Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, June 9, 2026, are:

Re:                Duran, Mariano et al vs. Farmers Insurance Exchange

Case No.:   VCU321509 

Date:           June 9, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment or Adjudication

Tentative Ruling:  To grant the motion for summary judgment.

Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange (FIE) moves for summary judgment on the complaint of plaintiffs Mariano Duran and Aguilera Oregon.  In the alternative, FIE moves for summary adjudication on four issues.  The court need not list, nor discuss, the four issues presented for summary adjudication because it finds FIE establishes entitlement to summary judgment. 

Plaintiffs sue FIE for breach of their homeowner’s insurance policy based on FIE’s alleged denial of full coverage “and/or” its failure to make all contractually required payments and provide all contractually required “benefits.”  Based on the same allegations, plaintiffs assert both a breach of contract and tortious bad faith claim against FIE (first and second causes of action, respectively).  Plaintiffs allege entitlement to punitive damages on their second bad faith claim as well. 

Plaintiffs allege that they suffered a covered loss to their house when, “on or about 04-13-2024,” “the roof of the home on the Property was damaged due to wind and rain, which allowed rainwater to seep through the roof and into the interior of the home causing further damage to the Property.”

Water damage is covered under plaintiffs’ policy when entry of the water to the covered structure (i.e., the home) is caused by wind.  Water damage incident to construction defects, latent defects, wear and tear, and lack of maintenance and the failure to make repairs, however, is not covered under the policy. 

FIE moves for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs do not have, and cannot reasonably obtain, evidence that they suffered a covered loss as alleged in their complaint (due to water intrusion caused by wind).  FIE additionally presents evidence intended to affirmatively show that plaintiffs did not suffer a covered loss based on water intrusion caused by wind.  

The court finds that FIE makes a prima facie showing that plaintiffs do not have, and cannot reasonably obtain, evidence to establish that plaintiffs suffered a covered loss, as they allege, due to water damage resulting from entry of water to their home caused by wind.  FIE makes this showing based on plaintiffs’ discovery responses.  

In discovery, FIE asked plaintiffs for all facts, persons with knowledge, and documents supporting their claim for breach of contract and for production of identified documents. Plaintiffs produced inspection reports, photographs, estimates, and invoices from their consultants and FIE’s consultant, but none of this material contained evidence of a covered loss or a covered occurrence as alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint (i.e., water damage incident to intrusion caused by wind).

FIE also makes a prima facie showing that the cause of the water damage plaintiffs allegedly suffered was not caused by wind, but, rather, resulted from improper installation of the roof tile materials and/or significant roof wear and tear—neither of which are covered under plaintiffs’ policy.   FIE makes this prima facie showing based on its own consultant’s report, detailing that inspection of the damaged premises revealed plaintiffs’ roof showed significant signs of wear and tear, no signs of wind damage, and areas of zippering on the roof attributable to improper installation of the roof tile materials. 

Plaintiffs have not, to date, filed an opposition.  FIE highlighted this, specifically, in a May 28, 2026 filed “Reply and Notice.”  Plaintiffs failure to file an opposition, in the instant circumstances, is fatal to their action.  FIE has met its initial burden on summary judgment that it did not breach the terms of plaintiffs’ policy by denying plaintiffs’ coverage; and plaintiffs, by failing to file any opposition, necessarily fail to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.  (See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493] [“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”].)

The court additionally notes that plaintiffs’ failure to have filed a separate statement that responds to each of the material facts contended by FIE to be undisputed may be deemed, itself, “a sufficient ground, in the court’s discretion, for granting [FIE’s] motion.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(3).)

Because FIE establishes entitlement to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim, FIE is also entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ bad faith claim, since, as pled in plaintiffs’ complaint, plaintiff’s bad faith claim is predicated on their breach of contract claim.  (See also, Griffin Dewatering Corp. v. Northern Ins. Co. of New York (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 172, 194-196 [97 Cal.Rptr.3d 568] [first step of analysis in bad faith cases is whether there was a breach unreasonable as to warrant contract damages; if the coverage decision is reasonable, the insurer has no liability for the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.].)

Accordingly, FIE’s motion must be, and is, granted as to the whole of the complaint. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Discover Bank vs. Aldama, Misty

Case No.:   VCL312483

Date:           June 9, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion for Entry of Judgment Pursuant to Stipulation

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and enter judgment as requested.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sued Defendant for account stated and open book, alleging $2,292.30 in damages.

On or about March 2, 2025, the parties stipulated to resolve this matter as to the amount alleged for a single payment of $50 and $160 per month until a final payment of $2.30 on May 31, 2026. The stipulation indicates Plaintiff may recover its costs in the event of default and that the Court shall retain jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 if the matter is dismissed.

This matter does not appear to have been dismissed.

On April 8, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion to enforce the stipulation as a judgment pursuant to its terms and enter judgment in the amount of $2,557.50.

Plaintiff indicates Defendant has made payments of $370.

Plaintiff further indicates costs incurred of $635.20.

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states: 

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1360.)

As indicated above, the Court retains jurisdiction over the parties and this matter and therefore is prepared to “enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”

Defendant appears to have breached the settlement, based upon the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel and, the Court, having no opposition, grants the motion and enters judgment in the amount requested of $2,557.50, consisting of the principal amount due of $2,292.30 plus the costs of $635.20 less credits for the payment of $370.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Discover Bank vs. Pence, Merrie L

Case No.:   VCL320631

Date:           June 9, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion for Entry of Judgment Pursuant to Stipulation

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and enter judgment as requested.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract, alleging $28,923.06 in damages.

On or about June 16, 2025, the parties stipulated to resolve this matter in the amount of the alleged sum as to monthly payments of $603 and a final payment of $582.06. The stipulation indicates Plaintiff may recover its costs in the event of default and that the Court shall retain jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 if the matter is dismissed.

This matter was dismissed July 22, 2025 and jurisdiction under section 664.6 was reserved.

On April 9, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion to enforce the stipulation as a judgment pursuant to its terms and enter judgment in the amount of $25,890.83

Plaintiff indicates Defendant has made payments of $3,618.00.

Plaintiff further indicates costs incurred of $585.77.

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states: 

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1360.)

As indicated above, the Court retains jurisdiction over the parties and this matter and therefore is prepared to “enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”

Defendant appears to have breached the settlement, based upon the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel and, the Court, having no opposition, grants the motion and enters judgment in the amount requested of $25,890.83 consisting of the principal amount due of $28,923.06 plus the costs of $585.77 less credits for the payment of $3,618.00.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Fonseca, David vs. Chimienti & Associates

Case No.:   VCU315048

Date:            June 9, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Application Pro Hac Vice as to Attorney Leigh S. Montgomery to appear as counsel pro hac vice.

Tentative Ruling: To deny the application.

Facts and Analysis

The Court notes it previously denied the application on February 3, 2026, noting that the seven prior appearances in 2024 and 2025 constituted the practice of law in this State and, absent special circumstances, the repeated appearances are sufficient to deny the application. This application appears to be substantially similar to the one previously denied and does not acknowledge the prior rejection. The Court discerns no discussion of any special circumstances in the declarations provided in support of this renewed application.

As such, the Court, again, finds that Attorney Montgomery’s seven (7) prior appearances in different cases before the courts in this state in the last two years (six of which were in 2025 and one of which was in late 2024) and that the nature of this practice requires “the frequent need for special admittance” constitute repeated applications similar to Golba v. Dick's Sporting Goods, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1266. (Declaration of Montgomery ¶9)

California Rules of Court, Rule 9.40 (b) states, ”absent special circumstances, repeated appearances by any person under this rule is a cause for denial of an application.” Again, Counsel does not articulate any special circumstances other than the presence of potential clients here, and if this formed a basis of for the finding of a special circumstance, it would be an exception that vitiates the rule.

Based on the foregoing, the application of attorney Montgomery to appear as counsel pro hac vice for Plaintiff in this action is denied.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Ramirez Naranjo, Anthony vs. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

Case No.:  VCU328025

Date:           June 9, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion as to Nos. 1, 3-4, 7, 10, 13, and 30; further responses are due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing; to deny the motion as to Nos. 23-29.

Facts

On or about October 29, 2023, 2023, Plaintiff leased a 2024 Honda Accord, bearing VIN: 1HGCY1F28RA011535 (“Subject Vehicle”).

On or about November 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed this matter for breach of written warranty, alleging various defects and nonconformities to warranty including, but not limited to, electrical, steering, and suspension system defects.

On or about January 28, 2026, Plaintiff propounded requests for production of documents, set one.

On or about April 2, 2026, Defendant provided responses containing objections and indicating that either documents responsive thereto would be produced or that, after a diligent search and reasonable inquiry, no such documents exist.

Plaintiff, thereafter, attempted to meet and confer in writing and telephonically as to the production of documents indicated in the responses. However, no documents have been produced.

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed this motion to compel further responses as to Nos. 1, 3-4, 7, 10, 13, and 23-30.

The Court notes an executed protective order filed May 8, 2026.

In opposition, Defendant argues that substantive responses were provided, that this motion is templated or recycled from other motions and addresses objections not present and that the discovery otherwise sought is beyond the claims Plaintiff makes in this matter.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.210 requires, in response to a request for production, the following:

“(a) The party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed shall respond separately to each item or category of item by any of the following:

(1) A statement that the party will comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling by the date set for the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 2031.030 and any related activities.

(2) A representation that the party lacks the ability to comply with the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of a particular item or category of item.

(3) An objection to the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling.”

 Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.220 provides “A statement that the party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed will comply with the particular demand shall state that the production, inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, and related activity demanded, will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production.”

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230 provides “A representation of inability to comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party. The statement shall set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item.”

Finally, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310(a) permits a party to demand a further response where:

“(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete.

(2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive.

(3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.”

Under subsection (b), the motion must “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” In Digital Music News LLC v Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216 at 224, the court defined “good cause” as a showing that there “a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.”  If the moving party has shown good cause for the requests for production, the burden is on the objecting party to justify the objections. (Kirkland v. Sup.Ct (2002) 95 Cal. App.4th 92, 98.) 

Nos. 1, 3, 4, 7 and 10

These requests relate to documents involving the Subject Vehicle in the possession or control of Defendant. After objecting on grounds of confidentiality, commercial sensitivity and/or that the requests seek proprietary information, Defendant indicates it will produce documents responsive to the requests.

Plaintiff’s motion states no documents have been produced.

However, Defendant’s declaration states “On April 29, 2026, AHM served its document production, including all records specifically pertaining to the Subject Vehicle. On May 8, 2026, AHM served its confidential document production after Plaintiff signed a standard stipulation and protective order.” (Declaration of Edel ¶6.)

To the extent that some production has not occurred, the Court will order production, as promised in the responses, to take place no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

No. 13

This request seeks communications or contacts between Plaintiff and Defendants. Again, after objecting on grounds of confidentiality, commercial sensitivity and/or that the requests seek proprietary information, Defendant indicates it will produce documents responsive to the requests.

Again, it is unclear whether Defendant has produced all documents responsive to this category, based on the statements in the motion and the declaration of Defendant’s counsel. To the extent that some production has not occurred, the Court will order production, as promised in the responses, to take place no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

Nos. 23-29

The requests seek information as to warranty policy and procedure manuals as to warranty repairs, categorization thereof, repeat visits, test drives, repair reimbursement and handling customer concerns on issues that cannot be replicated.

The Court notes that Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1103-1105 [manufacturer's policies and procedures requiring a part to be replaced or adjusted before it was deemed a "repair attempt" under the lemon law and refusing to find a "repair attempt" where a mechanic was unable to diagnose the problem were sufficient to establish a finding of willfulness under Song Beverly Act] and Johnson v. Ford Motor Co. (2005) 35 Cal. 4th 1191, 1199 [holding Ford's buyback program was "structured precisely to short-circuit lemon law claims," entitling the plaintiff to punitive damages] indicate that such policies are relevant to Song Beverly cases.

The Court reiterates the above regarding the repurchase policies and adds that a  violation is willful if the manufacturer knew of its obligations, but intentionally failed to fulfill them. (Schreidel v. American Honda Motor Co. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249-1250.) Therefore, a manufacturer's policies, or lack thereof as to replacement or repurchase may determine a willful violation. (See Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 136 [jury should consider factors as to willfulness "whether the manufacturer had a written policy on the requirement to repair or replace."]; Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of North America (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 186 ["Whether the lack of a written policy demonstrates [defendant's] lack of good faith is a question to be answered by a properly instructed jury . . . ."].)

However, the Court does not find these requests sufficiently tailored to the defects alleged in this case and the Court does not find the cases above justify obtaining any and every policy as to any and every vehicle suffering from any and every defect. Each request, however, does seeks such information, in violation of section 2031.030(c)(1).

Therefore, the Court will not order a further responses to Nos. 23-29. The Court does note, however, that Defendant has agreed to produce a documents responsive to Nos. 23, 24, 25 and 26.

No. 30

Here, Plaintiff seeks documents reflecting similar customer complaints to those at issue in this matter.

Though not a case involving a discovery issue, in Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 154, the appellate court held the trial court had not erred in denying defendant’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of other customers' complaints about the same transmission model Defendant installed in plaintiff's truck and other vehicles. The Donlon court ruled that “other vehicle testimony was not unduly prejudicial. It did not concern simply other vehicles. It was limited to the [defective component] in Plaintiff’s truck and other vehicles [Plaintiff’s expert] described what Ford itself had done to notify dealers and technicians about problems with this [defective component] model. Thus, everything about which he testified that applied equally to Plaintiff’s vehicle. Such evidence certainly was probative and not unduly prejudicial.”  (Id. at 154; See also Doppes v. Bentley (2009) 174 Cal.App.4^th 967 [documents related to the frequency of repurchases and similar complaints about other vehicles of the same year, make, and model are relevant in actions that involved violations of the Song-Beverly Act.].)

Similarly, in Jensen v. BMW of North American, LLC (S.D. Cal. 2019) 328 F.R.D. 557, 562-563, the court found that "information regarding whether the same defects reported to BMW in other cars of the same make, model, and year as Plaintiff's subject vehicle could conceivably be relevant to whether BMW acted reasonably in denying Plaintiff's warranty claims. A fact finder may find BMW's knowledge or lack of knowledge about the same defects to be a consideration in deciding whether BMW acted in good faith as to Plaintiff's specific case."

Therefore, the Court will order a further response to No. 30.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Gilbert, Sydney vs. Murray, Jacob Wayne

Case No.:   VCU333454

Date:           June 9, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Demurrer

Tentative Ruling: To overrule the demurrer; to order the City to answer the complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

Facts

Plaintiff sues Defendants Jacob Murray for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff sues the City of Hanford under Government Code section 815.2(a).

Plaintiff alleges on or around April 30, 2025, the City  deployed the Hanford Police’s Homeless Assistance Resource Team officers to conduct a multi-agency homeless encampment cleanup near Aquifer Drive and the San Joaquin Valley Railroad tracks located in Hanford, California (hereinafter the “Subject Location”.) (Complaint ¶11.)

While at the Subject Location, the City “encountered” Defendant Murray, who had a previous criminal history including driving with a suspended license, driving under the influence of a controlled substance, sale of a controlled substance, assault, robbery, terrorist threat, breaking and entering, and theft, and who had been incarcerated on multiple occasions. (Complaint ¶¶12, 13.)

The City “merely told Defendant [Murray] to leave the Subject Location without detaining him or checking his criminal record to see if he had any active warrants for his arrest,” Defendant Murray walked away from the Subject Location, but located a police truck operated, owner or controlled by the City. (Complaint ¶¶14, 15.)

Additionally, that Defendant Murray saw the truck with the words “Hanford Police” on it and that the City left the vehicle unlocked in a high crime area where an encampment clean-up was taking place. (Complaint ¶16.)

Plaintiff further alleges the City left the truck unlocked with the keys inside and that it was therefore foreseeable that the truck might be stolen. (Complaint ¶17.) Further, that the truck “posed a danger greater than an ordinary vehicle given that it was clearly marked as a police vehicle and contained various weapons or tools used in the furtherance of law enforcement activities.” (Complaint ¶17.)

Plaintiff alleges the Murray saw the truck was unlocked, stole the vehicle, led the City and other law enforcement personnel on a high speed chase and Murray, while driving the truck, failed to stop at an intersection and “rear ended a 3rd vehicle, driven by Lina Garza, who was already in the intersection waiting to make a left turn onto Cherry Street. The force of the initial impact forced this 3rd vehicle to collide into Plaintiff’s vehicle. As a result of the collision, Plaintiff sustained injuries to her person and damage to her vehicle.” (Complaint ¶¶18-22.)

As to the second cause of action under Government Code section 815.2, Plaintiff alleges the following:

31. Upon information and belief, Defendants HANFORD and DOES 11-50, inclusive, owned, maintained, managed, cared for, and/or repaired the motor vehicle that caused Plaintiff to sustain injuries. As such, Defendants, and each of them, did so negligently maintain, manage, care for, and entrust their vehicle that they allowed said vehicle to be stolen by Defendant MURRAY which caused Plaintiff to suffer damages.

32. Defendants DOES 51-100 and each of them, was acting within the scope of their employment with and operating a vehicle owned by fellow Defendant HANFORD at the time of the subject collision.

33. Defendants HANFORD and DOES 11-50 are vicariously liable for the injuries to Plaintiff under Government section § 815.2 and vehicle code sections §§ 17001 and 17002.

34. Defendants HANFORD and DOES 11-50 are vicariously liable for the negligent acts of DOES 51-100, who were acting within the scope of employment pursuant to Government Code § 815.2.

35. Defendants HANFORD and DOES 11-50 are liable for injuries caused by the negligent care and operation of the Vehicle by DOES 51-100 pursuant to Vehicle Code §§ 17001 and 17002.

36. Defendants HANFORD and DOES 11-100 are liable for the tortious act of Defendant MURRAY because Defendants HANFORD and DOES 11-100, inclusive, left the Subject Truck unlocked, with the keys inside. It was foreseeable that the Subject Truck might be stolen as the Subject Location was the target of an active multi-agency homeless encampment cleanup. The Subject Truck, unlocked with the keys inside, invited criminals to tamper or otherwise operate the vehicle…”

Defendant City demurrers, as discussed below, for failure to state sufficient facts.

Plaintiff, in opposition, argues that these acts resulted in a foreseeable injury to Plaintiff based on vicarious liability of a vehicle owner.

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

Public Entity Liability

The starting point is that, except as otherwise provided by statute, “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.”  (Gov. Code § 815(a).)  “[T]his section ‘abolished all common law or judicially declared forms of liability for public entities, except for such liability as may be required by the federal or state Constitution. Thus, in the absence of some constitutional requirement, public entities may be liable only if a statute declares them to be liable’ [Citation.]”  (Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1457.)  It has been recognized that it is impermissible to sue a public entity for common law negligence. (Torres v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 844, 850.) 

Government tort claims must be pled with particularity. (Susman v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 809.) They must also be grounded in statute. (Gov. Code § 815; E.L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach (1978) 21 Cal.3d 497, 512, fn. 9.)

While the demurrer substantially focuses on whether this cause of action is a negligent supervision or training claim disguised as a vicarious liability claim, the Court will analyze this claim in the manner it is pled under section 815.2 including addressing the duty arguments raised by Defendant.

Section 815.2 – Vicarious Liability

Koussaya v. City of Stockton (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 909, 943 summarizes the theories of recovery against a public entity as follows:

“When a party is injured by a tortfeasor and seeks to affix liability on the tortfeasor's employer, the injured party ordinarily must demonstrate either (1) the  employer violated a duty of care it owed to the injured party and this negligence was a proximate cause of the resulting injury (the direct liability theory), or (2) the tortfeasor-employee was liable for committing the tortious conduct that caused the injury while acting within the course and scope of his or her employment (the vicarious liability theory). [Citation.] When the employer is a governmental agency, the statutory framework permits the injured party to pursue the vicarious liability theory in accordance with these general common law principles. [Citation.] However, the statutory framework requires, as a condition to the injured party's recovery on a direct liability theory against a governmental agency, that the injured party identify a ‘specific statute declaring [the entity] to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care’ by the agency in favor of the injured party. [Citations.]” (de Villers v. County of San Diego (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 238, 247–248, fn. omitted)” (emphasis added.)

In other words: “[T]he public entities' potential liability…has two sources: (1) the public entities' liability based on their own conduct and legal obligations, and (2) the public entities' liability, based on respondeat superior principles, for the misconduct of their employees that occurred in the scope of their employment.” (de Villers, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at 251-252.)

Koussaya, supra, 4 Cal. App. 5^th at 943-944 further notes:

“Section 815.2 sets out the rule regarding vicarious public entity liability: “(a) A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his [or her] employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his [or her] personal representative. [¶] (b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability.” In turn,  “section 820 delineates the liability of public employees themselves: ‘(a) Except as otherwise provided by statute (including Section 820.2), a public employee is liable for injury caused by his [or her] act or omission to the same extent as a private person. [¶] (b) The liability of a public employee established by this part … is subject to any defenses that would be available to the public employee if he [or she] were a private person.’ In other words, ‘the general rule is that an employee of a public entity is liable for his [or her] torts to the same extent as a private person (§ 820, subd. (a)) and the public entity is vicariously liable for any injury which its employee causes (§ 815.2, subd. (a)) to the same extent as a private employer (§ 815, subd. (b)).’ [Citation.]” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 868)”

Therefore, vicarious liability for an employee's actions "…attaches if and when it is adjudged that the employee was negligent as well." (Munoz v. City of Union City (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1077, disapproved on other grounds in Hayes v. County of San Diego (2013) 57 Cal.4th 622, 639, fn. 1) Consequently "in order for vicarious public entity liability to attach, a public employee, either named as a defendant or at least 'specifically identified' by the plaintiff, must have engaged in an act or omission giving rise to that employee's tort liability." (Koussaya, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at 945.)

Here, the Court finds it sufficient that Defendant City’s employee, identified as a Doe, is alleged to have left the vehicle unlocked, during an active multi-agency homeless encampment cleanup, in the presence of Murray, a person with a prior criminal history.

As such, the Court examines the elements of negligence.

Negligence and Special Circumstances re: Duty

"[T]o prove facts sufficient to support a finding of negligence, a plaintiff must show that [the] defendant had a duty to use due care, that he breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury." (Hayes v. County of San Diego (2013) 57 Cal. 4th 622, 629)

As to duty, “absent special circumstances, California courts consistently have refused to impose a duty on owners or bailees of automobiles or ordinary pickup trucks who leave the key in the ignition of an unattended vehicle to prevent harm to third parties caused by a thief.” (Carrera v. Maurice J. Sopp & Son (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 366, 378.) Further:

“Absent ‘special circumstances,’ the owner or bailee of a motor vehicle has no duty to protect third persons against the possibility a thief will steal the vehicle and injure them with it. [citations omitted] ‘The Supreme Court cases show that “special circumstances” exist when heavy vehicles are left unattended and available for use by those not accustomed to driving them.’ ([Avis Rent a Car System, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 221,] 228, italics in original.)” (Id. at 370.)

The application of this special circumstances doctrine is “…nothing more than a test of foreseeability of harm." (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 186.)

The Supreme Court in Palma summarized the following cases where a special relationship was found as to stolen vehicles:

“In Hergenrether [v. East (1964) 61 Cal.2d 440] the plaintiffs had been injured when a two-ton truck owned by the defendant, but driven by a thief, collided head-on with the vehicle in which plaintiffs were riding. The truck had been stolen the evening before the accident when left unlocked, with the key in the ignition, by employees of the owner who had authorized their use of the truck. We found those circumstances to be analogous to those in Richardson v. Ham (1955) 44 Cal.2d 772, in which a 26-ton bulldozer was stolen for a joyride by 3 inebriates, and those in Murray v. Wright (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 589, where a used car dealer purposely left keys in the ignitions of cars on his lot. In Richardson the enormity of the potential harm, and in Murray the facility with which a potential wrongdoer could learn of and take advantage of the virtual invitation to theft were circumstances sufficient to warrant imposition of a duty to third parties to prevent the foreseeable harm. Those circumstances are merely illustrative, however, of conduct which may create foreseeable risk of harm and impose liability if that risk becomes a reality. "The special circumstances present in Richardson and Murray, and those suggested in Richards are not, of course, the only circumstances which justify the imposition of liability -- rather each case must be considered on its own facts to determine whether the joint effect of them in toto justifies the conclusion that the foreseeable risk of harm imposed is unreasonable, and that the defendant owner or one in charge of a vehicle has a duty to third persons in the class of the plaintiffs to refrain from subjecting them to such risk." (Hergenrether v. East, supra, 61 Cal.2d 440, 445.)

Factors which distinguished the conduct in Hergenrether, and were held sufficient to establish a duty, are also present here. They included the area in which the truck had been parked -- one frequented by persons who had little respect for the rights of others, and populated by alcoholics; the intent that the truck remain in the location for a relatively long period of time -- overnight; the size of the vehicle -- rendering it capable of inflicting more serious injury or damage if not properly controlled; and the fact that safe operation of a half-loaded two-ton truck was not a matter of common experience. These factors together led to a conclusion there, as similar factors may here, that a foreseeable risk of harm was posed by the truck left with its keys in the ignition or cab warranting imposition of a duty on the owner or operator to refrain from exposing third persons to the risk.” (Palma, supra, 36 Cal. 3d 171, 185.)

Here, the facts alleged which would support the finding of a special circumstance include that the truck was unlocked, in the presence of persons with a criminal history, had the keys inside and that the truck, while not alleged to be “heavy” or oversized, did contain various weapons or tools common to police vehicles. Moreover, the nature of a stolen police vehicle, with lights, sirens and other identifying marks, differentiates the truck from an ordinary vehicle that is stolen.

“Whether [defendant] could foresee that leaving its truck overnight, unlocked, on a lot adjacent to the street, in this industrial city with a transient population and a high crime rate, was an invitation to theft (see Enders v. Apcoa, Inc. (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 897) by persons not competent to safely operate the trucks and who might cause serious injury or damage to third persons and their property while attempting to operate the trucks is a question of fact for the jury to determine.” (Palma, supra, (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 186.)

Here, too, the Court finds that the conduct alleged in the complaint with respect to leaving the truck unlocked, in the presence of persons with a criminal history, had the keys inside and that the truck was a police vehicle containing various weapons or tools common to police vehicles, is sufficient to overrule the demurrer.

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer and orders Defendant City to answer the complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared June 8 - 9, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054060	In the Matter of Palomera Bravo, Hector Noe	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	1. Notice of Hearing to minor must be sent to the person or persons having legal custody of the minor, with whom the minor resides, CRC Rule 7.51(d)  2. Possible issue: the appropriate publication may be the Porterville Recorder, Prob C § 8121(b)
VPR054084	In the Matter of Ford, Donald Eugene	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	Petition Item 8: Decedent died after April 1, 2022, DE-300 not attached as required by Probate Code § 13152(e)
VPR054079	In the Matter of O'Dell, Lewis Arlin	Spousal Property Hearing	Appearance Required	Proposed Order Item 7a: not completed to reflect the petition requesting confirmation of property belonging to the surviving spouse
VPR054074	In the Matter of Maness, Richard Stanley	Spousal Property Hearing	Appearance Required	1. Petition Item 7 omitted: the facts upon which the petitioner bases the allegation that the estate is property passing to the surviving spouse necessary to establish the community property or quasi-community property claim, Prob C § 13651(a)(3), (4)  2. Notice of Hearing not served on a party, Prob C § 13655
VPR053927	In the Matter of Freitas 2015 Revocable Trust	Petition to Establish Trust Ownership	Recommended for Approval
VPR052840	In the Matter of Racca, Christine Kent	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	1. Petition, paragraph 6 and 8: Specifying the Date of Notice to Director of Health Services and Franchise Tax Board omitted, Prob C § 9100 2. Petition, paragraph 12:  Schedule A- Income Receipts and Schedule D- Losses on Sales not attached: When accounting is waived and the amount other than the amount of the Inventory and Appraisal is used as a basis for calculating statutory fees, detailed schedules of receipts and gains or losses on sale are required in report pursuant to CRC, rule 7.550(b)(6)
VPR051991	In the Matter of Medina, Gilbert	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	1. Proposed Order to Deposit Funds into Blocked Account (Form MC-355) to be submitted 2. Creditor’s Claim filed by Phillips & Cohen Associates obo LendingClub Bank not satisfied or addressed in petition, CRC rule 7.401
VPR054080	In the Matter of Subejano, Psalm Ramos	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing not filed
VPR051993	In the Matter of Mcdonald, Lola	OSC Hearing	Appearance Required	Proof of Posting Bond, Inventory & Appraisal, Accounting and Care Plan not filed
VPR048775	In the Matter of Hansen, Leann	Accounting Hearing; Attorney's Fees	Appearance Required	Documents in order
PPR052216	In the Matter of Tilden, Weltha May	Accounting Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR051898	In the Matter of Beauprey, Donna	Accounting Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared Thursday, June 4, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430.
 

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR052335	In the Matter of Ferguson, Ada	Confirm Sale Real Property	Recommended for approval	Note, the Declarant indicates the publication was for NOTICE OF PETITION TO ADMINISTER OF ESTATE but other than this discrepancy, publication is in order.
PPR052593	In the Matter of Carranza, Raul Jr.	Letters of Administration	Appearance required	Pending proof of service in Mexico for the competing petition
PPR052972	In the Matter of Mora, Erick Geovanni	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance required	Amended Confidential Conservator Screening forms need to be filed, all questions to be answered. No Temporary Orders & Temporary Letters lodged
PPR053031	In the Matter of Rickman, Leo M.	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance required	Petition is missing attachments, Exhibits A-C
PPR053138	In the Matter of The Randall S. Cline Living Trust u/d/t June 17, 2003	Status Conference	Appearance required
PPR054071	In the Matter of Siterlet, Lorraine M.	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Recommended for approval	UPDATED AT 2:50PM 6/3/26. issues resolved
PPR054075	In the Matter of McCue, Patricia Louise	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance required	All co-executors/co-trustees should be party to this action and verification to be signed; sole petitioner requests 25% interest be distributed to one party. The fraction or percentage that will pass to each petitioner must be set forth. Needs statement saying the real property was the decedent’s primary residence, ProbC§13152(a)(2).
PPR054082	In the Matter of Clawson, Richard	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance required	The estate asset appears to be a parcel of real property, not the primary residence, left out of the Trust. Additional note- see street address name in Notice of hearing.
PPR054091	In the Matter of Gilmer, Carol	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance required	Matter appears to be in order
PPR054092	In the Matter of Gilmer, Allen	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance required	Matter appears to be in order

South County Justice Center & Visalia-County Civic Center

SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate guardianship appointment with SIJF matters calendared the week of Monday, June 8, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date Dept	Case Number	Case Name	Status	COMMENTS:
6/11/26 Dept 2	VPR054063	IMO of L.M., S.M., V.M., L.M., I.M.	Appearance required	Notice for L.M. needs to be addressed; Notice for Father of the Petition for SIJF needs to be completed; Confidential Guardian Screening From needs to be filed; SIJF Order form GC-224 should be issued for each youth; Declaration of Orientation needs to be filed; Petitioner & adult Household members need to submit to background check.
6/11/26 Dept 2	VPR054089	IMO R.E.H	Appearance required	Notice for Father of the GS Petition and SIJF Petition needs to be completed; Notice for Paternal & Maternal Grandmother for the GS hearing needs to be completed; Confidential Guardianship Screening Form is incomplete; Declaration of Orientation needs to be filed; Petitioner & adult Household members need to submit to background check
6/12/26 Dept 2	VPR054096	IMO E.E.H.	Appearance required	SAME ISSUES ADDRESSED FOR RELATED CASE, VPR054089