Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Monday, August 24, 2026, are:

Re:                Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District vs. Sandridge Partners, L.P.

Case No.:   VCU334947 

Date:           August 24, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:      Motion to Change Venue

Tentative Ruling: The motion is denied, as are both parties’ requests for sanctions. 

Defendant Sandridge Partners, L.P. (Sandridge) moves to transfer this interpleader action to the Kern County Superior Court.  Sandridge asserts this court is an improper venue for this action, and that the only appropriate venue is Kern, where the issues raised in the underlying complaint “have been pending since 2018.”

This action

Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District (TLB) brings this action against Sandridge and Tulare Lake Reclamation District No. 761 (RD 761) to compel them to interplead and litigate alleged “conflicting” claims with respect to where water from the Kings River may be “used” that Sandridge has “placed an order for” (and/or otherwise “has or will place an order” for).  The claims allegedly conflict with respect to whether the subject water may be used outside an area described in the complaint as “the Kings River Service Area” or whether it cannot, but, in a more accurate sense, they conflict with respect to the efficacy of a stipulated judgment that clearly and unambiguously determines precisely that issue. 

The following is a summary of pertinent background allegations.

TLB is a water storage district under specified provisions of the Water Code.  RD 761 is a public entity under other specified provisions of the Water Code.  TLB and RD 761 are both “member units” of the Kings River Water Association (KRWA), a non-party. 

The “member units” of KRWA “are parties to various agreements, which establish a water rights schedule for the delivery and use of Kings River water.”  (In its papers, Sandridge asserts, without dispute by any party, that “KRWA was organized to allocate water from the Kings River to its Member Units and, through them, to the landowners within each Member Unit, who hold the right to the water for use.”)

Sandridge “is a landowner within the jurisdictional boundaries of RD 761 … ” and held or claimed, at times relevant to the complaint, some right to Kings River water incident, at least in part, to its status as “a landowner within the jurisdictional boundaries of RD 761.” 

“TLB operates the Empire Weir No. 2 headgate, the Tulare Lake Canal Company headgate, and the Blakeley headgate,” which “allow water to flow from the Empire Weir No. 2 pool just south of the community of Stratford into various water channels including the Blakeley Canal.”  “TLB receives orders for Kings River water from the water users within four member units of the Empire Weir No. 2 account. Water ordered from the Empire Weir No. 2 account is water that is to be delivered into those waterways so they can be delivered to landowners for irrigation, a beneficial use.”

Four member units of the KRWA, including both TLB and RD 761, “comprise the ‘Empire Weir No. 2’ account under the Kings River water rights schedule,” and TLB “maintains and allocates water for [these] four member units … .”

“Once TLB receives an order from the Empire Weir No. 2 water users, it … places the order with the KRWA,” which “is authorized to contact the Army Corps of Engineers to make the requested releases from storage at Pine Flat Dam.”

“RD 761 [had] a current balance of Kings River water in storage at Pine Flat Dam [as of the date the complaint was filed] and [was] anticipated to use such water” during a “‘Coordinated Run’” of Kings River water “on the lower channel” set to commence “on May 15, 2026.”

Prior to the scheduled “Coordinated Run,” RD 761, “[o]n or about March 31, 2025,” “accepted an offer of compromise from KRWA,” in which it “undertook specific commitments” later incorporated in “a judgment entered April 16, 2025.”  The stipulated judgment was entered in Kern County Superior Court case no. BCV-19-100523, in favor of KRWA against RD 761, and provided, in relevant part, as follows:

“RD 761 shall not deliver, and is enjoined from delivering, any Kings River water to its landowners or any other party for use on lands outside the Kings River Service Area as shown on Exhibit A to the 1963 Agreement among the member units of the Kings River Water Association.”

On May 4, 2026, KRWA sent a letter to RD 761 seeking to confirm that it would comply with the April 2025 stipulated judgment. 

Sandridge—not RD 761—first responded, stating that enforcement of the judgment “‘could result in [it] suffering significant damage exceeding seven figures … .’” Further, Sandridge did not confirm “it [would] comply with the RD 761 Judgment” and “instead … encouraged RD 761 to not seek compliance with the RD 761 Judgment” as it would result in Sandridge’s “inability to deliver water outside of the Kings River Service Area, thus causing it damages in the seven figures.”  It is not clear, from the complaint, why it would be significant whether Sandridge indicated it would “comply” with the judgment, since it is not alleged, and evidently not the case, that Sandridge was bound by it. 

RD 761 itself later responded, essentially confirming, for its part, that it would comply with the stipulated judgment.  Notably, the way it stated this, in a May 11, 2026 letter to KRWA, was as follows:

“We can also inform you that we are not aware of any effort, plan, request or intention on the part of RD 761 to violate or act contrary to the August 14, 2024 settlement agreement or the April 16, 2025 Judgment and Order … . We therefore would not recommend that the RD 761 Board take any action at this time contrary to the terms of the August 14, 2024 settlement agreement or the April 16, 2025 Judgement and Order.”

A few days after RD 761’s letter to KRWA, “[o]n May 14, 2026, [Sandridge] placed an order for RD 761 Kings River water to TLB (‘Water Order’).”

Under the heading of its interpleader cause of action, TLB alleges that it “claims no interest in the Water Order placed by Sandridge”; that the “RD 761 [stipulated] Judgment … enjoins RD 761 from delivering to its water users Kings River water for use outside of the Kings River Service Area” and the judgment “was not appealed and is final”; that Sandridge “has or will place an order with TLB to deliver RD 761 Kings River water for use outside of the Kings River Service Area during the Coordinated Run”; and, “[a]s a result of the foregoing,” Sandridge and RD 761 “do, or may, assert multiple, conflicting claims to the above-described water … .”

TLB alleges that it faces “conflicting” claims with respect to the Sandridge “Water Order” (and/or other Kings River water for which Sandridge “has or will place an order … for use outside of the Kings River Service Area during the Coordinated Run”) in that, on the one hand, “RD 761 by virtue of the RD 761 Judgment demands the water shall be used within a certain geographic location, the Kings River Service Area”; and, on the other, Sandridge “demands the water be put to use outside the Kings River Service Area.”

Accordingly, the allegedly conflicting claims arise from the alleged stipulated judgment in the Kern litigation referenced in the interpleader complaint. 

This is the case where Sandridge claims the issues raised in the interpleader action “have been pending since 2018.” 

The Kings/Kern litigation

The Kern litigation in which the stipulated judgment arose was initially commenced in Kings County, in October 2018, by TLB, along with three other co-plaintiffs (other “member units” of KRWA, and KRWA itself), with the aim of preventing defendants—Sandridge and RD 761—from transferring, selling, conveying or assigning Kings River water or water rights for use outside of the “Kings River Service Area.”

Shortly after the case was filed, the parties stipulated to transfer venue to Kern.  Then, shortly after that, Sandridge and RD 761 filed a cross-complaint. 

TLB and its co-plaintiffs thereafter filed an application for a preliminary injunction for the relief sought in their initial complaint pending trial.  That application was denied in a ruling issued in April 2019.

After the ruling denying the application for preliminary injunction, Sandridge and RD 761, in January 2021, filed a second amended cross-complaint against TLB and its co-plaintiffs in the underlying action, and against another named defendant.  Sandridge and RD 761 essentially sought relief to the effect that Kings River water would be delivered to RD 761 (and, effectively, to Sandridge) without any of the restrictions sought by TLB and its co-plaintiffs in the underlying complaint. 

After that, a limited issue was bifurcated for trial and tried after having been submitted for decision.  The limited issue submitted essentially was, according to the Kern court, “the meaning of … terms of contract” in two select paragraphs contained in a 1949 amendment and a 1963 amendment, which amendments were each part of a collection of associated agreements referenced by the parties there (and here) as “the Blue Book Agreements” or simply “the Blue Book.”  TLB and its co-plaintiffs advocated for an interpretation of the select provision supporting the relief sought in their underlying complaint; Sandridge and RD 761 advocated for an interpretation that would not restrict the use of Kings River water in the manner sought by TLB and its co-plaintiffs. 

In very short summary of a very long 35-page ruling issued in June 2021, the Kern court determined (a) the select paragraph of the 1963 amendment did not support the Kern River water use restrictions for which TLB and its co-plaintiffs advocated; and (b) that the select paragraph of the 1949 amendment, while “unambiguously convey[ing]” that Kings River water “may not be physically transported beyond a described area,” was “indefinite” (though, importantly, not ambiguous) with respect to the “described area” referenced in the select paragraph (i.e., “the watershed or service area of the Kings River”) and, that this indefiniteness effectively left that matter of determining “broader” issues of actual “water rights” “for future resolution” according to principles described in the court’s ruling. 

Then, just under three and a half years later, in February 2025, one of the co-plaintiffs in the underlying litigation, the Kings River Water Association (KRWA) sent RD 761 a statutory offer to compromise, under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, “any and all claims arising out of the litigation brought by it against [RD 761] … and the cross-action brought by RD 761 against KRWA … .”  In March of 2025, RD 761 accepted the offer to compromise, and, according to its terms, judgment was entered in favor of KRWA against RD 761 in April 2025. 

It is this judgment from which allegedly conflicting claims on the part of RD 761 and Sandridge allegedly arise, according to TLB’s interpleader complaint in this case. 

The judgment provides, in significant part, as the complaint alleges, that “RD 761 shall not deliver, and is enjoined from delivering, any Kings River water to its landowners [including Sandridge] or any other party for use on lands outside the Kings River Service Area as shown on Exhibit A to the 1963 Agreement among the member units of the Kings River Water Association.”

Of note, particularly from Sandridge’s perspective, the Kern court, in its ruling on the bifurcated issues, had specifically determined that the language of the 1963 amendment at issue, while explicitly prohibiting “a transfer of an interest in water or water right if such a transfer would result in use outside of” a clearly defined “Kings River Service Area” (an area “contained within the drawn black boundary” of a map attached to the 1963 amendment as its Exhibit A), solely prohibited, by its terms, “hypothecation of interests or rights in water for use outside the defined Kern River Service Area” and not “the physical transport of the water itself” outside that defined area. 

In other words, the Kern court determined that the 1963 amendment provided a clearly defined geographic area of restriction (an area marked on the amendment’s Exhibit A) but did not provide for prohibitions on “physical transport” of water outside that clearly defined area that, in the Kern court’s view, would be required to support TLB and its co-plaintiffs relief sought in their complaint. 

Also notable, Sandridge’s submits that something untoward was afoot in RD 761’s concession to entry of judgment against it.  It submits that an RD 761 board member who resigned was replaced with “an employee of Sandridge’s adversary” and its was “[r]ight away” after this that TLB and KRWA submitted their offer to compromise.  Sandridge notes that RD 761’s decision to accept the offer to compromise “is currently the subject of two litigated matters in Kings County, whereby Sandridge is seeking to void the decision … .”

In any event, though, as it stands today, the record of proceedings in the Kern action reflects, according to Sandridge’s submission of documents of which its requests judicial notice (which the court grants), establish that RD 761 stipulated to judgment as indicated in the interpleader action in this case and that, through that judgment, that which TLB and its co-plaintiffs effectively sought to establish in their complaint was accomplished, notwithstanding that a first phase trial ruling failed to accomplish that result. 

Subsequent developments in the Kern litigation

   i. Summary judgment/adjudication ruling

Approximately a year after entry of the stipulated judgment, in April 2026, the Kern court issued a ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication by Sandridge.

The Kern court, in its ruling, determined as follows: (1) Sandridge was not a party to the 1949 or 1963 amendments and was not bound by those amendments and, further, was not bound by licenses issued by the State Water Resources Control Board and held by KRWA in trust for its member units; (2) as determined in the first phase bifurcated ruling, the 1949 amendment, while addressing the physical transport of water, did not “establish a definite boundary or specific place of use for water delivered to landowners/farmers with property within a Member Unit of the KRWA”; (3) also as determined in the first phase ruling, “[t]he 1963 Agreement only relates to a limitation on transfer of any right or interest in water within the alleged ‘Service Area’” (italics added), and, the court additionally found, “[t]here is no evidence of such a transfer in rights or interests in water”; and (4) “[t]here is no evidence that RD 761 has transferred Kings River water outside of the Service Area or the watershed.”

The Kern additionally found “the evidence is clear that the Kings River water RD 761 provides to Sandridge is delivered at Empire Weir No. 2, a location that is indisputably within the ‘Service Area’ of the map attached to the 1963 Agreement,” and “[a]s such, delivery to that point cannot be a breach by RD 761 under anyone’s interpretation of [any agreement, inclusive of the 1949 and 1963 amendments, of “the Blue Book”].”  “Likewise,” the court found, “the Blue Book Agreement explicitly states [in an indicated paragraph of the 1949 amendment] that the water cannot be governed by the Water Master anywhere below that location [Empire Weir No. 2], which is where Sandridge receives and then uses it.”

The court here notes that the office of “Water Master” was created in the original 1927 agreement of the then-members of the KRWA (which agreement is considered part of “the Blue Book”) with the responsibility “to turn into the ditch or canal of each of the parties hereto [i.e., KRWA’s members] the quantity of [Kings River] water to which such party may be entitled under [an elsewhere described water rights schedule] … and to oversee the diversion of the waters of said River by the parties hereto, and to examine into all diversions of water from said River by natural and artificial persons not parties hereto, and do and perform such other acts as said Board may direct … .”

The pertinent implication of the Kern court’s last indicated determination is that, while the court had determined in the bifurcated first phase that, incident to the indefiniteness of the phrase “watershed or service area of Kings River” in the 1949 amendment, that the matter of determining “broader” issues of actual “water rights” would be left for “future resolution” “under a ‘test of reasonableness,’” the court, in its summary judgment ruling, effectively determined that the necessity of such “future resolution” would be entirely unnecessary because (a) “delivery to that point cannot be a breach by RD 761 under anyone’s interpretation of” any of the “Blue Book Agreements,” it being the express position of TLB and its co-plaintiffs’ that that point of delivery is within the “Kings River Service Area” defined in the 1963 amendment, and (b) once “Kings River water RD 761 provides to Sandridge is delivered at Empire Weir No. 2,” “the water cannot be governed by the Water Master anywhere below that location” under the terms of the 1949 amendment. 

Accordingly, it is clear that, but for the stipulated judgment entered into by KRWA and RD 761, RD 761 would not be entitled to demand that any water provided to Sandridge “be used within … the Kings River Service Area,” as defined in the 1963 amendment, and, accordingly, neither TLB, nor RD 761, would be entitled to refuse to facilitate delivery of Kings River water ordered by Sandridge based on any terms of “the Blue Book Agreements.”

Additionally of note, with the aforementioned resolution in Sandridge’s favor on its motion for summary judgment/adjudication, the only remaining issues in the Kern litigation arise under Sandridge’s second amended cross-complaint.  According to Sandridge, trial on these issues was recently continued and is now scheduled for November 16, 2026. 

  ii. Order granting preliminary injunction; subsequent water delivery to Sandridge

After this interpleader action was commenced, and after Sandridge filed the instant motion to change venue, an order to show cause regarding a request by Sandridge for a preliminary injunction came on for hearing in the Kern litigation on June 24, 2026. 

On July 23, 2026, the Kern court issued a ruling granting an injunction prohibiting KRWA, TLB, and other KRWA member unit co-plaintiffs in the underlying complaint from “refusing,” during the pendency of the Kern action, “to deliver water or to fulfill or otherwise process water delivery orders in connection with the rights Sandridge holds to 8,390 Acre-Feet of water being stored at Pine Flat Dam through its account with RD 761, notwithstanding (1) the April 16, 2025, stipulated interlocutory consent judgment between KRWA and [RD 761], (2) the complaint in interpleader filed in [this action] … (3) whether RD 761 has consented to such order or objected to it, or (4) whether the water will be used outside of the 1963 Mapped Service Area.”  (Emphasis added.)

Additionally, according to a farm manager of Sandridge, “[t]he Kings River water that is the subject of this interpleader action, which is water allocated to Sandridge through [RD 761] has been fully delivered to and utilized by Sandridge for this irrigation season.”

If Sandridge representations are accurate, then it appears correct that there would be nothing left to determine, as Sandridge indicates, in this interpleader case, but, again, the complaint does suggest, albeit somewhat vaguely, that there will be continuing conflicting claims over other water orders Sandridge “has or will place with TLB.”

Analysis of Sandridge’s motion

Sandridge’s lead contention is that this court “has been improperly thrust into” the still pending disputes in the Kern litigation and that TLB is engaged in “a transparent ‘hail Mary’ effort to shop for a forum that might reach a different result than is now inevitable in the Kern County action.”  Sandridge relatedly maintains the only appropriate venue for this case is Kern, where the issues raised in the underlying complaint “have been pending since 2018.”

And, “[u]nless venue is moved to Kern County,” Sandridge asserts, it “will … move to dismiss and/or abate this action on the grounds another action is pending in Kern County and that action must be resolved prior to consideration of the issues raised in the interpleader action.”

Per authorities cited by Sandridge, the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction provides, “‘[w]here two [courts] have concurrent jurisdiction over the same parties and subject matter, the tribunal which first acquires jurisdiction of the parties is entitled to retain it exclusively,’” and “[o]rdinarily, the other court must abate its proceedings on demand.” (Mission Imports, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 921, 926, fn. 3 [184 Cal.Rptr. 296, 647 P.2d 1075], citation omitted; see also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Lara (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 1119, 1129 [301 Cal.Rptr.3d 57]) [observing same].)

Sandridge, of course—while promising to, later, if necessary, file a motion “to dismiss and/or abate” these proceedings based on this rule and its apparent position that Kern has exclusive concurrent jurisdiction—has not filed such a motion. 

Accordingly, the court is not occasioned, here, to determine whether it is appropriate “to dismiss and/or abate” these proceedings based on exclusive concurrent jurisdiction in the Kern litigation. 

Moving on, the court turns to Sandridge’s arguments actually bearing on its motion to change venue.

To begin, Sandridge contends that, under Code of Civil Procedure section 394, “a public entity may not unilaterally select a neutral venue and sue in that venue without a court order,” and “[a] public entity must initially file the action in a venue that is proper under the general venue rules, such as those outlined in Cal Code Civ Proc §395 which generally requires filing in the county where the defendant resides or where the obligation arose.”

These contentions albeit vague on particulars, and somewhat difficult to parse, do convey matters of substantive import correctly. 

First, it is important to clarify, because Sandridge obfuscates the matter at points in its briefing, that Code of Civil Procedure section 394 has no bearing on the determination of the appropriate initial venue of an action because, as Sandridge expressly recognizes, “it does not control original venue.”  (Arntz Builders v. Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1203 [19 Cal.Rptr.3d 346].) 

Section 394, rather, “ ‘provides for removal of a case which is pending in a proper county.’ [Citation.]” (County of San Bernardino v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 378, 385 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 760].)

Sandridge observes this latter point expressly, but, confusingly, also requests “a ruling that venue was proper originally to Kings County under section 394.”  And, while it is clear Sandridge is aware that “original venue,” in Kings County or elsewhere, cannot be determined by section 394 (again, it expressly states as much), the problem is that Sandridge never gets around to expressly identifying the law that does determine original venue. 

Sandridge does assert, in conclusory fashion, that “Kings County is the proper venue of origin,” but only with troubling citation to section 394.   

Sandridge also asserts, the court notes, without expressly identifying a relevant statute that determines venue, (1) that TLB “resides in Kings County for venue purposes”; (2) that, based on TLB’s allegations in the underlying complaint in the Kings litigation, TLB is “a Kings County public entity for venue purposes”; (3) that “Sandridge's principle place of business is Santa Clara and its lands and water at issue in the underlying dispute are in Kings County.”

The court, however, is unsure what Sandridge intends to make of these assertions because Sandridge does not state its position expressly.   

One possible clue is Sandridge’s statement that “[a] public entity must initially file the action in a venue that is proper under the general venue rules, such as those outlined in Cal Code Civ Proc §395 which generally requires filing in the county where the defendant resides or where the obligation arose.”   This statement suggests, albeit only inferentially, that Sandridge may mean to assert determination of original venue is governed by section 395.  That is not, however, an argument Sandridge actually makes. 

Further confusing matters, though, is that elsewhere in the motion, Sandridge contends that this action “is local in that it involves real property of Sandridge and the rights to place of use of water on such property that is tied to the ownership of such property,” followed by a citation to Code of Civil Procedure section 392.  Sanridge asserts that “[a]ll of [its] properties at issue are in Kings County because the lands owned that are at issue are within the RD761 boundaries in Kings County … and the place the water is being used is on Sandridge owned land in Dudley Ridge area which is also in Kings County,” but it never expressly states that original venue is governed by section 392.

The court might attribute this position to Sandridge, but directly contravening that possible reading of the motion, Sandridge expressly disclaims that this is its position in its reply.  Sandridge states, rather, “the disputes between the parties, both in this action and in the Kern County action, do not relate to the recovery of real property or a determination of any parties’ rights or interests therein or to injuries to real property.”

Perhaps still, the court might derive that Sandridge means to assert venue is governed by some combination of rules cobbled together from section 392 and 395.  But that cannot be it, either, however, because section 392 cannot concomitantly govern venue coextensively with section 395.  That is because section 392 provides for original venue in actions, inter alia, for recovery of real property, or interests therein, in “the superior court in the county where the real property that is the subject of the action, or some part thereof, is situated” (§ 392, subd. (a)), and section 395 only governs venue of proceedings “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law” (§ 395, subd. (a)). 

And so, the court is left unable to discern what Sandridge’s position is on the statute that determines venue in the first instance.  To be clear, this harping on Sandridge’s failure to expressly identify a statutory basis for original venue is not intended to disparage Sandridge’s manner of argument; rather, the court identifies these issues because they directly bear on disposition of Sandridge’s motion according to the arguments it advances. 

Sandridge’s fundamental aim is to get this matter over to Kern county.  It submits that “had [TLB] properly filed in Kings County, Kings County would have been obliged [on a request made under section 394, subdivision (a)] to order the case to a neutral venue, [and] since the very issues [raised in the interpleader action, according to Sandridge] have been pending in Kern County (as previously stipulated by the parties …) for over 7 years, the only proper neutral venue is Kern County where the issues are already pending.”

In effect, Sandridge’s motion sets up a two-step.  First, Sandridge wants the court to determine that original venue in this action is in Kings.  Second, Sandridge wants to engraft—purportedly enabled by an initial determination of original venue in Kings—a motion to transfer venue to a “neutral county,” with Sandridge arguing, based on law not applicable to venue (the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction) that “the only proper neutral venue is Kings County.”

Sandridge’s position, and its request of this court, thus, necessarily depends on the essential proposition, as threshold matter, that “the proper venue of origin” of the interpleader action is Kings County.  Absent establishment of that proposition, however, there is patently no basis for a determination by this court that any venue other than this court is a more proper venue for the interpleader action because it will not have shown that venue in this county is improper in the first place.  “[Code of Civil Procedure] Section 397 sets forth the grounds for granting a change of venue, including ‘[w]hen the court designated in the complaint is not the proper court.’ (§ 397, subd. (a).)” (County of Siskiyou v. Superior Court (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 83, 94 [158 Cal.Rptr.3d 164].)  If venue is proper in Tulare County, however, “then the grounds set forth in section 397 do not apply.” (Ibid.)

The court finds, for reasons obvious from the above, that Sandridge has failed to establish the essential threshold matter of what county is the proper county of original venue (and by extension, that Tulare is not that county) because it fails even to identify a governing venue statute to determine this county is not a proper venue, and, accordingly, the court concludes that Sandridge’s motion must be denied. 

Needless to say, Sandridge’s request for sanctions is also denied.  Of course, that is largely because it has not prevailed on its motion, but, even if it had, amongst the matters “the court shall take into consideration” in the exercise of its discretion to award fees, is “whether an offer to stipulate to change of venue was reasonably made and rejected” (Code Civ. Proc., § 396b, subd. (b)) and Sandridge itself submits that it made no such offer. 

The court makes this point because the court cannot help but notice that meet and confer efforts could have potentially well-served Sandridge in at least developing a fully formed position with respect to venue prior to the filing of the instant motion.

What’s more, the court notes Sandridge’s counsel’s statement that he “felt it imprudent to meet and confer” with TLB’s counsel regarding Sandridge’s venue dispute because of his vague “concern” that TLB’s counsel “would attempt to seek emergent relief from this Court for a preliminary ruling indicating that TLBWSD need not deliver the water that will be requested by Sandridge” is entirely without merit and obviously could not support an award of sanctions even had Sandridge prevailed in the underlying motion. 

First, if it is true, as Sandridge maintains, that the parties’ disputes are now properly before the court in Kern, nothing about Sandridge’s rush to file a motion to change venue of the interpleader action in this court would clearly obviate the risk—assuming there was any risk at all—of TLB attempting “to seek emergent relief … for a preliminary ruling indicating that TLBWSD need not deliver the water that will be requested by Sandridge” in Kern.  By Sandridge’s own account, TLB already attempted this in the Kern litigation before the stipulated judgment was entered. 

Second, even if the proceedings in this case were the exclusive possible venue for the ex parte application about which Sandridge’s counsel had “concern,” such “concern” would not be a good reason to potentially obviate the necessity of Sandridge’s motion through meet and confer efforts, as section 396b, subdivision (b), clearly contemplates and encourages.  

TLB’s request for sanctions is also denied.  Sandridge’s failure to meet and confer, while ill-conceived, does not alone support sanctions.  Additionally, while Sandridge has bungled the effort to set up its motion, its failure to do so is not easily attributable to the absence of good faith.  The determination of venue in these proceedings is complicated by a number of factors, chiefly amongst them being that the association between Kings River water, as administered in the KRWA system, and the real property of those holding rights to that water vis-à-vis their association with KRWA “member units” is a complex matter, and, further, still, there is some question, in the court’s view, as to whether this interpleader action actually concerns rights to the use of water in the sense determined in the cases TLB cites in its opposition.  The court notes the alleged conflicting claims identified in TLB’s complaint, while they bear on Sandridge’s water rights, ultimately appear to relate to some undefined sense of uncertainty with respect to the efficacy of a stipulation that defined water rights of the parties irrespective of what the parties’ respective rights and obligations with respect to Kings River water may have been prior to the stipulation. 

In sum, then, Sandridge’s motion is denied, as are both parties’ requests for sanctions. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:               MPLI Capital Holdings IV vs. Arauz, Reynaldo

Case No.:  VCL303019

Date:          August 24, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Entry of Judgment Pursuant to Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and enter judgment as requested.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff filed a notice of conditional settlement on May 14, 2024 indicating that them atter would be dismissed no later than August 15, 2026.

This matter does not appear to have been dismissed.

On June 9, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion to enter judgment pursuant to a settlement agreement. Plaintiff indicates that Plaintiff and Defendant settled the case by entering into a written settlement agreement whereby Defendant acknowledges the principal amount of $10,749.99 and that the parties agreed that no judgment would be entered against Defendant so long as Defendant paid an agreed settlement amount in certain monthly installments of $450 commencing March 15, 2024 through January 15, 2026 and a final payment of $399.99 on February 15, 2026.

In the event of default, the settlement agreement indicates that Plaintiff is entitled to entry of judgment for the judgment amount noted above, less any credits. The agreement indicates that the Court shall retain jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

Plaintiff indicates that Defendant made payments totaling $2,250.

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states: 

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1360.)

As indicated above, the Court retains jurisdiction over the parties and this matter and therefore is prepared to “enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”

Defendant appears to have breached the settlement, based upon the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel and, the Court, having no opposition, grants the motion and enters judgment in the amount requested of $9,124.99 consisting of the $10,749.99 principal amount, less $2,250 in payments made plus $625 in court costs.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. vs. Barragan, Felipe

Case No.:  VCL329996

Date:          August 24, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 9 admitted.

Facts

On or about April 15, 2026, Plaintiff served by mail Requests for Admissions, Set One on Defendant. The discovery was mailed to the address on Defendant’s answer.

Responses were due May 20, 2026.

As of the date of the filing of this motion, no response has been received by Plaintiff. Plaintiff now seeks to deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 9 admitted.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. Here, Defendant has failed to serve a timely response and Plaintiff has moved for an order to deem the admissions admitted.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion. The facts and allegations alleged in Requests for Admissions Nos. 1 through 9 of Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Admission shall be deemed admitted.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:               Wells Fargo Bank, NA vs. Pearce, Chloe A

Case No.:  VCL316293

Date:          August 24, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Set Aside Dismissal and Enter Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and enter judgment as requested

Facts

In this collection matter, Plaintiff filed a stipulation resolving this matter for the principal amount of $6,786.27 and that this amount would be paid via monthly installments as follows:

(A) $754.27 shall be paid on or before May 02, 2025;

(B) $754.00 shall be paid on or before the 2nd of each and every consecutive month commencing on or before June 02, 2025 through and including December 02, 2025;

(C) $754.00 shall be paid on or before January 02, 2026.

In the event of default, the stipulation indicates that Plaintiff is entitled to entry of judgment for the judgment amount noted above as well as costs, less any credits.

The stipulation indicates that the Court shall retain jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

On May 21, 2025, this matter was dismissed pursuant to the stipulation.

Plaintiff indicates that Defendant has made payments totaling $5,278.27, but has failed to make any payments thereafter and is in breach of the stipulation.

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states: 

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1360.)

Therefore, the Court exercises jurisdiction over this dismissed matter pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, having found the parties have sufficiently stipulated to this continuing jurisdiction for purposes of entering this settlement as a judgment.

Defendant appears to have breached the settlement, based upon the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel and, the Court, having no opposition, grants the motion and enters judgment in the amount requested of $1,823.00, consisting of the $6,786.27 principal amount, less $5,278.27 in payments made, plus $315 in costs.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. vs. Lopez, Madison

Case No.:  VCL303944

Date:            August 24, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Set Aside Dismissal and Enter Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and enter judgment as requested

Facts

In this collection matter, Plaintiff filed a stipulation resolving this matter for the principal amount of $5,899.00,and that this amount would be paid via monthly installments as follows:

(A) $347.00 shall be paid on or before March 15, 2024;

(B) $347.00 shall be paid on or before the 15th of each and every consecutive month commencing on or before April 15, 2024 through and including June 15, 2025;

(C) $347.00 shall be paid on or before July 15, 2025;

In the event of default, the stipulation indicates that Plaintiff is entitled to entry of judgment for the judgment amount noted above as well as costs, less any credits.

The stipulation indicates that the Court shall retain jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

On March 14, 2024, this matter was dismissed pursuant to the stipulation.

Plaintiff indicates that Defendant has made payments totaling $5,554.57, but has failed to make any payments thereafter and is in breach of the stipulation.

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states: 

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1360.)

Therefore, the Court exercises jurisdiction over this dismissed matter pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, having found the parties have sufficiently stipulated to this continuing jurisdiction for purposes of entering this settlement as a judgment.

Defendant appears to have breached the settlement, based upon the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel and, the Court, having no opposition, grants the motion and enters judgment in the amount requested of $994.00, consisting of the $6,248.57 principal amount, less $5,554.57 in payments made, plus $300 in costs.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. vs. Serrano, Daisy T

Case No.:   VCL327441

Date:           August 24, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 9 admitted.

Facts

On or about March 27, 2026, Plaintiff served by mail Requests for Admissions, Set One on Defendant. The discovery was mailed to the address on Defendant’s answer.

Responses were due May 1, 2026.

As of the date of the filing of this motion, no response has been received by Plaintiff. Plaintiff now seeks to deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 9 admitted.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. Here, Defendant has failed to serve a timely response and Plaintiff has moved for an order to deem the admissions admitted.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion. The facts and allegations alleged in Requests for Admissions Nos. 1 through 9 of Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Admission shall be deemed admitted.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Tarkington, Jeffrey vs. Kia America, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU334514

Date:           August 24, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     (1) Demurrer and (2) Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling: (1) To sustain the demurrer with leave to amend; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint; (2) To find the motion to strike moot by the ruling on demurrer.

Facts

This matter was initially filed March 14, 2025.

The first amended complaint alleges violations of Song Beverly, as well as fraudulent inducement. Plaintiff alleges that on or about November 27, 2022, Plaintiff entered into a warranty contract with Defendant regarding a 2023 Kia Sportage, vehicle identification number KNDPZDAH4P7035366 ("Subject Vehicle"), which was manufactured and or distributed by Defendant. (FAC ¶6.)

Plaintiff further alleges Defendant provided a number of warranties, that “[d]efects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period, including but not limited to engine defects, electrical defects; among other defects and non-conformities” and that such defects substantially impair the use, value or safety of the Subject Vehicle. (FAC ¶¶10, 11, 12.)

As to the statute of limitations, Plaintiff alleges:

“23. To the extent there are any statutes of limitation applicable to Plaintiff's claims - including, without limitation, the express warranty and implied warranty -- the running of the limitation periods have been tolled by, inter alia, the following doctrines or rules: equitable tolling, the discovery rule, equitable estoppel, the repair rule, and/or class action tolling (e.g., the American Pipe rule).

 24. Plaintiff discovered Defendant's wrongful conduct alleged herein shortly before the filing of the complaint, as the Vehicle continued to exhibit symptoms of defects following KIA's unsuccessful attempts to repair them. However, KIA failed to provide restitution pursuant to the Song ~ Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.” (FAC ¶¶23, 24.)

As to fraudulent inducement, Plaintiff alleges Defendant concealed a known defect “that the 1.6L engine and/or its related components installed in the Subject Vehicle suffer from one or more defects that can result in loss of power, stalling, engine running rough, engine misfire(s), failure or replacement of the engine (the "Engine Defect").” (FAC ¶¶46, 47.)

Further, that “The Engine Defect causes unsafe conditions in vehicles equipped with the 1.6L engine, including, but not limited to, the engine losing power while driving. These conditions present a safety hazard because they severely affect the driver's ability to control the vehicle, and substantially increase the likelihood that the engine will fail, lose power, and/or cut off during operation, thereby resulting in accidents involving property damage, personal injury and even death.” (FAC ¶49.)

Additionally, that Defendant knew or should have known of the Engine Defect “through its exclusive knowledge of non-public, internal data about the Engine Defect, including: pre- releasing testing data; early consumer complaints about the Engine Defect to Defendant KIA's dealers who are KIA's agents for vehicle repairs; dealership repair orders; testing conducted in response to those complaints; and other internal sources of information possessed exclusively by Defendant KIA and its agents.” (FAC ¶¶51, 57.)

Further, that “The Engine Defect was not known or reasonably discoverable by the Plaintiff before purchase and Plaintiff did not know about KIA's fraudulent conduct alleged herein until Plaintiff made a reasonable number of attempts to repair the Engine Defect.” (FAC ¶63.)

Defendant demurrers to the fifth cause of action for fraud, arguing it lacks the requisite specificity, failure to plead actual concealment, failure to allege misrepresentations, contradictory pleading, failure to allege a duty to disclose, and that application of the economic loss rule precludes the cause of action.

Further, Defendant seeks to strike the references to punitive damages.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues, as discussed below in greater detail, the fraud cause of action has been pled sufficiently.

Authority and Analysis

(1) Demurrer

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

Concealment

“As with all fraud claims, the necessary elements of a concealment/suppression claim consist of ‘“(1) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (scienter); (3) intent to defraud (i.e., to induce reliance); (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage.”’” [citation omitted]”  (Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 843.)  “Suppression of a material fact is actionable when there is a duty of disclosure, which may arise from a relationship between the parties, such as a buyer-seller relationship.  [citation omitted]” (Id.)

Specificity and Actual Concealment

Unlike most causes of action where the “the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings,” fraud requires particularity, that is, “pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) Every element of a fraud cause of action must be alleged both factually and specifically. (Cooper v. Equity General Insurance (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1252, 1262.) 

Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 844 is instructive on the issue of specificity at the pleading stage, providing in relevant part:

“Plaintiffs alleged the above elements of fraud in the SAC. As we have discussed, plaintiffs alleged the CVT installed in numerous Nissan vehicles (including the one plaintiffs purchased) were defective; Nissan knew of the defects and the hazards they posed; Nissan had exclusive knowledge of the defects but intentionally concealed and failed to disclose that information; Nissan intended to deceive plaintiffs by concealing known transmission problems; plaintiffs would not have purchased the car if they had known of the defects; and plaintiffs suffered damages in the form of money paid to purchase the car….

Nissan also contends plaintiffs did not provide specifics about what Nissan should have disclosed. But plaintiffs alleged the CVT were defective in that they caused such problems as hesitation, shaking, jerking, and failure to function. The SAC also alleged Nissan was aware of the defects as a result of premarket testing and consumer complaints that were made both to National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and to Nissan and its dealers. It is not clear what additional information Nissan believes should have been included. We decline to hold (again in the absence of a more developed argument on this point) that plaintiffs were required to include in the SAC more detailed allegations about the alleged defects in the CVT. We conclude plaintiffs' fraud claim was adequately pleaded.” (Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 844.)

Further, the Court notes less specificity is required if it appears from the nature of allegations that defendant must necessarily possess full information, or if the facts lie more in the knowledge of opposing parties.  (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384-1385.

There are “‘four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts.’”  (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336.)  However, unless the parties were in a fiduciary relationship, the other three circumstances “presupposes the existence of some other relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in which a duty to disclose can arise.”  (Id. at p. 337.)  “Thus, a duty to disclose may arise from the relationship between seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual agreement.” (Id.)

On this issue, the court in Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 844 noted:

“In its short argument on this point in its appellate brief, Nissan argues plaintiffs did not adequately plead the existence of a buyer-seller relationship between the parties, because plaintiffs bought the car from a Nissan dealership (not from Nissan itself). At the pleading stage (and in the absence of a more developed argument by Nissan on this point), we conclude plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient. Plaintiffs alleged that they bought the car from a Nissan dealership, that Nissan backed the car with an express warranty, and that Nissan's authorized dealerships are its agents for purposes of the sale of Nissan vehicles to consumers. In light of these allegations, we decline to hold plaintiffs' claim is barred on the ground there was no relationship requiring Nissan to disclose known defects.” (Id.)

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege the facts found sufficient by Dhital as to allegations that Plaintiffs bough the car from a Kia dealership and that Kia’s authorized dealerships are agents for purposes of the sale.

Additionally, the Court does find the allegations that the repair dealerships were both instructed to perform superficial repairs to conceal the Engine Defect as a strategy as well as failed to inform those same dealers of the Engine Defect contradictory.

However, the Court does find the allegations as to the Engine Defect and exclusive knowledge by Kia sufficiently pled.

Therefore, based on the arguments as to transactional relationship and contradictory allegations, the Court sustains the demurrer to the fifth cause of action for concealment.

Economic Loss Doctrine

As to the economic loss doctrine, "economic loss consists of damage for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective product or consequent loss of profits-without any claim of personal injury or damages to other property." (Food Safety Net Services v. Eco Safe Systems USA, Inc. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 118, 1130.) As noted above, the economic loss doctrine, in some cases, bars a tort action in the absence of personal injury or physical damage to property. (Robinson, supra, 34 Cal.4th 979, 984.) "The economic loss rule requires a purchaser to recover in contract for purely economic loss due to disappointed expectations, unless he can recover harm above and beyond a broken contractual promise." (Id. at 988.) The holding of Robinson, permitting both recover under fraud and contract, “is narrow in scope and limited to a defendant's affirmative misrepresentations on which a plaintiff relies and which expose a plaintiff to liability for personal damages independent of the plaintiff's economic loss." (Id. at 993.) The economic loss rule, therefore, does not bar recovery as to a claim for fraudulent inducement. (Id. at 990; see also Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 838.)

Therefore, the Court does not find the economic loss doctrine would bar a properly pled cause of action for concealment.

Conclusion

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint.

(2) Motion to Strike

The motion to strike seeks to eliminate the allegations related to punitive damages as to the concealment cause of action. Based on the Court’s ruling on the demurrer and leave to amend, the Court finds the motion to strike moot.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Minyard, Bryn S vs. Pennymac Loan Services, LLC

Case No.:   VCU335033

Date:           August 24, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Demurrer

Tentative Ruling: To overrule the demurrer to the second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action; to sustain the demurrer with leave to amend as to the first and seventh causes of action; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendant for five violations of the Homeowner’s Bill of Rights, unfair business practices under Business and Professions Code section 17200 and for wrongful foreclosure.

Plaintiff alleges that, on or about July 24, 2018, Plaintiff obtained a mortgage loan memorialized by a deed of trust in the amount of $200,809 as to 615 North Helene Street, Tulare CA 93724 (“Subject Property”). (Complaint ¶¶ 1,10 – Ex. A.)

The deed of trust was assigned September 19, 2024. (Complaint ¶11 – Ex. B.)

Plaintiff further alleges he began to suffer from financial hardship at the end of 2024 and called Defendant at the end of January 2025 asking for help to avoid losing the Subject Property. (Complaint ¶¶12, 13.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant “advised they could help and they would send him some documents to fill out in furtherance of a loan modification.” (Complaint ¶14.) Plaintiff alleges nothing was sent from Defendant and instead, on March 28, 2025, a Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under a Deed of Trust was recorded in the Tulare County. (Complaint ¶¶15, 16 – Ex. C.)

Plaintiff further alleges he “requested assistance several times prior to the NOD being recorded and no paperwork for him to fill out was every provided. Nor was a single point of contact ever assigned to him” and “every time he called [Defendant] they transferred him to different people within the loss mitigation department and every person he spoke with told him he simply needed to fill out the paperwork because his numbers (given verbally) appeared to qualify him for a loan modification.” (Complaint ¶¶17, 18.) Plaintiff alleges again nothing was sent to him. (Complaint ¶18.)

Further, Plaintiff pleads that on July 8, 2025, a Notice of Trustee’s Sale was recorded. (Complaint ¶19 – Ex. D.)

 On or about October 10, 2025, Plaintiff alleges he “submitted a complete loan modification based on a material change in his financial condition request to DEFENDANTS and requested the appointment of a Single Point of Contact (“SPOC”) to assist him in the loan modification process” and never received a denial or other determination as to the modification application. (Complaint ¶¶20, 21.) Plaintiff alleges he was never advised the sale was moving forward. (Complaint ¶22.)

On these facts, Plaintiff alleges violations of Civil Code sections 2923.5, 2923.7, 2924.9, 2923.6(c), and 2923.6(e). Further, that these violations, and other allegations, support a cause of action under Business and Professions Code section 17200. Finally, that Defendant engage in wrongful foreclosure.

Defendant demurrers to each cause of action, and seeks judicial notice of the recorded documents. Defendant argues Plaintiff’s own allegations demonstrate no violation of the HBOR and that Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief. Further, that no unlawful, unfair or fraudulent act is pled to support of the UCL claim. Finally, that Plaintiff failed to allege tender and that Defendant was entitled to foreclosure based on Plaintiff’s default.

In opposition, Plaintiff notes that while the Court may take judicial notice of the recorded documents, it cannot accept the truth of the matters asserted therein and therefore each HBOR cause of action is sufficiently pled. Further, that these HBOR violations support the UCL claim and that Plaintiff has alleged tender was excused.

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Uncertainty

“[D]emurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.”  (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848, fn. 3, citing Lickiss v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.)  In addition, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, courts strictly construe a demurrer for uncertainty “because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.”  (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) 

The Court, under this standard, does not find the complaint uncertain.

Judicial Notice

Garcia v. Sterling (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 17, 22  recognizes the Court may take judicial notice of existence of document in court file, but can only take judicial notice of truth of facts asserted in documents such as orders, findings of fact and conclusions of law, and judgments. Here, the recorded documents, including a declaration by Defendant, are subject to judicial notice but the Court cannot accept the truth of the facts contained therein.

HBOR and Injunctive Relief

Defendant argues first that Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief on the HBOR claims. However, demurrers do not lie as to only parts of causes of action, where some valid claim is alleged. (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119 [“A demurrer must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.”].) Therefore, the Court will evaluate the arguments as to each cause of action and sustain or overrule the demurrer to each cause of action as a whole.

First Cause of Action - Civil Code section 2923.5

Civil Code section 2923.5 states that a mortgage servicer "…shall contact the borrower in person or by telephone in order to assess the borrower's financial situation and explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure" before recording a notice of default and prescribes a certain manner for doing so. (Civ. Code, § 2923.5.) Further, "[a] notice of default…shall include a declaration that the mortgage servicer has contacted the borrower, has tried with due diligence to contact the borrower…, or that no contact was required." (Civ. Code, § 2923.5, subd. (b).) Civil Code section 2923.5 states that a notice of default may be recorded when a mortgage servicer has not contacted a borrower "provided that the failure to contact the borrower occurred despite the due diligence of the mortgage servicer." (Civ. Code, § 2923.5, subd. (e).) The section provides different definitions of "due diligence" to satisfy these requirements. (Civ. Code, § 2923.5, subd. (e)(1)-(5).)

"After a trustee's deed upon sale has been recorded, a mortgage servicer…shall be liable to a borrower for actual economic damages pursuant to Section 3281, resulting from a material violation of Section 2923.5 … where the violation was not corrected and remedied prior to the recordation of the trustee's deed upon sale." (Civ. Code, § 2924.19, subd. (b).)

Here, the Court agrees that Defendant’s declaration in the recorded document cannot rebut the allegation that Plaintiff received no mail or messages and otherwise refused to communicate with Plaintiff.

However, as noted above Civil Codes section 2923.5(e)(1)-(5) provides various methods of satisfying due diligence. The complaint fails to address these alternative due diligence means, as the complaint only alleges a failure to communicate and/or contact Plaintiff. Specifically, the Court notes the due diligence requirement appears satisfied via posting a prominent link on a website that does not appear to involve communicating, refusing to communicate or attempting to contact Plaintiff. (Civ. Code §2923.5(e)(5).)

As such, the Court sustains the demurrer to the first cause of action with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint as to this cause of action.

Second Cause of Action - Civil Code section 2923.7

Civil Code section 2923.7 requires that, "[w]hen a borrower requests a foreclosure prevention alternative, the mortgage servicer shall promptly establish a single point of contact and provide to the borrower one or more direct means of communication with the single point of contact." (Civ. Code, § 2923.7(a).)

The single point of contact is responsible for "1) Communicating the process by which a borrower may apply for an available foreclosure prevention alternative and the deadline for any required submissions to be considered for these options. (2) Coordinating receipt of all documents associated with available foreclosure prevention alternatives and notifying the borrower of any missing documents necessary to complete the application. (3) Having access to current information and personnel sufficient to timely, accurately, and adequately inform the borrower of the current status of the foreclosure prevention alternative. (4) Ensuring that a borrower is considered for all foreclosure prevention alternatives offered by, or through, the mortgage servicer, if any. (5) Having access to individuals with the ability and authority to stop foreclosure proceedings when necessary." (Civ. Code, § 2923.7, subd. (b).)

Defendant demurrers on the basis that the allegations lack specificity.

The allegations include that Plaintiff submitted a complete loan modification and requested the single point of contact on or about October 10, 2025. (Complaint ¶29.) Plaintiff alleges, more generally, that as of March 28, 2025 (the date of recording as to the notice of default) he requested assistance several times prior thereto and no single point of contact was assigned. (Complaint ¶17.) Paragraph 18 alleges he was transferred to different persons in the loss mitigation department. (Complaint ¶18.)

"We adopt instead the view stated by federal district courts that have held the phrase ' "upon request" simply indicates when the SPOC must be assigned (i.e., upon the borrower's request for a foreclosure prevention alternative, as opposed to the borrower's selection of a foreclosure prevention alternative).'" (Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 279, 301.) "'The purpose of the act that added this section is to ensure that, as part of the nonjudicial foreclosure process, borrowers are considered for, and have a meaningful opportunity to obtain, available loss mitigation options, if any, offered by or through the borrower's mortgage servicer, such as loan modifications or other alternatives to foreclosure.'" (Id. at 305.)

As such, the Court finds the allegations that Plaintiff requested the single point of contact as alleged in paragraphs 17 and 18 and that none was assigned thereto sufficient under Morris.  The statutory remedies available require a material violation, defined as “…one that affected the borrower's loan obligations, disrupted the borrower's loan modification process, or otherwise harmed the borrower.' [Citation.]" (Id. at 296-297, 304.) Plaintiff’s theory appears to be that the failure to assign the contact point resulted in a delay of Plaintiff’s loan modification application process, which is sufficient under the above.

While Defendant notes the single point of contact can consist of “an individual or team of personnel,” the Court does not find that the allegation “every time he called PL they transferred him to different people within the loss mitigation department and every person he spoke with told him he simply needed to fill out the paperwork” indicates that a single point of contact team was assigned to Plaintiff.

As such, the Court overrules the demurrer to the second cause of action.

Third Cause of Action - Civil Code section 2924.9

Civil Code section 2934.9 requires that, "within five business days after recording a notice of default pursuant to Section 2924, a mortgage servicer that offers one or more foreclosure prevention alternatives shall send a written communication to the borrower that includes all of the following information: (1) That the borrower may be evaluated for a foreclosure prevention alternative or, if applicable, foreclosure prevention alternatives. (2) Whether an application is required to be submitted by the borrower in order to be considered for a foreclosure prevention alternative. (3) The means and process by which a borrower may obtain an application for a foreclosure prevention alternative." (Civ. Code, § 2924.9, subd. (a).)

Here, Plaintiff alleges the notice of default was recorded March 28, 2025 and that Plaintiff received no mail or messages as to alternatives prior to foreclosure. (Complaint ¶34, 35.)

Defendant argues that, despite this allegation, Plaintiff thereafter spoke with Defendant’s representative and eventually submitted a loan modification application in October 2025 and therefore no material violation has occurred.

Further, Defendant cites to Hernandez v. Shellpoint Mortg. Servicing (C.D.Cal. Feb. 5, 2026, No. 5:25-cv-03431-AH-MARX) 2026 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 24600, at *12-13 which states:

“Given that Plaintiffs were able to submit a completed loan modification application three days after the Subject NOD was recorded, it is unclear from the Complaint how Defendants' alleged failure to communicate to Plaintiffs about alternatives within five days materially harmed Plaintiffs. For instance, Plaintiffs do not plead what additional or different actions they would have taken had they received such information within five days. [*13]  Cf. Warren, 671 F. Supp. 3d at 1045 (finding Plaintiff plausibly pleaded a material violation of section 2924.9 where Plaintiff alleged that if he had received such communications, "he would have taken action to avoid the foreclosure of the subject property with other lending sources").”

Here, Plaintiff alleges he was unable to complete the loan modification application until approximately 6 months after the notice of default was recorded and therefore, the Court does not find Hernandez completely applicable here.

The complaint further pleads “If PLAINTIFF had received such contact and communication, she would have taken action to avoid the foreclosure of the Subject Property with other lending sources.” (Complaint ¶27.)

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer to the third cause of action.

Fourth Cause of Action - Civil Code section 2923.6(c)

Under Civil Code § 2923.6(c), "If a borrower submits a complete application for a first lien loan modification offered by, or through, the borrower's mortgage servicer at least five business days before a scheduled foreclosure sale, a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of default or notice of sale, or conduct a trustee's sale, while the complete first lien loan modification application is pending. A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of default or notice of sale or conduct a trustee's sale until any of the following occurs:

(1) The mortgage servicer makes a written determination that the borrower is not eligible for a first lien loan modification, and any appeal period pursuant to subdivision (d) has expired.

(2) The borrower does not accept an offered first lien loan modification within 14 days of the offer.

(3) The borrower accepts a written first lien loan modification, but defaults on, or otherwise breaches the borrower's obligations under, the first lien loan modification."

Plaintiff alleges the Property was sold March 5, 2026. (Complaint ¶32.) Further. Plaintiff alleges that on October 10, 2025, he submitted a complete loan modification application. (Complaint ¶30.) Further, that Plaintiff never received a denial or other determination as to the application. (Complaint ¶21.)

The Court does not find the allegation that Defendant, prior to the October 2025 submission of the modification application, failed to provide a single point of contact and thereby delayed or otherwise impeded Plaintiff’s prior loan modification efforts are contradictory. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the submission of a completed loan application, that no decision was made as to the application and that the foreclosure sale proceeded despite the pending application. This appears sufficient under this cause of action.

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer to the fourth cause of action.

Fifth Cause of Action - Civil Code section 2923.6(e)

Civil Code section 2923.6, subd. (e) provides: "If the borrower's application for a first lien loan modification is denied, the mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of default or, if a notice of default has already been recorded, record a notice of sale or conduct a trustee's sale until the later of: (1) Thirty-one days after the borrower is notified in writing of the denial. (2) If the borrower appeals the denial pursuant to subdivision (d), the later of 15 days after the denial of the appeal or 14 days after a first lien loan modification is offered after appeal but declined by the borrower, or, if a first lien loan modification is offered and accepted after appeal, the date on which the borrower fails to timely submit the first payment or otherwise breaches the terms of the offer."

Here, Defendant argues, in similar fashion to the above, that Plaintiff’s allegations are contradictory as to the completion of a loan modification application in October 2025 (Complaint ¶36) and that Plaintiff alleges the application was incomplete. (Complaint ¶31 – Page 5.) For the same reasons as above, the Court does not find this pleading contradictory.

Plaintiff alleges a complete loan modification application submitted in October 2025, that no response to the application was provided, and that the Property was sold without the opportunity to appeal the denial.

This appears sufficient to allege a violation of subsection (e) and the Court overrules the demurrer to this cause of action.

Sixth Cause of Action - Business and Professions Code section 17200

To prevail on this claim, the Plaintiff must prove the Defendants engaged in an "unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice." (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) This section “‘borrows’ violations from other laws by making them independently actionable as unfair competitive practices." (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1143,

A "violation of another law is a predicate for stating a cause of action under the UCL's unlawful prong." (Berryman v. Merit Property Management, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1554.) If there is no violation of another law, defendant cannot be held liable for an "unlawful" business practice. (Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 610

Here, as the Court has found sufficient violations above of the HBOR as to the second, third, fourth and fifth causes of action which constitute unlawful acts or practices.

As such, the Court overrules the demurrer to the sixth cause of action.

Seventh Cause of Action - Wrongful Foreclosure

The elements of wrongful foreclosure are “(1) the defendants caused an illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive sale of the property pursuant to a power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust; (2) the plaintiff suffered prejudice or harm; and (3) the plaintiff tendered the amount of the secured indebtedness or was excused from tendering. [Citation.]" (Chavez v. Indymac Mortgage Services (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1062; See also Miles v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 394, 408.)

Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege he tendered the amount due. However, Plaintiff notes the allegation that “PLAINTIFF is excused from the tender requirement because of DEFENDANTS violations of Civ. Code §2923 and 2924 as stated herein.” (Complaint ¶60.) Plaintiff cites to Chavez v. Indymac Mortgage Services (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1062 which notes:

“Recognized exceptions to the tender rule include when (1) the underlying debt is void, (2) the foreclosure sale or trustee's deed is void on its face, (3) a counterclaim offsets the amount due, (4) specific circumstances make it inequitable to enforce the debt against the party challenging the sale, or (5) the foreclosure sale has not yet occurred.”

Plaintiff seeks to apply the first exception, that the above stated violation of sections 2923 and 2924 void the debt. The Court’s ruling above has found sufficient allegations as to violations of 2923.7, 2924.9, 2923.6(c), and 2923.6(e).

However, the Court lacks a connection between violations of these sections, which appear to provide for, in some instances, monetary damages or injunctive relief, and the remedy of voiding the debt.

Plaintiff also cites to Barrionuevo v. Chase Bank, N.A. (N.D. Cal. 2012) 885 F.Supp.2d 964, 977, stating that tender is not required as to dual tracking claims.

However, Barrionuevo indicates that the language of the trust deed determines “whether it contains "conclusive presumption language in the deed" regarding notice defects that would render the sale merely voidable as opposed to void.” (Id. at 971.)

Specifically, Barrionuevo notes:

          “As was explained in Tamburri,

when a notice defect is at issue, it is not the extent of the defect that is determinative. Rather, "what seems to be determinative" is whether the deed of trust contains a provision providing for a conclusive presumption of regularity of sale. Little, 188 Cal. App. 3d at 1359, 233 Cal. Rptr. 923. "Where there has been a notice defect and no conclusive presumption language in the deed, the sale has been held void." Id. In contrast, "[w]here there has been a notice defect and conclusive presumption language in a deed, courts have characterized the sales as 'voidable.'" Id.

Tamburri, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144442, 2011 WL 6294472 at *5. In Little, the court considered a deed provision stating "[t]he recitals in such Deed of any matters, proceedings and facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness and regularity thereof" to be conclusive presumption language. Little, at 1360. In this case, the Barrionuevos' deed of trust provides no such conclusive presumption language. Therefore, "the Court cannot conclude, at least at this juncture, that the sale is merely voidable wherein tender would be required." Ottolini v. Bank of America, No. C-11-0477 EMC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92900, 2011 WL 3652501, at *4 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 19, 2011); see also Tamburri, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144442, 2011 WL 6294472 at *5.” (Id. at 971.)

The Court lacks a sufficient allegation in the complaint as to whether the deed of trust contains language as in Little as to a conclusive presumption of the regularity of sale term and whether the alleged notice defects render the sale voidable or void.

Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer to the seventh cause of action with leave to amend as to the tender and excuse issues. Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint as to this cause of action.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:           Brambila, Leonor vs. Familia Partida, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company et al

Case No.:   PCU318630

Date:      August 24, 2026

Time:           1:30 P.M. 

Dept.           15-The Honorable Gary M. Johnson

Motion:      Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Initial Verified Responses and to Deem Admissions Admitted or Alternatively to Compel Verified Responses to Requests for Admissions; Sanctions

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motions; to impose sanctions against Plaintiff’s counsel Goodrich in the amount of $275, due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing. 

Facts

On April 3, 2026, Plaintiff served written discovery on Defendants, including Form Interrogatories-General, Form Interrogatories-Employment Law, Special Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents, and Requests for Admission, Set One.

Defendant served responses on May 6, 2026. Plaintiff indicates the responses were not verified and that “Defendants’ responses consisted of objections and did not provide substantive discovery. Defendants did not answer interrogatories, did not produce documents, and did not admit or deny requests for admission.” (Declaration of Goodrich ¶¶3, 4, 5, 6.)

On June 8, 2026, Plaintiff’s counsel met and conferred with Defendant’s counsel regarding the responses.

Counsel for Plaintiff declares “Defense counsel represented during the June 8, 2026 telephone conference that Defendants would provide substantive responses.” (Declaration of Goodrich ¶10.) No substantive, amended responses have been provided.

On July 23, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion to compel initial verified responses to the above discovery, or, as the requests for admissions, to deem the admissions admitted.

In opposition, Defendant takes the position that this motion is to compel further responses, is untimely, lacked a proper meet and confer, that objection only response need not be verified, that no separate statement is provided and sanctions are unwarranted.

In support, counsel for Defendant declares, as to the June 8, 2026 conversation “The conversation did not consist of a request-by-request discussion identifying each disputed interrogatory, request for production, or request for admission, nor did it include a response- by-response proposal for resolving the objections.” (Declaration of Garcia ¶7.)

Additionally, additional counsel for Defendant states:

4. On June 5, 2026, counsel for the parties exchanged emails concerning a telephone conference between Rebecca Garcia and Mr. Goodrich. On June 8, 2026, Ms. Garcia and Mr. Goodrich participated in that telephone conversation. On June 9, 2026, Mr. Goodrich sent an email stating: “Thank you for taking the time to speak with me yesterday. As discussed, I am attaching a settlement demand. Please let me know your client’s response as soon as possible.” A true and correct copy of the June 5-10, 2026 email chain is attached as Exhibit B.

5. On June 10, 2026, Nick Pritchett, sent an email (to which I am a CC’ed recipient) stating: “We will work toward providing meaningful responses to your firm on or before June 26, 2026. That should give us time to discuss possible settlement.” (Ex. B.)

6. The June 10 email did not expressly grant Plaintiff an extension of the statutory deadline to move to compel further responses, did not refer to the 45-day deadline, and did not waive Defendants’ right to assert that a motion filed after the deadline was untimely.

          …

10. On August 3, 2026, I sent a follow-up email to Mr. Goodrich requesting to discuss settlement and to meet and confer regarding the outstanding discovery motion and responses. A true and correct copy of that email is attached as Exhibit E.

11. Neither email granted Plaintiff an extension of time to file a motion to compel, waived any deadline, or represented that Plaintiff could delay filing until July 23, 2026.

12. Mr. Goodrich did not respond to my July 27 email. He also did not respond to my August 3 follow-up email.” (Declaration of Landaverde ¶¶4-6, 10-12,)

In reply, Plaintiff states “Plaintiff agreed to extend Defendants’ discovery-response deadline from June 1, 2026 to June 15, 2026; and defense counsel agreed in writing to “a coextension for you to file your motion to compel.” (Landaverde Decl., Ex. B.) Defendants then stated they would “work toward providing meaningful responses” by June 26, 2026, but did not serve substantive discovery. (Landaverde Decl., Ex. B.)” (Reply 2:4-8.)

Further, that the May 29, 2026 email from Garcia to Goodrich stated “Thank you counsel for the extension, we agree to a coextension for you to file your motion to compel” in response to Goodrich stating “We agree to the two-week extension requested for Defendants’ discovery responses, extending the deadline from June 1, 2026 to June 15, 2026.” (Declaration of Garcia - Exhibit B)

Authority and Analysis

To start, the general rule is that unsworn responses are tantamount to no responses.  (Appleton v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636.) When no responses are received, there is no 45-day time limit to file a motion to compel initial responses and a motion to deem admissions admitted. (Code Civ. Proc, § 2030.290(a).)

However, because these responses at issue here consisted solely of pure objections on various legal grounds, no client verification was required under Code of Civil Procedure §2031.250(a), the discovery has been responded to and a motion to compel further responses within the 45 day time period (plus service) is required. The court in Food 4 Less Supermarkets,Inc v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 651, 657 summarizes this issue as follows:

“In contrast, subdivision (g) of section 2031 specifically provides that a response containing ‘only objections’ need not be signed by the party. The reason is clear. As Blue Ridge so cogently observed: ‘[O]bjections are legal conclusions interposed by counsel, not factual assertions by a party…’ [citation omitted] That is, an objection is based upon counsel's legal analysis of the matter (e.g., the document is privileged) as compared to a response which is based upon a party's factual representation of the matter (e.g., the document does not exist). There is absolutely no reason to require a party to verify an objection. It is sufficient to have the attorney sign the objection(s). If the attorney is wrong, the court will so decide after conducting the appropriate proceedings to determine if, for instance, the claim of privilege lies. Requiring the objection to be verified by the party would add nothing to the trial court's analysis. (emphasis in original.)

Therefore, the 45 day period applies because section 2031.250(a), for instance, states an objection-only response need not be verified, an objection is a code-compliant response, an objection-only response cannot be construed as the equivalent of no response at all in the same way untimely or unverified substantive responses are considered. (See also sections 2033.230, 2033.240(a) as to admissions; sections 2030.240 and 2030.250 as to interrogatories.) According to Weil & Brown, “….the 45-day limit probably also applies where the response is unverified and includes only objection [Y]ou should serve your motion within 45 days of unverified objections.” (Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.8:1492.4.)

First, the Court has reviewed the discovery responses at issue. They appear to the Court to be pure objections. Therefore, the general rule of Appleton does not apply and no motion lies to verify objection only responses. There is no motion to compel initial responses or motion to deem admissions admitted where timely, objection only responses were served. There is no failure to respond where objection only responses are provided. Rather, as noted above, only a motion to compel further responses is proper.

Second, the Court accepts that the May 29, 2026 email exchange mutually extended a time period for Defendants to provide supplemental responses and Plaintiff’s time to bring a motion to compel further responses. However, this provided, at most, a one time, two week extension on the motion to compel further period.

Plaintiff had 45 days from the May 6, 2026 service of the objection only responses, plus an extension based on the manner served. No party appears to have indicated to the Court how Defendant’s May 6, 2026 responses were served. The Court will assume they were served by mail here and provide an additional five (5) days based on this assumption.

As such, the Court calculates June 25, 2026 as the initial 45 day period. Extended an additional two weeks pursuant to the May 29, 2026 email places the agreed upon date to file the motion to compel further responses on July 9, 2026. Absent a further extension, in writing, this appears to be the last day to file a motion to compel further responses. Therefore, this motion is untimely. The 45-day requirement (plus extensions for service) is jurisdictional and mandatory and a late filed motion to compel must be denied. (Sexton v. Sup. Ct. (Mullikin Med. Ctr.) (1997) 58 Cal.App. 4^th 1403, 1410.)

Third, even if the motion were timely, the Court cannot ignore that Plaintiff has brought this motion as a motion to compel initial responses and therefore has not filed a separate statement or a sufficient meet and confer declaration.

A motion to compel must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration “showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code of Civil Procedure 2016.040, 2031.310(b)(2) [as to requests for production].)

The meet and confer requirement is designed “to encourage the parties to work out their differences informally so as to avoid the necessity for a formal order . . . . This, in turn, will lessen the burden on the court and reduce the unnecessary expenditure of resources by litigants through promotion of informal, extrajudicial resolution of discovery disputes.” (Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1016, quoting Townsend v. Superior Ct. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435, internal quotations and citations omitted.) Thus, there must be a serious effort at negotiation and informal resolution. (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294.)

 “[T]he law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate.” (Id.) The particular level of effort required in each case depends on the circumstances including the amount of discovery propounded, the time available to confer before the motion filing deadline, and the extent to which a party was complicit in the lapse of available time. (Obregon v. Superior Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 432.) “An evaluation of whether, from the perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the discovering party, additional effort appeared likely to bear fruit, should also be considered. Although some effort is required in all instances, the level of effort that is reasonable is different in different circumstances, and may vary with the prospects for success.” (Id. at pp. 432–33.)   To that end, trial courts are entrusted with discretion and judgment to determine the necessary effort required to satisfy the requirement of an informal resolution. (Id. at 433.)

It is unclear what exactly the substance of the June 8, 2026 telephonic meet and confer consisted of, but the Court lacks a sufficient declaration indicating a sufficient meet and confer process occurred under the standard above.

Fourth, no separate statement has been filed pursuant to California Rule of Court, rule 3.1345(a)(1), (2), and (3) and the Court denies the motion on this basis. (See Mills v. U.S. Bank (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 871, 893; St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 777-778.)

Sanctions

Both sides request sanctions.

While the Court agrees that Plaintiff’s motion must be denied for the reason above, the Court finds Defendants’ request for $2,868.75 to respond to this motion excessive.

The Court will permit one hour at Counsel Landaverde’s rate of $275 under Code of Civil Procedure sections, 2030.300(d) (Interrogatories), 2031.310 (h) (Request for Production of Documents), 2033.290 (d) (Request for Admissions) and 2022.020 (failure to meet and confer). Sanctions are imposed against Plaintiff’s counsel Goodrich and are due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared August 24, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054219	In the Matter of Jungk, Ronny	Letters of Administration	Recommended for Approval	Documents in order
VPR054210	In the Matter of Singo, Sila	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	1. Discrepancies: Petition Item 5(1) shows decedent is survived by spouse, whereas Item 8 lists spouse as “deceased”. 2. Petition Item 8: relationship of a party to decedent is omitted. 3. Notice of Petition to Administer: notice of the court address is South County Justice Center; Page 2 – Proof of Service is incomplete. 4. Proof of Publication not filed, Prob C § 8120. 5. Original will not lodged
VPR054215	In the Matter of Lujano, Eusibio Torrez	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	1. Duties & Liabilities of Personal Representatives not filed, Prob C § 8404(a). 2. Supplemental Statements of Birth Date and DL Number not filed, LR, rule 1000c(4). 3. Notice of Petition to Administer not served on all parties, Prob C § 1220. 4. Proof of Publication not filed, Prob C § 8120. 5. Objection filed
VPR054212	In the Matter of Malone, Norma Jean	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	Petition Item 8c: DE-300 not attached as required by Probate C § 13152(e)
VPR053581	In the Matter of Frausto, Esther C.	Final Distribution Hearing	Recommended for Approval	Documents in order
VPR044737	In the Matter of Christina Rivera Special Needs Trust	Accounting Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054229	In the Matter of Sandoval, Juventina	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing not filed
VPR039372-00	In the Matter of Beatty, Kim Maureen	Appoint Successor Conservator	Appearance Required	1. Petition filed without a vacancy in conservatorship, Prob C § 2650, 2680. 2. Documents not filed:  Order Appointing Court Investigator, GC-330; Supplemental Information, GC-312; Conservator Screening Form, GC-314; Capacity Declaration and Medical Ability to Attend Hearing; Questionnaire, PRO-006
VPR049370	In the Matter of Sample, Alexis	Review Hearing	Appearance Required	Regarding transfer of case

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         Probate calendar for August 20, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR054182	In the Matter of Olvera Reyes, Jose Adalberto	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	The copy of the Will is not attached to the petition; the attachment appears to be a Trust. Petition concerning Trust administration/internal affairs has not been filed.
PPR054184	In the Matter of Arroyo-Rico, Gabriela	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Matter appears to be in order
PPR054054	In the Matter of Northam, Rita	Terminate Conservatorship Hearing	Appearance Required	Matter appears to be in order
PPR054054	In the Matter of Northam, Rita	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Termination petition filed. Appointment not necessary

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

GUARDIANSHIP CASES

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared August 21, 2026 - August 25, 2026 that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
8/21/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR054250	In the Matter of D.V.W.	Appoint Temporary Guardian- matter appears to be in order
8/21/26 8:30 AM	Department 01	VPR053996	In the Matter of C.A.	NOT FILED- MC-356 (mandatory use form 2021) - Acknowledgment of Receipt of Order for the Deposit of Money Into Blocked Account. The MC-355 Order is supposed to be attached to this form. NOT FILED- GC-051 (mandatory use form 2005) - Notice of Opening or Changing a Guardianship or Conservatorship Account or Safe Deposit Box (completed by banking institution). NOT FILED GC-040 - Inventory and Appraisal GC-042 - Notice of Filing of Inventory and Appraisal and How to Object to the Inventory or the Appraised Value of Property
8/21/26 8:30 AM	Department 01	VPR053439	In the Matter of J.A.	Appoint Guardian, matter appears to be in order, Petitioner is required to appear for OSC.
8/21/26 10:00 AM	Department 09	VPR054253	In the Matter of M.L.M.	The notice of hearing must state the complete title of the pleading to which notice relates (Cal Rules of Ct 7.50) NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service to be in accordance with Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3), service to be completed on father, Mr. Rivera Jr.
8/21/26 10:00 AM	Department 09	VPR054243	In the Matter of K.K.M	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service to be in accordance with Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3), service to be completed on father, Mr. Rivera Jr.
8/24/26 8:30 AM	Department 01	VPR053691	In the Matter of A.A.	Appoint Guardian & OSC. Declaration of Guardianship Orientation attendance is required to be filed DOJ Background record check appears to be outstanding NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511- PARENTS & CHILDREN AGE 12 AND OLDER
8/25/26 11:00 AM	Department 19	PPR054277	In the Matter of O.M.A.	Appoint Temporary Guardian- NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service to be in accordance with Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3), service to be completed on father, Declaration of Due Diligence has been received for mother.