Tentative Rulings
Civil Tentative Rulings and Probate Examiner Recommendations are available below. All attempts possible are made to have the information on these pages updated by 3:00pm the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.
Civil Tentative Rulings: The court does not issue tentative rulings on Writs of Attachment, Writs of Possession, Claims of Exemption, Claims of Right to Possession, Motions to Tax Costs After Trial, Motions for New Trial, or Motions to Continue Trial. Under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308 and Local Rule 701, any party opposed to the tentative ruling must notify the court and other parties by 4:00 p.m. today of their intention to appear for oral argument. The court's notice must be made by facsimile (fax) to 559-733-6774; by email to research_attorney@tulare.courts.ca.gov; or by telephoning (559) 730-5010.
Probate Examiner Recommendations: For further information regarding a Visalia probate matter listed below you may contact the Visalia Probate Document Examiner at 559-730-5000 ext #2342. For further information regarding a SCJC probate matter listed below you may contact the SCJC Probate Document Examiner at 559-730-5000 ext #1430. The Probate Calendar Clerk may be reached at 559-730-5000 Option 4, then Option 6.
Civil Tentative Rulings & Probate Examiner Recommendations
The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, December 30, 2025, are:
Re: Gonzalez, Arnulfo et al vs. ABLP Properties Visalia, LLC et al
Case No.: VCU284145
Date: December 30, 2025
Time: 8:30 A.M.
Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman
Motion: Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen Case/Request for Reconsideration
Tentative Ruling: The motion is denied.
Esperanza Hansen, aka Esperanza Hansen Gonzalez, moves “for an order reopening [this case],” citing, as statutory bases, Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b) and 1008. Hansen additionally references “the Court’s inherent equitable power to reconsider and vacate orders obtained through mistake, inadvertence, fraud, or suppression of material evidence.”
Hansen “seeks to reopen proceedings so that newly discovered and previously withheld evidence including Tulare County District Attorney Report No. 18-01-000757 and related investigatory files can be reviewed and adjudicated on their merits.” Hansen asserts “[i]n 2018, the Tulare County District Attorney’s Office initiated investigation Report No. 18-01-000757, addressing slander of title, financial irregularities, and predatory practices connected to the same property and parties identified in [this case].”
Hansen asserts, unsupported by anything but unsworn argument, that she has “since obtained correspondence and confirmations showing that DA Report 18-01-000757 included witness interviews, banking records, and findings tied to the same receivership and foreclosure acts at issue in the civil case,” and that “[t]hese materials were never produced during discovery, constituting newly discovered evidence under CCP § 1008(a) and grounds for equitable relief.”
Relevant Background
Hansen and other plaintiffs commenced this suit with a complaint filed in September 2020 against various defendants. Plaintiffs asserted various claims, and inter alia, challenged foreclosure of various real property. Certain of those defendants, thereafter, cross-complained, against Hansen.
Later, in April 2021, Hansen filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. The bankruptcy trustee, acting on behalf of Hansen, including in her capacity as president of the Magnolia Group, Inc. and Magnolia Park, LLC (plaintiffs in the complaint; named cross-defendants in the cross-complaint), thereafter entered a settlement with a defendant/cross-complainants ABLP REIT, LLC; ABLP Properties Visalia, LLC, Jerry Sanada and Bruce Sanders. Pursuant to the terms thereof, judgment was entered in favor of ABLP REIT, LLC on the cross-complaint in a stipulated sum, and further reflecting that Hansen, Magnolia Group, Inc., and Magnolia Park, LLC, each had no ownership interest in the real property at issue in this litigation. Based on this settlement, dismissal was entered with prejudice as to each of ABLP REIT, LLC; ABLP Properties Visalia, LLC, Jerry Sanada and Bruce Sanders.
In July and August 2022, Hansen moved for reconsideration, essentially attempting to challenge the settlement made by the bankruptcy trustee with the aforementioned parties. The court denied the motion, noting then that Hansen’s claims that arose prior to the filing of her bankruptcy petition were property of her bankruptcy estate, subject to administration by her bankruptcy trustee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
Hansen’s bankruptcy trustee subsequently entered a stipulated judgment with defendants Ted and Iris Jacobsen in which the trustee agreed judgment may be entered in favor of Ted and Iris Jacobsen. All claims of the plaintiffs against Ted and Iris Jacobsen were subsequently dismissed with prejudice.
Disposition
Hansen’s instant motion for reconsideration is denied for the same reason her prior motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hansen’s claims became property of her bankruptcy estate, subject to administration by her bankruptcy trustee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) and the bankruptcy trustee settled her claims. (See Bostanian v. Liberty Savings Bank (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1083 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 68]; Haley v. Dow Lewis Motors (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 497, 504 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 352]; Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 544].)
What’s more, Hansen provides no evidentiary support for her material factual assertions (see Caldwell v. Methodist Hospital (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1521, 1524 [29 Cal.Rptr.2d 894]), and she does not even address the critical factual matter of when and how she came to discover the information or materials she asserts constitute “newly discovered evidence” warranting “reopening” this case. (See Even Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830, 839-842 [189 Cal.Rptr.3d 824, 352 P.3d 391].) Accordingly, even if Hansen maintained the right to seeking “reopening” of the instant case, she has failed to make any showing supporting the relief she seeks.
If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.
Re: Discover Bank vs. Kuehling, Roland L
Case No.: VCL312324
Date: December 30, 2025
Time: 8:30 A.M.
Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman
Motion: Motion to Enter Judgment Pursuant to Stipulation
Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion
Facts
On August 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant for breach of contract in the amount of $11,341.09
Defendant was served with the summons and complaint, and filed an answer on September 30, 2024.
On December 5, 2024, the parties entered into a stipulation to resolve this matter on the following terms:
Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff a total settlement amount of $9,106.90 by 08/28/2026, with monthly payments of $379.45 paid on or before 09/28/2024, and continuing each month thereafter through 07/28/2026, and a final payment of $379.55 on or before 08/28/2026.
It was further stipulated that if payments were not made pursuant to the schedule set forth above, Defendant would be in default. Additionally, that Defendant agreed Plaintiff would be entitled to judgment in the amount alleged in the complaint in the event of default.
The stipulation indicates that the Court shall retain jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. However, this Court notes this matter has not been dismissed.
Plaintiff indicates Defendant failed to make the July 28, 2025 payment and payments due thereafter, noting the total amount of payments made of $3,794.50.
Authority and Analysis
Section 664.6 (a) states:
“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”
“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1360.)
As indicated above, the Court has not lost jurisdiction over this matter.
Defendant appears to have breached the settlement, based upon the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel and, the Court, having no opposition, grants the motion.
The Court will enter judgment in the amount of $8,076.10, consisting of the principal sum of $11,341.09, plus costs of $529.51, less credits of $3,794.50.
If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.
Re: JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. vs. Vasconcellos, Jennifer
Case No.: VCL318183
Date: December 30, 2025
Time: 8:30 A.M.
Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman
Motion: Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted
Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 8 admitted.
Facts
On or about April 29, 2025, Plaintiff served by mail Requests for Admissions, Set One on Defendant. The discovery was mailed to the address stated on Defendant’s substitution of counsel filing dated April 29, 2025 wherein Defendant is now representing themselves.
As of the date of the filing of this motion, no response has been received by Plaintiff. Plaintiff now seeks to deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 8 admitted.
Authority and Analysis
Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. Here, Defendant has failed to serve a timely response and Plaintiff has moved for an order to deem the admissions admitted.
Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion. The facts and allegations alleged in Requests for Admissions Nos. 1 through 8 of Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Admission shall be deemed admitted.
If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.
Re: First Technology Federal Credit Union vs. Covarrubias, Rigoberto et al
Case No.: VCL320445
Date: December 30, 2025
Time: 8:30 A.M.
Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman
Motion: Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted and Compel Initial Responses to Form Interrogatories
Tentative Ruling: To order Plaintiff to pay the second $60 filing fee; to deem the admissions admitted as to Nos. 1 through 15, and 18 admitted upon payment of the second filing fee; to compel initial responses to form interrogatories no later than thirty (30) days from both the payment of the additional filing fee and service of this ruling on Defendant; to award sanctions in the amount of $175; sanctions are due no later than thirty (30) days from both the payment of the additional filing fee and service of this ruling on Defendant
Facts
On or about August 27, 2025, Plaintiff served by mail Requests for Admissions, Set One and Form Interrogatories on Defendant. The discovery was mailed to the address on Defendant’s answer. As of the date of the filing of this motion, no response has been received by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff now seeks to deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 10 admitted and to compel initial responses to the interrogatories.
Plaintiff has filed a single motion as to deeming admissions admitted and compelling initial responses and seeks sanctions in the amount of $900 based on 2 hours at $450 per hour.
Authority and Analysis
As an initial matter, the Court notes one motion fee has been submitted to this Court, but that two motions are made here. The Court will not issue an order as to each motion until the remaining filing fee of $60 is paid.
Requests for Admissions
Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. Here, Defendant has failed to serve a timely response and Plaintiff has moved for an order to deem the admissions admitted.
The facts and allegations alleged in Requests for Admissions Nos. 1 through 15, and 18 of Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Admission shall be deemed admitted. The Court notes no Request Nos. 16 or 17.
Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion upon the payment of the remaining filing fee and service of this order on Defendant thereafter.
Interrogatories
Based on Defendant’s failure to respond to the first set of Form Interrogatories, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.290(a), that Defendant provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Plaintiff’s first set of Form Interrogatories, no later than thirty (30) days from both the payment of the additional filing fee and service of this ruling on Defendant
Sanctions
Under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2033.280(c) (Admissions) and 2030.290(c) (Interrogatories), the Court imposes sanctions in the amount of $175, consisting of a reasonable, local rate of $350 and one half hour to prepare this motion. The Court notes there is no meet and confer requirement and all that is necessary to obtain the relief requested on this motion to compel initial responses or deem admissions admitted is that the other party failed to respond within the designated time. Sanctions are due no later than thirty (30) days from both the payment of the additional filing fee and service of this ruling on Defendant.
If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.
Re: Jasso, Guy vs. Visalia Unified School District
Case No.: VCU321582
Date: December 30, 2025
Time: 8:30 A.M.
Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman
Motion: Demurrer
Tentative Ruling: To sustain the demurrer with leave to amend; Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.
Facts
In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendant VUSD for a single cause of action for negligence. Plaintiff has alleged compliance with the tort claim presentation requirements and pleads Defendant VUSD is a public entity.
On November 6, 2025, Defendant demurred to the complaint on the grounds that a public entity cannot be sued for general negligence.
The opposition, filed December 22, 2025, argues that the complaint properly pleads Doe Defendants and therefore Plaintiff need not name, expressly, the employees of Defendant allegedly responsible. The opposition does not appear to address the issue as to pleading negligence absent a specific statute.
Authority and Analysis
To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 638.)
It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer. (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)
A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)
Public Entity Liability
The starting point is that, except as otherwise provided by statute, “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” (Gov. Code § 815(a).) “[T]his section ‘abolished all common law or judicially declared forms of liability for public entities, except for such liability as may be required by the federal or state Constitution. Thus, in the absence of some constitutional requirement, public entities may be liable only if a statute declares them to be liable’ [Citation.]” (Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1457.) Government tort claims must be pled with particularity. (Susman v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 809.) They must also be grounded in statute. (Gov. Code § 815; E.L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach (1978) 21 Cal.3d 497, 512, fn. 9.) Therefore, it is recognized that it is impermissible to sue a public entity for common law negligence. (Torres v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 844, 850.)
Here, the complaint cites no statute under which the claim is brought. Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer on this basis.
A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1226.)
The Court will permit amendment of the complaint and orders an amended complaint filed no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.
If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.
Re: Grassel, Jane vs. Grassel, Andrew
Case No.: VCL328542
Date: December 30, 2025
Time: 8:30 A.M.
Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman
Motion: Demurrer
Tentative Ruling: To sustain the demurrer without leave to amend
Facts
In this unlawful detainer matter involving 2234 E. Harvard Court, Visalia (“Subject Property”), the complaint alleges a month-to-month tenancy commencing on June 18, 2025 based on an oral agreement and $0 per month in rent. (Complaint ¶6.)
Plaintiff, on October 5, 2025, served a thirty day notice to quit (“Notice”) which states the “Property or tenancy IS covered by the TPA. See paragraph 2” and further checks a box on the Notice that applies to “properties or tenancies covered by the TPA.” (Notice.) Specifically, the Notice checks 2.B. which states “Your tenancy, if any, in the Premises is terminated 30 days after service of this Notice…”
However, the complaint alleges that the tenancy described in paragraph 6 is not subject to the TPA because “Tenancy less than one year. 1946.2(a).”
On December 12, 2025, Defendant filed this demurrer. Defendant argues that the allegations in the complaint and Notice are inconsistent and therefore the complaint fails to state a cause of action and renders it uncertain.
Authority and Analysis
Civil Code section 1946.2(a) states:
“Notwithstanding any other law, after a tenant has continuously and lawfully occupied a residential real property for 12 months, the owner of the residential real property shall not terminate a tenancy without just cause, which shall be stated in the written notice to terminate tenancy. If any additional adult tenants are added to the lease before an existing tenant has continuously and lawfully occupied the residential real property for 24 months, then this subdivision shall only apply if either of the following are satisfied:
(1) All of the tenants have continuously and lawfully occupied the residential real property for 12 months or more.
(2) One or more tenants have continuously and lawfully occupied the residential real property for 24 months or more.”
As the tenancy appears to be for less than 12 months, it would not appear that the TPA and section 1946.2 applies. However, the Notice states the TPA does apply and is therefore invalid to support this unlawful detainer action. If the TPA applies, no just cause reasons are stated and no default in payment of rent is alleged under section 1946.2.
Proper service on the tenant of a valid notice to quit is a prerequisite to a judgment declaring a landlord’s right to possession and is an essential element of the landlord’s prima facie case of unlawful detainer. (Liebovich v. Shahrokhkhany (1997) 56 Cal App 4th 511, 513.) The landlord must allege and prove proper service of the required notice and a court may not issue a judgment for possession in the landlord’s favor without evidence that the required notice was properly served. (Id.)
Accordingly, the demurrer to the complaint must be sustained without leave to amend. (Del Monte Properties & Investments, Inc. v. Dolan (2018) 26 Cal. App. 5th Supp. 20, 24-25.)
If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.
Re: Sequoia Healthcare Alliance vs. Collins, Monique N.
Case No.: PCU317393
Date: December 30, 2025
Time: 8:30 A.M.
Dept. 19-The Honorable Glade F. Roper
Motions: Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication; Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel Further (continued from 11/4/2025); OSC re: Sanctions
Tentative Ruling: Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied. There is no tentative ruling on plaintiff’s motions to compel or the OSC re: sanctions, and the parties are directed to appear at the hearing regarding these matters.
Summary Judgment
In this action, Sequoia Healthcare Alliance sues Monique Collins to recover a $90,000 “retention bonus” paid according to the terms of an “Employee Retention Bonus Agreement” (RBA).
Sequoia filed its complaint on January 27, 2025, asserting a single cause of action alleging Collins breached the RBA by not repaying the bonus after she terminated her employment with Sequoia.
The RBA, “entered into as of January 01, 2023,” states that if Collins “terminate[s] [her] employment with [Sequoia] without good reason … at any point prior [sic] the end of the Retention Period” (defined elsewhere as being “at least three years” from the date of the agreement), “[Collins] must repay the Bonus to [Sequoia] … .” (Italics added.)
Sequoia alleges Collins “submitted her resignation stating her last day would by [sic] January 24, 2025”—prior to the end of the three-year “Retention Period”—and she “refused to repay the $90,000 retention bonus.”
It is not disputed that Collins gave a resignation notice indicating that her last day with Sequoia would be January 24, 2025. Materially in dispute is whether Collins had a “good reason” for quitting.
Collins moves for summary judgment on the grounds (a) that “the parties have a valid agreement which allows either party to terminate”; and (b) that she terminated her employment with Sequoia for a “good reason” and, pursuant to the RBA, “is not obligated to repay the bonus payment.”
The RBA
Recitals set forth in the RBA state that Sequoia recruits medical professionals to provide services to Sequoia’s patients; that Collins was a valuable employee, recruited for permanent employment with Sequoia, and she accepted the position offered (nurse practitioner); that, for various reasons, Sequoia desired “to retain [Collins] for a period of at least three years from the date of [the] Agreement (‘Retention Period’)”; and that Sequoia entered the RBA “to provide additional consideration, in addition to the consideration provided for in the Employment Agreement, to incentivize [Collins] to remain employed by the Company through the Retention Period (‘Bonus’).”
The RBA provides that, in addition to regular pay and benefits, Sequoia agreed to pay Collins (as it did) a $90,000 bonus, subject to terms contained in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the agreement, which include, as material here, the following provisions:
Paragraph 3 – As noted above, paragraph 3 provides in pertinent part that if Collins “terminate[s] [her] employment with [Sequoia] without good reason … at any point prior [sic] the end of the Retention Period [Collins] must repay the Bonus to [Sequoia] … .” (Italics added.)
Paragraph 4 – Consistent with paragraph 3, paragraph 4 provides in pertinent part that Collins would “not be required to repay the bonus,” “[i]f [she] is subject to an involuntary termination,” which “would include … (iii) [e]mployment is terminated by … [Collins] for a good reason.” (Italics added.)
The RBA makes clear, stating it twice in two different places, that the repayment obligation described in the agreement—triggered, as pertinent here, if Collins terminated her employment prior to the end of the “Retention Period” “without a good reason”—“is a full recourse obligation owed by [Collins],” for which she would be “personally liable.”
Lastly of note, the RBA states that it “shall not constitute an employment agreement and in no way alters the ‘at will’ nature of [Collins’s] employment but rather is intended only to apply to [Collins’s] eligibility for a Bonus hereunder and the amount of any such Bonus.”
1. Discussion
A. First Ground – Collins’s “At-Will” Employment with Sequoia
Collins’s first ground asserted in support of summary judgement is stated this way: “It is undisputed that COLLINS terminated the employment relationship. However, as COLLINS’ employment was at-will, she could terminate her employment. As terminating the employment relationship is equivalent to not working the entire retention period, Plaintiff has not, and based upon the allegations of the Complaint, cannot state a claim for breach of contract.”
Collins here pretends she is being sued for breach of the RBA solely for terminating her employment prior to the end of the “Retention Period,” and not for terminating employment prior to the end of the “Retention Period” and not repaying the retention bonus.
It is obvious from the allegations in the complaint, and affirmed by the parties’ respective submissions on this motion, that it is Collins’s alleged termination of employment without “good reason,” coupled with her retention of the bonus, that has given rise to Sequoia’s breach suit.
Collins, ultimately though, clearly understands what this suit is about and she, indeed, asserts, as her second and only meaningful ground for summary judgment, that she terminated her employment with Sequoia for a “good reason.” The court next turns to this ground.
B. Second Ground – Whether Collins had a “Good Reason” to terminate her employment
Collins asserts she terminated her position at Sequoia to assist her mother in the care of her father and grandmother. Sequoia does not dispute the submitted fact that “COLLINS made it very clear that her decision to resign was solely to help her family in their time of need,” but it disputes, by way of myriad cursorily stated evidentiary objections, much of Collins’s factual account of the circumstances under which Collins felt she needed to leave Sequoia to help her family.
The parties’ arguments, though, chiefly center on whether Collins’s stated reason for terminating her employment with Sequoia was a “good reason.” And, because Collins’s factual assertions surrounding her asserted need to leave Sequoia, and the evidentiary objections to those assertions, are only material if Collins’s stated reason for leaving Sequoia necessarily constituted a “good reason” for termination of her employment within the meaning of the RBA, the court first turns to whether Collins’s stated reason for leaving Sequoia, as framed by the parties’ respective briefs, necessarily constituted a “good reason” under the RBA.
The RBA, unfortunately, does not define “good reason.” Sequoia will confront this problem as the plaintiff at trial, but at the summary judgment stage, as the moving party, it is Collins’s obligation to explain to the court how the law requires the court to construe the term “good reason” in these circumstances, and, further, to persuade the court that application of the cited law necessitates a determination, as a matter of law, that Collins’s stated reason for leaving Sequoia constituted a “good reason.” This is because, as the moving party, Collins “bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that [s]he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law … because of the general principle that a party who seeks a court's action in [her] favor bears the burden of persuasion thereon.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493], citing Evid. Code, § 500.)
Collins, however, does not discuss how the law requires the court to construe the term “good reason” in the absence of express contractual definition.
Instead, Collins submits, first, that “[b]oth [sic] Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the California Family Rights Act (CFRA) consider the need to care for a parent as a good reason to leave work.”
Apparently, Collins reasons that if she would have been permitted under the FMLA or CFRA to “leave work” to help with her family’s medical needs, then her decision to terminate her employment with Sequoia to help her family necessarily constituted a “good reason” for termination of her employment within the meaning of the RBA.
This reasoning is not, however, persuasive.
First, nothing in the RBA suggests that it borrows from, or otherwise references, any part of the FMLA or the CFRA in defining the term “good reason.” The RBA as noted above, is silent on the meaning of “good reason.”
Second, the FMLA and CFRA do not address—at least not in any provisions identified by Collins (she identifies no specific provisions of the cited laws)—“good reason[s]” to terminate employment, and, more specifically, do not address the right of an employee to terminate her employment and to keep benefits conditioned upon the employee remaining employed with her employer for a longer period. The FMLA and CFRA simply provide certain employees with the ability to take protected family or medical leave in specified circumstances. (See Rogers v. County of Los Angeles (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 480, 487-488 [130 Cal.Rptr.3d 350] [discussing leave provisions under the FMLA and CFRA].)
Beyond referencing the FMLA and CFRA, Collins invites the court to make what would, in effect, be an independent value judgment regarding whether her reason for terminating her employment with Sequoia was a “good” one. She submits she worked for Sequoia for nearly four years “through COVID-19 without a bonus,” “had no intention of leaving Sequoia [],” “made [sic] Central Valley her home” where she “bought a house, started [her] family and made friends,” and that her “family’s medical needs rose above her plans”; summing it up by asserting: “She is a dutiful daughter who terminated a well-paid position, uprooted her home where she intended to raise her children, and moved across several states for the sole ‘good reason’ to help her mother care for her family.”
True as all this may be (and the court needn’t decide that here), the problem, amongst others, with this approach is that Collins fails to cite any authority supporting that this court can make the type of value judgement she implies is warranted in adjudicating her summary judgment motion. The court is not independently aware of authority permitting such a determination based on Collins’s showing.
Because Collins fails to show she is entitled to summary judgment, her motion is denied.
Other matters: Plaintiff’s discovery motions; OSC re: sanctions
The court issued orders to Collins to respond to Sequoia’s interrogatories regarding her employment at the hearing in this case on November 4, 2025. The remaining matters at issue in the discovery motions were continued to December 30, 2025, for Sequoia’s counsel to review supplemental responses and to allow time for potential resolution of the discovery disputes.
There is no tentative ruling at this time. The parties are directed to appear and report on the status of their efforts to resolve the discovery disputes and to report as to which, if any, discovery demands remain at issue. In the event discovery disputes remain, the court intends to set the matter for further hearing regarding the still pending issues in dispute.
The court, at the settlement conference on December 9, 2025, issued an order to show cause re: sanctions for Collins’s and her counsel’s failure to personally appear for the settlement conference (Collins’s counsel appeared via Zoom; Collins did not appear). There is no tentative ruling on the order to show cause. The parties are directed to appear, and court intends to determine this matter at the hearing.
If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.
Re: Delgado, Olga vs. Delgado, Guadalupe
Case No.: PCU321808
Date: December 30, 2025
Time: 8:30 A.M.
Dept. 19-The Honorable Glade F. Roper
Motion: Plaintiff’ Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted, Motion to Compel Initial Responses to Form Interrogatories and Special Interrogatories and for sanctions.
Tentative Ruling: To order Plaintiff to pay an additional $120 in filing fees; to deem the admissions admitted as to Nos. 1 through 13 admitted upon payment of the additional filing fees ; to compel initial responses to form interrogatories and special interrogatories no later than thirty (30) days from both the payment of the additional filing fee and service of this ruling on Defendant; to award sanctions in the amount of $175; sanctions are due no later than thirty (30) days from both the payment of the additional filing fee and service of this ruling on Defendant
Facts
In this matter, Plaintiff, on September 23, 2025, served Defendant, personally and at a time when Plaintiff had not yet substituted in counsel of record, requests for admissions, form interrogatories, and set one special interrogatories, set one.
On November 24, 2025, Defendant filed this single motion seeking an order deeming admissions admitted and to compel initial, verified responses, without objection to form interrogatories, set one special interrogatories, set one and request for production of documents set one.
The Court notes here that Exhibit A does not contain the requests for production of documents and Exhibit B, the proof of service of this discovery, does not indicate requests for production were served.
As such, the Court considers this motion to contain three motions as follows (1) motion to deem admissions admitted; (2) motion to compel initial responses to form interrogatories and (3) motion to compel initial responses to special interrogatories.
Responses were due no later than October 23, 2025. As of the date of the filing of this motion, no responses have been received by Plaintiff.
No opposition appears to have been filed.
Authority and Analysis
As an initial matter, the Court notes one motion fee has been submitted to this Court, but that three (3) total motions are made here. The Court will condition the order as to initial responses upon payment of the remaining filing fees of $120 total.
(1) - Requests for Admissions
Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. Here, Defendant has failed to serve a timely response and Plaintiff has moved for an order to deem the admission admitted.
Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion. The facts and allegations alleged in Requests for Admissions 1 through 13 of Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Admission shall be deemed admitted, upon payment of the remaining filing fees and service of this ruling on Defendant thereafter.
(2) and (3) - Interrogatories
Based on Defendant’s failure to respond to the first set of form and special interrogatories, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.290(a), that Defendant provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Plaintiff’s first set of form interrogatories and first set of special interrogatories, no later than thirty (30) days from both the payment of the additional filing fees and service of this ruling on Defendant
Sanctions
As Plaintiff is unrepresented, the Court cannot award fees as sanctions. However, the Court will award $180 in filing fees plus $80 in service costs, for a total of $260 against Defendant only.
If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.