Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, May 26, 2026, are:

Re:                 Sierra Range Construction vs. Lower Tule River Irrigation

Case No.:   VCU330462

Date:           May 26, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Petition for Relief from Claim Presentation Requirements

Tentative Ruling: The Court’s tentative ruling is to deny the petition, but to reserve its final ruling under Government Code section 946.6(e) based upon any evidence that may be presented at the hearing; Counsel may appear in any manner.

Facts

In this matter, Petitioner Sierra Range Construction seeks an order relieving Petitioner from the claim presentation requirements of Government Code section 945.4 as to two claims:

1) Improper termination of public works contract regarding fencing

2. Improper post-bid submission of bid security resulting in the awarding of the contract to another contractor

As to the first claim, Petitioner and Respondent entered into a contractual relationship on or about March 27, 2024 to install protective fencing.

On August 1, 2024, Respondent issued a letter terminating the contract. The letter did not allege default, identify any breach, invoke default termination procedures or reference approval by Respondent’s board.

Petitioner’s CEO states: “At the time [Petitioner’s] contract was terminated by [Respondent], [Petitioner] had no reason to believe [Respondent] was acting in bad faith. At that time [Petitioner] did not possess facts suggesting violations of bidding laws or a lack of Board authority in actions taken by [Respondent].” (Declaration of Jones Jr ¶7.)

As to the second claim, in August 2024, Respondent solicited bids for a replacement contractor as to the fencing project. Bids were due on or before 12:00 p.m. on September 23 27, 2024, and the bid opening was scheduled for October 1, 2024, at 1:00 p.m.

Petitioner was not the lowest bidder and the contract was awarded to B & J Consulting Inc.

However, on November 18, 2024, Petitioner, through counsel, submitted a Public Records Act request. On November 26, 2026, Respondent produced records responsive thereto. Petitioner argues these records reflect that the cashier’s check submitted by B & J as bid security was time stamped 3:56 pm. As such, Petitioner argues, the security was provided three days after the bid deadline and almost three hours after the bids were opened.

Petitioner’s CEO states further “At that time [after receipt of the documents responsive to the PRA request], I realized the contract between SRC and LTRID did not authorize termination absent default. I then reviewed LTRID's website and board minutes for July and August of 2024, and there appears no agenda items or reference to terminating the contract between LTRID and SRC. I then realized the Board did not take action or approve the termination of the contract between LTRID and SRC.” (Declaration of Jones, Jr. ¶16.)

On October 16, 2025, Petitioner, through counsel, sent a “demand for payment” which outlined these two claims, in addition to others.

Relevant here, on November 15, 2025, Respondent, through counsel, sent letters returning the two claims noted above “…because [they were] not presented within twelve months after the event or occurrence as required by law. See Sections 901 and 911.2 of the Government Code. Because the claim[s] [were] not presented within the time allowed by law, no action was taken on the claim[s].”

Further, the letters stated:

“Your only recourse at this time is to apply without delay to the Lower Tule River Irrigation District for leave to present a late claim. See Sections 911.4 to 912.2, inclusive, and Section 946. 6 of the Government Code. Under some circumstances, leave to present a late claim will be granted. See Section 911.6 of the Government Code.”

In response, on November 25, 2025, Petitioner presented an application for leave to present a late claim and attached claims for the two claims noted above. The application states “The claims for contract damages and violations of the Public Contract Code was presented with over a month's time left in the relevant claims period; one year. (GOV. Code § 911.2.)”

In opposition to the petition, Respondent argues that the claims at issue are subject to the one year requirement under section 911.2, that there is no late claim application process available to such claims and therefore, there is no relief from the denial of the late claim application.

Authority and Analysis

Under the Government Claims Act (the “Act”), a plaintiff bringing suit for monetary damages against a public entity or employees thereof must first present a claim to the public entity (“government claim”) which must be acted upon or deemed rejected by the public entity.  (Gov. Code § 945.4)

The time frame from the date of accrual in which to present a claim depends on the nature of the claim.

For recovery of monetary damages arising from death or injury to person or personal property, a claim must be submitted no later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action. (Gov. Code, § 911.2(a).)

However, “[a] claim relating to any other cause of action shall be presented as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 915) not later than one year after the accrual of the cause of action.”

Here, it is undisputed that both claims are related to “any other cause of action” and therefore must be submitted not later than one year after accrual.

This, however, presents an issue as to the utilization of the late claim application procedure under Government Code section 911.4 entitled “Application to present claim not timely filed” which states, in relevant part:

“(a) When a claim that is required by Section 911.2 to be presented not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action is not presented within that time, a written application may be made to the public entity for leave to present that claim.”

As such, the late claim application process has no effect here, where the claims are related to “any other cause of action” and allow a one year presentation period from the date of accrual. In other words, there is no late claim application process for claims that do not arise from death or injury to person or personal property.

This finding is consistent with the statutory scheme. If a claim for “any other cause of action” must be presented within one year of accrual and a late claim application must be presented no later than one year from accrual, the deadlines for presentation and late claim application overlap entirely.

Under Government Code section 946.6(a), this petition for relief can only be made “[i]f an application for leave to present a claim is denied or deemed to be denied pursuant to Section 911.6…”

Here, there is no late claim application available under section 911.6 and therefore no relief from the denial of the late claim application available.

Government Code section 946.6(e)

In ruling on a claim relief petition, the “court shall make an independent determination upon the petition. The determination shall be made upon the basis of the petition, any affidavits in support of or in opposition to the petition, and any additional evidence received at the hearing on the petition.” (Gov. Code § 946.6, subd. (e).) (emphasis added.) Where no testimony is received, the trial court may rule on the basis of the petition and any declarations. (Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Educ. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702, 708-709.)

Therefore, the Court is inclined to deny the petition, but must hold the hearing as to any additional evidence. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Jiroud, Shokouh vs. American Family Connect Property and Casualty Insurance Co.

Case No.:   VCU331451

Date:           May 26, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion to Compel Arbitration  

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion without prejudice.

Facts

Petitioner seeks an order compelling arbitration arising from an underinsured motorist claim for a motor vehicle crash.

In support, Petitioner states on or about January 4, 2023, Petitioner was involved vehicle collision. Petitioner was injured as a result of the collision. However, upon settlement of her third-party claim, Petitioner needed additional treatment, thereby necessitating a demand for underinsured motorist coverage. Petitioner made such a request to Respondent for benefits pursuant to her policy.

Respondent refused to afford coverage and refused to arbitrate the matter.

Petitioner attaches the policy as Exhibit A to the petition, noting that page 14 of the policy states, in pertinent part, “If we and an insured do not agree: whether that person is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of the uninsured motor vehicle under this coverage; or as to the amount of damages; then the matter shall be settled by arbitration…”

Petitioner proposes the four following arbitrators:

• Richard Stone, Ret.
• Leonard S. Levy, Esq.
• Darrel Forgey, Esq.
• Linda Marks, Ret.

On May 12, 2026, Petitioner filed a proof of service of these documents, indicating that personal service occurred on May 4, 2026. This service date, however, is less than 16 court days from this hearing date.

No opposition appears to have been filed.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 permits a party to file a petition to request that the Court order the parties to arbitrate a controversy.

Insurance Code section 11580.2 establishes certain rules governing uninsured and underinsured motor vehicle insurance policies. Subdivision (f) of section 11580.2 requires that "the determination as to whether the insured shall be legally entitled to recover damages ... shall be made by agreement between the insured and the insurer or, in the event of disagreement, by arbitration." The provisions of section 11580.2 are deemed to be a part of every uninsured motorist policy. (Quintano v. Mercury Casualty Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1049, 1053.)

Additionally, “Any demand or petition for arbitration shall contain a declaration, under penalty of perjury, stating whether (i) the insured has a workers' compensation claim; (ii) the claim has proceeded to findings and award or settlement on all issues reasonably contemplated to be determined in that claim; and (iii) if not, what reasons amounting to good cause are grounds for the arbitration to proceed immediately." (Ins. Code, § 11580.2, subd. (f).)

No such declaration has been submitted to the Court.

The Court notes the petition alleges “Petitioner attempted both formal and informal attempts to initiate arbitration with Respondent to no avail. Attempts included formal UIM demand letters mailed via Certified Mail to Respondent” (Petition ¶3.) However, no declaration in support thereof is provided. (See Ponte v. County of Calaveras (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 551, 556 [“the arguments of counsel in a motion are not a substitute for evidence...”).)

Further, Code of Civil Procedure section 1005 requires that motions be served no less than 16 court days prior to the hearing date. Here, service occurred May 4, 2026, which is less than 16 court days from today’s hearing date.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion, without prejudice.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Jimenez, Alejandro vs. Fresno County Private Security

Case No.:   VCU331954

Date:           May 26, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:      Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To grant the unopposed motion. The court sets a Case Management Conferenced to review the status of the arbitration on December 18, 2026, at 8:30 AM in Dept. 2.

Background Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendant Fresno Couty Private Security for disability discrimination, failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in the interactive process, retaliation, wrongful termination, failure to provide meal and res periods, failure to reimburse for business expenses and failure to produce personnel records.

Defendant seeks to compel arbitration of these claims.

Facts – Agreement to Arbitrate

In support, Defendant provides the declaration of its director of operations who states personal knowledge as to Plaintiff’s hiring on November 17, 2024, and signature as to various intake documents and forms required for employment with Defendant. (Declaration of Rogers ¶¶1-3.) Defendant requires all new employees to sign an Arbitration Agreement as a condition of their employment. (Declaration Rogers ¶4.)

Defendant indicates Plaintiff electronically signed the Arbitration Agreement on the date of hiring. (Declaration of Rogers ¶4 – Ex. A.)

No opposition has been filed.

Authority and Analysis – Agreement to Arbitrate

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2(a), (b).) (emphasis added.) The motion to compel arbitration requires the facts are to be proven by affidavit or declaration and documentary evidence with oral testimony taken only in the court’s discretion. (Code Civ. Proc., §1290.2; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413–414.) The motion must set forth the provisions of the written agreement and the arbitration clause verbatim, or such provisions must be attached and incorporated by reference. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330; see Condee v. Longwood Mgmt. Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218.)

Absent a challenge by the nonmoving party, this burden is met by simply providing a copy of the arbitration agreement.  (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2017) 13 Cal. App. 5th 1152, 1160; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.)  “For purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 218; Sprunk v. Prisma LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 785, 793.)  

However, when the opposing party disputes the agreement, then the opposing party must provide evidence to challenge its authenticity.  (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) 

Under California law, "[t]he burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence …." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 164-165.)

"However, the burden of production may shift in a three-step process." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at. 165.)

"First, the moving party bears the burden of producing 'prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.' [Citation.]" (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) "The moving party 'can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party's] signature.' [Citation.]" (Id.) "For this step, 'it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.' [Citation.]” (Id.)

Here, Defendant has provided the Agreement it submits was signed by Plaintiff when Plaintiff started employment and has met the initial burden.

Therefore, in the absence of an opposition, the Court finds an agreement to arbitrate.

Facts – Scope of Agreement

The Agreement states:

“Any dispute, controversy or claim arising from or regarding [Plaintiff’s] employment with Fresno County Private Security ("FRESNO COUNTY PRIVATE SECURITY"), shall be submitted to and settled by binding arbitration, at the request of either party, in accordance with the Employment Dispute Resolution Procedures of the American Arbitration Association or other similar organization. The claims covered by this agreement include, but are not limited to, claims for wages and other compensation, claims for breach of contract (express or implied), tort claims, claims for discrimination (including but not limited to, race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, national origin, age, marital status, medical condition, and disability), harassment (including, but not limited to, race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, national origin, age, marital status, medical condition, and disability), and claims for any violation of any federal, state or other government law, statute, regulation, or ordinance, except for claims for workers' compensation or unemployment insurance benefits. Nothing contained in this Agreement shall prohibit any current or former employee from filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and/or the Department of Fair Employment and Housing and cooperating in the investigation of such charge.”

Authority and Analysis – Scope of Agreement

As noted above, Plaintiff sues for a number of theories involving disability discrimination, wrongful termination and retaliation arising out of Plaintiff’s employment with Defendants. As such, the Court finds these claims within the scope of the Agreement.

The Court, having found an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists and that the claims in this matter are within the scope of the Agreement, grants the unopposed motion and compels arbitration in this matter. The court sets a Case Management Conferenced to review the status of the arbitration on December 18, 2026, at 8:30 AM in Dept. 2.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Estes, Jeremy Lee vs. Cheema Transport, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU289306

Date:           May 26, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Hearing re: Final Compliance

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with the final compliance hearing. The Court requires a declaration from the settlement administrator as to distribution of the settlement fund. Therefore, the Court continues this motion to June 30, 2026, 8:30 am., Dept. 2. The court also sets an Order to Show cause for potential dismissal of the case and/or potential monetary sanctions to be paid by plaintiff’s counsel in the amount of $500 for June 30, 2026, 8:30 am., Dept. 2.

This case has been pending since November 2, 2021, making it one of the older cases on the court’s docket. It was eventually settled and the court granted preliminary approval on December 31, 2024. The court set a final approval hearing for June 24, 2025, now almost a year ago. No documents were filed and the court continued the hearing to March 24, 2026. Again, no documents were filed, and the matter was continued util May 26, 2026. Again, nothing has been filed.

The court won’t speculate about the repeated failures to timely file the final approval documents, but counsel needs to be aware the court’s patience is not infinite. Absent timely filing of the required documents the case could be dismissed and monetary sanction levied.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Fonseca, David vs. Chimienti & Associates

Case No.:   VCU315048

Date:           May 26, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Continued Motion for Preliminary Approval

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to set the motion for final approval for January 12, 2027, 8:30 am, Dept. 2.

Background

The Court previously continued this matter and ordered a supplemental declaration as to the lodestar, the presently incurred costs of counsel and the administrative costs.

On May 19, 2026, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a supplemental declaration addressing these issues as follows.

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees and costs no greater than of 33.3% of the gross settlement fund of $650,000 or $216,666.67 are sought in this matter.

Counsel has utilized the percentage of common fund methodology as well as provided adequate lodestar information to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee request.

However, the Court notes that the stated rates are already higher than what is typically “…prevailing in the community for similar work.”  (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) The Court, therefore, adjusts the hourly rates as follows:

Kopelowitz Ostrow, P.A.:

Name	Stated Hourly Rate	Approved Hourly Rate	Hours	Adjusted Total
Jeff Ostrow	$1,100	$900	18.5	$16,650
Kenneth J. Grunfeld	$1,025	$850	0.2	$170
Kristen L. Cardoso	$950	$800	52.4	$41,920
Courtney E. Maccarone	$900	$750	8.9	$6,675
Steven P. Sukert	$815	$675	.2	$135
Andrew W. Haussdorf	$250	$150	2.8	$420
Allyson Stuart	$250	$150	1	$150
Adjusted Base Lodestar - Kopelowitz Ostrow, P.A.: $66,120

Siri & Glimstad, LLP:

Name	Stated Hourly Rate	Approved Hourly Rate	Hours	Adjusted Total
Tyler Bean	$905	$750	20.2	$15,150
Catherine Ybarra	$1,020	$850	15.8	$13,430
Neil Williams	$625	$500	40	$20,000
Kennedy Brian	$625	$500	9.7	$4,850
Alcira Pena	$325	$250	5.1	$1,275
Delilah Estefano	$280	$150	60.2	$9,030
Cherie Cornfield	$280	$150	17.8	$2,670
Adjusted Base Lodestar - Siri & Glimstad, LLP:  $66,405

Ellzey Kherkher Sanford Montgomery, LLP:

Name	Stated Hourly Rate	Approved Hourly Rate	Hours	Adjusted Total
Leigh S. Montgomery	$950	$800	32.9	$26,320
Josh Sanford	$1,000	$850	10.6	$9,010
Natischa Volpe	$650	$500	11.9	$5,950
Alice Newlin	$260	$150	2.3	$345
Raya Jacob	$225	$150	5.7	$855
Katheryn Orms	$225	$150	.3	$45
Adjusted Base Lodestar - Ellzey Kherkher Sanford Montgomery, LLP: $42,525

Strauss Borrelli, PLLC

Name	Stated Hourly Rate	Approved Hourly Rate	Hours	Adjusted Total
Raina Borrelli	$800	$675	2.1	$1,418
Samuel Strauss	$800	$675	13.6	$9,180
Cassandra Miller	$725	$600	23.8	$14,280
Alex Phillips	$675	$500	4.2	$2,100
Stephen Pigozzi	$600	$475	3.3	$1,568
Andrew Gunem	$550	$425	6	$2,550
John Erickson	$150	$150	0.6	$90
Adjusted Base Lodestar - Strauss Borrelli, PLLC:  $31,185

Therefore, the total adjusted base lodestar is $206,235. To award the $216,666.67 in attorneys’ fees as requested, the Court would need to apply a multiplier of .05. The Court permits a maximum lodestar multiple of 1.5 in these cases. Therefore, the fees, as requested, are approved.

As to costs, counsel indicates the firms have incurred the following costs:

Firm	Incurred Costs
Kopelowitz Ostrow, P.A.	$12,458.46
Siri & Glimstad, LLP:	$2,413.40
Ellzey Kherkher Sanford Montgomery, LLP:	$3,015.87
Strauss Borrelli, PLLC	$3,216.70
Total:	$21,204.43

Therefore, the Court preliminarily approves attorney costs not to exceed $25,000.

Claims Administrator

The Court previously preliminary approved Simpluris, Inc. as the administrator for this class action. The supplemental declaration indicates administration costs of $59,722.00. The Court approves this cost.

Summary

Therefore, the Court grants the motion for preliminary approval. Plaintiffs’ deductions from the gross settlement of $650,000 are approved as follows:

Preliminarily Approved Attorney Fees (33.3%):	$216,666.67
Preliminarily Approved Attorney Costs (up to):	$25,000.00
Preliminarily Approved Payment to Plaintiff Fonseca:	$2,500.00
Preliminarily Approved Payment to Plaintiff Kim:	$2,500.00
Preliminarily Approved Payment to Plaintiff Simplicio:	$2,500.00
Preliminarily Approved Payment to Plaintiff Marshall:	$2,500.00
Preliminarily Approved Payment to Plaintiff Prendez:	$2,500.00
Preliminarily Approved Settlement Administrator Costs	$59,722.00
Preliminarily Approved Net Settlement Amount	$336,111.33

The Court sets the motion for final approval for January 12, 2027, 8:30 am, Dept. 2.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Ratliff, Melaina M. vs. Hyundai Motor America, a California corporation

Case No.:   VCU328191

Date:           May 26, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion to Compel Arbitration 

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and delegate issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator. The court sets a Case Management Conferenced to review the status of the arbitration on December 18, 2026, at 8:30 AM in Dept. 2.

Background Facts

In this Song Beverly Act case, Defendant seeks to compel arbitration of claims for (1) “Violation of Subdivision (d) of Civil Code Section 1793.2”; (2) “Violation of Subdivision (b) of Civil Code Section 1793.2”; (3) “Violation of Subdivision (a)(3) of Civil Code Section 1793.2”; and (4) “Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability.

Facts – Agreement to Arbitrate and Delegation Clause

Defendant notes that the vehicle at issue was accompanied by a warranty provided by Hyundai, located in the Owner’s Handbook & Warranty Information (“Warranty”), which included a binding arbitration provision. Defendant’s counsel provides a copy of the warranty in support of the motion.

Plaintiff objects to the presentation of the warranty as lacking authentication via the declaration of counsel. Plaintiff further argues that the existence of the arbitration term within the warranty does not constitute an enforceable contract.

Neither party appears to discuss the presence of the delegation clause.

The Warranty contains the following provision:

BINDING ARBITRATION FOR CALIFORNIA VEHICLES ONLY:

PLEASE READ THIS SECTION IN ITS ENTIRETY AS IT AFFECTS YOUR RIGHTS THIS SECTION DOES NOT PRECLUDE YOU FROM FIRST PURSUING ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION THROUGH BBB AUTO LINE AS DESCRIBED IN THE “ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION” PROVISION IN SECTION 3 OF THIS HANDBOOK.

If you purchased or leased your Hyundai vehicle in the State of California, you and we, Hyundai Motor America, each agree that any claim or disputes between us (including between you and any of our affiliated companies) related to or arising out of your vehicle purchase, advertising for the vehicle, use of your vehicle, the performance of the vehicle, any service relating to the vehicle, the vehicle warranty, representations in the warranty, or the duties contemplated under the warranty, including without limitation claims related to false or misleading advertising, unfair competition, breach of contract or warranty, the failure to conform a vehicle to warranty, failure to repurchase or replace your vehicle, or claims for a refund or partial refund of your vehicle's purchase price (excluding personal injury claims), but excluding claims brought under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, shall be resolved by binding arbitration at either your or our election, even if the claim is initially filed in a court of law. If either you or we elect to resolve our dispute via arbitration (as opposed to in a court of law), such binding arbitration shall be administered by and through the American Arbitration Association (AAA) under its Consumer Arbitration Rules.

…

This agreement to arbitrate is intended to be broadly interpreted and to make all disputes and claims between us (including our affiliated companies) relating to or arising out of your vehicle purchase, use or performance of your vehicle, or the vehicle warranty subject to arbitration to the maximum extent permitted by law. The arbitrator (and not a court) shall decide all issues of interpretation, scope, and application of this agreement.

In any arbitration, the arbitrator shall be bound by the terms of this agreement and shall follow the applicable law. The arbitrator shall not have the power to commit manifest errors of law, and any award rendered by the arbitrator that employs a manifest error of law may be vacated or corrected by a court of competent jurisdiction for such error…If arbitration is elected by either party, the parties collectively agree that they waive their right to a jury trial.

…

This agreement evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. Judgment upon any award in arbitration may be entered in any court having jurisdiction.

IF YOU PURCHASED OR LEASED YOUR VEHICLE IN CALIFORNIA, YOUR WARRANTY IS MADE SUBJECT TO THE TERMS OF THIS BINDING ARBITRATION PROVISION. BY USING THE VEHICLE, OR REQUESTING OR ACCEPTING BENEFITS UNDER THIS WARRANTY, INCLUDING HAVING ANY REPAIRS PERFORMED UNDER WARRANTY, YOU AGREE TO BE BOUND BY THESE TERMS. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE WITH THESE TERMS, PLEASE CONTACT US AT OPT-OUT@HMAUSA.COM WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF YOUR PURCHASE OR LEASE TO OPT-OUT OF THIS ARBITRATION PROVISION. (emphasis added.)

Authority and Analysis - Delegation Clause

Malone v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1551 summarizes the applicable analysis with respect to delegation clauses:

“A delegation clause requires issues of interpretation and enforceability of an arbitration agreement to be resolved by the arbitrator. Delegation clauses have the potential to create problems of circularity. For example, suppose an arbitration agreement delegates the issue of enforceability to the arbitrator. If the arbitrator concludes that the arbitration agreement is, in fact, not enforceable, this would mean that the entire agreement, including the delegation clause, is unenforceable-a finding that would undermine the arbitrator's jurisdiction to make that finding in the first place. For this reason, courts have treated the delegation clause as a separate agreement to arbitrate solely the issues of enforceability…

“For this reason, when a party is claiming that an arbitration agreement is unenforceable, it is important to determine whether the party is making a specific challenge to the enforceability of the delegation clause or is simply arguing that the agreement as a whole is unenforceable. If the party's challenge is directed to the agreement as a whole--even if it applies equally to the delegation clause--the delegation clause is severed out and enforced; thus, the arbitrator, not the court, will determine whether the agreement is enforceable. In contrast, if the party is making a specific challenge to the delegation clause, the court must determine whether the delegation clause itself may be enforced (and can only delegate the general issue of enforceability to the arbitrator if it first determines the delegation clause is enforceable). (Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 70)”

Here, the delegation clause clearly and unmistakably, with consistent and unambiguous reservation of all issues, delegates the authority as to an agreement to enforce, including defenses to enforcement, to the arbitrator by stating:       

“The arbitrator (and not a court) shall decide all issues of interpretation, scope, and application of this agreement.”

Challenge to Agreement in its Entirety as Unenforceable

Here, Plaintiff has challenged the agreement noted above as unenforceable in its entirety.

The Court, therefore, interprets this challenge, under Rent-A-Center and Malone, above, a challenge “…directed to the agreement as a whole--even if it applies equally to the delegation clause--the delegation clause is severed out and enforced; thus, the arbitrator, not the court, will determine whether the agreement is enforceable.”

Therefore, the Court will sever out the delegation clause and enforce it.

As such, the Court grants the motion and compels issues of interpretation, applicability, enforceability, and formation to the arbitrator pursuant to warranty information noted above.

The Court further stays this matter pending the arbitrator’s rulings on these issues. The court sets a Case Management Conferenced to review the status of the arbitration on December 18, 2026, at 8:30 AM in Dept. 2.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 RENFRO, MARGIE M vs. PRIME TOWING & TRANSPORT, INC, et al

Case No.:   PCU317211

Date:           May 26, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:     Motion to Compel Discovery

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. The Court, therefore, takes the hearing off calendar.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Romero, Luis Fernando vs. Young's, Inc et al

Case No.:   PCU324051

Date:            May 26, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:      Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts

In this class action matter, Plaintiff alleges a number of Labor Code and Business and Professions Code violations.

On April 29, 2026, Defendant filed this motion for protective order seeking discovery sequencing.

On September 12, 2025, Plaintiff served, via email, the first set of Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents.

Defendant notes on September 18, 2025, Defendant served discovery in this case, including a notice of deposition of Plaintiff.

Plaintiff served an Objection to Defendant’s initial deposition notice.

The parties then appear to have engaged in meet and confer discussions related to a Belaire-West notice process.

Defendant’s counsel states that “Plaintiff only worked for Defendant at single location, in a single position, for a short amount of time. As such, Defendant needs to take Plaintiff’s deposition to confirm his sworn testimony as it pertains his purported work experience, and then Defendant can reasonably meet and confer with Plaintiff’s counsel on a proper scope for any proposed Belaire-West notice.”

Defendant states that Plaintiff has not been deposed, despite two deposition notices. However, the Court notes no pending motion to compel the deposition of Plaintiff.

Defendant seeks to sequence discovery through compelling Plaintiff’s deposition prior to engaging in further discovery, issuance of a Belaire-West notice, and for a protective order regarding the compelling of further responses.

The protective order request, however, appears moot at this time, as the Court ruled on motions to compel further responses to this discovery on May 7, 2026 and ordered that further responses be provided.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the Court’s prior ruling has indicated that sequencing of discovery, under these facts, is not appropriate and that, as to the instant motion, Defendant has not demonstrated good cause as to sequencing discovery.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure § 2019.020, entitled "Sequence and Timing of Discovery," provides as follows:

(a) Except as otherwise provided by a rule of the Judicial Council, a local court rule, or a local uniform written policy, the methods of discovery may be used in any sequence, and the fact that a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or another method, shall not operate to delay the discovery of any other party.

(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), on motion and for good cause shown, the court may establish the sequence and timing of discovery for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice.

As to good cause, Defendant states:

“…it is Plaintiff that must establish that, as a class representative, his claims are typical of the class. This is also Plaintiff’s burden to prove – not Defendant’s burden. (See Sav–On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 326.) Further, Plaintiff cannot act as a class representative for purported violations he did not suffer himself. (Stephens v. Montgomery Ward (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 411, 422, quoting East Tex. Motor Freight Sys. v. Rodriguez (1977) 431 U.S. 395, 403[“[A] class representative ‘must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.”]). These are additional reasons Defendant needs to depose Plaintiff, to obtain Plaintiff’s sworn testimony as to his own employment experience to determine the level of veracity of his (unverified) civil complaint and a reasonable Belaire-West Notice scope.”

However, the scope of discovery is broad and is construed liberally in favor of disclosure. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010; Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541.) There is "no obligation on a party propounding interrogatories to establish good cause or prove up the merits of any underlying claims." (Id. at. 550.)

Further, class-wide discovery is allowed prior to certification: "Each party ... must have an opportunity to conduct discovery on class action issues before filing documents to support or oppose a class action certification motion ... so the trial court can realistically determine if common questions are sufficiently pervasive to permit adjudication in a class action." (Stern v. Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 223, 232-233.)

The court in Carabini v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 239, 244 noted, “Due process requires an order with such significant impact on the viability of a case not be made without a full opportunity to brief the issues and present evidence…In addition, each party should have an opportunity to conduct discovery on class action issues before its documents in support of or in opposition to the motion must be filed.” (See also Bartold v. Glendale Fed. Bank (2000) 81 Cal. App. 4th 816, 836 [plaintiffs are entitled to discovery necessary to support a motion for class certification].)

“Standing is typically treated as a threshold issue, in that without it no justiciable controversy exists. ‘As a general principle, standing to invoke the judicial process requires an actual justiciable controversy as to which the complainant has a real interest in the ultimate adjudication because he or she has either suffered or is about to suffer an injury … .’ (Shapell Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1111.) Paragraph 15 of the complaint alleges, sufficiently, “Plaintiff and the Class received non-discretionary bonuses, shift differentials, and other remuneration. However, Defendants failed to incorporate all remuneration when calculating the correct overtime rate of pay, break premium rate of pay, and sick day rate of pay, leading to underpayment.” (Complaint ¶15.) The alleged class is “hourly, non-exempt employee at any time during the period beginning four years before the filing of the initial complaint in this action…”

Moreover, the Court reasonably interprets this allegation that Plaintiff claims eligibility for a bonus. Therefore, even if no bonus was paid to Plaintiff, and as Defendant states Plaintiff was never entitled to a bonus, some discovery as to whether Plaintiff should have received a bonus appears proper. The Court does not appear faced with a situation where Plaintiff, for example, was never an employee of Defendant or was exempt.

As such, the Court does not find good cause to sequence discovery in this matter.

As to the compelling of Plaintiff’s deposition, the Court notes, as it did above, no motion to compel is pending. Further, Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450 states:

“(a) If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.”

“(b)(2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the documents, electronically stored information, or things described in the deposition notice, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance.” (emphasis added)

However, a motion to compel a deposition must be accompanied "by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance." (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450, subd. (b)(2).) No traditional meet and confer was required by law. As Rutter notes,  "No 'meet and confer' is required where the deponent 'fails to attend the deposition ....' In such cases, all that is required is a declaration by the moving party that he or she has contacted the deponent 'to inquire about the nonappearance.'" (Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial [The Rutter Group 2023], ¶ 8:813 [quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b)(2)].)

No motion to compel here lies where the deponent or counsel merely states they will not attend the deposition and where no notice of nonappearance is placed on the record via transcript or declaration.

Serving an objection based on unavailability or unilateral setting does not impose a stay on a notice of deposition and is not a substitute for a protective order. (Snyder v. Superior Court (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 579, 586 [applying former Code Civ. Proc. § 2021]; Carl v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 73,76.)

Here, no deposition and nonappearance took place based on the record before the Court. Therefore there is presently no basis to compel the deposition of the Plaintiff based on Defendant’s failure to attend the properly noticed deposition, record the nonappearance of Plaintiff and move to compel Plaintiff’s deposition.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared Wednesday, May 27, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054044	In the Matter of Chavez, Olga	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	Waiver of Bond not filed by all heirs: missing petitioner’s, Prob C § 8481(a)(2). Proof of Publication not filed at the time of this review
VPR054043	In the Matter of Gomez, Pascual Jimenez	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Recommended for Approval
VPR054034	In the Matter of the Mirizzi Family Revocable Trust D/T/D May 28, 1991	Petition to Confirm Trust Assets	Recommended for Approval
VPR054026	In the Matter of Emma B. Lowe Trust, established January 17, 2024	Petition to Terminate Trust	Recommended for Approval
VPR045490	In the Matter of Justin Fry Special Needs Trust	Accounting Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR038601-99	In the Matter of Fry, Justin	Accounting Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR051985	In the Matter of Johanna Bangma Marital Trust, dated April 11, 2018	Accounting Hearing	Appearance Required	Proposed order to be submitted for review
VPR053627	In the Matter of Acosta, Ofelia Guzman	Final Distribution Hearing	Recommended for Approval
VPR050196	In the Matter of Tarbell, John Lee	Final Distribution Hearing	Recommended for Approval
VPR053099	In the Matter of Sundaresan, K.R.	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Schedule of receipts not attached to Petition: When accounting is waived and the amount other than the amount of the Inventory and Appraisal is used as a basis for calculating statutory fees, detailed schedules of receipts and gains or losses on sale are required in report pursuant to CRC, rule 7.550(b)(6)
VPR051715	In the Matter of Duran, Josefina L	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing not served on all heirs, Prob C § 11601

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared Thursday, May 21, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR054038	In the Matter of Turnbough, Jerrilee Ann	Letters of Administration	Recommended for Approval
PPR054033	In the Matter of Frazier, Joan	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	Petition Incomplete: Caption not selected – Authorization to Administer under the IAEA (full authority requested). Item 6(b) – No selection made, but issues of deceased parents are listed in 8. Item 8 – Age of siblings, and need notion if there is no issue of deceased siblings.
PPR053952	In the Matter of Havekost, Kathleen Louise	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	Supplemental Statement of Birth Date and DL Number incomplete, TCSC LR, rule 1000(c)(4). Proof of Publication not filed.
PPR054049	In the Matter of Akin, Samie Jane	Petition Hearing	Appearance Required	Incomplete/untimely notice: A 30-day notice of hearing is required pursuant Probate Code §851(a)