Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, January 8, 2026, are:

Re:                 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company vs. Lopez, Eddie Israel

Case No.:   VCU285261

Date:           January 8, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Motion to Enforce Settlement as Judgment

Tentative Ruling:  To grant the motion; to enter judgment in the amount of $8,646.20.

Facts

This is a complaint for subrogation seeking $27,728.08 from Defendant.

On September 27^th, 2022, Plaintiff filed a notice of conditional settlement after the mandatory settlement conference indicating that this matter had been resolved, but that the request for dismissal would not be filed until April 1, 2029.

However, at that time, Defendant failed to execute the settlement agreement and the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the notice of settlement and place this matter back on calendar.

On January 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed a stipulation and order for entry of judgment indicating that this matter arose out of a motor vehicle collision on or about December 23, 2019, and that Plaintiff has paid out $27,728.08 in property damages, and is seeking recovery of the monies paid in the amount of $27,728.08.

Pursuant to the stipulation, “Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendant Eddie Israel Lopez the sum of $20,214.23, and in the event of a default by Defendant, costs of suit, interest from the date of loss of December 23, 2019, and attorney’s fees.”

Further, that “Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff a total of $14,513.85 as follows:

I. Defendant has already caused his insurance carrier Viking Insurance to pay to Plaintiff the sum of $7,513.85, which will be applied to his obligation to pay $14,513.85.

II. Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff $7,000.00 with a $185.00 payment due by January 15, 2024, then beginning February 15, 2024 and continuing every 15th day of each month thereafter Defendant shall make monthly payments of $145.00, until a total of $7,000.00 has been paid in full to Plaintiff. B. Payments made under this agreement for the total settlement amount of $14,513.85 will be interest free…”

Further, that “Should Defendant fail to make or cause to be made any payment(s), as agreed, he will be deemed to be in default of this agreement, and Plaintiff may immediately cause Judgment to be entered, pursuant to Paragraph 4, in the amount of $20,214.23, plus costs of suit, interest from from [sic] December 23, 2019, and attorney’s fees; and shall, when necessary, also file a partial Satisfaction of Judgment for all sums previously paid pursuant to this Stipulation”

Finally, that “It is further stipulated and agreed that, in the event of an uncured default in payments as provided herein, the Judgment shall be entered pursuant to this Stipulation is deemed reasonably related to the breach of this Stipulation and the losses sustained by Plaintiff as plead in the underlying cause(s) of action and therefore does not amount to an unenforceable penalty, and Defendant(s) voluntarily disclaim and waive any rights or benefits under the holding in Greentree Financial Group, Inc., v. Execute Sports, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 495, and any other similar law, which states in essence that an acceleration clause seeking a judgment amount that exceeds the damages arising strictly from a breach of the minimum payment stream called for herein may be deemed an unenforceable penalty.”

On January 25, 2024, the matter was dismissed without prejudice and with the Court expressly reserving jurisdiction pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

On October 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed this motion to vacate the dismissal and enter judgment in the amount of $27,728.08, consisting of the principal amount of $24,152.63 plus $1,428.48 in interest at 7% from January 5, 2024, plus costs of $602, plus statutory attorneys’ fees in the amount of $2,692.92.

Plaintiff indicates receipt of $8,298.85 from Defendant’s insurance company.

Plaintiff has only received $785.00 from Defendant, with no other payments made.

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states: 

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1360)

The mandatory requirements for application of Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6: (1) the request for the trial court to retain jurisdiction has been made during the pendency of the case; (2) by the parties themselves, and (3) in a writing signed by the parties expressly, clearly, and unambiguously requesting the court retain jurisdiction under this statute. (Mesa RHF Partners, LP. v. City of Lost Angeles (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 913, 917.)

Here, the Court has expressly retained jurisdiction under section 664.6 via its own order prior to dismissal of this matter. Therefore, the Court may enter judgment in accordance with this section.

Unenforceable Penalty

The initial issue for the Court is whether the $27,728.08 of principal sought is an unenforceable penalty in light of the settlement with this Defendant for $7,000. The starting point for this issue appears to be Greentree Financial Group, Inc. v. Execute Sports, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 495.

The Court noted above a term of the stipulation purporting to “voluntarily disclaim and waive any rights or benefits under the holding in Greentree Financial Group, Inc., v. Execute Sports, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 495, and any other similar law, which states in essence that an acceleration clause seeking a judgment amount that exceeds the damages arising strictly from a breach of the minimum payment stream called for herein may be deemed an unenforceable penalty.”

However, Civil Code section 1671 renders contractual penalties or forfeitures illegal and unenforceable as against public policy if they bear no reasonable relationship to the actual damages caused by the breach that triggered them. (Ridgley v. Topa Thrift & Loan Assn. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 970, 976-977); Purcell v. Schweitzer (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 969, 974-975.) In the Court’s view, the public policy expressed in that code section may not be waived or circumvented by language in the settlement agreement, as even an express waiver of the right to appeal or the right to contest a stipulated judgment on any ground will not prevent a party from challenging a penalty or forfeiture included in the stipulated judgment. (Purcell, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at 972, 975; see Sybron Corp. v. Clark Hosp. Supply Corp. (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 896, 902, fn. 3.) The law cannot prevent a party from challenging an illegal term in a contract simply because the party agreed to the illegal term.

In Greentree, the plaintiff sued defendant for breach of contract for failure to pay $45,000 due under the contract. (Id. at 498.) The parties resolved this dispute via stipulation for entry of judgment providing that defendant would pay $20,000 in two installments of $15,000 and $5,000. (Id.) Further, if the defendant defaulted on either installment, the plaintiff would be entitled to have judgment entered for the amount prayed for in the complaint, plus interest, attorney fees and costs, less any amounts already paid. (Id. at 498.) The defendant defaulted on the first payment, and the plaintiff sought entry of judgment pursuant to the stipulation. (Id.) The trial court entered judgment in the amount of $61,232.50, consisting of the $45,000 prayed for in the complaint, plus $13,912.50 in prejudgment interest, $2,000 in attorney fees, and $320 in costs. (Id.) The defendant argued at the appellate level that the judgment of $61,232.50 for failure to make a $15,000 payment constitutes enforcement of an illegal penalty. (Id. at 498-499.)

The appellate court, agreeing with the defendant, interpreted the stipulation as an unenforceable liquidated damages clause that effectively imposed $61,232.50 in liquidated damages for breach of the defendant's obligation to pay $15,000 as follows:

“Greentree and ESI did not attempt to anticipate the damages that might flow from a breach of the stipulation. Rather, they simply selected the amount Greentree had claimed as damages in the underlying lawsuit, plus prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs. But the appellate record contains nothing showing Greentree's chances of complete success on the merits of its case—the record contains only the complaint, the answer, and the stipulation. In the stipulation, ‘[e]ach party disclaims any admission of wrongdoing, fault, liability, or violation of law.’ The lack of a guarantee of success at trial may explain, at least in part, why Greentree was willing to accept in settlement less than half the amount demanded in the complaint.

Also, the $ 61,232.50 amount in the judgment bears no reasonable relationship to the range of actual damages the parties could have anticipated from a breach of the stipulation to settle the dispute for $20,000. ‘[D]amages for the withholding of money are easily determinable—i.e., interest at prevailing rates…’ [citation omitted.] The amount of the judgment, however, was more than triple the amount for which the parties agreed to settle the case.” (Id. at 499-500.)

The court in Greentree noted that the validity of a liquidated damages provision is governed by section 1671, subdivision (b) and that “‘A liquidated damages clause will generally be considered unreasonable, and hence unenforceable under section 1671[, subdivision] (b), if it bears no reasonable relationship to the range of actual damages that the parties could have anticipated would flow from a breach.’” (Id. at 499.) Damages for failing to pay money are “‘easily determinable’” and are limited to “‘interest at [the] prevailing rate[]’” and (perhaps) “reasonable costs [incurred] in pursuing the payment.” (Id. at 500.)

Last, the court in Greentree concluded that:

“The stipulation does not contain any provision for an award of attorney fees or prejudgment interest, although the judgment included $ 2,000 in attorney fees and $ 13,912.50 in prejudgment interest. The $ 20,000 settlement sum in the stipulation is unallocated, and may or may not have included Greentree's claimed attorney fees and prejudgment interest. We find no basis for awarding Greentree its attorney fees and prejudgment interest in addition to the stipulated settlement sum. Greentree is entitled to recover its costs in the trial court (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032), and postjudgment interest.
(Id. at 502.)

Vitatech International, Inc. v Sporn (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 796 is also instructional here. In that case, the parties settled before trial for payment of $75,000 although plaintiff was seeking $166,000 in its complaint. Like this case, there was an agreement to “forbear” collection if Defendant paid the lesser sum. Defendant defaulted, and Plaintiff sought and obtained a judgment of over $300,000, including compensatory damages, prejudgment interest, attorney’s fees and costs.

In that case, plaintiff also argued that it sought damages that were no more than it could have recovered at trial and that all parties expressly accepted the amount that would be paid on default. The appellate court focused on the damages that could have flowed from the breach of the stipulation, not the amount claimed in the complaint:

“We reversed because "[the parties] did not attempt to anticipate the damages that might flow from a breach of the stipulation. Rather, they simply selected the amount [the plaintiff] had claimed as damages in the underlying lawsuit, plus prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs. But the appellate record contains nothing showing [the plaintiff's] chances of complete success on the merits of its case .... [¶] Also, the ……. amount in the judgment bears no reasonable relationship to the range of actual damages the parties could have anticipated from a breach of the stipulation to settle the dispute…” (Id. at 809)

Here, the Court will not enforce the $27,728.08 of principal sought in light of the settlement with this Defendant for effectively $7,000. The Court does not find the principal amount claimed by Plaintiff were damages that might flow from breach of the stipulation, but rather the amount Plaintiff claimed in the underlying lawsuit, plus interest and costs. Plaintiff urges the court to order the full amount claimed to be due as it is not in dispute, and was agreed to in the stipulations of the parties. The Court, however, sees the essential question from the cases noted above as to what the relationship is between the stipulated amount and the damages that flow from the breach. The total amount sought is essentially three and a half times the amount owed under the settlement agreement.

The Court, therefore, sets the principal amount at $7,000, less the $785 payment, equaling $6,215.

Interest

The next issue is interest, which Plaintiff calculates from the date of default on September 13, 2024 to the date the motion was prepared August 7, 2025 or 384 days. Plaintiff’s interest calculation, however, is based on a figure of $19,429.23, multiplied by 7% and dividing it by 365 days to obtain a daily interest rate.

Rather, the Court will use the $6,215 and therefore calculates a daily interest rate of $1.19. As such, the Court will add interest in the amount of $457.70.

Costs

The next issue is costs. The stipulation provides for costs of the suit. Plaintiff’s memorandum of costs (after subtracting attorneys’ fees, addressed below) provides for $527 in filing and motion fees and $75 in service of process fees, for a total of $624.50.

The Court will award these costs as presented in the amount of $602.

Attorneys’ Fees

The stipulation also provides for attorneys’ fees.

Here, Plaintiff seeks $2,692.92 in fees.

Here, Plaintiff has utilized the Court’s Local Rule 708 and Appendix 8 as to “Attorney Fees on a Default Action on Note or Contract”

As noted above, the Court sets the principal amount at $6,215.

Therefore, 25% of the first $5,000.00 is $1,250.00 and 10% of the amount over $5,000 (or $1,215) is $121.50.

Therefore, the Court awards fees of $1,371.50.

Summary

Therefore, the Court will enter total judgment in the amount of $8,646.20 consisting of $7,000 in principal, plus $457.70 in interest, $602 in costs, $1,371.50 in fees, less the $785 payment for a total of $7,861.20..

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 In the Matter of Chaidez, Margaret J

Case No.:   VCU291663

Date:           January 8, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Moving Party Carlo Gomar’s Motion to Set Aside Void Judgment and Dismiss the Case for Failure Properly Serve the Summons and Complaint

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion.

Facts

On May 12, 2022, the petitioner, Margaret J. Chaidez filed a Petition for Change of Name to change her then five year old daughter’s name from Madelyn May Gomar to Madelyn May Chaidez.

On May 31, 2022, a proof of service was filed indicating that Carlo Gomar was personally served at 132 N. Los Angeles Street, Tulare, on May 17, 2022, at 5:04 pm by Vishavjit Parihar, who is not a registered California process server.

The order to show cause hearing was thereafter published for four successive weeks, as indicated by the proof of publication filed July 5, 2025. 

On July 7, 2022, the Court granted the petition after being satisfied with the proof of publication, no objections to the proposed change of name, and CLETS record check was cleared.

On October 15, 2025, moving party Carlo Gomar brings this motion to set aside the granting of the petition for failure to serve the summons and complaint. In support, Gomar declares “On or about May 17, 2022, Petitioner MARGARET J. CHAIDEZ personally handed me the papers relating to a petition to change the name of my minor child. Two individuals witnessed Petitioner personally deliver the papers to me at her residence.” and that “Petitioner had a third party falsify a proof of service filed on 05/31/22.”

On these facts, Gomar seeks to void the granting of the petition under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(d).

In opposition, Chaidez states, under penalty of perjury, that she did not personally serve Gomar with the petition. Additionally, Chaidez has attached a declaration from Vishavjit Parihar who states the following:

“2. On May 17, 2022, at approximately 5:00 pm, I personally served Carlo Gomar at 132 N. Los Angeles St., Tulare, California.

3. I approached Carlo Gomar, who was seated in a vehicle with his brother. I stated, ‘Hello, this is a service for a name change for Carlo Gomar.’

4. Carlo Gomar then directed his brother to accept the documents on his behalf.

5. At Carlo’s direction, I handed the documents to his brother. Carlo then personally took possession of the documents.

…

7. After service, I returned to my vehicle and left the premises…” (Declaration of Parihar ¶¶2-5, 7.)

Authority and Analysis

"'[C]ompliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction. [Citation.] Thus, a default judgment entered against a defendant who was not served with a summons in the manner prescribed by statute is void. [Citation.]' [Citation.] Under section 473, subdivision (d), the court may set aside a default judgment which is valid on its face, but void, as a matter of law, due to improper service." (Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 544.)

Such a motion under section 473(d), prior to the California Supreme Court’s decision in California Capital Ins. Co. v. Hoehn (2024) 17 Cal.5th 207, used to be subject to the two year statutory period provided by section 473.5 (See Trackman v. Kenney (2010) 187 Cal. App. 4th 175, 180, overruled by California Capital.)

However, under California Capital, supra, 17 Cal. 5^th at 225 “We hold that a section 473(d) motion to vacate a judgment that is void for lack of proper service is not subject to the judicially imposed two-year limitation”

Therefore, this motion is timely.

“A judgment ‘is considered void on its face only when the invalidity is apparent from an inspection of the judgment roll or court record without consideration of extrinsic evidence.’ [Citation.] When a default judgment has been taken, the judgment roll consists of ‘the summons, with the affidavit or proof of service; the complaint; the request for entry of default ..., and a copy of the judgment.’ (§ 670, subd. (a).) If the invalidity can be shown only through consideration of extrinsic evidence, such as declarations or testimony, the order/judgment is not void on its face.” [Citation.] (Kremerman v. White (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 358, 370.)

“ ‘A judgment or order is said to be void on its face when the invalidity is apparent upon an inspection of the judgment-roll.’ [citation omitted] In a case in which the defendant does not answer the complaint, the judgment roll includes the proof of service. (§ 670, subd. (a).) Thus, in a motion under the sixth paragraph of section 473 [“The court…may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order” and now subsection (d)], the moving defendant need make no evidentiary showing whatsoever, so long as the jurisdictional defect is shown by the proof of service.” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1441.)

Here, the proof of service appears proper on its face, as it was completed by a third party under Code of Civil Procedure section 414.10. The Court finds the service, and therefore, the granting of the petition facially valid.

Defendant seeks to have the judgment declared void based on extrinsic evidence.

California is a jurisdiction where the original service of process, which confers personal jurisdiction, must conform to statutory requirements or all that follows is void.  (Honda Motor Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1043, 1048.)  

Accordingly, the Court may set aside judgment when there is improper service. (Brown v. Williams (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 182, 186 n4.) “A judgment may be void due to improper service of summons . . .” (Sakaguchi v. Sakaguchi (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 852, 857–858; Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 544 (“a default judgment entered against a defendant who was not served with a summons in the manner prescribed by statute is void.”).) The Court notes that "notice does not substitute for proper service. Until statutory requirements are satisfied, the court lacks jurisdiction over a defendant." (Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808.) Kappel v. Bartlett (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1457, 1466-1467 further states: “Appellant was under no duty to act upon a defectively served summons. The requirement of notice 'is not satisfied by actual knowledge without notification conforming to the statutory requirements' [citation]; it is long-settled that methods of service are to be strictly construed and that a court does not acquire jurisdiction where personal service is relied upon but has not in fact taken place.”

Under 414.10, a summons may be served by any person who is at least 18 years old and who is not a party to the action.

Here, the Court has, on the one hand, a proof of personal service by a third party and a declaration in support of such service, and on the other, a declaration from Gomar which states Chaidez “personally handed me the papers relating to a petition…” and that “Two individuals witnessed Petitioner personally deliver the papers to me at her residence.”

The Court notes here that no declaration from those two individuals mentioned is presented to the Court. Gomar does not name the “two individuals” he references in his declaration. The Court does not find Gomar’s declaration sufficient to void the granting of the petition in light of the lack of specificity, the lack of additional declarations, the filed proof of service and declarations of Chaidez and Parihar in opposition to the motion.

Further, the minor at issue in this matter has been living with the name change for the past three years and Gomar now moves to void the granting of the petition. Although the motion is timely under the Code of Civil Procedure and caselaw, Gomar does not explain the delay in seeking to undo the name change petition.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Angiola Water District vs. Tri-County Water Authority

Case No.:   VCU316296

Date:           January 8, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Motion for Change of Venue

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and order venue changed to either Fresno County or Kings County. CMC is continued to March 18, 2026; 8:30 am; D1 to verify transfer has been initiated.

Facts

In this petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, Angiola Water District, a California Water District, sues Tri-County Water Authority, a joint powers authority and names Vanderham West Dairy, Three Rivers Sequoia Ranch LLC TRSR and Jay Tevelde as Real Parties in Interest.

Petitioner is a California Water District duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of California and its principal offices and operations are situated in Tulare County and Kings County, California (Stroud Decl., ¶ 2).

Respondent Tri-County Water Authority (“Respondent”) is a joint powers authority organized under the laws of the State of California and its principal offices and operations are likewise situated in Tulare County and Kings County, California. (Stroud Decl. ¶ 3.)

On November 13, 2025, Petitioner filed this motion to transfer venue to Ventura County pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 394, as both Petitioner and Respondent are local agencies within Tulare and Kings Counties.

Defendant/Respondent Tri-County does not oppose the motion, but requests transfer to (1) Ventura; (2) San Luis Obispo; or (3) Fresno

Real Party in Interest Vanderham opposes the motion and seeks to keep the matter within Tulare County by invoking the disinterested judge proviso of section 394(a).

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 394 states:

(a) An action or proceeding against a county, or city and county, a city, or local agency, may be tried in the county, or city and county, or the county in which the city or local agency is situated, unless the action or proceeding is brought by a county, or city and county, a city, or local agency, in which case it may be tried in any county, or city and county, not a party thereto and in which the city or local agency is not situated. Except for actions initiated by the local child support agency pursuant to Section 17400, 17402, 17404, or 17416 of the Family Code, any action or proceeding brought by a county, city and county, city, or local agency within a certain county, or city and county, against a resident of another county, city and county, or city, or a corporation doing business in the latter, shall be, on motion of either party, transferred for trial to a county, or city and county, other than the plaintiff, if the plaintiff is a county, or city and county, and other than that in which the plaintiff is situated, if the plaintiff is a city, or a local agency, and other than that in which the defendant resides, or is doing business, or is situated. …When the action or proceeding is one in which a jury is not of right, or in case a jury is waived, then in lieu of transferring the cause, the court in the original county may request the chairperson of the Judicial Council to assign a disinterested judge from a neutral county to hear that cause and all proceedings in connection therewith.

(b) For the purposes of this section, “local agency” shall mean any governmental district, board, or agency, or any other local governmental body or corporation, but shall not include the State of California or any of its agencies, departments, commissions, or boards.” (emphasis added.)

“Section 394 has been described as an exception to the general venue rules of section 395.” (Arntz Builders v. Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1203) “Section 394 also has been characterized as a ‘removal statute’ rather than a ‘venue statute’ because it does not control original venue.” (Id.)

Here, Petitioner is a local agency within Tulare and Kings Counties, brings this matter against a local agency within Tulare and Kings Counties and therefore transfer appears mandatory under the above.

As to the requested transfer to Ventura County, Petitioner states:

“Ventura County presents a fair and appropriate venue for the resolution of this matter. One advantage of Ventura County has to do with the nature of this case, which seeks to invalidate a groundwater credit transfer within the Tule Subbasin, which is part of the broader San Joaquin Valley Groundwater Basin. (Stroud Decl., ¶ 4.) Ventura County is hydrologically separated from that basin by the Western Transverse Mountain Ranges and lies completely outside the Tulare Lake Hydrological Region. (Id., ¶ 5.) This geological separation indicates that Ventura County would be a truly neutral venue, and the purpose of the venue statute would be best served by transferring the case there.”

However, counsel for Petitioner provides no foundation for this evidence and the Court does not read the neutrality concerns in section 394 as relating to the underlying nature of the matter, but rather as to the location of the parties.

As such, under section 394, Fresno and Kern Counties are just as neutral as Ventura, as both Petitioner and Respondent operate outside of those counties. Further, both are within this Court’s appellate district.

As such, the Court is inclined to grant the motion, but to order transfer to Fresno or Kern County.

The Court will not invoke the provision of section 394(a) as to bringing in a disinterested judge to Tulare County.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Graham, Michael vs. CA Farms, LLC

Case No.:   VCU324716 

Date:            January 8, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens

Tentative Ruling:  CA Farms’s motion to expunge lis pendens and for attorney fees is denied. 

In this action Michael and Cynthia Graham seek a declaratory judgment determining that any encumbrance, without their consent, on real property owned by a company in which they hold an ownership interest, is invalid. 

The pertinent company here is Prosperity Farms Ranch 20, LLC (Prosperity Farms R20), a limited liability company that the Grahams allege is owned 50% by them and 50% by CA Farms, LLC (CA Farms), which, in turn, owns certain real property. 

The operative allegations supporting the Grahams declaratory relief claim are that the Grahams, together with CA Farms, as members of Prosperity Farms R20, entered into an operating agreement in which they agreed that “major decisions affecting the company, including encumbering the Property with loans or other liens, require the consent of all members or a majority of membership interests”; that “[a]s 50% members, [the Grahams’] consent is required for any such encumbrance [upon the subject real property]”; and that (on information and belief) CA Farms and Cook “are attempting to secure a loan or other financing against the Property without [the Grahams’] knowledge or consent,” and “[s]uch actions, if completed, would create an unauthorized encumbrance on the Property [i.e., in violation of the operating agreement between the members], clouding title and impairing [the Grahams’] rights and interests therein.” 

CA Farms here moves to expunge a lis pendens that the Grahams caused to be recorded on August 19, 2025, in connection with this action.  CA Farms additionally seeks its attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 405.38.

CA Farms argues the Grahams “have no real property claim” as to the subject real property because that property is owned, not by the Grahams directly, but by Prosperity Farms R20.

Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 405.30 provides that, “[a]t any time after notice of pendency of action has been recorded, any party, or any nonparty with an interest in the real property affected thereby, may apply to the court in which the action is pending to expunge the notice.”

Pursuant to section 405.31, “the court shall order the notice expunged if the court finds that the pleading on which the notice is based does not contain a real property claim.” A “real property claim” means a “cause or causes of action in a pleading which would, if meritorious, affect (a) title to, or the right to possession of, specific real property or (b) the use of an easement identified in the pleading, other than an easement obtained pursuant to statute by any regulated public utility.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.4.)

In determining whether a pleading contains a real property claim, the court engages in “a demurrer-like analysis.” (Kirkeby v. Superior Court (2004) 33 Cal.4th 642, 647–648 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 805, 93 P.3d 395] (Kirkeby).) “ ‘Rather than analyzing whether the pleading states any claim at all, as on a general demurrer, the court must undertake the more limited analysis of whether the pleading states a real property claim.’ [Citation.] Review ‘involves only a review of the adequacy of the pleading and normally should not involve evidence from either side, other than possibly that which may be judicially noticed as on a demurrer.’ [Citation.] Therefore, review of an expungement order under section 405.31 is limited to whether a real property claim has been properly pled by the claimant.” (Id. at p. 648.) The party opposing a motion to expunge has the burden of showing the existence of a real property claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.30.)

In support of its argument that the Grahams complaint cannot support the filing of a lis pendens because it is brought in their individual capacity, CA Farms’s motion relies on N. Coast Business Park v. Superior Court (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 858 [205 Cal.Rptr. 81] (N. Coast).

In N. Coast, three limited partners in a limited partnership sued the partnership’s general partners alleging that the general partners had transferred partnership real property for less than fair market value.  (Id., at pp. 859-860.)  The limited partner plaintiffs asserted, inter alia, a cause of action alleging “fraud warranting imposition of a constructive trust,” and, as part of that cause of action, filed a lis pendens on the subject property.  (Id., at p. 860.)

In a short three-page opinion, the Fourth District held a motion to expunge the lis pendens was properly granted by the trial court because the suit was “not brought by the partnership entity,” but by “three individual members of the partnership” whose interest in the partnership was merely an interest in personal property (citing former Corp. Code, § 15518, repealed eff. 2010).  (Ibid.) “Just as partnership property is not available to satisfy a judgment against a limited partner in his individual capacity [citation],” the court reasoned, “so individual limited partners do not have an interest in the partnership's real property, neither title to the property nor a right of possession, that can support the filing of a lis pendens.”  (Ibid.)

The court does not find N. Coast persuasive in the context of the instant case.

N. Coast essentially reasoned that the limited partners in the case before it had asserted a claim that ultimately belonged to the partnership, as the “rightful owner” of the transferred interest in partnership real property.  (Shoker v. Superior Court (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 271, 278 [296 Cal.Rptr.3d 743] [“A constructive trust is an equitable remedy that compels a wrongdoer—one who has property or proceeds to which he is not justly entitled—to transfer same to its rightful owner.”].)  In the instant case, however, the Grahams seek a declaration of their rights, as members, pursuant to the terms of Prosperity Farms R20’s operating agreement, to participate in any decision to encumber the company’s real property.  Such claim does not belong, in any sense, to Prosperity Farms R20, but, rather, to the members of the company themselves. 

Beyond this, it cannot reasonably be disputed that if the Grahams are successful in securing the specific judicial declaration they seek, that such declaration “would … affect … title to, or the right to possession of, specific real property” and, accordingly, that the Grahams assert a “real property claim” as necessary to support the filing of a lis pendens.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.4)

Accordingly, the court finds CA Farms motion must be denied.

The court does note, though the point merits little discussion, that CA Farms argues that the Grahams seek, in addition to their declaratory relief claim, to enjoin encumbrance of the subject real property without their consent, and that, for reasons that are not clear from their briefing, that such “injunction would not affect either title or possession to the Property.”  CA Farms correctly notes that the Grahams include a prayer in their complaint “[f]or a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from encumbering the Property without Plaintiffs' consent.”

Perplexingly here, CA Farms cites Urez Corp. v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1141 [235 Cal.Rptr. 837] and Campbell v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 904, 918 [34 Cal.Rptr.3d 68] for points having to do with equitable claims on real property asserted as a collateral means to collect money damages, despite that those points do not address any issue presented here. 

It is not clear that there is any argument to respond to by CA Farms at all.  The court only notes, to the extent it is apparently not obvious, that claims for injunctive relief can and often do affect title or possession to real property. 

Based on the foregoing, CA Farms motion is denied in its entirety. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Square 1 Development, LLC vs. Kinwork, LLC a California Limited Liability Company

Case No.:   VCU317240

Date:            January 8, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Demurrer to Cross-Complaint

Tentative Ruling: To sustain the demurrer with leave to amend; Cross-Complainant shall have ten (10) days from the date of this hearing to file an amended cross-complaint.

Facts

In the amended complaint, Plaintiff Square 1 Development, sues Defendants Kinwork, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; Kinwork Collective; Saegan Brien, individually; Gurdeep Singh, individually, for breach of contract, common counts, fraud, and enforcement of mechanics lien arising out of an alleged failure to pay for a work of improvement to real property.

On May 2, 2025, Singh answered the amended complaint and filed a cross-complaint against Kinwork LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; Kinwork Collective; Saegan Brien, individually; Jalisca Thomason, individually, and Megan Bravinder, individually for breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation and concealment.

On December 4, 2025, Cross-Defendants Megan Bravinder, Jalisca Thomason, and Saegan Brien filed this demurrer to the cross-complaint as to intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation and concealment for uncertainty, ambiguity, and for failure to allege facts to support the claim.

Cross-Complainant alleges purchase of property at 2301 Augusta St. Visalia, CA 93277 ("Property") on December 12, 2022. (Cross-Complaint ¶10.) Further, that on June 5, 2023, Singh and Kinwork, LLC, by and through the representation of the Megan Bravinder, Jalisca Thomason, and Saegan Brien (“Individual Defendants”) entered into a Standard Multi-Tenant Office Lease-Net ("Lease") commencing July 2, 2025 and ending June 30, 2029. (Cross-Complaint ¶¶11, 12.) Further, that the Individual Defendants are the managing members of Kinwork, LLC. (Cross-Complaint ¶25.)

Additionally, that Kinwork, LLC took early possession on July 1, 2024, was to pay Singh $7,030.00 ("Lease Amount") a month beginning July 1, 2024 with a security deposit of $7,485.13, making the total due, upon execution of the Lease, $14,488.13. (Cross-Complaint ¶¶14, 15.)

On May 20, 2024, Kinwork LLC entered into The Building Construction Contract Agreement ("Agreement") with Square 1 Development, LLC ("Square 1"), with Brien signing the Agreement as the CEO of Kinwork LLC. (Cross-Complaint ¶18, 19.)

On April 15, 2024 Singh provided Kinwork LLC with $100,500.00 for tenant improvements at the Property, which were to be paid to Square 1 Development through the Individual Defendants. (Cross-Complaint ¶20.) Kinwork, LLC, through the Individual Defendants “relayed to Gurdeep Singh the $100,500 provided for tenant improvements would only be used for tenant improvements and paid to Square 1 Development.” (Cross-Complaint ¶21.)

The cross-complaint further alleges that Kinwork, LLC did not use the $100,500 for tenant improvements, left and vacated the Property without notice. (Cross-Complaint ¶¶23, 24)

As to intentional misrepresentation, Singh alleges “Cross-Defendants made the following representations to Singh to induce him to enter into the Lease: (1) the $100,500 was paid by Singh would be used only for tenant improvements; (2) the remaining balance for tenant improvement after the $100,500 would be paid by the Cross-Defendants; (3) Cross-Defendants would be renting the Property for 5 years, (4) Property would be insured by Cross-Defendants for 5 years ("Representations"); and that they had the financial means to pay their obligations under the Lease and for the tenant improvements.” (Cross-Complaint ¶35.)

As to negligent misrepresentation, Singh alleges “Cross-Defendants requested Singh to pay $100,500 for improvements and promised to use that amount for improvements, pay the remaining amount to Square 1, and would rent the Property for 5 years and pay all obligations under the Lease.” (Cross-Complaint ¶44.)

As to concealment, Singh pleads:

“Cross-Defendants, and each of them, concealed a material fact from Cross-Complainant when they requested $100,500 for tenant improvements from Cross-Complainant and promised to use that towards tenant improvements, and other Lease obligations, pay the remaining cost for tenant improvements and rent the Property for 5 years — i.e., that the CrossDefendants, and each of them, did not have the ability to pay for the improvements, the intent to use the amount paid by Cross-Complainant towards improvements or rent the Property for 5 years and pay the Lease obligation or, in the alternative Cross-Defendants, and each of them, concealed their desire and lack of intent to pay for the improvements or use the amount paid by Cross-Complainant towards improvements or rent the Property for 5 years and pay the Lease obligations.” (Cross-Complaint ¶52.)

As noted above, the Individual Defendants demurrer to each of these causes of action for failure to meet the specificity requirements as to fraud and negligent misrepresentation causes of action.

In opposition, Singh argues that sufficient specificity as to each cause of action is pled.

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

Specificity of Pleading Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation

“‘The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or “scienter”); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.’” (Tenet Healthsystem Desert, Inc. v. Blue Cross of California (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 821, 837.)

“ ‘[T]he elements of an action for fraud and deceit based on concealment are: (1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage [citations omitted]’ Thus, the elements of fraud and deceit based on concealment are the same as for intentional fraud, with the additional requirement that the plaintiff allege that the defendant concealed or suppressed a material fact in a situation in which the defendant was under a duty to disclose that material fact.” (Id. at 844.)

“The tort of negligent misrepresentation is similar to fraud, except that it does not require scienter or an intent to defraud.” (Id. at 845.)

Further, “In California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice. [Citations.] ‘Thus “‘the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings … will not ordinarily be invoked to sustain a pleading defective in any material respect.’” [Citation.] [¶] This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which “show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.”’” [citation omitted] In addition, a plaintiff is held to a higher standard in asserting a fraud claim against a corporate defendant. “In such a case, the plaintiff must ‘allege the names of the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written.’” [citation omitted]” (Id. at 837-838.)

“The specificity requirement serves two purposes. The first is notice to the defendant, to ‘furnish the defendant with certain definite charges which can be intelligently met.’ [Citations.] The pleading of fraud, however, is also the last remaining habitat of the common law notion that a complaint should be sufficiently specific that the court can weed out nonmeritorious actions on the basis of the pleadings. Thus the pleading should be sufficient ‘“to enable the court to determine whether, on the facts pleaded, there is any foundation, prima facie at least, for the charge of fraud.”’” [citation omitted]” (Id. at 838.)

Here, the Cross-Complaint lacks the requisite specificity as to which of the Individual Defendants made the alleged Representations, how each Representation was communicated, what exactly was said, and to whom it was said to. The Court applies the corporate standard noted above to the Cross-Defendant LLC. The general pleading style of “Cross-Defendants made the following representations” is insufficient. (Cross-Complaint ¶35; see also ¶44, 45, 51, 52.)

Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer as to each cause of action.

 A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Therefore, the Court will sustain the demurrer with leave to amend and order an amended cross-complaint filed no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 Conterra Agricultural Capital, LLC vs. Prosperity Farms, LLC et al

Case No.:   PCU325122 

Date:           January 8, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Corporate America Lending, Inc.’s Motion for Leave to Intervene

Tentative Ruling:  The motion is denied. 

In this action plaintiff Conterra Agricultural Capital, LLC (Conterra) seeks appointment of a receiver, judicial foreclosure, and a deficiency judgment.

Conterra’s requests for relief relate to a loan made to defendant Prosperity Farms, LLC (at the time, its name was York Pistachio Ranch, LLC, and it is herein referred to as Prosperity Farms), and defendants Michael and Cynthia Graham, which loan was secured by, inter alia, a deed of trust against real property of Prosperity Farms. 

Corporate America Lending, Inc. (CAL) moves to intervene.  CAL is an entity owned and controlled by Ron Cook.  Cook, also, substantially owns and controls CA Farms, LLC (CA Farms), which, in turn, owns 50% of Prosperity Farms. 

CAL’s motion is opposed by defendants Compeer Financial, ACA; Compeer Financial, PCA; and Compeer Financial, FLCA (collectively, Compeer).  Conterra joins in Compeer’s opposition.

CAL contends this action, and another action, PCU323957, “threaten to impede CAL’s compliance” with “a Judgment of the United States District Court, District of Minnesota … that ordered it to transfer real property … of Defendant, PROSPERITY FARMS, LLC … , to Compeer by way of the Grant Deed.”  CAL contends it “has an interest in protecting compliance with the Judgment in the Minnesota Federal Court” and that this “means protecting the transfer of the Property to Compeer and preventing foreclosure.”

It appears CAL’s position is in express contradiction to previous rulings issued in the federal litigation it references in its motion.  

Background

In the Minnesota federal litigation, Compeer alleged, regarding a transaction completely unrelated to this case, that CAL sold two loans to Compeer that CAL had made to two borrower entities, and, later, after the borrowers closed on a transaction to refinance the loans with another lender and CAL received funds for payoff of the loans, totaling over $58 million, that CAL kept, and did not pay over to Compeer, the payoff proceeds, despite Compeer’s entitlement to the funds as the owner of a 100% economic interest in the refinanced loans. 

The court takes judicial notice of Compeer’s submissions regarding the Minnesota federal litigation, which involved federal court and arbitration proceedings.  Generally, Compeer alleged in that litigation that CAL sold them two loans by two borrower entities. When the borrower entities refinanced the loans with another lender, CAL received the payoff funds totaling over $58 million. As alleged, CAL kept the payoff proceeds, despite Compeer’s entitlement to the funds as the owner of a 100% economic interest in the refinanced loans.

On May 29, 2024, the US District Court, District of Minnesota (District Court) ordered CAL to preserve the $58 million in disputed funds and to refrain from disposing of the funds pending further court order.  On June 3, 2024, an emergency arbitrator again ordered CAL to preserve the disputed funds and refrain from disposition of them and, further, ordered CAL to put the funds in a segregated account within two days. 

CAL did not perform as ordered.  CAL’s refusal/failure to comply with the order to turnover the disputed funds was a continuing subject in the federal litigation and resulted in repeated orders to comply and repeated sanctions. 

Later, on October 17, 2024, CAL transferred $23,000,000 of the disputed funds to the trust account of its counsel, Russell Georgeson.  Also on October 17, 2024, Ron Cook, acting on behalf of CA Farms, and Michael Graham, together purporting to act on behalf of Prosperity Farms, executed a grant deed to Compeer for the real property at issue in this case and delivered the deed to Georgeson to hold in trust pending further order or award by the arbitration panel. 

CAL did not execute the deed—and, even if it had, it would be of no consequence, since it had, and has, no interest in the real property purportedly transferred. 

On October 28, 2024, a merits panel of arbitrators issued an interim award.  That order contained orders adopting the emergency arbitrator’s order to preserve the disputed funds in a separate account without modification.  The panel specifically determined that “CAL’s late attempt to show compliance with the awards and order, by depositing a portion of the funds into Counsel’s Trust Account and offering a Grant Deed to secure the payment of any ultimate award on the merits, failed to adequately preserve the Payoff Proceeds and did not materially comply with the prior Awards and/or Order.”  Regarding “[t]he offer of the grant deed,” specifically, the panel stated that it “raises more issues than it solves … .”

On February 4, 2025, the arbitration panel issued a “partial final award of merits panel on Phase I.”  The panel ordered CAL, inter alia, to (a) “[i]mmediately and without delay … transfer to [Compeer] … the $23 million and any and all additional funds, including without limitation any and all accrued interest thereon, held in the account … identified as ‘C. Russell Georgeson, as Trustee for Corporate America Lending, Inc.,’ ” and (b) “[p]ending further instructions from this Panel, continue to hold in trust, and take no action which would or may in any way release, transfer, dissipate, damage or impair the Grant Deed … submitted in this arbitration.”

In the final paragraph of the partial final award, the panel stated:  “Finally, Respondent deposited $23 million of the Payoff Proceeds into its Counsel's trust account, and also transferred a Grant Deed for Counsel to hold in trust, to await the direction of this Panel. Based on the award to Claimant of compensatory damages, prejudgment interest, attorneys' fees and costs, and administrative and arbitrator fees, the Panel directs Respondent to forthwith transfer those assets to Claimant in order to partially satisfy this Award.”

On March 28, 2025, the District Court issued a judgment confirming, inter alia, the arbitration panel’s October 24, 2024 and February 4, 2025 awards as well as a November 26, 2024 sanctions order against CAL. 

On April 15, 2025, CAL, for some reason, in derogation of the panel’s directive to “continue to hold in trust, and take no action which would or may in any way release, transfer, dissipate, damage or impair the Grant Deed,” recorded the grant deed.  Georgeson then sent Compeer’s counsel an email stating:  “Pursuant to the Partial Final Award of Merits Panel on Phase 1, last paragraph, and the District Court’s Judgement entered March 28, 2025, Exhibit 1, the Grant Deed dated October 17, 2024 transferring the real property to Compeer Financial, ACA/FLCA/PCA has been accomplished.”

Compeer advised that it rejected the purported transfer of the real property, which, as Compeer correctly highlights, CAL did not own.  Compeer thereafter sought assistance from the arbitration panel. 

On April 23, 2025, the panel issued an “order on grant deed,” specifically stating that its prior partial final award “did not contemplate the unilateral recording of the Grant Deed by CAL,” and directing “CAL and its Counsel … to cooperate with Claimant and Counsel for Mr. Graham to reverse or otherwise rectify the premature recordation of the Grant Deed and to restore it to Mr. Georgeson, to be held by him in Trust as required by … the Partial Final Award, or, at Claimant’s option, to be delivered to Claimant to be held as security for payment of the Judgment.”

On December 12, 2025, the District Court issued an “order on motion to confirm arbitration awards” in which it, inter alia, confirmed the arbitration panel’s grant deed order, specifically observing that the arbitration panel’s directive regarding the grant deed was “to take no action affecting the Grant Deed absent further instruction.”

In another action, PCU323957—the action described by CAL in its motion as “threaten[ing] to impede CAL’s compliance” with “a Judgment of the United States District Court, District of Minnesota … that ordered it to transfer real property … of Defendant, PROSPERITY FARMS, LLC … , to Compeer by way of the Grant Deed”—Compeer currently seeks cancellation of the recorded grant deed.

Analysis

With this background in place, it is clear that CAL’s motion is without merit. 

CAL was not ordered by the Minnesota court to transfer the real property at issue in this case “to Compeer by way of the Grant Deed.”  Any such order would have been nonsensical since CAL had no legal authority to transfer Prosperity Farms’s real property.  Both the federal arbitration panel and District Court determined against CAL on precisely the question of whether CAL was directed, by the panel’s order, to record the grant deed. 

That CAL merely procured, somehow, and later recorded, in derogation of an express arbitration panel order, the grant deed, purportedly executed by two of three managers of Prosperity Farms, LLC, does not supply any basis for intervention in this case by CAL. 

The court additionally notes CAL’s arguments that it “has an interest in obtaining credit toward the damages awarded against it in the Judgement for the Property as of April 2025 when the Property was transferred,” and that “if this action is allowed to proceed and Conterra prevails, CAL has an interest in ensuring that the Property is sold at the maximum value that the market can bear, since the Property is intended as security for a) the loan to Prosperity Farms and the Grahams secured by the Property and b) partial satisfaction of the Judgment.

These arguments are also without merit. 

CAL may have an interest, in the Minnesota litigation, in the validity of a purported transfer by Prosperity Farm’s of its real property to Compeer, insofar as that transfer could potentially effectuate a measure of satisfaction of its judgment debt in the Minnesota litigation, but that interest is not in the real property itself, but merely that of one desirous of relief from the financial consequences of judgment debt, whatever the source of relief may be.  CAL’s interests in judgment relief in the Minnesota litigation has no connection with this case. 

As CAL has no interest in the real property, or the loan that property secures, CAL’s motion is denied.

 If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 In the Matter of J.G. Wentworth Originations, LLC

Case No.:   VCU326682

Date:           January 8, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Petition for Approval of Structured Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To deny the petition.

Facts

Payee is 20 years old, single with no minor children. Payee is employed and declares income of $2,166.66-$3,250 per month. No information as to Payee’s expenses are provided.

In or about 2012, Payee became entitled to certain structured settlement payments resulting from a claim for damages arising in connection with a personal injury claim.

Payee’s annuity contract from Berkshire Hathaway Life Insurance Company of Nebraska provides for the following payments:

• Commencing July 9, 2027, the sum of Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars and Zero Cents ($750.00) per month, increasing by 2.00% on July 9, 2028 and each July 9th thereafter, payable on the 9th day of each month, until June 9, 2035 (96 Certain Monthly Payments)

Additionally, certain deferred lump sums payable on the following basis:

• July 9, 2024 -  $8,000.00
• July 9, 2025 - $8,500.00
• July 9, 2026 - $9,000.00
• July 9, 2027 - $9,000.00
• July 9, 2030 - $25,000.00
• July 9, 2035 - $50,000.00
• July 9, 2040 - $198,000.00

Payee does not have any court ordered support payments. Payee indicates Payee is not likely to require future medical care and treatment for injuries sustained in connection with the settlement and that the settlement was not intended for such purposes, nor was intended to provide for necessary living expenses.

Via this petition, Payee seeks to transfer a total of $54,048.48 consisting of the following:

A) 1 payment of $9,000.00 on July 9, 2026

B) 1 payment of $9,000.00 on July 9, 2027

C) 96 monthly payments of $350.00 each, increasing at 2% annually, beginning on July 9, 2027 and ending on June 9, 2035.

In exchange, the petition provides a payment of $24,844.07, creating a discount rate of 24.99%.

The petition further states: “Payee is facing a hardship situation. Payee would like to enter into this transaction with the Petitioner and sell a portion of their underlying annuity payments so that they can have the financial means to pay off outstanding debts and pay day to day living expenses.” Payee’s declaration states “I will use the money received from the proposed settlement to payoff my car loan as well as get my own place of residence.” Petitioner filed additional documents indicating debt in the amount of $8,731 and an estimate of $1,500 per month in housing expenses.

Petitioner filed supplemental documents which provided the purchase contract for a portion of the annuity, the annuity contract and the general settlement agreement underlying the annuity.

Payee has been advised in writing to seek independent professional advice regarding the transfer and has either received that advice or knowingly waived that advice in writing.

BHLN’s Response and Alternative Offer

On November 20, 2025, Berkshire Hathaway Life Insurance Company of Nebraska (“BHLN”) filed a response to the amended petition, noting that, at that time, it failed to include the underlying settlement agreement and annuity contract. The Court notes that subsequent filings appear to have cured this issue.

Additionally, that the Petition fails to include Payee’s address under Insurance Code § 10139.5(c)(1).

Further, that Payee has waived the right to receive independent professional advice.

Finally, BHLN notes an alternative to the transfer petition via the BIFCO Hardship Exchange Program.

BIFCO will contract to purchase future payments at an annual discount rate of 6.5% plus a $1,000.00 administrative charge.

Applied here, if BIFCO were to contract to purchase from Payee for the same $54,048.48 in future payments, it would pay him approximately $41,300.00, using an effective rate of approximately 7.67%, resulting in Payee’s receipt of $16,500.00 more.

Alternatively, BIFCO could pay Payee the same $24,800.00 by purchasing a prorated share of the same payments, totaling approximately $33,000.00 (allowing him to retain more than $8,200.00 of the future payments to be paid when they come due.

BIFCO notes other options available as well.

Authority and Analysis

A transfer of structured settlement payment rights is not effective unless the transfer has been approved in advance in a final court order based on the following express findings by the Court.

Under Ins. Code § 10139.5(a)(1), the Court must determine whether the “transfer is in the best interest of the payee, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee’s dependents.” The Court considers the following non-exclusive factors under Ins. Code § 10139.5(b):

(1) The reasonable preference and desire of the payee to complete the proposed transaction, taking into account the payee’s age, mental capacity, legal knowledge, and apparent maturity level.

(2) The stated purpose of the transfer.

(3) The payee’s financial and economic situation.

(4) The terms of the transaction, including whether the payee is transferring monthly or lump sum payments or all or a portion of his or her future payments.

(5) Whether, when the settlement was completed, the future periodic payments that are the subject of the proposed transfer were intended to pay for the future medical care and treatment of the payee relating to injuries sustained by the payee in the incident that was the subject of the settlement and whether the payee still needs those future payments to pay for that future care and treatment.

(6) Whether, when the settlement was completed, the future periodic payments that are the subject of the proposed transfer were intended to provide for the necessary living expenses of the payee and whether the payee still needs the future structured settlement payments to pay for future necessary living expenses.

(7) Whether the payee is, at the time of the proposed transfer, likely to require future medical care and treatment for the injuries that the payee sustained in connection with the incident that was the subject of the settlement and whether the payee lacks other resources, including insurance, sufficient to cover those future medical expenses.

(8) Whether the payee has other means of income or support, aside from the structured settlement payments that are the subject of the proposed transfer, sufficient to meet the payee’s future financial obligations for maintenance and support of the payee’s dependents, specifically including, but not limited to, the payee’s child support obligations, if any. The payee shall disclose to the transferee and the court his or her court-ordered child support or maintenance obligations for the court’s consideration.

(9) Whether the financial terms of the transaction, including the discount rate applied to determine the amount to be paid to the payee, the expenses and costs of the transaction for both the payee and the transferee, the size of the transaction, the available financial alternatives to the payee to achieve the payee’s stated objectives, are fair and reasonable.

(10) Whether the payee completed previous transactions involving the payee’s structured settlement payments and the timing and size of the previous transactions and whether the payee was satisfied with any previous transaction.

(11) Whether the transferee attempted previous transactions involving the payee’s structured settlement payments that were denied, or that were dismissed or withdrawn prior to a decision on the merits, within the past five years.

(12) Whether, to the best of the transferee’s knowledge after making inquiry with the payee, the payee has attempted structured settlement payment transfer transactions with another person or entity, other than the transferee, that were denied, or which were dismissed or withdrawn prior to a decision on the merits, within the past five years.

(13) Whether the payee, or his or her family or dependents, are in or are facing a hardship situation.

(14) Whether the payee received independent legal or financial advice regarding the transaction. The court may deny or defer ruling on the petition for approval of a transfer of structured settlement payment rights if the court believes that the payee does not fully understand the proposed transaction and that independent legal or financial advice regarding the transaction should be obtained by the payee.

(15) Any other factors or facts that the payee, the transferee, or any other interested party calls to the attention of the reviewing court or that the court determines should be considered in reviewing the transfer.”

The Court seeks additional information regarding Payee’s “(3)…financial and economic situation.” Information such as Payee’s monthly expenses would indicate to the Court the effect of the transferring the structured settlement payments at issue. The declaration contains insufficient information for the Court to fully analyze Payee’s economic situation. 

The Court lacks information as to the interest rate on the vehicle and other debt sought to be paid off. The Court does, however, note the proposed use for an apartment at $1,500 per month appears reasonable. 

Additionally, the 24.99% rate is higher than what the Court typically sees on these petitions. In this matter, this is especially true in light of the alternative programs set out via BIFCO through BHLN.

Therefore, the Court denies the petition.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Salado-Gomez, Reyes vs. The Gary and Donna De Graaf Family Trust

Case No.:   VCU297485

Date:           January 8, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Motion for Final Approval

Tentative Ruling:  To grant the motion; to set the hearing as to final distribution for August 27, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

Facts and Analysis

Plaintiff’s motion for final approval of class action and PAGA settlement, attorneys’ fees, costs, enhancement award, LWDA payment and class certification for settlement purposes came on for hearing on January 8, 2026.  The Court finds and rules as follows:

On November 21, 2025 and December 12, 2025, the settlement administrator Simpluris, filed declarations detailing the following events.

On March 31, 2025, the administrator  received a mailing list of 288 potential class members from Defendant’s counsel with names, contact information, social security numbers and relevant employment information. On October 6, 2025, after the administrator processed the names through the National Change of Address Database and updated the list with any updated addresses located, the administrator sent class notice by mail. Forty-one (41) notices were returned and updated addresses for twenty-eight (28) addresses were obtained and notices were mailed. Therefore, thirteen (13) notices have been deemed undeliverable.

Additionally, notice was sent out via text message and by publication.

Class members had sixty (60) days, until December 5, 2025 to submit objections, disputes and/or requests for exclusions. Zero (0) workweek disputes, zero (0) requests for exclusion and zero (0) valid objections have been received from the proposed class members. Therefore, all 288 proposed members or 100% will participate in the settlement.

The Court presumes the settlement is fair and reasonable given (a) that it was reached through arms-length bargaining at mediation, (b) that there was sufficient time for investigation and discovery since commencement of litigation (c) class counsel have particularized experience with the claims at issue in the case, and (d) there appear to be no disputes or objections.  (Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4^th 1794, 1802.) 

A net settlement amount of $77,408.91 is available to pay to the class members in accordance with the terms of settlement. The average estimated class payment is $242.82, the highest estimated payment is $1,468.00 and the lowest estimated payment is $5.36. The Court believes basic information about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise under the circumstances, in accordance with Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4^th 116, 133.  This case involved extensive informal discovery and investigation of disputed claims, including review and analysis by Plaintiff’s expert.  The settlement avoids significant risks and delay that would result from further litigation of the case, which would include, amongst other matters, certification proceedings, trial, and the possibility of further delay and cost resulting from appeals.

Class counsel has provided updated declarations in support of the requests for attorney fees representing 33 1/3% of the gross settlement fund of $200,000 or $66,666.66. At preliminary approval, Counsel indicated $49,078.00 consisting of 72.2 hours at rates ranging from $1,141 to $100, resulting in the use of a 1.35 multiplier to award the fees requested.

The motion for final approval indicates 98.7 hours at rates ranging from $1,141 to $100, resulting in a base lodestar of $62,390.10. Therefore, the Court approves the requested fees with essentially no multiplier.

Further, counsel indicates $15,145.36 in costs.

The Court believes the requested attorney fees and costs appear reasonable under the circumstances. Additionally, counsel has provided a sufficient declaration to demonstrate adequate previous experience with class actions to further support the reasonableness of the award.

The settlement administrator has provided, in the declaration describing the work it has performed on the case a value of services totaling $9,050, slightly higher than the amount approved at preliminary hearing. Despite this, the Court believes the amount requested as compensation for the administrator appears reasonable. 

The settlement agreement designates the distribution of unclaimed settlement proceeds to Valley Children’s Hospital, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

The Court previously approved a representative payment of $5,000.

Finally, the Court confirms its conditional certification of the settlement class. The Court finds no significant events have occurred that would cause it to change its prior determination that the settlement class met all requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 382 for certification for settlement purposes at the time it granted Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval.

On review of the declarations and pleadings submitted, the Court finds, given the established presumption that the settlement is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of this case, and, particularly, given the absence of any objection or opposition following the class notice, that the settlement is fair and reasonable and that the motion for final approval should be, and is hereby, granted.

Therefore, the following deductions from the gross settlement of $200,000 are therefore preliminarily approved as follows:

Approved Attorney Fees (33.3%):	$66,666.67
Approved Attorney Costs (up to):	$15,145.36
Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :	$5,000.00
Approved Settlement Administrator Costs	$9,050.00
Approved PAGA payment to the LWDA	$11,250.00
Approval Payroll Tax Deduction	$15,479.06
Approved Net Settlement Amount	$77,408.91

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and sets the hearing as to final distribution for August 27, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Examiner Notes for Probate Matters Calendared

• Visalia Division 
• South County Justice Center Division