Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Monday, July 27, 2026, are:

Re:                 Montes De Oca, Jeniffer vs. Saputo Cheese USA Inc.

Case No.:   VCU314147

Date:           July 27, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:    (1) Defendant Stafford’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; (2) Defendant Stafford’s Motion for Protective Order re: Discovery

Tentative Ruling: (1) To grant the motion without leave to amend; (2) To find the motion moot by the ruling on motion for judgment on the pleadings.

(1) Defendant Stafford’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Facts and Analysis

The sole issue on this motion for judgment on the pleadings is whether an Defendant Bill Stafford, alleged to be a manager of Plaintiff, can be held liable under the fourth cause of action for whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5.

Defendant Stafford contends that the plain language of section 1102.5 does not provide for individual liability.

In opposition, Plaintiff notes an amendment to section 1102.5 in 2013 to include the phrase “or any person acting on behalf of the employer” imposes such individual liability.

Labor Code section 1102.5 provides in part:

(a) An employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer, shall not make, adopt, or enforce any rule, regulation, or policy preventing an employee from disclosing information to a government or law enforcement agency, to a person with authority over the employee, or to another employee who has authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance, or from providing information to, or testifying before, any public body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry, if the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the employee’s job duties.

(b) An employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer, shall not retaliate against an employee for disclosing information, or because the employer believes that the employee disclosed or may disclose information, to a government or law enforcement agency, to a person with authority over the employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance, or for providing information to, or testifying before, any public body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry, if the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the employee’s job duties.

(c) An employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer, shall not retaliate against an employee for refusing to participate in an activity that would result in a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation.

(d) An employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer, shall not retaliate against an employee for having exercised their rights under subdivision (a), (b), or (c) in any former employment.

Neither party has presented the Court, and the Court’s research did not uncover, a reported California case on this issue and the District Court in Mewawalla v. Middleman   notes Califorina courts "ha[ve] not spoken on the express issue of whether a supervisor can be liable under California Labor Code Section 1102.5." (Mewawalla v. Middleman  (N.D. Cal. 2022). 601 F. Supp. 3d 574, 608.)

Further, the Court notes section 1105, entitled “Recovery of damages by employee” states “Nothing in this chapter shall prevent the injured employee from recovering damages from his employer for injury suffered through a violation of this chapter.” As this section does not discuss recovery from an individual, the Court finds this leans in favor of a finding that section 1102.5 does not apply to individuals.

Additionally, 1102.6 entitled “Burden of proof in action under Section 1102.5” states:

“In a civil action or administrative proceeding brought pursuant to Section 1102.5, once it has been demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that an activity proscribed by Section 1102.5 was a contributing factor in the alleged prohibited action against the employee, the employer shall have the burden of proof to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged action would have occurred for legitimate, independent reasons even if the employee had not engaged in activities protected by Section 1102.5.”

Like the above, section 1102.6 do not discuss an individual defendant’s burden of proof as opposed to the employer’s burden.

The District Court in Toranto v. Jaffurs (S.D. Cal. 2018) 297 F.Supp.3d 1073,  states  the following:

“No California court has addressed the issue of individual liability since the amendment to the language. All district courts, but one, that have addressed the issue have found no individual liability. See Tillery v. Lollis, 2015 WL 4873111 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (Looking to California Supreme Court discussion of language similar to the language of section 1102.5 and finding no individual liability); Vera v. Con-way Freight, Inc., 2015 WL 1546178 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (Finding the "statutory text, structure and legislative history all indicate that only employers-no individual employees-are liable for violations of the statute.")[;] Conner v. Aviation Services of Chevron, U.S.A., 2014 WL 5768727 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (Finding the plaintiff failed to point to any language establishing individual liability and that section 1104 of the Labor Code expressly stated, in all prosecutions under the pertinent chapter, employers are responsible for acts of its manager, officers, agents and employees.). While the court in De La Torre v. Progress Rail Servs. Corp., 2015 WL 4607730 (C.D. Cal. 2015) found the language ambiguous, it made no determination as to whether the statute permitted individual liability when it remanded the action to state court. (Id.) This Court is persuaded by the district courts' distillation of the statutory language and, similarly, finds no individual liability under section 1102.5. As such, Defendant's motion is granted as to the claim for retaliation under section 1102.5.” (Id. at 1105.)

(See also Vierria v. Cal. Highway Patrol (E.D.Cal. 2009) 644 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1244 [finding that section 1102.5 does not provide individual liability for managers and supervisors because "the statute is meant to establish prohibited activity by employers, rather than individuals."].)

On the other hand,  the language of section 1102.5 was amended to refer not only to an "employer," but also "any person acting on behalf of the employer." (Lab. Code § 1102.5(a).)

However, no amendments containing such language were made as to the burden of proof or damages sections noted above.

The Court notes further that Labor Code sections 558.1 and 1197.1 contain express language providing for individual liability:

• An "employer or other person acting on behalf of an employer . . . may be held liable as the employer for such violation" (Labor Code  §558.1(a)); and
• An "employer or other person acting either individually or as an officer, agent, or employee of another person, who pays or causes to be paid to any employee a wage less than the minimum fixed by an applicable state or local law . . . shall be subject to a civil penalty . . . " (Labor Code §1197.1(a).)

Section 1102.5 does not contain similar express language imposing liability on individuals who “act[] on behalf of the employer” despite the amended section 1102.5(a) language.

Again, the Court recognizes the federal rulings are,  at most, persuasive authority, but under the sum of the above, the Court finds liability against an individual, such as Defendant Stafford, is unavailable under Labor Code section 1102.5.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion without leave to amend.

(2) Defendant Stafford’s Motion for Protective Order re: Discovery

As the Court has granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend as to Defendant Stafford, the Court finds the request for protective order regarding discovery responses moot. No cause of action currently lies against Defendant Stafford.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Raney, Markai vs. Flores, Michaela marie

Case No.:   VCU335322

Date:           July 27, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Deem Filing of Complaint Nunc Pro Tunc

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff alleges motor vehicle and negligence causes of action arising out of an incident that occurred March 26, 2024.

The Court’s file reflects the complaint in this matter was filed May 22, 2026.

Plaintiff moves for an order deeming the complaint filed March 26, 2026. In support, Plaintiff’s counsel and counsel’s staff declare that the complaint was electronically submitted for filing on March 26, 2026, but that on April 6, 2026, Plaintiff’s counsel received notice that the submission had been rejected because “names is cut off on complaint.”(Declaration of Smith ¶¶5, 7; Declaration of Dobbins ¶¶5, 6 – Exs. A, C.)

Plaintiff’s counsel attempted to refile the same complaint on April 6, 2026, but a notice of rejection was sent April 9, 2026 stating “Plaintiff's name is misspelled.” (Declaration of Smith ¶11; Declaration of Dobbins ¶8 - Ex. B.)

On May 20, 2026, Plaintiff “copied the original filing submission and resubmitted the Complaint materials” (Declaration of Smith ¶14; Declaration of Dobbins ¶8.)

Based on this, Plaintiff argues the complaint should be deemed filed March 26, 2026 (and therefore within the statute of limitations) due to ministerial processing issues.

Authority and Analysis

Trial courts have the inherent authority to enter nunc pro tunc orders to address clerical errors, but not judicial errors. (Sannmann v. Department of Justice (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 676, 683.) A court should grant or refuse to enter a nunc pro tunc order "as justice may require in view of the circumstances of a particular case." (Norton v. City of Pomona (1935) 5 Cal.2d 54, 62.)

“…[T]he local superior court may not condition the filing of a complaint on local rule requirements. Instead, so long as a complaint complies with state requirements, the clerk has a ministerial duty to file.” (Mito v. Temple Recycling Center Corp. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 276, 280, quoting Carlson v. Department of Fish & Game (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1270.)

Under Rule of Court, rule 1.20. Effective Date of Filing: “Unless otherwise provided, a document is deemed filed on the date it is received by the court clerk.”

Although uncited by Plaintiff, the Court notes the examination of filing issues in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Gonzalez (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 51:

“The clerk refused to file the underlying complaint because Hartford failed to provide a case information sheet pursuant to local rule 3.10 (Mun. Ct. Ventura County).  The two-page case information sheet requires that the case caption and certain blanks be filled in, and that various boxes be checked. The completed sheet informs the court whether plaintiff requests: fast track, mediation, and a jury trial. It also gives the court a brief description of the nature of the case and the relief sought. Page 2 of the sheet explains that the information is requested ". . . in order that this case may  be properly managed pursuant to the Delay Reduction Rules mandated by the Legislature and the Judicial Council.” (Id. at 54.)

The plaintiff Hartford argued there was no statute specifically requiring it to provide a case information sheet and that the clerk could not impose such a requirement pursuant to only a local rule, which stated “[n]o case shall be filed without a completed Case Information Sheet." (Id.) The Hartford plaintiff further argued that the requirement of a case information sheet “…conflicts with Code of Civil Procedure section 412.10 which states that ‘[a]fter payment of all applicable fees, the plaintiff may have the clerk issue . . . summons for any defendant.’” The appellate court in Hartford upheld the decision denying the motion, finding that the requirement of a case information sheet was consistent with the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act and that “’Local court rules and policies have the force of procedural statutes, so long as they are not contrary to  legislative enactments.’” (Id. at 55-56.)

In Rojas v. Cutsforth (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 774, the appellate court examined Hartford and distinguished it, noting “But in Hartford the plaintiff did not even attempt to comply with the local rule. It tendered no case information sheet at all.” (Id. at 777.)

In Rojas, by contrast, the plaintiff in a personal injury action mailed the complaint to the superior court clerk for filing within the statutory period, but the clerk returned the unfiled complaint by mail because the declaration for court assignment was not signed, and the summons contained the address of the wrong branch of the court. (Id. at 776.) The statute of limitations passed. (Id.)

The trial court denied the request for a nunc pro tunc filing of the complaint and found on summary judgment that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. (Id.)

The Rojas appellate court reversed, however, finding that clerk had no proper basis for rejecting plaintiff's complaint and therefore it was deemed filed on the date that it was first deposited with the clerk. (Id. at 777.) The court there noted that function of the clerk is purely ministerial and the lack of signature was the only defect present in this matter. (Id.) Further, Rojas noted the local rule as to the court assignment form did not require it to be filed with the complaint. (Id.) As to the defect in the summons, the court noted “The second defect pointed out in the clerk's notice is that the summons did not reflect the address of the Simi Valley division of the court. Cutsforth cites no authority, however, in support of the proposition that the clerk may refuse to file the complaint if the summons contains the address of the wrong division.” (Id.)

Further, the court noted “The second defect pointed out in the clerk's notice is that the summons did not reflect the address of the Simi Valley division of the court. [Defendant] cites no authority, however, in support of the proposition that the clerk may refuse to file the complaint if the summons contains the address of the wrong division…” (Id. at 778.)

Finally, the Rojas court noted “Where, as here, the defect, if any, is insubstantial, the clerk should file the complaint and notify the attorney or party that the perceived defect should be corrected at the earliest opportunity” (Id. at 777.)

Under Hartford, the total failure to file a document with the complaint precluded the relief requested here. Under Rojas, the filing of a summons containing an incorrect address, formed a basis to grant relief.

Here, the Court grants the motion, finding that the illegibility of the complaint regarding the legibility of the Defendant’s name or misspelling of the Plaintiff’s name to be more akin to the attempts to comply in Rojas than the total failure in Hartford.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              Valadez, Brenda et al vs. DLR Management Group, Inc.

Case No.:     VCU310362

Date:           July 27, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:       Plaintiff’s Motions to Enforce Court Orders re: Defendant Kamohai as to (1) Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (Set One); (2) Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (Set Two); (3) Further Responses to Request For Production of Documents (Set One) (4) Further Responses to Requests for Admissions (Set One)

Tentative Ruling: (1) through (4): To continue these motions to September 28, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 9.

Facts Common to (1) through (4)

On April 10, 2026, Defendant Robert John Kamohai’s counsel, David M. Hillings, Esq. of Clinton & Clinton moved to be relieved as counsel. The Court notes that this document reflected an address of 1811 Early View Dr, Anchorage, AK 99504 associated with Defendant Kamohai. The Court notes here that the declaration in support of this motion indicated that counsel has been unable to communicate with Defendant since November 12, 2025 and Defendant has been wholly nonresponsive to attempts to communicate since that time.

On April 16, 2026, this Court entered an order as to discovery related to Defendant Kamohai as follows:

1. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel the Deposition of Defendant Robert Kamohai is GRANTED. IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Robert Kamohai appear for his deposition within 7 days from the date of the hearing. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Robert Kamohai and Counsel of record jointly and severally, pay monetary sanctions to Plaintiffs and their attorney, Rodriguez & Associates, in the amount of $500, within (30) thirty days from the date of this hearing.

2. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (Set One) is GRANTED. IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Robert Kamohai provide Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (Set One) within 10 days from the date of this hearing.

3. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production (Set One) is GRANTED. IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Robert Kamohai provide Further Responses to Request for Production (Set One) Nos. 17, 18, 23, and 26, within 10 days from the date of this hearing. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Robert Kamohai and Counsel of record jointly and severally, pay monetary sanctions to Plaintiffs and their attorney, Rodriguez & Associates, in the amount of $500, within (30) thirty days from the date of this hearing.

4. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Further Verified Responses to Request for Admissions (Set One) is GRANTED. IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Robert Kamohai provide Further Verified Responses to Request for Admissions (Set One) Nos. 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13, within 10 days from the date of this hearing.

5. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (Set Two) is GRANTED. IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Robert Kamohai provide Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (Set Two) within 10 days from the date of this hearing.

On June 1, 2026, this Court signed an order relieving counsel, David M. Hillings, Esq. CLINTON & CLINTON as to Defendant Robert John Kamohai. However, this order is not effective until proof of personal service has been submitted thereof. No such proof of personal service has been provided. As such, Counsel Hillings, and the firm, remain counsel for Defendant Kamohai.

On June 22, 2026, Plaintiff filed four discovery motions related to enforcement of the April 16, 2026 order:

1) Motion to Enforce Court Order re: Form Interrogatory, Set One, No. 2.6, for issue and evidentiary sanctions, and for monetary sanctions in favor of Plaintiff’s counsel and the Court.

2) Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted as to Requests for Admissions, Set One, 1-2, 6-13 based on Defendant Kamohai’s failure to obey the April 16, 2026 order, and for monetary sanctions in favor of Plaintiff’s counsel and the Court.

3) Motion to Enforce Court Order re: Form Interrogatory, Set One, Nos. 17, 18, 23, and 26, for issue and evidentiary sanctions, and for monetary sanctions in favor of Plaintiff’s counsel and the Court.

4) Motion to Enforce Court Order re: Form Interrogatory, Set Two, No. 17.1, and for monetary sanctions in favor of Plaintiff’s counsel and the Court.

However, these motions were filed June 16, 2026 and set for hearing initially on July 13, 2026.

These motions were served by “personal service” and “electronic mail” on Counsel Hillings (as counsel for Defendants Ryder, AG, Bowman and Extra), other counsel in this matter, Defendant Macuixtleruiz and Defendant Kamohai at “51462 Koehler Ave, Keni AK 99611.”

The Court continued these motions to this hearing date to permit 16 court days between filing, and service (as extended by electronic service), and the hearing dates.

In opposition to these motions, Defendant Kamohai, via still retained counsel, argues that because the order as to withdrawal of counsel has not been personally served, and no proof of service has been filed, “Kamohai has no notice of the pending discovery motions or that a request is being made for monetary sanctions against him.” Further, the opposition notes service at “51462 Koehler Ave., Keni, AK, 99611” of these motions, which differs from the address noted by counsel in the motion to withdraw, “1811 Early View Dr., Anchorage, AK, 99504.”

Additionally, the opposition notes a pending motion to intervene by National Specialty Insurance Company (NSIC) on behalf of Kamohai, its insured.

In reply, Plaintiff notes personal service on Kamohai of these motions, using a private investigator “to track down KAMOHAI to his latest address in rural Alaska where they completed personal service of the moving papers by leaving them with KAMOHAI’s adult wife/co-occupant, Mrs. Sarah Kamohai, pursuant to CCP § 1011(b).”

(1) through (4) - Authority and Analysis

It appears to the Court, at this point, that there exists a new address for Defendant Kamohai which would permit the service of the April 16, 2026 order.

Therefore, Kamohai would appear to be able to be personally served under Code of Civil Procedure section 1101(b) with the order permitting withdrawal of counsel.

Further, it remains unclear whether Kamohai has notice of the April 16, 2026 order and his outstanding discovery obligations.

The Court is unwilling to grant the present motions ordering compliance with the order, as well as a variety of sanctions, at this point in time, absent notice of the April 16, 2026 order and some opportunity to comply. It is unclear to the Court whether such an opportunity has been provided.

The Court does not find that Counsel Hillings has acted in bad faith as to the lack of communication with Kamohai, the inability to locate Kamohai regarding the outstanding discovery orders or withdrawal of counsel order. However, at this point in time, it appears service on Kamohai is obtainable.

As such, the Court will continue this matter to September 28, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 9, to be heard at the same time as NISC’s motion to intervene.

By this time, the Court expects Counsel Hillings to have personally served both the April 16, 2026 order, as well as any discovery necessary to comply therewith, on Kamohai, as well as the order re: withdrawal of counsel.

At the continued hearing, the Court will address the impact, if any, of NISC’s motion as to the outstanding discovery re: Kamohai.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Loza, Marisela vs. Addiction Research and Treatment, Inc., a Corporation

Case No.:   VCU321645

Date:           July 27, 2026

Time:           10:00 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:      Motion for Coordination

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion, to set Contra Costa County as the coordinate site and the 1^st District Court of Appeal as having appellate jurisdiction.

Facts

On May 20, 2026, the Judicial Council of California, in response to a petition by Petitioner Ferdinand Parcasio, for coordination of complex PAGA and class actions detailed below, issued an order authorizing this Court, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 404 and rule 3.524, to determine if the matters are complex and, if so, whether coordination is appropriate.

The Presiding Judge of this Court thereafter, set this matter for July 27, 2026, 10:00 am, in Dept. 9.

Cases at Issue

The following cases are at issue via this motion:

• Loza v. Addiction Research and Treatment, Inc., Tulare County Superior Court, Case No. VCU321645, filed on May 19, 2025, and assigned to Hon. Bret Hillman, Department 2 (“Loza Class Action”); 

• Loza v. Addiction Research and Treatment, Inc., Tulare County Superior Court, Case No. VCU323614, filed on July 11, 2025, and assigned to Hon. Bret Hillman, Department 2 (“Loza PAGA Action”);

• Parcasio v. BAART Programs, Inc., et al., Contra Costa County Superior Court, Case No. C25-02285, filed on August 11, 2025, and assigned to Hon. Julia Campins, Department 10 (“Parcasio PAGA Action”);

• Casey Christopher Hutton v. MedMark Treatment Centers-Fresno West, Inc., et al, Fresno County Superior Court, Case No. 25CECG04037, filed on August 27, 2025, and assigned to Hon. D. Tyler Sharpe, Department 501 (“Hutton Class Action”);

• Casey Christopher Hutton v. MedMark Treatment Centers-Fresno West, Inc., et al, Fresno County Superior Court, Case No. 25CECG05047, filed on October 27, 2025, and assigned to Hon. D. Tyler Sharpe, Department 501 (“Hutton PAGA Action”);

It appears to the Court that none of these matters are presently set for trial.

Loza Class Action - VCU321645

On May 19, 2026, Plaintiff Loza filed a complaint against Defendant Addiction Research and Treatment, Inc. (“Defendant ART”) for the following:

1. Unfair Competition in Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200;

2. Failure to Pay Minimum Wages in Violation of Lab. Code §§ 1194, 1197 & 1197.1;

3. Failure to Pay Overtime Wages in Violation of Lab. Code § 510;

4. Failure to Provide Required Meal Periods in Violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7 & 512 And The Applicable IWC Wage Order;

5. Failure to Provide Required Rest Periods In Violation of Lab. Code §§ 226.7 & 512 and the Applicable IWC Wage Order;

6. Failure To Provide Accurate Itemized Statements in Violation of Lab. Code § 226;

7. Failure To Reimburse Employees for Required Expenses in Violation of Lab. Code § 2802;

8. Failure To Provide Wages When Due in Violation of. Lab. Code §§ 201, 202 And 203; And,

9. Failure To Pay Sick Pay Wages in Violation of. Lab Code §§ 201-203, 233, 246.

In this matter, Plaintiff Loza is represented by Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw LLP.

The matter was filed as complex.

The Court notes that Defendant ART’s motion to compel arbitration was denied on December 12, 2025.

Loza PAGA Action - VCU323614

On July 11, 2026, Plaintiff Loza filed this matter against Defendant ART for a single cause of action under for civil penalties Pursuant to Labor Code § 2699 based on the following violations:

(1) pay overtime;

(2) provide meal periods;

(3) provide rest periods;

(4) pay minimum wages;

(5) timely pay wages upon termination;

(6) timely pay wages during employment;

(7) provide compliant wage statements;

(8) pay sick pay; and

(9) reimburse necessary business expenses.

Plaintiff Loza is also represented by the same firm, Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw LLP, in this matter.

The Loza PAGA Action was not filed as complex and has not been deemed complex.

Parcasio PAGA Action - C25-02285

In this matter, filed August 11, 2025 in Contra Costa County, Plaintiff Ferdinand Parcasio brings claims against Defendant ART, as well as Defendants BAART Programs, Inc. Baymark Health Services, Inc. and Patrice Trisvan for civil penalties Pursuant to Labor Code § 2699 based on the following violations:

(1) failed to pay overtime;

(2) failed to provide meal periods;

(3) failed to provide rest periods;

(4) failed to pay minimum wages;

(5) failed to timely pay wages upon termination;

(6) failed to timely pay wages during employment;

(7) failed to provide compliant wage statements;

(8) failed to keep complete or accurate payroll records; and

(9) failed to reimburse necessary business expenses.

Plaintiff Parcasio is represented by Lawyers for Justice, PC.

The Parcasio PAGA Action does not appear to have been filed as complex and has not been deemed complex.

Hutton Class Action - 25CECG04037

In this matter, filed August 27, 2025 in Fresno County, Plaintiff Christopher Hutton brings claims against Defendants MedMark Treatment Centers- Fresno West, Inc., MedMark Treatment Centers, Inc., MedMark Services, Inc., and BayMark Health Services, Inc. for the following:

(1) failure to pay all wages earned for all hours worked and other compensable hours at the correct rates of pay,

(2) failure to provide meal periods;

(3) failure to provide rest breaks;

(4) failure to reimburse necessary business expenses;

(5) wage statement penalties;

(6) waiting time penalties; and

(7) unfair competition.

Plaintiff Hutton is represented by Spivak Law Firm and United Employees Group.

The Hutton Class Action was filed as complex.

Hutton PAGA Action - 25CECG05047

In this matter, filed October 27, 2025 in Fresno County, Plaintiff Hutton brings claims against Defendants MedMark Treatment Centers- Fresno West, Inc., MedMark Treatment Centers, Inc., MedMark Services, Inc., and BayMark Health Services, Inc. for civil penalties Pursuant to Labor Code § 2699 based on the following violations:

(1) pay all wages;

(2) provide all meal and rest periods;

(3) pay premiums for unprovided meal and rest breaks;

(4) reimburse necessary business expenses;

(5) provide compliant wage statements;

(6) timely pay wages during employment;

(7) timely pay wages upon termination; and

(8) maintain accurate records.

The Hutton PAGA Action does not appear to have been filed as complex and has not been deemed complex.

Plaintiff Hutton is represented by Spivak Law Firm and United Employees Group.

Authority and Analysis

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 404 and California Rules of Court, rule 3.524, the Judicial Council authorized the Tulare County Superior Court presiding judge to assign the matter to a judge "to sit as coordination motion judge to determine whether the included actions listed" in the order: (1) are complex, and if so, (2) whether coordination of those actions is appropriate. Further, pending the determination of whether coordination is appropriate, whether the stay any action being considered for or affecting any action being considered for coordination.

According to the order, if the coordination motion judge grants the petition for coordination, he or she must (1) recommend a particular superior court for the site of the coordination proceedings, pursuant to rule 3.530, and (2) select the reviewing court having appellate jurisdiction if the actions to be coordinate are within the jurisdiction of more than one reviewing court, pursuant to rule 3.505(a).

Code of Civil Procedure section 404 provides in pertinent part:

"When civil actions sharing a common question of fact or law are pending in different courts, a petition for coordination may be submitted to the Chairperson of the Judicial Council, by the presiding judge of any such court, or by any party to one of the actions after obtaining permission from the presiding judge, or by all of the parties plaintiff or defendant in any such action. A petition for coordination, or a motion for permission to submit a petition, shall be supported by a declaration stating facts showing that the actions are complex, as defined by the Judicial Council and that the actions meet the standards specified in Section 404.1."

Therefore, the Court must determine if the actions are complex and whether the actions are appropriate for coordination under section 404.1

Petitioner’s Petition provides argument and the declaration of counsel in support of these two elements.

On July 14, 2026, Plaintiff Loza timely filed an opposition, arguing that the Petition does not meet the standard for coordination, as addressed below in further detail.

Complex

To determine whether a case is complex, the Court must consider whether the action is likely to involve (1) Numerous pretrial motions raising difficult or novel issues that will be time-consuming to resolve; (2) Management of a large number of witnesses or a substantial amount of documentary evidence; (3) Management of a large number of separately represented parties; (4) Coordination with related actions pending in one or more courts in other counties, states, or counties, or in a federal court; or (5) Substantial postjudgment judicial supervision. (CRC, Rule 3.400(b).)

In support, Petitioner states:

“i. the cases will involve numerous pretrial motions raising difficult or novel legal issues, such as issues regarding the scope and implementation of PAGA which is a relatively recent and still evolving area of law and frequently raises previously unresolved legal questions;

ii. the cases will require the management of thousands of documents, including time records and payroll records for all aggrieved employees as defined by the complaints; policy documents issued by Defendants regarding, inter alia, hourly-paid employees’ meal breaks, rest breaks, premium pay, overtime pay, and reimbursement procedures; and internal communications between Defendants’ agents relating to the violations at issue;

iii. the cases will require depositions of several employees whom plaintiffs seek to represent;

iv. all three actions will require substantial post judgment supervision because courts will need to ensure that in the event uncashed checks result from a monetary judgment or settlement, the requirements of the newly amended Code of Civil Procedure section 384 are followed.” (Declaration of Wilson ¶17.a.i-iv.)

To start, the Loza and Hutton Class Actions are provisionally deemed complex by Rule of Court, rule 3.400(c)(6).

All the Actions seek to prosecute claims on behalf of non-exempt employees across California based on allegations of violations of the Labor Code, with the Hutton Class Action seeking recovery under the Business and Professions Code for what are effectively derivative claims. 

However, the Court does not find a specific identification of “difficult or novel legal issues” as to PAGA or “previously unresolved legal questions.” Petitioner cites to Raines v. Coastal Pacific Food Distributors, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 667, 677 as to the issue of “Whether a PAGA claim for a violation of section 226(a) requires the same showing of injury as an individual claim for statutory penalties under section 226(e).” However, Gunther v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (2021) 72 Cal. App. 5th 334, 355-356 rejected this reasoning, noting that the enhanced penalties only apply when an employer “…fails to provide the employee a wage deduction statement” based on the plain statutory language. This appears to be the only “novel” legal issue specifically identified and the Court does not find it sufficient to warrant a “complex” label under the first factor.

As to the management of documents and witnesses, the Court agrees that these Defendants’ will likely have a large number of percipient witnesses and applicable policies, as well as numerous wage and hour statements.

The Court agrees that the cases are likely to require depositions of several employees of Defendants.

Further, that class actions and PAGA claims require post judgment supervision with respect to full compliance with any judgment or settlement and disbursement of funds, including the supervision of the processing of the sum of uncashed checks to the cy pres recipient.

Therefore, the Court finds the Actions complex.

Coordination

Code of Civil Procedure section 404.1 provides:

"Coordination of civil actions sharing a common question of fact or law is appropriate if one judge hearing all of the actions for all purposes in a selected site or sites will promote the ends of justice taking into account whether the common question of fact or law is predominating and significant to the litigation; the convenience of parties, witnesses, and counsel; the relative development of the actions and the work product of counsel; the efficient utilization of judicial facilities and manpower; the calendar of the courts; the disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments; and, the likelihood of settlement of the actions without further litigation should coordination be denied."

In support, the Petitioner notes judicial efficiency and economy, as well as convenience, as to coordinated discovery and depositions, including those of expert witnesses. (Declaration of Wilson ¶18.)

Further, that the Actions are pending in three counties and that a single judge hearing all law and motion provide a basis for coordination and will reduce the risk of inconsistent rulings. (Declaration of Wilson ¶19.) Further, that PMK depositions of the Defendants will, under a coordinated proceeding, be more efficient and require fewer depositions overall to be taken. (Declaration of Wilson ¶20.)

Finally, that settlement would be discouraged if different parties could obtain different ruling in different courts. (Declaration of Wilson ¶22.)

In opposition, Plaintiff Loza argues that the Actions, a mixture of class action and PAGA, involve different parties in interest, where the named Plaintiff and class are the parties in a class action, but the State is the real party in interest in the PAGA claim. Further, that, due to this, there is a lack of commonality between the actions.

Additionally, Plaintiff Loza argues a lack of evidence as to the convenience arguments set forth above and the coordination would prejudice Plaintiff Loza who filed these actions first.

Finally, Plaintiff Loza argues that the parties in the Loza Class Action and Loza PAGA Action have already agreed to mediation without coordination and that coordination at this point would discourage a global settlement.

The Court recognizes that “An employee suing under PAGA 'does so as the proxy or agent of the state's labor law enforcement agencies.' [Citation.] Every PAGA claim is 'a dispute between an employer and the state.' [Citation.] . . . The 'government entity on whose behalf the plaintiff files suit is always the real party in interest.'” (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 81.)

However, the Court also commonly adjudicates settlements of PAGA and class action cases together, noting a commonality between the separate claims under the class action and the violations for which the PAGA penalties are sought. Here, the Loza Class Action presents claims for various Labor Code violations and the Loza PAGA Action seeks civil penalties for what appears to be the same Labor Code violations. The Parcasio PAGA Action appears to add a violation for failure to keep complete or accurate payroll records. The Hutton Class Action adds an unfair competition claim.

As such, the Court finds sufficient common questions of fact and law predominating the litigation.

While the Court agrees that Petitioner has failed to quantify the witnesses, documentary evidence and law and motion work, the Court notes that, at least as to PMK depositions of Defendants, it would be more efficient to coordinate these actions and therefore coordinate such discovery. The Court’s experience with these cases is that, even for a lower number of affected putative class members or aggrieved employees, wage statements spanning multiple years alone will generate significant documentary evidence.

Further, a coordinated action would reduce law and motion volume and eliminate the risk of inconsistent rulings as to discovery and approval of settlement.

Finally, the Court’s experience with parallel wage and hour class actions and PAGA cases is that a coordinated action will encourage settlement, as it will provide assurance to Defendants that resolving the coordinated case resolves all claims against it.

As such, the Court finds coordination appropriate.

Coordination Site and Appellate Jurisdiction

The Petition seeks to deem Contra Costa County Superior Court as the appropriate court for this coordinated action.

California Rule of Court 3.530(b) provides the following relevant factors for a coordination motion judge to recommend the site of coordination proceedings: (1) the number of included actions in particular locations; (2) whether the litigation is at an advanced stage in a particular court; (3) the efficient use of court facilities and judicial resources; (4) the locations of witnesses and evidence; (5) the convenience of the parties and witnesses; (6) the parties’ principal place of business; (7) the office locations of counsel for the parties; and (8) the ease of travel to and availability of accommodations in particular locations.

Petitioner notes that the Martinez-Wakefield Taylor Courthouse has been designated as the courthouse where complex cases are managed in the Superior Court of California County of Contra Costa. Further, that Fresno and Tulare lack dedicated complex litigation departments.

The opposition does not address this issue, except to note that the Parcasio PAGA Action (set in Contra Costa) is the latest filed case.

The Court sets Contra Costa County Superior Court for the site of coordination proceedings.

Further, the Court sets the First Appellate District as having appellate jurisdiction.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

The Tentative Rulings for Friday, July 24, 2026 , are:

Re:              Brambila, Leonor vs. Familia Partida, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company et al

Case No.:     PCU318630 

Date:           July 24, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           15-Honorable Gary M. Johnson

Motions:     Motion to Compel and Motion to Deem Admitted

Tentative Rulings:  The motion to deem admitted is denied, and the motion to compel further responses to general form interrogatories, employment-specific form interrogatories, special interrogatories, and requests for production of documents is granted as provided herein.  Sanctions of $861.50 on the motion to deem admitted, based on the untimely served responses to requests for admission, and sanctions of $1,074.50 on the motion to compel further responses to other discovery, are granted against plaintiff. 

The court here takes up defendant Familia Partida LLC’s previously continued motions (a) to compel further discovery responses, and (b) to deemed admitted matters at issue in requests for admission.

Background

Plaintiff commenced this action with a 21 cause of action complaint asserting various employment law claims, including, amongst several others, various wage and hour Labor Code claims, sexual harassment claims, and discrimination.  Plaintiff alleges she was hired by Familia Partida LLC (Familia) “to work in the Meat Section at Defendant’s business,” “[o]n or about 2022,” and during her employment through “her constructive dismissal” “[o]n or about April 14, 2024” (when she “was forced to resign” “due to the ongoing stress and hostile work environment”), she suffered various unlawful actions perpetrated by Familia, her former co-workers “Juan Doe” and “Noe Doe,” as well as “Adolfo Doe,” “the owner of the Guadalajara Meat Market.”

Plaintiff filed her complaint on February 26, 2025. 

Nearly a year later, on January 16, 2026, Familia served general form interrogatories, employment-specific form interrogatories, special interrogatories (377 of them), requests for production of documents (81 of these), and requests for admission (also 81 of these) on plaintiff that were due February 19, 2026. 

February 17, 2026, plaintiff served only unverified responses consisting of boilerplate objections and a response to general form interrogatory 1.1, regarding the identify of the person answering. 

On February 25, 2026, Familia’s counsel sent a letter outlining various deficiencies in plaintiff’s discovery responses.  The parties later scheduled a March 4, 2026 call to further confer. 

Less than 15 minutes prior to the scheduled call, plaintiff’s counsel, Christopher Goodrich, emailed stating, “something has come up and I will not be able to make our 12:30 p.m. phone call today.”  Counsel acknowledged the discovery responses lacked verification by plaintiff and indicated they were “working to obtain our client’s signature.”  Counsel also indicated they were “diligently working to secure our cooperation and will supplement the responses with substantive answers where appropriate.”  Counsel suggested a “short extension” would “allow us to resolve these issues without the need for motion practice.”  Counsel requested an extension to March 18, 2026, “to serve verified, supplemental responses.”

Familia’s counsel, Nick Pritchett, responded that Goodrich’s action were “nothing more than gamesmanship,” and that “[i]f no acceptable responses are provided by Monday March 9, 2026, at noon, we will file the appropriate motions and will seek sanctions against your firm.”

Plaintiff did not, thereafter, serve “verified, supplemental responses” and, on March 19, 2026, Familia filed its discovery motions, including requests for sanctions. 

In opposition, plaintiff challenged the sufficiency of defendant’s declarations of necessity (see Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2033.050 [re: requests for admission]; 2030.050 [re: special interrogatories]); averred that “verified, substantive responses to [requests for admission] [were] being served concurrently with [the] opposition” (inferably limiting the declaration of necessity challenge to the special interrogatories); and requested a 45-day extension “to serve verified, substantive responses to the Form Interrogatories and Requests for Production, given the extraordinary volume of discovery propounded and the complexity of the claims involved.”

In its reply, Familia acknowledged receipt of plaintiff’s verified responses to requests for admission and withdrew its request that the matters at issue be deemed admitted.  Familia still maintained that it was entitled to sanctions, as it had initially requested, incident to having to file a motion to secure plaintiff’s responses. 

Familia’s discovery motions came on for hearing on May 5, 2026. The court found plaintiff, during meet and confer efforts preceding the motions, “acknowledged insufficient responses, sought additional time and was prepared to provide substantive responses.”  The court, therefore, ordered “the parties to meet and confer over the next 45 day period”; “to discuss the sufficiency of the further responses to the requests for admissions”; and “to discuss the sufficiency of the declaration as to additional interrogatories.”

The court additionally stated:  “Should Defendant receive further, verified responses to the interrogatories and requests for production and should Defendant find substantial compliance as to the further responses to admissions, the Court will consider these motions moot. Any issues with the further responses will require a motion to compel further responses, including a meet and confer requirement and separate statement.”

The court additionally set a status conference as to the discovery motions on July 21, 2026. 

On June 23, 2026, the case was scheduled for settlement conference.  In a settlement conference statement filed June 18, 2026, Goodrich stated “[p]laintiff is actively working to finalize supplemental discovery responses and anticipates providing verified, substantive responses in advance of the July 21, 2026 status conference.”

Neither Goodrich nor plaintiff, however, appeared for the settlement conference.  The court issued an order for Goodrich and plaintiff to show cause why the matter should not be dismissed or why sanctions of $600 should not be imposed for failure to appear. 

Plaintiff filed a response to the order to show cause and defendants filed an opposition.  In defendants’ opposition, they asserted that plaintiff and her counsel had not “provided code-compliant discovery responses,” attempted “to meet and confer,” “nor otherwise indicated any intention to comply with the Court’s [May 5, 2026] adopted ruling.”

The court’s order to show cause came on for hearing on July 14, 2026.  Goodrich appeared late at the hearing via Zoom.  Judge Burke, then presiding, recused himself from the proceedings, and continued the order to show cause to July 20, 2026.  Judge Burke additionally reset hearing on the discovery motions to July 24, 2026.

At the continued OSC hearing on July 20th, the court imposed sanctions of $600 against Goodrich and, further, confirmed continued hearing on the discovery motions for July 24, 2026.

DISCUSSION

There have been no subsequent submissions in this case since defendants’ opposition to plaintiff’s response to the court’s order to show cause.  The court assumes, given defendants’ statement in defendants’ opposition to plaintiff’s response to the court’s order to show cause—that plaintiff and her counsel had not “provided code-compliant discovery responses,” attempted “to meet and confer,” “nor otherwise indicated any intention to comply with the Court’s [May 5, 2026] adopted ruling”—that, beyond the further verified, substantive responses to requests for admission, there have been no further efforts on plaintiff’s part to respond to Familia’s discovery demands, as promised or otherwise. 

As to the motion to deem admitted, the court accepts the concession that responses were provided, and denies the request to deem admitted, but is required to grant, and therefore grants, Familia’s request for sanctions in the amount of $861.50 against plaintiff based on plaintiff’s failure to serve timely responses, which failure necessitated the motion.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c).)

As to the motion to compel, the court finds plaintiff’s objections to Familia’s declaration of necessity in support of its special interrogatories without merit. 

As plaintiff concedes, Familia’s special interrogatories are styled as contention interrogatories that demand, with respect to the factual allegations in “each numbered paragraph of the Complaint” (there are 221 total), a statement of “all facts,” and identification of “all persons with knowledge” and “all documents,” in support of those factual allegations. 

Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.010, subdivision (b), specifically authorizes contention interrogatories and provides: “An interrogatory may relate to whether another party is making a certain contention, or to the facts, witnesses, and writings on which a contention is based.” (See also, Burke v. Superior Court of Sacramento County (1969) 71 Cal.2d 276, 285 [78 Cal.Rptr. 481, 455 P.2d 409]; Singer v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1960) 54 Cal.2d 318, 326 [5 Cal.Rptr. 697, 353 P.2d 305].)

The court additionally notes that, to the extent plaintiff believes these inquires could be narrowed, it is well-past the 45-day period designated by the court in its May 5, 2026 ruling for meet and confer efforts, and well-past the date Goodrich indicated that he anticipated plaintiff “providing verified, substantive responses” to Familia’s outstanding discovery. 

Plaintiff raised no substantive objection to Familia’s form interrogatories or requests for production and instead merely requested an additional 45 days to serve responses.  That period was given, and has, again, long passed. 

Plaintiff did object, however, to being compelled to serve responses without objections, particularly as to objections on attorney client privilege or work product grounds.  Familia had asserted, citing Appleton v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632 [253 Cal.Rptr. 762], that because the responses plaintiff timely served, consisting solely of boilerplate objections, were unverified, they were effectively not responses at all. 

Verification of the discovery responses, however, is not required where responses contain only objections under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.250, subdivision (a) and 2031.250, subdivision (a).  Appleton is distinguishable as it involved partially substantive responses to requests for admission (id., at p. 634) and did not discuss sections 2030.250 or 2031.250.  Familia did not otherwise analyze the validity of plaintiff’s objections or even include copies of plaintiff’s responses.

The court notes, however, in Familia’s initial meet and confer correspondence, it stated that plaintiff asserted, in response to all discovery demands, objections that the demands were essentially overbroad, burdensome, irrelevant, and “could encompass information protected by privacy rights.”  No reference was made to any objection based on attorney client privilege or work product protection. 

Further notable, in opposing the motions, while plaintiff argued that the right to object to discovery on attorney client privilege or work product protection grounds should remain, she did not identify any of Familia’s discovery demands as implicating such protections. 

Based on the foregoing, the court grants Familia’s motion to compel further responses to its general form interrogatories, employment-specific form interrogatories, special interrogatories, and requests for production of documents, and directs plaintiff to provide code compliant responses within 30 days and without objection, including any objection based on attorney-client privilege or work product protection, if such objections were not previously asserted in plaintiff’s prior discovery responses. 

In the event plaintiff reasserts attorney-client privilege or work product protection in objection to a document demand, plaintiff shall provide a privilege log, including a specific factual description of the documents withheld, with a sufficient explanation of the basis for objection to enable the court to evaluate the privilege or protection claim. 

In the event plaintiff reasserts any such privilege or protection in objection to an interrogatory, the response must state the particular privilege or protection asserted with sufficient information for the court to evaluate the privilege or protection claim and must otherwise respond to the interrogatory as to any information not claimed to be privileged or protected.

The court finds, under the circumstances presented here, sanctions requested on the motion to compel further responses of $1,074.50 are warranted, and it grants that request against plaintiff as well. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared July 27, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054165	In the Matter of Tomasetti, Steven Lewis	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	1. Petition Item 5a (3) or (4); (7) or (8) omitted: re any surviving registered domestic partner; issue of a predeceased child. 2. Petition Item 8: relationships of parties to decedent omitted. 3. Notice of Petition to Administer not filed, Prob C § 1220. 4. Proof of Publication not filed, Prob C § 8121. 5. Supplemental Statement of Birth Date and DL Number not filed (DE-147S), TCSC LR, rule 1000(c)(4).
VPR054164	In the Matter of Nunes Verissimo, Carmel S.	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Recommended for Approval
VPR054157	In the Matter of Garcia, Jose	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	1. Discrepancies: Caption and Petition Item 2a claim there is a will, whereas 3f selected, “decedent died intestate”. 2. Petition 3g(2)(b) Attachment omitted, nomination. 3. Petition Item 5b omitted: re any surviving stepchild/foster child or children who would have been adopted. 4. Petition Item 8: Petitioner’s name, age and relationship to decedent omitted; issue of a predeceased child omitted. 5. If a citizen of a foreign country dies without leaving a will or leaves a will without naming an executor, notice shall be given to a recognized diplomatic or consular official of the foreign country, Prob C § 8113. 6. Notice of Hearing Item 6: incorrect date of hearing. 7. Proof of Publication not filed, Prob C § 8121. 8. Proposed order and letters incomplete.
VPR054153	In the Matter of Reynoso, Stephanie Denise	Letters of Administration	Recommended for Approval
VPR054154	In the Matter of Reynoso, Edward Vincent	Letters of Administration	Recommended for Approval
VPR054159	In the Matter of Long, Donald Leroy	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	Petition Item 11(2) omitted: facts that show that the real property was decedent’s primary residence, Prob C § 13152(a). Petition Item 8c: DE-300 not attached as required by Probate C § 13152(e)
VPR054167	In the Matter of Pirnstill, Juddith A.	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	Petition Item 8c: DE-300 not attached as required by Probate C § 13152(e)
VPR054201	In the Matter of Zempoalteca, Natan	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054117	In the Matter of Madriz Raya, Manuel Jr	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing not served on all relatives within the second degree and proposed conservatee
VPR054134	In the Matter of Velasco, Alejandro	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	1. Petition Attachment 1d omitted: Specifying orders, powers, and reasons powers are requested under Prob C § 2590. 2. Proposed order Item 21: Attorney may petition the court for an order allowing compensation pursuant to Probate Code § 2640

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         Probate calendar for JULY 16, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR054150	In the Matter of Smith, Carolyn Rae	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	Original will not lodged in case. Improper Notice of Hearing served, rather than Notice of Petition to Administer, DE-121.
PPR053976	In the Matter of Lemus Orozco, Yamilet	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing of appointment hearing with copy of the Petition required to be served
PPR048739	In the Matter of Luna, Guadalupe	Accounting Hearing - Conservatorship	Appearance Required	Documents in order
PPR053492	In the Matter of Broome, Justin Bryton	Contested Hearing - Conservatorship	Appearance Required	Documents in order

South County Justice Center & Visalia-County Civic Center

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared July 24, 2026 that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
7/24/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR054014	IMO R.V.	Need Notice of Hearing to be filed with proof of service on ALL RELATIVES indicating they were served with15 calendar days notice, as required by PROB Code §1460,1510, with a copy of the Notice of Hearing and Petition for Appointment DECLARATION of attendance of Guardianship Orientation needs to be filed DOJ BACKGROUND RECORD CHECK needs to be completed
7/24/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR053990	In the Matter of Thompson, Jaylah Rae	Appoint Guardian, THOMPSON Need Notice of Hearing to be filed with proof of service on relatives indicating they were served with15 calendar days notice, as required by PROB Code §1460,1510, with a copy of the Notice of Hearing and Petition for Appointment DECLARATION of attendance of Guardianship Orientation needs to be filed DOJ BACKGROUND RECORD CHECK needs to be completed FORM ICWA-030 needs to be filed
7/24/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR053990	In the Matter of Thompson, Jaylah Rae	Appoint Guardian, RENTERIA/CREECH Need Notice of Hearing to be filed with proof of service on relatives indicating they were served with15 calendar days notice, as required by PROB Code §1460,1510, with a copy of the Notice of Hearing and Petition for Appointment DECLARATION of attendance of Guardianship Orientation needs to be filed DOJ BACKGROUND RECORD CHECK needs to be completed
7/24/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR045613	In the Matter of Hancock, Felicia Nicole	OSC Hearing
7/24/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR043409	In the Matter of McGuire, Jayden Allen	OSC Hearing