiff sought between $8 billion and $88 billion in damages depending on the cause of action.

On February 26, 2024, the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend this time because of the appellant’s failure to comply with the presentation requirement.

The February 26, 2024 ruling did not address the inclusion of Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C § 1983 claim, included in the third amended complaint.

Plaintiff appealed this decision on the basis that no claim presentation was required as to a 1983 claim.

On September 10, 2024, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of Tulare County issued its decision reversing the ruling on demurrer as it pertains to the 1983 claim and permitting leave to amend the complaint as to the 1983 claim.

On October 2, 2024 and October 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed additional amended complaints, thereafter served one or more of the amended complaints on various other defendants.

On March 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a seventh amended complaint. The motion was unopposed and the Court granted it, permitting filing of the seventh amended complaint. The amended complaint alleges 15 causes of action under the 14^th Amendment and 42 U.S.C § 1983.

An operative eighth amended complaint was filed, and, after Defendants’ demurrer and motion to strike were heard, the Court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend as to the majority of the operative amended complaint. The second cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 – 14^th Amendment  as to Defendant Brogan and fourth cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 – 14^th Amendment, as to Defendants Pacheco and Frausto, remained following the ruling on demurrer.

Further, the result of this demurrer is that prior Defendants Jennifer Gomez, Jay Brock, Ralph Vasquez and Farmersville Police Department were dismissed.

The Court notes that it previously denied a motion to deem Plaintiff vexatious litigant, finding an insufficient number of repeated filings under Code of Civil Procedure section 391(b)(3).

Facts as to Vexatious Litigant

On March 24, 2026, Defendants filed this motion to deem Plaintiff a vexatious litigant on the basis that Plaintiff “continues to file frivolous motions, pleadings and legal actions which contain irrelevant, false, and improper matters.”

Defendants note that on August 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed three motions: (1) Motion to Order Defendants 1-7 to Pay Their Own Court and Attorney Costs (2) Motion to Reclassify from limited to unlimited jurisdiction; (3) Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Interrogatory Responses. Further that, on October 27, 2025, all three motions were denied.

Further, on March 13, 2026, Plaintiff served on Defendants' counsel a Subpoena for Personal Appearance and Production of Records and a Notice to Consumer, at issue in the motion to quash adjudicated above. The Court has granted Defendants’ motion to quash the subpoena.

Further, on March 13, 2026, Plaintiff served Defendants, including the four dismissed Defendants noted above, with interrogatories identical to the ones served May 14, 2025 and subject to the prior, denied, motion to compel.

On March 25, 2026, Plaintiff filed (1) Motion to Order Defendants 1-7 to Pay Their Own Court and Attorney Costs; (2) Motion titled Motion to Not have a Settlement Conference; and (3) Motion for Renewal and to Enter Proposed Order. The Court denied these motions on April 20, 2026.

In opposition, Plaintiff, on March 25, 2026 filed a declaration arguing that the Court has previously denied this motion and making a number of other statements that fail to address the repetitive filing issues. Plaintiff also filed an opposition on April 27, 2026, arguing that that it is not significant that these prior motions were denied.

Authority and Analysis

A person may be declared a vexatious litigant upon a noticed motion and hearing. (Bravo v. Ismaj (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 211, 225; Hupp v. Solera Oak Valley Greens Assn. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1300, 1319.) “Any determination that a litigant is vexatious must comport with the intent and spirit of the vexatious litigant statute.  The purpose of which is to address the problem created by the persistent and obsessive litigant who constantly has pending a number of groundless actions and whose conduct causes serious financial results to the unfortunate objects of his or her attacks and places an unreasonable burden on the courts.”  (Morton v. Wagner (2007) 156 Cal. App. 4th 963, 970-71.)

The requirement that a judge must find that a litigant has no reasonable probability of prevailing in the litigation applies only when the judge orders the litigant to furnish security in an action under Code of Civil Procedure section 391.1 and 391.3. Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7 does not require the judge to find that there is no reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail in the litigation before the judge may make a prefiling order. (In re Marriage of Rifkin & Carty (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1348.)

Defendants move to deem Plaintiff vexatious pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 391(b)(3), which states that a vexatious litigant is a person who:

"[i]n any litigation while acting in propria persona, repeatedly files unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay."

Here, Plaintiff has acted in propria persona.

This matter qualifies as a litigation, expressly defined under subsection (a) as follows: “any civil action or proceeding, commenced, maintained or pending in any state or federal court.”

As to the standard of “repeatedly files unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay” the Court agrees that the filing of motions that have been previously denied, filing motions for reconsideration that are untimely and lack new facts or law, service of discovery on nonparties and an incomplete subpoena constitute sufficient repetitive filings of unmeritorious motions and conducting of unnecessary discovery. On these facts, the Court concludes Plaintiff has met the definition of a vexatious litigant under section 391(b)(3).

Security and Prefiling Order

Once an individual is deemed a vexatious litigant, the Court can monitor and control their access to the court system, including by requiring them to furnish security to assure payment of the opposing party’s reasonable expenses, including attorneys’ fees in an action in which they cannot demonstrate a probability of success and by issuing a “pre-filing order” prohibiting them from filing new litigation in a California court in propria persona without first obtaining permission from the presiding judge. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 391, subds. (c), (d); 391.3, subd. (a); 391.7, subd. (a).)

Such measures are warranted because “[t]he unreasonable burden placed upon the courts by groundless litigation prevents the speedy consideration of proper litigation … The court cannot permit such litigation to continue without offering the protection provided in the vexatious litigant statutes ….” (First Western Development Corp v. Superior Court (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 860, 870.)

Under section 391.1(a), “a defendant may move the court, upon notice and hearing, for an order requiring the plaintiff to furnish security or for an order dismissing the litigation pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 391.3. The motion for an order requiring the plaintiff to furnish security shall be based upon the ground, and supported by a showing, that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and that there is not a reasonable probability that they will prevail in the litigation against the moving defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 391.1.)

Section 391.2 provides that “the court shall consider any evidence, written or oral, by witnesses or affidavit, as may be material to the ground of the motion.”

Here, Defendants have moved for an order requiring Plaintiff to file an undertaking and for the Court to order a prefiling order.

However, the Court’s review of the written evidence, consisting of the Declaration of Farley that attaches a number of documents and the request for judicial notice of the dockets of a various cases filed by Plaintiff, does not indicate a lack of probable validity as to the 1983 claims remaining against Defendants Brogan, Pacheco and Frausto.

Therefore any determination of probable validity will be based on evidence presented at the hearing. The Court understands that either party may appear at this motion and present evidence material to the grounds of the motion pursuant to section 391.2. The Court reserves the right to modify this ruling after hearing any such evidence. 

Should Defendants make the requisite showing as to no reasonable probability that Plaintiff will prevail in this litigation, the Court is prepared to order a bond of $25,000, as requested, pursuant to section 391.1 within thirty (30) days and to make a prefiling order pursuant to section 391.7.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Trinidad, Tanya vs. BMW of North America, LLC

Case No.:   VCU313462

Date:           May 11, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Deposition of Defendant’s PMK

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts

In this Song Beverly action, Plaintiff served an initial notice of deposition of Defendant BMW NA’s Person Most Knowledgeable and requests for production of documents for the deposition to BMW NA’s counsel for the deposition to take place in April of 2025.

On April 3, 2025, BMW NA served objections to Plaintiff’s deposition notice and that Defendant would not produce a witness on that date.

“Thereafter, Plaintiff attempted again to depose the PMK, and again on December 24, 2025, Defendant served objections indicating no witness would be provided, and did not offer any alternative dates for the deposition to occur.” (Declaration of Ardi ¶12.)

It does not appear to the Court that the depositions the first or second time were conducted, as no transcript of nonappearance or declaration as to the nonappearances has been provided,

No opposition appears to have been filed.

Authority and Analysis

Plaintiff has the right to take Defendant PMK’s deposition.

Serving an objection based on unavailability or unilateral setting does not impose a stay on a notice of deposition. A notice of unavailability has no legal effect and does not entitle a party to a continuance. Should the deponent fail to appear or fail to answer questions at a properly noticed deposition, only then Plaintiff may choose whatever remedies that are available to seek the Court's intervention to resolve any discovery disputes.

Moreover, although Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.410(b), provides that any deposition taken after the timely service of a valid objection cannot be used against the objecting party if the party did not attend the deposition, such objection mentioned in section 2025.410 relates to an error or irregularity in a deposition notice that does not comply with Article 2 (commencing with Section 2025.210). (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450(a).)

The types of objections contemplated by Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.210 et seq., deal with procedural requirements such as when a defendant or plaintiff may serve a deposition notice (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.210), the contents required to be included in a deposition notice (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2025.220, 2025.230), to whom notice of the deposition must be given (CCP § 2025.240), the location of the deposition (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2025.250, 2025.260), the number of days required to be given in advance of the deposition (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.270), and the manner of service upon party deponents (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.280).

Therefore, Defendant, based on validly served deposition notices and absent the objections noted above, was required to produce "those of its officers, directors, managing agents, employees, or agents who are most qualified to testify on its behalf as to those matters to the extent of any information known or reasonably available to the deponent." (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.230.)

However, to obtain a court order for the deposition, Plaintiff must comply with the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450 states:

“(a) If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.”

“(b)(2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the documents, electronically stored information, or things described in the deposition notice, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance.” (emphasis added)

However, a motion to compel a deposition must be accompanied "by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance." (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450, subd. (b)(2).) No traditional meet and confer was required by law. As Rutter notes,  "No 'meet and confer' is required where the deponent 'fails to attend the deposition ....' In such cases, all that is required is a declaration by the moving party that he or she has contacted the deponent 'to inquire about the nonappearance.'" (Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial [The Rutter Group 2023], ¶ 8:813 [quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b)(2)].)

No motion to compel here lies where the deponent or counsel merely state they will not attend the deposition and where no notice of nonappearance is placed on the record via transcript or declaration.

As noted above, the objections served do not impose a stay on a notice of deposition and are not a substitute for a protective order. (Snyder v. Superior Court (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 579, 586 [applying former Code Civ. Proc. § 2021]; Carl v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 73,76.)

The Court cannot say 2025.450 has been complied with absent the failure to appear for the examination and a declaration stating Plaintiff has contacted Defendants to inquire as to the nonappearance. Here, no deposition and nonappearance took place based on the record before the Court.

Plaintiff has failed to meet the conditions of section 2025.450 before bringing this motion because Plaintiff did not move forward with the deposition, did not provide a declaration sufficient under subsection (b)(2) and because no deposition was held for which the PMQs failed to appear, to proceed, or to produce documents or tangible things as requested by Plaintiff.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Toor Farming, LLC vs. Kaitech Automation

Case No.:  VCU294686

Date:           May 11, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Defendant’s Counsel’s Motion to be Relieved

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts

On April 9, 2026, Defendant’s counsel filed this motion to be relieved as to Defendant Kaitech and set the motion for hearing May 11, 2026.

Counsel filed the following with respect to withdrawing:

(1) MC-051 - Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as Counsel;

(2) MC-052 – Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel; and

(3) MC-053 - Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel

The Court notes that the mandatory settlement conference is set for this same hearing date May 11, 2026 and trial is set for May 18, 2026.

Counsel has filed proofs of service of these documents by mail.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 284 provides that “[t]he attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at any time before or after judgment of final determination, as follows: 1. Upon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes; [or] 2. Upon the order of the court, upon the application of either client or attorney, after notice from one to the other.”

California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) requires that the “notice of motion and motion to be relieved as counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) must be directed to the client and must be made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-051).”

As noted above, counsel has complied with California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) by submitting the notice and motion on MC-051 and by directing the notice and motion to Plaintiff.

California Rule of Court 3.1362 (c) further mandates that: “The motion to be relieved as counsel must be accompanied by a declaration on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel--Civil (form MC-052). The declaration must state in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1). Specifically, the declaration that Rule 3.1362(c) requires must state that the moving attorney attempted to secure a “Substitution of Attorney” from the client as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1) and that the client refused to so stipulate.

Here, the declaration is properly made on form MC-052 and uses general terms without compromising confidentiality, but does not indicate that counsel attempted to obtain a substitution by consent prior to making this motion.

Further, the Court notes a stipulation filed March 26, 2026 indicating “On July 29, 2025, Kaitech notified Toor that Kaitech intends to file Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, through separate bankruptcy counsel,” that “To date, Kaitech has not filed for bankruptcy” and “Kaitech’s counsel also informed Toor’s counsel that no person with settlement authority intends to appear on behalf of Kaitech at the Mandatory Settlement Conference given the aforementioned circumstances.”

Next, service under Rule 3.1362(d) requires personal service, electronic service, or mail and counsel’s declaration must note the service made. Here, service was by mail on April 9, 2026. The declaration of counsel indicates that Defendant’s address was confirmed as current via telephone. 

Finally, Rule 3.1362(e) requires the proposed order be lodged with the Court on MC-053 with the moving papers, specifying all hearing dates scheduled, including date of trial. Counsel has complied with this requirement.

The Court denies, without prejudice, Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw as to Defendant based upon the lack of compliance with California Rule of Court 3.1362(c) with respect to attempting to obtain a “Substitution of Attorney” prior to moving to withdraw and reflecting such efforts in the declaration and based on the proximity to trial and the mandatory settlement conference date.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Progressive West Insurance Company vs. Chapa, Alexander et al

Case No.:   VCL322500

Date:           May 11, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:    Motion for Relief from Dismissal

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to set a CMC for June 29, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 7.

Facts

Plaintiff filed this matter June 16, 2025. Defendants were served via substitute service June 30, 2025. No answers appear to have been filed. Default has been entered as to Defendant Liza Chapman.

A case management conference was set for October 20, 2025.

Plaintiff failed to appear at the case management conference.

On October 20, 2025, this Court issued an order to show cause why monetary sanctions in the amount of $150.00, including dismissal of this action or striking a pleading, should not be imposed for your failure to appear for the Case Management Conference on October 15, 2025.

The OSC was set for November 21, 2025, 8:30 am, Dept. 7.

No appearance was made and the Court dismissed this matter.

On March 24, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion for relief from the dismissal and attaches counsel’s declaration that states:

“4. At the time the case was filed, the Court set a Case Management Conference for 10/15/2025. The hearing date was placed on the firm calendar, and a Case Management Statement was filed on 10/01/2025.

5. On or about 09/25/2025, the firm calendar clerk arranged for a special appearance through Court Appearance Professionals (“CAPS”) for the 10/15/2025 Case Management Conference.

6. On or about 10/17/2025, results from the 10/15/2025 hearing were received in my office. The assigned attorney advised that he was never admitted to the Zoom hearing by the court. A copy of the hearing result is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

7. The firm’s regular calendar clerk was out of the office on the date of this hearing and when the results came in. The person who processed the hearing results did not understand the ramifications of the results received and, therefore, did not check the Court docket to determine what had transpired at the 10/15/2025 hearing. As a result of that error, my office was unaware that the Court set an Order to Show Cause for 11/21/2025, that hearing was never placed on the firm calendar and no appearance was made.” (Declaration of Gaba Jr. ¶¶4-10.)

Therefore, Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to the mandatory provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b).

Authority and Analysis

As Younessi v. Woolf (2016) 244 Cal. App.4th 1137 explains, Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b) allows a court to vacate a judgment dismissing an action on two separate grounds. First, “[t]he court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (Id. at 1144.) The application must be made within a “reasonable time,” but in no event more than six months after the dismissal or other action. (Id.)

However, the second ground for relief under section 473(b), the “attorney-fault” provision, makes relief from dismissal mandatory if accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to the attorney’s “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect” resulting in the dismissal, unless the court finds, in fact, the dismissal did not result from such conduct. (Id. at 1147.) As opposed to the “discretionary” prong for relief, a motion based on “attorney fault” need not show diligence in seeking relief. (Id.)

The entry of dismissal in Younessi was due to an unopposed ex parte application for an entry of dismissal, and the court found this to be the procedural equivalent to a default and resulted from plaintiffs’ counsel’s inexcusable conduct. (Id. at 1148; see also Leader v. Health Indus. Of America, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 603, 618 [Mandatory relief only applies to defaults, default judgments or dismissal equivalent to default.] (emphasis added).) Thus, the Appellate Court concluded the mandatory “attorney-fault” provision applied and affirmed the order vacating the dismissal. (Id.) 

The Court finds that the failure to appear at the case management conference and properly calendar the order to show cause hearing is the procedural equivalent of dismissal via default, as it was Plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to appear that caused the dismissal. (See Flores v. Board of Supervisors (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 480, 483 [“[w]hile not every mistake of an attorney constitutes excusable neglect [citation], calendar errors by an attorney or a member of his staff are, under appropriate circumstances, excusable.”].)

The Court, therefore, grants the motion under the mandatory provision of section 473(b), finding that the failure was due to counsel’s mistake, inadvertence or neglect. (See Billing v. Health Plan of America (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 250, 256 [The Court is not concerned with the reason for the attorney’s inexcusable mistake.].)

The matter is placed back on calendar and a Case Management Conference is scheduled for June 29, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 7.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Torres, Jose vs. Kings River Farming, Inc.

Case No.:  VCU327349

Date:           May 11, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion, enforce the waiver of class claims, compel the individual claims to arbitration, including the Type A PAGA claim and stay this matter as to the Type O PAGA claim pending completion of arbitration.

Background Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendants Kings River Farming, Inc., Kings River Packing, LP, Kings River Packing, Inc., Kings River Packing, LLC, Kings River Trucking, Inc., and Cobblestone Fruit (“Defendants”) on a classwide basis for violations of the Labor Code and Business and Professions Code, as well as under for violations of PAGA under Labor Code sections 2698, et seq.

Plaintiff alleges Defendants were “each acting as the agent, employee, alter ego, and/or joint venturer of, or working in concert with, each of the other co-Defendants and was acting within the course and scope of such agency, employment, joint venture, or concerted activity with legal authority to act on the others’ behalf.” (FAC ¶13.) Further, that each Defendant is a joint employer of Plaintiff and/or alter ego of each other Defendant. (FAC ¶¶15-21.)

Defendants seek to compel arbitration of these claims on an individual basis, to dismiss the class claims, and to stay the “representative” PAGA claims.

Facts – Agreement to Arbitrate

In support, Defendants submit the declaration of the human resources generalist for Defendant Kings River Farming, Inc. (“KRF”) who declares they have access to the personnel records of current and former employees, kept in the ordinary course of business, including copies of documents signed copies by such current and former employees. (Declaration of Hildebrandt ¶¶1, 2, 3.)

The declarant indicates further that Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant KRF from February 21, 2023 to June 19, 2025 and that within Plaintiff’s personnel file, Plaintiff on October 7, 2024, attended an orientation session for which declarant was present, during which Plaintiff was provided with and executed a Spanish version of the Arbitration Agreement. (Declaration of Hildebrandt ¶¶12, 14.) A true and correct copy of the executed Spanish version of the Agreement is attached as Exhibit A (Declaration of Hildebrandt ¶15 – Ex. A.) The declarant states further they are fluent in English and Spanish and that Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the English Version of the Agreement attached as Exhibit A. (Declaration of Hildebrandt ¶¶16, 17 – Ex. B.)

In opposition, Plaintiff challenges the failure to provide a certified translation pursuant to Rule of Court, rule 3.1110(g), which requires “Exhibits written in a foreign language must be accompanied by an English translation, certified under oath by a qualified interpreter.”

The Court continued this matter as to a certified translation and on April 30, 2026, sufficient compliance with Rule 3.1110(g) was found through the declaration of Benson, a certified court interpreter and translator described in Government Code section 38561, certification number 301499, who confirmed that Exhibit 2 is a true and accurate English translation of Exhibit 1. (Declaration of Benson ¶¶1-5.)

Further, Plaintiff presents a declaration that the signature is not his on the Agreement, that he did not sign the Agreement, that he did not handwrite his name on the Agreement, that he does not read Spanish, that no employee of Defendant asked him to sign any arbitration agreement, that he does not recall an October 7, 2024 orientation and that, as to all other documents, he requested and received an English version. (Declaration of Plaintiff ¶¶3, 4, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20.)

Plaintiff, however, also states:

“20. During my employment with Defendants, there was an instance when I was given a Spanish version of a document. I asked for an English version of a document, but I was told there were not any English version documents available anymore. I asked for a translation of the document from Spanish to English so I could understand what I was being told to sign. However, I was quickly rushed to sign the Spanish version without knowing what it was and I was never provided a translation from Spanish to English. I was not provided a copy of this document either.

21. I don’t know what that document was since it was a Spanish version and since I don’t read in Spanish. However, I was never told that the document was an arbitration agreement or anything related to arbitration.”

On reply, Defendants provide a further declaration of Hildebrandt that provides, as Exhibit C, other documents purporting to contain the handwritten signature of Plaintiff in both Spanish and English, including a document on October 7, 2024, as well as a number of electronically signed documents on October 7, 2024, attached as Exhibit D.  (Supplemental Declaration of Hildebrandt ¶¶1-4 – Exs. C and D.)

Authority and Analysis – Agreement to Arbitrate

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2(a), (b).) (emphasis added.) The motion to compel arbitration requires the facts are to be proven by affidavit or declaration and documentary evidence with oral testimony taken only in the court’s discretion. (Code Civ. Proc., §1290.2; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413–414.) The motion must set forth the provisions of the written agreement and the arbitration clause verbatim, or such provisions must be attached and incorporated by reference. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330; see Condee v. Longwood Mgmt. Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218.)

Absent a challenge by the nonmoving party, this burden is met by simply providing a copy of the arbitration agreement.  (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2017) 13 Cal. App. 5th 1152, 1160; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.)  “For purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 218; Sprunk v. Prisma LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 785, 793.)  

However, when the opposing party disputes the agreement, then the opposing party must provide evidence to challenge its authenticity.  (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) 

Under California law, "[t]he burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence …." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 164-165.)

"However, the burden of production may shift in a three-step process." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at. 165.)

"First, the moving party bears the burden of producing 'prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.' [Citation.]" (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) "The moving party 'can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party's] signature.' [Citation.]" (Id.) "For this step, 'it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.' [Citation.]” (Id.)

Here, Defendants have provided the Agreement, Exhibit A, in purported satisfaction of this requirement, as well as Exhibit B, an English version of the Agreement.

If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.) “The opposing party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may testify under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement.” (Id.)

Here, however, Plaintiff challenges the signature on Exhibit A, stating “None of the signatures that appear on Exhibit A attached to the Hildebrandt Declaration are my signature. I do not know who may have signed the document, but I did not” and “I do not know who may have handwritten the printed name “Jose Torres” on the document, bates labeled Torres RR00073 attached as Exhibit A to the Hildebrandt Declaration attached as Exhibit A to the Hildebrandt Declaration, but I did not.” (Declaration of Plaintiff ¶¶12, 13.)

In Gamboa, the Court of Appeal found that the plaintiff “met her burden on the second step by filing an opposing declaration, saying she did not recall the agreement and would not have signed it if she had been aware of it: ‘I do not remember these documents at all .... Had I been made aware of the existence of an arbitration agreement, and been explained its provisions, I would not have signed any such documents.’” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 167.)

However, under Ramirez v. Golden Queen Mining Co., LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 821, the declaration in Gamboa would be insufficient on a handwritten signature issue where there is no denial as to the authenticity of the signature:

“There is a split of authority among the Courts of Appeal as to what constitutes sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute about the authenticity of a handwritten signature on a document agreeing to arbitration. (Compare Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 757–758, review den. Apr. 26, 2023, S278817 with Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164–165) We join Iyere in concluding that an individual is capable of recognizing his or her handwritten signature and if that individual does not deny a handwritten signature is his or her own, that person's failure to remember signing the document does not create a factual dispute about the signature's authenticity. (Iyere, supra, at p. 757.)” (Id. at 825.)

Here, the declaration is sufficient under Ramirez in that Plaintiff can recognize his own signature, that the handwritten signature on Exhibit A is not Plaintiff’s signature, and that the handwriting on Exhibit A is not Plaintiff’s handwriting.

Additionally, the Court notes that Plaintiff indicates he has never met declarant Hildebrandt and that he does not recall attending an orientation on October 7, 2024 (the purported date of the Agreement.)

The Court, therefore, finds Plaintiff has met Plaintiff’s burden as to the second step in challenging the Agreement.

As such, the Court turns to the documents filed in reply, noting Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165 requires, this third step, admissible evidence a valid arbitration agreement between the parties.

Here, Plaintiff’s declaration is rebutted by the supplemental declaration of Hildebrandt that provides other documents executed on October 7, 2024 in both handwriting and electronically and that such documents were within Plaintiff’s personnel file. “A qualified witness need not be the custodian, the person who created the record, or one with personal knowledge in order for a business record to be admissible under the hearsay exception. (Jazayeri v. Mao (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 301, 322; 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Hearsay, § 243, p. 1108.)” (Unifund CCR, LLC v. Dear (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th Supp.1, 8.) Therefore, the Court overrules Objection No. 1 with respect to the Agreement and Hildebrandt’s presentation thereof.

The Court, therefore, by a preponderance of the evidence, finds an agreement to arbitrate as evidenced by Exhibit A.

Authority and Analysis – Mutual Assent and Fraud in the Execution

As to the argument regarding mutual assent, Caballero v. Premier Care Simi Valley LLC (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 512, 518 notes:

“ ‘Mutual assent is determined under an objective standard applied to the outward manifestations or expressions of the parties, i.e., the reasonable meaning of their words and acts, and not their unexpressed intentions or understandings.’ [citation omitted] ‘A party's acceptance of an agreement to arbitrate may be express, as where a party signs the agreement.’ [citation omitted].) ‘[O]ne who accepts or signs an instrument, which on its face is a contract, is deemed to assent to all its terms, and cannot escape liability on the ground that he has not read it. If he cannot read, he should have it read or explained to him.’ [citation omitted]”

Therefore, the Court finds sufficient mutual assent, having found sufficient authentication of the signature on the Agreement above.

As to the argument regarding fraud in the execution of the Agreement, Najarro v. Superior Court (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 871, 885-886  states:

“California law distinguishes between fraud in the ‘execution’ or ‘inception’ of a contract and fraud in the ‘inducement’ of a contract … in the former case ‘“the fraud goes to the inception or execution of the agreement, so that the promisor is deceived as to the nature of his act, and actually does not know what he is signing, or does not intend to enter into a contract at all, mutual assent is lacking, and [the contract] is void. In such a case it may be disregarded without the necessity of rescission.”’”

However, in Najarro, the plaintiff, after stating she did not know how to read and had trouble completing the paperwork, was asked: “‘do you want to work or not?’” to which she replied “ ‘[W]hat do these documents say? I don't know how to read,’ to which she was told, ‘It's okay, if you don‘t know how to read, then just sign them,’ adding that it was ‘nothing important.’ She signed a Spanish version of Version One.” (Id. at 887.)

There are no facts before this Court as to affirmative representations minimizing the importance of the documents or simply encouraging Plaintiff to sign if he wanted to work. Here, at most Plaintiff’s declaration states that a Spanish language document was placed in front of him at some point and that he signed it without knowing its contents. This is insufficient to establish fraud in the execution of the Agreement. As such, the Court will not find the Agreement void based on the theory of fraud in the execution.

Facts – Scope of Agreement

The Agreement designated Defendant KRF as “Employer” and is between “you and Employer.” The Agreement indicates it is “equally enforceable by or against any person acting as an agent or employee for the Employer including any officer, director, member, owner, employees, contractors, consultants, affiliates, and all successors and assigns of any of foregoing.” (Agreement - Section 1.)

Further that “To the extent allowed by law, this Agreement will be enforceable by and/or against any person acting as an agent for or [sic] employee of [sic] Employer including but not limited to any officer, director, principal, shareholder, member, owner, and employee and all successors and assigns of any of the foregoing. This Agreement shall also apply to and be binding on Employer’s parent companies, subsidiaries, affiliates, and all successors and assigns of Employer and such entities.” (Agreement – Section 11.)

The Agreement states it applies to:

“...any and all disputes, claims or controversies arising out of or in any way relating to your employment, including those that may exist at the time of entering into this agreement or arising from events that occurred prior to execution of this agreement (collectively referred to below as “Disputes”) but excluding claims described below that this Agreement excepts from arbitration…” (Agreement - Section 1.)

Authority and Analysis – Scope of Agreement

Here, the Agreement expressly applies to any and all disputes, claims or controversies related to employment of Plaintiff and therefore applies to the claims asserted in this matter. As the waiver of class claims and PAGA claims are dependent upon the application of the FAA, the Court addresses these issues below.

Authority and Analysis  - Non-Signatories

When a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement seeks to compel arbitration of claims asserted against it, the Court notes there are generally six theories which may support the petition: “‘(a) incorporation by reference; (b) assumption; (c) agency; (d) veil-piercing or alter ego; (e) estoppel; and (f) third-party beneficiary…[Citations.]” (Benaroya v. Willis (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 462, 469.) 

All Defendants seek to enforce this Agreement as to all claims raised by Plaintiff. As noted above, the Agreement is between Defendant KRF and Plaintiff. However, the Agreement expressly applies to KRF’s “…parent companies, subsidiaries, affiliates, and all successors and assigns of Employer and such entities”

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s operative amended complaint alleges that Defendant KRF and all other Defendants are joint employers of Plaintiff and alter egos of each other. (FAC ¶13-21.)

Defendants cite to Garcia v. Pexco, LLC (2017) 11 Cal. App. 5th 782, 787–788 and Gonzalez v. Nowhere Beverly Hills LLC (2024) 107 Cal. App. 5th 111, 124 that these allegations of joint employment is sufficient to bind all Defendants.

“For the doctrine [of equitable estoppel] to apply, the claims plaintiff asserts against the nonsignatory must be dependent upon, or founded in and inextricably intertwined with, the underlying contractual obligations of the agreement containing the arbitration clause. [Citation.] ‘This requirement comports with, and indeed derives from, the very purposes of the doctrine: to prevent a party from using the terms or obligations of an agreement as the basis for his claims against a nonsignatory, while at the same time refusing to arbitrate with the nonsignatory under another clause of that same agreement.’ [Citation.] Application of the doctrine in a proper case is not unfair to signatory plaintiffs resisting arbitration: Not only have such plaintiffs ‘decided the theories on which to sue’ the nonsignatory, they also have ‘consented to arbitrate the claims against [the signatory defendant] anyway.’ [Citation.]” (JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1238.)

In Garcia, the appellate court held that an arbitration agreement between a staffing agency and its employee was enforceable as to a nonsignatory client employer because “Labor Code violations are clearly, and indeed expressly, included as one of the types of disputes covered by the arbitration agreement.” (Garcia, supra, 11 Cal. App. 5th at 786.) There, a temporary staffing company hired plaintiff and assigned Garcia to work for a third-party. (Id. at 784.) The arbitration agreement provided that any dispute staffing company and plaintiff could not resolve informally would be determined by binding arbitration. (Id.) The court held that plaintiff’s claims against the third party must be arbitrated because of the staffing agency’s agreement with plaintiff, reasoning that it “is inequitable for the arbitration about Garcia’s assignment with [third party] Pexco to proceed with [staffing agency] Real Time, while preventing Pexco from participating [because] Garcia’s claims against Pexco are rooted in his employment relationship with Real Time, and the governing arbitration agreement expressly includes statutory wage and hour claims. Garcia agreed to arbitrate his wage and hour claims against his employer, and Garcia alleges Pexco and Real Time were his joint employers. Because the arbitration agreement controls Garcia's employment, he is equitably estopped from refusing to arbitrate his claims with Pexco.” (Id. at 787.)

Here, the Court finds similar sufficient allegations of joint employment as well as the inextricable intertwinement of the Labor Code and Business and Professions Code claims against all Defendants with the arbitrable claims against Defendant KRF.

As such, the Court will find the Agreement applies to the non-signatory Defendants.

Facts – FAA Application

The Agreement states “To the extent there is a conflict between state and federal law as applied to this agreement, federal law shall govern. However, if it is ultimately determined by a proper court or arbitrator that the Federal Arbitration Act does not apply to this Agreement, then California law shall govern this Agreement and the California Arbitration Act (starting with California Code of Civil Procedure section 1280) shall apply.”

Further, Defendant KRF’s human resources generalist indicates that the fruit packed by Plaintiff “upon information and belief” is distributed in California and other states. (Declaration of Hildebrandt ¶18.)

Authority and Analysis – FAA Application

The party asserting the FAA applies to an agreement has “the burden to demonstrate FAA coverage by declarations and other evidence.” (Hoover v. American Income Life Ins.Co. (2012) 206Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207; see Shepard v. Edward Mackay Enterprises, Inc. (2007) 148Cal.App.4th 1092, 1101)

In general, the FAA "governs arbitration provisions in contracts that involve interstate commerce." (Mastick v. TD Ameritrade, Inc. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1263, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 717.) Title 9 of the United States Code section 2, ("the primary substantive provision of the FAA" as noted by Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge Services (2005) 35 Cal.4th 376, 384) provides in part:

"A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract . . . ." (9 U.S.C. § 2,; see Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson (1995) 513 U.S. 265, 277 ["involving commerce" broadly construed].)

“The FAA applies to contracts that involve interstate commerce (9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2), but since arbitration is a matter of contract, the FAA also applies if it is so stated in the agreement.” (Davis v. Shiekh Shoes, LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 956, 963.)

Here, there is no argument that the FAA applies.

Facts – Class Action Waiver

Further, the Agreement contains a class action waiver indicating that such Disputes shall be arbitrated on an individual basis and that class claims are waived.

Authority and Analysis – Class Action Waiver

As the FAA applies, the class action waiver is enforceable. (Viking River Cruises v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 651 ["'a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so'"]; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 352 [holding class action waivers are enforceable under FAA and California rule to contrary preempted].)

Facts – PAGA Claims

As to PAGA claims, the Agreement states:

“Notwithstanding the above, nothing in this Agreement shall prevent you from bringing any claim under the California Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) if the law does not allow you to waive your right to bring a PAGA claim. However, if the law prevents you from waiving the right to bring a PAGA claim, you hereby agree to arbitrate all of your individual PAGA claims pursuant to the terms of this Agreement, and you shall then only have standing to maintain a PAGA claim on behalf of others if and to the extent the law gives you that standing and the law precludes you from waiving the right to bring a PAGA claim on behalf of others.

Any argument that the waivers set forth above are illegal or unenforceable in whole or in part must be determined by a court of proper jurisdiction. If a court determines that the waivers described above are legally unenforceable in whole or in part, the unenforceable portion of the waivers shall be severed from this Agreement, and, if legally possible, the Party’s individual Disputes that are not affected by the unenforceable waiver shall continue in arbitration pursuant to the terms of this Agreement. If any portion of the waivers described above is severed so as to allow a Party to maintain any class, representative, or collective action, that class, representative, or collective action must be litigated in a civil court of proper jurisdiction and shall be stayed pending the outcome of any arbitration on the remaining Disputes.” (Agreement – Section 3.)

Authority and Analysis – PAGA Claims

In Viking River, the United States Supreme Court held that, under an agreement permitting such, a PAGA cause of action may be divided into individual and representative claims and that the individual claims may be ordered to arbitration: "PAGA authorizes any 'aggrieved employee' to initiate an action against a former employer 'on behalf of himself or herself and other current and former employees' to obtain civil penalties that previously could have been recovered only by the State in an [Labor Workforce and Development Agency] enforcement action." (Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 645.) The "individual PAGA claim" is the claim for the violations suffered by the aggrieved employee and the "representative PAGA claim" is the PAGA claim arising out of events involving other employees. (Id. at 648.)

The Viking River decision “left undisturbed” and “intact” both of the rules from Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th 348 that (1) prohibited categorical waivers of the right to bring a PAGA action in any forum and (2) prohibited waivers of PAGA claims on behalf of other employees, i.e., non-individual or representative claims. (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1117-1118.)

However, the United States Supreme Court held that the third rule, which prohibited the "'division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate'" was preempted by the FAA. (Id. at 1118.)

Specifically, the Viking River Court stated:

"The agreement between Viking and Moriana purported to waive 'representative PAGA claims. Under Iskanian, this provision was invalid if construed as a wholesale waiver of PAGA claims. And under our holding, that aspect of Iskanian is not preempted by the FAA, so the agreement remains invalid insofar as it is interpreted in that manner. But the severability clause in the agreement provides that if the waiver provision is invalid in some respect, any portion that remains valid must still be 'enforced in arbitration.' Based on this clause, Viking was entitled to enforce the agreement insofar as it mandated arbitration of Moriana's individual PAGA claim." (Id. at 1924-1925.)

As summarized by Adolph: "The high court explained that an anti-splitting rule 'unduly circumscribes the freedom of parties to determine "the issues subject to arbitration" and "the rules by which they will arbitrate," [citation], and does so in a way that violates the fundamental principle that "arbitration is a matter of consent."' (Viking River, at p. 659.) Requiring parties to adjudicate a PAGA action entirely in one proceeding, the high court said, 'compels parties to either go along with an arbitration in which the range of issues under consideration is determined by coercion rather than consent, or else forgo arbitration altogether. Either way, the parties are coerced into giving up a right they enjoy under the FAA.' (Viking River, at p. 661.) Thus, Viking River requires enforcement of agreements to arbitrate a PAGA plaintiff's individual claims if the agreement is covered by the FAA." (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1118-1119.)

 “There is no individual component to a PAGA action because '"every PAGA action . . . is a representative action on behalf of the state."' [Citation.]" (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 87.) The term "individual" refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by the plaintiff. (See Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 639, 648 [referring to these claims as "Type A" claims].) The term “non-individual” refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by employees other than the plaintiff. (Galarsa, at 649 [referring to these claims as "Type O" claims].)

As summarized by the California Supreme Court in Adolph, an agreement that is covered by the FAA may require arbitration of "alleged Labor Code violations personally sustained by a PAGA plaintiff — so-called 'individual' claims." (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1114, 1119.) "'[W]hen an appropriate arbitration agreement exists'" and "a plaintiff has filed a PAGA action comprised of individual and non-individual claims," the trial court must "'bifurcate and order [the] individual PAGA claim[] to arbitration.'" (Id. at 1126, 1123.) In this circumstance, the "order compelling arbitration of [the] individual claim[] does not strip the plaintiff of standing to litigate non-individual claims [i.e., claims on behalf of other employees] in court." (Id. at 1123) Instead, "'the individual PAGA claim[] in arbitration remain[s] part of the same lawsuit as the representative claims remaining in court.'" (Id. at 1126.) The plaintiff would thus be "'pursuing a single PAGA action "on behalf of [himself or herself] and other current or former employees," albeit across two fora.' [Citation.]" (Id.)

Here, the Agreement sufficient evidences an intent to split the PAGA claim, where, as here under the FAA, permitted by law and compel arbitration of the individual Type A PAGA claim while staying the representative Type O PAGA claim in this Court.

Facts – Defense to Enforcement – Unconscionability

Plaintiff argues that, as to procedural unconscionability, there was unequal bargaining power between the parties, that no information was provided to Plaintiff with respect to the contents of the Agreement, including the waiver of a jury trial right, that he lacked the opportunity to review the Agreement, and that the rules referenced in the Agreement were not provided.

As to substantive unconscionability, Plaintiff argues the Agreement requires ordering Plaintiff to pay costs of suit to compel arbitration and therefore attorneys’ fees and expenses and that refusal to submit to arbitration is a material breach of the Agreement. Further, that the prevailing party may recover attorneys’ fees. Finally, that the Agreement contains an unconscionable confidentiality provision.

Authority and Analysis – Defense to Enforcement – Unconscionability

The inquiry into unconscionability consists of two prongs: A contract will be revoked if it is both procedurally unconscionable and substantively unconscionable. (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Service, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 82, 102.) Procedural and substantive unconscionability need not be present to the same degree. “[T]he more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” (Id. at 114.)

Procedural Unconscionability

“‘Procedural unconscionability’ concerns the manner in which the contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties at that time.  It focuses on the factors of oppression and surprise. The oppression component arises from an inequality of bargaining power of the parties to the contract and an absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice on the part of the weaker party. The component of surprise arises when the challenged terms are ‘hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce them.’” (Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1281.)

The Court also considers whether circumstances of the contract’s formation created such oppression or surprise that closer scrutiny of its overall fairness is required. (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 126-127.) “The circumstances relevant to establishing oppression include, but are not limited to (1) the amount of time the party is given to consider the proposed contract; (2) the amount and type of pressure exerted on the party to sign the proposed contract; (3) the length of the proposed contract and the length and complexity of the challenged provision; (4) the education and experience of the party; and (5) whether the party's review of the proposed contract was aided by an attorney.” (Id.) As OTO recognizes, the pressure exerted on a standard employee to accept an adhesive arbitration agreement as a condition of employment is “particularly acute,” which indicates oppression.  (Id. at 127.)

“An adhesive contract is standardized, generally on a preprinted form, and offered by the party with superior bargaining power on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. (Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1245.) Arbitration contracts imposed as a condition of employment are typically adhesive. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 114-115; Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 695, 704.) But the fact that an agreement is adhesive is not, alone, sufficient to render it unconscionable. (Malone v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1561.) “[A] compulsory pre-dispute arbitration agreement is not rendered unenforceable just because it is required as a condition of employment or offered on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.” (Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1127.)

Here, the Court agrees there is a medium degree of procedural unconscionability given the it is a preprinted form provided to an employee, and that the Agreement was not the product of negotiation.

Substantive Unconscionability

“Substantive unconscionability occurs when a contract, particularly, contracts of adhesion, impose terms “that have been variously described as overly harsh, unduly oppressive, so one-sided as to shock the conscience, or unfairly one-sided. All of these formulations point to the central idea that the unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with a simple old-fashioned bad bargain, but with terms that are unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party. Unconscionable terms impair the integrity of the bargaining process or otherwise contravene the public interest or public policy or attempt to impermissibly alter fundamental legal duties.” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho, supra, 8 Cal. 5th at 129–30, internal quotations and citations omitted.)

Armendariz sets forth elements of essential substantive fairness as follows:

(1) provide for a neutral arbitrator:

(2) provide for adequate discovery;

(3) require the arbitrator to issue a written decision that permits limited judicial review;

(4) provide for the same remedies that would otherwise be available to the employee in court;

(5) not require the employee to bear costs unique to arbitration; and

(6) provide a “modicum of bilaterality” between the employer and employee. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal 4th at 102-113, 117-118.)

Attachment of the Rules

Failing to attach arbitration rules fails to support a finding of substantive unconscionability.  (See Peng v. First Republic Bank (2013) 219 Cal.App.4^th 1462, 1472; see also Cisneros Alvarez v. Altamed Health Services Corp. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5^th 572, 589-590 [“The law requires more than the simple failure to provide the employee with a copy of the rules.”].)

Costs and Attorneys’ Fees

Here, the Court notes the provisions as to fees and costs are limited by the term “to the extent allowed by law.” Neither of the terms at issue as to fees and costs in Mills v. Facility Solutions Group, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 1035 nor Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal 4^th contained this limiting language. The Agreement, therefore, does not contain a substantively unconscionable term related to fees and costs.

Confidentiality

Here, the Agreement state “To the extent allowed by law, arbitration shall be conducted on a confidential basis and there shall be no disclosure of evidence or award/decision beyond the arbitration proceeding.”

Plaintiff cites to Ramos v. Super. Ct. (2018) 28 Cal. App. 5th 1042, 1065, where the confidentiality provision stated ““Except to the extent necessary to enter judgment on any arbitral award, all aspects of the arbitration shall be maintained by the parties and the arbitrators in strict confidence.” There, the court noted “…a confidentiality clause like the one at issue in this case would impair her ability to engage in informal discovery in pursuit of her litigation claims.” (Id. at 1066.)

Here, Defendants do not sufficiently address the issue of substantive unconscionability and concerns set out in Ramos. Further, where an agreement had "no commercial need for requiring employment-related proceedings to remain confidential," the appellate court has found such clauses  unconscionable because they “…benefit[] only [the employer] with respect to harassment, retaliation, and discrimination claims.” (Hasty v. Am. Auto. Assn., (2023) 98 Cal. App. 5th 1041, 1062.)

Therefore, the Court finds the confidentiality provision substantially unconscionable.

Severance

Courts have discretion to sever unconscionable clauses and enforce the remainder of the contract. (Civ. Code, § 1670.5, subd. (a); Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1244.)

There is a strong preference for courts to sever unconscionable provisions unless unconscionability permeates the entire agreement. (De Leon v. Pinnacle Property Management Services, LLC (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 476, 492.) However, if "the central purpose of the contract is tainted with illegality, then the contract as a whole cannot be enforced." (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 124.) But if "the illegality is collateral to the main purpose of the contract, and the illegal provision can be extirpated from the contract by means of severance or restriction, then such severance and restriction are appropriate." (Id.)

Here, the Agreement provides “If any wording of this Agreement is determined to be illegal or unenforceable by a court with proper jurisdiction, the illegal or unenforceable wording shall be removed from this Agreement and all other parts of this Agreement shall be valid and shall not be affected thereby.” (Agreement Section 17.)

The Court, therefore, severs the unconscionable confidentiality term and enforces the remainder of the Agreement.

As such, the Court enforces the waiver of class claims, grants the motion to compel the individual claims to arbitration, including the Type A PAGA claim and stays this matter as to the Type O PAGA claim pending completion of arbitration.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Velocity Investments LLC vs. Barragan, Maria

Case No.:   VCL328053

Date:            May 11, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:      Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Pay Arbitration Fees

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion for lack of proof of service, for failure to file a declaration in support of the assertion that Plaintiff failed to pay arbitration fees and on the basis that dismissal of the action is not a proper ground of relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 1291.97(b), which permits either “(1) Withdraw the claim from arbitration and proceed in a court of appropriate jurisdiction or (2) Compel arbitration in which the drafting party shall pay reasonable attorney's fees and costs related to the arbitration.”

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared Monday, May 11, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR053972	In the Matter of The Jathan Quiroz Trust	Petition to Purchase Real Property	Appearance Required	Continued hearing
VPR054022	In the Matter of Mitchell, Erilla M	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	Proof of Publication not filed. Possible issue: The will was not witnessed by at least two persons during the testator’s lifetime, Prob C § 6110(c)
VPR054021	In the Matter of Taylor, Phoebe	Letters of Administration	Recommended for Approval
VPR053738	In the Matter of Pena, Joan Carol	Letters of Administration		Notice of Petition to Administer: a valid service shall be completed by a non-party, Prob C § 1261; CCP § 1013a. Proof of Publication does not contain contents of the Notice of Hearing of Petition to Administer as required by Prob C §§ 8100, 8120
VPR054023	In the Matter of Bastardo, Mary O.	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Recommended for Approval
VPR052707	In the Matter of Zendejas, Penelope Estrada	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order An award of extraordinary compensation to the attorney is within the discretion of the court, CRC, rule 7.703(a)
VPR053637	In the Matter of Chester, Patsy Jane	Attorney Fee Allowance Hearing	Recommended for Approval
VPR053995	In the Matter of the Rejean Houle Revocable Trust	Petition for Appointment of Successor Trustee	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053994	In the Matter of 2010 Kee Family Revocable Trust	Petition to Confirm Assets	Appearance Required	Summons to be personally served on Respondent, Trustee of the Bracamonte Trust, Prob C § 851(a); CCP § 413.10
VPR052911	In the Matter of Chatman, Alan	Petition to Confirm Assets to the Estate	Appearance Required	Summons to be personally served on Respondent, Prob C § 851(a); CCP § 413.10. OSC hearing scheduled
VPR053997	In the Matter of Garcia Romero, Yanexil Eberardo	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Attachment Requesting Special Orders Regarding a Major Neurocognitive Disorder (form GC-313) NOT attached to petition. Citation not served. Investigation not completed.

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared Thursday, May 7, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR053685	In the Matter of Ochoa, Jayra	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required
PPR053767	In the Matter of Lloyd, Helen Maria	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	The court to consider the reimbursement of expenses, Attachment D.  Prob C § 11005
PPR053577	In the Matter of White, Dorothy Annella	Final Distribution Hearing	Recommended for Approval